How Neofascism Emerges from Neoliberal Capitalism
I. Introduction Inherent political, economic, and social contradictions exist between the necessary conditions for capitalist accumulation and the political legitimacy of the capitalist state. During the development of neoliberal capitalism over the past forty years, the rise of corporate power has weakened public representation, agencies, and accountability mechanisms within the state. Definitions of neoliberal capitalism often evade the issue of corporate power, conflating "neoliberalism" with the weakening of the state's role in favor of the "free market." On the contrary, improving the representation of corporate power within the capitalist state—rather than "weakening the state" or promoting "free markets"—is the core to understanding the developmental dynamics of neoliberal capitalism. Under neoliberal capitalism, the shift in the public functions of the capitalist liberal-democratic state (namely, further subsidization, enhancement, and concentration of private power within both the state and the market) has expanded the political and market power of corporations. As the public functions of the capitalist state have been continuously eroded during the forty-year rise of neoliberal capitalism, public support for capitalist liberal-democratic systems has declined accordingly. This has created opportunities for politicians supporting authoritarian capitalism to pursue neo-fascism, which has already become a global phenomenon.
To better understand the relationship between neoliberal capitalism and neo-fascism, we must first trace back to the historical context of the emergence of fascism in the 1930s. When the ruling institutions of capitalist society are unable to operate within the original laws, norms, and standards, capitalist crises give rise to authoritarian "solutions." For a long time, these crises have been driven by the tensions inherent in capitalism as an accumulative economic system. When capitalists are unable to maintain a rate of profit that allows for the expansion of capital investment, they seek solutions (including the restructuring of those institutions that hinder profitability).
When such crises erupt, restructuring may lead to fundamental changes in the polity of the capitalist state, or at least the emergence of social movements and hegemonic projects that protect capitalism through authoritarian rule. The history of capitalist development tells us that authoritarian regimes exist in many types, varying by their degree of military force, mass mobilization, and/or the retention of republican forms (such as plebiscites or controlled electoral processes).
In the 1930s, as "national capitalists" faced intensifying political, economic, and social crises due to the Great Depression, leaders embracing fascism strutted onto the stage from fractured class and social environments. They promoted white supremacy, reactionary nationalism, militarism, and chauvinism, viewing ethnic minorities, social democrats, and labor movements as obstacles to the realization of their ideal state, seeking to expel, oppress, and eliminate them.
The capitalist ruling class either supported this reactionary turn, viewing it as an opportunity to stabilize and increase capitalist profits, or ultimately collaborated with fascist movements out of shared interests to suppress working-class parties and trade unions seen as obstacles to profitability. The fascism that emerged in the 1930s was the bitter fruit of capitalist crisis, manifesting as the collapse of the capitalist system's legitimacy and the deepening of class and social struggles centered primarily on what kind of society needed to be constructed to resolve the crisis. Therefore, the types of fascism were closely linked to the economic, political, and social conditions of capitalism during that period. It proved that if fascists could restructure the capitalist state in a way that expanded state power, restored profitability, and suppressed working-class parties, unions, and political movements, they served the interests of the ruling class. In a period where state capitalism actively competed for market access, raw materials, and geopolitical advantage, the fascism of the 1930s began building large-scale authoritarian states that relied on powerful militaries and mass mobilization by large fascist parties.
II. Fascism and Neo-fascism In contrast, contemporary neo-fascism has emerged amidst the crisis of neoliberal capitalism. During this crisis, except in the areas of militarization and regulation, the functions of the capitalist state have long since shifted away from large-scale state capacity back toward the exigencies of capitalist accumulation. Over forty years, neoliberal capitalism has restructured the capitalist state to make it serve the profit accumulation of the most powerful capitalist sectors more directly. This means the capitalist state has undergone forty years of "deconstruction," whereby state activities have been dedicated, to varying degrees, to enhancing the political and economic strength of the corporate sector. In this process, the state has relied more heavily on regressive taxation policies, which reduced taxes on corporations and the wealthy while increasing the burden on the middle and working classes, leading to more public-private "partnerships." In these relationships, the state directly provides more subsidies to corporate investors to lower investment costs; reduces public subsidies and welfare assistance to the working class to encourage the provision of more cheap labor to capitalists; and incentivizes the establishment of global supply chains through trade and investment agreements, promoting the institutionalization of a globalized system of corporate power.
Compared to the 1930s, today's neo-fascist movements aim to accelerate the institutionalization of neoliberal capitalism by pushing for the further "deconstruction" of the capitalist state. Unlike 1930s fascism, which used parties to build a powerful state apparatus serving capitalists by mobilizing mass support networks, neo-fascism operates within a globalized capitalist system. Its goal is to accelerate the divestment of public and regulatory functions from an already weakened public capacity to increase the accumulation of social assets and promote the "freedom" of powerful capital interests. Contemporary far-right fascist rhetoric—including white supremacy, chauvinism, xenophobia, and attacks on the corrupt "political class"—echoes many of its 1930s fascist predecessors. Neo-fascism is the product of an intensified crisis of capital accumulation. The ability of neo-fascists to attack what they call the institutionalized power of the "political class" is a direct manifestation of the declining political legitimacy of liberal capitalist democracy. For forty years, the public functions of the capitalist state have been hollowed out, turned instead to serve the accumulation needs of the bourgeoisie directly.
Our interpretation of contemporary neo-fascism includes the following structural and useful factors, which explain the relationship between neo-fascism, the capitalist state, and the power blocs of different sectors of capital:
During the forty years of neoliberal capitalist development, the capitalist state has experienced a long-term structural crisis characterized by the hollowing out of public functions and the dominance of corporate interests within the state. This has lowered the state's public legitimacy, leading to a decline in support for major political parties and government institutions, creating opportunities for far-right, neo-fascist movements and their leaders.
Capitalist crises, particularly the global capitalist crisis that erupted in 2008, led directly to the rise of far-right movements. These movements typically include neo-fascist political currents whose rhetoric and goals oppose the institutions, procedures, and processes of liberal democracy, supporting authoritarian "strongmen" who demand the replacement of procedural democracy. In this process, attacking the "political class," people of color, ethnic minorities, and immigrants becomes a political weapon for neo-fascist leaders. These movements seek to express that "white civilization" is under attack and define the "nation" as an embodiment of white supremacist values.
Capitalist sectors are divided on how to respond to far-right and neo-fascist alliances. Financial speculators, extractive capitalist sectors such as oil, mining, and agribusiness, as well as small business groups and alliances, have facilitated and funded the formation and development of far-right and neo-fascist political networks. Their purpose is to increase corporate power by strengthening neoliberal capitalist policy support. Some (though not all) powerful neoliberal think tanks, often funded by capitalists, have embraced much of the far-right's xenophobic and racist rhetoric as part of a capitalist political project that seeks to further delegitimize and deconstruct the state to empower private sector capitalists. For a long time, corporations have utilized far-right and neo-fascist political movements to delegitimize the public functions of government, supporting privatization, subsidizing corporations, and expanding corporate power within the state.
The far-right, which encompasses neo-fascist forces, also includes groups outside the capitalist power structure, such as members of the middle class, upper segments of the white working class, police and security personnel, and religious groups. They define themselves using the racialized language and political programs associated with neo-fascism: embracing white supremacy, viewing ethnic minorities, people of color, and immigrants as "threats," and peddling "law and order" rhetoric that treats prisons, border security, and punitive security measures as necessary conditions for a return to white supremacy.
We recognize that neo-fascist movements will produce different variants with the above four characteristics based on their specific historical and social contexts.
To better illustrate the classification of neo-fascism, this article conducts relevant research on the United States and Brazil. They not only fully illustrate this article's definition of neo-fascism but will also have a profound impact on driving the global neo-fascist movement.
Contrary to our view, many left-wing and liberal commentators describe the rise of neo-fascism as "right-wing populism," arguing that it fills the void left by the hollowing out of public functions in liberal-democratic polities. For example, the Amsterdam School [1] describes "national populism" as a response to financial globalization, viewing it as a counter-force to neoliberalism. Contrary to this understanding of the rise of right-wing authoritarianism, our analysis points to the consistent persistence and defense of neoliberalism. Donald Trump’s "rebranding" of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) was actually a reshaping; that is, while neo-fascism rhetorically stirs up public resentment toward the effects of neoliberalism, as a power bloc, it embodies an adaptation of global hegemony rather than its overthrow.
Regarding Donald Trump, in contrast to classical fascism, Dylan Riley argues that "Trump has no bureaucratic organization to lead." But since the United States "Capitol Riot" [2] on January 1, 2021, the above view is clearly untenable. At least as far as left-wing analysis of developments in the United States is concerned, one should not lightly dismiss this Trumpism, which possesses neo-fascist characteristics. That is to say, while the American far-right lacks both ideological unity and the organizational capacity of classical fascism, Riley’s view may still be correct in that the ideological fractures of the American right have a long history. Looking back at the heyday of Keynesian-liberalism in the United States, we can see a common pattern described by the liberal historian Richard Hofstadter [3]. He noted: "The American right wing is organized into an extremely large number of fanatical groups of indeterminate size. These groups are far from united. They have points of cooperation and convergence... they also have common idols." Hofstadter listed a unique combination of various issues, including "solving money problems, breaking land monopolies, exposing the invisible world government, leading the way out of bureaucracy, distributing the Protocols of the Elders of Zion, impeaching Eisenhower, abolishing the income tax, eliminating Freemasonry, persecuting Catholics... dissolving the mental health movement, stopping the supply of fluoridated water..." The continuities and differences between neo-fascism and the far-right of the 1950s are thought-provoking; racism and xenophobia needed further escalation to encompass Islamophobia and more overt hostility toward immigrants. Notably, contemporary neo-fascism has largely abandoned the "socialist" alternative goals of its classical predecessors; it is no longer interested in breaking any form of monopoly, nor in challenging any form of property rights. But its hostility toward medical research seems to possess significant staying power.
Perry Anderson insists that the term "fascism" can only be used within the significance and context of the socio-economic crises and mass-based social movements of the interwar period; for him, fascism was "a response to a crisis of social revolution in a period of economic dislocation or depression." In contrast, in our view, the insistence that fascism can only be the product of specific circumstances—namely, the need for an extreme authoritarian state to constrain a working class that is both radical and strong, yet unfortunately not strong enough to successfully achieve socialism—lacks a historical basis. As we have observed in the rise of neo-fascism, the recourse to authoritarian politics can also be preemptive. In Anderson’s focal analysis of Brazilian politics, he puts forward a point of fundamental significance to our own analysis: that the Brazilian Workers' Party (PT) is "the only new mass party built from the labor movement since World War II, surpassing other organizations in Latin America in terms of size, influence, and relative cohesion." In the historical context of the post-Cold War era, even the revival of the most moderate social democracy in Brazil, or the campaign of Bernie Sanders, was sufficient to trigger panic or serve as a pretext for the anti-socialist ideology of political figures like Bolsonaro and Trump. Anderson also notes: "There was always an asymmetry between the PT’s policies of moderation and conciliation and the hostile attitudes of an angry middle class and media... the expression of this unilateral hatred became increasingly violent... while demonstrators sang their signature song, 'Capitalism is here to stay.'" William I. Robinson offers a quite skillful summary of the rise of neo-fascism, stating: "This appears to be a preemptive strike to prevent the spread of working-class and popular resistance."
In the post-Cold War era, the emergence of moderate social-democratic politics in the United States and Brazil has been sufficient to trigger neo-fascism. In this context, the petite bourgeoisie is easily misled, and a significant portion of the capitalist elite is habituated to instrumentalizing the state. This also helps us understand the crisis of traditional conservatism, which tends to conceptualize the state as an instrument of social integration. All forms of fascism tend to mimic the Left (as they imagine it) and view politics as a struggle capable of playing a vital role; given its chauvinistic ideology, fascism describes more traditional forms of conservative politics in pejorative terms (such as "deplorables" [4], etc.). Steve Bannon’s use of "deconstruction" in this regard is a "classic fascist" rhetorical device, especially in how he treats "cultural Marxism" as the enemy.
Wherever neo-fascist leaders or movements gain power, the public legitimacy of the capitalist liberal-democratic state is in decline. Over the course of forty years, the public functions of the capitalist state have been reversed to serve private capital accumulation more directly (particularly during prolonged political, social, and economic crises), further eroding the state's public legitimacy. The outbreak of the 2008 global financial crisis can be seen precisely as the ultimate manifestation of massive public subsidies from the state to capitalist enterprises, whose survival thereafter became dependent on trillions of dollars in government spending. The enormous public subsidies flowing from taxpayers to the wealthiest financial firms clearly exposed the indivisible and close relationship that had been established between the capitalist state and its most powerful corporate donors. By accelerating the growth of economic inequality and intensifying distrust and suspicion of capitalist managerial institutions, the government’s largesse toward the powerful global financial sector deepened the contemporary crisis of capitalism. Concurrently, the intensification of the crisis led to the emergence of neo-fascist politicians, parties, and social movements whose interpretation of the crisis reflects the dominance of political alliances that believe the entire "political class" is beyond redemption and requires "radical change." Far-right and neo-fascist forces also used the COVID-19 pandemic as a political opportunity to justify avoiding disruptions to capitalist production and global value chains at the cost of human lives.
Powerful capitalist sectors have long relied on such demagogic rhetoric to drive neoliberal restructuring, which has depleted the state’s public functions and regulatory capacities. Currently, the crisis of capitalism under the COVID-19 pandemic is repeating the 2008 global financial crisis even more intensely. The same actors are benefiting from the largest corporate subsidies in contemporary capitalist history, supported by mainstream parties whose long-standing commitments to their corporate networks, donors, and lobbyists have disqualified them from representing the public electorate. As public anger continues to grow over where tax money goes and who is lining their pockets with taxpayer spending, these public handouts are provided with almost no conditions, creating the conditions for larger-scale class conflict and the rise of leftist social movements—movements, parties, and organizations that can direct anger toward the intimate relationship between the political and corporate classes. However, because forty years of ruling-class attacks on labor unions, combined with the rightward shift of social-democratic and labor parties toward corporate-friendly legislative policies, fragmented and destroyed effective working-class political and economic representation, this path has been blocked.
The vacuum of working-class representation was ultimately filled by far-right political alliances. These easily evolve into neo-fascist variants because they seek to distinguish themselves from the "political class" as "outsiders" who can purge state corruption and represent interests couched in traditional fascist discourse (such as white supremacy, racism, xenophobia, and myths of "national greatness"). Neo-fascism, like its predecessors, defines the crisis of capitalism in racial terms, arguing that the interests of the privileged race are harmed because the "political class" has stripped them of the "special interests" that rightfully belong to them. This rhetoric is a "gift" to those segments of the bourgeoisie who have a vested interest in further delegitimizing the public functions of the capitalist state. As neo-fascist rhetoric demonizes ethnic minorities and immigrants and calls for the acceleration of social control and militarization, the culprits of the capitalist crisis are gradually shifted from powerful capitalists to the institutions of the liberal-democratic state itself. In this way, neo-fascism, like its predecessors, provides the political and ideological impetus toward further restricting, reducing, or even potentially eliminating capitalist liberal democracy, favoring authoritarian measures and the election of a trusted leader who can represent the grievances of a segment of the public.
As with historical fascism, the segment of the public most supportive of neo-fascist leaders belongs to the petite bourgeoisie. They are significantly wealthier than most of the working class but less secure than the dominant sectors of capital, whose interests are most directly protected and guaranteed by neoliberal capitalism. Implementing more regressive tax systems impacts "middle capital" more than the top 1%. The degree of support this group—middle capital—provides to neo-fascist leaders and movements should not be underestimated, despite an unfortunate tendency to describe this group's decline as part of the "white working class." This mislabeling weakens the understanding of their socio-economic status and hierarchy, as lower strata of the petite bourgeoisie are grouped into the same income and class category as workers who possess little capital or savings beyond their wages. Any analysis of the social base of neo-fascism needs to consider the divisions existing between workers and middle capitalists and/or managers. The use of false statistical classifications to equate the working class with people without a college degree—a practice commonplace in American articles depicting "white working-class support" for Trump—must be challenged through a more specific examination of Trump’s neo-fascist support networks.
In the following analysis, we will first discuss the structural economic and political conditions for the rise of neo-fascism in contemporary global capitalism. Second, we will parse the composition of the political alliances that tend to support neo-fascist political leaders or movements. These include capitalist sectors of global speculative finance; extractive sectors such as oil, gas, mining, and agribusiness; members of the petite bourgeoisie (including both high- and low-income groups within small business); groups of white workers who feel abandoned by deindustrialization and financial deregulation; and religious movements, especially those linked to far-right Evangelicals or other Christian denominations. The marriage between some of the most profitable sectors of global capital and middle-class social support is built on the foundations of racism, xenophobia, and patriarchal power structures intensified by corporate and religious ideologies. This marriage facilitates neo-fascist support networks at the national and even global levels.
Finally, we will briefly outline two case studies involving two politically successful neo-fascist political alliances: Trump in the United States and Bolsonaro in Brazil. We use these case studies to illustrate the historical and comparative factors that gave rise to neo-fascist movements in different contexts, followed by an examination of the implications of the rise of neo-fascism for the Left. Here, we argue that the Left needs to take an explicit stand against neo-fascism because it poses an existential threat to workers and humanity. However, the necessity of this political opposition must be built on a general elevation of the status of the working class, which has been extremely suppressed throughout the forty years of neoliberal development. Only by promoting a working-class movement with a shared mission to defeat fascism and reverse neoliberal capitalism (as well as challenging capitalism itself) can we both defeat neo-fascism and weaken the direct relationship between neo-fascism and capitalism. Capitalism has an inherent tendency toward authoritarianism; neoliberal capitalism has produced neo-fascism because the ruthless drive for accumulation has stripped away the mechanisms of public accountability in liberal-democratic institutions—mechanisms whose only historical inclusion of the working class originated from the pressure of labor movements. Faced with the political and economic crisis of neo-fascism, the Left needs to learn these lessons.
III. The Crisis of Legitimacy of the Capitalist State
Powerful capitalist alliances have accelerated the "rightward turn" of domestic and international policies through political lobbying, structural economic power, and class struggle against workers and the poor. In our analysis, these alliances represent a "fusion of transnational capital with reactionary and repressive political power," leading to a "transnational capital dictatorship" under contemporary neo-fascist forms. One of the contradictions of the neoliberal regime is that it deregulates corporate entities while strictly regulating the poor. As neoliberalism transforms into neo-fascism, its authoritarian side naturally becomes more prominent and increasingly dominant. In this sense, with the intensification of marginalization and authoritarian control over surplus populations, the war on drugs and the militarization of police have become indispensable parts of maintaining its rule.
Particular attention should be paid to "fossil fuel fascism," which plays an important role in the neo-fascist agenda regarding the maintenance of deregulation through force when necessary. The re-emergence of green politics, especially on the left—much like the social democracy of Lula and Sanders—largely threatens the power and profits of the fossil fuel sector. Notably, we find a material basis for the ideological appeal to the segment of the working class employed in this sector. While our analysis aligns with the traditional concept of the petite bourgeoisie as the mass base of fascism, it also acknowledges that a relatively privileged segment of the white working class provides a certain foundation for neo-fascism in the United States due to their ties to the fossil fuel industry, the military-industrial complex, or national security and police apparatuses. In this sense, on the one hand, the COVID-19 pandemic provided a backdrop for accelerating the radicalization of Trump-Bolsonaro neo-fascism and created the conditions for its crisis and possible decline; on the other hand, we anticipate an increasing amount of irrationalism regarding climate science, medicine, electoral operations, and any other issues of reality that are not easily verified. This is a typical fascist characteristic and a manifestation of what we call the underlying structural decline of neoliberal capitalism.
From 1980 to the present, by way of a relentless assault on social welfare and regulatory functions, capitalist states have, to varying degrees, facilitated the structural adjustment of capitalist production and accumulation. One method of measuring these trends is to examine the respective shares of capitalist profits and working-class wages in total income. In numerous capitalist countries, issues such as the gap between rich and poor and class inequality have become increasingly prominent, with the share of labor income declining relative to capital income. Due to differences in the specific socio-economic and political histories of various countries, this trend manifests in different ways. Multinational corporations in the United States and Western Europe have utilized their political and market power to promote the restructuring of production within global value chains. This has led to the subcontracting of production activities to low-wage regions, thereby driving down the wages of workers in developed countries. Simultaneously, transnational capital has fully exploited its structural power within the global political economy through preferential trade agreements. These agreements help establish an increasingly globalized production system, placing downward pressure on wages in the "Global South," where governments facilitate the global division of labor under conditions highly favorable to the extraction of surplus value by capital.
In the wake of successive capitalist crises—including the 2001 global economic crisis, and particularly the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2019 COVID-19 pandemic—transnational capitalists have aggressively sought large-scale subsidies from capitalist states, with the scope of these subsidies continually expanding. The increasing scale of systemic crises in global capitalism has accelerated the erosion of capitalist state legitimacy. This legitimacy was already being undermined by decades of state policies that led to increased debt financing in the public sector, increased debt (and precariousness) for working-class families facing wage stagnation, and increased corporate debt driven by sluggish rates of profit and the increasing financialization of corporate profits—incentivized by sources of cheap money provided by the capitalist state.
In response to the hollowing out of the state’s public functions, capitalist states have experienced a long-term crisis of legitimacy. This is evident in many capitalist countries, including the United States, most of Western Europe, and countries across different income levels in the "Global South." In the U.S. and much of Western Europe, public approval ratings for national legislatures and elected officials have declined, as has voter turnout (especially among the working class). Meanwhile, political parties historically linked to working-class voters, particularly socialist and social-democratic parties, have also seen their support dwindle. Regardless of ideology, parties of different stripes have increasingly favored neoliberal policies upon taking office—a trend reflecting the corporatization and "professionalization" of political parties, as party elites rely more on public relations firms, corporate consultants, polling data, and the anticipated impact of their policies on capitalist markets.
IV. Agents of Neo-Fascism
Scholarship has attempted to explain the rise of far-right parties, movements, and alliances by focusing on both supply-side and demand-side factors. On the supply side, they examine the extent to which the declining legitimacy of mainstream capitalist parties drives far-right forces to absorb their supporters, who often feel betrayed or abandoned by the mainstream. Many scholars link the decline in support and legitimacy of social-democratic and labor parties to the political vacuum filled by far-right parties. Simultaneously, conservative parties have also experienced a crisis of legitimacy through falling public support, leading to ruptures within conservative party alliances. The emergence of far-right movements and parties has accelerated the dissemination of rhetoric such as white supremacy, anti-immigrant sentiment, and ultranationalism.
Demand-side scholars argue there is a close relationship between financial crises and the rise of far-right political movements. However, most of these scholars have failed to directly link increasing inequality or poverty to the rise of the far right; instead, the best predictor of rising social support for far-right movements is relative deprivation—particularly among groups within the middle class. Their uncertainty regarding the stability of their class status is often related to perceived threats, such as ethnic minorities, immigrants, foreign cultures, or religious traditions, and the weakening of the social order deemed best able to protect existing hierarchies. It has been found that financial crises fuel support for far-right movements and parties among individuals whose mounting debt threatens to detach them from their position in the social hierarchy. As part of this process, new leaders who promise to "challenge" the establishment and its entire institutional edifice gain support from those who perceive a need for fundamental reform to restore conditions of greater security.
To date, scholars have often downplayed the links between the far right and fascism, not only because far-right parties demonstrate a willingness to participate in elections but also because they (sometimes) adjust their messaging and political promises. These adjustments may include promises to strengthen the welfare state (specifically for native-born white voters) and the formation of alliances that may include explicitly fascist parties as only a small component. We argue that this view—treating the far right as operating within the establishment rather than actively seeking to destroy liberal democracy—overlooks the attempts by leaders of far-right movements to actively seek the expansion of capitalist profits and to clear away any liberal-democratic obstacles to capitalist accumulation. By examining far-right political movements in recent decades, particularly in the aftermath of the 2008 global financial crisis, we identify three trends that constitute the characteristics of what we call neo-fascist political movements.
First, there is a close connection between certain neoliberal think tanks, foundations, and political actors and neo-fascist political signaling. Many global neoliberal organizations began promoting conservative nationalist positions as early as the 1990s, providing favorable ideological support for neo-fascist political movements. This includes the superiority of "Western culture," opposition to multiculturalism, Islamophobia, the reaffirmation of "national greatness," xenophobia, and anti-immigrant sentiment, as well as justifications for state support of capitalist accumulation. The founders of neoliberalism were largely committed to establishing barriers between capitalist markets and the liberal-democratic state; the functions of the latter were to be restricted to ensure the universal protection of capitalist property rights and to provide conditions for free capitalist accumulation. Neoliberals have long opposed liberal democracy when it exceeds what they consider the permissible limits for protecting and expanding capitalist private property and capital accumulation, as the founders of the neoliberal tradition sought to shield these rights from democratic accountability.
Neoliberal thinkers from the 1990s to the present have continued this trend, viewing the rise of multiculturalism, the struggles of immigrants and oppressed groups against institutional and systemic racism for recognition, and foreign religions (particularly Islam) as threats to the "Western order." This order is essentially a commitment to individual property rights; Eurocentric values perceive collective demands on the state—especially those from cultures, religions, or ideologies deemed "foreign"—as antithetical to the Western concept of "freedom." Neoliberal think tanks—including the Institute for International Affairs, the Adam Smith Institute, the Hayek Institute, the Austrian Economics Center, the Mises Institute, the Hoover Institution, and the Heritage Foundation—have produced some of the primary intellectual vanguards supporting neo-fascist political movements. This includes the far-right political alliance that spearheaded the Brexit referendum in the UK. Members of these neoliberal think tanks also maintain important links with neo-fascist movements in the U.S. (Trump) and Brazil (Bolsonaro), as well as a range of other neo-fascist movements emerging in Western and Eastern Europe. Neoliberal policy advocates have provided ideological and material support to far-right parties and movements, whose alliances include typical fascist groups intent on replacing the liberal-democratic state with authoritarian rule.
Second, the political coalitions comprising neo-fascist movements include capitalist interest groups that often demand the weakening or destruction of the liberal-democratic state's law enforcement and regulatory capacities. Speculative financial capital has supported far-right movements, including neo-fascism, such as the Brexit movement in the UK, which was funded by the most speculative sectors of the City of London. Extractive sectors, such as oil, mining, and agribusiness, rely on natural resources for profit accumulation; they have consistently provided support for neo-fascist movements, which are rife with fallacies and lies related to climate change denial and ecosystems. Neo-fascism is built on a systematic attack on truth and the peddling of myth-related narratives, which are often framed as necessary means to defend Western civilization and white identity against "threats" to the "natural order." Rooted in traditional fascist conceptions of white supremacist ideology and capital’s history of racial oppression to facilitate profit-making, capitalist extractive industries have been major drivers of the neo-fascist attack on the liberal-democratic state. Corporations in this sector have forged ties with far-right movements and parties, with activities aimed at further delegitimizing the concept, actions, and purpose of the liberal-democratic state.
Third, the base of neo-fascist movements primarily comes from relatively small-scale regional and local businesses, rather than globalized capitalist sectors. These capital owners possess direct political influence locally and are linked to larger networks of capital owners through commercial supply chains. However, their status is not equivalent to that of global upper-tier capital, as the latter tends to own and control power, privilege, or monetary funds. For small and local capital, the greatest threats are state ordinances, regulations, and tax requirements; they are also affected by a shrinking tax base, which reduces the tax burden on multinational corporations whose transnational ownership structures enhance their flexibility and ability to evade domestic taxes. Small and medium-sized enterprises, especially those whose capital composition includes a high proportion of labor costs, are most vulnerable to capitalist crises and are most likely to support far-right candidates associated with neo-fascist movements.
Religious extremist movements typically play a significant role in the ideology and aims of neo-fascist movements. Scholars have linked the rise of the far-right evangelical movement in the U.S. to the authoritarian and neo-fascist objective of abolishing the separation of church and state as a path toward establishing an autocratic theocracy. This far-right evangelical neo-fascist current paved the way for Trump’s election as U.S. president, but it has been a vital political and social base for the Republican Party for decades. This neo-fascist evangelical extremist movement is not limited to the United States; it has become a global movement, as seen in neo-fascist currents in Latin America, including Brazil. Religious extremism appears in different sectarian forms elsewhere, such as the rise of nativist and neo-fascist Hindu nationalist movements, which enabled Narendra Modi to become Prime Minister of India and pursue neo-fascist policies.
The following section will present two short case study summaries of neo-fascist movements: Trump and Bolsonaro. The authors will focus on how these movements emerged, the characteristics of their support bases, and the types of policies they advocate.
V. Case Studies
Fascism is a fundamental structural feature of capitalism, and its emergence is often accompanied by various crises of capitalism. Therefore, it is incorrect to view 21st-century fascism simply as a replay of early 20th-century fascism. While both originate from capitalism and its crises, these crises are shaped within specific historical materialist contexts; their differences are crucial for understanding the fundamental characteristics of neo-fascism. Here, we briefly introduce two presidents who came to power amidst the contemporary crisis of capitalism—Trump and Bolsonaro—who epitomize the characteristics of neo-fascism. Our work aims to strengthen the effectiveness of political responses to neo-fascist movements, thereby promoting the establishment of an alternative more likely to defeat neo-fascism, rather than simply rebuilding the conditions in which neo-fascism continually recurs.
Capitalism and capitalist political alliances paved the way for the emergence of neo-fascists such as Trump and Bolsonaro. Just before Trump and Bolsonaro won their elections, well-organized and deeply entrenched corporate lobbying groups engaged in deep predation of their respective capitalist states. In the United States, the most direct manifestation occurred after the 2008 global financial crisis, where crisis management provisions [10] exacerbated the continuous concentration of social wealth at the top of the American income pyramid and further delegitimized the capitalist political system. The corporate-funded Tea Party movement anticipated Trump’s attacks on the "political class," governing institutions, and the social safety net, thus directly paving the campaign trail for him. At the federal and state levels, organizations representing broad capitalist interests actively pushed to defund public services, privatize government functions, vilify supporters of activist government, and utilize racism and xenophobia to fuel the continuous militarized expansion of American police and security forces—a long-standing trend that has become particularly prominent since the September 11 attacks.
Trump’s greatest financial backing came from sectors of capital seeking to further neoliberal policies such as deregulation and tax cuts, as well as those lobbying for tariff protection, expanded military budgets, and strengthened border "security." Additionally, capitalist hedge fund managers, oil and gas companies, steel and aluminum firms, and manufacturing sectors seeking protection from foreign competition were all drawn to Trump. During Trump's tenure, a wider range of corporate interest groups actively participated in drafting the details of the corporate tax cut package, which was projected to cut taxes by $1.9 trillion. Other capitalists distanced themselves from Trump, directing their wealth and political capital toward the Democratic Party. Trump’s political machine operates within a larger context in which capitalist political alliances can skillfully extract a steady stream of benefits from the state even if he himself leaves office. In recent decades, the function of the capitalist state has often been to directly subsidize capitalist profits and cut funding for public services. Capitalist political alliances hope to salvage a large part of this political system, even as they disagree on how to handle Trump. However, the vacuum that enabled Trump’s success was filled neither by a cohesive capitalist political bloc nor by a vibrant labor movement. Over the past 40 years, as the Democratic Party further capitulated to corporate interests, the labor movement continued to suffer defeats. Biden’s failure during his presidency to deliver substantial long-term benefits to the American working class helps ensure that the neo-fascist Republican Party led by Trump remains highly likely to regain the presidency and seats in Congress.
Bolsonaro’s rise to power was also related to the crisis of capitalist accumulation and state legitimacy. Initially, the social base of Bolsonaro’s campaign (i.e., his most radical supporters) consisted of agribusiness, the arms industry, and religious conservative movements, which were also products of social crisis and widespread opposition to the dysfunction of the "political class." In the later stages of the October 2018 presidential campaign, the financial sector and large-scale domestic industrial capital flocked to Bolsonaro because their preferred candidate, Geraldo Alckmin of the Brazilian Social Democracy Party, was on the verge of defeat. Bolsonaro’s victory set off a fascist wave, with racism and xenophobia attacking political opponents, workers, and the poor; state-sanctioned mass riots launched by illegal paramilitary organizations escalated, continuing to use terror to "monitor" and expand their property, and openly licensing agribusiness to further plunder the Amazon rainforest. This accelerated the existential threat of climate change and intimidated Amazonian smallholders, villagers, and indigenous guardians who posed a threat to further profit accumulation by agribusiness. Just as the fossil fuel sector has long supported fascist currents in global politics, and much like neo-fascist leaders such as Trump, agribusiness relied not only on Bolsonaro’s favoritism but also on the previous Workers' Party (PT) government, whose funding allocations for social welfare programs were directly linked to rising commodity export prices and, by extension, the economic fortunes of agribusiness.
However, as with Trump’s presidency, Bolsonaro failed to secure broad support for his government. In fact, he gradually lost the support of sectors of capital as well as the vast majority of Brazilians. Bolsonaro is key to how fascist politics expresses its contradictions: deep-seated rifts such as racism, xenophobia, and unrestrained capitalist accumulation have intensified; sectors threatened by previous governance measures are free to engage in capitalist accumulation and hope to use fascist political movements to further enrich themselves. If opportunities to increase profits arise, capitalist political alliances may seek the shelter of fascism. But the instability associated with fascist rule can also undermine the stability of capital sectors to the point that they attempt to restore the "normalcy" of previous institutions. However, capitalist political actors lack the economic incentives to support reversing the socio-economic conditions that initially propelled fascism.
VI. Conclusion
In summary, what is the political significance of our analysis? First, the rise of far-right forces is not merely an exercise within the framework of the current system of governance. The spread of neo-fascism, neo-fascist political movements, and neo-fascist leaders—their increasing political momentum—has normalized attacks on liberal capitalist democratic politics as a justification for using authoritarian methods to maintain, expand, and enhance capitalist power. This means that far-right and neo-fascist movements pose an existential threat to humanity, a threat of which left-wing activists and social movements should be aware. Second, considering the dominant power of corporations in the liberal capitalist state, and those powerful corporate sectors that weaponize far-right and neo-fascist alliances and are willing to assist them, the left must confront neo-fascist political movements because they represent a potential extension of capitalist political rule through authoritarian means. This means the left must systematically determine whether the goals of the far-right and the neo-fascist right align with the most powerful capitalist interest groups and organizations. To combat these far-right and neo-fascist movements, the left must build mass civil society organizations, demand the expansion of the state’s political democracy and public accountability, and transform corporate welfare into social welfare. If we want to defeat neo-fascist movements supported by major capital sectors and capitalist think tanks, and backed by a middle class enjoying relative privilege, the only way is to mobilize more of the working class to fight for higher social wages and democratic representation within the system. Failing to take these measures will only leave the field of political and economic competition in the hands of corporate economic and political elites, who have too much at stake to change the system, including fighting neo-fascism under the capitalist system.