Wang Lincong: New Developments in the Middle East Under Great Changes: Characteristics, Challenges, and Prospects
In recent years, the evolution of the international landscape has accelerated. Middle Eastern countries have enhanced their capacity for strategic autonomy, a consensus has emerged among regional states on the priority of development, and the "wave of reconciliation" between Middle Eastern countries has grown from a ripple into a strong current. The status of Middle Eastern countries within the international system has undergone new changes, as they become an important force within the "Global South." Concurrently, amid the changes unseen in a century [1], new concepts and proposals for improving global governance and resolving global and regional challenges have continuously emerged. In particular, the concepts and practices of the Global Development Initiative, the Global Security Initiative, and the Global Civilization Initiative proposed by China are helping Middle Eastern countries break out of their security and development dilemmas, shaping a "New Middle East" that differs from the past.
New Characteristics of Development in the Middle East
The new changes in Middle Eastern development are primarily reflected in the prioritization of development as the top item on national agendas, the clear trend of detente among regional states, and the significant elevation of national strategic autonomy.
I. Implementation of Development-First Strategies at the National Level
Key to the adoption of development-first strategies in Middle Eastern countries are reflections on the negative impacts of the "Arab Spring" [2], efforts to grasp the developmental trends of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, and a focus on issues of people's livelihoods and governance. First, rather than resolving the long-standing development, security, and governance deficits, the Arab Spring further exacerbated the security and development dilemmas of regional states. The traditional regional security situation continued to deteriorate, characterized by intense bloc formation, confrontation, and conflict; meanwhile, non-traditional security issues such as extremism, food security, and climate disasters became increasingly acute. At the same time, the economic and social factors that triggered the Arab Spring remain present and have even intensified.
Second, with the arrival of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, Middle Eastern countries urgently need to "hitch a ride" on the new technological revolution. Both elites and the public in these countries realize that as human society transitions from the Information Age to the Intelligence Age, profound impacts will inevitably hit productive forces and relations of production, the economic base and the superstructure, as well as organizational forms and lifestyles. If a country fails to catch this wave of the new industrial revolution, it will be difficult to achieve high-quality development and sustainability.
Third, the populace in Middle Eastern countries is increasingly focused on economic livelihoods and governance performance rather than abstract issues of democracy and human rights. The Arab Opinion Index 2022 indicated that 60% of Arabs believe the most pressing problems facing their countries are economic, including high unemployment, high prices, poor economic conditions, and poverty. According to a 2022 report by the "Arab Barometer" polling agency, in seven out of nine surveyed Arab countries, more than 50% of the public believed that "economic performance is worse under a (Western-style) democratic system."
Solving development issues and improving national governance capacity have become a broad consensus among Middle Eastern ruling elites and ordinary citizens. Every country views the promotion of economic and social development as the breakthrough point for resolving domestic issues and enhancing regional and international influence. Consequently, they have launched mid-to-long-term development plans, such as "Turkey's Vision 2023," "Egypt Vision 2030," and "Saudi Vision 2030." Furthermore, countries have proposed development strategies to address the Fourth Industrial Revolution, such as Turkey's "2023 Industry and Technology Strategy," Egypt's "National Strategy for Artificial Intelligence," and the UAE's "Industry 4.0 Strategy."
II. Promotion of Reconciliation and Detente at the Regional Level
Since 2019, the regional bloc hostilities triggered by the Arab Spring have shown signs of easing, with the reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran in March 2023 attracting particular attention. Following the Arab Spring, Middle Eastern regional powers were primarily divided into three blocs: the Shia bloc centered on Iran; the pro-Muslim Brotherhood bloc led by Turkey; and the anti-Iran, anti-Muslim Brotherhood bloc composed of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Israel. These parties engaged in intense maneuvering, repeated tests of strength, and brinkmanship. In July 2019, officials from Iran and the UAE met in Tehran to discuss maritime security, marking an easing of regional bloc confrontation.
From 2021 onward, detente between major Middle Eastern powers accelerated significantly. On one hand, reconciliation was achieved between the pro-Muslim Brotherhood and anti-Muslim Brotherhood blocs. On January 5, 2021, the Emir of Qatar traveled to Saudi Arabia for the 41st GCC Summit. In November 2021 and June 2022, the then-Crown Prince of the UAE, Zayed, and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman respectively visited Turkey; in the first half of 2022, Turkish President Erdoğan visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia in succession. Additionally, Turkey's relations with Israel and Egypt improved markedly. On the other hand, the Iran-led bloc and the Saudi-led anti-Iran bloc accelerated their reconciliation. In 2022, Kuwait and the UAE restored ambassador-level diplomatic relations with Iran. Saudi Arabia and Iran began contact and negotiations in April 2021, and through Chinese mediation, issued a joint declaration in March 2023 agreeing to restore diplomatic ties. On September 5, 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran exchanged ambassadors, completing the final link in the resumption of ties. Simultaneously, the Saudi-Iran reconciliation facilitated Syria’s return to the Arab League, becoming a significant hallmark of the ongoing "wave of reconciliation" in the Middle East.
The Middle Eastern "wave of reconciliation" is primarily a rational choice made by regional countries after evaluating security and economic factors. Regarding security, continued military conflict and confrontation among regional powers failed to achieve political goals and strategic gains, leading instead to deteriorating security conditions and increased diplomatic isolation. The security situations for Saudi Arabia and the UAE were precarious, with frequent drone and missile attacks on their territories; meanwhile, although Iran and Turkey appeared aggressive in regional affairs, they both faced an increasingly hostile and isolated regional environment. Regarding the economy, the intervention of Middle Eastern powers in regional conflicts severely depleted fiscal resources and brought a series of negative economic, social, and political impacts. Turkey's economy continued to decline, and Iran faced large-scale public protests that posed a severe test to the authorities' political stability. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are in a critical period of economic diversification and transformation; massive security expenditures restricted the capital investment needed for this transition. Therefore, regional states chose reconciliation to create a peaceful environment for development. It is worth noting that as the U.S. strategically contracted in the Middle East and its influence in regional affairs declined, cracks widened in its relationships with regional allies. In contrast, China has long advocated for peace through talks and served as a "guarantor" for the Saudi-Iran reconciliation, which became an important external driver for regional states seeking rapprochement.
III. Enhancement of Strategic Autonomy at the Global Level
In today’s world, the post-Cold War landscape is evolving at an accelerated pace. The global hegemonic status of the United States is in decline, and emerging market countries and developing nations are rising as a group. The trend of "the East is rising and the West is declining" [3] is evident. The willingness and capacity of traditional extra-regional powers to intervene in Middle Eastern affairs are gradually diminishing, providing Middle Eastern countries with greater space for strategic autonomy. Political elites in the Middle East generally believe that the world is moving toward multipolarity; for instance, Saudi Investment Minister Khalid al-Falih stated in an interview that a "multipolar global order has already emerged." Furthermore, the "great power competition" marked by the Ukraine crisis has elevated the global status of Middle Eastern countries, as the region has become a vital alternative for Russian oil and gas resources. Global powers' political and economic competition for the Middle East has risen significantly, markedly increasing the region's strategic room for maneuver. Consequently, Middle Eastern countries realize they possess more strategic options and autonomy than ever before.
The enhancement of strategic autonomy in Middle Eastern countries is manifested in two main ways. First, they possess an increasing capacity to bargain with global powers. Traditionally, Middle Eastern countries had limited strategic autonomy and often chose to follow the policies of extra-regional powers. In recent years, however, they no longer look to the United States for every cue, which was clearly demonstrated in the Ukraine crisis. Despite U.S. opposition, America's traditional ally Saudi Arabia several times led "OPEC+" to cut crude oil production; another ally, Turkey, has repeatedly challenged the U.S. regarding NATO expansion. In terms of Russia-Iran relations, in the past, Iran relied more on Russia for political, diplomatic, economic, and military support; following the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, Russia's demand for Iran increased, and the relationship has become more equal.
Second, Middle Eastern countries are increasingly pursuing a diversified and balanced diplomatic strategy. Historically, they tended to align and bind themselves completely with a single extra-regional power. In recent years, they have actively developed relations with multiple political forces, a trend particularly evident among traditional U.S. allies. For example, while Saudi Arabia still values its security and strategic relationship with the U.S., it has upgraded military ties with Russia, strategic links with the EU, and actively developed energy, economic, and strategic cooperation with countries like China and India. Additionally, Middle Eastern countries are attempting to change the Western-dominated international governance system by actively joining multilateral organizations representing the interests of developing countries. In July 2023, Iran officially joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). In August 2023, the BRICS nations announced the inclusion of six new members, including four Middle Eastern countries: Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran, and the UAE. These instances reflect the efforts of Middle Eastern countries to actively participate in shaping the international system, becoming a significant force in the "Global South."
Challenges Facing Middle Eastern Development
Currently, Middle Eastern development has reached a historic turning point, yet it still faces a series of problems and challenges in economic, diplomatic, and security spheres.
I. Prominent Economic Structural Issues
Since the Arab Spring, the problems faced by most Middle Eastern countries—such as population explosions, increasing inequality, a shrinking middle class, high unemployment, rampant corruption, low levels of social security, and insufficient economic vitality—remain severe and continue to hinder socio-economic development. On one hand, most countries without abundant oil and gas resources face increasingly heavy fiscal pressure. Since 2019, due to long-standing economic structural defects exacerbated by major external negative shocks such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the Ukraine crisis, and the tightening of global credit markets, many Middle Eastern countries have fallen into deep economic distress. For example, Tunisia, Egypt, and Lebanon face severe economic crises, particularly debt crises; from 2010 to 2020, the public debt-to-GDP ratios of these three countries rose from 40%, 70%, and 130% to 85%, 95%, and 180%, respectively.
On the other hand, the oil-and-gas-rich countries in the Middle East face pressure for economic diversification. Driven by carbon neutrality strategies adopted by many nations, the global energy transition is accelerating, and the oil and gas resource dividends for the energy-rich Middle Eastern states, represented by the Gulf Arab countries, are gradually weakening. Although these countries have proposed economic diversification strategies, overall progress and effectiveness remain limited. Taking Saudi Arabia as an example, compared to 2016, the share of oil and gas revenue in its GDP dropped from 40.5% to 37.3%; however, this was mainly due to Saudi oil production cuts and falling international oil prices. The degree of Saudi economic dependence on oil and gas resources remains very high.
Furthermore, Middle Eastern countries still play the role of "catch-up" players in the Fourth Industrial Revolution, with a massive capacity gap compared to early movers. Most Middle Eastern countries have not adapted well to the Fourth Industrial Revolution and generally remain in a backward position. In the field of Artificial Intelligence, the Arab world is below the global average, with most Arab countries ranking among the lowest; in e-governance, Arab countries are far below the global average; in network construction, they are below the global average but above the average for developing countries; and in e-commerce, although they grew rapidly during the COVID-19 pandemic, they remain below the global average and roughly equivalent to the average for developing countries.
II. Persistent External Intervention
Relative to global powers, Middle Eastern countries remain in a position of power weakness. The power imbalance between Middle Eastern countries and global powers means that the former lack sufficient counter-measures against the latter's intervention. From the end of the Cold War until the Iraq War, U.S. hegemony in the Middle East reached its peak. Although U.S. influence in the Middle East has waned in recent years, it still strives to maintain its hegemony, exerting many negative impacts on Middle Eastern development.
On one hand, the United States vigorously suppresses anti-American forces in the region, undermining the development and stability of the relevant countries. The U.S. frequently imposes economic sanctions on Middle Eastern countries and non-state actors—such as Iran, Syria, and the Houthi movement—which not only hinders the development of regional countries but also brings about severe humanitarian disasters. Over the past decade, due to U.S.-led international sanctions, Iran has lost approximately $450-billion in oil revenue. It is also worth noting that while the U.S. no longer easily launches large-scale direct military interventions in the Middle East, it frequently conducts indirect military interventions such as "proxy wars," drone warfare, and mercenary warfare. The U.S. has repeatedly launched drone strikes against pro-Iranian armed forces in Iraq and Syria, exacerbating regional tensions, undermining regional stability, and hindering regional peace.
On the other hand, the United States is promoting major-power strategic competition in the Middle East, obstructing normal cooperation between regional states and other extra-regional powers. The U.S. has pressured its traditional allies, exerting every effort to undermine their cooperation with Russia and China in the military, technological, and economic fields. Furthermore, the U.S. has vigorously courted allies to establish exclusive "small-multilateral" [4] mechanisms in the Middle East to weaken the influence of China, Russia, and Iran. In March 2022, the Foreign Ministers of the U.S., Israel, the UAE, Bahrain, Morocco, and Egypt held the Negev Summit in Israel, deciding to hold the "Negev Forum" regularly and establish working groups on regional security, energy, tourism, health, education, and food and water security. In July of the same year, the U.S., alongside Israel, the UAE, and India, held a summit to form the "I2U2" quadrilateral mechanism to strengthen cooperation in water, energy, transportation, space, health, and food security. At the G20 Summit in September 2023, the U.S. and its allies proposed the "India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor" (IMEC) plan, aiming to strengthen cooperation in infrastructure, energy, data, and trade; its intention to suppress China’s Belt and Road Initiative is quite obvious. The U.S. promotion of exclusive small-multilateralism in the Middle East is a form of "pseudo-multilateralism" that practices hegemony in the name of multilateralism. This is detrimental to normal cooperation in the Middle East and does not serve the interests of Middle Eastern countries and their peoples.
III. The Superposition of Multiple Security Risks
Currently, although the security situation in the Middle East has improved, structural security issues remain unresolved. Against the broad backdrop of development priority, strategic autonomy, and the relaxation of relations between regional states, the security situation has improved in three main aspects: the threat posed by popular protests to regime security has declined, the situation on the ground in war-torn countries has basically stabilized, and regional bloc confrontation has eased. However, because the Middle East has long been subject to external intervention, complex internal and interstate contradictions, and a lack of security cooperation mechanisms and strategic mutual trust, its structural security problems have not undergone fundamental improvement.
The Middle East still faces superimposed traditional and non-traditional security risks. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) analyzed the perceptions of security threats among Middle Eastern decision-makers by studying speeches made by heads of state, heads of government, defense ministers, foreign ministers, and chiefs of general staff at the UN, Arab League, OSCE, and the Manama Dialogue between 2008 and 2021. The conclusion was that conflict and instability, terrorism and extremism, attacks on national territory, nuclear proliferation, climate change and natural disasters, organized crime, missiles, maritime security, food-water-energy security, the refugee crisis, cybersecurity, and public health security are regarded as the most serious security threats. The top four threats are all traditional security issues, which means that the political and military elites of the Middle East still regard traditional security as the gravest concern. Since 2023, traditional security issues in the Middle East have remained severe. A new round of violent conflict broke out between Palestine and Israel; Israel launched a large-scale military operation in the West Bank city of Jenin, resulting in hundreds of deaths. On October 7, 2023, the Palestinian Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) launched a massive rocket barrage toward southern and central Israel, and its armed personnel entered Israeli territory to conduct military operations. On the same day, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu announced that Israel had entered a "state of war." Civil war broke out in Sudan, with intense clashes between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces causing thousands of deaths. At the same time, non-traditional security issues in the Middle East have become increasingly prominent. In February, a massive earthquake struck Turkey and Syria, killing over 50,000 people and causing economic losses totaling hundreds of billions of dollars. In September, Libya suffered devastating floods that killed over 10,000 people; this was both a manifestation of the frequent extreme weather in the Middle East and a result of the insufficient provision of public services caused by years of civil war.
The Prospects for Development in the Middle East
From the perspective of historical development, the Middle East is undergoing profound changes of the times and changes of history. Focusing on development, strategic autonomy, and reconciliation and cooperation is becoming the consensus of an increasing number of Middle Eastern countries. This will change the course of regional history and help realize peace and development in the Middle East. However, resolving long-standing security deficits, development deficits, and governance deficits is by no means the work of a single day; development in the Middle East will proceed through hardships and setbacks.
Regarding security, the "tide of reconciliation" in the Middle East is merely an important positive step toward improving security. Due to the lack of strategic mutual trust and institutional foundations for security cooperation, the challenges remain immense. Security contradictions between some regional powers remain sharp, the traditional Palestinian-Israeli issue is more urgent and severe, and non-traditional security issues brought by extreme weather cannot be ignored.
Regarding development, many long-term structural problems facing Middle Eastern economies have not been alleviated. Differences in resource endowments, strategic choices, and governance capabilities have led to uneven economic performance. The impact of sudden events, such as the Ukraine crisis, persists, and the capacity of regional states to adapt to the Fourth Industrial Revolution is not optimistic.
The peace and development of the Middle East are inseparable from the efforts of regional countries and peoples, as well as the support of extra-regional countries and the international community. In this new period of development for the Middle East, China has played an important constructive role. China is deepening political communication and mutual trust with Middle Eastern countries, strengthening the alignment of development strategies and economic cooperation, and enhancing security exchanges. Relations between China and the Middle East have entered a new stage in the New Era, boosting regional peace and development. The December 2022 "Three Rings" summits—the China-Arab States Summit, the China-GCC Summit, and the China-Saudi Arabia Summit—resulted in the Riyadh Declaration and joint statements. Relying on strategic cooperation, these summits collectively promoted the upgrading of China-Arab relations and reached a consensus to go all out to build a China-Arab community with a shared future for the New Era, further elevating strategic mutual trust and cooperation. A group of Middle Eastern countries has actively requested to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the BRICS cooperation mechanism, demonstrating the willingness of Middle Eastern countries to move from "Looking East" to "Acting East."
The total trade volume between China and Middle Eastern countries continues to climb, investment cooperation has risen against the trend, and landmark engineering projects have been conspicuous. Cooperation across the entire energy industrial chain and in new energy is constantly improving. China is the largest trading partner of the Middle East; in 2022, trade between China and Middle Eastern countries exceeded $500 billion. China has become the largest trading partner of 12 Arab countries. Arab countries exported 271 million tons of oil to China, accounting for 53.31% of China’s total global crude oil imports for that year. On June 11–12, 2023, the 10th Arab-China Business Conference and the 8th Investment Symposium were held in Riyadh, the capital of Saudi Arabia, where the two sides signed more than 30 cooperation projects worth over 70 billion RMB.
At the same time, China and Middle Eastern countries have enhanced security exchanges and cooperation, with cooperation in traditional and non-traditional security fields continuously improving. China is providing an increasing amount of public goods to the Middle East. The Chinese Navy’s escort missions in the Gulf of Aden have a 15-year history, and its UN peacekeeping operations in Lebanon are widely praised. China has proposed several security initiatives related to Middle Eastern affairs. More importantly, by facilitating the restoration of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, China has played a key role as a "Middle East peacemaker," vigorously promoting regional peace and development.
Against the backdrop of the accelerating evolution of the world landscape, development in the Middle East is embracing a historic turning point. Facing new historical conditions, China and Middle Eastern countries will be guided by the concept of building a community with a shared future for humanity, using the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) as levers to deepen exchanges and innovate cooperation, jointly promoting peace and development for the region and the world.
First, driven by the dual engines of the Global Development Initiative and the Belt and Road Initiative, we will strengthen the sharing of development. China and Middle Eastern countries have similar economic development philosophies, highly complementary economic structures, and a strong desire for economic cooperation. Both sides are joining hands to meet the opportunities and challenges of the Fourth Industrial Revolution. China will continue to work with Middle Eastern countries to promote high-quality development of the Belt and Road and practice the GDI, deepening cooperation in new technologies, new industries, new infrastructure, and new energy—such as big data, artificial intelligence, green energy, aerospace, and genetic engineering—to achieve economic development together, promote new-type globalization, improve the global governance system, and push for stronger, greener, and healthier global development.
Second, guided by the Global Security Initiative, we will strengthen the collective building of security. In the context of the "tide of reconciliation" and the increased strategic autonomy of Middle Eastern states, China and Middle Eastern countries are continuously promoting the construction of regional security cooperation mechanisms and a security community. Basic principles may include: leadership by regional states with coordination from external powers; starting with non-sensitive issues while accounting for both traditional and non-traditional security; and creating a security architecture that is flexible in organization, inclusive in membership, and credible in commitment, thereby helping to resolve long-standing structural security problems in the Middle East.
Third, guided by the Global Civilization Initiative, we will strengthen mutual learning between civilizations. Adhering to the spirit of "appreciating one’s own beauty, appreciating the beauty of others, and sharing beauty together," [5] we should tap into the experience and wisdom of fine traditional Chinese culture and Arab-Islamic culture, endowing them with the spirit of the times and universal significance. We must strengthen exchanges and mutual learning between the civilizations of China and the Middle East, deepen the exchange of experience in governance, walk the path of modernization together, and jointly oppose the civilizational and discourse hegemony imposed by some Western countries, while advocating for the common values of all humanity. Driven by this, Middle Eastern countries will gradually escape the vortex of the "long wave of upheaval" [6] and shape a prosperous and stable "New Middle East" that differs from the past.