Yan Yan: Critique and Transcendence of Justice
In recent years, the academic community has engaged in heated discussions regarding the concept of justice, distributive justice, and the relationship between justice (equality) and freedom. This debate also involves critical topics such as "whether justice exists in capitalist society" and "whether communist society transcends justice." It is generally believed that communist society is a brand-new social type fundamentally heterogeneous to capitalist society, and that the two societies can never share the same principles of justice—or, more extremely, that communist society should transcend justice. The problem, however, lies in the fact that as the first stage of communism, socialist society follows the principle of "distribution according to work" [1]. Particularly for China at present, capital remains an important factor of production in the socialist market economy. Regulating and guiding the healthy development of capital is both a major economic issue and a major political issue. To promote the healthy and sustainable development of the market economy, we must establish a social environment of fairness and justice. This requires us to construct a Marxist theory of justice that "possesses the dual function of critiquing the logic of capital and providing norms for market institutions," while responding to the distortions and misreadings of Marx’s theory of justice by Western scholars.
Agnes Heller, a theorist of Eastern European Neo-Marxism [2], has provided new interpretations in works such as Beyond Justice and "The Concept of Justice in Marx" regarding "distributive justice in capitalist society," the "internal contradictions in Marx's principle of distribution according to need," and "whether communist society can transcend justice." Her work contains both distortions of Marx’s theory of justice and beneficial intellectual resources that can be utilized. Given that Heller’s views on justice are somewhat representative within Western academia, clarifying what is true and what is false, and revealing their essence and causes, will help in understanding and constructing a Marxist theory of justice that accords with China's national conditions.
I. Does Distributive Justice Exist in Capitalist Society?
The Marxist historical materialism emphasizes that the mode of production determines the mode of distribution; the injustice of the capitalist mode of production determines the injustice of its mode of distribution. In Marx’s view, even if capitalist society could equally distribute wages and increase workers' incomes, it would still be unjust in its distribution because the mode of production is unfair. Marx does not emphasize that production determines distribution in a narrow sense, but rather emphasizes at a higher, more abstract level that the socioeconomic structure (relations of production) determines the legal-juridical relations (relations of distribution). That is, he holds that "right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development conditioned thereby." Based on this, Marx believes that talking about distributive justice under the capitalist mode of production is misleading; any discourse regarding the equality of income or wages is bourgeois ideology. It must be pointed out that Marx is not merely emphasizing that the bourgeoisie uses false consciousness to cover up facts and truth, but rather telling people that the injustice of the capitalist mode of production determines the impossibility of distributive justice.
Heller’s analysis of Marx’s theory of justice starts from a specific genealogy of the concept of justice. Based on a formal concept of justice, she argues that since the rules of the commodity economy in capitalist society apply to everyone, this indicates that capitalist society has achieved distributive justice. In fact, Marx does not deny "formal justice" in Heller’s sense; what he questions is that market rules, under the influence of an unfair mode of production, necessarily tend toward injustice. This can be seen from his critique of Adam Smith. Smith realized that selfish individuals would come into conflict with society and others over interests, but he firmly believed that the market’s self-regulating mechanism could coordinate many different private interests to achieve the universal interest, finally reaching market equilibrium and social integration. Society is always "led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention... By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends to promote it." Marx acknowledges that market rules are an "invisible hand" and have the same force for every member of society, but he denies that market rules can automatically realize a good state for society. He opposes the de-historicized view of this alienated force that stands above man as the eternal natural state of humanity. Regarding market economic relations, Marx remarked not without irony:
"To use the words of an English economist, these relations are like the fate of antiquity which hovered over the world and with an invisible hand distributed happiness and calamity among men, creating kingdoms and destroying them, making nations rise and fall; but with the abolition of the basis, private property, with the communistic regulation of production and its concomitant—the abolition of the alien relation between men and what they themselves produce—the power of the relation of supply and demand is dissolved into nothing, and men get exchange, production, the mode of their mutual relation, under their own control again."
In Marx’s eyes, justice in capitalist society possesses only a formalized appearance while lacking substantive content. Although the norms and rules of justice apply to every member of society in a legal-juridical sense, they are not worthy of people's expectations. It is not difficult to see that the disagreement between Heller and Marx lies in whether distributive justice exists in capitalist society. Starting from formal justice, Heller believes it exists; starting from the premise that the economic structure determines legal-juridical concepts, Marx denies it. The key to the problem lies in whether a society that conforms to formal justice is worthy of the title "distributive justice." In fact, Heller’s affirmation of distributive justice and Marx’s critique of justice in capitalist society are not irreconcilable. On one hand, Heller does not deny that production determines distribution; she simply believes that as long as distribution conforms to formal justice, it is just. On the other hand, Marx does not deny that capitalist distribution conforms to formal justice; he simply believes that this justice is a mere facade and is essentially unjust.
Heller’s emphasis on formal justice is mainly directed at the economic determinism of Soviet Orthodox Marxism. In her view, distribution is influenced by the dominant values (norms and rules) of society and is not unilaterally determined by production. In certain circumstances, "norms can provide a standard starkly different from the rules of production, especially the rules of commodity production." Furthermore, Heller believes that Orthodox Marxism, and even Marx’s own theory of justice, lacks an ethical foundation. This is prominently manifested in her claim that: "Social politics has increasingly lost its ethical basis; social-political inquiry has become primarily economic science, in which the 'invisible hand' reigns supreme." Because the productive forces were substituted for ethics and morality, "Marx designed his 'City of Man' without reference to the 'City of the Soul,' and in his theory, there is no space provided for the latter."
The above assertions are clearly unfair. On the surface, Heller seems to be opposing economic determinism, but in reality, she falls into the trap of economic determinism herself. Marx’s political economy is not the "national economy" (classical economics) of Smith and others, but a critique of national economy. Marx acknowledges that the "invisible hand" "reigns supreme" in capitalist society, but he emphasizes that the "invisible hand" is a product of a specific historical stage of human society. The future communist society will eliminate the rule of all alienated forces that stand above man; at that time, the "invisible hand" will be transformed into a "visible hand." Marx never denies the counter-reaction of ethical values on politics and the economy; the reason he places the decisive role of the economy in the first place and limits the role of ethical values is that he soberly realized that the basis of ethical values is the production of material life and the relations between people formed within that production. Once Heller’s excessive reliance on ethical and moral concepts encounters capital in reality, it is bound to suffer a total defeat—a point easily proven by historical experience.
II. Can Distribution According to Work Transcend Justice?
In the Critique of the Gotha Programme, Marx divides communist society into two stages: the first stage implements "distribution according to work," and the second stage implements "distribution according to need." Distribution according to work means that after the necessary social deductions, workers receive corresponding remuneration according to the amount of labor performed. This means that "the individual producer receives back from society—after the deductions have been made—exactly what he gives to it. What he has given to it is his individual quantum of labor." In Marx's view, the question is not whether a communist society should labor, but whether the quantum of labor is still regarded as the sole measure of value. Regarding this point, Marx is very clear: "The exchange of living labor for objectified labor—i.e., the positing of social labor in the form of the contradiction of capital and wage labor—is the ultimate development of the value-relation and of production resting on value. Its precondition is and remains that the mass of direct labor time, the quantity of labor expended, is the determinant factor of the production of wealth." That is to say, the future communist society should by no means use labor time as the measure of wealth, but should use disposable time as the standard: "To measure wealth by labor time is to show that wealth itself is based on poverty, and that disposable time exists in and through its opposition to surplus labor time."
According to Marx, in the first stage of communist society, "the same principle prevails as in the exchange of commodity-equivalents: a given amount of labor in one form is exchanged for an equal amount of labor in another form." However, this seemingly equal right is still a bourgeois right. The exchange of equivalents exists only on average and not in every individual case. Since equal right is still restricted within a bourgeois framework, this form of communism still bears the "birthmarks" of the old capitalist society from whose womb it emerges. Equal right is merely an unequal right, because it "recognizes no class differences" but tacitly recognizes "unequal individual endowment, and thus productive capacity, as a natural privilege." In essence, Marx believes that distribution according to work is not the most rational mode of distribution, yet he acknowledges it is the mode that must be adopted in the first stage of communism. Heller discovered that if necessary social deductions are unavoidable, a problem of the "prerogative of distribution" arises; once deductions become coercive, instances of unfairness appear. It is in this sense that Heller again emphasizes the importance of ethical justice. In her view, if deductions are seen as an equal obligation and a responsibility that every person must observe, then the injustice and unfairness brought about by coercive deductions can be avoided. Heller’s conclusion is that distribution according to work necessarily posits a standard of distributive justice; therefore, it fails to transcend justice.
Heller believes that the reason Marx considers equal right to be unequal right (justice to be injustice) is primarily in view of the differences between human individuals. To appeal to the same norms and rules for every member of a specific group is clearly unjust.
Communist society is not intended to make everyone wear clothes of the same color and style, speak the same words, or do the same things; simplified equality is precisely inequality. Marx's goal was the full realization of every individual's freedom and the comprehensive development of human talents and potential, which necessitates the implementation of "distribution according to need." If distribution according to labor has not escaped formal justice, then distribution according to need implies the transcendence of justice, because it distributes products based on the uniqueness of every individual, where no one has the right to obstruct the satisfaction of another’s needs. In a society of distribution according to need, the principles of justice will no longer apply: first, because specific norms and rules do not exist; second, because judgment, comparison, and ranking do not exist. In essence, the fact that no one has the right to interfere with the satisfaction of others' needs is a negation of the principles of justice and signifies the transcendence of justice.
We know that Marx once criticized the egalitarian view of justice, but Heller believes Marx's rejection of the principle of equality was too radical. In her view, the first stage of communism (distribution according to labor) should not ignore the rational value of the principle of equality. Logically speaking, justice and equality are closely linked; if distribution according to labor cannot be separated from the principle of justice, then it cannot be separated from the principle of equality either. Equality constitutes the standard of justice in two aspects: first, justice based on form, which emphasizes that the same norms and rules apply to every member of the same group; second, justice based on politics, which emphasizes that the value of equality directly constitutes the norms and rules of justice. Heller believes Marx rejected both types of equality—rejecting the second because it represents an egalitarian view of justice. In Marx’s view, egalitarianism is a broad form of envy and a negative negation of private property, rather than a positive sublation [3] in the full sense of communism.
Heller agrees with Marx’s critique of the egalitarian view of justice but believes the first type of equality should be retained. She even argues that Marx fell into a contradiction between factual and value judgments—namely, "recognizing the fact of justice inherent in market rules, but refusing to regard the principle of equality as a latent value." Confirming that distribution according to labor fails to transcend justice not only accords with the original intent of Marx's theory of justice but also offers certain insights for the current construction of socialism with Chinese characteristics. Today, China’s market-oriented transformation has reached an advanced stage of comprehensive reform. How to find a theory that confirms the justice of market institutions within the Marxist critique of capital and markets has become key to the discursive construction of Marxist political philosophy. How, then, can we both preserve the critical dimension of Marx’s view of justice and simultaneously confirm the justice of the socialist market economy? The key lies in having a consciousness of the "theory of stages" of social development, profoundly understanding Marx's expositions on the different stages of communist development, and approaching the issue of justice by proceeding from the primary stage of socialism, which is China’s greatest national reality. Some domestic scholars distinguish Marx’s political philosophy into "social justice" based on the premise of equal rights at the level of reality, and "freedom" with human self-actualization as its theme at the level of ideality. This indicates that Marx did not reject lower-order justice, even though achieving higher-order justice is the value-goal of communist society. Heller emphasizes that under the system of distribution according to labor, one must still follow the norms and rules of justice while maintaining a faith in the transcendence of justice; this is entirely consistent with Marx’s basic premises regarding justice.
III. Challenges to Marx’s Principle of Distribution According to Need
According to Marx’s view, distribution according to need is the distributive principle that should be followed in the second stage of communism. If distribution according to labor does not transcend justice, then distribution according to need does transcend justice. Heller fully agrees with the principle of distribution according to need, considering it a rational hypothesis with important significance and value; however, at the same time, she believes Marx’s interpretation of this principle contains two contradictions.
The first contradiction is the conflict between infinite needs and finite life. Understood literally, distribution according to need refers to satisfying all needs of all people. Marx believed that needs are social in nature and will continuously expand with the development of production; the emergence of new needs is a basic fact of human history. As is well known, the structure of needs is constrained not only by the level of development of the productive forces but also by specific value concepts. For example, what were once luxury goods may become daily necessities today; this is both a result of production development and a consequence of cultural change. Heller pays particular attention to the influence of ethical value concepts on needs. She notes, for instance, that a nun may only need a piece of bread and a cup of water every day, which indicates that culture can have a decisive impact on the structure of needs. Communist society is a free society with highly developed productive forces, where the quality and quantity of needs reach their highest level of richness. But in Heller's view, if freedom is understood as absolute, needs cannot be fully satisfied. There will always be a contradiction between infinite needs and the finite life of the individual. Therefore, understanding distribution according to need as satisfying all needs of every person is unrealistic. When the satisfaction of one need obstructs the satisfaction of another, there exists a priority sequence for the satisfaction of needs, but in reality, it is difficult for people to determine the basis for such choices. Heller advocates analyzing the issue of needs starting from pluralistic ethical communities; she emphasizes that every community possesses different value concepts and specific structures of needs, and people can freely choose different communities to live the life they long for, changing their structure of needs and lifestyle at any time. The problem is that if the structure of needs is shaped and determined by specific value concepts, and the latter apply to every member of society—fitting the principle of formal justice—then it shows that justice has not yet been transcended. That is to say, if distribution according to need allows individuals to make free choices, it must accept formal justice and its specific norms and rules; thus, justice has still not been transcended. Logically, Heller's analysis contains an obvious flaw: while the finitude of life certainly cannot be eliminated, it does not necessarily conflict with infinite needs. The author believes the key is to clarify where infinite needs come from and what their essence is. As a fellow student of Lukács, István Mészáros saw the manipulation of needs by the logic of capital more clearly than Heller. He pointed out: "What is currently counted as 'need' is not the human need of the producer, but rather the structural rules of capital for stabilizing prices and reproduction. Only when it involves (and is strictly subordinate to) the latter does use-value become legitimate." Mészáros also revealed the secret of how luxury consumption transforms into universal consumption: the capital system, by declaring that "luxuries" can be relativized and popularized, deliberately spreads luxury enjoyment to the next level of consumers, thereby stimulating and expanding the demand for products to obtain massive profits. Heller is correct to oppose the "dictatorship over needs" [4], but she ignores that capital is precisely the root of all dictatorships. When she hallucinates that ethical value concepts can determine people's needs, she falls into a subjectivist utopia.
The second contradiction is the conflation of the means of satisfying needs with the satisfaction of needs itself. Heller believes that communist society can provide the necessary means for the satisfaction of all members' needs, but this does not mean the needs are actually satisfied. For example, if a person requires the satisfaction of the need to develop a musical talent, society can provide various musical instruments, but whether that musical talent is fully developed is another matter. Expressed as a general formula: Person A needs a certain type of knowledge X; society can provide the means required to satisfy X, but it cannot satisfy A's need itself, because the satisfaction of needs "possesses an indivisible personality and contingency." Heller further points out that the social provision of means to satisfy needs is inseparable from the principle of justice, while the satisfaction of needs implies the transcendence of justice. Starting from the realization of human needs, Heller believes the future society should transcend justice; however, if distribution according to need refers to the society providing the means to satisfy needs, then this society has not transcended justice. Based on this, Heller believes Marx's principle of distribution according to need contains a contradiction, which determines that communist society still does not transcend justice. The author believes that Heller's distinction between the "idea" of communism and "communist society" is necessary, but her denial of the latter's realistic possibility is a prejudice. Its philosophical root lies in Kant’s distinction between constitutive and regulative principles. Kant’s purpose in distinguishing these two principles was to limit the function of reason and prevent the understanding-principles of pure reason from overstepping their bounds; in his view, once an idea shifts from a regulative principle to a constitutive principle, it becomes theoretically trapped in antinomies and brings disaster to reality. For a long time, people have had no dispute over the regulative function of the idea of communism, but they hold different views on whether this idea possesses constitutive attributes. In Heller's view, the idea of communism can only play a regulative role and must never become a constitutive principle. If distribution according to need is regarded as a constitutive principle, it implies that every social member's needs are satisfied, which is unachievable in reality. However, if distribution according to need is seen as a regulative principle, one need not worry about whether the needs are realized, but only confirm the rationality of the needs and emphasize that they ought to be satisfied. Proceeding from this, Heller believes socialist society should accept a regulative concept of justice. If it is determined that distribution according to need concerns only the satisfaction of needs, then it has nothing to do with justice and points toward the transcendence of justice, because there are no norms, rules, rankings, or comparisons here. If it is determined that distribution according to need is a regulative principle—emphasizing that all needs are not necessarily all realized but should be equally recognized—then when society cannot simultaneously provide the means to satisfy needs, social members will have to make choices and rankings regarding priorities, which implies the reconstruction of the norms and rules of justice. In short, Heller believes distribution according to need cannot be understood in a constitutive sense because abundance is relative; but as a regulative principle, distribution according to need involves the recognition of human needs and is therefore important and necessary. Once the legitimacy of needs is denied, personality, dignity, and radical democracy are also denied, and such a society would no longer be a socialist society. It is easy to see that Heller does not deny the principle of distribution according to need—individual freedom and the comprehensive development of the person are inseparable from this principle—but she emphasizes that as a value-ideal, distribution according to need is impossible to realize in reality and can only function as a regulative principle.
IV. Which is More Fundamental: Freedom or Justice?
Heller emphasizes...
Marx’s repeated claims that "justice is injustice" were not intended to oppose justice, nor to suggest that Society X is just by its own standards while being unjust when viewed from a higher standard of justice; the latter view presupposes an absolute, transcendental concept of justice. Marx intended to challenge the existence and significance of all norms of action and standards. Since all individuals are unique and non-comparable, justice can only become a form of limitation and lack of freedom. In Heller's view, if equality represents the first stage of communist society, then freedom represents the second stage; the freer a society is, the more it tends toward inequality. Assuming a future society can achieve absolute freedom, it must imply the withering away of equality and justice. Conversely, in a relatively free society, justice and equality will necessarily coexist for a long time.
Furthermore, Heller argues that neither justice nor equality are categories of the highest order. Freedom is the foundation for modern people and the ultimate principle of modernity: "Freedom became the foundation of the modern world. It is a foundation on which nothing else is founded." Regarding the relationship between freedom and justice, Heller emphasizes their interdependence—neither can exist without the other—while simultaneously leaning toward the side of freedom, emphasizing that justice cannot provide a standard for freedom, but freedom can (and should) provide value guidance for justice. That is to say, it is not justice that is superior to freedom, but freedom that is superior to justice. According to Heller's vision, in a society without domination or oppression, members of society possess active freedom and can reach a consensus on certain norms and rules through rational debate. Modern society is a dynamic society where social norms and rules change constantly. However, the problem remains that a society cannot exist without norms and rules, yet once they exist, the problem of injustice arises.
Heller acknowledges that in real life, there are many situations where justice is inapplicable because people desire a freely chosen, pluralistic lifestyle. She firmly believes that no society can completely transcend justice; a free society without justice is unimaginable. People can rationally imagine a just, free society in which freedom provides the value criteria for justice. In Heller's view, measuring and judging whether a society is just depends, first, on whether specific norms and rules exist and, second, on whether these norms and rules are consistently applied to specific groups. From a static perspective, any society meeting these conditions is just; even if social norms and rules are not implemented frequently or consistently, the society may still be considered just—people may simply view this as the result of unjust individuals breaking faith. According to strict standards for a just society, norms and rules usually cannot be questioned or tested. Historically, such societies belong to the pre-modern era and, characteristically, belong to societies of static justice. Although pre-modern societies were just, they were not good societies because people could not imagine different ways of life at all, let alone question social norms and rules. Capitalist society is a society of dynamic justice; people never take specific social norms and rules for granted. Although it has not transcended justice, it possesses historical progressiveness compared to pre-modern societies. Modern people always expect a just society, hoping that the concept of justice can apply to every member of society while remaining able to question specific norms and rules of justice at any time.
Heller believes that Western liberal-democratic society is the most reasonable form of dynamic justice. She agrees with Rawls's view that the norms and rules of justice must be accepted by all members of society, but she opposes theoretical presuppositions such as the "original position" and the "veil of ignorance" [5]. She argues that the "original position" is merely a beautiful fantasy and that it is a utopia to believe everyone would abide by the same principles of justice under a "veil of ignorance." Heller contends that Rawls's view presupposes that modern people possess an identical and unchanging structure of needs, which is taken for granted and cannot be questioned. Starting from the plurality of needs and lifestyles, she argues that the need structure of modern people cannot represent the need structure of all humanity. Modern people must never be subject to the same norms and rules of justice; justice can only be historical and pluralistic.
In terms of her basic inclinations, Heller identifies with the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs." However, she attempts to place freedom above justice and denies that a future communist society can transcend justice. This theoretical tendency stems from her hostility toward the socialist societies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Having experienced the Holocaust and Soviet political intervention, dissident intellectuals in Eastern Europe had no affection for either Western capitalism or Soviet-bloc socialism. They longed for individual freedom and, when choosing the priority between justice and freedom, generally tended to lean toward the side of freedom. Heller believes that a communist society must allow people to freely choose their lifestyles and be able to constantly question and test the norms and rules of justice. This necessarily involves a philosophical-value discussion of freedom and making discourse a necessary link in the procedure of justice. Heller calls the justice toward which free discourse points "democratic justice" (radical democracy) and believes that the future society must be based upon it.
The problem, however, is: how is a philosophical-value discussion possible in a capitalist society based on relations of command and dependency? Societies based on dependency and command are filled with asymmetric relations; although it is possible to form equal, symmetric relations within a class, these cannot be extended to the whole of society. Thus, philosophical-value discussions in societies based on dependency and command can only function as regulative ideas rather than constitutive principles. Heller believes that people who actively engage in philosophical-value discussions, although they have particular interests, are willing to seek the welfare of the collective interests of humanity; such individuals are called "good people." Heller optimistically believes that good people exist in modern society; when engaging in philosophical-value discussions, they can actively accept the guidance of moral norms and avoid the trivialities and positivism of daily life. Participants in the discussion take humanity as the highest point of reference, suspending their own particular interests, and every participant recognizes the authenticity of others' values, treating others as representatives of humanity. The discussion eventually forms a certain hierarchy of value priorities. At this point, individuals must temporarily set aside their original values and abide by the newly established ones, but this does not mean a denial of the authenticity of the original values—it merely recognizes that the new values have priority over the old ones. In short, Heller believes that contemporary capitalist society remains a society based on relations of dependency and command, where philosophical-value discussions cannot achieve universality; therefore, one must turn toward a socialist society. In the process of transformation, people must maintain a desire for philosophical-value discourse. Changing the world cannot be separated from philosophy; philosophy provides the world with norms: "All those who want to end a society based on relations of dependency and command need philosophy. They need the norms and ideals that provide a perspective from which they can change the world."
Philosophical-value discussion is an idealistic "ought." It is precisely because of this "ought" that a world conforming to norms can be created. I do not oppose grounding justice upon freedom, but the question is: what kind of freedom is being discussed here, and whose justice? Heller’s understanding of freedom has not left the ground of normative political philosophy established since the dawn of the modern era. For her, justice, rights, and equality are concepts of the same degree, possessing the same value orientation. The reason Heller constantly vacillates between affirming justice and transcending justice, and between liberalism and socialism, is primarily due to her failure to understand in what sense Marx’s communism actually transcends justice. In fact, Marx’s most important vision for the future communist society is the free and comprehensive development of the individual, which is the self-realization of the human being. Therefore, the problem is not whether justice is grounded in freedom, but what constitutes true freedom and how human society can comprehensively transcend civil society. As for whether communist society transcends justice, this question is somewhat similar to whether communist society abolishes the state. We can say both that the "association of free individuals" is not a state and that it is a new type of state. Similarly, we can say both that communist society transcends justice and that it is a new type of justice.
V. Brief Comments
As stated above, Heller introduced many of her own "private views" when interpreting Marx’s theory of justice. On the surface, she agrees with the principle of distribution according to need, the ideal of communism, and the concepts of freedom and justice. However, in her concrete understanding of these concepts, she failed to grasp the true essence of Marxism, tending instead to conflate Marx’s original thought with Soviet "Orthodox Marxism." Whether demonstrating the existence of distributive justice in capitalist society from the starting point of formal justice, misreading the internal contradictions of Marx’s "to each according to his needs" principle, or denying that communist society transcends justice—all these indicate her failure to correctly understand the unity of the empirical and transcendental dimensions of Marxism, as well as the coercive force and role of the logic of capital in modern society. Heller’s theory of justice carries obvious colors of liberalism and utopianism. Marx did not oppose freedom, but he recognized the illusory nature of freedom in capitalist society. Because Heller suffered long-term political suppression, she had an extreme longing for freedom, which is a major reason why she fell into liberalism and utopianism.
Nevertheless, Heller’s interpretation of the issue of justice has positive significance. For example, her analysis of dynamic justice is entirely consistent with Marx’s judgment on the fluidity of modern society, and her analysis of pluralistic needs is consistent with Marx’s discourse on the free and comprehensive development of humans in a communist society. Heller’s understanding of justice originated from the unique socio-historical and cultural atmosphere of Central and Eastern Europe. While she did not propose an exquisite and rigorous theory of justice like Rawls and others, her opposition to frozen and unchanging norms and rules of justice is entirely correct. Heller’s greatest theoretical contribution lies in revealing the most thorny problem in current research on justice theory: namely, "how is it possible in a pluralistic world where each culture is linked to all other cultures through bonds of mutual reciprocity?" Like mainstream Western theorists of justice, Heller believed that merely appealing to proletarian revolution or arguing for the necessity of communism purely at the level of economic laws would not work. The correct approach should be to persuade people to believe that the communist ideal possesses not only a historical necessity akin to objective laws but also a moral legitimacy that is universally desirable. The problem is that under the conditions of modernity, socio-political justice is increasingly divided into ethical justice and political justice: "The concept of socio-political justice is increasingly unconcerned with the best possible moral world. It advocates a legal-political order that perhaps protects civil rights (freedom), but not their 'Good'." This leads to a consequence where people always... [Text ends]
Focusing one’s gaze onto distributive justice results in overlooking the moral attributes of justice. On the issue of justice, Heller agrees with neither Marx nor Rawls. Her disagreement with Rawls is manifested in her continued longing for a society that transcends justice, while her disagreement with Marx is shown in her persistent skepticism toward the realization of a communist society. Heller strives to resolve the problem of pluralistic values and social integration; unlike Rawls, who establishes a universal normative foundation for a theory of justice through "overlapping consensus" [6] to form public reason, she advocates for constructing a common normalized foundation for the pluralistic lifestyles of modern people through incomplete ethico-political justice. Regarding Heller’s theory of justice, Jean Louise Cohen summarizes it quite accurately: in her view, the theory relies heavily on Habermas’s writings, especially discourse ethics, and "focuses on the procedures through which social-political norms and rules can be legitimately constructed and revised, rather than pretending to be a universal and general moral theory." The problem lies in how to reach a consensus on values and, ultimately, who decides the supreme value? As Michael Walzer put it, "Heller defends a highly idealized version of democratic decision-making, and we have a long way to go before we can claim to have made it a reality." It is evident that Heller attempts to reconstruct ethico-political justice under the conditions of modernity by emphasizing the dynamic and incomplete nature of justice. Her theoretical conception of "beyond justice" is not intended to actually establish a society that transcends justice, but rather to ensure that the norms and rules of justice are constantly questioned, maintaining a certain openness and fluidity, allowing people to autonomously choose lifestyles that suit them and lead the best moral (political) life in their own minds. Although Heller did not fundamentally terminate the disputes surrounding justice, she proposed a plan different from that of Rawls and stimulated our thinking. This possesses important reference value for better realizing fairness and justice [7] under the system of socialism with Chinese characteristics.