Yan Jiehua, Zhang Shengjie: Basic Practices of the CPC's Political Construction in Vietnam Since the Renovation Policy
Political construction of the Party is one of the central themes in the political life of the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV; hereinafter "the Party"), concerning the overall situation and fundamental direction of the CPV's Party-building undertaking. The 13th National Congress of the CPV pointed out that the political construction of the Party aims to guarantee the goals and direction of Vietnamese national independence and socialism, plan the Party's political line in advance, organize the implementation of that line, maintain the political stance of Party members and cadres, continuously enhance their political ability and competence, and create a favorable political ecosystem for building a clean and strong Party. Over the 37 years of Doi Moi [1], the CPV has gradually placed the political construction of the Party at the forefront of Party building. By using political construction to drive construction in other areas—such as ideology, ethics, organization, and cadres—a Party-building pattern has formed with political construction as the guide and ideological, ethical, organizational, and cadre construction advancing in coordination. This has improved the CPV’s leadership and governing capabilities.
Through continuous exploration, the CPV has achieved several successes in the political construction of the Party, but it also faces certain problems and challenges. Summarizing the primary practices, basic experiences, and results of the CPV's political construction since Doi Moi holds significant reference value for the Party building of Marxist governing parties.
I. Calibrating the political direction and upholding the nature of a working-class party
The CPV believes that political direction is the primary issue for a party's survival and development; it serves as the compass for the political construction of the Party and even for Party building as a whole, affecting the Party's destiny. During Doi Moi, the CPV has consistently adhered to its political direction, namely achieving the long-term ideal of communism and building a modern socialist country characterized by "prosperous people, a strong nation, democracy, equity, and civilization." This is an experience the CPV derived by summarizing the lessons from the upheavals in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, as well as Vietnam's socialist construction prior to Doi Moi: past failures were not the failure of the socialist system itself, but rather the failure of a dogmatic socialist model that was detached from the people and violated the principles of scientific socialism. Therefore, "Doi Moi is not about changing the goal of socialism, but rather about better achieving that goal through correct socialist concepts and appropriate forms, steps, and measures." Throughout the process of Doi Moi, the CPV has consistently adhered to this political direction, resolutely opposing and timely correcting any behavior within the Party that deviates from or violates it.
The upheaval in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe exacerbated the difficulties for the Doi Moi policy, which had only recently been implemented and had yet to yield significant results. Some opportunists took the opportunity to aggressively advocate for ideas and propositions such as pluralism, multi-party systems, and democratic socialism. The socialist convictions of some Party members began to waver, doubts arose regarding the socialist path, and there was a danger that Vietnam’s Doi Moi might deviate from the socialist direction. To ensure that Doi Moi proceeded in the right direction, the 6th Plenary Session of the 6th CPV Central Committee in March 1989 proposed "Five Basic Principles": namely, "must persist in socialism, must persist in the theory of Marxism-Leninism, must persist in the leadership of the Communist Party, must build and perfect socialist democracy, and must combine patriotism with internationalism." These were established as the basic principles Vietnam must adhere to in following the path of socialism and carrying out Doi Moi. In 1991, the 7th National Congress of the CPV adopted the Platform for National Construction in the Period of Transition to Socialism, which took "holding high the banner of socialism and persisting in the leadership of the Party" as the primary experiences of the Vietnamese revolution and emphasized continuing to advance Doi Moi along the socialist direction. Since then, the "Five Basic Principles" have become the fundamental reference for the CPV to maintain its political direction and constitute an important political guarantee for Vietnam to achieve industrialization and modernization.
In 2011, based on the new situation, the 11th National Congress of the CPV emphasized once again: "We must persist in the goals and line of Doi Moi; persist in the creative application and development of Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought; persist in the goals of national independence and socialism; persist in combining active and proactive international integration with the construction of an independent and self-reliant economic system and the preservation of national traditional cultural identity; and persist in combining the expansion and promotion of democracy with the strengthening of discipline and rules." That is to say, the direction of Vietnam's Doi Moi is socialist; this is beyond doubt and cannot be shaken. On this basis, the Party must also integrate the characteristics of the era and the international situation to explore a Vietnamese socialist path with national characteristics. In 2016, when discussing political direction, the 12th National Congress of the CPV highlighted the need to "persist in the working-class nature of the Party." In the new era, the status of the working class has not changed; it remains the vanguard and the leading class of the revolution for the CPV, the representative of advanced productive forces, and the vanguard in the cause of building socialism. The CPV remains the party of the working class; this is an inherent requirement for persisting in the correct direction of Vietnamese socialism. Nguyen Xuan Phuc, then Prime Minister of Vietnam, stated: "Although the working class only accounts for 14% of the national population and 27% of the total labor force, its contribution to Vietnam's GDP exceeds 65% and it contributes over 70% of the national revenue." Therefore, it is necessary to recognize and expand the power of the working class to consolidate the CPV's class foundation, maintain its essence as a working-class party, and ensure that Vietnamese socialist construction advances in the right direction. In 2021, the 13th National Congress of the CPV summarized the experience of political construction into the "Five Persistences": persist in and continuously apply and develop Marxism-Leninism and Ho Chi Minh Thought in a creative manner to meet the practical development requirements of Vietnam in different stages; persist in the goals of national independence and socialism; persist in the Doi Moi line aimed at "prosperous people, a strong nation, democracy, equity, and civilization"; and persist in the nature of the Party as a working-class party and in the basic principles of Party building. These "Five Persistences" are not only the basic requirements for the CPV's political construction but also the important standards for measuring whether the Party’s political direction is correct. They represent both an inheritance of and adherence to the "Five Basic Principles," as well as new requirements for maintaining political direction under the new situation. This demonstrates that the CPV has a clear awareness of its environment and has become increasingly confident in its own development.
II. Standing firm on the "people-as-the-root" political stance and achieving the unification of "Party intent" and "people's hearts"
The people's standpoint is the fundamental political standpoint of the CPV. Prioritizing the central position of the masses and giving play to their role as the main subjects is a consistent proposition of the CPV. In 1986, the 6th National Congress of the CPV proposed "people-as-the-root" and "the people know, the people discuss, the people do, and the people inspect" [2], emphasizing that all work of the Party and state must take the people as the foundation and calling for the implementation of the masses' rights to be informed, to participate, to express themselves, to inspect, and to participate in state management. The 8th National Congress of the CPV further implemented and executed these principles. In 2001, the 9th National Congress of the CPV proposed: "Our state is the primary tool for realizing the people's status as masters; it is a socialist rule-of-law state [3] belonging to the people, from the people, and for the people." Combining the fundamental "people-as-the-root" stance with the building of a socialist rule-of-law state, and using the legal system to guarantee various rights of the people as masters, represented a major step forward in the practice of Vietnamese socialist democracy. Since Doi Moi, with the continuous deepening of the reforms and the advancement of democratic construction, while standing firm on the "people's standpoint" and solidifying the tenet of "people-as-the-root," the CPV has gradually formed a discursive expression with Vietnamese national characteristics: namely, "the people are the center and the subject," achieving the unification of "Party intent" and "people's hearts."
(I) "The people are the center and the subject"
In 2011, the 11th National Congress of the CPV proposed in the 2011–2020 Socio-Economic Development Strategy the need to "expand democracy and maximize the role of people, regarding them not only as the subject and primary force of development but also as the goal of development." In 2021, the 13th National Congress of the CPV summarized as a major experience of the past five years of Doi Moi that "the people are the center and the subject of the cause of innovation, construction, and protection of the Fatherland." "Giving play to the human factor and taking the people as the center" was also an important theoretical understanding in the socialist construction of the past ten decade. The primary meaning of "the people are the center and the subject" is to achieve prosperity for the people through vigorous economic development. Furthermore, it involves giving play to the people's role as subjects and refining the mechanism of "Party leadership, state management, and the people as masters," so that the top-down construction of the socialist democratic system is combined with bottom-up political participation, truly realizing the people's status as masters. The 13th National Congress of the CPV evolved the formula of "the people know, the people discuss, the people do, and the people inspect" into "the people know, the people discuss, the people do, the people inspect, the people supervise, and the people enjoy." This is intended to further exercise the people's role as subjects by guaranteeing and expanding their democratic rights, truly achieving the status of "the people as the center and the subject."
(II) Unification of "Party intent" and "people's hearts"
In recent years, the CPV has frequently mentioned the unification of "Party intent" (dang yi) and "people's hearts" (min xin). The CPV believes this unification contains several layers of meaning: First, "Party intent" originates from "people's hearts." The Party's intent must reflect the interests, aspirations, and demands of people from all strata; these are the most important foundations for forming the Party's intent. Consequently, the CPV requires leading cadres at all levels to periodically go deep into the grassroots to understand the people's demands, listen to their opinions, engage in direct dialogue, and collect their feedback and suggestions, practicing a work style that "values the people, stays close to the people, understands the people, learns from the people, and is responsible to the people." Since the 9th National Congress, before any level of Party congress is held, opinions are publicly solicited from the masses on draft documents, which are then revised and supplemented accordingly. This reflects how "Party intent" originates from "people's hearts." Second, "people's hearts" identify with "Party intent." After collecting the people's opinions, suggestions, and demands, the CPV researches them and incorporates reasonable portions into "Party intent." Policies are then issued according to specific procedures, and Party committees and organizations at all levels are required to implement them thoroughly to safeguard the interests of the masses. This enables the people to better understand and identify with the Party's intent, strengthens their confidence in the Party, and encourages them to consciously commit themselves to the cause of Doi Moi and actively protect its achievements. Third, a bridge must be built between "Party intent" and "people's hearts." The CPV believes: "Grassroots organizations are the foundation of the Party, the political core of the grassroots, and the bridge connecting the Party and the people, ensuring the Party's leading position at the grassroots." To ensure that "Party intent" originates from "people's hearts" and that "people's hearts" identify with "Party intent," it is necessary to strengthen the construction of the Party's grassroots organizations. These should be built into strong fortresses—politically, ideologically, and organizationally—serving as the bridge between "Party intent" and "people's hearts" to truly grasp the people's situation, understand their hearts, improve their livelihoods, enhance their wisdom, and continuously consolidate the people's trust in the Party.
III. Improving predictive ability and strengthening political stamina to resist political risks
Since its founding, the CPV has been a party with a strong sense of potential crisis. In recent years, with the complex evolution of domestic and international situations, various political risks facing the CPV have continuously increased. It must both respond to the "peaceful evolution" [4] of the West and guard against internal "self-evolution" and "self-transformation" [5]. Since 1992, the CPV has issued a series of documents concerning the political construction of the Party, all emphasizing the need to improve political risk prediction capabilities and strengthen political stamina to cope with major political risks.
(I) Improving political risk prediction capabilities
The CPV regards the prevention of domestic and international political risks as an important and regular task for the entire Party. It has formulated various measures at the strategic level and concretized and institutionalized them to improve the CPV’s predictive capabilities in planning paths and policies. First, it has strengthened consultation and research on major issues. Since the dawn of Đổi Mới, the role of domestic policy consultation and research institutions in Vietnam has gradually gained prominence. They hold regular meetings to study major theoretical and practical issues arising during the Đổi Mới process, providing planning and justification for the CPV’s formulation of lines, principles, and policies. For example, during the drafting of the documents for the 13th CPV National Congress, the Central Theoretical Council of the CPV planned the country’s development goals for the near term (up to 2025), mid-term (up to 2030), and long term (up to 2045). It discussed ownership forms, the roles and development directions of various economic sectors for the next five to ten years, explored the relationship between the state, market, and society, as well as how to ensure the market economy develops toward a socialist orientation, and researched issues such as building an independent and self-reliant economy in the context of globalization. Second, it has clarified the content and manifestations of various risks. Summarizing and publicly disclosing the content and modes of expression of various risks—and using these as standards and foundations for judging risks and formulating countermeasures—is an important measure for the CPV to prevent hidden political risks. In October 2016, the Fourth Plenary Session of the 12th CPV Central Committee issued Resolution No. 04-NQ/TW, titled "Resolution on Strengthening Party Building and Rectification; Preventing and Combating the Degradation of Political Ideology, Ethics, and Lifestyle, and Manifestations of Internal 'Self-Evolution' and 'Self-Transformation' [6]." This resolution listed nine manifestations of the regression of political ideology among Party members and cadres, nine manifestations of moral decay and lifestyle degeneration, and nine manifestations of internal "self-evolution" and "self-transformation," warning the entire Party to raise its ideological awareness and political standing and to consciously resist corruption and prevent degeneration. Third, it maintains timely awareness of domestic and international public opinion to avoid falling into a passive position. Insight into the situation and a firm grasp of public opinion is another important measure for the CPV to predict major political risks. The Fourth Plenary Session of the 11th CPV Central Committee pointed out: "Leading cadres at all levels and elected cadres must regularly engage in contact and direct dialogue with the masses, actively grasp the ideological dynamics of cadres and Party members, evaluate and predict their ideological trends, and take timely remedial measures. Maintain unity and consistency within the Party and maintain social consensus." The Fourth Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee also emphasized the need to proactively understand changes in the thinking of Party members and cadres, carry out ideological work reasonably and effectively, create a "first move" to deal with various risks and challenges, and win the strategic initiative in subtle and complex situations.
(2) Strengthening Political Decisive Power
Party members and cadres are the backbone for resisting various risks and challenges, while also being the primary targets for corruption by hostile forces. Since Đổi Mới, the CPV has prioritized "construction" while using "opposition" as a supplement, taking a series of measures to enhance the political decisive power of Party members and cadres. First, it has strengthened the political-theoretical study of Party members and cadres to firm up their political positions and socialist convictions. As of 2022, Vietnam has opened over 700 district-level political centers, 63 provincial political schools, 4 regional political academies, one Academy of Journalism and Communication, one Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics, and one National Academy of Public Administration. This forms a four-tier Party school training system—district, province, region, and center—to provide education and training in political theory and management knowledge for Party members and cadres at all levels. According to statistics, district-level political centers train 1.7 million grassroots Party members and cadres annually, while regional political academies, the Academy of Journalism and Communication, and the Ho Chi Minh National Academy of Politics have trained 12,312 participants in advanced political theory classes. Second, it has strengthened the construction of ideology, ethics, and work style. Since Đổi Mới, the CPV’s propaganda and education departments have formulated and implemented annual publicity plans centered on ideological politics, ethics, and lifestyle. For example, centered on the resolution of the Fourth Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee and Directive No. 05 of the 12th Central Committee Politburo regarding "Promoting the Study and Practice of Ho Chi Minh’s Thought, Ethics, and Style," the Party has published study manuals, held knowledge competitions, and commended advanced models. In addition to strengthening positive guidance, the CPV has organized theoretical workers to strike back against the reactionary rhetoric of hostile forces to maintain ideological unity within the Party. Third, it has carried out Party rectification and style-rectification movements. The CPV places particular emphasis on the vanguard and exemplary role of the heads of Party organizations, requiring them to lead Party members and cadres in conducting criticism and self-criticism against 27 manifestations of "self-evolution," "self-transformation," and various erroneous ideas. This allows for the timely discovery and criticism of organizations and individuals with corrupt tendencies in ideology, ethics, and lifestyle, thereby enhancing the political decisive power of the entire Party.
IV. Improving the Political Capacity of Party Members and Cadres, and Cultivating a "Six Dares" Cadre Corps
Improving the political capacity of Party members and cadres is an important component of the Party’s political building. Since Đổi Mới, the CPV has paid special attention to improving the political capacity of Party members and cadres, particularly leading cadres, key cadres, and strategic-level cadres. By strengthening selection and appointment standards, refining assessment and evaluation criteria, raising education and training standards, and improving cadre incentive and protection mechanisms, the CPV aims to enhance the political capacity and political skills of Party members and cadres, constructing a "Six Dares" cadre corps that "dares to think," "dares to speak," "dares to do," "dares to take responsibility," "dares to innovate," and "dares to face difficulties and challenges and act for the public interest."
(1) Strengthening Selection and Appointment Standards
In recent years, the CPV has continuously strengthened selection and appointment standards in the selection and recommendation of cadres at all levels, taking political capacity as the primary indicator for evaluating cadre ability. In the planning work for the preparatory candidates for the CPV Central Committee (for the 2021–2026 term), the CPV Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat specifically established a Steering Committee for the formulation of the strategic-level cadre preparatory candidate plan, headed by Nguyễn Phú Trọng, and a supporting group for the Steering Committee, headed by Phạm Minh Chính, to lead grassroots units in carrying out recommendation work. At the Steering Committee meeting, Nguyễn Phú Trọng emphasized that strategic-level cadres are the people who formulate the future development lines of the Party and the state, and thus there are higher standards for their professional abilities; cadres whose political ideology has degenerated, who lack unity, who are passive, or who engage in embezzlement, corruption, or political opportunism must never be included in the planning. In December 2018, the Ninth Plenary Session of the 12th CPV Central Committee, in accordance with Plan No. 11 issued by the Politburo regarding "Personnel Recommendations for the Central Committee for the 2021–2026 Term," screened and reviewed 250 cadres recommended by various localities, agencies, and units, agreeing to include 205 cadres in the planning and submit them to the Politburo for decision. The recommendation and selection work for the strategic-level cadre corps highlighted the CPV’s requirement to take political standards as the primary standard in the selection and appointment of personnel.
(2) Refining Assessment and Evaluation Standards
The CPV believes that establishing an open, transparent, comprehensive, and reasonable cadre assessment and evaluation mechanism is an important breakthrough in the construction of the cadre corps. The assessment and evaluation mechanism for Party members and cadres must be transparent and continuous, involving multi-dimensional inspections of Party members and cadres, with the results disclosed to overcome subjectivity. In August 2017, the CPV Central Committee issued Regulation No. 89-QD/TW regarding "Guidelines for Title Standards and Evaluation Criteria for Leading and Management Cadres at All Levels," which adopted a quantitative 100-point system to assess cadres. The assessment content included political ideology, ethics, work style, organizational discipline, and task completion, with each indicator subdivided into 4–5 specific metrics to conduct a more detailed inspection of cadres. On this basis, the CPV Central Committee Politburo issued Regulation No. 214-QB/TW in January 2020 regarding "Title Standards and Evaluation Criteria for Cadres under the Management of the Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat," which set more comprehensive and strict requirements for the political ideology, educational background, and prestige of strategic-level cadres. Through refining assessment and evaluation standards, the CPV hopes to select a group of cadres possessing both political integrity and professional competence [7], replacing those who lack ability, have insufficient prestige, or have committed errors, thereby providing internal impetus for improving the political capacity of Party members and cadres.
(3) Raising Education and Training Standards
The CPV improves the political capacity of Party members and cadres by formulating a scientific and complete training planning system. In cadre training, the CPV sets different standards for different positions and سپس (thereafter) assigns appropriate roles based on each cadre’s professional skills and areas of expertise. For example, for strategic-level cadres, the Organization Commission of the CPV Central Committee held knowledge-update training classes in August and November 2019 and July 2020. The curriculum covered the Party’s ideological theory, economy, society and culture, Party building, politics, national defense and security, diplomacy, and leadership and management skills, aiming to cultivate high-level cadres with foresight, strategic thinking, strong moral character, and responsibility to the Party and the people who can adapt to the new situation. For cadres working in difficult areas, important sectors, and experimental zones for new development models, the Party implements career planning and a rotation system to firm up their revolutionary character and enhance their leadership abilities. Furthermore, the CPV focuses on the rotation and off-site posting of Party committee secretaries at the provincial and district levels to ensure that Party members and cadres cultivate and temper their political capacity and accumulate leadership and management experience through practice, while avoiding phenomena such as "networks of relationships" and "cronyism."
(4) Improving Incentive and Protection Mechanisms
In recent years, the CPV Central Committee, Politburo, and Secretariat have issued a series of resolutions, directives, regulations, and conclusions regarding cadre incentive and protection work. For example, Resolution No. 12-NQ/TW on "Several Urgent Issues in Current Party Building," passed by the Fourth Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee, and Resolution No. 26-NQ/TW on "Focusing on Building a Cadre Corps, Especially at the Strategic Level, with Both Integrity and Competence," passed by the Seventh Plenary Session of the 12th Central Committee, have formed a relatively complete set of cadre incentive and protection mechanisms. These aim to enhance the combat effectiveness of Party members and cadres and protect those vital and creative "Six Dares" cadres. The 13th CPV National Congress also explicitly proposed: "Establish mechanisms for the selection, training, attraction, and heavy use of talent; encourage and protect cadres who dare to think, dare to speak, dare to do, dare to take responsibility, dare to innovate, and dare to face difficulties and challenges and act for the common interest." In September 2021, the CPV Central Committee Politburo issued Conclusion No. 14-KL/TW on "Encouraging and Protecting Dynamic and Innovative Cadres Who Strive for the Common Interest," requiring Party committees at all levels, especially the "Number One Leaders" [8], to do a good job in cadre cultivation. Cadres who are proactive and courageous in innovation should be praised, rewarded, and given important roles, and for those who act appropriately to safeguard the public interest but actually cause certain losses, their responsibility should be mitigated or exempted.
V. Reshaping the Political Ecosystem and Building a "Clean and Strong" Party
In recent years, the CPV has reshaped the political ecosystem from the perspectives of political style, political discipline, and political institutions to build a clean and strong Party and political system.
(1) Rectifying the Political Style
The CPV believes that political style is formed by the attitudes, methods, and habits of Party members and cadres in their daily work; it is a reflection of political quality, political level, political wisdom, and political combat effectiveness, and it affects the relationship between the Party and the people. Addressing problems existing in the Party’s political style, the CPV has proposed a series of measures to rectify it. In January 2016, the 12th CPV National Congress proposed the overall goal of style construction: "scientific, collective, democratic, close to the people, respecting the people, for the people, sticking to reality, and matching words with deeds." It required the heads of Party committees and agency units at all levels—especially Politburo members, Secretariat members, and Central Committee members—to set an example by being the first to conduct criticism and self-criticism. This stimulated the enthusiasm of Party members and cadres to rectify their political style and produced good results. At the same time, the CPV further clarified political style standards and rectified issues of improper style. Regulation No. 89-QD/TW regarding "Guidelines for Title Standards and Evaluation Criteria for Leading and Management Cadres at All Levels" clearly defined standards for work style: being responsible for work, being active and innovative, daring to think and do, and executing tasks flexibly; using scientific and democratic work methods and adhering to principles; and actively collaborating, enthusiastically guiding, and striving to help comrades and colleagues. In the "Study and Practice Ho Chi Minh’s Thought, Ethics, and Style" activities, the CPV focused on excavating advanced models, summarizing experiences, and promoting them to guide the masses of Party members, cadres, and people in reshaping the political ecosystem.
(2) Strengthening Political Discipline
Since the start of Doi Moi [9], the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) has continuously emphasized political discipline and strengthened "hard constraints" on Party members. In November 2011, the Central Committee of the CPV promulgated Regulation No. 47-QD/TW on "Prohibitions for Party Members," listing 19 categories of behavior forbidden to Party members. In October 2021, to adapt to the latest requirements for Party building, the CPV promulgated Regulation No. 37-QD/TW to replace Regulation No. 47-QD/TW. This new regulation added supplementary provisions regarding violations of organizational principles, the deterioration of political ideology, and detachment from the masses, thereby raising the awareness of the entire Party regarding political and organizational discipline. The CPV believes that the "incapacity" or "displacement" of Inspection Committees [10] at various levels is a major reason for the laxity of political discipline. To this end, the CPV has, on the one hand, granted higher authority to Inspection Committees at all levels through legalization. Examples include Regulation No. 01-QDi/TW on the "Duties and Powers of Inspection Committees in Preventing and Combating Corruption" (May 2018), Regulation No. 22-QD/TW on "Party Inspection, Supervision, and Discipline" (July 2021), and Conclusion No. 34-KL/TW on the "Strategy for Party Inspection and Supervision to 2030" (April 2022). These documents redefined the duties and powers of Inspection Committees at all levels, granting them the power to strictly, swiftly, and thoroughly inspect and handle disciplined Party organizations and members. On the other hand, the CPV has continuously strengthened the coordination mechanism between Inspection Committees and functional departments such as state inspection, auditing, investigation, prosecution, and adjudication. It comprehensively employs Party disciplinary actions, administrative sanctions, and legal penalties to punish disciplined Party members and cadres. From 2012 to 2022, Party committees and Inspection Committees at all levels of the CPV handled over 2,700 Party organizations and nearly 168,000 disciplined Party members, including 7,390 members involved in corruption. The CPV Central Committee, the Politburo, the Secretariat, and the Central Inspection Commission handled 170 high-ranking cadres, including 33 members of the CPV Central Committee, 4 members of the Politburo, and over 50 generals. Prosecutorial organs investigated and prosecuted 33,868 individuals in 19,546 cases, and initiated proceedings against 33,037 individuals in 16,699 cases. Nguyen Phu Trong [11] remarked: "This is a good experience. In accordance with principles, Party discipline comes first, followed by administrative discipline, and then criminal processing. This conforms to verified guidelines and practice, and has achieved good results." Enforcing strict political discipline, strengthening political inspection and supervision, and severely punishing disciplined Party members and cadres helps maintain the authority of the CPV, eliminates "forbidden zones" and "exceptions" within the Party, and curbs the corruption and degeneration of the ideological, political, moral, and lifestyle aspects of Party members. It serves as a powerful guarantee for reshaping the political ecosystem.
(3) Strengthening Institutional Constraints
Promoting the supporting institutional framework and filling policy gaps provides the institutional guarantee for the CPV to reshape its political ecosystem. In the practice of Party rectification and governance, the CPV curbs negative phenomena, corruption, and the "running for office" [12] culture by strengthening institutional constraints. First, it strengthens the inspection, monitoring, and supervision mechanisms for cadres. In recent years, the CPV has issued new regulations on the functions, tasks, and powers of Inspection Committees and the Government Inspectorate. Simultaneously, it provides a basis and support for the supervisory powers of representative organs, the Fatherland Front [13], social organizations, and the masses, forming a joint supervision and constraint mechanism involving internal Party inspection, state monitoring, and multi-subject supervision. Second, it improves relevant laws and regulations. To adapt to the new requirements of the Doi Moi cause, Vietnam amended its Anti-Corruption Law in 2007, 2012, and 2017, making new provisions for corrupt acts, the anti-corruption responsibilities of various subjects, and the property declaration system. In addition, Vietnam has recently promulgated several laws and regulations involving the management of specific economic and social affairs, mainly concentrated in areas prone to corruption such as construction investment, public revenue and expenditure, public assets, state-owned enterprise reform, land and mineral resource management, finance, taxation, and customs. These aim to limit the negative influence of "interest groups," "private plots" [14], and "term thinking" [15], as well as to eliminate office-based corruption.
VI. Conclusion
Since the start of Doi Moi, the CPV has treated political building as an essential component of Party building. It has unified internal Party thinking, curbed unhealthy tendencies within the Party, and enhanced the Party’s leadership capacity, governing capacity, and combat effectiveness. Its ties with the masses have also grown closer, consolidating its governing status and creating a favorable environment for continuing Doi Moi and achieving industrialization and modernization.
It must be pointed out that the CPV still faces several issues in the political building of the Party. First, more effort is needed to transform the Party's will into specific policies for implementation, and the effectiveness of governance needs further improvement. This is mainly due to some Party members and cadres having insufficient understanding and a lack of thorough comprehension of the Party's theories, lines, and policies. Progress is slow and effectiveness is poor when transforming the Party's will into individual will and action, which has caused a certain degree of alienation in cadre-mass relations. The focus of the CPV's political building work in the future will be to implement the policies and resolutions of the CPV Central Committee more efficiently and to reverse the "hot at the top, cold at the bottom" [16] situation. Second, the phenomena of "self-evolution" [17] and "self-transformation" still exist within the CPV. In some areas, formalism, bureaucratism, and the political-ideological deterioration of cadres persist. How to proceed from within to improve the consciousness and ability to resist corruption and prevent degeneration is the focus of the CPV's future efforts to guard against political risks. Third, the cultivation of "Six-Dares" [18] cadres has a long way to go. Cultivating a "Six-Dares" cadre contingent is the key and breakthrough point for the future enhancement of the CPV's political capacity. It requires not only a complete set of mechanisms for selection, appointment, evaluation, and training, but also a relaxed environment across society that allows for failure, encourages responsibility, and does not seek quick success and instant benefits. Building both aspects is a long-term and arduous task. Fourth, although the CPV has promulgated many Party regulations and disciplines in recent years to purify the Party's political atmosphere through the "hard constraints" of the system, the construction of relevant institutional systems remains incomplete. Furthermore, supporting "soft constraints" are relatively lacking. That is, creating a clean and upright internal political ecosystem through the lenses of political culture and political style remains a difficult problem facing the CPV.