He Tao: Is Populism a Thin-Centered Ideology?
Populism is undoubtedly one of the research topics that has garnered the highest degree of attention in the social sciences in recent years. Scholars have engaged in exceptionally heated debates surrounding key issues such as the concept of populism, the causes of its rise, its impacts, and the necessary response strategies. Among these, the conceptual definition of populism remains a subject of intense controversy [1]. Political scientist Cass Mudde proposed that populism should be defined as a so-called "thin-centered ideology," or "thin ideology" for short. By using the concept of thin ideology, Mudde on the one hand clarified that the essence of populism is ideological—that is, a unique set of ideas and notions—and on the other hand highlighted the ambiguity of populism's content. He argued that, compared to mainstream ideologies such as socialism and liberalism, populism does not possess the same level of intellectual sophistication and consistency, and its ideological core is relatively limited. While populism can encapsulate major social rifts and offer general suggestions on the best way for politics to function, it rarely provides specific views on political institutions or socio-economic issues; therefore, it can at best be considered a thin ideology.
This perspective, which defines populism as a thin ideology, is known as the "Mudde Thesis." This thesis has been highly recognized by many researchers, particularly those in comparative politics, and has even been upheld by some as an unquestionable definition. In Chinese academic circles, the Mudde Thesis has also received widespread attention and discussion, with over 50 articles citing this concept in the past three years alone. However, since its inception, the Mudde Thesis has also faced criticism, with some scholars recently labeling it a "dangerous myth." Compared to international academia, domestic [Chinese] academia has paid less attention to the potential flaws of the Mudde Thesis. Building on an affirmation of the value of the Mudde Thesis, this article attempts to conduct an in-depth review of its historical background and ideological roots, and subsequently offers a critical reflection on its potential defects from both methodological and core-element perspectives.
I. Freeden and the Origins of the Concept of Thin Ideology
The concept of thin ideology was not created by Mudde; the first person to propose and use this concept was the contemporary British expert on ideological studies, Michael Freeden. In his monograph published in 1996, he defined ideology as "a unique configuration of political concepts, creating particular conceptual patterns from an indeterminate and infinite pool of combinations." Since he believed that all ideologies are clusters of concepts assembled in specific patterns, Freeden maintained that the best method for studying ideology is the "morphological approach." This method focuses on investigating the internal structure of the conceptual clusters within an ideology, which comprises three layers from the inside out: key concepts, adjacent concepts, and peripheral concepts. Key concepts constitute the minimum content of an ideology, without which the ideology could not exist; adjacent concepts flesh out the connotation of an ideology, eliminating potential misunderstandings of the key concepts and extending them in a more definite direction; peripheral concepts are more variable and fluid, allowing the ideology to relate to a broader range of objects, particularly linking it to specific policy proposals. It should be noted that these three layers are not static but are influenced by changes in the objective environment and people's political practices, undergoing a continuous two-way movement from core to periphery and vice-versa. This two-way movement both increases the inclusivity of the ideology and enhances its adaptability to various new issues.
Taking the mainstream ideology of modern Western countries—liberalism—as an example, one can consider its key concepts to be primarily liberty, individuality, rationality, and progress; its adjacent concepts include democracy, equality, and legitimacy; and its peripheral concepts include equal rights for women and opposition to censorship. Other ideologies such as conservatism have similar structures, and they all attempt to provide a comprehensive diagnosis of all major political problems facing human society, thereby proposing corresponding blueprints and programs for political action. Therefore, Freeden argued they could be called "macro-ideologies" or "thick ideologies"—that is, a kind of "all-encompassing thought network that intentionally or unintentionally proposes solutions for all important political issues faced by a society."
However, in addition to these common thick ideologies, Freeden also keenly observed that since the 1970s, new trends of thought like feminism and greenism had emerged in Western society. From the perspective of the morphology of ideology, compared to thick ideologies like liberalism and conservatism, the key concepts of these emerging trends are relatively limited, and the number of adjacent and peripheral concepts attached to them is small. Their relationship with the key concepts is also relatively loose, with little evidence of the two-way interactive relationship between the core and the periphery. At times, these trends even seem to "insulate themselves from a broader conceptual context by the deliberate deletion or replacement of many of the concepts we expect an ideology to contain." Functionally, they are usually unable or unwilling to propose comprehensive solutions to socio-political problems in the way thick ideologies do; their ambition and scope are relatively limited.
Therefore, Freeden suggested naming them "thin ideologies" for the time being. Regarding the specific scope of thin ideologies, in addition to feminism and greenism, Freeden later added nationalism. He further deduced that in reality, these thin ideologies usually evolve in two directions: first, continuing to maintain relatively limited characteristics and advocating for a single issue, such as women's rights or environmental protection; second, merging with other "thicker" ideologies to break through their own limitations, thereby forming new ideological variants, such as liberal feminism or green socialism. In these cases, the thick ideologies to which they attach themselves are also known as "host ideologies."
It should be noted here that Freeden himself did not link populism with thin ideology in his research. However, this concept provided inspiration to many researchers, and it was Mudde who, in his search for a "minimal definition" of populism, connected the two. The label of "thin ideology" is indeed conducive to highlighting the simple nature of populism's ideological core. In 2008, the journal Journal of Political Ideologies, edited by Freeden, published Ben Stanley’s seminal article "The Thin Ideology of Populism." This was likely the first academic paper in the English-speaking world to place "thin ideology" directly in the title, and it played a crucial role in the promotion of the Mudde Thesis. Many arguments in that article were later cited by Mudde. For instance, Stanley argued that populism not only lacks the capacity to provide broad and coherent solutions to key political problems but also that in reality there is no such thing as a "Populist International"; furthermore, there are no major populist theoretical texts or significant anniversaries. All this evidence suggests that populism is merely a loose combination of ideas. Although Freeden did not initially categorize populism as a thin ideology, he did not oppose other researchers linking the two for a long time. Moreover, while editing The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies, Freeden specifically invited Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser to co-author the chapter on "Populism." It was in this chapter that Mudde reiterated the definition of thin ideology and its advantages over other approaches.
II. The Intentions and Advantages of the Mudde Thesis
In fact, Mudde was not an expert on populism in his early years; his initial focus was on far-right political parties in Europe, and this problem-consciousness has run through his research on populism. From the late 20th century to the early 21st century, many far-right parties in Europe adjusted their programs and claims. For example, they no longer openly used racist discourse or directly denied the liberal democratic system; instead, they branded themselves as the true defenders of democracy and the interests and values of ordinary people, claiming to speak for the masses who were ignored and disregarded by the elites in power. Consequently, an increasing number of researchers and commentators began to use the label "populism" to refer to these parties. It was against this backdrop that Mudde turned his attention to populism research.
However, Mudde soon discovered that there was immense controversy and confusion regarding the definition of populism within academia itself. At that time, three different types of conceptual orientations toward populism were prevalent in Western academia: political discourse, political strategy, and political style. After an in-depth comparison, Mudde acknowledged that while these different orientations each had their advantages, they also possessed many shortcomings.
Specifically, Ernesto Laclau and the Essex School that formed under his influence understood populism as a particular kind of political discourse. Laclau argued that the core of populism is the construction of an opposition between "the people" and "the elite" through the "empty signifier" [2] of "the people"—which can be filled with any content—thereby gaining the support of the vast majority. The Laclauian definition has been widely praised in the field of political theory. However, in Mudde's view, Laclau's understanding of populism is too abstract; furthermore, Laclau later equated populism with politics itself—stating that "either populism is omnipresent, or nothing non-populist can be regarded as political"—which caused the concept to lose its significance in empirical research. Compared to the political discourse orientation, the approach of understanding populism as a political strategy is particularly popular in political communication and media studies, with Kurt Weyland as its representative figure. Weyland argued that populism is essentially a "method and means of winning and exercising power," based on the direct, unmediated, and non-institutionalized support provided by a large number of unorganized followers. This definition is very popular in Latin American political studies. However, in Mudde's view, this definition overstates the importance of political leadership and omits certain classic cases when categorizing populism. For example, it cannot cover populist movements like the American Tea Party, which have no obvious leader. Furthermore, the concept of political strategy tends to overlook the study of the psychology and motivations of the "demand side" of populism—the ordinary supporters. Benjamin Moffitt and others advocate that populism is a unique political style, primarily manifested by politicians speaking and acting in ways favored by the masses, frequently discussing issues like crises, collapse, and threats, and deliberately engaging in behavior that is ill-mannered. Clearly, this definition, which emphasizes the dimension of political performance, easily conflates populism with various types of demagoguery, making it possible for almost all political actors to be labeled as populist and failing to serve as a discerning analytical concept for comparative research.
Thus, based on his dissatisfaction with the three mainstream definitions of populism mentioned above, Mudde sought to construct a minimal definition through a new path. He hoped that this minimal definition would meet the requirements for an ideal concept in comparative politics as proposed by Giovanni Sartori: it should accurately capture the core of all major past and present manifestations of populism while precisely excluding other non-populist phenomena, thereby laying a basic consensus and a firm foundation for cross-national and cross-regional comparative research.
Mudde believes that while populism can manifest as a political movement, political discourse, or political strategy, its essence belongs to a distinct set of ideas; it is precisely this set of ideas that shapes certain groups' understanding of politics, thereby driving them to adopt specific political movements, promote certain political discourses, and formulate corresponding political strategies. The core of populist ideas is undoubtedly "the people," while "the elite" is defined as the antithesis of the people. In addition to the people and the elite, Mudde adds "the general will" (公意), and together these constitute the simplest and core three elements of populism. At the same time, because the systemic nature of populist ideas is weak and easily combined with other more complex ideologies, Mudde drew upon Freeden’s concept of "thin-centered ideology" and subsequently conceptualized populism as a thin ideology. That is to say, seeking a minimalist definition of populism was the original intention behind the Mudde Thesis.
In Mudde’s view, understanding populism as a thin ideology with the people, the elite, and the general will as its core elements possesses four obvious advantages compared to other definitional methods: distinguishability, categorizability, travelability, and versatility.
Distinguishability means that this definition sets clear boundaries and can be used to distinguish populism from non-populism. As long as a set of ideas interprets the primary divide in society as an antagonism between the people and the elite, and puts forward the general suggestion for the best way for politics to operate as "conforming to the general will of the people," it can be identified as populism, without needing to consider whether it also puts forward specific views on political systems or socio-economic issues. For example, in qualitative research, Mudde used this definition to examine several Belgian political parties frequently labeled as populist; the results showed that only "Flemish Interest" (Vlaams Belang) possessed all three elements simultaneously and could be categorized as a populist party.
Categorizability means that this definition lays the foundation for the classification of populism. Mudde believes that according to Sartori’s classic taxonomy, for a concept to be categorizable, it must meet two preconditions: first, the concept itself must have a clear definition; second, every sub-type should include all the characteristics of the concept itself. The definition of thin ideology fits this requirement perfectly because it clarifies the minimal core elements of populism. Researchers can classify sub-types based on its peripheral elements or the other ideologies it attaches to. For instance, based on differences in economic policy, populism can be divided into left-wing populism and right-wing populism; based on different definitions of the scope of "the people," populism can be further divided into inclusive populism and exclusive populism, etc.
Travelability means that this definition is applicable to cross-national and cross-regional multi-case comparative studies. Previous definitions of populism were mostly confined to specific cases, such as the People's Party in American history or Peronism in Latin America. In contrast, the definition of thin ideology can be used for research on populism on a global scale and across different historical periods. Among these, the book Populism in Europe and the Americas: Threat or Corrective for Democracy? co-edited by Mudde and Kaltwasser is a model of such research; the book contains large-scale comparative studies by ten scholars on eight different national cases in Eastern Europe, Western Europe, North America, and South America.
Versatility means that this definition can be used to study the supply side and demand side of populism simultaneously. The supply side mainly focuses on populist politicians; for example, some scholars have used this definition to study the speeches of certain leaders and party platform documents. The demand side mainly focuses on the political attitudes of ordinary citizens—that is, populist attitudes at the individual level. This definition can also be used to explore questions such as whether voters with populist attitudes necessarily support populist parties, and whether the countries that most successfully implement populist policies possess the largest number of populist voters.
In summary, Mudde defines populism as a thin ideology primarily to overcome relevant debates in academic circles and to provide a widely accepted minimalist definition. On this basis, he expects to advance comparative research on populism across regions and time periods, deepening people's understanding of populism.
III. Methodological Controversies surrounding the Mudde Thesis
Despite the affirmation and recognition scholars have shown for the Mudde Thesis, criticisms have also been incessant. This section mainly discusses the methodological controversies of the Mudde Thesis, focusing on whether Mudde’s pursuit of a minimalist definition of populism is appropriate and the problems that arise when defining populism as a thin ideology.
First, for a complex and multi-dimensional political phenomenon like populism, the minimalist definition method pursued by the Mudde Thesis may be inapplicable itself. Mudde believes he followed the minimalist definition method pioneered by Sartori—that is, expanding the extension of a concept by reducing its intension. However, although a minimalist definition is conducive to eliminating disagreements among researchers, researchers cannot artificially obscure the complexity of populism in reality for the sake of pursuing an idealized, so-called minimalism. Regarding populism as an ideology is only one of many viewpoints in the history of populism studies, rather than an academic consensus. As Carlos de la Torre, Oscar Mazzoleni, and others have criticized: why focus only on the ideological dimension of populism rather than its political strategy or mode of communication? Mudde has not provided a sufficient answer to this.
Sartori once cautioned researchers to be very cautious when constructing the defining attributes and accompanying attributes of a concept; an important point therein is to avoid bringing in too many personal preferences as much as possible. Yet, Mudde’s view of populism as an ideology is, to a large extent, constrained by his own early research on European far-right parties. While these European parties often have clear ideological platforms, many populists in other parts of the world do not. For example, some famous populists in Latin American history, such as Perón in Argentina and Chávez in Venezuela, adjusted their political positions and even proposed diametrically opposed policy propositions during their time in power; therefore, it is hard to believe they possessed a consistent ideology, even a thin one. What these populists value more is establishing a direct link with voters to win and maintain voter support; thus, the policies they launch depend on their own strategic considerations, sudden thoughts, or even a momentary whim. Therefore, Barrios Suvelza reminds us: "Examining populism from an ideological perspective is one thing, but defining populism as an ideology is another." That is to say, ideology is only one dimension of populism; we can study it, but we should not directly equate it with an ideology. If one wishes to make ideology a defining attribute of the concept of populism, one needs not only to prove that all populism contains an ideology but also to prove that this attribute is more important than other attributes of populism. However, not only has Mudde failed to prove the first point, but when he declares that populism is essentially a thin ideology—meaning the cognitive core is very thin—does he not effectively admit that the reason populism can continuously develop and exert influence in reality is perhaps because populist political discourse and political style play a more important role?
It is worth noting that in several important works on populism published recently in Western academia, such as The Oxford Handbook of Populism and The Routledge Handbook of Populism, most researchers believe that populism itself may precisely be a complex political phenomenon, and a single-theme definition method cannot describe all important dimensions of populism. Therefore, they insist on a methodological pluralism, emphasizing that political strategy and political discourse remain important dimensions for studying populism. In an influential article, Giuseppe Ballacci and Rob Goodman also argued that the study of populism should adopt a holistic approach that takes into account both content and substance; only in this way can the coherent logic of the populist political phenomenon, from ideas to action, be fully presented.
Secondly, the Mudde Thesis also seriously underestimates the flaws of the concept of thin ideology itself. From Mudde's relevant discussions, it appears he does not have a particularly clear understanding of Freeden’s theory of ideology and merely borrowed the label "thin ideology" at will. In fact, Freeden’s concept of thin ideology is highly controversial. From start to finish, Freeden never clearly defined the intension and extension of this concept. For him, "thin" and "thick" are very vague matters of degree. As for the claims that "the core concepts of a thin ideology are relatively limited and the policy content is relatively narrow," these statements also lack clear, quantifiable standards. As Paris Aslanidis has criticized, thin ideology is likely a pseudo-concept, because the vagueness of its standards inevitably leads to an over-expansion of its extension, "to the point where almost any political idea with a relatively simple core concept and an inability to propose a package of policy suggestions can be regarded as a thin ideology." Furthermore, regarding whether the same ideology is thin or thick, different researchers are likely to reach completely different views. For example, Mudde declares that populism belongs to thin ideology, one reason being that populism usually does not propose specific schemes on how to distribute scarce resources. However, political reality in recent years shows that both left-wing and right-wing populism in Western countries have developed their own distribution schemes: right-wing populism demands that priority be given to citizens belonging to a certain ethnic or cultural group during distribution, while left-wing populism demands limiting the income of economic elites and foreign workers who benefit more from globalization, distributing more resources to the domestic laboring class.
More troublesome is that Freeden himself has recently publicly opposed viewing populism as a thin ideology, which puts Mudde in a very awkward position. In Freeden's view, besides core concepts, a thin ideology should also include adjacent and peripheral concepts, even if their number might not be large. For example, thin ideologies like feminism and nationalism, "though their cores are relatively limited, are still well-explicated and are the product of long-term, deliberate political thinking." In contrast, populism seems to have only core concepts, and these core concepts also lack the potential for and interest in outward expansion. Therefore, populism not only has the problem of a thin center but is "emaciatedly thin" overall. At best, it is a mixture of ideas that is "amorphous, sporadic, fragmented, scattered, militant, and contemptuous of traditional ideological opponents." Thus, Freeden modestly but firmly stated: "While we are all engaged in the art of interpretation, not the issuing of academic orders, we should harbor considerable skepticism regarding the applicability of 'thin-centrism' to populism."
In some works published in recent years, Mudde has also begun to intentionally downplay terms like "thin ideology" and "ideology," sometimes even declaring: "Whether this set of ideas in populism constitutes a political discourse, ideology, or style... in many cases, this distinction is secondary to the question at hand." This adjustment by Mudde not only blurs the distinction between his own definition and the discourse-based research approach to populism but also proves once again that his use of the concept of ideology is highly arbitrary.
IV. Flaws in the Three Core Elements of the Mudde Thesis
In addition to defining populism as a thin ideology, the Mudde Thesis summarizes its main content as: populism believes that society is fundamentally divided into two internally homogeneous and antagonistic camps—the "pure people" and the "corrupt elite"—and that politics should reflect the public/general will of the people. Thus, the people, the elite, and the general will constitute the three core elements of the Mudde Thesis. This section will specifically analyze the flaws existing in each of these three core elements.
First, Mudde’s understanding of "the people" is overly general and fails to grasp the uniqueness of populism. The people are undoubtedly the most important core element of populism, as the other two elements—the elite (the antithesis of the people) and the general will (the people’s political claims)—acquire their respective meanings only based on the people. Mudde acknowledges that the object referred to as "the people" is quite blurred and is usually used by researchers across three overlapping dimensions: the sovereign, the common people, and the nation. However, to distinguish his work from Ernesto Laclau's research on political discourse, Mudde is unwilling to accept the concept of the "empty signifier." He repeatedly emphasizes that in his ideological approach, the people are not completely empty but are determined by the cultural context of each society. For example, "populists in the US will not describe the people as atheists, and populists in Western Europe will not define the people as Muslims. In other words, the populist perception of the people is usually related to the self-perception or self-loyalty of the target people."
However, the above examples are too broad, whereas populism in reality proposes much more diverse and granular definitions of the people: for instance, linking the people to specific classes, specific races, or specific lifestyles. To this, Mudde simply explains that populism is actually influenced by the "host ideology" to which it attaches itself, which forces him back into Laclau’s "empty signifier" that he previously rejected.
Mudde seems to realize that the scope of the people may be determined by a certain cultural context, but this line of thought fails to go deeper. On this point, the sociocultural research orientation of Pierre Ostiguy and others is more enlightening. Simply put, Ostiguy constructs a cultural "high-low" dimension that intersects with the common economic "left-right" axis. This so-called "low" dimension of culture is not about economic poverty but rather the tastes and aesthetics emphasized by French thinker Pierre Bourdieu as social markers. Every society has "high" or "low" cultures identified with different groups, which have no direct connection to politics. However, when someone begins to use low-dimensional culture as a marker of identity and gathers a sizable group expressing specific political demands, populist "people" and populist politics truly emerge. In other words, from a cultural perspective, the characteristic of the populist people lies in the "flaunting of the low." This explains why most populist politicians must act "down-to-earth" ([jièdìqì] [6]) in their dress, language, and behavior.
Second, Mudde overemphasizes the moral nature of the antagonistic relationship between the elite and the people, which narrows the understanding of populism. Another researcher, Kirk A. Hawkins, even elevates this antagonism to a theological level, viewing it as a Manichaean cosmology of light against darkness. However, the intense moral opposition between what Mudde and Hawkins call the "pure people" and the "corrupt elite" is neither unique to populism nor its core element; at most, it is merely one type of opposition between the people and the elite. For example, some researchers have pointed out that in Hugo Chávez's countless speeches, the word "pure" almost never appeared. According to another researcher, Giorgos Katsambekis, in the public discourse of Greece's most famous populist party, Syriza (the Coalition of the Radical Left), the party's views on the people and their enemies were based more on purely political reasons than on moral ones. Mudde’s overemphasis on the moral opposition between the people and the elite reveals that his understanding of populism is primarily based on Western European right-wing populism, making his definition difficult to apply to the left-wing populism of Latin America and Southern Europe.
More notably, some famous populist politicians like Donald Trump, Silvio Berlusconi, and Alberto Fujimori are not only part of the wealthy economic elite themselves, but have also been considered morally flawed due to improper remarks or behavior. Yet, this does not prevent them from being seen by many supporters as representatives of the people—even their only true representatives. That is to say, the masses do not fixate on the moral issues of these political figures; they seek an outsider to the system who shares their values. What populism opposes is not a morally corrupt elite, nor the elite in a general sense, but the political elite currently holding power. The primary reason for the people's resentment is the feeling that they have been harmed and neglected, rather than their own "purity." As Nadia Urbinati summarized: "Populist voters do not expect Berlusconi, Fujimori, or Trump to be as pure as saints, because they themselves are not pure. The immorality of the subject is not the problem; the problem lies in the exercise of power."
Third, Mudde’s understanding of the "general will" is biased. Although the general will follows the people and the elite in sequence, it determines the specific populist positions on political issues and is used to explain populist dissatisfaction with representative systems and their preference for direct democratic forms such as referendums. However, Mudde’s understanding of the general will does not align with the discourse of the concept's progenitor, Jean-Jacques Rousseau. For Rousseau, the general will possesses a strong idealistic character; it requires every citizen to vote from the perspective of the whole, always thinking of others rather than themselves. Therefore, Rousseau’s concept of the general will emphasizes a form of reflexivity: "the reflecting individual thus participates in the effort to identify commonalities amidst pluralistic differences." The British Brexiteers and major European populists have not demonstrated reflexivity in the Rousseaunian sense. On the contrary, they describe themselves as the "real" and "only" people. Furthermore, referendums are originally a form of modern democratic systems, and many countries frequently conduct referendums on various issues in reality; it is impossible to categorize them all as populism. In other words, criticism of the representative system does not mean that direct democracy is the only alternative.
It is worth noting that Hawkins, whose research orientation is close to Mudde's, has explicitly abandoned the concept of the general will in his definition of populism. Mudde has also adjusted his position in recent years, beginning to admit that the populist understanding of the general will is "vulgar" and does not match Rousseau’s original intent. However, Mudde fails to notice that his main problem is not the general will itself, but that his understanding of the relationship between populism and democracy is confined to the perspective of direct democracy. In contrast, Jan-Werner Müller, Urbinati, and others point out that populism does not pursue a so-called general will, but rather a phenomenology of substituting the part for the whole. To be a populist, one must claim that only a part of the people constitutes the "true" people, while all others are to be excluded. That is to say, the populist challenge to democracy does not stem mainly from a critique of indirect democracy by direct democracy, nor does it aim to completely exclude the representative role of the elite; rather, it seeks to establish a completely new representative relationship between a segment of the people and the elite—where the politician becomes the incarnation of the people.
In short, the discourse of the Mudde thesis regarding the people, the elite, and the general will contains obvious flaws and cannot comprehensively or accurately summarize the phenomenon of populism. This also seriously weakens the advantages of distinctiveness, categorizability, commensurability, and versatility that Mudde previously claimed. As mentioned earlier, Mudde himself and supporters of his thesis have recently argued in defense that researchers should not fixate too much on Michael Freeden’s discourse but should view the term "thin-centered ideology" in a general and broad sense—for example, by understanding it simply as a set of ideas. It seems this could compensate for the flaws of the Mudde thesis. However, such a defense is clearly untenable because, beyond the methodology, the core elements of the Mudde thesis are also riddled with problems. Therefore, while Mudde criticizes the deficiencies of other definitions, others can launch equally powerful counterattacks against him.
V. Conclusion
In summary, whether referring to Freeden’s own discourse on thin-centered ideology or the specific manifestations of populism in reality, it is not difficult to see that populism is not suitable to be defined as a thin-centered ideology. Mudde’s attempt to eliminate conceptual confusion by pursuing a minimal definition is itself worth affirming. However, the Mudde thesis has problems in both its methodology and its core elements, which may instead bring about greater disadvantages.
Populism is a complex political phenomenon that encompasses multiple dimensions, including ideology, political strategy, political discourse, and social movements. In specific research, one can focus on one of these dimensions, but one must also avoid the temptation of minimalism and the mistake of "taking the part for the whole" ([yǐpiāngàiquán] [7]). When researchers attempt to examine populism from an ideological perspective, they should first take seriously the complex lineage and rich connotations of ideological theory, rather than simply applying a trendy-looking label. Furthermore, efforts must be made to penetrate surface characteristics and excavate the unique insights populism offers into the understanding of politics itself. For example, the latent religious color or dimension of faith in populist thinking tends to view political activity as a thorough renewal and redemption of the real world rather than a purely rational process of interest redistribution. Populism advocates granting political leaders more discretionary power, weakening the role of legal procedures and checks and balances. The populist conception of political representation differs from mainstream representative democracy, expecting to establish a form of direct representation between leaders and voters, fundamentally questioning the necessity of accountability, deliberation, and debate, and so on. Only by exploring such issues as comprehensively as possible can we truly grasp the complex relationship between populism and modern democracy, thereby compensating for the lack of theoretical analytical depth in the Mudde thesis. In other words, it is not that the populist ideology itself is too "thin," but that the Mudde thesis only touches the "thin" outer layer of populism.
(Author Profile: He Tao, School of Political Science and Public Administration, China University of Political Science and Law) Network Editor: Tong Xin Source: Foreign Theoretical Trends (Guówài Lǐlùn Dòngtài), Issue 2, 2024