Xiang Zuotao and Gu Feng: Beyond "Labeling" — A Re-examination of New Radical Parties in Europe

Since 2008, under the overlapping effects of factors such as the international financial crisis, the refugee crisis, terrorist attacks, and civil unrest, political polarization in Europe has intensified. Represented by the Hungarian Civic Alliance (hereafter "Fidesz"), the French "National Rally," the Brothers of Italy, and the Sweden Democrats, a cohort of parties wielding radical platforms has successively emerged on the European political stage. Beyond these, new radicalist parties across Europe also include: "France Unbowed"; Italy’s "Lega" and "Five Star Movement"; the Alternative for Germany (AfD) and the Left Party; Spain's "Vox" and "Podemos"; the Freedom Party of Austria; the Dutch "Ja21"; the Czech "ANO 2011" and "Freedom and Direct Democracy"; Hungary’s "Jobbik"; the Greek "Syriza," and others. They have used various elections to steadily expand their influence, powerfully impacting the dominant position of traditional parties in the political arena. In 2022, the Brothers of Italy garnered 26% of the vote in the national parliamentary elections; in Hungary, Fidesz received nearly 54% of the vote, securing 135 out of 199 seats in the National Assembly; the Sweden Democrats won 20.5% of the vote, becoming the second-largest party in parliament with the ability to influence the policies of the Moderate Party government; and the French "National Rally" received 18.7% of the popular vote in national parliamentary elections, ultimately securing 89 seats. The "New Ecological and Social People's Union" (NUPES), led by "France Unbowed," won 131 seats, becoming the second-largest bloc in parliament. It should be noted that due to differences in statistical criteria, the Le Monde website reported 142 seats for NUPES, which deviates from the Ministry of the Interior's data. At the same time, since their inception, these parties have been subjected to criticism from traditional European political forces and mainstream media. The latter frequently use derogatory labels such as "extremist," "xenophobic," "populist," and "racist" to describe new radicalist parties, accusing them of inciting the public, violating the core values of freedom and democracy, and posing a major threat to democracy. However, why have such "disreputable" new radicalist parties gained increasing favor among the European public?

I. The Image of New Radicalist Parties Under the "Labels"

The origins and development processes of various new radicalist parties are not identical; overall, they represent an ideologically heterogeneous collection. However, because they all direct their fire ^[1] at social ills in their own countries and Europe as a whole, proposing policy positions that differ from traditional parties—or are even "politically incorrect"—and have gradually come to "stand as equals" ^[2] with traditional parties, they have incurred a derogatory "labeling" response from the latter.

Traditional parties and politicians generally believe that new radicalist parties are a "heterodox" force. They attempt to challenge or transform mainstream values and institutions in an "aggressive" manner, which is primarily manifested in the following aspects: First, new radicalist parties possess distinct characteristics such as being "extreme," "hateful," and "racist." For instance, French President Emmanuel Macron claimed during a debate that Marine Le Pen, leader of the "National Rally," represented "corrupt, dangerous nationalism" and was a dangerous liar. The "Progressive Alliance," a joint organization of Social Democratic parties from many Western European countries, stated that new radicalist parties are "bent on policies of division, igniting the fires of hatred and fear, and encouraging marginalization and fragmentation." Second, new radicalist parties run counter to liberal democratic principles, possessing traits such as being "authoritarian," "oligarchic," and "despotic," as well as "pro-Russian" or "colluding with Russia" tendencies. Since 2010, the European Union has repeatedly criticized the Hungarian Fidesz government for violating the EU's basic value principles and undermining freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, leading to democratic backsliding in Hungary. In 2022, the European Parliament even determined that Hungary was no longer a full democracy, but rather an "electoral autocracy." Giorgia Meloni, leader of the Brothers of Italy, and Le Pen have frequently been characterized as "pro-Russian" because they have either advocated for developing partnerships with Russia or have publicly praised Putin. Third, new radicalist parties advocate populism, inciting public anxiety and hostility. For example, Macron stated that populism is spreading through Europe like leprosy and that Europeans should fight against it more actively. Donald Tusk, leader of the European People’s Party, believes that two major camps have formed in European politics—irresponsible populist parties and the responsible People's Party—and has vowed to fight resolutely against "populists, manipulators, and autocrats."

Similar to traditional parties and politicians, the labels most commonly used by Western mainstream media in their commentary are "far-left/right" and "populism." The former is primarily used to illustrate how the views and propositions of new radicalist parties deviate from traditional mainstream values, carrying radical or even extreme sentiments. For example, the media often uses "far-left" or "hard-left" to refer to "France Unbowed" because the party attempts to "deviate" from the EU's economic, social, and budgetary policies, challenging the free-market principles upheld by the EU. The New York Times translated its party name as "Rebellious France," implying it is a "rebel" against mainstream values. The "National Rally" is viewed as a typical French far-right entity because of its intolerant and unfriendly attitude toward immigrants, refugees, and foreign religious cultures, even instigating cultural confrontation and conflict. "Populism" is the response of Western mainstream media to new radicalist parties’ self-proclamation as representatives of the people's will and "amplifiers for the people." They note that the rise of the populist phenomenon is related to the current situation of mounting European problems, but they tend to believe that charismatic leaders of new radicalist parties use "inciteful" and "deceptive" discourse to distort social issues, encourage opposition between the people and the elites, and divide society. For instance, the BBC claimed that populist forces have brought Europe to a crossroads and suggested it would lead to a "fragile, fragmented Europe." Euronews similarly believes that populism will seriously erode European liberal democracy.

In addition, for some parties with historical links to fascism, Western mainstream media view them as remnants of fascism. After the Brothers of Italy won the election in 2022, several Western mainstream media outlets called them a "post-fascist" party and predicted that Italy's future was uncertain due to their victory. Some commentaries even suggested that Meloni's victory was a turning point in Italian history, breaking the democratic legacy and development trajectory established since the fall of Benito Mussolini. Ezio Mauro, former editor-in-chief of the Italian newspaper La Repubblica, similarly worried that Meloni's rise would "change the shape of our country" and "mark the end of anti-fascism." Regarding the rise of the Sweden Democrats, Deutsche Welle argued that the party cannot shed its neo-Nazi label and that many of its members remain racists. The Boston Review stated that with its promise of reviving a homogeneous nation, the Sweden Democrats have gained the identification of many white nationals. In the coming four years, its influence on policy will exceed anything seen before, and it might even become the largest single party—a nightmarish prospect.

Evaluations from Western academia are slightly more objective, yet cases of "pulling a biased side" ^[3] also frequently occur. Western scholars often use terms such as "Radical Left/Right," "Far Left/Right," "Extreme Left/Right," or "Left/Right-Wing Populism" to refer to new radicalist parties. Behind these concepts remains their concern over the rise of new radicalism.

First, new radical parties are divided into left and right categories. The vast majority of research focuses on right-wing radicalist parties, regarding them as a brand-new party family. In the eyes of scholars, right-wing radicalist parties contain features such as nationalism, racism, xenophobia, opposition to multiculturalism, and a preference for a strong state. For example, Cas Mudde distilled the ideology of the radical right party family into nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. Among these, the primary element is nativism—the idea that the state should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and that non-native elements (both people and ideas) fundamentally threaten the homogeneous nation-state. Conversely, left-wing radicalist parties possess distinct characteristics such as anti-capitalism, anti-neoliberalism, anti-establishment/elite stances, and internationalism. They adhere to values of social justice and wealth redistribution, demanding thorough reforms of a socialist nature for the current economic and social systems. The division between left and right constitutes the basic approach to the study of new radicalist parties in contemporary Western academia. However, its flaws are quite evident: specifically, it fails to explain why the supporters of both right-wing and left-wing new radicalist parties mostly belong to the lower-middle strata of society, failing to "reflect the true range of choices available to voters seeking to express their disillusionment with the establishment."

Second, Western academia refuses to equate new radicalist parties with the remnants of fascism, believing they are merely ideologically distant from centrist mainstream parties rather than being entirely opposed to the existing system. Western academia uses the term "extreme" to distinguish it from "radical." Mudde and Luke March define "extreme" as being thoroughly anti-democratic in both ideology and practice, not excluding the use of violent means; "radical" implies opposition to certain key features or specific elements of liberal democracy, most notably opposition to political pluralism and constitutional protection for minority groups. New radicalist parties basically abide by the rules of representative democracy. Hans-Georg Betz, a scholar at the University of Zurich, similarly believes that unlike the fascist and right-wing extremist parties and movements of the past, the radical populist right hardly seeks revolutionary changes to existing democratic regimes or the creation of a "New Man." Therefore, new radicalist parties such as the "National Rally" and the "Lega" (Northern League) are basically categorized within the "radical" scope in the aforementioned research.

Third, populism is the most prominent characteristic of current new radicalist parties, but populism has no fixed ideology and is "hollow." For example, Paul Taggart believes that populism originally existed as an adjective attached to other ideologies to fill its own emptiness. Mudde pointed out that populism is a thin-centered ideology that needs to be attached to thick-centered ideologies such as fascism, liberalism, or socialism. Currently, populist forces have branched into two "variants": "left-wing populism," produced by the integration with left-wing values; and "national populism" or "right-wing populism," characterized by the integration with nationalism and nativism to defend national cultural traditions and exclude immigrants. Regarding the impact of populism, Western scholars tend to admit that while it reveals some flaws in existing liberal democracy, it divides society into two homogeneous and opposing groups—"the pure people" and "the corrupt elites." Furthermore, its self-proclamation as the "true defender of true democracy, capable of considering the concerns and interests of 'ordinary people' and daring to speak out against the establishment," brings challenges to current political operating mechanisms and threatens the democratic system.

In summary, current traditional Western parties and politicians, mainstream media, and academia have assigned a series of labels to new radicalist parties, such as "populism," "far-left/right," "radical," "extreme," and "racist." Among these, traditional parties and politicians hold the strongest prejudice and hostility toward new radicalist parties; in the discourse of the former, the latter are regarded as social "malignant tumors" that must be eradicated. Although mainstream media have noted that the rise of new radicalist parties is related to current social problems, they still give a thoroughly negative evaluation of these parties' words and deeds. By comparison, evaluations from academia are slightly more objective. Although the vast majority of Western scholars give negative evaluations of new radicalist parties, viewing them as challengers to the Western political system, some scholars recognize the realistic factors of their emergence—certain ills of Western society. However, it must be pointed out that they still fail to link the rise of new radicalist parties with the inherent flaws of the capitalist system and the fundamental contradictions of the capitalist political apparatus. In reality, the rise of new radicalist parties is the inevitable result of the lower-middle strata in Western societies having their interest expression blocked due to the insufficient representativeness of traditional parties.

II. The "Public Pleasing" of New Radicalist Parties

Since the 1980s, neoliberal values and policies have gradually permeated every aspect of European society alongside the process of European integration. Following the 2008 international financial crisis, the flaws of Europe’s standing system were more fully exposed. Economic growth in various countries became sluggish, unemployment remained high for protracted periods, and some European nations faced bankruptcy due to debt issues. The practice of traditional political parties attempting to save the economy through austerity policies and drastic cuts to social welfare harmed the rights and interests of ordinary people, leading to a further widening of the gap between rich and poor. At the same time, due to the massive influx of immigrants and refugees, the social order and cultural traditions of European countries suffered a shock. A portion of the populace became dissatisfied with various policies led by the EU, generating "Euro-skeptic" and "Euro-phobic" sentiments. In response to these circumstances, new radicalist parties put forward unconventional propositions.

Regarding domestic affairs, new radicalist parties attack traditional parties as the promoters and defenders of the standing system who have monopolized power for a long time, preventing the people’s demands from being voiced. For example, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) claims that actual political power is concentrated in a narrow circle of state and party officials, while ordinary people are almost completely alienated from "politics." Consequently, most new radicalist parties advocate for direct democracy in their respective platforms to provide more opportunities for ordinary citizens to participate in political activities. Marine Le Pen and Jean-Luc Mélenchon both support the introduction of citizens' initiative referendums to vote on major issues. Mélenchon even calls for the establishment of a "Sixth Republic," allowing for recall referendums—where enough citizen signatures can remove elected officials—as well as the convening of constituent assemblies and the power to propose or repeal laws. Furthermore, due to the constant scandals surrounding the Spanish royal family in recent years, public opposition to the constitutional monarchy has strengthened. In response, Spain’s Podemos clearly opposes the current constitutional monarchy, stating that the people have the right to choose whether Spain implements a monarchy or a republic. Additionally, because corruption scandals involving traditional elites have frequently broken out in some European countries, new radicalist parties have hoisted the banner of "anti-corruption." For instance, Spain’s Podemos, Italy’s Five Star Movement, and Greece’s SYRIZA have all expressed "anti-corruption" stances. Andrej Babiš, the founder of ANO 2011, even claimed that it was the corruption of traditional parties that made his success possible.

On economic issues, new radicalist parties have proposed strengthening state intervention as a counterpoint to the EU’s long-standing principle of unrestricted free markets. This is mainly reflected in several areas: First, due to the serious "hollowing out" ^[4] of European industry, many new radicalist parties have incorporated the revitalization of manufacturing into their campaign platforms. Brothers of Italy (FdI) proposed the slogan "Made in Italy," arguing that the government should invest resources to build secure, localized industrial chains and enhance the reputation and competitiveness of domestic products. Furthermore, some new radicalist parties support the nationalization of strategic sectors concerning the national economy and people's livelihood, and hope to introduce a package of measures to encourage and support the development of domestic small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), including facilitating financing, simplifying regulations and administrative procedures, and tax reductions. Second, facing competition and acquisitions from foreign capital, new radicalist parties proposed strengthening the regulation of large multinational corporations and banks to crack down on tax evasion, tax avoidance, and unfair competition. For example, during her campaign, Le Pen proposed the establishment of a "French Sovereign Fund" to avoid improper acquisitions by foreign capital. Third, regarding the existing framework of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy, new radicalist parties demand strengthened protection for domestic agriculture. As a traditional agricultural power, France is now plagued by problems such as the aging of the rural labor force and the worsening poverty of farmers. In response, Le Pen formulated an independent agricultural development outline during her campaign, the core propositions of which include intervening to set a minimum price index for agricultural products to guarantee farmers' income, excluding agriculture from multilateral free trade agreements, and setting entry thresholds for imported agricultural products. The Sweden Democrats (SD) advocate for always prioritizing domestic agricultural and fishery products in public procurement and hope to set up special funds to attract the younger generation to the agriculture and forestry industries. Fourth, to cope with the rising cost of living, new radicalist parties either suggest increasing wages and minimum wage standards or advocate for yielding benefits to the people through tax adjustments. Affected by the Ukraine crisis, European energy and raw material prices have soared. In France, the cost of a ton of gasoline rose from 680 euros before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic to 1,000 euros in 2022, while diesel prices rose from 650 euros per ton to 2,400 euros, causing the economic pressure on ordinary people to increase sharply. Based on this, Le Pen called for energy products (gas, electricity, fuel, and heating oil) to be regarded as basic necessities for the people's life, and that their Value Added Tax (VAT) should be reduced from 20% to 5.5%.

In the social sphere, new radicalist parties hope to reform the existing welfare system to cater to the demands of the lower and middle classes. Most of their platforms cover the following: increasing unemployment benefits, adjusting pension standards, providing more convenient and equal employment opportunities for persons with disabilities, and strengthening the crackdown on violence against women. For example, to increase the willingness of young people to have children, Brothers of Italy proposed a package of policies, including increasing birth subsidies, reducing the VAT on maternal and child products, and providing free childcare services. After experiencing the shock of the COVID-19 pandemic, new radicalist parties have generally enhanced their focus on the healthcare field. Both Le Pen and Mélenchon have proposed ideas such as improving conditions in areas with insufficient medical resources and improving the treatment of medical staff. On the issues of immigrants and refugees, while a few new radicalist parties such as France’s La France Insoumise (LFI) and Spain’s Podemos hold an inclusive stance, hoping to fully guarantee the right of asylum for refugees and improve their living environment, most parties hold a strict attitude and oppose the EU’s multiculturalism. They believe that immigrants are difficult to assimilate simply and that naturalization requirements need to be tightened to crack down on illegal immigration. The Sweden Democrats stated that new immigrants should demonstrate a willingness to actively integrate into Swedish culture, and those who do not learn Swedish, do not want to work, or do not want to adapt to Swedish values should be deported. Le Pen hopes to amend the current constitution and laws to raise the threshold for immigration to protect France's identity, culture, history, and linguistic heritage. Moreover, due to the increase in violent incidents in European countries in recent years and the heightened sense of insecurity among domestic residents, new radicalist parties have also proposed strengthening security forces and severely cracking down on crime.

At the level of external relations, new radicalist parties emphasize prioritizing domestic interests. Regarding the question of relations with the EU, they all hold Euro-skeptic positions, albeit to varying degrees. For example, Hungary's Fidesz holds a lower degree of Euro-skepticism, hoping to be able to say "no" to the EU on policy levels such as refugees; Le Pen, however, holds a tougher stance, insisting on the principle that French law is superior to European law, and even once advocated that France should leave Europe or exit the Eurozone. Regarding relations with the United States, new radicalist parties have different ideas due to the varying interests of their countries. Brothers of Italy actively maintains close relations with the United States and supports EU common defense to deal with "extra-territorial challenges"; France's LFI and National Rally (RN) hope France keeps its distance from the "Atlantic Alliance" and advocate for France's withdrawal from NATO’s integrated command system; different from the former two, the Czech Republic’s Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) opposes the Czech Republic following the United States’ lead under the NATO system, advocating that it should maintain good relations with China, the United States, and Russia to find and enhance common interests.

Viewed this way, the propositions of new radicalist parties exhibit clear pragmatic colors, catering to the tastes of their domestic populations. In recent years, their support rates have shown varying degrees of growth, and they have taken power successively in countries such as Hungary, Greece, the Czech Republic, and Italy. However, the governance effects of new radicalist parties vary, generally characterized as "great thunder but little rain" ^[5].

Hungary’s Fidesz is a relatively successful case. Facing an economic situation of high debt and high unemployment, the Fidesz government implemented a package of state-interventionist policies known as "Orbanomics," including tax reform, the nationalization of private pension funds and key industries, and the implementation of a workfare system. In 2011, the Hungarian State Asset Management Company acquired a 22% stake in the energy company MOL Group, and in 2013, it fully acquired the natural gas business under the E.ON Group. At the same time, the Fidesz government also adopted pragmatic social security policies to reduce unemployment, hoping to create "a work-based society." On the one hand, it eased the dissatisfaction of the working population regarding government subsidies for the long-term unemployed and those waiting for employment by reducing-subsidy amounts and shortening-claim periods; on the other hand, the government absorbed the unemployed by launching a large number of public construction projects. In 2013, the average monthly number of people engaged in public projects in Hungary reached 129,100, and in January 2016, it reached 197,000. Existing data indicates that the Hungarian economy under Fidesz rule has significantly improved. Since 2013, Hungary's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has grown steadily, and the unemployment rate dropped from 10.18% in 2013 to 4.05% in 2021, while the youth unemployment rate dropped from 26.52% to 13.49% over the same period. In the socio-cultural field, the Fidesz government has indeed taken culturally conservative actions, as criticized by traditional parties and the media. For example, Viktor Orbán has repeatedly emphasized that "the influx of Muslim refugees poses a threat to Europe’s Christian identity" and that "Hungarians are not a mixed race and do not want to become one," and he has opposed the EU's refugee distribution plan and refused to pay compensation to Roma children who had been illegally segregated. These practices cater to the demands of a considerable portion of the Hungarian populace. According to a 2020 report by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, 57% of Hungarians still harbor resistance toward immigrants. In terms of external relations, the Fidesz government emphasizes conducting independent and autonomous diplomacy. After the outbreak of China-U.S. trade frictions, Hungary withstood U.S. pressure and persisted in expanding friendly relations with China. In 2020, the total volume of China-Hungary bilateral trade reached 11.69 billion USD, a year-on-year increase of 14.4%, a record high. Currently, Hungary has become a logistics center for China's economic and trade relations with Europe, with approximately 15% of European imported goods needing to transit through Hungary. After the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, Hungary repeatedly opposed U.S. and EU sanctions on Russia to protect its own energy security. In a situation where energy prices in European countries soared due to conflicts and sanctions, the increase in energy prices in Hungary was limited. From 2021 to 2022, the price of household gas in Hungary increased by about 35%, which was at a relatively low level among EU countries (the countries with the largest increases were the Czech Republic, Romania, and Latvia, at 230.6%, 165.1%, and 157.2% respectively). Meanwhile, in the second half of 2022, Hungary's household gas price was the lowest among the 24 reporting countries in Europe at 0.0349 euros per kWh (the highest price was in Sweden at 0.2751 euros per kWh). While other European countries were looking for alternative energy sources, Hungary obtained a stable supply of natural gas from Russia and was allowed to defer payments. Clearly, some policies and actions of the Fidesz government that run contrary to the EU have indeed brought tangible benefits to its citizens. It should be further pointed out that although the Fidesz government's practices have drawn criticism from the domestic opposition and the EU, as most scholars predicted, it has only "attacked" or "changed" certain parts of the old system of Hungary and the EU; on the whole, it still follows the Western capitalist system and operating rules.

In contrast, the governing journeys of some new radicalist parties have not been so smooth, leaving one with the sense of "the general dying before the mission is accomplished." ^[6] Taking Greece as an example, Syriza rose to prominence against the backdrop of the debt crisis by championing anti-austerity and anti-corruption stances. After the radical left government took power, it attempted to renegotiate with international creditors, but its proposals were rejected. To obtain bailout funds and avoid national bankruptcy, the radical left government was forced to accept an austerity-linked rescue agreement. This meant the government had to cut pensions, reduce public spending, and slash social welfare, failing to fulfill its previous anti-austerity promises. This move triggered disappointment among some voters. In the parliamentary elections of September 2015, Syriza's votes plummeted from over 2.24 million in the January election to just over 1.92 million, narrowly maintaining its governing status. In 2019, it dismally left office after losing nearly half of its seats again. In Italy, the "Five Star Movement" and the "Lega" (League) formed a coalition government after the 2018 elections. Then-Prime Minister Giuseppe Conte stated that the new government would be a "government of change" that "stands on the side of the citizens." In the early stages of governing, the Conte cabinet approved a series of measures such as the "Citizens' Income" program aimed at eradicating poverty and a new pension scheme. However, more plans were unable to be put into practice due to constraints from other political parties. Meanwhile, as the Lega’s popular support continued to rise after entering the government, the party made new demands regarding the distribution of power. Ultimately, the governing coalition fell into internal friction; the cooperation collapsed the following year, and the coalition government fell.

In light of these situations, some predict that the experiences and lessons of governing will prompt radical forces to return to the establishment. For example, The New York Times stated that no matter how radical a party was previously, "the risks of putting their rebellion into practice once in power can steer them away from the extremes." In reality, the setbacks faced by new radicalist parties in governance are not because they defy the establishment, but because their words and deeds are more "grounded" ^[7] than traditional parties, demonstrating a proactive posture of attempting to change the status quo. The problem is that the social issues in European countries are intricate and complex, rather than being something where "the medicine cures the disease immediately" ^[8] simply through the accession of a new party and a series of new policies. The propositions and policies of new radicalist parties do indeed contain a certain degree of utopianism and narrowness: either they underestimate realistic resistance and incur opposition from various quarters, or they fail to touch the root causes, proposing only stopgap measures that treat the symptoms rather than the disease. As the saying goes, "the person who tied the bell must be the one to untie it" ^[9]—can the people who created the European crisis solve it? The problem for new radicalist parties is precisely that they are "only unable to see the true face of the mountain because they are inside it." ^[10]

III. Supporters of New Radicalist Parties

Who supports new radicalist parties? The answer from these parties is "the people." So, which groups does "the people" include? In the 1990s, when analyzing the radical right such as the French "National Front" and the Austrian Freedom Party, some scholars discovered that the voter base of these parties was gradually becoming "proletarianized"—that is, they were gaining more and more votes from blue-collar workers. Today, a large amount of academic research suggests that the "losers" who have been marginalized or had their interests damaged by modernization and globalization—such as workers, farmers, artisans, and even a portion of the middle class—constitute the core support group for new radicalist parties. In the first round of the 2017 French presidential election, Marine Le Pen mainly received support from farmers, the self-employed, employees, and blue-collar workers, and her support rates among the latter two groups significantly led other candidates. Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s support rate ranked second among intermediate professions, employees, and workers. Intermediate professions include school teachers, middle-level civil servants, technicians, and corporate supervisors. Blue-collar workers and farmers also constitute the solid social foundation for the rise of the Sweden Democrats. According to data from Statistics Sweden’s "Party Preference Survey," as of May 2022, 24.5% of unskilled workers, 27.8% of skilled workers, and 23.3% of farmers and the self-employed preferred the Sweden Democrats. During the same period, the party's support rate among ordinary clerks, middle-level employees, and senior managers was only 13.8%, 11.8%, and 8.3% respectively. In the latest survey, the party's support rates across all social and industrial groups have risen to varying degrees, with support among unskilled and skilled workers increasing to 25.3% and 30.5% respectively.

According to polling data from Ipsos, in Italy, 34.6% of workers voted for the Brothers of Italy in the 2022 parliamentary elections. This figure is double the 16.4% vote share obtained by the Five Star Movement, another new radicalist party. Additionally, 30.2% of individual shopkeepers and artisans, as well as a large number of housewives and pensioners, voted for the Brothers of Italy. Conversely, the Five Star Movement attracted support from the majority of the unemployed, those seeking work, and student voters. If viewed from the perspective of voters' economic income, most Italian citizens with incomes below the median are more willing to trust new radicalist parties. 29.9% of people in the lower-middle income bracket supported the Brothers of Italy, while the Five Star Movement’s support rate was 18.2%, ranking second. Among low-income groups, the Five Star Movement ranked first with a 25% support rate, followed closely by the Brothers of Italy with 23%.

From the perspective of the geographical distribution of voters, new radicalist parties have harvested votes from the economically backward regions of their countries. Le Pen’s "vote bank" is the traditional industrial zones of northern and eastern France—namely Hauts-de-France, Normandy, Grand Est, and parts of the Mediterranean coast. This highly overlaps with France’s impoverished areas. Data from the National Institute of Statistics and Economic Studies (INSEE) shows that the poverty rate in the northern region bordering Belgium and the English Channel ranks second in France, surpassed only by Corsica, with about 18.6% of residents (approximately 1 million people) having incomes below the median level. Poverty rates in regions such as Normandy and Centre-Val de Loire also rank among the highest in France. In contrast, Emmanuel Macron’s votes were concentrated on the Atlantic coast, which has a higher level of economic development, and in wealthy regions near the borders with Germany and Switzerland. In the 2022 presidential election, Le Pen not only maintained her advantage in traditional strongholds but also continued to gather public support in other regions. According to an investigation by The Guardian, Le Pen’s vote share increased across France, particularly in the Massif Central—an area with lower economic levels and agriculture as the main industry—where a large number of rural voters turned to support Le Pen due to the decline of Les Républicains. The situation in Central and Eastern European countries is generally similar. In the last two Czech parliamentary elections, "ANO 2011" received over 35% of the votes in most districts in Karlovy Vary and Ústí in the west, and Moravia-Silesia in the northeast. Since the "Great Changes in Eastern Europe," ^[11] these regions have all experienced significant economic recession. According to reports from the Czech Statistical Office, between 1993 and 2000 alone, the employed population in the Ústí region decreased by about 51,000, while the Moravia region saw a decrease of 44,000. In Hungary, Fidesz's stable source of support is likewise the small-to-medium towns and rural areas with lower levels of economic development. In 2018, Fidesz's support rate was 65% in the least developed regions, 58% in underdeveloped regions, 55% in moderately developed regions, 53% in developed regions, and 44% in the most developed regions.

Furthermore, most voters who support new radicalist parties have received only limited education, placing them at a relative disadvantage in the labor market. A 2019 survey of Czech political parties showed that among those who had received only primary education, about 41.4% of respondents inclined towards supporting "ANO 2011," a figure that was 33.9% among respondents with a secondary education level. It is worth mentioning that the corresponding figures for "ANO 2011’s" main competitor—the Civic Democratic Party—were only 4.6% and 9.3% respectively. According to surveys, the Sweden Democrats are also preferred by citizens with lower levels of education, while voters with higher education levels are more supportive of the Swedish Social Democratic Party.

From this perspective, the supporters of new radicalist parties are not simply limited to a single class or stratum with fixed ideological goals; rather, they share similar socio-economic circumstances—lower-middle incomes, limited education, and employment in traditional industries or self-employment. The situation of these groups has been severely impacted during the process of globalization. The rise of emerging industries, the relocation of industrial chains, and the popularization of automated production have significantly reduced the jobs and incomes of traditional industrial workers, leading to the deterioration of socio-economic conditions in traditional industrial zones and exacerbating the inequality between depressed rural areas and small towns and prosperous metropolises. Meanwhile, the role of the nation-state as a "protective net" ^[12] maintaining the livelihood of people in the lower-middle social strata has been weakened in this process. The practice of cutting welfare protections adopted by the governing traditional parties has caused ordinary people to bear increasingly high living costs. Consequently, the resentment of the lower-middle classes has provided the momentum for new radicalist parties to step into the center of the political stage.

The first layer of resentment among the lower-middle classes stems from a growing sense of insecurity. Due to their lower levels of education, these classes lack the knowledge and social capital for upward mobility and are increasingly uncompetitive in the labor market. Despite working hard, their incomes remain meager; they are exhausted by the struggle for daily necessities ^[13] and lack a "sense of gain." ^[14] A poll ten days before the 2022 French presidential election showed that more than half of the respondents believed the primary crisis currently facing France is social, mainly manifesting as the decline in purchasing power for ordinary people. 74% of respondents believed their purchasing power had decreased over the past five years, while only 7% believed it had improved. In other words, a manifest degradation of living conditions has become the consensus for the majority of the French people today. In Italy, the public similarly expects the new government to take action in the socio-economic sphere. The top three issues of public concern are: subsidies or price caps on oil and gas (43%); tax cuts to increase workers' wages (25%); and the revision or abolition of the "Citizens' Income" policy (23%). In this context, the issue of immigrants and refugees has become a "catalyst" amplifying public anxiety, as they are perceived as competitors for the jobs, social welfare, and security resources of the local European lower-middle classes. The criminal behavior of some immigrants and refugees has further intensified the concerns of ordinary Europeans regarding their personal safety, causing insecurity to transmit from the economic sphere to the realm of cultural identity. As Benz stated, on a deeper level, immigrants and refugees are both an embodiment of a rapidly changing world and an embodiment of the increasing impotence of the nation-state in the face of this world.

The second layer of resentment among the lower-middle classes is directed at the neglect of their situation by the mainstream narratives of traditional parties and media. For years, the propositions of traditional political elites have filtered out the true thoughts of the lower-middle classes. The former tirelessly promote values such as "human rights, freedom, democracy, equality, and the rule of law," while the latter keep their eyes fixed on oil and gas prices, wage levels, and price fluctuations, hoping the government will take measures to improve their real-life conditions. However, through multiple rotations of political parties, the lower-middle classes have seen no hope for change. Therefore, when traditional parties fail as political intermediaries for expressing public will, the lower-middle classes can only seek other ways to voice their demands—including spontaneous political and economic struggles, such as the previous "Yellow Vest Movement" or the French strikes that lasted for several months in early 2023, or choosing new parties that can better represent their interests. In contrast, new radicalist parties have keenly captured the direction of public sentiment and responded more bluntly to the demands of the lower-middle classes. According to polls, 42% of Le Pen’s supporters believe her propositions better represent their voices, while 38% admit they chose Le Pen due to dissatisfaction with Macron. Not only that, new radicalist parties do not just passively respond to the public; they are adept at "setting the pace" ^[15] and proactively "finding their targets." For example, regarding income tax, Mélenchon hopes to refine the existing five brackets into 14, while Le Pen hopes to exempt all young workers under the age of 30 from income tax to help them start families. Clearly, through differentiated propositions, new radicalist parties not only distinguish themselves from traditional parties but also carve up the "losers" of globalization among themselves, attempting to recruit those groups in specific geographical locations, professions, and economic conditions.

IV. Conclusion

As the social crisis in Europe deepens, new radicalist parties have now become a political force capable of rivaling traditional parties. From the perspective of traditional parties, new radicalist parties provoke and manipulate public opinion, ambitiously launching challenges against the existing order; they are consequently branded with labels such as "extremist," "populist," and "xenophobic." Ironically, beneath these many negative labels, new radicalist parties have increasingly gained the recognition of the lower and middle classes, with their support ratings continuously rising. In fact, the narrative discourse of traditional parties carries an obvious bias. New radicalist parties are not as "unorthodox" ^[16] as the mainstream parties allege; rather, they generally follow the rules of the game within existing electoral systems and do not take the fundamental replacement of the system as an explicit objective. More importantly, the rise of new radicalist parties reflects the insufficient representativeness of Western representative democracy. The mainstream values and slogans promoted by traditional parties may seem beautiful, yet because they cannot effectively resolve practical dilemmas, they have failed to move the "disappointed" ^[17] among the lower and middle classes. In sharp contrast, although some of the propositions of new radicalist parties are "unorthodox," they cater to the anxieties and demands of the "disappointed" lower- and middle-class populace, and are regarded as an alternative choice for addressing the current social crisis.

(The authors' affiliation: School of International Studies, Peking University) Internet Editor: Tongxin Source: Contemporary World and Socialism ^[18], Issue 5, 2023