Yuan Qun: The Current Status, Challenges, and Prospects of the Nepalese Communist Movement from the Perspective of the 2022 General Election
In the 2022 general election, the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist-Leninist) (CPN-UML) [hereafter referred to as "CPN (UML)"] and the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist Centre) (CPN-Maoist) [hereafter referred to as CPN (Maoist Centre)] suffered defeats, ranking second and third respectively, while the Nepali Congress became the largest party in parliament. After the election, why did the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML) part ways after initially forming an alliance, turning instead to cooperate with the Nepali Congress to form a coalition government? What challenges will the Nepalese communist movement face?
I. The Electoral Defeat of the CPN (UML) and CPN (Maoist Centre)
The 2022 Nepalese general election was the second held since the promulgation of Nepal's new constitution. In the first general election held in 2017 after the constitution's promulgation, the Left Alliance composed of the CPN (UML) and the CPN (Maoist Centre) won 174 seats in the House of Representatives, achieving an absolute majority, and took office on February 15, 2018. In May 2018, the CPN (UML) and the CPN (Maoist Centre) merged to form the Nepal Communist Party (NCP). That same month, Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli, Chairman of the CPN (UML), and Prachanda, Chairman of the CPN (Maoist Centre), signed an agreement stipulating that Oli would serve as Prime Minister first and hand over the position to Prachanda after two and a half years. On November 20, 2019, Oli and Prachanda reached another power-sharing agreement, which stipulated that Oli would lead the government for the full five-year term while Prachanda would manage party affairs as "Executive Chairman," but Oli failed to abide by this agreement. Prachanda subsequently insisted that Oli adhere to the original agreement and implement the rotation of the premiership, but Oli refused. As intra-party conflict intensified, on December 20, 2020—at Oli’s request during an emergency cabinet meeting to dissolve the House of Representatives—President Bidhya Devi Bhandari announced the dissolution of the House. On February 23, 2021, the Supreme Court of Nepal ruled that the dissolution of the House the previous year was invalid and ordered the government to reinstate the House within 13 days. In March 2021, the Supreme Court ruled that the Nepal Communist Party registered in May 2018 was invalid due to a duplicate registered name, causing the party to split back into the independent CPN (UML) and CPN (Maoist Centre). The NCP government reverted to a coalition government of the two parties. In a vote of confidence held in the House of Representatives on May 10, Oli failed to obtain more than half of the support votes and, according to constitutional provisions, became the caretaker Prime Minister. On July 12, the Supreme Court of Nepal ruled to restore the House (which had been dissolved again on May 22 by President Bhandari on the recommendation of Prime Minister Oli) and simultaneously appointed Sher Bahadur Deuba, President of the Nepali Congress, as Prime Minister.
On May 13, 2022, following a decision by the Nepalese Cabinet, local elections were held as scheduled. Among the 753 local electoral units, the Nepali Congress, CPN (UML), and CPN (Maoist Centre) won 13,773, 11,929, and 5,045 seats respectively, ranking first, second, and third. On August 4, 2022, the Nepalese Cabinet decided to hold federal and provincial assembly elections on November 20, 2022. On April 27, members of the former ruling coalition—the Nepali Congress, CPN (Maoist Centre), CPN (Unified Socialist), Lokatantrik Samajwadi Party, and Rashtriya Janamorcha—formed an electoral alliance ahead of the local elections. On October 9, the CPN (UML), Janata Samajwadi Party, and Rastriya Prajatantra Party formed their own electoral alliance. In the direct elections for the provincial assemblies, the Nepali Congress, CPN (UML), and CPN (Maoist Centre) ranked first, second, and third with 112, 91, and 53 seats respectively. In the House of Representatives elections, the Nepali Congress won 89 seats (57 first-past-the-post, 32 proportional representation), the CPN (UML) won 78 seats (44 first-past-the-post, 34 proportional representation), and the CPN (Maoist Centre) won 32 seats (18 first-past-the-post, 14 proportional representation), ranking first, second, and third respectively. Based on the results, the Nepali Congress ranked first in local, provincial, and federal elections, whereas in the 2017 elections, it had ranked second, third, and second respectively. In the House of Representatives election, the total seats of the CPN (UML) and CPN (Maoist Centre) decreased from 174 five years ago to 110, a drop of 23.2 percentage points; specifically, the CPN (UML) lost 43 seats and the CPN (Maoist Centre) lost 21 seats. Conversely, the Nepali Congress rose from 63 seats to 89 seats, an increase of 26 seats, rising by nearly 10 percentage points (see Table 1).
II. The CPN (UML) and CPN (Maoist Centre): Brief Cooperation Followed by Another Split
Before the November 20, 2022 election, Deuba and Prachanda reached an agreement to share the premiership. However, after the election, given that the Nepali Congress became the largest party and secured far more seats than the CPN (Maoist Centre), Deuba decided to break the power-sharing agreement with Prachanda. The Nepali Congress argued that the most important issue was how the state should reflect the aspirations of the people. Only by respecting the people's vote could the goals of stability, development, and progress be achieved. Allowing another party or the CPN (Maoist Centre) to lead the next government would go against the will of the voters since the Nepali Congress had become the largest party in parliament. Leaders close to Deuba also incited him to take a hardline stance; Nepali Congress Vice-President Bimalendra Nidhi assured Deuba that he would receive support from India if he continued as Prime Minister. Deuba’s wife, Arzu, held a similar view. They also told Deuba that letting the leader of the third-largest party become Prime Minister was meaningless. Furthermore, due to the animosity between Prachanda and Oli, Deuba and his supporters believed it was impossible for the CPN (Maoist Centre) to cooperate with the CPN (UML) again; they thought Prachanda would have no choice but to accept Deuba’s position and would not break with the Nepali Congress. On December 25, 2022, with the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the Nepali Congress still unable to reach a consensus on power-sharing, Prachanda rushed to the residence of CPN (UML) Chairman Oli along with leaders of the Rastriya Swatantra Party, Rastriya Prajatantra Party, Janata Samajwadi Party, Janamat Party, and Nagrik Unmukti Party to seek support. Oli and Prachanda agreed that Prachanda would serve as Prime Minister for the first two and a half years; meanwhile, the CPN (Maoist Centre) would support CPN (UML) nominees for the presidency and the speaker of the house, and the premiership would be handed over to Oli after the initial period. Ultimately, before the deadline, the seven parties reached an agreement to jointly form a new government led by Prachanda. Subsequently, Prachanda arrived at the President’s Office with the support of 169 parliamentarians (composed of all members from the seven parties and three independents) to claim the premiership.
On December 26, 2022, Prachanda was sworn in as Prime Minister of Nepal for the third time at the President’s Office. After Prachanda broke with Deuba, the Nepali Congress lost the opportunity to hold the positions of President, Prime Minister, and Speaker. To break the alliance between the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML) and to gain an advantage in the subsequent presidential election, on January 10, 2023, the Nepali Congress—acting as the opposition—voted in favor of Prime Minister Prachanda in a vote of confidence. Prachanda received support from 268 of the 270 members present in the House, winning the confidence vote by more than a two-thirds majority. Prachanda then began emphasizing the election of a new president based on "national consensus" and claimed there was no agreement to hand the presidency to the CPN (UML). This intensified the mistrust between Oli and Prachanda, causing cracks to appear in the ruling coalition. On February 25, 2023, an eight-party alliance—comprising former coalition members the CPN (Maoist Centre), Nepali Congress, CPN (Unified Socialist), Lokatantrik Samajwadi Party, and Rashtriya Janamorcha, joined by the Janamat Party, Nagrik Unmukti Party, and Rastriya Swatantra Party—decided to support the Nepali Congress candidate Ram Chandra Paudel in the presidential election. That same day, the CPN (UML) nominated its Vice-Chairman, Subas Chandra Nembang, as its presidential candidate. Since the Nepalese presidential election follows an electoral college system, the president is decided by the electoral college votes; among the 52,628 electoral college votes, the eight parties held 31,821, making it easy for their alliance to exceed the required threshold. On February 27, seeing no hope of securing majority support for its nominee, the CPN (UML) announced its withdrawal from the government and retracted its support for the Prachanda-led administration. On March 20, the House of Representatives held a second vote of confidence for the Prime Minister. With the support of the eight-party alliance, Prachanda received 172 votes out of 262 present, surpassing the constitutional threshold of 138 votes and once again winning the vote of confidence.
III. Challenges Facing the Nepalese Communist Movement
Since the implementation of the democratic republican system in 2008, Nepal has held four general elections. This latest election reveals that the Nepalese communist movement faces both the old problems encountered in previous elections and even more severe new challenges.
(1) The Challenge of the Fragmentation of the Political Party Landscape
The rise and development of the Nepalese communist movement has greatly advanced the struggle of the Nepalese people for national independence and liberation, freeing Nepal from the shackles of feudalism and colonialism. This is the fundamental reason why Nepalese communist parties have garnered extensive public support and become a mainstream political force in the country. Following the 2008 declaration by the Nepalese Parliament to abolish the monarchy and implement a republican system, the masses have looked forward to achieving political stability, economic development, and the goal of building a better Nepal under the leadership of communist parties. In the four general elections held since 2008, the average proportion of parliamentary seats won by the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML) has exceeded 50%, which is a concentrated reflection of these expectations. However, in the 14 years since the first Constituent Assembly [5] election in 2008, Nepal has seen eleven changes of government. Although the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML) have led the government on several occasions, none of their terms exceeded one year. The Nepal Communist Party (NCP) government, which was held in high regard across all sectors of society and described as Nepal’s most stable government in nearly 30 years, collapsed after three and a half years due to infighting between Oli and Prachanda. During their periods in power, fundamental issues such as political instability and lagging economic development remained unresolved; furthermore, the frequent exposure of negative news surrounding both parties drew significant public criticism. During the latest campaign, emerging parties emphasized free healthcare, free education, the effective implementation of constitutional provisions, the full realization of fundamental rights stipulated in the Constitution of Nepal, the eradication of corruption, job creation, and the promotion of sustainable economic development. In contrast, the agendas in the election manifestos of the mainstream parties remained consistent from one election to the next; they were perpetually occupied with power struggles and remained slow to respond to the people's problems.
The growing disappointment of the Nepalese public toward mainstream parties, including the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML), has led to a continuous decline in voter enthusiasm. While 17,988,570 people were eligible to vote in this election, the actual turnout was only 61.85%—nearly 9 percentage points lower than expected and the lowest record for a parliamentary election since the restoration of the multi-party system in 1990 (see Table 2). To express dissatisfaction with the mainstream parties, a "No, Not Again" campaign was launched on Nepalese social media as the provincial and federal parliamentary elections approached. This movement called on voters to use their ballots wisely and refrain from voting for the leaders of mainstream parties, instead electing new, capable leaders to establish a rational system. In the general election, the National Independent Party (Rastriya Swatantra Party), formed in June 2022 by television star Rabi Lamichhane, won 20 seats to become the fourth-largest party. Regional nationalist parties established in 2019 and 2022—the Janamat Party and the Nagarik Unmukti Party—won 6 and 3 seats respectively. Meanwhile, the veteran Rastriya Prajatantra Party, which had once fallen into obscurity and won only one seat in the 2017 election due to its advocacy for a return to a Hindu state and the monarchy, gained support from a portion of the electorate in 2022, securing 14 seats and becoming the fifth-largest party. As the fragmentation of the political landscape intensifies, the party political structure dominated by mainstream parties has begun to differentiate and reorganize. In this general election, the combined seats in the House of Representatives won by the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML) accounted for only 40% of the total, a decrease of 23 percentage points compared to 2017 (see Table 3). In the 2017 election, only nine parties entered the House of Representatives, and five parties became national parties by obtaining more than 3% of the proportional representation votes. In contrast, the 2022 election saw 12 parties enter the House of Representatives, with seven becoming national parties. This indicates that the fragmentation of the party landscape has begun to erode the mass base of the two major [communist] parties. With the rise of constitutionalism, Hindu nationalism, and regional nationalist parties within Nepal, the future development of the Nepalese communist movement will face severe challenges.
(2) Disputes over Practical Interests Continue to Plague the Development of the Nepalese Communist Movement
The Nepalese communist movement has long been troubled by disputes over practical interests. Following the 2008 election for the first Constituent Assembly, a conflict arose regarding the presidential election. The CPN (UML) nominated its former General Secretary, Madhav Kumar Nepal, as the presidential candidate; however, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [hereafter CPN (M)] initially offered support but subsequently fielded its own candidate. This resulted in the successful election of Ram Baran Yadav, nominated by the Nepali Congress. Although the CPN (UML) joined the new government led by the CPN (M) in August 2008, the coalition eventually collapsed due to disagreements over the integration of the CPN (M)’s People’s Liberation Army into the Nepalese Army and the dismissal of the Chief of Army Staff, Katawal, who opposed the integration. In February 2011, CPN (UML) Chairman Jhala Nath Khanal was elected Prime Minister with the support of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) [hereafter UCPN (M)]. After taking office, Khanal was forced to resign on August 15 because he could not reach a consensus with the UCPN (M) on the issue of army integration. On May 5, 2016, Prachanda and Oli reached an agreement that Prachanda would serve as Prime Minister following the establishment of a future government of national consensus. However, Oli’s subsequent refusal to honor this agreement led to the withdrawal of the CPN (Maoist Centre) from the Oli-led coalition, triggering the government's collapse. In May 2018, the CPN (UML) and the CPN (Maoist Centre) merged to form the Nepal Communist Party (NCP), but the party later split due to the infighting between Oli and Prachanda. These struggles over practical interests have seriously weakened the strength of the Nepalese communist movement and exerted a negative influence on its further development.
In the recent split of the governing coalition between the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML), the primary factors remain practical interest considerations: Prachanda’s desire for the premiership and the CPN (UML)’s desire to secure the presidency and control the government. Since the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Devraj Ghimire, and the Chairman of the National Assembly, Ganesh Timilsina—as well as the heads of major constitutional bodies such as the Election Commission, the Commission for the Investigation of Abuse of Authority, and the National Human Rights Commission—were all nominated by the CPN (UML), and the Deputy Speaker of the House, Indira Rana, was nominated by the National Independent Party (viewed as an ally of the CPN (UML)), the power balance is tilted. According to the power-sharing agreement reached between Prachanda and Oli, Oli was to assume the premiership after two and a half years. If the CPN (UML) were to secure the presidency as well, it would dominate all vital positions, thereby severely weakening the leading role of the CPN (Maoist Centre) in the government. By disregarding the power-sharing agreement with Oli and instead supporting the Nepali Congress candidate for president, the CPN (Maoist Centre) could not only strive for more significant ministerial portfolios but Prachanda could also make decisions during his premiership that align with his party's interests with the support of the Congress party. Based on these considerations of self-interest, Prachanda chose to violate the agreement with Oli, leading to the renewed fracture of the governing coalition. Whether they can act from the overall perspective of the development of the Nepalese communist movement and transcend the barriers of practical interests by strengthening unity and cooperation will be a major test for both the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML).
(3) The Nepalese Communist Movement Still Suffers from Intervention by External Forces
As Nepal’s neighbor, India has regarded itself as the hegemon of South Asia since its independence and viewed Nepal as within its sphere of influence. Since 2008, as the CPN (Maoist Centre) and the CPN (UML) have taken power multiple times, the once relatively stable Nepal-India relationship has begun to fluctuate. In August 2008, when the then-Chairman of the CPN (M), Prachanda, visited China as his first foreign destination after becoming Prime Minister, he broke the convention that Nepalese Prime Ministers must visit India first, causing strong dissatisfaction in India. During Oli’s term as Prime Minister from 2015 to 2016, India imposed a border blockade on Nepal because the Oli government refused the demands of the Madheshi people (who are of Indian descent) to amend the constitution. Oli took a hardline stance against India to safeguard national sovereignty, causing Nepal-India relations to fall into a state of tension. Conversely, when leaders of the Nepali Congress have served as Prime Minister, relations have generally improved. Consequently, India believes that Nepalese communist parties are pro-China and anti-India, and that the governance of the Nepali Congress is more beneficial to Indian interests. The Indian government has thus used the manipulation of internal struggles among high-level communist leaders and the support of Nepali Congress governance as primary means of influencing Nepal’s political situation. India played a behind-the-scenes role in the collapse of the UCPN (M) and CPN (UML) coalition led by Prachanda in May 2009, the collapse of the CPN (UML) and CPN (Maoist Centre) coalition led by Oli in July 2016, and the victory of the Nepali Congress in the second Constituent Assembly election in November 2013. Between October and November 2020, as the internal struggle within the NCP intensified, Samant Goel (Director of India’s Intelligence Bureau [6]), MM Naravane (Chief of the Army Staff), and Foreign Secretary Harsh Vardhan Shringla visited Nepal in succession, accelerating the split of the NCP. Following the 2022 election, India again pressured the Nepali Congress to prevent Prachanda from becoming the Prime Minister of the new government as much as possible. After this plan failed, breaking up the CPN (Maoist Centre) and CPN (UML) coalition once more became India’s primary task in its post-election strategic layout for Nepal. On February 13 and 18, 2023, Indian Foreign Secretary Vinay Mohan Kwatra, four former Indian Chiefs of Army Staff, and the current Chief of Army Staff, General Manoj Pande, visited Nepal in sequence, ultimately accelerating the disintegration of the CPN (Maoist Centre) and CPN (UML) governing coalition.
Since the beginning of the 21st century, the United States has entered a new period of strategic adjustment. To maintain U.S. hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region and contain the rise of China, the U.S. views the establishment of a closer partnership with Nepal as part of its Indo-Pacific Strategy. In February 2022, the U.S. took advantage of the dispersed state of Nepalese communist forces following the split of the Nepal Communist Party to coerce Nepal into passing the "Millennium Challenge Corporation" (MCC) agreement, a component of the Indo-Pacific Strategy. The agreement stipulates that the U.S. government will provide $500 million in "aid" for domestic infrastructure construction, attempting to use economic aid as bait to control Nepal, squeeze the development space of the "Belt and Road Initiative," and counterbalance China’s influence in South Asia. Currently, U.S. strategy toward Nepal focuses on two aspects: first, advancing the implementation of the MCC in Nepal. During her visit to Nepal from January 29 to 30, 2023, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Victoria Nuland stated that the U.S. is strengthening cooperation with Nepal and accelerating energy-related projects under the MCC, noting, "By leveraging the potential of hydropower, we want to help Nepal become a stronger economic power." Second, the U.S. aims to push Nepalese communists toward accepting Western democratic models, transforming the Nepalese communist movement in a way that aligns with U.S. interests. During her visit, Nuland pointed out that for the U.S., it is "very important for a partner like Nepal to work day after day to strengthen your democracy, as we are also doing at home."
The core demand of the U.S. and Indian strategies toward Nepal is to control the political situation, counterbalance China's influence, and prevent Nepal from leaning toward China; this is the point where the strategic interests of the U.S. and India converge. The cumulative effect of U.S. intervention and India's long-term influence on Nepalese politics will deliver an unprecedented shock to the Nepalese communist movement.
IV. Future Prospects of the Nepalese Communist Movement
Looking at the 2022 general election, the Nepalese communist movement maintains significant influence within the Nepalese political arena; its future development will fundamentally be characterized by progress through twists and turns. However, whether the various communist factions can strengthen their unity and properly manage the relationship between maintaining the Party’s character and advancing the Party’s transformation will have a long-term and profound impact on the Nepalese communist movement.
(1) Advancing through twists and turns will be the basic trend for the future development of the Nepalese communist movement.
The 2022 general election in Nepal served as another test for the Nepalese communist movement. Judging from the election results, the parliamentary seats won by the CPN (UML) and the CPN (Maoist Centre) declined severely, with their combined proportion falling to its lowest level since 2008. However, in terms of total seats obtained, five communist parties—the CPN (UML), the CPN (Maoist Centre), the CPN (Unified Socialist), the National People's Front (Rastriya Janamorcha), and the Nepal Workers Peasants Party—won a total of 122 seats, far exceeding the 33-seat lead held by the largest single party, the Nepali Congress. Furthermore, among the eleven governments formed since the first Constituent Assembly election in 2008, Nepalese communists have led eight of them. This indicates that Nepalese communist parties currently remain the largest political force in Nepal and continue to play a pivotal role in Nepalese society. Lenin pointed out: "A development that repeats, as it were, stages that have already been passed, but repeats them in a different way, on a higher basis ('the negation of the negation'), a development, so to speak, that proceeds in spirals, not in a straight line." Judging from the evolutionary trajectory since 2008, the development of the Nepalese communist movement will not be smooth sailing. A setback in one or even several elections does not indicate its decline. Rather, development amidst turbulence and progress through twists and turns will become the basic trend of its future development.
(2) Whether unity among the various communist factions can be strengthened is the key to the Nepalese communist movement breaking out of its current predicament.
In summarizing the experience of the First International, Marx pointed out: "One of the fundamental principles of the International—solidarity. If we can firmly consolidate this vital principle among all workers in all countries, we will surely achieve the great goal we yearn for." The history of the international communist movement proves that any party with a consistently positive development momentum and thriving undertakings must be a party that attaches great importance to unity and unification. The Nepalese communist movement has also proven that whenever unity and unification can be strengthened, the Party's cause develops smoothly. Conversely, the Party's cause suffers losses or even encounters serious setbacks. Prachanda, Chairman of the CPN (Maoist Centre), once stated: "If there were only one Communist Party, we could lead Nepal for 100 years." Former Chairman of the CPN (UML) Khanal also noted: "The merger of the two parliamentary democratic parties, the CPN (UML) and the CPN (Maoist), will push Nepal's communist movement to a new height." After taking office, in order to strengthen left-wing unity, the CPN (Maoist Centre) actively contacted other communist parties to discuss grand plans for cooperative development. On June 19, 2023, the CPN (Maoist Centre), the CPN (Unified Socialist), the People's Socialist Party (Rastriya Janata Party), and the Communist Party of Nepal (Biplav) led by Netra Bikram Chand announced the formation of the Socialist Front (Samajbadi Morcha). The 15-point commitment document signed by the four parties at the founding assembly stated: The Socialist Front will "remain committed to democracy, the republican order, good governance, prosperity, and socio-economic justice, and strive to establish socialism with Nepalese characteristics." Senior CPN (Unified Socialist) leader Khanal stated: "Unless we bring progressive and patriotic forces together, we cannot bring about revolutionary change. I want to tell all the leaders of the Front that this Front should not just be a means of maintaining power, but should bring about revolutionary change." Therefore, whether they can learn from the experiences and lessons of both the international and Nepalese communist movements, strengthen unity and cooperation, maintain political stability, and promote economic and social development has become the key to the Nepalese communist movement emerging from its current predicament.
(3) Whether the relationship between maintaining the Party’s character and advancing the Party’s transformation can be properly handled will directly affect the future direction of the Nepalese communist movement.
How a proletarian party following the parliamentary road handles the relationship between maintaining the Party’s character and advancing the Party’s transformation is a major theoretical and practical issue in the history of the international communist movement. Regarding this issue, the international communist movement since the 20th century has accumulated rich experience and profound lessons. For instance, the Western Social Democratic parties, which were once Marxist parties, adopted pragmatism as their principle starting from the early 20th century, gradually transforming from revolutionary parties outside the capitalist system into reformist parties within the system, leading to their waning influence. After World War II, Western European communist parties were once important political forces in European politics, but since the 1970s, due to the spread of reformist trends, they gradually diluted the Party's character, becoming vague and wavering regarding the nature of the Party and its class policies. This led to their decline into second- or third-rate parties in their respective countries and their gradual marginalization. Since the 21st century, the Nepalese communist movement has undergone a transformation from a dogmatic treatment of Marxism to a creative exploration of Marxist Sinicization [7], from advocating violent revolution to advocating a developmental path of parliamentary democracy, from a proletarian vanguard party to a mass party of all laborers, and from implementing democratic centralism to emphasizing a democratic operating system. In this process, along with changes in status and environment, the dilution of ideology and the emergence of factionalism, egoism [8], and anarchist tendencies have begun to spread within the Party. This is also an important reason for the setbacks encountered by the Nepalese communist movement. Therefore, whether they can correctly handle the relationship between maintaining the character of a Communist Party under the conditions of capitalist multi-party competition and advancing the transition to a parliamentary party, while continuously exploring a path of socialist development that conforms to their own national characteristics, will directly affect the future direction of the Nepalese communist movement.