Li Ming: The Establishment and Collapse of the Japanese Communist Party's United Front in the 21st Century
Guided by Marxist united front theory, the Japanese Communist Party (hereafter JCP) has consistently viewed the united front as the fundamental method for assembling revolutionary forces and seizing state power. It does not pursue a one-party regime; rather, its current periodic objective in the revolutionary struggle is the establishment of a democratic coalition government based on a united front. In a speech commemorating the centenary of the JCP's founding, Shii Kazuo, Chairman of the JCP Central Committee, emphasized that the JCP is determined to promote social transformation by winning the support of the majority of citizens through elections, regardless of the difficulties encountered. He stated that the party’s overarching policy is to drive social change through the combined power of the people (the united front) at every stage of social development. Since the start of the 21st century, the JCP has undertaken many new efforts to build a united front, once successfully establishing one with opposition parties such as the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP). However, following defeats in two national elections, the united front abruptly fractured. Why was the united front established, and why did it break apart? Exploring this through both internal and external lenses helps to achieve a deeper understanding of the reasons behind the twists and turns in the JCP’s united front development and provides a scientific outlook on its future direction.
I. The Process of the United Front: From Establishment to Rupture
"The JCP has attached great importance to united front work since the end of the Second World War because developing the united front is of vital significance for the victory of the proletarian revolution." On the eve of the 21st century, the JCP, while actively promoting the united front, faced an unfavorable situation where it was marginalized, isolated, and even blockaded by other Japanese political parties. To counter the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and establish a "two-party system," various opposition parties frequently split, reorganized, gathered, and dispersed, constructing an invisible "anti-communist barrier." To break this deadlock in united front work, the JCP continually adjusted its policies in the early 21st century, proposing new united front strategies and claims, eventually realizing a united front for joint struggle with center-left parties.
(1) The JCP Adjusts Policies to Seek a United Front
First, the JCP continuously adjusted its own positioning to find a suitable foothold. In December 2002, the 5th Plenum of the 22nd Central Committee proposed the positioning of the JCP as a "party that conducts activities uprightly from the original standpoint of a political party." It criticized other parties for lacking political strategy and organizational building, arguing they had lost the proper standing of a political party, and that only the JCP could shoulder the responsibility of acting as a party that speaks for the citizens. In August 2005, the JCP proposed the positioning of being a "reliable opposition party in a resolute political showdown with the LDP," criticizing the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) for its "non-opposition" and "not anti-LDP" stances, while emphasizing the JCP's position as an anti-LDP opposition party. In July 2009, facing the prospect of the DPJ achieving a change of government, the JCP viewed the then-DPJ administration as a "transitional new regime" and positioned itself as a "constructive opposition party." Its task was to promote the DPJ regime's development toward a democratic, innovative, and progressive direction. However, as the DPJ’s strength was then surging, it ignored the JCP, whose seats remained stagnant, and the united front advocated by the JCP made no substantive progress.
Second, the JCP innovated its united front strategy, reducing the difficulty of coalition building. After the DPJ took power in 2009, in order to open up united front work, Shii Kazuo first proposed the concept of "single-issue joint struggle" (itten kyōtō [1]) in November 2011: in various fields, to transcend differences in political stance and partisan barriers, expand cooperation based on points of agreement, and strive to develop multifaceted and rich struggles based on the demands of the people to push forward real-world politics. Compared to previous united front strategies, the new strategy had two differences: First, the political basis of the united front was no longer a systematic and complete common program, but any possible point of agreement in any field. Previously, the united fronts formulated by the JCP had systematic and complete programs; "single-issue joint struggle" broke the common program down into struggle tasks and goals involving different fields, using these as the basis for uniting with other parties and organizations. Theoretically, this expanded the scope of the united front and increased opportunities for cooperation. Second, the united front movement was no longer a single-level movement but a multi-directional, multi-layered, and rich movement. Because the political basis of the united front was refined, it actually produced multiple political bases at different levels, thereby providing the possibility of establishing multiple united fronts. The united front changed from a single "line" to a "web," producing the effect of advancing the cause of innovative democracy and the democratic reform movement as a whole. "Single-issue joint struggle" played a certain role in helping the JCP open its united front work, sending a positive signal to the outside world.
Finally, the JCP timely proposed a new common program for the united front and called for the establishment of a coalition government. In September 2015, to oppose the Abe Cabinet’s forced passage of the New Security Legislation [2], the JCP urgently convened a Central Committee Plenum and formally issued a call to "overthrow the Abe regime and establish a national coalition government to abolish the war legislation." This "National Coalition Government" took "abolishing the war legislation and restoring constitutionalism" as its basic philosophy and political foundation. It pointed out that the form and content of the Abe regime's forced passage of the war legislation were unconstitutional and trampled on the principles of democracy and constitutionalism, "destroying the democratic foundation of popular sovereignty on which the Constitution of Japan stands." It demanded the overthrow of the Abe regime, the dissolution of the House of Representatives, and the holding of a general election, calling on opposition parties to implement a unified election and form a coalition government. The JCP called for cooperation and unified campaigning among opposition parties in the general election to further achieve the goal of establishing a national coalition government. Although this task was limited, taking this step in accordance with the spirit of the Constitution would be a grand feat of the citizens as sovereigns using their own power to drive national politics, undoubtedly opening a new phase in Japanese politics. The JCP's call for a "National Coalition Government" still elicited only suspicion and vigilance from other opposition parties in the political arena, but it won praise from the intellectual community and prominent democratic figures, providing positive factors for opening up united front work in the subsequent period.
(2) The Formal Establishment of "Opposition Joint Struggle"
On the eve of the 2016 House of Councillors election, to avoid repeating the mistake of internal friction among opposition parties seen in the 2013 election, the five opposition parties—Democratic, Communist, Ishin, Social Democratic, and People's Life—held a leaders' meeting on February 19 and reached a consensus: to make the abolition of the security legislation and the withdrawal of the cabinet decision allowing the exercise of the right to collective self-defense their common goals; to strive to overthrow the Abe regime; to force the current ruling party and its supplementary forces into a minority in national elections; and to collaborate as much as possible in parliamentary struggles and national elections. On May 19, the four parties—Democratic Progressive (DP), Communist, Social Democratic (SDP), and People's Life—held a leaders' meeting and again reached a consensus: to oppose the consumption tax hike; to confirm and continuously accumulate other points of agreement; to realize unified candidates in all single-seat constituencies for the House of Councillors and exert every effort for victory; to cooperate as much as possible in the House of Representatives general election and accelerate negotiations on various specific matters; and to study the joint submission of a motion of no-confidence against the Abe Cabinet. These consensuses confirmed the common goals and direction of cooperation among opposition parties but did not touch upon what kind of government would be established in the future or whether the JCP's participation in government would be accepted.
In the July 2016 House of Councillors election, the JCP took the initiative to withdraw the vast majority of its own candidates, realizing unified opposition candidates in all 32 single-seat constituencies. As a result, unified opposition candidates won in 11 constituencies, a major step forward from the 2 seats in the previous election. The JCP focused on the proportional representation segment, increasing its seats from 11 to 14. Thereafter, the opposition parties continued to cooperate, with election results showing both victories and defeats. In November of the same year, the four parties—DP, Communist, Liberal, and SDP—reached an agreement in principle on common policies with the "Civil Alliance for Peak Abolition of Security Legislation and Restoration of Constitutionalism" (referred to as the "Civil Alliance"). In the October 2017 House of Representatives general election, the newly formed Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) reached a cooperation agreement with the JCP, the SDP, and forces opposing the ruling party, fielding unified candidates in a total of 249 small electoral districts. In the election results, the JCP failed to achieve its pre-election goal of maintaining 21 seats, dropping to 12. The CDP won 55 seats, becoming the largest opposition party with the fewest seats in history; its acceptance of the "Communist-Democratic Joint Struggle" (min-kyō kyōtō [3]) increased significantly, and the joint struggle continued to develop in depth.
By September 15, 2019, the landscape of Japanese opposition parties had basically stabilized after a reshuffle, producing three new parties: the Constitutional Democratic Party (second formation), the Democratic Party for the People (third formation), and Reiwa Shinsengumi. Initially, the parties held varying attitudes toward the JCP. However, due to the Suga cabinet's ineffective pandemic prevention measures and the LDP's falling poll numbers, the opposition parties believed the timing for a change of government had arrived, thus strengthening their coalition. In June 2021, the four opposition parties—CDP, Communist, DPP (Democratic Party for the People), and SDP—jointly demanded an extension of the Diet session to formulate effective pandemic strategies and subsequently jointly submitted a motion of no-confidence against the cabinet. This joint struggle in the Diet became the precursor to the joint struggle in the election. In July of the same year, during the Tokyo Metropolitan Assembly election, the JCP and the CDP conducted a joint campaign; the JCP’s seats increased from 18 to 19, and the CDP’s seats increased from 7 to 15. This result caused significant alarm within the LDP.
On September 8, 2021, the four parties—CDP, Communist, SDP, and Reiwa—together with the Civil Alliance signed a policy agreement for the 2021 general election. Its propositions, such as "abolishing the unconstitutional parts of the security legislation" and "opposing constitutional revision under the pretext of COVID-19," aligned with the JCP's "National Coalition Government" concept. The Democratic Party for the People did not participate in the signing due to disagreement with some of the policies. On September 30, Edano Yukio and Shii Kazuo held a leaders' meeting where the two parties reached an agreement on common policies, unified campaigning, and government cooperation, marking the formal establishment of the united front. The JCP stated that if a change of government could be realized, it would engage in "limited cooperation from outside the cabinet" [4] to implement the common policies in the new regime. This was the first time in the JCP's history that it had reached a government agreement with another party, implying that Japan might see its first regime with Communist participation, which caused a great stir. The 49th House of Representatives general election was held in October 2021; the opposition alliance fielded unified candidates in 214 constituencies. This was the "first general election of truly joint struggle" in the JCP's history.
(3) The United Front Moves Toward Rupture
The results of the House of Representatives general election caused cracks to appear in the united front. On November 1, 2021, the election results were released: the JCP dropped from 12 seats to 10; the number of seats for the SDP and Reiwa Shinsengumi remained unchanged; the CDP dropped from 109 seats to 96. In the 214 constituencies with unified candidates, they won in only 62. Japanese society generally believed that the "opposition joint struggle had failed." Edano Yukio resigned on November 2 to take responsibility. Voices within the CDP opposing cooperation with the JCP grew stronger; none of the four candidates in the leadership election supported continuing the cooperation. On November 30, 2021, Izumi Kenta was elected as the new leader of the CDP, and on January 31 of the following year, he announced that "cooperation thus far [with the JCP] would be nullified." The united front faced the danger of collapse.
To maintain the united front, the JCP comprehensively articulated the effectiveness of the "joint struggle": First, the seats lost by the JCP and the CDP were all in proportional representation districts, whereas in the small electoral districts where unified campaigning was conducted, the JCP maintained one seat and the CDP actually increased by 23 seats. Furthermore, the competition in many districts was extremely close; although the unified candidates lost, they "resurrected" in the proportional representation districts due to extremely high "loss-margin ratios" (sekihairitsu [5]). Thus, without the "joint struggle," even more seats would have been lost. Second, the joint opposition campaign led to the defeat of LDP Secretary-General Amari Akira and veteran politician Ishihara Nobuteru (son of Ishihara Shintaro). The defeat of a sitting LDP Secretary-General was an unprecedented failure for the LDP; the symbolic significance of a veteran politician and faction leader losing to a newcomer was far greater than the gain or loss of the seats themselves. Finally, the "opposition joint struggle" ignited the political enthusiasm of voters and increased the hope of changing real-world politics. According to statistics, in districts where unified opposition candidates were established, the total turnout and the turnout of non-partisan voters exceeded previous levels and those of other districts. This indicates that due to the "opposition joint struggle," voters saw hope for changing LDP politics, thus increasing their enthusiasm for political participation.
At the JCP's urging, in May 2022, the Secretariats of both parties reached a consensus to continue coordinating the nomination of candidates in single-seat districts; however, the previously signed government agreement was nullified, and the united front was weakened. Due to the Constitutional Democratic Party's (CDP) persistent lack of enthusiasm for the "joint struggle," unified nominations were ultimately realized in only 11 single-seat districts. On July 11, when the House of Councillors election results were announced, the JCP fell from 13 seats to 11, and the CDP from 45 seats to 39. Only two of the 11 unified candidates were elected, resulting in the pro-constitutional amendment forces [6] surpassing the two-thirds threshold of seats in the House of Councillors. The JCP pointed out that the failure to achieve unified candidacy and synchronized steps among opposition parties was the primary reason for this situation, and therefore continued to advocate for opposition cooperation. The CDP conceded defeat and shifted toward a negative stance on the "joint struggle." In May 2023, Kenta Izumi publicly stated that the CDP would not cooperate with the JCP in the next general election for the House of Representatives, opting instead to "strive alone without relying on other parties." This was equivalent to declaring the previous policy and electoral agreements null and void; except for maintaining limited cooperation with the JCP within the Diet, the united front had effectively fractured. Kazuo Shii continued to reiterate the effectiveness of the "joint struggle" and emphasized that the constitutional amendment forces were establishing a four-party coalition, risking a revival of the "Imperial Rule Assistance System" [7], which necessitates that opposition parties replace bickering with unity.
II. Exogenous Factors in the Rupture of the JCP's United Front
The proactive acceptance of the JCP by the Democratic Party and its successors was the main reason the united front was established, and their declaration to cease cooperation was the direct cause of its rupture. Therefore, exogenous factors are the primary cause of the collapse of the JCP's united front, specifically involving three aspects: the form, objective, and environment of cooperation.
(1) Form of cooperation: Utilizing "opposition joint struggle" as the primary modality
"Opposition joint struggle" (yǎzhědǎng gòngdòu) is a form of Japanese party alliance maintained through agreements signed by various opposition parties based on certain common policies. Inter-party agreements include informal verbal agreements as well as formally signed policy agreements, electoral agreements, and government agreements. The stability of the alliance depends on the form, content, and quantity of these agreements. The "opposition joint struggle" is a united front form the JCP has participated in since the mid-1960s. As the JCP has increasingly affirmed the path of parliamentary elections and centered its work on them, this has gradually become the primary form of the united front.
From the perspective of Marxist united front theory, the "opposition joint struggle" is a lower-level form of united front organization because its scope of activity is limited—primarily revolving around the parliament—and its organizational content is limited—primarily concerning relations between opposition parties. The alliance is relatively loose and lacks organizational structure. In particular, inter-party alliance relations are maintained only by a piece of paper signed by party leaders, which does not necessarily gain the support of the voters and social bases of both sides. Since the cost of tearing up the agreement is low, it is not stable. Replacements of party leaders or changes in the situation can render cooperation agreements void. The JCP is helpless against the departure of its allies; all it can do is appeal and criticize. Therefore, the "opposition joint struggle" is essentially a path that focuses on high-level cooperation between parties while disregarding or ignoring the use of a "united front from below" to advance cooperation at the top. This makes the united front a "castle in the air" lacking a foundation, facing the risk of rupture at any time.
For instance, the supporting forces on the CDP side, far from taking a stand to maintain the "joint struggle," actually obstructed it. The "Japanese Trade Union Confederation" (known as Rengo [8]) is the largest supporting force for the CDP and the Democratic Party for the People. In April 2021, Rengo explicitly stated it did not want the CDP and the Democratic Party for the People to cooperate with the JCP; the leaders of both parties immediately promised they would not establish a coalition government with the JCP. Even after the "opposition joint struggle" was established for the 2021 general election, Rengo continued its interference, repeatedly expressing opposition to the joint struggle with the JCP and continuously issuing anti-communist statements, declaring that "the Communist Party's way of thinking is diametrically opposed to that of us democrats." As the CDP began to doubt its cooperation with the JCP, Rengo opportunistically reiterated its anti-communist stance, strengthening to some extent the CDP's decision to reject cooperation. This demonstrates that the JCP's cooperation with friendly parties did not receive the approval of their respective supporting forces; the "opposition joint struggle" existed in a dangerous state of "floating duckweed without roots," leading to the easy rupture of the united front.
(2) Objective of cooperation: Focusing on securing votes and parliamentary seats
In the 20th century, the primary object of the JCP's united front was the Japan Socialist Party. Although the two parties had differences on specific policies, they shared a common long-term goal: overthrowing capitalism and realizing socialism. Therefore, theoretically speaking, the prospects for cooperation were relatively broad. However, the parties currently capable of establishing cooperation with the JCP do so almost entirely based on practical interests—namely, gaining support from the other party’s voters in joint campaigns to increase their votes and seats. Because of this, the Democratic Party (and the Democratic Innovation Party) chose to approach the JCP when their seats were declining, and the CDP chose to part ways with the JCP after electoral setbacks.
The parties within the united front possess only a limited degree of political consensus. The policy agreements signed by the parties are based on the common policies proposed by the "Civil Alliance" [9]. Kazuo Shii once said that the old model, where parties or traditional mass organizations issued the call first and then the masses mobilized, has changed; now, it is the civil movements that drive party activities. The civil movement against the Abe government’s forced passage of the new security laws in the summer of 2015 gave rise to the "Civil Alliance," which made this its political demand. Its basic political positions share many commonalities with those of the JCP and the CDP, leading it to strive for cooperation with powerful parties. Thus, through the mediation of the "Civil Alliance," major opposition parties including the JCP reached formal cooperation twice, in 2016 and 2021, to conduct the "opposition joint struggle." The political demands of the "Civil Alliance" thus became the basis for opposition cooperation and their common campaign platform.
However, the common platform did not reflect the core propositions of each party, and internal differences remained. The JCP platform calls for "regulating disordered capitalism" and changing the status of subordinating to the U.S. and protecting the interests of large corporations. Therefore, the JCP’s general election policies demand "eliminating tax preferences for large corporations" and "correcting the abnormal political obedience to the United States." Yet the CDP recognizes the Japan-U.S. alliance, merely wishing for it to be more "healthy" and "equal." The fundamental propositions of the two parties differ. Although the JCP increased its flexibility within the united front by accepting the common platform as the "greatest common denominator" for cooperation and proposing a "cooperation from outside the cabinet" [10] model, the foundation of the united front remained unstable due to fundamental divergences and a lack of a shared ideological basis.
(3) Cooperation environment: Deep-seated prejudices of the Japanese public against the JCP
For the Japanese public, the JCP—which has long been in opposition—can play a certain political role, such as criticizing government failures, expressing the people’s demands, and investigating political scandals involving officials. However, there is low acceptance of the JCP actually participating in government. Tomoko Tamura, Chairperson of the JCP Policy Commission, once said: "The unease of 'The Communist Party is fine as an opposition party, but what would happen if it were involved in the government?' exceeded our imagination." This is because, on the one hand, the ruling authorities have conducted long-term anti-communist propaganda, which has imperceptibly instilled deep-seated prejudices in the Japanese public, making them worry about and doubt the consequences of the JCP ruling or participating in government. For example, in September 2021, Chief Cabinet Secretary Katsunobu Kato publicly pointed out that the government believes the JCP’s "depending on the enemy's attitude" theory [11] means it has not changed its policy of violent revolution. In December 2022, the Fumio Kishida cabinet approved a written response maintaining the view that the JCP’s "policy of violent revolution has not changed." In October 2021, Natsuo Yamaguchi, leader of the Komeito party, slandered the JCP in a speech, claiming it advocates that "the Emperor system violates the Constitution and should be abolished" and arguing the JCP should be banned. These frames and slanders have invisibly become obstacles to the JCP's development of its own strength and the united front. On the other hand, there are the historical lessons of the Socialist Party and the Democratic Party: when parties long in opposition finally gain power, they find it difficult to fully fulfill campaign promises, and their governing capacity cannot match that of the LDP. Moreover, because the JCP has long participated in national politics as an opposition party, expressing its views mostly by voting "no," it has left the public with the impression of being a "party that opposes everything." The extent to which such a party possesses practical administrative ability is viewed with skepticism. Consequently, the level of recognition and acceptance among the Japanese public for the JCP's participation in government is relatively low.
The Japan public's "unease" regarding the JCP’s participation in government directly affects the JCP's votes and seats, and indirectly influences allies' evaluations of the JCP and the development of the united front. The government agreement between the JCP and the CDP stipulated that "the Japanese Communist Party will conduct limited cooperation from outside the cabinet within the scope of realizing common policies," which caused a massive stir in Japanese society. Because there was a high expectation before the election that the CDP might achieve a change in government, this raised the possibility of the birth of the first government in Japanese history with Communist participation, which was highly provocative. Yukio Edano stated in public that the new government would be a single-party government of the CDP, implying that the other three opposition parties would not only receive no cabinet positions but would also not have excessive influence on policy—this was intended somewhat to allay the concerns of voters. Nevertheless, some CDP members and social figures still believed the party lost the 2021 general election because voters did not want to see the party cooperate with the JCP to establish a coalition government. This trend of public opinion could not fail to influence the CDP's decision-making.
III. Endogenous Reasons for the Rupture of the JCP's United Front
The journey of the JCP's united front from establishment to rupture in the 21st century was influenced not only by ally factors and objective obstacles but also by critical internal reasons within the JCP itself. First, there are significant differences and divergences between the class interests represented by the JCP, its revolutionary theory, and its basic policies compared to other center-left parties. Second, although the JCP has adopted a lower profile than in the 20th century, no longer blindly striving for leadership and increasing its tactical flexibility, it also faces new challenges.
(1) Continuous decline in party strength and diminishing attractiveness to allies
Since other parties' alliances with the JCP focus on winning votes and seats, if the JCP does not have a large enough party member base, a sufficient number of branches to conduct actual electoral work, and a sufficient number of support groups (kōenkai) to provide stable votes, it cannot gain the attention and cooperation of other parties. Even if an alliance is temporarily realized, it will ultimately fracture because the expected goals of the allies cannot be met. The JCP's party strength has basically been in a state of continuous decline since the beginning of the 21st century. Generally, party strength is evaluated in terms of quantity and quality. Key quantitative indicators include the number of party members, the number of readers of Akahata [12] (including daily and weekly editions), the number of branches, and the number of seats in the Diet and local assemblies. Qualitative aspects include the leadership of local party organizations (the number of full-time standing committee members), the demographic structure of the membership, and the financial situation. The changes in major indicators of JCP party strength since the start of the 21st century are shown in Table 1.
Clearly, since the beginning of the 21st century, and particularly since 2010, except for a few fluctuating indicators, the vast majority of metrics show a gradual trend of decline in the JCP’s party strength. Issues not listed in the table, such as the aging of the membership and the reduction in full-time cadres, have also consistently plagued the JCP. After the 2022 House of Councillors election, the JCP Central Committee's Executive Committee summarized the electoral lessons, publicly admitting that the decline in the party's own strength was the main reason for the electoral defeat. Compared to the previous House of Councillors election three years prior, the number of JCP members had shrunk to 92.5%, and the readers of the daily and Sunday editions of Akahata had shrunk to 92% and 91.4% respectively. The JCP Central Committee called on the entire party to contribute wisdom, offer frank opinions and suggestions, and work together to build a strong party. The Central Committee plenary session on June 24, 2023, reiterated that the decline in its own strength was the main reason for the defeat in the unified local elections, noting that in the four years since the previous unified local elections, the number of party members had shrunk to 91%, and the daily and Sunday readers of Akahata had shrunk to 87% and 85% respectively. This indicates that the problem of decaying party strength faced by the JCP has reached a serious level; efforts to reverse the decline have not yet yielded significant results, making it even more difficult for the JCP to attract other parties into alliances.
(2) Weakness in mass work and neglect of the united front from below
Compared to the 20th century, the JCP has devoted most of its energy to electoral struggles, resulting in relatively weak mass work. This has objectively led to the neglect of the "united front from below," focusing only on high-level party cooperation and using emerging civil organizations as bridges and links. Due to the weakness of its mass work, the traditional mass organizations that the JCP can control have increasingly diminished since the start of the 21st century, and its leadership and organizational power over the masses have gradually declined, which in turn has hindered the recovery and development of JCP party strength.
Traditional mass organizations refer to those organized based on class, strata, or sectoral criteria; these were generally established early on and maintain close ties with the political party. Currently, the mass organizations that or openly or de facto accept the leadership of the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) include the National Federation of Trade Unions (Zenroren), the Japan Family Farmers Movement (Nouminren), the National Federation of Merchants and Industrialists Organizations and its local Democratic Merchants and Industrialists Associations (collectively Zenshoren), the Democratic Youth League of Japan (Min-yo), the New Japan Women’s Association (Shinfujin), and the Women’s Democratic Club (Fumin). Additionally, there is the National Conference for Peace, Democracy, and Progressive Reform (Zenkoku Kakushinkon), a united front organization primarily composed of these affiliated groups. Historically, these mass organizations played a united front role in consolidating the masses across various classes and strata, giving the JCP's united front a basic structure of "Party—Mass Organization—Masses." However, they currently face a general predicament regarding organizational development.
First is the case of labor unions. Zenroren, established in 1989, had 1.53 million members in 1998, but has since shrunk year by year. From 2012 to 2020, Zenroren implemented two "Four-Year Plans" with the goal of "building a Zenroren with 1.5 million members" to expand and strengthen the organization. Nevertheless, it remained difficult to stem the tide of organizational atrophy; membership instead dropped from 1.137 million in 2012 to 1.017 million in 2020. The situation for other traditional mass organizations is equally far from optimistic. Membership in Zenshoren fell from 370,000 in 1985 to 200,000 in 2016, and further to 160,000 in 2021. The Min-yo league has maintained a scale of around 10,000 members in recent years, and except for 2022, it usually struggles to complete its annual recruitment plans. Shinfujin is reported to have 200,000 members, while Nouminren does not release membership figures. Furthermore, the membership of Zenkoku Kakushinkon has not been updated since the 4.5 million figure announced in 2007; based on the status of its affiliated organizations, it can be inferred that its total membership has also declined.
Except for Min-yo, which explicitly acknowledges JCP leadership, these organizations are nominally independent. However, judging from their platforms and actions, they actually accept the political leadership of the JCP. Due to this relationship, the JCP was historically able to develop Party members and promote cadres from within these organizations, using the development of mass organizations to drive Party growth, and vice versa—realizing a virtuous cycle. However, since the 21st century, while the JCP and various organizations have actively sought paths for development, the results have been unsatisfactory. This has further led the JCP to focus primarily on emerging civil society organizations, to some extent neglecting traditional mass organizations and departing from the mass line [13]. The Party has become overly focused on "joint struggle among opposition parties," leading to a predicament where its own strength continues to decline while the united front lacks a solid foundation. Furthermore, the decline of mass organizations manifests in a weakened ability to mobilize votes during elections, which similarly diminishes the JCP's appeal to other political parties.
(3) Unresolved internal Party issues causing negative social impact
While the Japanese public's prejudice against the JCP is certainly the result of long-term distorted propaganda by the ruling authorities, the targets of anti-communist attacks are usually unresolved issues within the JCP itself. For instance, the anti-communist climax in early 2023 was directed at problems existing within the JCP.
On January 19, 2023, Nobuyuki Matsutake—a JCP member and journalist—published A New Manifesto for the Japanese Communist Party: Why an Ordinary Member Demands Public Election of the Party Leader and Seeks to Run. The book publicly proposed that the JCP should implement a system for the public election of its leader, similar to other Japanese parties—where the leader is elected by member votes through an open competition—thereby challenging the JCP's current leadership system. Additionally, the book raised the author's dissenting views on security policy issues such as constitutional revision and the Self-Defense Forces. Matsutake stated that he expressed his views publicly because the channels for intra-Party democracy were blocked, and the opinions he submitted to higher levels and the Central Committee received no response. Gen Suzuki, a standing member of the Kyoto Prefectural Committee, also published A Letter to Chairman Kazuo Shii in January 2023, publicly demanding that Kazuo Shii resign to take responsibility for the decline of Party strength and calling for the implementation of a public election system for the Party leader. The JCP expelled Nobuyuki Matsutake and Gen Suzuki from the Party on February 6 and March 16, respectively. On June 6, the JCP also expelled Tomohiko Ebisu, a Minamiawaji City Councilor who held similar views.
This incident received significant attention from Japanese society. After Matsutake was expelled, Japanese bourgeois media hyped the narrative that the JCP is a "terrorist party that does not allow dissenting opinions." Yuichiro Tamaki, leader of the Democratic Party for the People, stated on the day of the disciplinary action, "One can only conclude it is not a democratic party, but a totalitarian party." Masaba Nobuyuki, leader of Nippon Ishin no Kai (Japan Innovation Party), also said, "Excluding opinions that advocate for democratic selection is the exact opposite of the Communist Party's posture in the Diet." Ichiro Matsui, former leader of that party, also stated that day that the JCP "is a terrifying party that deprives people of freedom of speech." Toshimitsu Motegi, Secretary-General of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), remarked, "In our party, the sudden expulsion of a member is rare," alluding to the JCP's excessive punishment. Many Japanese citizens also expressed confusion over the JCP's opposition to the public election of its leader and the expulsion of the three members. Kenta Izumi of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP) stated euphemistically at a February 10 press conference that while each party can have its own organizational structure, democratic centralism is something no other party adopts, "so there is a feeling that there is still a cultural difference from us." This statement itself revealed subtle criticism of the JCP and democratic centralism.
Why did what was originally an internal JCP affair attract such social attention and malicious attacks? The reason is that they attempted to use this incident to attack the JCP's democratic centralism. Regarding the JCP itself, insufficient internal Party education meant it failed to resolve internal issues effectively, leaving itself a target for attack; furthermore, the JCP's usual propaganda and explanation of democratic centralism were inadequate, leading to public confusion and misunderstanding. These internal problems or deficiencies, amplified and distorted by bourgeois parties and media, produced negative results that further impacted public perception and the willingness of allies to form coalitions.
IV. Conclusion
The united front has been an unremitting pursuit of the JCP since its founding, a staged goal of its current Party Program, and one of the "century of experience" in the JCP's development to date. On July 15, 2022, in a speech commemorating the centenary of the JCP's founding, Kazuo Shii summarized several characteristics of the JCP over the past hundred years, one of which is the consistent adherence to a united front strategy of standing with the people. The united front is an important manifestation of the JCP's practice of "revolution by the majority" and "people's democratic revolution," highlighting its democratic character and distinguishing it from the one-party dictatorship of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the JCP will continue to adhere to the united front strategy and tactics in the future, struggling unremittingly to achieve the goal of establishing a democratic coalition government. On June 24, 2023, the 8th Plenum of the 28th Central Committee of the JCP established a "go it alone" strategy for the next general election, calling for a shift in electoral tactics, the expansion of Party strength, the development of young Party members, and the completion of a generational transition. Since then, signs of re-alignment among opposition parties have appeared, but taking history as a mirror, Japan's center-left parties may still waver before the general election. Regardless of whether "joint struggle among opposition parties" is reconstructed, the JCP should maintain the initiative and summarize historical lessons. On one hand, it should restore a degree of revolutionary character and principle, proposing clearer policies to win the support of progressive forces; on the other hand, it should humbly accept suggestions from both inside and outside the Party, promote intra-Party democracy, consolidate the mass line, and build itself into a stronger organization.