Sun Chenghao and Zhang Chenghao: The Resurgence of Contemporary American Anti-Intellectualism
After the end of the Cold War, the United States styled itself as a "beacon of the world," promoting and exporting the values of "democracy and freedom" abroad. However, due to the implementation of extreme domestic and foreign policies following Donald Trump's assumption of power and other factors, American society has become increasingly polarized. This is manifested in the worsening of partisan struggle, strained class relations, and frequent social and ethnic conflicts—phenomena viewed by academia as the "2017 Political Crisis."
Anti-intellectualism originated in the 1960s and received widespread attention from domestic and foreign political and academic circles following the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic; it can partially explain the domestic chaos in the United States. Its progenitor, Richard Hofstadter, took as his subject of study "those who belittle the life of the mind, reject independent thought, and suspect or even harbor hostility toward the group known as 'intellectuals,'" using this to describe the "anti-intellectual" culture in American life. Building on this, Hofstadter conducted an in-depth analysis of the causes of anti-intellectualism in the United States from the perspectives of religious tradition and democratic politics, providing a new theoretical lens for understanding American social trends and political paradigms. Inspired by this, scholars of the same period approached the issue from the perspectives of ideology and social management, predicting that anti-intellectualism would head toward extinction.
However, academic predictions did not come true. Anti-intellectualism did not go extinct; rather, it reappeared on the historical stage in the 21st century alongside populism. Constrained by the changes in historical conditions, Hofstadter’s analysis sixty years ago—which used McCarthyism as the primary social phenomenon to explain the causes of "anti-intellectualism"—has difficulty explaining the current resurgence of anti-intellectual trends in the United States. In response, the author attempts to start from meritocracy, characterized by "equality of opportunity" and "the capable earn more," to explain the reasons for the resurgence of anti-intellectualism from social-institutional and ideological perspectives. By clarifying the internal connection between anti-intellectualism and meritocracy, we can better understand the origins of anti-intellectualism and the changes in the current American political paradigm.
I. Anti-Intellectualism in the United States: Rise and Manifestations
Since Hofstadter, anti-intellectualism has been considered an opposition to intellectuals and the intellect they represent, which further extends into a resentment and antipathy toward elite groups. This is prominently manifested in various fields, including American politics, society, spiritual culture, and the individual minds of citizens. Simultaneously, anti-intellectualism originates from multiple factors, such as the flaws in the American education system, the "individualization" of the democratic system, and shifts in industrial structure.
(A) The Connotation of Anti-Intellectualism
As a theoretical doctrine, anti-intellectualism was synthesized in the book Anti-Intellectualism in American Life written by Hofstadter. The book argues that anti-intellectualism is a "resentment and suspicion of the life of the mind and those who are considered to represent it." In other words, what anti-intellectualism opposes is not "intelligence" as an excellence of the mind, but rather the critical, creative, and contemplative "intellect"; on this basis, it also opposes the intellectuals who possess and enjoy such intellect. While Hofstadter made anti-intellectualism an academic concept, this definition remains relatively simple and vague. Scholar Daniel Rigney summarized Hofstadter’s anti-intellectualism into three types: first, anti-rationalism, which originates in religion and upholds religious absolutism and the conservative claim that faith is superior to science; second, anti-elitism, a critical view of elite power serving its own class to construct privilege; and third, unreflective instrumentalism, manifested as the abandonment of "ideas that do not bring reward value," namely the reflective side of the intellect.
Under the framework of Hofstadter and Rigney, subsequent scholars further summarized anti-intellectualism: First, from the perspective of anti-rationalism, they discussed the negative attitudes of anti-intellectuals toward rationality and intellectuals, constituting the first level of the connotation of anti-intellectualism. Second, as a critique of elite politics, anti-intellectualism is a "resentment and loathing of the complacency and condescension of the elite." Anti-intellectuals either turn toward a radical populism with right-wing political demands or hold attitudes of suspicion and criticism toward experts and scholars in relevant fields. Third, as an abandonment of the reflective viewpoint within the intellect, anti-intellectualism is seen as an opposition to the "life of the mind"—that is, emphasizing practical and utilitarian knowledge while lacking analytical capacity, innovative thinking, and critical thinking skills, manifested as a dogmatism highly dependent on empirical content.
With the rise of populism in the political arenas of various countries, academic research on anti-intellectualism has achieved new breakthroughs in both quality and quantity. Martin Eigenberger and others, using an "anti-intellectualism scale," proposed that anti-intellectualism is a kind of "closed-mindedness." With the advent of the "post-truth" era, academia has extended the connotation of anti-intellectualism to the rejection of factual information and professional expertise, which is prominently manifested in rhetoric and behavior such as "COVID-19 conspiracy theories."
(B) Reasons for the Rise of Anti-Intellectualism
Hofstadter argued that the zeal of Evangelical Christians, the fear of elite rule, the pragmatism of business and trade, and the defects of the education system left many Americans lacking the capacity for independent thought and reflection. Additionally, scholars have sought the causes of the rise of anti-intellectualism from political operation, culture and education, and the social level.
Certain cultural factors in American society have led to anti-intellectualism. Not only did Hofstadter rank religious factors as the primary cause, but some scholars have also proposed links between Pietism, the doctrine of original sin, and anti-intellectualism. With the popularization of public education, academia has gradually blamed the origins of anti-intellectualism on the absence of the education system—manifested in the scarcity of books, the lack of general education curricula, and the educational deficiencies caused by the education system's inability to adapt to the situation after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic. Furthermore, the improper handling of news by traditional print media, the internet, television, and radio has fueled the spread of anti-intellectualism.
Simultaneously, American political life triggered the rise of anti-intellectualism. Following the exit of the first generation of American leaders and the election of Andrew Jackson, known for his recklessness, mass democracy replaced elite rule. "Jacksonian democracy" improved the American democratic institution while simultaneously intensifying the public's antipathy toward the elite. Thereafter, to cater to the preferences of populist voters, anti-intellectualism increasingly became an electoral strategy for many presidents. Since the 1950s, presidential candidates who possess an elite temperament and high-level degrees have instead lost to candidates with lower educational backgrounds and anti-intellectual tendencies, causing the upper levels of American democratic politics to gradually shift to the right, becoming more conservative and anti-intellectual. Not only this, but historically, right-wing politicians like Joseph McCarthy, George W. Bush, and Donald Trump have incited opposition against intellectuals through political demagoguery to gain political support.
As research deepened, social explanations for anti-intellectualism also gradually emerged. The pursuit of high-income positions has caused university students to learn professional knowledge more pragmatically while neglecting the cultivation of the intellect. Changes in social structure caused by income shifts have also led to the disappearance of the middle class, thereby damaging the intellect of American citizens. Anti-intellectual differences are reflected not only in the vertical differences of the occupational social structure but even more so in horizontal urban-rural differences: rural areas rely on "acquaintance groups" [1] to exclude outside information, which to some extent also drives the production of anti-intellectualism. With the development of political psychology, academia has debated the question of "whether the social environment affects anti-intellectual tendencies." Martin Eigenberger and others explained anti-intellectualism as a personal trait, believing the anti-intellectual personality originates from hereditary factors; however, some scholars believe anti-intellectualism changes due to environmental and peer factors rather than being a hereditary trait.
In summary, academic explanations for the causes of anti-intellectualism are relatively mature, but research blind spots remain. Not only is some research quite dated, with viewpoints unable to adapt to the current anti-intellectualism born of populism and political polarization, but few scholars have provided a rational elaboration on the resurgence of anti-intellectualism from the perspective of the American social distribution system and ideology. Following the 2008 international financial crisis and the profound exposure of the flaws in the American political and economic system after Trump's election, the meritocracy branded into the American "DNA" can no longer satisfy the American people’s fantasies of the "American Dream," becoming the primary cause of a new wave of anti-intellectualism. Taking this as an entry point, the author attempts to explore the driving role of social distribution systems and ideology in anti-intellectualism.
II. Meritocracy as Institution and Ideology
Before the outbreak of the 2008 international financial crisis, meritocracy—characterized by equality of opportunity and the capable earning more—was recognized and promoted by American society. This academic concept first appeared in leftist articles in the 1950s and developed into an ideology championed by conservatives. Combined with the capitalist distribution system, it inevitably carries the flaws of a lack of substantive equality, the extremalization of individual contribution, and the protection of elite interests.
(A) The Connotation and Development of Meritocracy
As a distribution system, meritocracy is famous for "equality of opportunity," "merit-based appointment," and "the capable earning more." It advocates that social and economic rewards should be determined according to "merits" such as talent, effort, and achievement. It has two core principles: "distributing jobs strictly according to 'merit'" and "distributing income strictly according to production efficiency." It exists not only in the realms of power, status, and income distribution but also in everyday areas such as educational resources and job positions. Its emergence can be divided into two stages: Before the 1980s, meritocracy was a unique concept of distribution that emphasized equality of opportunity rather than substantive equality. It ignored family background, race, and gender differences; compared to aristocracy and hierarchy which emphasized birth, it was often seen as a manifestation of civilizational progress and social fairness. After the 1980s, conservatives combined meritocracy with conservative ideology, turning it into a political rhetoric for maintaining elite interests. This doctrine, which emphasizes gaining "social mobility" through individual "struggle and effort" under the premise of equality of opportunity, constitutes an ideology that maintains the private property and political legitimacy of the upper-level elite in the process of encouraging social progress and mobility.
Through this process, meritocracy has already become the "political oxygen" of Western society. People find it difficult to perceive its existence, yet cannot extricate themselves from it. People take it for granted and find it difficult to question its rationality; some conservative scholars even view it as the guarantee of sufficient social mobility in modern society.
(B) Characteristics and Flaws of Meritocracy
Meritocracy is not the most perfect design for human society. Democratic socialist Alan Fox and British scholar Michael Young were the first to criticize meritocracy. They argued that meritocracy, while seemingly offering equality of opportunity, actually becomes an obstacle limiting the working class from achieving class escalation and social mobility. Furthermore, as a market-oriented distribution system, it is highly likely to cause income inequality and polarization.
Meritocracy with an ideological color has the following characteristics and flaws: First, from its theoretical origin, meritocracy excessively focuses on equality of opportunity and covers up substantive inequality. Meritocracy combined with ideology pays more attention to equality of opportunity; meritocrats believe the poor can become rich by exerting talent and working hard: although income may be unequal, everyone has an equal opportunity to become wealthy. But in reality, substantive inequality is masked under the equality of opportunity advocated by meritocracy. The gap between rich and poor in American society has gradually increased, with the share of usable wealth held by the top 10% of households increasing from 59.8% in 1992 to 70% in 2019. According to statistics from the World Inequality Database (WID), around 2021, the top 1% of Americans in terms of income already possessed nearly 20% of social wealth. This means that even if the middle and lower classes exert tremendous effort, it is difficult for them to obtain corresponding economic, political, and social returns. The promise of equality of opportunity in meritocracy has not realized substantive equality.
Second, from the perspective of evaluative criteria, meritocracy attaches extreme importance to individual ability and effort. Michael Young, who coined the term "meritocracy," defined merit as "merit equals IQ plus effort"; subsequently, conservative politicians also treated effort as a key factor, with the slogan "as long as you work hard, you can succeed" becoming a favorite among them. In reality, however, whether the contributions and achievements represented by merit possess a "moral desert" [2] related to effort is debatable. Opportunity, talent, the assistance provided by social groups to the individual, and market demand all possess a substantive moral arbitrariness. In other words, individual achievement cannot be attributed entirely to effort and talent; market demand and social assistance are also foundations of success. The strong individualist orientation of the meritocratic concept ignores the role of and feedback from the community, planting the seeds of risk for anti-intellectuals to oppose the elite class.
Third, from the perspective of outcomes, meritocracy within an ideological context has become a barrier for safeguarding elite interests and preventing latecomers from rising. While meritocracy appears to value talent over birth, reality is far removed from the ideal; elites can monopolize the channels of individual mobility by monopolizing education. Meritocracy holds that social outcomes over time—such as an individual’s profession, class, and wealth—are directly proportional to their level of education and not significantly correlated with factors like social origin. This links individual achievement to education. In practice, education is inevitably influenced by family background, meaning that achieving class mobility through effort is difficult to realize. Empirical research shows that the non-elite strata find it harder to achieve good grades in basic education, which makes it harder for them to enter top-tier universities. This also means it is harder for the masses to engage in decent, high-income professions or to integrate into "elite circles." Therefore, by monopolizing high-quality educational resources, meritocracy has degenerated into a tool for the elite to maintain their own interests and consolidate their privileges. It is difficult for the masses to cross the class chasm, let alone truly achieve social mobility.
Today, meritocracy has become the mainstream trend of thought and institutional design in American society. Since the 1980s, successive U.S. administrations have promoted meritocracy, viewing it as a vital foundation for social mobility and constructing a "New American Dream" that incentivizes work and mobility. However, this American Dream is tending toward disillusionment. The upper-tier elites monopolize wealth, power, and social status within the elite class, leaving the masses to suffer moral condemnation while finding it difficult to obtain political or economic benefits. This not only harms social justice but also impairs American-style democracy and has triggered a new wave of anti-intellectualism.
III. Meritocracy Stimulates the Re-emergence of a New Round of American Anti-Intellectualism
Factors such as the pragmatic tradition, ideology, the lack of basic education, and religious culture within the classic analytical perspective can explain the formation of several waves of anti-intellectualism in American history, but they struggle to fully explain the rise of this new round. First, the end of the Cold War made domestic ideological issues in the U.S. relatively mild; Americans’ self-proclamation that liberalism had won "victory" has diminished the explanatory power of the traditional view that anti-intellectualism arose from McCarthyism and gradually targeted intellectuals. Second, the influence of religious factors and the American pragmatic tradition on anti-intellectualism has gradually waned. Although the spread of atheism in the U.S. is currently extremely limited, the intensity with which anti-intellectuals oppose scientific views such as evolution is far weaker than at any other period in American history. Furthermore, pragmatic theory cannot explain why utility-oriented anti-intellectuals actually refused vaccinations and masks during the COVID-19 pandemic; this makes "old anti-intellectualism" increasingly inconsistent with the current anti-science and anti-authority status quo of American society. Third, the lack of basic education was an important reason for the rise of several waves of anti-intellectualism in American history; however, under the catalysis of meritocracy, the utilitarianization and class-differentiation [3] of American basic education have become factors more worthy of discussion. Finally, mass media and social media are only one of the reasons for the rise of the new round of anti-intellectualism, and at most serve as the channels and surface manifestations that fueled it. The full exposure of American social maladies on social media does not mean that mass media is the sole factor triggering the new round of anti-intellectualism; hence, some scholars refer to it as a "technical factor" rather than a "root factor."
Therefore, the author believes that, by comparison, meritocracy is an important and non-negligible cause explaining the rise of the new round of American anti-intellectualism. By utilitarianizing and class-stratifying the education intended to foster a spirit of civic reflection, meritocracy has weakened the cultivation of independent thinking skills, triggering anti-science phenomena in American society. On this basis, the elite class—by monopolizing the government and legislature, cutting off the representativeness of public opinion, and constructing an opposition between the masses and the elite—has incited anti-elite sentiment among the populace, weakened public political trust in the elite, and triggered anti-elite phenomena in the American political sphere, leading to a "de-elitization" sentiment. The resulting inequality in job opportunities and political participation has damaged the dignity of work and civic spirit, weakened the reflective capacity of citizens, and induced a "non-reflective" state in the intellect of American citizens.
(1) The Class-Differentiation and Utilitarianization of Meritocratic Education Impair the Cultivation of Civic Intellect
From the perspective of the social impact of education, education can allow citizens to recognize individual deficiencies and establish a spirit of lifelong learning and belief in science, thereby becoming high-quality, rational citizens. In the United States, however, not only are high-quality higher education resources extremely limited, but the backward state of basic education also fails to support all students in receiving higher education: this tilts high-quality educational resources toward the elite class. The impact of such problems is multifaceted. On the one hand, this phenomenon leads to the majority of citizens having lower intellectual levels and lacking independent thinking abilities, thereby triggering the "anti-intellectualism" described by Hofstadter. [4] On the other hand, it also results in American society requiring a screening mechanism to select high-level students to receive higher education and subsequently become elites. Meritocracy emerged as a result, making "merit" a vital value esteemed by American society. In the meritocratic vision, only students with outstanding academic ability who contribute to academic endeavors can enter institutions of higher learning. Top schools tend to select excellent students, and top students chase so-called prestigious schools; the combination of the two uses academic performance as a reference, providing elites with top-tier credentials while further amplifying the value of elite education. This seemingly "win-win" design accelerates the pace of talent cultivation while improving individual quality. Therefore, under the premise of equality of opportunity, higher education—through means such as the Scholastic Assessment Test (SAT)—allows the most talented people to rise and achieve social mobility.
However, from the perspective of intergenerational transmission, the credentials that elite children take pride in are essentially cultural capital inherited from their parents; they are an "innate advantage" that the elite class passes down to their offspring under the guise of merit. That elite children obtain high-quality educational resources is actually a benefit of their parents' wealth, information, and extensive social networks—intangible "capital." This means elites can use cultural capital to send their children to expensive academic tutoring sessions via connections, wealth, and social status to obtain entrance training superior to that of ordinary people, or obtain admission as alumni through large donations to universities. In this context, children from high-income families in the top 1% are 77 times more likely to enter "Ivy Plus" [5] institutions than children from bottom-tier families, and only 0.5% of high-income children end up in community colleges. Yet, among the nearly 5,000 universities in the U.S., research universities like the "Ivy Plus" constitute an absolute minority. Although they possess extraordinary resources for cultivating citizens' independent thinking, they have become the exclusive domain of the elite. The remaining majority of ordinary institutions and community colleges have become the primary destination for ordinary students, but the latter are unable to effectively cultivate civic intellect due to the scarcity of educational resources. Therefore, the elite not only monopolize education but also the process of intellectual cultivation; the trend of class-differentiation in the field of education has intensified the scarcity of intellect in American society.
From the perspective of educational goals and means, against the backdrop of scarce top-tier higher education resources and educational class-differentiation, receiving elite higher education requires utilitarian academic training. Consequently, under this model, basic education institutions are no longer schools providing general education or cultivating civic intellect. Under the meritocratic evaluation system, which values outcomes over processes, basic education has become a utilitarian site aimed at obtaining university credentials. Faced with the merit-only assessment in university admissions, applicants to prestigious schools receive education for the purpose of obtaining qualification for higher education rather than for self-improvement or becoming a polymath—education is no longer an end but a tool for pursuing high-level credentials. Under these conditions, learning is not for cultivating citizens with independent thinking skills, but for gaining social recognition through examinations, which is then fixed and institutionalized via credentials, becoming a mark of social approval and capability. Consequently, this brings about a major defect: "the ability of basic education to foster intellect will decrease, and the purpose of schools will become more utilitarian."
(2) Meritocracy Triggers a Wave of Anti-Elitism
Meritocracy triggers public resentment toward the elite through the following two processes. First, the opposition in meritocratic discourse triggers anti-elite sentiment among the masses. Meritocracy not only forms monopolistic privileges in various fields but also treats merit as the sole standard for judging individual value. Meritocrats, represented by the elite, regard struggle and effort as a form of political correctness and moral necessity. Young once pointed out the arrogance that merit brings to the elite: "The upper classes are no longer weakened by self-doubt and self-criticism; success is the reward for their own ability, effort, and achievement." This conceit stems from the meritocratic "morality of striving, built on a reservation about average individual ability": its adherents believe that under the premise of "equality of opportunity," individuals need to be tested by society, and everything depends on individual effort; striving is seen as the necessary prerequisite for success.
However, the result of the meritocratic moral view "is harmful because it does not adequately explain success and failure, and incorrectly exalts the winner while unjustly condemning the loser." Under this moral view, winners (mostly elites) are seen as "strivers" who meet meritocratic moral requirements; they represent the "correct" trend. Conversely, losers (mostly the masses or industrial workers) are precisely those who have lost the possibility of success because they are "stupid and lack the qualities of diligence and self-discipline," leading to a phenomenon where "for the first time in human history, ordinary people have no pillar to support their self-esteem." Successors represented by the elite are self-righteous, becoming elites who control the masses morally. The opposition between the elite and the masses deepens the resentment of the latter: the masses not only experience material deprivation because education, wealth, and power resources are squeezed by the elite, but they also accept unwarranted criticism from the elite. In this context, the elite and the masses are severely polarized, making political trust difficult to generate. After the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the "post-truth" phenomenon in American society intensified; its thinking mode of "opposing science and placing emotion before facts" also stems from the "elite-mass" opposition created by meritocracy.
Second, meritocracy triggers a crisis of representation that weakens public political trust in the elite. Another major drawback of meritocracy is that it undermines the original system of elite representation, preventing public opinion from being fully expressed within the existing political framework. While weakening public political trust in the elite, this also pushes anti-intellectualism and anti-elitism to extremes. Generally speaking, the conditions upon which American-style democracy depends are as follows: first, the belief that everyone is born equal and possesses equal rights to political participation; second, regular national and local elections and universal suffrage; third, the nomination of candidates for government office (such as heads of government) by left-wing and right-wing parties to represent public opinion and exercise state power; fourth, allowing public opinion to be fully expressed within legal boundaries. The key to its effective operation is the effective representation of public preferences by political parties or elites.
But current American-style democracy finds it difficult to actually meet these requirements. Under the impact of meritocratic concepts, American-style democracy lacks equality in political participation; the elite lack reasonable representativeness, and the masses lack legitimate mechanisms for political expression. This has led to the re-emergence of anti-intellectualism characterized by anti-elitism. This is manifested in the following three aspects:
First, meritocracy masks the inequality of opportunity for political participation among the American grassroots. In a society where meritocracy is mainstream, meritocrats use the belief in "equal opportunity to hold political office" to conceal the substantive inequality wherein elites use money and power to consolidate their ruling position. The distribution of public office, public power, and legislative positions in contemporary American society is by no means based on talent or contribution. On the one hand, from the perspective of the right to vote, there is a world of difference between the influence of the elite and the masses on political life: due to gaps in wealth and information, it is difficult for the votes of the masses to achieve a truly rational choice, and even more difficult for them to truly influence election results. The wealthy classes and professional politicians can use inequality in wealth and information to shape the policy preferences of citizens and "manipulate" the election landscape. On the other hand, regarding the right to be elected, the masses find it difficult to become members of Congress, governors, or even the president because they lack the social networks, economic strength, education, and professional political backgrounds possessed by the elite. From a legislative perspective, among the 533 members of the House and Senate in the current 118th Congress, 64% (341 people) previously worked in local legislatures or the federal Congress, and 23% (124 people) had political experience as mayors, governors, or local prosecutors. From the perspective of the federal government, the populace has not elected a president without a higher education degree since President Truman. Therefore, the elite monopoly on the power to participate in politics has actually increased the difficulty and degree of inequality for the masses to participate in political life.
Second, the difficulty for elites to represent the grassroots has triggered a crisis of representation and a crisis of trust, becoming a key factor in undermining American-style democracy and triggering anti-elite anti-intellectualism. In a society that uses unequal capability factors—such as education and social networks—as measures and blindly pursues merit, it is not only difficult for the masses to serve as public officials, but the legislature also lacks effective representatives from ordinary backgrounds who can represent the people. This has caused a rupture in the representativeness of public opinion. In the 118th Congress, no member was a former industrial worker or had worked in a factory; yet in the 109th Congress in 2004, at least 21 members successfully ran for office from grassroots occupations such as steelworkers. Differences in primary occupations inevitably lead to differences in held positions and interest preferences. This means that industrial workers—who account for nearly 20% of the employed population in American society and are on the brink of unemployment with meager benefits—lack representative value and necessary channels to speak out. This results in a serious lack of the representativeness that the American democratic system once prided itself on. Within a representative system centered on the elite, the fundamental interests of the masses cannot be understood or responded to by the elite, forcing the masses to adopt extra-establishment means to attract political attention. Consequently, once anti-elite and anti-establishment politicians run for office under the banner of "saving democracy," they can gain the support of the masses.
Finally, the difference in education levels between the masses and the elite has caused a severe elite-mass polarization. A crisis of trust exists between the two: the elite despise the masses and cannot understand them, while the masses view the elite as a closed clique detached from reality. In the 87th Congress of the early 1960s, 24% of members of the House and Senate did not have an undergraduate degree, yet they could still fulfill their duties as legislators; in the current Congress, this figure is 4%. In reality, however, approximately two-thirds of American citizens have not obtained a bachelor's degree. The highly educated elite and the unrepresented masses are severely polarized. The masses do not believe that political agents will fulfill their promises, causing them to gradually detach from the political trust networks of the elite. Such a crisis of trust has created a giant rift: in the 2016 general election, about two-thirds of white voters without a higher education supported the highly anti-intellectual Trump, while the Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton, who ran as an elite, won the support of over 70% of highly educated voters. This problem became even more apparent after the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, as citizens without higher education insisted that the pandemic and vaccines were "lies" told by the elite. It is evident that the ideology of meritocracy has dissolved the political trust of the masses in the elite, undermining American-style democracy while intensifying anti-intellectual and anti-elite sentiments.
(3) The lack of dignity of labor and public spirit weakens the reflective spirit of the masses
The American populace believed they could increase their well-being through work and improve the functioning of the democratic system through political participation—that is, they believed they could exert influence on political and social life through their actions. However, in the discourse of meritocracy, occupations are divided into different grades with social status and income as rewards; therefore, those who cannot obtain "decent" occupations are subject to the ruthless criticism of the elite. On the one hand, in the elite's perception, only "lazy and ignorant" people engage in "disrespectable" occupations like assembly line work; if one is not a politician, lawyer, or Wall Street manager, it is difficult to contribute to public causes or civic welfare. Thus, the work spirit of the masses is eroded, and they can no longer find a sense of value in their individual roles. On the other hand, the elite monopoly on public office makes it difficult for the masses to access public positions and power, frustrating the public spirit required to achieve political goals and personal vocational value. The unwarranted criticism from the elite regarding their work also causes the grassroots to lose basic dignity of labor, recognition of self-worth, and the belief that work creates value. The loss of dignity of labor and lack of recognition from others makes the goal of the masses' work merely to obtain a meager income to subsidize their livelihood. They lack the public spirit to reflect on the process of work and the implementation of democracy, and they are even less likely to offer suggestions on work and social phenomena. This doubt about the value of work and civic politics leads to political apathy. This sows the seeds for the degradation of citizens' reflective intellect.
In the early days of the American founding, a pluralistic society required a diverse populace to handle public affairs on a small scale and form self-governance. This mode of self-governance helped people develop habits of reasoning, persuasion, and mutual respect. These habits allowed people to start from the public affairs of community life, giving them the chance to think about the progress of small residential communities, thereby forming the ability to think independently for public life, cultivating a public spirit for reflecting on public life, and producing a spirit of self-governance with a reflective character. Those with outstanding abilities would then intend to run for public offices such as federal legislators. But today's American populace lacks this kind of thinking: the upward channel for ordinary people to start from grassroots affairs and subsequently offer insights on local, state, and federal affairs has been severed. Consequently, it is difficult for them to become statesmen who propose beneficial insights, and their suggestions are unlikely to receive the attention and recognition of the elite. This dampens the people's desire for political thought and expression. In recent US elections, the turnout rate of industrial workers and those with a high school education or less has been far lower than that of white-collar workers and those with a college degree or higher, and this phenomenon is spreading to other Western countries like Canada and the UK. The price of meritocracy's deprivation of the value of labor and social participation—which weakens independent thinking and causes a loss of reflective capacity—is that the masses are more easily incited by news media and social software, becoming anti-democratic forces that oppose the elite and intellect. Therefore, the lack of effective dignity of labor and public spirit participation has caused the American masses to increasingly lack the reflectiveness necessary to constitute intellect.
IV. Characteristics and Impact of the New Wave of Anti-intellectualism
Unlike the several waves of anti-intellectualism in American history, the new wave triggered by meritocracy has new characteristics and impacts. It exhibits a strong anti-elite and "de-elitist" character; the means of political participation and expression used by anti-intellectuals are more extreme and radical, showing a trend toward a populist turn. Furthermore, this new wave of anti-intellectualism not only destroys the spiritual life of American society but will also promote a conservative trend in social issues, undermine the American democratic system, and ultimately accelerate the decline of American hegemony.
(1) New characteristics of the new wave of anti-intellectualism
The difference between the new wave of anti-intellectualism triggered by meritocracy and the historical waves lies in two points: first, the new wave expresses a stronger "de-elitist" characteristic. Anti-intellectualism from the early founding period to the end of the Cold War was closer to the concept defined by Hofstadter—that is, a resentment toward high levels of education, a distaste for reflective thinking, and a rejection of intellectuals based on religious or educational reasons. But today, due to changes in social structure and the development of higher education, few people hold a critical attitude toward education itself. Contemporary American anti-intellectualism manifests first as the "anti-elitism" described by Rigoni; it uses the name of opposing "intellect" to express dissatisfaction with the lack of social mobility, the elite monopoly on resources, and the failure of American-style democracy, subsequently turning its spearhead toward the vested interests—the elite. Starting from a logic of opposing facts, the masses view the elite as a group hostile to themselves, believing the elite have occupied political and economic resources that should belong to the public, leading to deep resentment. In this opposition, the masses doubt the motives of the elite, view elite propositions as lies, and de-legitimize the elite, thereby deepening a value orientation where personal emotion takes precedence over facts and everything is doubted. Therefore, while American public opinion has seemed anti-science and anti-common sense in recent years—manifesting in anti-intellectual behaviors like refusing to wear masks or get vaccinated—it reflects an underlying resentment and distrust toward the propositions and rhetoric of the elite.
Second, the means of expression for this new wave are more extreme and radical, exhibiting a more populist trend. In traditional anti-intellectualism, people's criticism of intellectuals could be expressed within the framework of the law and representative democratic mechanisms: they could use the media or vote for more pragmatic candidates. In other words, such expressions were at most differences in political concepts and value orientations between citizens, without a strict distinction of superior or inferior. However, anti-intellectualism incited by right-wing anti-intellectual politicians is characterized by extremism. Under the mobilization of anti-intellectual discourse, radical right-wing conservatism has risen and become an important reason for the emergence of extreme political behavior in the contemporary US. On the one hand, anti-intellectuals incited by politicians attempt to break through the existing democratic and legal framework to express political demands directly: populists born from the incitement of anti-intellectual politicians like Trump have a heavy anti-establishment color, even using extreme methods like the violent assault on the Capitol to express their demands and dissatisfaction. On the other hand, due to the "mandate" of anti-intellectual voters, polarization among anti-intellectual politicians is severe. Within the democratic framework, they use "vetocracy" to obstruct and delay normal democratic procedures to express extreme political demands. Such extreme behavior has become a means to win votes and enter the government and Congress, possessing strong populist characteristics.
(2) The impact of the new wave of anti-intellectualism
The new wave of anti-intellectualism triggered by meritocracy has a more profound impact on American society. First, it intensifies the conservative trend in American social issues. Under the influence of high anti-elite sentiment, opposition to scientific authorities, and conspiracy theories, non-reflective anti-intellectualism is gradually returning. The masses are increasingly embracing dogmatic claims, which exacerbates the conservative trend in social issues. Currently, this is manifested in issues such as gun control, abortion rights, and even climate change. On the one hand, the masses show resentment and disgust toward policy propositions advocated by the elite, strikingly illustrated by the climate change issue: since 2016, the level of trust American citizens have in experts on climate change has shown a downward trend; 31% of the public believe climate experts have a poor understanding of "whether climate change is occurring," and 36% believe experts misunderstand the causes. Additionally, about 40% of the public believe there is no evidence for climate change or that it is caused by natural factors, and about one-third believe Congress and the president should not prioritize the issue. Distrust of experts, elites, and their advocated issues inevitably leads to a conservative trend on topics like the climate. On the other hand, anti-intellectuals holding religious absolutism are driving social issues toward conservatism. Marked by the federal Supreme Court's overturning of Roe v. Wade, consensual issues like abortion rights and the Establishment Clause [6]—which were once accepted by the majority of voters—are being attacked and challenged. The counterattack of religious conservative forces is reflected in the extremely conservative ideology and strong religious color of the new Speaker of the House [7]. This is also an important manifestation of the bottom-up development of conservatism in American social issues.
Second, the new wave of anti-intellectualism has weakened the American democratic system and delegitimized American politics. The source of legitimacy for the American democratic system is representative democracy and the representativeness and compliance created by the national universal suffrage system. Periodic elections and the "one person, one vote" universal suffrage system reflect that election results represent the people, and similarly reflect that public officials produced through elections can represent the interests of the people. However, today, on the one hand, the rise of meritocracy has caused the American political system to increasingly reveal its side of maintaining the interests of elite rule. Universal suffrage has become a "rubber stamp" [8]. Under conditions of polarized wealth gaps and the polarization between the masses and the elites, legislators are more likely to become interest representatives for the elite rather than the masses, and the public's distrust of the political system is deepening day by day. On the other hand, existing anti-intellectual politicians incite anti-intellectuals, not hesitating to publicly question general election results, attack the democratic system, and undermine the existing political structure for the sake of winning votes, thereby reducing the degree of compliance in democratic operations. The consequence of this is that the rate of legitimate political participation by the masses is decreasing year by year, and the public's trust in the existing system has dropped significantly. People are more inclined to adopt populist, extremist, and anti-establishment means to express political demands. In current Western democratic political practice, the masses even tend to bypass the legislature, which holds the highest authority, and choose referendums or petitions—which lack legal status but possess the highest representative value—to express demands and force the executive authorities to listen to the people's opinions. Therefore, the anti-intellectualism intensified by meritocracy not only harms American intellect at the spiritual level but also denies the legitimacy of American democratic politics at the political level.
Third, the new wave of anti-intellectualism will, to a greater extent, weaken American cohesion and its international image. Several waves of anti-intellectualism in American history have all brought varying degrees of impact. For example, the anti-intellectualism triggered by McCarthyism in the 1960s [9] stifled the atmosphere of free discussion in academia and triggered public fear of and opposition to intellectuals, "driving many thinking people to a dead end." The new wave of anti-intellectualism triggered by meritocracy will cause even greater damage to the cohesion of American society. On the one hand, the new wave of anti-intellectualism will trigger more extremist social trends. Under the suggestion and incitement of anti-intellectual politicians like Trump who are dissatisfied with election results, voters mobilized by extremist rhetoric—in order to maintain their prestige and correctness—have produced many social trends and movements to defend party leaders. For example, "anti-wokeism," which stands in sharp opposition to the far-left, has also become a new extremist social trend. On the other hand, the new wave of anti-intellectualism weakens the scientific and democratic nature of decision-making, as well as American international leadership over its allies and its own international image. Looking at several recent American presidents, the policy positions of anti-intellectual politicians such as George W. Bush and Donald Trump are often difficult to predict; they ignore expert advice and frequently make unpredictable and controversial decisions.
George W. Bush's choice to start a war in Iraq and Trump's blind pursuit of "America First" weakened ties with allies and, to a large extent, undermined the stability and continuity of U.S. domestic and foreign policies, damaging the American image while weakening the "world leadership" of American hegemony.
V. Conclusion
Today, anti-intellectualism has become a problem that American policymakers must face. Starting from meritocracy as a distribution system and an ideology, this author has explored the causes of anti-intellectualism from the perspectives of an educational field characterized by class stratification and utilitarianism, the public's emotional exhaustion with elites, the representativeness of the elite class versus mass-elite opposition, and the public's lack of reflexivity regarding the public spirit. Elites use meritocracy to monopolize educational resources, thereby depriving the masses of educational opportunities and weakening the process of cultivating public intelligence. Elites also construct a discourse system that disparages the masses and maintains their own interests, cutting off the representativeness upon which the American democratic system depends for survival, thus triggering a wave of anti-elitism among the masses. Furthermore, the deprivation of opportunities for citizens to participate in politics has weakened civic spirit and further diminished the public's reflective spirit, ultimately damaging the independent thinking ability of the American people.
Distinct from the several waves of anti-intellectualism in American history, the new wave of anti-intellectualism profoundly exposes the deep-seated grievances of the American political and economic systems. It not only exceeds previous waves in scope and depth of influence but also plunges the United States into an unprecedented social division—a division that will be difficult to bridge in the short term. At the same time, the new wave of anti-intellectualism manifests first as extremely intense anti-elitism; anti-intellectuals reject elites who lack representativeness, and it also exhibits various characteristics of the "post-truth" era, manifesting as groundless questioning and criticism of truth and facts. The harmfulness and destructive power of this type of anti-intellectualism have increased due to the rise of the internet, short videos, and self-media [10]. American people lacking judgment, independent thinking, and the capacity for reflection are highly likely to be incited by public opinion of uncertain veracity, thereby triggering a series of violent conflicts, undermining the democratic system while weakening American leadership in the international community.
Anti-intellectualism is merely one of the consequences brought about by the "tyranny of meritocracy." The widening gap between rich and poor, the decline of the middle class, and the resulting political and social inequality are also closely related to meritocracy. However, as a belief, meritocracy is deeply branded into the concepts of most Americans, making endless academic competition and the "performance-first" philosophy part of social maladies. The resurgence of anti-intellectualism has pulled back the illusory veil of the American Dream and revealed the chasm of income inequality in American society. Yet the United States cannot completely abandon meritocracy and retreat to other even more unequal systems such as hereditary or aristocratic systems. Through reflection on meritocracy and anti-intellectualism, it must be recognized that the harm meritocracy does to the United States is reflected not only on the material level of economic and political inequality but also on the spiritual level of public emotion. Whether the United States can soothe the emotions of an anxious, angry, anti-establishment, and anti-elite public is a question that requires sustained attention.
(Institutional Affiliations: Sun Chenghao, Center for International Security and Strategy, Tsinghua University; Zhang Chenghao, School of Political Science and Public Administration, China University of Political Science and Law)
Online Editor: Tong Xin Source: Contemporary World and Socialism, Issue 1, 2024