Han Qi: Reasons for the Return of Left-wing Governments in Latin American Countries and Their Potential Impact
At the beginning of the 21st century, an unprecedented political phenomenon occurred in Latin America: in the majority of countries across the region, leftist governments took power one after another. This wave began in 1998 with Hugo Chávez's electoral victory in Venezuela, followed by electoral successes in countries such as Chile, Argentina, Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Bolivia, Peru, Honduras, Ecuador, Paraguay, and Haiti. If Cuba is included, by 2010, thirteen Latin American countries were considered to have leftist governments. Although these governments achieved significant successes in the struggle to eliminate poverty and inequality, this leftist wave began to fracture in the second decade of the 21st century due to various factors—including a new round of U.S. intervention, the sharp drop in international raw material prices in 2014, a new political offensive by the right wing, and political corruption in some countries. Starting with the 2009 coup against then-Honduran President Manuel Zelaya, right-wing governments won successive electoral victories.
However, just when it was thought that the Latin American left’s challenge to neoliberal ideology had failed and the "turn to the left" had ended, the region unexpectedly began a second "turn to the left." The turning point was the 2018 election victory of Andrés Manuel López Obrador in Mexico, followed by the successive rise to power of the left in countries such as Argentina (2019), Bolivia (2020), Peru (2021), Chile (2022), Honduras (2021), Colombia (2022), and Brazil (2023). Combined with countries long governed by the left such as Venezuela (with Maduro’s re-election in 2018), Nicaragua (with Ortega’s re-election in 2021), and Cuba, by January 2023, leftist countries in the region accounted for approximately 90% of the total land area and 90% of the total population, exhibiting characteristics of broad scope and large scale.
The Rise of the Second Wave of Leftist Governments in Latin America as the Result of Interacting Internal and External Factors
Shortly after the phenomenon of the first wave of leftist governance in Latin America receded, a second wave quickly emerged. While this situation may appear accidental, careful analysis reveals it was not coincidental but rather the result of multiple internal and external factors acting in concert.
The restoration of normalcy in electoral politics created conditions for the alternation of power between the left and right. As a regional phenomenon, the "pendulum effect"—the alternating governance of left-wing and right-wing parties in Latin America—emerged in the 21st century. Prior to this, in the 20th century, the "pendulum effect" was more frequently manifested in the cycling between authoritarianism and democracy. By the mid-1970s, only three countries in Latin America (Costa Rica, Colombia, and Venezuela) were democracies; all others were military regimes or dictatorships [1]. Starting in the late 1970s, Latin America underwent a wave of democratization. By 2000, it had completed the transition from military to civilian rule, established electoral democratic systems, and normalized the alternation of power. However, prior to 1998, with the exception of the Cuban government, newly inaugurated governments were uniformly right-wing. Nevertheless, the democratic transition paved the way for the later emergence of leftist government blocs. The first wave of leftist governments took the stage of history by precisely exploiting the dissatisfaction of the majority of voters with neoliberal reforms, as well as the context in which the United States "recognized" Latin American electoral democratic systems and ceased direct intervention. It must be emphasized that the "left" and "right" mentioned here are limited to distinctions within the bourgeois camp. Furthermore, these leftist governments are defined relative to the governments of the 1990s that actively promoted neoliberalism—that is, the criteria for "left" and "right" are based on the Latin American realities of the time rather than traditional leftist standards. Generally, the right advocates for market-based resource allocation and promotes neoliberal economic policies such as privatization, liberalization, marketization, and internationalization, viewing electoral democracy as the standard for political liberty. The left insists on the role of state intervention in resource allocation and believes the meaning of democracy is broader, encompassing the social rights of citizens and the protection of vulnerable groups. Both propositions possess market appeal and attraction in Latin American countries. Following the brief period of rule by right-wing governments in the second decade of the 21st century, the reversal of domestic and international situations led to a resurgence of the left. This is inextricably linked to "political cycle" factors; as voters possess a psychology of seeking change, a desire for a new political alternative as a result of dissatisfaction with the status quo becomes an expected outcome.
The pandemic and global inflation facilitated a turning point. In 2020 and 2021, the pandemic spread extensively across Latin American countries; hospitals were filled to capacity, medical supplies were scarce, and healthcare systems faced collapse. In some countries, scenes occurred where bodies were abandoned in the streets or people waited in endless lines for oxygen. Due to the massive impact of the pandemic, the Latin American economy suffered a recession of as much as 7% in 2020. Specifically, Peru’s economy contracted by 11.1%, Argentina’s by 9.9%, Mexico’s by 8.2%, Colombia’s by 7%, Chile’s by 6%, and Brazil’s by 0.39%—setting the worst records since the 20th century [2]. In the social sphere, unemployment rates grew rapidly, and the poor population increased significantly. The poverty rate rose to 33% and the extreme poverty rate to 13%, regressing to levels seen over a decade ago, while a large portion of the middle-income group slid into poverty [3]. Because demand had been suppressed by the pandemic, inflation had already begun to rear its head; the pandemic also led to supply chain bottlenecks and exhausted fiscal resources. The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2022 led to rising global fuel prices and increased transportation costs, further exacerbating inflation in Latin America. Consequently, unemployment, inflation, and poverty became intertwined, and social security continued to deteriorate. The pandemic stimulated demand for public policy; pandemic control is closely related to national medical capacity and even overall levels of governance. At this time, the neoliberal advocacy for shrinking the role of the state and limiting social rights was rejected by the people. Under the influence of the pandemic and inflation, Latin American voters chose to abandon right-wing governing parties in favor of leftist candidates who promised increased social spending.
The intensification of inequality and social exclusion increased the discursive power of the left. Latin America is one of the most unequal regions in the world. Since the 1770s, its high degree of inequality has persisted to the present day, with the Gini coefficient long maintained around 0.5; in Brazil, it even once exceeded 0.6. Beyond the Gini coefficient, social inequality in Latin America is also manifested in low primary and secondary school enrollment rates, poor educational quality, a high proportion of the population living below the poverty line, and a low proportion of the population entitled to legal protections, medical insurance, and social welfare. Neoliberal reforms pushed Latin American inequality to new heights. In 1990, the proportion of the poor in the total population reached 51.2%, the extreme poverty population reached 15.5%, and the Gini coefficient was above 0.51 [4]. In the first decade of the 21st century, leftist governments increased social spending on healthcare, education, housing, and food, successfully lifting tens of millions of people out of poverty. The Gini coefficient for the entire region fell from 0.52 in 2002 to 0.46 in 2018 (5); the poverty rate dropped from 45.4% in 2002 to 27.8% in 2014, while the extreme poverty rate dropped from 12.2% to 7.8% over the same period, achieving great successes in the struggle to eliminate poverty. It is precisely these achievements that more easily evoke positive memories among voters of the first period of leftist governance; people hope the second wave of leftist rule can be a continuation of the first wave of leftist regimes. The masses hold very realistic hopes, such as whether their children can attend a nearby public school that provides basic services and quality education, whether they can enjoy free medical care and top-tier nursing after falling ill, and whether they can secure a decent pension through their work as they enter old age. The solution leftist candidates provide for inequality and poverty is a "better" distribution of wealth, specifically including more tax reform and more regulations. They frequently offer harsh critiques of the wealth of the rich and private corporations and question the effectiveness of the market economy, becoming spokespersons for a discourse of "justice" while continuously updating the expression of that discourse. These expressions are highly attractive to lower- and middle-class voters.
The governance crises of right-wing governments forced the populace to make new choices. The rise of leftist governments is linked to the governance dilemmas of right-wing governments. In Mexico, without the failure of the National Action Party (PAN) governments (2000–2012) and the disappointing return of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) (2012–2018), the victory of López Obrador would be inexplicable. López failed in his 2006 and 2012 presidential bids, but it was precisely because previous governments failed to effectively control drug violence and the corruption of the Enrique Peña Nieto administration that López succeeded in his third attempt in 2018. The downfall of former Brazilian President Jair Bolsonaro was largely due to irresponsible management of the pandemic; meanwhile, during his term, the Amazon rainforest suffered record destruction and the poor population increased by 33 million. Conversely, his electoral opponent Lula, during his previous presidential terms, had brought approximately 29 million Brazilians into the middle-income group [6]. In Argentina, without the economic failure of the Mauricio Macri government, the return of Alberto Fernández and Kirchnerism would similarly be inexplicable. Due to social inequality, poverty, widespread corruption, the increase in organized crime, and the destruction of the rule-of-law environment, "what we see in Latin America is people voting against the incumbents." A Latin American scholar pointed out: "This is a punishment for existing governments. I don't know if it can be said that Latin Americans have become more leftist, but I am certain they are angrier at their own governments" [7]. It is precisely because of the failures of right-wing governments—their inability to fulfill pre-election promises and their helplessness in the face of crisis—that a new opportunity was provided for the left to reinvent itself.
Leftist forces adopted flexible and pragmatic political strategies in their campaigns. In the new context, the political strategies adopted by leftist forces have demonstrated greater flexibility and pragmatism. They know how to communicate with the masses and how to maximize their appeal to the key demands and core interests of various strata.
Regarding campaign and governance platforms, they declare that the leftist parties they belong to or the leftist movements they lead have a mission to seek benefits for the people, thereby occupying the high ground in public opinion. However, they do not rigidly adhere to traditional leftist propositions; instead, they uphold the fundamentals and break new ground, proposing more inclusive agendas. For example, the leftist party alliance "Approve Dignity" led by Gabriel Boric in Chile bases its governing philosophy on socialist values, emphasizing universal democracy, progressive change, and pluralistic solidarity. Its governing agenda includes vanguard propositions of the global leftist movement such as feminism, environmentalism, reproductive rights, and the recognition of same-sex marriage. Former Peruvian President Pedro Castillo won the election with a socialist platform; his governance plan included controlling the pandemic, increasing public investment in education and health, increasing taxes on domestic and foreign companies, and increasing the state's share of profits from copper mining companies through constitutional reform. To win the support of business owners, however, Pedro Castillo stated he would not establish a radical leftist government similar to those in Cuba or Venezuela; the Castillo government was more moderate. Facing market failure, the first wave of leftist governments relied on the commodity export boom to promote equity through greater public spending. The second wave of leftist governments, by calling for a new agenda—respect for human rights, indigenous rights, gender and LGBTQ+ rights, attention to climate and environmental protection, and public health—seeks to realize the aspiration of resolving inequality.
Regarding campaign styles, the Left has been willing to abandon radical aesthetics in favor of a shift toward the center, opting for pluralistic coalitions. For example, the margin of victory by which Lula defeated Bolsonaro was provided by the centrist Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB)—the party led by Michel Temer, who in 2016 used his votes in Congress to oust Lula’s successor, Dilma Rousseff. During his campaign, Lula also united with his former Social Democratic rival, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and selected the centrist Geraldo Alckmin as his running mate. Lula did not hesitate to reconcile with Marina Silva, a former presidential candidate and Minister of the Environment who had previously challenged the Left, and sought the Evangelical vote by promising not to support abortion or the liberalization of drugs. In Colombia, Gustavo Petro participated in leftist guerrillas in his youth; after signing a peace agreement with the government, he ran for president unsuccessfully in 2010 and 2018. Petro ultimately won by forming an alliance with "Santos-istas" (supporters of former president Juan Manuel Santos), maintaining close ties with the Liberal Party of former president César Gaviria, and nominating environmentalist Francia Márquez as his running mate to form the "Historic Pact for Colombia" (Pacto Histórico) coalition. Beyond Brazil and Colombia, presidential elections in Peru and Chile were also decided in second-round runoffs, both involving processes of negotiation and compromise with rivals to eventually win the support of swing voters and even voters from the opposition camp.
Changes in the "U.S. factor" have assisted the return of the Left to power. After the Trump administration took office in early 2017, it adjusted its policy toward Latin America. On one hand, it reduced aid, practiced "zero tolerance" toward illegal immigration, and implemented economic and trade protectionism and unilateralism by withdrawing from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and signing the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). On the other hand, it struck at leftist governments in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, continuously increasing economic sanctions and blockades while uniting with right-wing countries to exert collective pressure on these three nations. This undermined Latin American integration and marginalized extra-regional powers such as China and Russia, thereby facilitating a temporary period of "leftist retreat and right-wing advance" in regional regimes. However, the Trump administration’s approach—refusing to offer "carrots" while brandishing a "big stick"—ultimately harmed the interests of the Latin American people and intensified contradictions between Latin American countries and the United States. Simultaneously, the U.S. failure in Afghanistan signaled that the "Giant of the North" [8] was in decline. With the end of the Trump administration, right-wing regimes in Latin America were replaced by the Left in quick succession. The Biden administration has weakened the international environment of "maximum pressure" applied during the Trump era against leftist regimes, favoring a shift of the political pendulum back to the left.
As seen above, the institutional foundation for the return of the Left is the normalization of electoral politics. The fundamental cause is the long-standing existence of poverty and inequality. The external causes are the occurrence of the pandemic and the economic crisis, alongside the reduction of "maximum pressure" from the United States. Short-term internal factors include the right-wing governments’ helplessness in the face of worsening economic and social crises, and the flexible and pragmatic political strategies adopted by leftist forces to adapt to the voters' desire for change. Looking at the internal logic of these causes, as long as the fundamental causes do not undergo significant change, a new cycle of alternation between the Left and Right will occur again. The duration of this "second wave" of leftist rule depends, in the short term, on their ability to manage crises and, in the long term, on whether they can achieve major breakthroughs in resolving poverty and inequality.
Challenges Facing the Second Wave of Leftist Governments in Latin America
Although the second wave of leftist rule in Latin America has become a reality, both internal and external situations have changed significantly compared to the first wave. As previously mentioned, the two waves share a commonality: both were catalyzed by crises. The previous one arose from the crisis of failed neoliberal reforms, while this one stems from the crisis brought about by the poor management of the pandemic; both crises galvanized the mid-to-lower classes' desire for change. However, conditions differ following their respective ascents to power. When the first wave emerged, coinciding with the period around the "9/11" attacks, the focus of U.S. foreign policy shifted to counter-terrorism, leaving it no time to attend to Latin America. This provided an opportunity for the Latin American Left. Furthermore, the acceleration of the Chinese-path modernization process brought about a demand for Latin American commodities. Supported by this export boom, leftist leaders were able to implement and expand social programs to satisfy the demands of the lower classes. Conversely, after this wave took office, governments have faced heavy fiscal pressure from the pandemic, soaring inflation triggered by the Ukraine crisis, and the threat of a global economic recession. Uncertainties are mounting, and Latin America's social structure has undergone marked changes: the proportion of the middle class has increased significantly, necessitating more attention to their demands. Consequently, the Left faces more complex challenges:
First, consolidating the base of the governing party and achieving political stability. In this wave, many leftist parties won by slim margins: Lula won with 50.8% to 49.2%; former Peruvian President Castillo won with 50.1% to 49.9%; and Petro in Colombia with 50.4% to 47.4%. Once in power, many do not hold a majority in the legislature. For instance, Castillo’s party held only 37 of 130 seats in parliament; Boric’s coalition held only 37 of 155 seats in the Chamber of Deputies and 4 of 43 in the Senate; and Honduras’s ruling party held only 50 of 128 seats. This situation often results in governments being exhausted by right-wing obstructions, struggling to pass bills, and finding governance difficult. For example, Gabriel Boric, who became President of Chile in March 2022, saw approval ratings drop below 30%. In September 2022, voters overwhelmingly rejected the new draft constitution promoted by the Chilean government. In Peru, Castillo faced two consecutive impeachment attempts by the opposition; to avoid a third, he announced the dissolution of Congress and the establishment of an emergency government on December 7, 2022, but was subsequently imprisoned by the judiciary. The Peruvian Congress passed an impeachment motion to remove him, and Vice President Dina Boluarte took over as interim president. In Brazil, however, Lula promised after the election: "I will govern for 215 million Brazilians; there are not two Brazils." [9] Lula indicated he would seek support across classes through more pragmatic and inclusive policies, striving to build a national development consensus, which has been viewed favorably by observers. In Colombia, Petro has performed well in both domestic and foreign affairs; on his 100th day in office, a poll by the National Consulting Center (CNC) showed that 62% of Colombians approved of his performance. The former two leaders lacked political experience while the latter two are highly experienced, illustrating that governing capacity is crucial.
Second, carrying out social reforms and fulfilling campaign promises. During the pandemic, Latin America experienced its most severe economic and social crisis in history. Social conditions deteriorated, poverty levels rose sharply, and income inequality intensified, while the living conditions of the middle-income group declined precipitously. To maintain legitimacy, the new governments must fulfill campaign promises by strengthening reforms in employment, education, health, and the rights of minorities, while maintaining support for the most vulnerable families. However, to combat the pandemic and its social impacts, governments depleted their treasuries. The fiscal health of most countries has deteriorated, leaving few public resources available. New governments have little "budgetary maneuvering room" for social reforms. Some Latin American scholars have noted that during the first wave of leftist rule, the prices of raw materials exported by most Latin American countries soared, which "allowed them to increase social spending and significantly reduce poverty. But without this external engine, these policies cannot be sustained." [10] Therefore, to ensure sustainable public fiscal expenditure, leftist governments must find ways to expand fiscal revenue, implement tax reforms, and establish macroeconomic governance mechanisms to shorten recession cycles.
Third, promoting economic recovery and achieving growth. An important prerequisite for social reform is economic growth. Although the current global economic situation remains grim and complex, Latin American countries can still hope to restore growth if they seize opportunities. First, the Ukraine crisis has caused a sharp rise in global prices for energy and grains. Latin America’s primary exports—oil, soybeans, beef, coffee, and minerals such as copper and iron—can partially replace the raw materials from Russia that are under embargo by Western countries. Rising oil prices have also breathed life into the Venezuelan economy, even prompting subtle shifts in U.S.-Venezuela relations. Second, the adjustment of global trade patterns has brought opportunities to Latin America through "nearshoring." In April 2022, the U.S. House of Representatives proposed the Western Hemisphere Nearshoring Act. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) estimates that nearshoring could generate $78 billion in annual exports for Latin America in the short-to-medium term, of which Mexico could account for nearly half. Finally, it is crucial whether Latin American countries can keep pace with the current revolution in new technologies. They should reconsider production policies and change production models to seize opportunities in the technological revolution, particularly in sectors with high growth potential, such as "energy transition, electric vehicles, circular economy, bio-economy, healthcare manufacturing, digital transformation, the care economy, sustainable tourism, MSMEs, and the social and solidarity economy." This suggestion by ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) points toward a direction for economic recovery.
Fourth, changing economic and social structures to promote the transformation of development models. The change in economic structure focuses on increasing productive forces, while the change in social structure focuses on breaking down inequality. During the first wave, leftist politicians like Chávez, Morales, and Correa proposed holistic alternatives to neoliberalism, namely "21st-Century Socialism," but encountered fierce conflict with conservative forces. The goals of the new wave are relatively moderate, focusing on transforming development models and promoting sustainable economic and social development. Many leftist leaders are highly concerned with reducing the environmental costs of growth and moving away from economic models dependent on low-value-added exports. Luis Arce’s government in Bolivia has stated it will promote industrialization through import substitution, while Alberto Fernández’s government in Argentina hoped to promote industrial production and improve manufacturing levels. These governments emphasize transforming economic and production systems to create more and better jobs. Regarding social equality, the Latin American Left has noted that education should be transformed into a genuine driver of social mobility and growth, gender inequality must be eradicated, and social security systems should be advanced and perfected. However, under current internal and external environments, achieving these fundamental goals remains a long-term task for leftist governments.
Following the rise of the second wave of leftist governments in Latin American countries, differences in governing philosophies and policies compared to right-wing governments will produce several distinct impacts, both domestically and internationally.
The adjustment of domestic policies under left-wing governance will be conducive to the middle and lower classes. Left-wing governments generally emphasize the role of the state, advocate for the realization of social equity, and promote sustainable development, stressing that one should not merely pursue economic growth, but rather the rational distribution of wealth. One commonality among the second wave of left-wing leaders is their advocacy for resolving severe economic inequality and their prioritization of poverty reduction measures. Once these policies are implemented, they will enhance the welfare of the lower and middle social strata. For example, during his "First Hundred Days" of governance, Colombian President Gustavo Petro submitted several important bills to Congress, including the establishment of a Ministry of Equality, tax reform, the creation of land and peasant ownership rights, and a "Total Peace" law. He also delivered 600 hectares of land—including land previously seized by paramilitary organizations—to 50 peasant families. To help impoverished mothers improve their quality of life, he launched the "Mothers as Heads of Household" social assistance program, through which each beneficiary receives a monthly subsidy of 500,000 pesos. Bolivian President Luis Arce proposed ten economic pledges during his election campaign, three of which were fulfilled within one year of taking office. These included the distribution of "Hunger Vouchers" starting in December 2020 to mitigate the negative impacts of the pandemic, with a distribution standard of 1,000 Bolivianos per person. Simultaneously, the VAT refund system under Decree No. 1355 came into effect, allowing low-income groups with an average monthly income equal to or below 9,000 Bolivianos to enjoy tax rebates; Decree No. 1357 introduced a "Great Wealth Tax," involving the taxation of high-value real estate, personal property, and income. Other pledges are currently moving forward. Similar initiatives by left-wing governments to improve income distribution and expand social rights will improve the situation of the middle and lower classes.
Left-wing governance will promote regional integration. The first wave of left-wing governance led to a surge in regional organizations, such as the establishment of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) (2011), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) (2004), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA) (2004), and the Pacific Alliance (2011). However, during subsequent periods of right-wing governance, the activities of these regional organizations decreased significantly. Given the difficulties of domestic governance, the second wave of left-wing regimes may look forward more intently to strengthening themselves through regional cooperation. Currently, many left-wing governments are showing a strong interest in restructuring regional integration and promoting regional cooperation. For instance, Argentine President Alberto Fernández currently serves as the pro tempore president of Mercosur (Southern Common Market); he successfully hosted the 30th-anniversary celebration of Mercosur's founding in March 2021 and stated that he would further deepen cooperation within the bloc during his term. In September 2021, Mexico successfully hosted the 6th Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States. Colombia has proposed revitalizing the Andean Community and allowing two former members who withdrew, Venezuela and Chile, to rejoin. Chilean President Gabriel Boric has expressed a greater emphasis on the Pacific Alliance. Shortly after taking office, at the 7th CELAC Summit held on January 24, 2023, President Lula announced Brazil's official return to the CELAC family (Brazil had announced a temporary withdrawal in 2019) and called for the creation of a "regional community with a shared future."
Left-wing governance will strengthen cooperation with China. Left-wing governments generally maintain a higher degree of identification with China's political system, party system, and ideology, providing more common ground between the two sides. One of the five characteristics of Chinese-path modernization is the "modernization of common prosperity for all people." Many Latin American leftists have stated that the most attractive aspect of China's development path is that it ended absolute poverty, finished the comprehensive building of a moderately prosperous society [11], and brought people's lives to a new level. The achievements China has made have earned the admiration of the Latin American left, who hope to cooperate with China and learn from Chinese experience.
Left-wing governance will make the conditions for China-Latin America cooperation more favorable. In 2021, the trade volume between China and Latin America reached a record 451.591 billion USD, a year-on-year increase of 41.1%, and China continued to maintain its position as Latin America's second-largest trading partner. The number of Latin American countries that have signed cooperation documents with China on the joint construction of the "Belt and Road" has reached 21. However, the coordination mechanisms and strategies between the two sides still need to be perfected. Left-wing governance contributes to the revitalization of regional integration organizations in Latin America, thereby aiding the strengthening of overall China-Latin America cooperation. Of course, Chinese enterprises should also be fully mentally prepared for the "resource nationalism" policies of certain left-wing governments.
Left-wing governance is conducive to neutralizing U.S. containment and sabotage of China-Latin America relations. Compared to the first wave of left-wing governance, although this wave of left-wing governments is more moderate and pragmatic toward the United States—for example, the López Obrador government in Mexico signed the revised USMCA with the U.S. and Canada; Chilean President Boric stated he would not choose sides and would implement a balanced diplomacy consistent with national interests; and Brazilian President Lula expressed hope to maintain equally good relations with both the U.S. and China—the left still possesses an anti-American tradition compared to the right and does not hesitate to criticize the hegemonic foreign policy of the United States. For instance, at the Summit of the Americas held in June 2022, because the U.S. did not invite government officials from Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua, Mexican President López Obrador was the first to criticize the U.S. approach, and leaders from Mexico, Bolivia, and Honduras refused to attend. Regarding the Ukraine crisis, President Lula pointed out in a media interview that the U.S. and the EU share responsibility for the outbreak of the crisis. President López Obrador stated that Mexico would remain neutral and criticized the U.S. for lacking the will to provide funds for the development of the Americas while providing money to support Ukraine, which he called "putting the cart before the horse." To escape U.S. influence, Colombian President Petro announced the restoration of diplomatic relations between Colombia and Venezuela in August 2022 and criticized as "unjust" the U.S. move to list Cuba as a state sponsor of terrorism.