Yan Yan: On the Conservative Elements in Lukács's History and Class Consciousness
Introduction In 1923, Lukács published History and Class Consciousness, emphasizing that to clarify Marx's historical dialectics, one must "return to Hegel" and "shatter the 'dead' edifice of the system as it exists in its historical form, in order to rescue the most contemporarily relevant tendencies of his thought, so they may once again become a living and effective force in the present." [1] The author has no doubt regarding Lukács's good intentions in rescuing the revolutionary dialectics of Marxism; indeed, in his book, Lukács elucidated the principled differences between Hegelian and Marxian dialectics. His critique of positivist philosophy and economics from a methodological level reaffirmed that his core theoretical concern was the restoration of the critical and revolutionary nature of Marxism. The problem, however, lies in whether Lukács successfully and thoroughly purged the conservative elements within Hegelianism. Was the revolutionary nature of the Marxian dialectic truly and completely restored? Given the significant status and enormous influence of History and Class Consciousness in the history of Western Marxism, clarifying these issues is not only key to a reasonable assessment of Lukács's thought but also a necessity for correctly grasping the overall direction and theoretical essence of Western Marxism. Lukács later profoundly reflected on the theoretical errors present in the book (idealist ethical bias, the cancellation of natural ontology, an idealist view of praxis, revolutionary utopianism, etc.) and warned that "the theoretically erroneous parts often have the greatest influence." [2] The author believes that these errors were not merely Lukács's modest self-deprecation but were real and substantive. If they are not carefully analyzed, they will lead to theoretical ambiguity and even policy failures; therefore, they must be treated with caution.
It is an indisputable fact that Max Weber exerted a significant influence on the formation of Lukács's thought. The question, however, is whether Lukács consciously filtered out the inherent "conservative elements" when observing Marx through Weber's methodological lens. Lukács never shied away from his academic connection to Weber, and Weber greatly admired Lukács's talent. In History and Class Consciousness, Weber's theory of rationalization serves as the most important supportive background for understanding the concept of reification [3]. However, the academic community generally focuses on how Lukács transformed and absorbed Weber's ideas, failing to fully realize that the conservative components in Weber's thought might have permeated Lukács's thinking, thereby frustrating his noble desire to restore Marx's revolutionary dialectics. Fundamentally, the standpoint of Weber's thought is capitalist civil society, which means his theory inevitably carries the negative components of conservatism. Lukács was undoubtedly a committed Marxist; after his turn to Marxism in 1918, he "wholeheartedly acknowledged Communism as a moral, spiritual, and political solution. Despite undergoing various philosophical adventures, he dedicated the rest of his life entirely to the Communist movement." [4] Clearly, a tension exists between Lukács's Marxist revolutionary stance and Weber's capitalist civil society stance, but Lukács did not fully realize this. Consequently, his appropriation of Weber's thought ultimately fell into a paradox. Drawing upon the commentary on History and Class Consciousness by Lukács's student, István Mészáros, this article focuses on analyzing the negative components of Hegel's philosophy of history and Weber's ideas on rationalization (bureaucracy). It aims to reveal the latent conservative elements in History and Class Consciousness, thereby providing new perspectives for a correct evaluation of Lukács's thought.
I. Why is Hegel called "Uncritical Positivism"? In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx pointed out that although Hegelian thought already possessed a completely negative and critical appearance in the Phenomenology of Spirit, his later works were a type of uncritical positivism and an equally uncritical idealism. Furthermore, these conservative elements already existed in his early thought in a latent manner, as seeds, potentials, and secrets. This indicates that Hegelian thought inherently possesses conservative elements. It is less that the idealist system strangled the revolutionary nature of the dialectic than that the narrow standpoint of civil society determined that the idealist system would inevitably triumph over the dialectic. In his later autobiography, Lukács emphasized that Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx were peerless, genuine thinkers, which speaks to the status Hegel held in his mind. For this reason, the academic community generally regards Lukács as a Hegelian Marxist.
Although Mészáros was Lukács's student, he followed the principle of "I love my teacher, but I love the truth more." In Beyond Capital, he devoted five entire chapters to assessing Lukács's theoretical legacy. His basic conclusion was that Lukács was unfortunately infected by the conservative elements of Hegelianism and thus fell into a theoretical paradox. Mészáros held a sharp critical attitude toward the conservative components in Hegelian philosophy, arguing that Hegelian philosophy "suppresses man with objective historical laws" and always "grasps history as a relentless objective movement, which possesses an autonomous coercive logic that will not be tamed by illusory subjective designs and corresponding voluntaristic interventions." [5] If Hegel believed that true historical progress lay in the sublation [6] of civil society and humanity's entry into a communist society, then emphasizing the objective necessity of historical laws would be reasonable. However, Hegel intended to use the ethical state to mediate the contradictions of civil society, emphasizing that "the state, which is divine as the will present on earth... is the reality of the substantial will." [7] This departs from Marx's idea of the "association of free individuals," falls into the narrow horizon of civil society, and shapes the myth of the universal and eternal rule of capital. Like Adam Smith and other national economists, Hegel realized that the selfish individuals of civil society would inevitably treat others as means, but he fully affirmed the positive side and necessity of civil society, asserting that "the individual's life and welfare, as well as his legal existence, are interwoven with the life, welfare, and rights of all, and they can only be established on the basis of this system." [8] Although Hegel did not believe, as Smith did, that an "invisible hand" could automatically achieve the maximization of social interest, he believed that the ethical state could regulate the contradictions of civil society and achieve overall social harmony. Thus, both Smith and Hegel proclaimed the "end of history" and fell into the ideological fantasy of "capital as eternal."
As is well known, Hegel was no optimist. He emphasized that radical evil is pervasive in history and that Enlightenment reason would inevitably fall into a quagmire within civil society; therefore, one must use supra-individual Absolute Reason to solve the problems of the age. In Hegel's eyes, although Napoleon was a "world-historical figure," he was merely a tool used by the World Spirit to realize its own ends. History is the process of the World Spirit's self-realization, which will eventually conclude within the order of universal and eternal capital. Marx parted ways with Hegel on issues such as "the eternity of capital" and the "end of history." He did not "regard capital as an unalterable ultimate in the historical process, but rather as a dynamic movement, which, despite its obvious and irresistible logic of global expansion, should be seen as temporary." [9] Marx was fully aware of the grave consequences of capital's self-valorization and thus admitted that "the development of human powers is achieved at the cost of the majority of individuals and even classes." [10] There is an essential difference between Marx's and Hegel's philosophies of history: the latter carries a strong teleological color, while the former is not teleological. As Terry Eagleton has remarked: "Teleological theories hold that each historical stage of human society is the inevitable product of the preceding historical process. In this process, each stage is itself necessary, and all these historical stages are indispensable conditions for achieving a specific goal. This goal itself is inevitable; it is the driving force hidden behind the entire historical process." [11] The reason Hegel set a goal for history was primarily to pursue the identity of thinking and being, as well as the reconciliation of concept and reality. Consequently, historical development became a closed circle, and the "end of history" was its inevitable result.
In his Philosophy of History, Hegel proposed the concept of the global at an early stage. He viewed the developmental process of world history as an inevitable progression, believing that humanity would certainly reach the "absolute end of history." Following this logic, European colonial rule was an unalterable rational fate; people could only act according to the predetermined developmental trajectory of world history. Mészáros argues that Hegel was correct to emphasize that world history possesses its own objective laws of development. However, due to his neglect of the decisive role of capital in the modern world, Hegel failed to see that "the process of globalization [is] asserted by strengthening the most dynamic centers of domination (and exploitation) of capital, making the vast majority of people aware of growing inequality and extreme misery" [12]. Hegel's problem was this: if the World Spirit bestows upon humanity a cruel order of capital exploitation, does it mean that humanity will live under the global rule of capital forever? Just as Adam Smith believed the "invisible hand" represented moral omnibenevolence, Hegel believed the World Spirit would surely lead humanity toward a beautiful society. Yet this philosophical value-presupposition does not conform to social reality; both are predicated on maintaining the basic structure of civil society [13] and capitalist private ownership.
Hegel's disregard for the negative side of capital stems primarily from the fact that he spoke from the standpoint of the national economists [14]. Starting from the universal dependence between persons in civil society, he emphasized that the division of labor makes "the dependence and the reciprocal relation of men in the satisfaction of their other needs a complete and necessary reality" [15]. That is to say, Hegel believed that the formation of inseparable links between people through objects was not only natural and right but also of great benefit to both the individual and society, because "while man in his acquisition, production, and enjoyment for himself is at the same time producing and acquiring for the enjoyment of all others... this necessity, which lies in the universal complex of the interdependence of all on all, is now for every one the universal and permanent wealth" [16]. Here, "universal and permanent wealth" does not refer to material wealth in general, but specifically to the mode of production and distribution of wealth in capitalist society, which implies the universality and eternity of the rule of capital. It is not difficult to see that Hegel did not directly argue for the eternity of capital; rather, by revealing the universal dependence between persons in capitalist society, he emphasized that individuals should submit to a universal entity—the ethical state [17]—thereby indirectly arguing for the eternal presence of capital relations.
In the Economic Manuscripts of 1857-1858 (the Grundrisse), Marx emphasized that capitalist society is one in which abstractions hold sway. However, unlike Hegel, he opposed all abstract forces that stand above human beings, arguing that the rule of abstractions is merely the product of a specific stage of human social development and thus possesses historical transience. That is, while Marx acknowledged on a factual level that different individuals in capitalist society form universal connections mediated by objects—and even identified this as a form of historical progress insofar as it "creates the material preconditions for communist society"—he determined on a level of value-orientation that this was a false universality. For Marx, only the "association of free individuals" possesses true universality.
Going further, Mészáros hits the mark by pointing out that Hegel's dialectic is an apologetic "pseudo-dialectic." In his view, the particularity of egoism cannot be reconciled with the universality of the ethical state because "universality cannot appear in our existing world without overcoming the antagonistic contradictions of the capital/labor relation—in which specific individuals are embedded and through which they are ruled" [18]. In other words, without the abolition of capital, universality can only form a relationship of rule and oppression over the subject. The essence of modern society lies precisely in the rule over human beings by the false universality manufactured by capital. The greatest conservatism of Hegelian philosophy lies not only in its indirect argument for the "eternity of capital" but also in its inherent promotion of a "virtue of capital"—the idea that the rule of capital can ensure the realization of diverse human needs and thus possesses great virtue. Like Smith, Hegel mistakenly viewed the compulsion of capital as a comprehensive reciprocity between individuals. In fact, this reciprocity is non-existent and fictional. The core issue is: "to which class the individuals belong who actually create the 'wealth of the nation' and which class steals the benefits of such production; or more accurately, which class of individuals must be restricted to the function of forced subordination, and which specific individuals—in Marx’s terminology, 'personifications of capital'—exercise the function of control" [19].
By retaining the egoistic individual and emphasizing the reciprocal interaction between persons, Hegel declared the capitalist system to possess unparalleled rationality and justice. To be sure, Hegel identified the dangers of egoism, emphasizing that particularity without moderation or measure would lead passions into a "bad infinity" [20]. He noted, "Civil society affords a spectacle of extravagance and misery as well as of the physical and ethical degeneration common to them both" [21]. But like Smith, Hegel preferred to view danger as an indispensable basic condition for the development of human society, believing that "in furthering my end, I further the universal, and the universal in turn furthers my end" [22]. Hegel’s overall logic is that particularity must move toward universality, and universality can achieve the overall harmony of society. Therefore, even if civil society might lead to human alienation, it possesses a natural legitimacy. This is clearly a conservative ideology.
In summary, Hegelian philosophy—especially the philosophy of right and the philosophy of history—carries a heavy conservative coloring. It is not only idealism in a general sense but also an "uncritical positivism." As for why Hegelian philosophy is conservative, I fully agree with Mészáros’s analysis: "What undermines Hegelian philosophy is not merely its idealism, but the fact that he holds the 'standpoint of political economy,' which implies a general uncritical attitude toward capital as a social-metabolic control" [23]. Unlike Hegel's dialectic, Marx's dialectic confronts the rule of capital directly, scientifically revealing the material basis and general laws of capitalist social development, and providing a fundamental solution for the transcendence of capital.
II. The Negative Influence of Hegelianism on History and Class Consciousness
Lukács did not first become "infected" with the habits of Hegelianism in History and Class Consciousness. According to the consensus in academic circles, he had already moved from Kant to Hegel in The Theory of the Novel (1916). Lukács himself confirmed this in the preface to the new edition of History and Class Consciousness, stating: "During the First World War, I once again set about studying Marx, but this time... it was under the influence of Hegel." The Theory of the Novel was completed in a mood of permanent despair over the global situation; at that time, his greatest concern was the question: "Who will save us from Western civilization?" Lukács attributed the crisis of Western civilization to the "loss of totality." He pointed out: "Our world has become infinitely large, and in every corner it hides gifts and dangers richer and more diverse than the Greek world; however, this richness and diversity sublate [24] the basic and positive meaning of its existence: totality."
Although Lukács no longer emphasized the individual but rather the class in History and Class Consciousness, his reliance on totality remained consistent. Rooted in its origins, this can be traced back to Hegelianism. While Mészáros acknowledges that History and Class Consciousness represented a major rupture in Lukács's thought, he is convinced that "intellectuals of weight cannot simply empty themselves every time the cultural-political wind shifts" [25]. From the perspective of research themes, the continuity of Lukács’s thought is primarily manifested in his concern for the possibilities of culture; "culture was the 'sole' thought in Lukács's life" [26]. From the perspective of research methodology and theoretical essence, the continuity is primarily manifested in the inheritance of Hegelianism.
The progressiveness of History and Class Consciousness lies in its weakening of the transcendentality of "spirit" and "form," emphasizing that they are products of the capitalist social structure. From a Marxist standpoint, Lukács realized that capitalist society, as a totallic existence, was exerting objective structural compulsion on the individual. Therefore, abstract Kantian forms alone could not eliminate alienation in reality. This meant that the individualistic perspective held in his early period had to be abandoned in favor of a class discourse: "The individual can never become the measure of things, because the individual faces an objective reality that must emerge as a complex of rigid things. The individual finds these things as already existing and unchangeable. Faced with such things, the individual can only make subjective judgments of recognition or rejection. Only the class (rather than the 'species' [27], which is merely a mystified individual molded according to intuitive spirit) can relate to the totality of reality and play an actual role in transforming it." It must be pointed out that emphasizing class does not mean Lukács escaped Hegelianism. His theory of the proletariat as the "identical subject-object of history" is precisely a version of Hegelianism. In his own words, "To see the proletariat as the identical subject-object of the real history of mankind was no materialist realization that overcame the idealist system, but rather an attempt to out-Hegel Hegel."
At its root, Lukács’s problem lay in his optimistic estimation of the revolutionary situation in Europe after the October Revolution, which led him to underestimate capital and overestimate class consciousness. Around 1858, Marx had maintained an optimistic attitude toward revolution, yet he also revealed a certain "uncertainty." In a letter to Engels, he noted: "The proper task of bourgeois society is the creation of the world market, at least in outline, and of the production based upon it. Since the world is round, this seems to have been completed by the colonization of California and Australia and the opening up of China and Japan. The difficult question for us is this: on the Continent the revolution is imminent and will immediately assume a socialist character. Is it not bound to be crushed in this little corner, considering that in a far greater territory the movement of bourgeois society is still on the ascendant?" [28] Here, the "little corner" refers to Western Europe. Marx’s inner worry was that the capitalist mode of production was expanding globally and was still generally in an ascendant phase; under such circumstances, could it be overthrown? Although the 1920s differed greatly from the mid-19th century, the general trend of global capitalist expansion had not changed. The adjusted relations of production in capitalism could still promote the development of productive forces to a certain extent. This meant that simply and crudely declaring the imminent demise of capitalism was bound to fail. In fits and starts, the judgment of Lukács’s student Ferenc Fehér is not without merit: "The hope inherent in this book regarding the imminent second coming of the Messiah—namely, the conception of a rapid and thorough redemption through the conscious action of the international proletariat—vanished without a trace by the late 1920s." According to Mészáros, although Lukács moved from the individual to the class in History and Class Consciousness, he simplistically reduced the crisis of capitalism to a "crisis of proletarian consciousness," believing that as long as the proletariat shook off reified consciousness, it could once again transform the world and overthrow capitalist society in its capacity as the revolutionary subject. This voluntarism dictated that Lukács would inevitably adopt a non-critical attitude toward the proletariat and ultimately fall into subjectivism.
The obvious paradox of History and Class Consciousness is that, on the one hand, proceeding from the Marxist theory of class revolution, Lukács had to resort to a strong Hegelian philosophy of history to demonstrate the historical necessity of the proletarian revolution; on the other hand, proceeding from a metaphysical ontological analysis of culture, to eliminate the alienation of everyday life, Lukács had to resort to the autonomous consciousness of the individual, exploring the selectivity of ethics and morality rather than the necessity of objective laws. Influenced by the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Lukács began in the 1930s to reflect on the utopianism of History and Class Consciousness, but he did not return to his early focus on the individual and abstract forms; instead, he turned toward the "species" [29], emphasizing that the unity of the individual and the species is the key to resolving social crises. Furthermore, Lukács placed his hopes on aesthetic activity, believing that it is precisely in the process of appreciating and understanding works of art that the individual can become aware of their species-essence and be elevated to the level of the species. Regardless, Lukács did not transcend Hegelian philosophy of history in History and Class Consciousness, and the conservative elements within that philosophy of history were inherited—an ironic turn for a Marxist theorist and revolutionary. In Mészáros’s view, Lukács’s greatest tragedy was overemphasizing the importance of class consciousness. He assumed the working class was the true possessor of the standpoint of totality, but from this position, "there can be no way out except jumping from rule to rule." By retaining Hegelian idealist discourse, Lukács implied that the proletariat’s victory over capitalist society could be achieved through an act of consciousness alone—that is, obtaining liberation without changing the capital-labor relationship of domination. Here, the Marxist principle of the primacy of matter (economics) was marginalized, and Lukács became trapped in the labyrinth of conceptual mythology, unable to extricate himself.
III. The Hidden "Weberian Baggage" in History and Class Consciousness
Mészáros emphasizes that Lukács’s tendency to be "more Hegelian than Hegel" also stemmed from the heavy "Weberian baggage" he carried. Lukács never avoided the influence of Weber’s thought, frankly admitting that Weber’s methodological works "played a role in clarifying problems and opening up paths of thought" for reading and understanding Marx’s Capital. The problem, however, is that it was precisely the most conservative and destructive viewpoints in Weber’s thought that influenced the conceptual framework of History and Class Consciousness. This is primarily reflected in Lukács’s appropriation and evaluation of Weberian concepts such as "rationality" and "calculability."
In 1917, in his essay "The Meaning of 'Value Freedom' in the Social and Economic Sciences," Weber proposed that social science research should not only distinguish between factual and value judgments but that researchers should maintain value neutrality. In his view, capitalism is a process of development from irrationality to rationality; market capitalism operating according to the principle of calculability is rational capitalism, which manifests politically as bureaucracy. Weber did not believe that a rational capitalist society was perfect; a bureaucratic society could become an "iron cage" [30] imprisoning humanity and turning individuals into insignificant cogs in a machine. However, overall, he believed that the ills of capitalist society could be eliminated through democratization. Like Weber, Lukács criticized capitalist bureaucracy on a value level, believing it led to a one-sided division of labor, destroyed human nature, and invaded the soul to derive reified consciousness. Yet on a factual level, Lukács basically agreed with Weber’s judgment that capitalist bureaucracy brings high efficiency. For instance, when discussing judicial sentencing, he quoted Weber at length: "The judge is more or less an automaton of legal paragraphs into which the files are put at the top, along with the necessary costs, for it to discharge the judgment from below together with more or less convincing reasons: the judge’s function is therefore at least roughly calculable." From the perspective of reification, Lukács opposed the invasion of individuality by any system; he mocked journalists for having "no integrity" and selling their convictions, and he opposed the separation of the worker’s labor-power from their personality, as this turned the worker into a thing. However, from the perspective of the laws of historical development, Lukács also believed these phenomena of reification were products of specific relations of production in capitalist society and thus possessed a certain historical necessity.
One of Weber’s important theoretical contributions was the distinction between early capitalism and modern capitalism. The greatest difference between the two is the different degree of correlation between economics and politics; in modern capitalist society, people are controlled by mysterious "entrepreneurs" and "politicians," and the rule of capital is established through the personification of capital. Mészáros believes Weber’s theory has two fatal flaws: first, it ahistorically expands the concept of capitalism indefinitely, blurring the essential difference between capitalism and pre-capitalism; second, it dissolves the unique antagonisms and contradictions of capitalist society into illusory systems such as "rational technology," "rational legal systems," and "rational management." Taking bureaucracy as an example, although Weber admitted it could evolve into bureaucratic rule, he still believed the high efficiency it brought could bring liberation to humanity, and that the capitalist system was the optimal political system. According to Weber’s vision, bureaucracy uses the principle of calculability to depersonalize people; though it cancels out individuality, it greatly improves work efficiency: "Experience everywhere shows that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization—that is, the monocratic bureaucracy—viewed from a purely technical standpoint, is capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency. In this sense, it is the most rational known means of exercising authority over human beings. It is superior to any other form in precision, stability, stringency of its discipline, and its reliability." Weber not only affirmed bureaucracy but also ahistorically regarded bureaucracy and the principle of calculability as unsurpassable basic characteristics of modern society, implying that abolishing bureaucracy was an "impossible task." Weber did not believe that abolishing capitalist private property would end bureaucracy; he noted: "If those who are controlled by the bureaucratic system attempt to escape the influence of the existing bureaucratic organization, it is generally only possible by establishing another organization. However, this organization will be equally bureaucratized." It is precisely in the sense of emphasizing that bureaucracy and the principle of calculability are ineradicable that Mészáros believes Weber fell into a conservative ideology, and that his theory "leaves no room for the action of antagonistic social classes, let alone for the feasibility of any rational and viable strategy to turn a subordinate class into a class that controls the social order." Just like the aforementioned example of the judge reaching a verdict: if a judge in a bureaucracy is merely an "automaton of legal paragraphs" who cannot make any rational interpretation of the law beyond routine, then "calculability" will not only bring "high efficiency" but will also lead to a terrible consequence—the masking of the interests of the ruling class and the consolidation of the rule of capital.
Mészáros’s analysis of the "Weberian baggage" fails to perceive the high complexity of Lukács’s thought. He only saw Lukács’s "affirmation" of the principles of rationality and quantification on a factual level, while ignoring how Lukács, as a Marxist, sought a "negation" of Weber’s theory of reification on a value level. Overall, Weber’s theory of reification is non-critical and affirmative; its core danger lies in how the "principle of value neutrality" leads to a bias toward and affirmation of instrumental rationality. This intellectual trend further leads to the "suspension" and "disregard" of the reification of capitalist relations of production. However, the reification theory of the mature Marx exists on two different levels: first, the reification of the relations of production, toward which Marx holds a negative and critical attitude; second, the reification of the production process, which is objectification, toward which Marx holds an affirmative attitude. Weber primarily explored reification on the second level, hence his affirmation of the principle of calculability and quantification. Lukács’s problem lay in confusing these two levels of reification, which inevitably led him into a paradox: sometimes affirming Weberian reification, and sometimes taking a critical stance against the principles of calculability and quantification. But fundamentally, Weber’s understanding of reification gained the upper hand. This ultimately led to a peculiar phenomenon: Lukács was often substantively affirming Weber within the very discourse of opposing him on the surface. Zhang Yibing [31] correctly reconstructed the social background of Lukács’s theory of reification—namely, that it "describes not the inverted state of social relations in the 19th-century capitalist market exchange encountered by Marx, but rather the rationalization (the standardized process of quantified calculability) in the 20th-century process of objectified industrial civilization starting from Taylorism, as described by Weber." In essence, although Lukács opposed instrumental rationality in History and Class Consciousness—a point where he clearly differs from Weber—his understanding of reification was precisely built upon the foundation of Weberian reification theory; therefore, it can still be called "Weberian baggage."
IV. Conclusion
It must be pointed out that a fundamental difference exists between Lukács and Weber regarding how to view the "ultimate questions of humanity." Lukács opposed Weber’s "principle of value neutrality." In What is Orthodox Marxism?, he unequivocally opposed "scientificity," "factuality," and "pure objective laws," noting: "When 'science' maintains that the manner in which these 'facts' are immediately presented forms the basis of the vital truths of science, and that their form of existence is the point of departure for the formation of scientific concepts, it simply and dogmatically takes its stand on the basis of capitalist society. It uncritically accepts its essence, its objective structure, and its laws as the immutable foundation of 'science'." [32] Lukács also realized that formalized mathematical methods cannot solve the problems of human existence; therefore, epistemology must return to ontology and accept the guidance of practice and values. However, Lukács did not believe that Kant’s categorical imperative or Hegel’s "cunning of reason" had successfully solved the problem. What he strove to seek was a non-formalized, collectivist solution—namely, an appeal to the class consciousness and revolutionary activity of the proletariat.
Yet Mészáros was not satisfied with Lukács’s solution. In his view, the lapse of History and Class Consciousness into Hegelian idealism was a necessity of its theoretical logic. Since Lukács determined that the crisis of capitalist society was an ideological crisis, he inevitably relied on the class consciousness of the proletariat, thereby weakening the Marxist principle of the primacy of the material (economy). That is to say, as long as Lukács failed to examine the secrets of the capitalist mode of production from the perspective of the critique of political economy, he could only remain within the Hegelian philosophy of consciousness, moving forward burdened by the "Weberian baggage." Fundamentally, Mészáros believes Lukács’s basic dilemma was his "lifelong attempt to find a way of liberation by solving the contradictions he discovered through the direct intervention of social consciousness." [33] But the problem lies in the fact that forms of social consciousness can neither directly intervene in the rule of capital nor reshape the productive order of social metabolism.
In his frustration, Lukács could only turn to the salvation offered by intellectuals. However, he overlooked the fact that by relying solely on "external infusion" [34] from intellectuals, the masses cannot escape reification and the rule of capital. This is because "solving these problems 'from the outside' (which means from the standpoint of the ruling class favorable to the eternal existence of society) is destined to fail; the power of capital, continuing to exist in a disguised form, will be impossible to eliminate. As long as capital (in whatever form) remains the lever controlling the social metabolism, the danger of maintaining the revival of capitalism on a hereditary basis will also remain insurmountable." [35] Furthermore, Lukács’s turn toward ethics and aesthetics in his later years possessed a certain inevitability. The sharp contrast between theory and reality forced him to abandon the class theory of History and Class Consciousness and turn instead to the universality of the "species" [36] and morality—emphasizing that individuals with higher moral levels and aesthetic capacities could realize the unity of the individual and the species, thereby escaping reification.
Although Lukács always invoked revolutionary enthusiasm with an optimistic attitude throughout his life, he nonetheless had to face the reality of the rule of capital. Mészáros argues that once one accepts Lukács’s philosophical ontology, one can only agree that the contradictions and tragedies in reality are irreversible stages in achieving "humanity for-itself." This, like Smith, Hegel, and Weber, re-confirms the "no alternative" nature of capital’s rule on a factual level. The reality, however, is that capital inevitably influences politics, and politics necessarily influences morality. Therefore, the key to the problem is how to let ethics actively intervene in politics, rather than abstractly declaring that morality and politics are identical. In short, Mészáros believes Lukács’s fundamental problem was "attempting to solve acute political and socio-economic problems at the level of abstract methodology and abstruse ontology, without pointing out the material and institutional mediations necessary to critically and strategically overcome the difficulties and contradictions now identified." [37] If this judgment is accurate, then it is not surprising that History and Class Consciousness—a work that should have been the most revolutionary and critical—carries conservative overtones. The analysis by domestic scholar Zhang Yibing hits the nail on the head; he points out that although Lukács was fortunate enough not to be poisoned by the dogmatic Marxism of the Second International and directly intuited the scientific critical spirit of Marxism, "he still failed to realize that his dependence on the Hegelian structural logical tension and the Weberian-Simmelian critique of reification would still turn his desire to reawaken the revolutionary class will of reified laborers into a flower in a mirror or the moon in the water [38]." [39]
Finally, it must be pointed out that neither Mészáros nor Lukács’s other students (the Budapest School) completely rejected History and Class Consciousness. Although Ferenc Fehér believed that the conception in History and Class Consciousness collapsed by the late 1920s, he claimed that "friends and enemies alike recognize that the publication of History and Class Consciousness was the most important event in the history of Marxist philosophy since the death of Marx." [40] Mészáros held reservations about History and Class Consciousness but emphasized that it was a very important work of a transitional period, "serving as a crucial point of reference throughout its author's life... and playing the role of a watershed in Lukács’s theoretical development." [41]
(Author’s Affiliation: School of Philosophy, Zhongnan University of Economics and Law) Online Editor: Zhang Jian Source: Modern Philosophy, Issue 6, 2023
*Additionally, although Mészáros provided a precise analysis of the conservative components in the intellectual legacies of Hegel and Weber, he overlooked the positive influence of the Marxist historical method on History and Class Consciousness. The author believes that Lukács’s thought is highly complex and full of contradictions; perhaps, as he said himself, "two souls reside in the breast" [42] of any ordinary person. It was precisely the Marxist historical method that kept him constantly alert; thus, the critical and revolutionary components did not entirely disappear into the ideological flood of conservatism.