Ouyang Qian: "French Theory" and Future Philosophy: The Construction of a New Philosophical Paradigm
Since the second half of the 20th century, against the intellectual backdrop of the "postmodern turn," the theoretical innovations of contemporary French philosophy have, so to speak, stood in a class of their own, becoming the vanguard and bellwether of transformation in contemporary Western philosophy. It is precisely due to these theoretical innovations and their associated conceptual production that contemporary French philosophy has almost entirely lost the semblance of what philosophy was previously expected to be. The philosophical theories proposed by French philosophers such as Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida do not seem like "authentic" or "original" philosophy at all; rather, they appear more like historical research, social critique, literary criticism, cultural studies, psychoanalysis, or some kind of indefinable "Theory." The theoretical pursuit of these French philosophers is no longer a "system of critique," but has instead become a certain "critique of the system." It is no longer a "grand narrative" woven together by reason, but a "micro-perspective" focused on the tyranny of reason. It is no longer satisfied with the "philosophy of consciousness," but has turned toward "cultural studies." The fundamental philosophical questions they concern themselves with have deviated from the intellectual orbit of traditional metaphysics, and the philosophical methods they employ are mostly non-philosophical analytical tools drawn from linguistics, psychology, and other fields. As a result, it is difficult for people to grasp contemporary French philosophy using established philosophical routines. Consequently, Americans invented the label "French Theory" specifically to refer to the theoretical endeavors of contemporary French philosophy. This term did not originate in French but in English, indicating that "French Theory" is a label brought by outside observers. Nevertheless, the ambiguity of this label precisely reflects a certain developmental capacity and indeterminacy within contemporary French philosophy.
One need only open Foucault’s published works, such as History of Madness, Discipline and Punish, or The History of Sexuality, to question whether they belong to the category of philosophical theory. Faced with Derrida’s "incendiary" deconstructionist works, the reader is likewise presented with a philosophy that is unrecognizable. If we continue to read the theoretical works of French philosophers such as Gilles Deleuze, Jean-François Lyotard, Alain Badiou, Bruno Latour, Jean Baudrillard, Pierre Bourdieu, and Julia Kristeva according to the original appearance of the philosophical discipline, we will similarly find it difficult to grasp their philosophical substance. When Americans applied the intellectual label "French Theory" to contemporary French philosophy, they were in fact indicating that a significant change had occurred within it. What, then, will the philosophy of the future look like? Although the content designated by "French Theory" resembles an intellectual smorgasbord, the theoretical "deformation" revealed within it portends a possible gaya for future philosophy. "French Theory" does not merely announce the "end of philosophy"; it also attempts to end the "end of philosophy"—that is, to construct a new philosophical paradigm for a period of epochal change. Contemporary French philosophy has transformed itself into various forms of critical theory, cultural theory, social theory, political theory, discourse theory, and theories of life, thereby initiating an entirely nascent and new philosophical paradigm.
I. From a "System of Critique" to a "Critique of the System"
Starting from the philosophical systems of Plato and Aristotle, traditional philosophy or metaphysics has generally taken the construction of a "system of critique" as its mission. The most typical examples are undoubtedly the "three Critiques" constructed by Kant and Hegel’s system of speculative philosophy. In other words, the purpose of philosophy’s deployment of critique was to overthrow old and erroneous "absolute truths" and replace them with a "truth" that it presumed to be absolutely correct. "Destruction" was for the sake of "construction" [1]; the destination of critique was the attainment of an ultimate system of truth. Every great philosopher had their own original theoretical system—for instance, the Aristotelian system, the Cartesian system, the Spinozist system, the Kantian system, the Hegelian system, and so on. According to Jürgen Habermas, despite the many contradictions between Plato and Aristotle, the metaphysical thought that emerged with Parmenides generally took the question of the Being of beings as its starting point—hence, it was an ontological type of metaphysical thought. The pursuit of true knowledge was always for universality, eternity, and necessity. Whether modeled on mathematics (understanding true knowledge as intuition and recollection) or on logic (viewing true knowledge as contemplation and discourse), what cognition grasped was the structure of beings themselves. Since antiquity, philosophy has seemingly been the incarnation of true knowledge, always constructing its critical metaphysical systems around universality, eternity, and necessity. However, after Hegel, this "system of critique" gradually collapsed. The movement to "reject metaphysics," which began early on with positivism and pragmatism, continued through the analytical philosophy and phenomenological movements, until it took a radical turn [2] in the currents of structuralism, post-structuralism, and postmodernism staged in contemporary French philosophy. This turn was an attempt to transform philosophy into an activity of intellectual critique. Philosophy is by no means for the sake of the system itself; the critique of philosophy is to identify and analyze problems. This critique also seeks certain possible answers, but it does not pursue ultimate answers or attempt to construct an absolutely perfect system.
From the perspective of the intellectual evolution of contemporary Western philosophy, the "rejection of metaphysics" and the transformation of traditional philosophy have consistently been the theoretical directions in which philosophy seeks its own breakthrough. In fact, the theoretical slogan "the end of philosophy" has resonated throughout many theoretical currents in modern and contemporary philosophy. It either means completely abandoning philosophy's original pursuit of a system to willingly become a simple intellectual tool—believing that linguistic and logical analysis is sufficient—or it attempts to move toward a new philosophy that radically departs from traditional metaphysics. As one researcher noted: "A striking phenomenon of our century is that philosophers have conducted a massive amount of critique regarding philosophy, such that the creation of 'anti-philosophy' has actually become a new school of philosophy. There are, of course, degrees of difference in terms of comprehensiveness. Philosophers have always criticized one another. However, if the critique of a philosophical school goes so far as to negate the legitimacy of the entire field of philosophy, it becomes an attack on philosophy itself. This has become commonplace in the 20th century. But anti-philosophy goes further than this; in Richard Rorty’s words, it is calling for a 'post-philosophical culture.'"
The "post-philosophical culture" proposed by the American neopragmatist philosopher Rorty is a demand for a new, anti-systemic philosophy: "Pragmatists think that the Platonic tradition... is simply worn out. This is not to say that they have a new, non-Platonic set of answers to the Platonic questions to offer, but rather that they think we should stop asking those questions." According to Rorty’s description, the so-called "post-philosophical culture" is actually a non-systematized "philosophy with a small p," rather than the universally systematized "Philosophy with a capital P." Contemporary French philosophy is precisely "philosophy with a small p" in Rorty’s eyes; it is the intellectual array of the dazzling "French Theory." This "philosophy with a small p" takes on diversified intellectual forms in France, leading the German philosopher Habermas to remark: "If we consider the descriptions of the 'symptoms of the age' in social theory, Paris has produced more original and productive theory in the last decade or two than any other place in the world." Regarding this diversified intellectual array of contemporary French philosophy, the French themselves have become aware of and take pride in it. When evaluating the theoretical status of contemporary French philosophy, the famous French philosopher Badiou argued that there have been three theoretical peaks in the history of philosophy to date: Ancient Greek philosophy, German Classical philosophy, and contemporary French philosophy. In the grand chorus of contemporary Western philosophy today, French philosophy, unique and fruitful, indeed plays the role of the lead singer. Whether on the intellectual map of Continental philosophy or in the theoretical evolution of Anglo-American philosophy, French philosophy has played the role of vanguard and leader. As a feminist researcher stated: "Many of us for several years have let ourselves be drawn to something both glamorous and dangerous that lacks a proper name; I shall call it French Theory." One could even say that "French Theory" has become a cultural paradigm.
The shift from a "system of critique" to a "critique of the system" is fully embodied in the many theoretical attempts of contemporary French philosophy. Simply put, it is the abandonment of the pursuit of universal and eternal systems in favor of focusing on specific and accidental events. Its fundamental intellectual logic is to completely break away from the systematized mode of traditional metaphysics. In the intellectual logic of "French Theory," traditional metaphysics is a totalizing mode of thinking that uses reductionism to construct a system of absolute truth governing nature and society. The ultimate goal of such theoretical systems is to find the "substance" or "origin" [3], thus turning philosophy into a philosophy of identity that denies difference and contingency. The reason "French Theory" has been labeled with terms like "post-metaphysics," "postmodernism," and "postmodern philosophy" is precisely because it exhibits a "post" posture. This so-called "post" not only carries a temporal sense of "before and after," but more importantly, it carries the connotation of transcendence and rebellion. Since the 1980s, the rise of postmodernist thought has pushed "French Theory" to the center of the intellectual stage. Contemporary French philosophy—or "French Theory"—became synonymous with postmodernist thought. Many French philosophers, such as Georges Bataille, Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard, Deleuze, Baudrillard, and Kristeva, are regarded as postmodern philosophers. It could also be said that "French Theory" and the "postmodern turn" complemented each other, leading a new philosophical fashion. If contemporary philosophy has a "Frenchness," it is precisely this postmodern orientation of anti-systemic philosophy. Although postmodernism is not a clear concept, and its "potluck" [4] of intellectual demands makes it difficult to grasp, its basic theoretical interest is relatively clear: humanity paid a heavy price in the past to achieve universal intellectual unity; therefore, it is now necessary to strive to establish a principle of pluralistic co-existence and a corresponding social form.
In his book Thinking the Impossible: French Philosophy Since 1960, Gary Gutting suggests that the face of French philosophy has changed since the 1960s. Philosophers "rejected all forms of humanism—religious, scientific, existentialist. However, they did not give up hope of finding some philosophical way of thinking intended to provide some guidance for human needs. Since the 1960s, French philosophy has been seeking such ways of thinking." For Foucault, seeking such a way of thinking actually meant recovering the critical temperament of philosophy. In the post-metaphysical era, we should choose a critical philosophy directed at our own ontology. "We see that the result... is that critique is not carried out in the form of a search for formal structures with universal value, but rather as a historical investigation into the events that have led us to constitute ourselves and to recognize ourselves as subjects of what we are doing, thinking, saying. In that sense, this criticism is not 'transcendental,' and its goal is not that of making a metaphysics possible." The critical philosophy Foucault speaks of here is a critique in a broad sense—that is, philosophy must question all phenomena of domination and the operations of power, regardless of the extent or form these phenomena and operations take in political, economic, or organizational fields. In Foucault's eyes, although one could say that traditional philosophy no longer exists, this does not mean that philosophy has completely vanished. In fact, philosophy has dispersed into many different activities, such as those of mathematicians, linguists, ethnographers, historians, revolutionary activists, and political scientists—all of which can be forms of philosophical activity. Today, any activity that explores new goals for knowledge and practice is a philosophical activity, whether it stems from mathematics, linguistics, ethnography, or history. Thus, the theme of philosophy has shifted from eternal Being to current events, the method of philosophy has shifted from speculative logic to factual investigation, and the connotation of philosophy has shifted from systemic construction to critical advancement.
"French Theory," represented by [Michel] Foucault, is a typical "critique of systems." In the eyes of Foucault and other philosophers, a system represents universality and norms, while simultaneously manifesting as power and suppression. Furthermore, the construction of a system is inextricably linked to universal rationalism; in other words, the system and reason are interconnected. The establishment of a universal system relies on the support of universal reason; conversely, the establishment of universal reason depends upon the completion of a universal system. Thus, in Foucault’s work, the "critique of systems" is transformed into a critique of reason. To reveal the suppression inherent in universal systems, Foucault conducted a dual "archaeological" and "genealogical" investigation into the "tortures of reason." In short, under the banner of the critique of reason (i.e., the critique of modernity), Contemporary French Philosophy’s strategy toward the "end of philosophy" is to reshape a new philosophical paradigm. This is akin to performing major surgery on philosophy—performing a heart, liver, kidney, and face transplant on the theoretical organism of philosophy—intending to transform philosophy from "Great Unification" [5] thought into "nomadic" thought. Contemporary French Philosophy strives to leap out of the traps of the "philosophy of substance" of the past, calling for and vigorously promoting a new "philosophy of relations." Driven by the "critique of systems" and its postmodern turn, "French Theory" reveals its unique intellectual orientation: shifting from "large questions" to "small questions," and moving from "grand narratives" to "micro-perspectives."
II. From "Grand Narratives" to "Micro-Perspectives"
From the perspective of theoretical themes and systematic construction, why does "French Theory" look nothing like existing philosophy? This is because in the process of moving toward postmodern philosophy, Contemporary French Philosophy has become completely transformed and "out of shape." On the one hand, philosophy has changed its perspective on questions. Questions of origin, which were originally considered "large questions," are now seen as meaningless, while issues that were previously not considered questions at all have become central. For example, the question of language has become not only an epistemological issue but even a foundational ontological one. On the other hand, philosophy has updated its methods of thought. From phenomenological description to structural analysis and then to psychoanalysis, analytical tools from linguistics, semiotics, psychology, and hermeneutics have continuously invaded the territory of philosophical methodology. This makes philosophical critique look more like textual study, symbolic interpretation, unconscious analysis, social investigation, or historical research. In fact, philosophy no longer values the world as an ultimate existence, but instead pays special attention to the constructive significance of human knowledge. What the object of knowledge is is not important; what matters is the way in which people know. Under the critical scrutiny of "French Theory," everything from Ancient Greek philosophy to contemporary phenomenology and analytical philosophy has been labeled with the theoretical hat of "totalizing knowledge" or "grand narratives." After a list of various theoretical symptoms, essentialism, foundationalism, universalism, representationalism, logocentrism, and anthropocentrism have all been rejected. As a theoretical label, "grand narratives" are regarded as the very root of traditional metaphysics. Thus, to thoroughly eliminate the many intellectual harms caused by "grand narratives," "French Theory" has resolutely turned toward the philosophical standpoint of the "micro-perspective."
As the construction of a new philosophical paradigm, "French Theory" has completely abandoned the obsession with competing to be the "First Science" or an "Encyclopedia." So, what exactly does it want to turn philosophy into? Deleuze replied: "Is there some kind of progress in philosophy? To this question, one should answer as Robbe-Grillet answered regarding the novel: there is no reason to do philosophy as Plato did, not because we have surpassed Plato, but on the contrary, because Plato is unsurpassable. It is meaningless to repeat the work Plato already finished. We have only two choices: either the history of philosophy, or a Platonic transplantation for problems that are no longer Platonic. In other words, it presupposes a kind of micro-analysis (which Foucault calls the micro-physics of power and Guattari calls the micro-politics of desire)... splitting things down the middle, splitting words down the middle. Not looking for eternity, but looking for new forms." Deleuze’s phrase "presupposing a kind of micro-analysis" indicates the shift in perspective within "French Theory." Whether it is Foucault’s "micro-physics of power," Deleuze and Guattari’s "micro-politics of desire," Lyotard’s "libidinal economy," or Baudrillard’s "critique of the political economy of the sign," almost all are escaping and rejecting those grand narratives of liberation. In their view, "the macro-politics of traditional rationalism ignores the realms of desire, culture, and daily life, unaware that these are precisely the places where subjects are produced and controlled, and where fascist movements originate. Capitalism not only exploits labor power, it also penetrates and operates within the libidinal economy of every subject." Searching for the mechanisms of diffuse power operations in everyday and localized sites has become the basic approach of "French Theory" in exploring micro-politics. In Habermas’s words, the remaining task for philosophy today is to mediate between expert knowledge and the everyday practices that need to be discussed, promoting the self-understanding of the human life-world through theoretical interpretation, while striving to overcome the excessive alienation of the life-world.
Why does "French Theory" mostly suffer from "phobia of the macro"? This is because the traditional philosophy of identity aims to eliminate difference, eventually evolving into various forms of "totalizing tyranny" in the pursuit of uniformity in ideas and behavior. The "postmodern turn" exhibited by "French Theory" is actually the transcendence of monistic thought by pluralistic thought. The dominant consciousness of Contemporary French Philosophy is no longer believing in the blueprint of modernity sketched by universal rationalism, nor in the utopian visions envisioned by various "grand narratives." The various critiques of philosophers are conducted under the banners of plurality and diversity, rejecting the identity and singularity that have long held an overwhelming advantage. In fact, the theoretical crisis faced by traditional metaphysics and its speculative philosophy is precisely the crisis of legitimacy encountered by "grand narratives." Lyotard, in his book The Postmodern Condition, defines the "postmodern" as an incredulity toward "grand narratives," because it is precisely within the logic of totality and universality that various forms of repressive terror are generated: "You must become operational, become commensurable, or else disappear." However, in his view, after entering the postmodern age of knowledge, "the coming society is essentially not part of a Newtonian anthropology (such as structuralism or systems theory); it belongs more to a pragmatics of language particles. There are many different kinds of language games; this is the heterogeneity of elements. Language games only establish institutions in a fragmentary way; this is local determinism... Invention always arises in dissent. Postmodern knowledge is not merely an instrument of the state. It can increase our sensitivity to differences and strengthen our ability to tolerate the incommensurable." Amidst the clamor of postmodernism, any theoretical system that blindly pursues identity or totality is cast aside, while theories that focus on and long for difference and plurality are sought after. "French Theory" clearly defends heterogeneity and difference.
From the theoretical inquiries of Foucault and Deleuze, their historical research and analysis of desire constitute a completely micro-level critique of reason. Foucault’s critique of micro-power is a capillary-style scrutiny conducted from mental asylums and modern prisons. Traditional universal rationalism possesses an eye like this: "In philosophical reflection, the eye comes from the ability to observe the power that is becoming increasingly internal to the self. Behind every supervising eye, there is an even more discerning eye. This eye is so discreet and so agile that one could say its omnipotent glance can happily devour the white of the eye surrounding it. Behind this special eye, there is another eye, and behind that, another, each more subtle, until we reach an eye constituted entirely of the pure transparency of an insight." If we compare traditional systematic philosophy to a "telescope of thought," then "French Theory" is attempting to forge a more piercing "microscope of thought." The telescope of thought can see things infinitely far away, and thus will strive to conceive some kind of ultimate, perfect narrative; conversely, the microscope of thought can see things infinitely small, and thus can grasp the complexity and mutability of existence. What the telescope of thought sees are beautiful things that do not yet exist—smooth things to be longed for, which are often not-so-real rational utopias. Conversely, what the microscope of thought discovers are everyday things that already exist—rough things that are unpleasant, which are often very real states of contradiction. "Behind the micro-strategies advocated by thinkers such as Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, and Lyotard, there lies the following view: since power is dispersed and plural, the forms of political struggle must necessarily be dispersed and plural. Therefore, Foucauldian postmodern politics attempts to break away from unified, totalizing strategies, fostering diverse forms of resistance, destroying accepted cages of identity and exclusionary discourses, and encouraging the proliferation of all kinds of differences."
As a typical method of "micro-perspective," Foucault’s archaeology of knowledge and genealogy of power adopt a bottom-up micro-investigation rather than a top-down macro-scrutiny. They aim to discover the coupling mechanisms between knowledge and power and the process by which subjectivization is shaped. In Foucault’s own words: "My problem is not to study the history of ideas in their evolution, but to study, from beneath thought, how this or that thing becomes a possible object of knowledge—for example, to study how madness, at a certain period, became an object of knowledge corresponding to a certain type of knowledge. Thus there exists a dislocation between the thought concerning madness and the construction of madness as an object. I used the word 'archaeology' rather than 'history' to express the study of this dislocation."
To study thought from beneath thought, to study desire from behind desire, to study words from the middle of words—this is precisely what structuralism and post-structuralism excel at in theoretical analysis, and it is the reason why "French Theory" stands tall among the intellectual crowd. Grand history and the absolute subject are completely deposed. Through the "micro-perspective," realities that have been suppressed and hidden are revealed. If "grand narratives" pursue a "categorical imperative" of universalization and homogenization and seek to eliminate difference based on "consensus," then the "micro-perspective" stands on the side of ambiguity and heterogeneity. This is because real knowledge arises from disagreement and from the invention of new paradigms, rather than from absolute agreement with a universal consensus.
III. From "Philosophy of Consciousness" to "Cultural Studies"
We can see that a clear turn in contemporary philosophy is the shift from the "philosophy of consciousness" to "cultural studies." Discussions surrounding the human and the problem of subjectivity have transformed from previous simple descriptions of conscious acts to today's complex research into cultural structures. The problem of the existence of consciousness is no longer an isolated and abstract thing of self-derivation; it is a deep cultural phenomenon occurring within the life-world. When we say "French Theory" is constructing a new philosophical paradigm, the strongest proof is that "cultural studies" seems to have become a synonym for "French Theory." In many recognized representatives of "French Theory," we can clearly see a cultural logic present in their thought. When they discuss themes such as language, discourse, signs, symbols, texts, and the body, they are actually exploring various manifestations of culture. Under the inducement of psychoanalysis and linguistics, especially under the influence of Ferdinand de Saussure’s structural linguistics, French theorists have almost reached a consensus: the human and their subjectivity are manufactured by signs, or rather, the human grows within the environment of linguistic systems. Therefore, social life and its operating mechanisms can only be understood clearly through symbolic systems. Badiou believes that the problem of the subject is a core issue in contemporary French philosophy. Although there are many different ideological positions and theoretical views with different analytical methods in contemporary French philosophy, they all share a distinct commonality: a concern for cultural issues. It can be said that "French Theory" has turned from the pure "description of consciousness" of the past to the complex "cultural studies" of the present. The theoretical theme has shifted from the thin, pure subject of consciousness to the more realistic socio-cultural structures, melting historical research, social research, psychological research, and linguistic research into one furnace.
Why has "cultural studies" become the paramount focus and the "signature skill" of French Theory? From the most direct intellectual motivation, it perhaps emerged because French Theory opened the doors to cultural studies out of dissatisfaction with the phenomenological theory of the subject. Before phenomenology and psychoanalysis entered the French intellectual world, the philosophy of René Descartes constituted the backbone of French thought, centered on the cogito to explore the subjectivity of consciousness, thus forming the visage of a "philosophy of consciousness." Later, Henri Bergson’s philosophy of life further enriched this and opened a convenient gate for the introduction of phenomenology and psychoanalysis. Along with the import of German intellectual resources—including critical engagements with Hegel, Nietzsche, and Marx—the philosophy of consciousness within the French context made even deeper progress. Jean-Paul Sartre’s phenomenology of freedom was the most representative theoretical achievement, as he fully combined Cartesian cogito with phenomenological "intentionality" to create a unique existentialist philosophy of consciousness. "French phenomenology was first Sartrean; it emphasized that consciousness can know itself. Maurice Merleau-Ponty took up Husserl’s project again but pointed out two different meanings: one extrinsic; the other appearing within things. This led him into a dialogue, and that dialogue moved increasingly closer to the social sciences." The "dialogue" mentioned here prompts us to notice the difference between Merleau-Ponty and Sartre. Clearly, Merleau-Ponty saw the problems inherent in the idealist view of pure consciousness—namely, the lack of exploration into crucial dimensions such as the body and signs. As he noted: "Our task is to enlarge our reason so as to make it capable of understanding what, in ourselves and in others, precedes and surpasses it." In fact, in the shift from the "philosophy of consciousness" to "cultural studies," Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception and his theory of signs played an extremely vital role.
Starting from the rise of structuralism and post-structuralism, the research on consciousness or the subject—carried out by contemporary French philosophy within the tide of postmodern thought—shifted from pure philosophy of consciousness to multi-dimensional studies of cultural structures. This gave the postmodern philosophical writing of French Theory a distinct attribute of cultural critique. We can summarize at least five cultural studies paradigms within it: first, the critique of reason represented by Foucault, which uses analytical methods of archaeology of knowledge, genealogy of power, and hermeneutics of the subject to provide a microscopic perspective on the cultures of the abnormal, of punishment, and of the self, revealing the power-effects of the rule of reason; second, the deconstructionism represented by Derrida, which uses playful textual interpretation to dismantle the obsession with the "metaphysics of presence"—that is, the certainty and identity of verbal meaning; third, the schizo-analysis of the politics of desire represented by Deleuze, showcasing a new form of thinking and subjectivity; fourth, the critique of the sign-based political economy represented by Baudrillard, which attempts to combine Marxism with semiotics and emphasizes the sign-character of postmodern consumer society; fifth, the "constructivist structuralism" represented by Bourdieu, which seeks to resolve the binary logic of opposition between subject and structure. This summary might not fully reflect the scope and dominant questions of French Theory's cultural studies, but one can see the critical consciousness and political orientation shared by these French philosophers. From the "philosophy of consciousness" to "cultural studies," the criticality of French Theory has intensified, and without exception, these thinkers have formed a certain intellectual connection with Marxism. As Derrida said: "In rereading the Communist Manifesto and a few other great works of Marx, I said to myself that I knew of few texts in the philosophical tradition, perhaps none, whose lesson seemed more urgent today." In a sense, French Theory presents new trends in the evolution of contemporary French Marxism by virtue of its theoretical advances in cultural studies.
For French Theory as a whole, "cultural studies" as the construction of a new philosophical paradigm exhibits the following three distinct features. First, it is an interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary research ensemble. In today's established disciplinary divisions, "cultural studies" is a theoretical type whose disciplinary identity is hard to fix. For example, when one reads Foucault's theoretical works, a question arises: Is he a philosopher, a historian, a sociologist, or a political scientist? In History of Madness [6], he examines the evolution of psychiatry and the asylum. Judging by the title and content, it is a historical study of mental illness. However, when he proposes that madness is a cultural product rather than a natural one, and that the hegemony of reason relegated madness to a state of silence, we see that madness is no longer a medical fact but a cultural one. Medical knowledge is not as objective or natural as we think; in fact, it is constructed by power. Knowledge produces power, and power manufactures knowledge; the establishment of psychiatry is the best proof. In this study involving the history of psychiatric medicine, Foucault mixes medicine, psychology, sociology, economics, ethics, and history, initiating his cultural study as a critique of reason.
Second, "cultural studies" is oriented toward the present and subordinate to practice. How did we become what we are now? This is the research topic for theorists like Foucault. France was the main birthplace of the modern Enlightenment and the main stronghold for the philosophy of subjectivity. So, has humanity become mature after the Enlightenment? Has humanity truly escaped external constraints? The French theorists' critique of modernity begins with cultural studies—that is, asking how modern culture became a new repressive force. After the Enlightenment, a society of "discipline and punish" replaced the sovereign society. Today, a well-governed society [7] has in turn replaced the "discipline and punish" society. Therefore, the task of "cultural studies" is to expose the crisis of modernity and its various symptomatic problems, and to propose corresponding micro-political strategies.
Finally, "cultural studies" also attempts to overcome the binary logic of subjectivism versus objectivism, unfolding a comprehensive exploration around the relationship between subject and structure. This is most typically embodied in the concept of "habitus" and the theory of practice proposed by Bourdieu. Aided by concepts like "habitus" and "field," Bourdieu expanded "habitus" from a concept of individual behavior to a socio-cultural category. He constructed his theory of cultural practice through the idea of "the structuralist being structured, and the mutual transformation of the subjective and objective." The reason Bourdieu became one of the most cited French theorists is that he successfully overcame the limitations of the philosophy of consciousness, resolving the contradiction between subject and structure into a question of the logic of practice. Like Foucault and others, Bourdieu is an "unclassifiable" French theorist; his theory of cultural practice completely broke down the boundaries between philosophy, sociology, economics, anthropology, semiotics, and psychology, reflecting the fundamental nature of French Theory.
Will the philosophy of the future look like French Theory? This is a question we cannot yet settle today. However, it is certain that French Theory is indeed striving to forge a philosophy different from existing ones. When Foucault views philosophical research as a form of journalism, when Deleuze emphasizes that philosophical activity is the creation of concepts, and when Bourdieu turns philosophy into a kind of fieldwork, the prototypes and hopes of a future philosophy are already latent within them. French Theory might not look like philosophy; its "critique of systems," "micro-perspectives," and "cultural studies" look like a "Si-bu-xiang" [8] (neither fish nor fowl), yet they represent a certain possibility for philosophy. As Foucault said in his final interview: "The philosophical research I conducted in The Order of Things, History of Madness, and even Discipline and Punish basically still adopted a philosophical vocabulary, philosophical games, and philosophical experience, which I fully accepted. But it is certain now that I am trying to get away from this form of philosophy; I do this to study, map out, and organize philosophy as a field of experience. Thus, to some, this period of mine seems to adopt a completely non-philosophical approach, but in fact, it is a more radical way of thinking about philosophical experience." French Theory appears non-philosophical, but in reality, it is thinking philosophically more radically. Perhaps it can be said that the critique of reason and cultural critique by French theorists like Foucault represent a possible form of future philosophy.
IV. Conclusion
As the construction of a new philosophical paradigm, the formation and evolution of French Theory demonstrate at least two points. First, today's "world actually needs philosophy more than philosophy thinks it does." Second, it is impossible to do philosophy exactly as before; philosophy needs innovative modes of expression. It is precisely these two "needs of the era" that intensified the creativity and future-philosophical orientation of French Theory, allowing "philosophy to possess the function of always remaining relevant and always creating concepts." Or rather, French Theory fully embodies what Deleuze said: "Philosophy is always about creating concepts." As a prototype of future philosophy, the debut of French Theory was the creation of many new concepts. For French Theory, "the style of philosophy is the movement of concepts." Of course, French Theory does not create concepts for the sake of creating concepts, nor is it playing conceptual games; rather, it uses philosophy to respond to changes in the world.
In Alain Badiou's view, the world needs philosophy. There are four reasons for asking after philosophy in today's world: first, today's prevailing opinion polls, epidemiological surveys, and election projections have nothing to do with truth—average numbers cannot tell us what truth is; second, faced with many of today’s "inhuman" conditions, we cannot retreat infinitely but must make our own decisions; third, faced with cultural pluralism, religious fundamentalism, nationalism, racism, and other strong emotions, we need to provide rational answers; fourth, we cannot cover up a world full of violence and fragility. This world does not develop in a straight line and is thus not peaceful; it is full of dramatic crises and contradictory events. Of course, the emergence of a new philosophy must have a new appearance, new methods, and new paths. From Foucault and Derrida to Deleuze and Badiou, their intention is to discover another philosophical style and reaffirm the possibility of philosophy in its original sense. Thus, we see the singular style of French Theory, different from traditional philosophy. As Deleuze said: "One can imagine a Hegel with a large beard on the philosophical level, a Marx with his beard shaved off, just like a Mona Lisa with a mustache added."