Song Xiongwei: An Analysis of the Historical Evolution and Causes of Decline of the Century-Old Communist Party of Britain

I. Statement of the Problem Britain is the birthplace of modern party politics, and research on its party politics has consistently been a focal point for academic circles both at home and abroad. Compared to the mainstream Conservative and Labour Parties within the British political system, academic research on British communist parties remains relatively thin. However, as an important integral part of the international communist movement and the development of world socialism—and particularly as a window for observing the developmental trends of communist parties in advanced Western capitalist countries—the British communist parties hold significant research value. Therefore, exploring the century-long developmental trajectory of British communist parties and analyzing the successes and failures therein can both deepen our understanding of the laws governing the growth and development of communist parties and provide a beneficial comparative perspective for deepening our understanding of the Communist Party of China's laws of long-term governance.

Existing Chinese literature on British communist parties primarily focuses on two aspects. The first is the concentrated study of their historical development and the reasons for their decline. For instance, Wang Wei argued for the historical inevitability of the founding of the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), citing the objective existence of class struggle in Britain and the close integration of Marxism-Leninism with the British workers' movement. Shang Wenbin conducted a systematic and comprehensive review of the British communist movement and analyzed the reasons for its decay. Yan Jiefeng and Zu Jinyu analyzed the reasons for several splits within the CPGB from a historical perspective, primarily including the setbacks of the international communist movement, the opposition between the "Eurocommunist" and traditionalist factions, and serious defects in the party's internal ideological and theoretical construction. Zhang Yang and Xu Yuan offered philosophical reflections and critiques on the CPGB’s history of alliances and united fronts with other parties. The second aspect is the concentrated study of theoretical development and shifts in the political line. For example, Liu Jian analyzed the reasons for the CPGB’s decline from the perspective of party theory, categorizing these reasons into three major types: international, domestic, and internal. Dai Jinping and Zhong Lianfa analyzed why splits occurred and why the party moved toward a reformist line based on the CPGB’s political goals, conditions of establishment, and lines of struggle. Zhao Ting and Ding Guanghao introduced the "Alternative Economic Strategy," a new communist theory formed by the Communist Party of Britain (CPB) after the 2008 financial crisis, along with its corresponding practical work.

Broadly speaking, existing research suffers from two shortcomings. First, it has not clearly delineated the developmental trajectory and inter-party relationships of British communist parties. Some studies generalize from particulars, treating a single branch as the representative of "the British communist party," which fails to accurately grasp the evolutionary process and characteristics of various British communist parties across different stages over the past century. For instance, some scholars view the CPB as the orthodox successor to the CPGB while ignoring the fact that several other existing British communist parties also split from the CPGB; others refer more vaguely to the "British CP" as a research object without clearly defining which specific party is meant, let alone explaining the primary viewpoints of other branches. In short, we cannot ignore the fact that there exist many communist parties and organizations in Britain, each with its own distinct constitution, organizational structure, and leadership. Second, although existing literature has to some extent analyzed the developmental history and related characteristics of British communist parties and discussed the facts and causes of their decline, it places relatively high emphasis on external factors. It attributes the long-term fragmentation and decay of British communist parties mainly to the shaking of convictions caused by the dissolution of the Comintern, dissatisfaction arising from the Soviet invasion of Poland ^[1], the impact of the Secret Report of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, and the influence of the Sino-Soviet split, while providing insufficient analysis of internal factors. Therefore, it is necessary to further analyze in depth why British communist parties have remained in a state of long-term division and weakness, especially which internal factors led to this change, thereby deepening our understanding of their development and transformation.

II. The Historical Evolution of British Communist Parties As shown in Figure 1, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) holds a unique historical position among British communist parties. It was not only the first unified communist party in British history but also, at its peak, possessed the largest membership, the greatest scale, and the most significant influence. The various major splits in the CPGB’s history, along with changes in its membership numbers and scale, serve as important indicators reflecting the degree of decay among British communist parties. While this article primarily analyzes the CPGB, it also introduces other British communist parties and organizations. On the eve of the 1917 October Revolution, several communist organizations in Britain began difficult negotiations with the aim of "merging and reorganizing" these scattered groups into Britain's first unified communist party to operate as the British section of the Communist International (Comintern). After more than two years of negotiations, in August 1920, Britain’s first unified communist party—the Communist Party of Great Britain—was proclaimed in London. At its inception, the CPGB had between 3,000 and 5,000 members. During the 1926 General Strike, membership rapidly surpassed 10,000, but following the end of the strike, it quickly receded, leaving only about 2,000 members by 1930.

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Following the outbreak of World War II, the CPGB followed Comintern instructions and opposed British participation. However, with the rapid fall of France and the expansion of Nazi Germany, the Comintern's attitude shifted; the CPGB then followed the Soviet Union in opposing Nazi Germany, at which point membership quickly rebounded to 17,000. In 1942, after Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union and following the Battle of Stalingrad, pro-Soviet sentiment surged in Britain, and membership rapidly increased to over 56,000. At the start of the Cold War, Britain chose to follow the United States in opposing the Soviet Union. After Churchill’s "Iron Curtain" speech, British communist parties began to be marginalized and treated with hostility by mainstream British politics. Leveraging the power of capital and media advantages, non-communist parties in Britain continuously promoted anti-communist propaganda at the ideological level, smearing communism as a threat to British democracy and freedom, and sparing no effort to undermine the legitimacy of communism in Britain and shape negative public perceptions. The British Labour Party began purging communists from its ranks, and with the encouragement of Vic Feather and other officials, trade unions also began to seek ways to limit the power of communists. Under the combined effect of these factors, the CPGB’s development became arduous, and membership numbers continued to decline. Furthermore, with the dissolution of the Comintern and growing skepticism toward Stalinism, ideological wavering began to appear within the CPGB. The majority of CPGB members, represented by Harry Pollitt, believed that the capitalist system would not end imminently and that the line of abolishing Parliament to replace it with workers' councils and a Soviet system was unworkable; this led to the idea of seeking legal struggle within the existing political system. Conversely, Trotskyist organizations, represented by the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP, formed in 1944 by the merger of the Revolutionary Socialist League and the International Workers' League), advocated the "Theory of Permanent Revolution." A considerable number of RCP members did not identify with the CPGB’s revisionist tendencies and chose to leave the party to join Trotskyist organizations instead. However, the Trotskyist organizations were also unstable. After the Attlee Labour government proposed the Welfare State plan in 1945, some high-ranking RCP members, represented by Gerry Healy, believed that since a welfare society could already be envisioned under Labour governance, there was no longer a need for the continued existence of socialist, Marxist, and Trotskyist organizations. The RCP dissolved in 1950, followed by the formation in the 1950s of more than 70 Trotskyist organizations of various sizes, represented by the Socialist Labour League and other radical factions, which became competitors to the CPGB.

After the conclusion of the 20th Congress of the CPSU in February 1956, Khrushchev delivered his "Secret Report" criticizing Stalin. This report caused a massive shock within the CPGB, creating supporters and opponents with irreconcilable positions. In the same year, the Poznań protests broke out as Poland attempted to escape Soviet control. Subsequently, the Soviet Union invaded Hungary, and the CPGB leadership chose to publicly support the invasion. This blind subservience to the CPSU caused dissatisfaction among many members; morale within the CPGB collapsed, and membership numbers fell further. In the autumn of 1956 alone, more than 7,000 members left the party, accounting for about 20% of the total membership at the time. In 1963, due to his support for China during the Sino-Soviet split, Michael McCreery led a small group of members to break away from the CPGB and establish the Committee to Defeat Revisionism, for Communist Unity. In 1965, this committee merged with the "Maoists" led by Bill Bland to form the Action Centre for Marxist-Leninist Unity. This organization was renamed the Communist Federation of Britain (Marxist-Leninist) in 1967, and again renamed the Communist League of Great Britain in 1975.

In 1968, also due to supporting China in the Sino-Soviet split, Reg Birch led some members to leave the CPGB and establish the Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist). The CPB (M-L) subsequently underwent several splits, producing organizations such as the Nottingham Communist Group and the Communist Workers' Movement. Shortly after becoming independent, the Communist Workers' Movement collectively joined the Revolutionary Communist League of Britain. Formed in 1977, the Revolutionary Communist League of Britain had evolved from the Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Britain established in 1969. The Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Britain had a name highly similar to the Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist) and was established only one year later, resulting in a competitive relationship. In 1977, the Marxist-Leninist Organisation of Britain absorbed the Communist Workers' Movement and the Birmingham Communist Association to form the Revolutionary Communist League of Britain, which later dissolved in 1988. Additionally, the founding of the Communist Party of England (Marxist-Leninist) in 1972 was also related to the impact of the Sino-Soviet split; this party was renamed the Revolutionary Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist) in 1979.

In 1977, due to opposition to the CPGB’s Eurocommunist policy, Sid French established the New Communist Party of Britain. In 1988, a group of members led by the Morning Star newspaper circle split from the CPGB to form the Communist Party of Britain (CPB). Amidst these continuous splits, the CPGB grew increasingly weak. In November 1991, the CPGB formally reorganized into the Democratic Left, and in 1999, it reorganized again into the New Politics Network. In 1995, a small number of members who identified with neither the CPB nor the Democratic Left established the Communist Liaison, with a membership of fewer than 100. Similar cases include the Communist Party of Great Britain (Provisional Central Committee) founded between 1990 and 1991, and the Communist Party of Great Britain (Marxist-Leninist) founded in 2004.

Since entering the 21st century, almost all British communist parties have been reduced to typically marginal parties. Taking the Communist Party of Britain (CPB) as an example, although it has continuously attempted to increase its influence through parliamentary elections, media propaganda, and strengthening party building, the results have been negligible. In the 2010 UK general election, the CPB fielded six candidates but received only 947 votes. In 2015, it fielded nine candidates and received only 1,229 votes, an electoral share of less than 0.01%. Besides this, some parties choose to operate by supporting the Labour left. In the 2017 UK general election, with the support of Labour leader Jeremy Corbyn, members of the Communist Party of Great Britain (Marxist-Leninist) could run under the banner of the British Labour Party to enter Parliament, but this was unsuccessful. Similar attempts occurred in the 2019 UK general election but likewise failed to yield significant results.

III. Analysis of Internal Factors for the Long-term Fragmentation and Decay of British Communist Parties

1. Severe ideological divergence during the founding stage and failure to form unified political goals

As a communist organization guided by Marxist ideology, whether supporting the line of armed revolutionary struggle or the line of parliamentary peaceful struggle, the realization of communism should be the ultimate political goal. However, many early British communist parties and organizations held significant differences in their understanding of Marxism and the goals of communist struggle. Faced with ideological confusion and difficulties in uniting, they encountered great obstacles during the merger process. In the subsequent course of development, the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) failed to promptly digest and resolve these historical legacies. Instead, it underwent a forced merger and reorganization under the influence of external factors (the Soviet Union), causing these historical issues to gradually transform into profound internal contradictions and creating the soil for fission within the ideological foundation.

The organizations that accepted the advice of the Comintern to participate in reorganization negotiations primarily included the Left Wing Committee of the Independent Labour Party, the Shop Stewards' and Workers' Committee Movement, the Workers' Socialist Federation, the British Socialist Party, the South Wales Socialist Society ^[2], the Communist Unity Group of the Socialist Labour Party, and several other smaller British communist organizations. The core objective was to establish a unified communist party in Britain to serve as the British section of the Comintern and carry out revolutionary activities. During the negotiations, the most difficult issue on which to reach a consensus was whether the unified CPGB should participate in British parliamentary politics. Organizations represented by the British Socialist Party, the Communist Unity Group of the Socialist Labour Party, and the Left Wing Committee of the Independent Labour Party opposed participation in parliamentary politics. They refused to join the parliament, viewing it as a tool for the bourgeoisie to rule the people, and feared that once communists entered the parliamentary system, they would become corrupt and degenerate into appendages of the bourgeoisie. Conversely, other communist organizations believed that rejecting the line of peaceful struggle was "Left"ist thinking ^[3] and argued for making full use of the parliamentary platform to conduct revolutionary struggle legally, explicitly supporting participation in parliamentary politics.

During the early stages of the merger and reorganization negotiations, Lenin’s guidance was that differences in the line of struggle were secondary contradictions rather than the principal contradiction—the establishment of a unified Communist Party in Britain was the overriding and essential task. However, until July 1920, the opposing sides remained entrenched in their views and failed to reach an agreement. Considering the influence the Comintern wielded over national communist organizations at that time, mere questions of the line of struggle are insufficient to explain the massive divisions between the British communist parties. This article contends that the root of the division lay in deep-seated ideological issues, while the difference over the line of struggle was merely its outward expression. The CPGB, formed after long negotiations, was not the result of British communist organizations setting aside differences and unifying their thinking; rather, external pressure from the Soviet Union played a more significant role. Foreign scholars such as L. J. Macfarlane, Roderick Martin, and Francis Beckett have demonstrated the Soviet influence on British communist parties from the perspectives of Soviet Russian pressure, the need to satisfy the Soviet launch of world revolution and the defense of the Bolshevik regime, and Soviet financial support for Britain. The CPGB failed to properly resolve these differences in line during its founding stage and was unable to unify its thinking or form a common goal of struggle, which created the soil for the split and decline of British communist parties at the very ideological foundation.

2. Gradual deviation from the guidance of Marxism-Leninism and ideological confusion

From the perspective of collective memory, a political party is a "community of memory." A party's collective memory is closely related to its history, which is especially true for Marxist parties that believe in historical materialism. Therefore, adhering to the guiding ideology of Marxism-Leninism, staying true to the original aspiration and founding mission, remembering history, and maintaining consistency in narrative are of paramount importance for a communist party to maintain its ideological leadership. However, in its development process, the CPGB gradually deviated from Marxism and performed several acts of self-negation regarding the party's historical line of development and narrative system, leading to ideological confusion and its eventual demise.

In 1944, at the 17th Congress of the CPGB, the Party Central Committee released a document titled Britain for the People: Proposals for Post-war Policy, which constituted a major self-negation of the struggle line the CPGB had held since its founding. In the 1935 document For a Soviet Britain, the CPGB had argued that socialism could not be achieved through parliament; however, the 1944 new policy overturned this principle, claiming that socialism could be realized simply by reforming the electoral system of the House of Commons. This marked the beginning of the CPGB’s substantive implementation of revisionism, using Marxist-Leninist terminology to oppose Marxism-Leninism.

In 1951, the CPGB released the white paper The British Road to Socialism, stating that the British working class no longer needed to engage in bloodshed and sacrifice, but should instead use constitutional means to win control of the capitalist state and then transform it into a state that meets the needs of the working class. This was equivalent to a disguised recognition of the bourgeois parliamentary system and a disguised negation of the party’s long-standing pursuit of the dictatorship of the proletariat advocated by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, thereby embarking on the erroneous path of revisionism.

In 1970, Eurocommunist thought began to spread widely within the CPGB, further shaking the status of the dictatorship of the proletariat and democratic centralism. The tenets of Eurocommunism can be summarized as the "Four Anythings" and the "Two Negations." The "Four Anythings" referred to: any communist party could independently define a concept of "socialism" consistent with its own conditions; could participate in any capitalist enterprise; could cooperate with any foreign power; and could criticize any other communist party, including the CPSU. The "Two Negations" referred to the negation of the dictatorship of the proletariat and democratic centralism. Although the original intent of Eurocommunism was to break free from Soviet control and attempt to forge a communist path different from the "Soviet model" by integrating with local realities, the "Four Anythings" and "Two Negations" policy in fact negated the basic principles of the dictatorship of the proletariat and democratic centralism while negating Soviet leadership. This shook the party's foundations and brought about serious ideological confusion.

In January 1990, Nina Temple was elected as the new General Secretary of the CPGB. At its 42nd Congress, the Party Central Committee resolved to abandon Marxism-Leninism as its guiding ideology and completely give up the principle of democratic centralism and the recommended list system for elections. This meant that the CPGB began to transform from its organizational form into a federalist organization. In May 1991, the CPGB officially announced its new party constitution, publicly declaring its abandonment of Marxism-Leninism and its acceptance of a series of concepts including reformed Marxism, feminism, anti-racism, and ecologism, while replacing democratic centralism with a so-called "more open and democratic mechanism." In November 1991, the CPGB formally declared its dissolution at its 43rd Congress and reorganized as the Democratic Left. At the same time, with a vote of 135 in favor, 72 against, and 3 abstentions, it resolved to completely abandon the name and constitution of the Communist Party of Great Britain. However, abandoning organizational principles did not bring a turning point for the nominally "newborn" Democratic Left. Against the backdrop of a continuous loss of party members, the Democratic Left reorganized again in 1999 as the New Politics Network. In 2007, the New Politics Network merged and reorganized with Unlock Democracy (a think tank), becoming an ordinary think tank. To this point, the spark of the CPGB’s communist revolution was completely extinguished.

3. Pro-Soviet forces within the party were stubborn and rigid, making it difficult to maintain independence

Throughout the history of the international communist movement, the CPSU always placed the national interests of the Soviet Union in a position of supremacy. All actions were based on whether they met Soviet interests, and at the same time, the revolutionary movements of various countries were forcibly brought into the framework of defending Soviet interests. In policy formulation, the CPSU exhibited a clear pragmatic attitude, frequently interfering in the internal affairs of fraternal parties and even intervening in the appointment of their leaders.

In this objective context, the British communist parties were unable to maintain independence and autonomy internally. Samuel argued that the CPGB "was not an independent organization at all, but was subordinate to the Comintern. Its members were those it developed, not those it was intended to represent. Its Central Committee was primarily responsible not to its members, but to the Third International in Moscow." Furthermore, in the development of British communist parties, Soviet economic support was an important factor for their survival. Taking the CPGB, the largest of these, as an example, it received long-term Soviet financial support before 1979 to establish party branches and organs at all levels across the country. The long-term acceptance of Soviet funding and obedience to Soviet instructions resulted in the high solidification of pro-Soviet factions within the party, forming a stable vested interest group. Subsequently, no matter how the CPGB Central Committee's policy line changed, pro-Soviet members would take the Soviet side without hesitation, even to the point of splitting the organization by entire units to set up their own rival establishments. One prosopographic study of CPGB leaders summarized it even more sharply: "It is better said that they succeeded more in the goal of defending the Soviet Union than in establishing a Communist Party in Britain." For instance, in 1982, the Morning Star publicly criticized the Eurocommunist tendencies of Marxism Today and expressed support for Soviet leadership. Consequently, the CPGB Central Committee decided to remove Tony Chater, editor of the Morning Star, and David Whitfield, assistant editor, from their party positions. In 1984, the majority of delegates, ignoring the will of the CPGB Central Committee, re-elected the two men to the newspaper’s management committee. In 1985, the CPGB Central Committee increased its crackdown on the Morning Star group, passing a resolution with over 650 amendments in one go and expelling 18 members. In 1988, a portion of members led by the Morning Star group split from the CPGB to establish the Communist Party of Britain (CPB) as a rival. Then-leader Michael Hicks claimed: "We are not building a new party, but rebuilding the Communist Party by upholding the program and rules of the original CPGB."

As another example, the CPGB had a veteran member named Andrew Rothstein. In his early years, he served as a liaison between the CPGB and the Soviet Union, and worked successively for the Soviet Trade Delegation, the Russian Telegraph Agency (ROSTA), and TASS. According to the memoirs of historian Eric Hobsbawm, Andrew Rothstein was a typical Soviet mouthpiece, "who would only help the Soviet Union defend everything that needed defending." This way of working with loyalty to the Soviet Union accompanied Andrew Rothstein throughout his life. After the Morning Star group announced its independence and established the CPB in 1988, Rothstein—as the only surviving founding member at the time—chose to leave the CPGB and join the CPB. Although the first membership card of the newly formed CPB was issued to him, the true object of his loyalty was neither the CPB nor the CPGB, but the Soviet Union.

4. Serious sectarianism within the party prevented the formation of true internal unity

Sectarianism refers to a pattern of behavior and thought within a party organization oriented toward the interests of small groups or factions. It manifests as an excessive persistence in and exclusivity regarding one's own views and interests, thereby neglecting the importance of solidarity, cooperation, and common goals. Throughout the history of British communist parties, sectarian thinking led to the formation of opposition and competition between different factions and cliques within the party. Various factions overemphasized their own concepts and interests while ignoring cooperation and shared objectives, leading to internal strife and splits that weakened the party's unity and cohesion. Furthermore, the prevalence of sectarianism and internal infighting sapped the parties' strength and reputation, making them more vulnerable to criticism and subversion from other political forces, and diminishing the parties' influence and appeal. The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) employed methods of expulsion and political persecution against dissenting members, which sabotaged the internal solidarity of British communist parties, leading to the emergence of numerous "mountain strongholds" ^[4] that attacked one another, making it impossible to form unified action.

Many British communist organizations, media outlets, and individuals were labeled as "ultra-leftists" or "Trotskyites" by the CPGB Central Committee, facing fierce attacks and even expulsion. They viewed these attacks and expulsions as politically motivated persecution with ulterior motives. Some expelled members harbored deep resentment; after leaving the party, they made it their mission to oppose and attack the CPGB, with some even becoming staunch anti-communists. Others chose to join or establish small Trotskyist organizations, such as the Revolutionary Communist Party, the Socialist Workers Party, the Revolutionary Workers' Party, and the Militant tendency. According to statistics, more than 70 Trotskyist organizations coexisted in Britain at that time. Although these Trotskyist groups were generally small and frequently attacked one another, as a whole, they became powerful competitors to the CPGB. During the 1950s and 1960s, the CPGB consistently attempted to develop its membership among the left and students, but it was the active mobilization of these more radical, small Trotskyist organizations that caused the CPGB to miss the opportunity to recruit members and expand its influence during the 1968 student movement and anti-Vietnam War activities.

It is entirely normal for there to be certain differences in ideological understanding within a party. A mature Marxist party should follow the principle of "learning from past mistakes to avoid future ones, and curing the illness to save the patient" ^[5]. Based on the organizational principle of democratic centralism, such a party should seek to unify the party’s ideological understanding through in-depth and meticulous ideological and political work, by conducting criticism and self-criticism, and by engaging in discussions with a scientific Marxist attitude. However, whenever a crisis occurred in British communist parties, the various branches took stubborn stances and attacked one another. When differences could not be reconciled, the center of the British communist movement often handled internal crises in a simple and crude manner. Party cadres and members who disagreed with the central line were either dismissed or expelled. This resulted in the British communist parties splitting time and again; for parties whose strength and influence were already weak, each split was a case of "snow added to frost" ^[6].

5. Lacking an attractive political program and failing to win the support of the masses

Productive forces and relations of production are the basic elements of Marxist political economy, and the level of development of productive forces plays a decisive role in social development and transformation. Following the Industrial Revolution, Britain's bourgeois parties achieved significant economic success and established a solid social foundation. In the 1980s and 1990s, the neoliberal economic policies promoted by Thatcher—emphasizing the market economy, privatization, and reduced state intervention—achieved certain results, bringing economic prosperity and growth. This led to a general public recognition of capitalism’s advantages in creating wealth and employment opportunities.

British communist parties, however, failed to propose an attractive political program regarding economic development and the promotion of progress in the productive forces. The theories and policies of British communist parties lacked innovation and could not provide forward-looking strategies for technological development, nor could they propose economic reform plans that met the needs of contemporary development. They appeared outdated and out of touch with British society. Without an attractive political program, it was impossible to win the support of the masses, achieve success in elections, or compete with the Labour Party, which marched under the banner of social democracy. The political programs put forward by the CPGB were nearly identical to the Labour Party's programs from twenty years prior and held no appeal. The specific goals promoted in their programs included guaranteed full employment, improving social security, increasing wage income, establishing a comprehensive health service, and expanding public ownership—all of which highly overlapped with the policy goals previously proposed by the British Labour Party. For example, "Labour and the New Social Order," the policy statement drafted by Sydney Webb in 1918, already included content that closely met the practical needs of labor, such as a minimum wage, full employment, nationalization of key industries, and a higher degree of national income redistribution.

Furthermore, under the British electoral system, a good political program is not enough for an influential party to win voter support; it also requires "technical" proficiency in democratic campaigning and the broad dissemination of the program's content to win the people's identification with it. Since its founding in 1900, the British Labour Party has dedicated itself to helping the groups it represents integrate into society and assisting workers in negotiations with capital, becoming the party choice for the working class to strive for rights within the British political system of the time—though in essence, this was the result of a compromise within British capitalist society. British communist parties should have unswervingly followed the mass line, served the people heart and soul, and used the ideological weapon of Marxism to profoundly analyze the bourgeois essence of the Labour Party. In practice, however, British communist parties not only failed to find effective working methods but were also preoccupied with internal strife and mutual attacks. Even their own positions wavered; the CPGB, the largest of these parties, attempted to join the Labour Party en masse several times in its history.

6. Loose and fragmented organization, never forming a disciplined political party

Organizational discipline refers to the norms of behavior that party organizations and members must obey to maintain the party's organizational solidarity and unity; it is the discipline that governs relations between party organizations and between the organization and its members. A proletarian party is a political organization formed with the ultimate goal of achieving communism; its requirements for organizational discipline are higher than those of any other political party. Marx and Engels wrote in the "Address of the Central Committee to the Communist League" that revolutionary activity "can only proceed with full power from the center." Lenin further elaborated on the extreme importance of organizational discipline, noting: "The proletariat has no other weapon in the fight for power except organization." However, British communist parties generally suffered from loose and fragmented organizational discipline.

The New Communist Party of Britain, which split from the CPGB, was established precisely against the background of loose organizational discipline in the CPGB and the failure of local branches to uphold the authority of the Central Committee. In 1977, Sid French, then secretary of the Surrey District Committee, opposed the Eurocommunist tendency of the CPGB. The CPGB Central Committee's response was to expel Sid French. Subsequently, French and his followers held an emergency meeting in London and rapidly established the New Communist Party. It should be noted that the divergence between the Eurocommunist faction and the pro-Soviet faction caused the CPGB to lose a total of about 6,000 members by the end of 1977, but only about 700 joined the New Communist Party, and these members were almost entirely locals from the Surrey district. In other words, the New Communist Party did not receive recognition from the majority of the pro-Soviet faction within the CPGB; rather, it only succeeded in mobilizing the vast majority of members in the Surrey district to leave the CPGB directly. Therefore, although the New Communist Party used the same rhetoric upon its founding in 1977 as the CPGB did upon its own founding—namely, opposing a Central Committee with Eurocommunist tendencies—the underlying reasons were different. The split and establishment of the New Communist Party stemmed more from the contradiction in the relationship between the Central Committee and local party organizations. Local branch members were more loyal to local factions, which prevented the CPGB Central Committee's authority from being maintained and made it impossible to achieve centralized and unified leadership.

Furthermore, the relationship between party organizations and members in British communist parties was loose, lacking cohesion. For a long period, British communist parties generally overemphasized increasing the number of members while neglecting quality. Their procedures for joining and leaving the party were quite casual; joining involved simple registration, and leaving could even be done without a formal resignation. Grassroots party organizations were inactive in important tasks such as screening, identifying, and educating/training members, making it difficult to carry out work. Additionally, due to low organizational cohesion, new members would seek other ways to gather, leading to the phenomenon of "mountain-strongholdism." For instance, people from the same region would automatically form groups, creating "small circles." Under this loose and fragmented organizational discipline, the grassroots organizations of British communist parties were weak and unable to effectively conduct work or execute party tasks. Blindly pursuing membership numbers and organizational scale while lacking cultivation of and attention to grassroots members, and demanding voluntary work from members while lacking care for them—all of these are manifestations of the lack of cohesion in the grassroots organizations of British communist parties, and they are the root causes of the constant loss of personnel and the negligible effectiveness of their work.

IV. Conclusion

Through a comprehensive review of historical materials, this article has initially clarified the process of development and fragmentation of British communist parties and analyzed the complex relationships between them, providing a relatively clear historical thread for subsequent research. Through the analysis of the fission of British communist parties, it can be seen that wavering in the ideological field, a lack of independence, and a fragmented organizational system were important reasons for these parties losing support.

Taking the century-long history of British communist parties as a mirror, on the new journey of comprehensively building a modern socialist country, we must continuously deepen our understanding of the laws governing the building of a Marxist governing party. We must adhere to the fundamental system of the guiding position of Marxism in the ideological field, build a socialist ideology with strong cohesion and leading power, and consolidate the common ideological foundation for the united struggle of the whole Party and the people of all ethnic groups. At the same time, we must strengthen the Party's overall leadership, making it clear that the most essential characteristic of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC). We must unswervingly uphold the fact that the CPC is the highest force for political leadership, uphold and maintain the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee as the highest political principle, systematically improve the system of Party leadership, and safeguard the authority of the Party Central Committee. We must persistently use the Party's innovative theories to unify the thoughts, will, and actions of the entire Party, continuously tighten the organizational system—which must be interconnected from top to bottom, effectively executed, fully functional, and scientifically standardized—and enhance the Party’s organizational power. We must focus on building a high-quality team of governing backbone cadres capable of shouldering the heavy responsibility of national rejuvenation, continue to strengthen the arming of the Party with innovative theories, optimize the work of selecting, cultivating, managing, and utilizing cadres, cultivate and attract talents in an all-round way, and strictly and practically manage the ranks of Party members. This will enhance the overall effectiveness of the Party's organizational system and provide a strong organizational guarantee for the great cause of building a strong country and achieving national rejuvenation.

(Author Profile: Song Xiongwei is a Professor and Doctoral Supervisor in the Department of Political and Legal Teaching and Research at the Central Party School of the CPC [National Academy of Governance])