Zhang Jinling: The Gradual Failure of the Traditional "Contractual Order": Social Roots of the Rise of Right-Wing Populist Parties in Europe
Over the past decade, right-wing populist parties—which once bore extremely negative labels in public perception—have risen rapidly in Europe and achieved historic breakthroughs. Their political influence has grown significantly, not only profoundly reshaping the political ecosystem [1] of individual nations and the European Union (EU) alike, but also altering the socio-political landscapes of European countries and the process of European integration. The substantial rise of right-wing populist political forces is the result of a general rightward shift in European public opinion, rooted in deep and complex social causes. The interplay of various factors reflects the gradual failure of Europe’s traditional "contractual order," while also manifesting the attempts and efforts of right-wing populist parties to reshape the "social contract."
Right-Wing Populist Parties Profoundly Reshaping the European Political Ecosystem
Since 2015, a wave of right-wing populism has swept across Europe. Many populist parties have seen significant increases in public support and in the seats they hold within the European Parliament and their respective national legislatures. Some populist parties have even become governing parties or participated in government coalitions in their own countries, introducing considerable uncertainty into the direction of European politics.
Judging by the results of the 2024 European Parliament elections, traditional political forces—the center-right European People's Party (EPP) group and the center-left Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D)—retained their dominant positions with 188 and 136 seats, respectively. However, right-wing populist groups [2] rose with great momentum, securing a total of 187 seats—a substantial increase over the previous term. They now occupy three of the eight major parliamentary groups: the Patriots for Europe and the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) secured 84 and 78 seats, ranking third and fourth respectively, while the Europe of Sovereign Nations group obtained 25 seats, ranking eighth. Meanwhile, the centrist Renew Europe group fell from third to fifth place with 77 seats; the Greens/European Free Alliance and The Left followed in sixth and seventh with 53 and 46 seats. Among the right-wing populist groups, with the exception of the ECR, both the Patriots for Europe and the Europe of Sovereign Nations are newly established and are dominated by right-wing populist parties from three major Western European powers—Italy, France, and Germany—creating a dynamic of both cooperation and mutual restraint within the European Parliament.
The rise of right-wing populist groups in this European Parliament election has standardly impacted the political ecosystems of several EU member states, even reshaping the political landscapes of some. Specifically, right-wing populist parties in five countries—France, Italy, Hungary, Belgium, and Austria—emerged as the biggest winners.
In France, the National Rally (RN) alone garnered 31.37% of the vote, more than double that of President Macron’s governing coalition, winning 30 of France’s 81 European parliamentary seats, while the latter secured only 13. Given the political pressure exerted by the National Rally, Macron announced the dissolution of the National Assembly and called for new legislative elections on the very night the European election concluded. In Italy, the governing Brothers of Italy (FdI) won 28.76% of the vote, increasing its European parliamentary seats from 10 to 24 (out of Italy’s total of 76), an increase of nearly 1.5 times. In Austria, the Freedom Party (FPÖ) similarly defeated the governing coalition, winning 25.36% of the vote and 6 out of 20 seats, doubling its count from the previous parliament. In Hungary, although the vote share for Fidesz and its allies decreased compared to the last election, it remained firmly in first place with 44.82%, winning 11 of 21 seats. In Belgium, Vlaams Belang won the highest vote share at 14.5%, securing 3 seats.
In Germany and the Netherlands, although right-wing populist parties did not win the most seats, they still achieved breakthrough progress or occupied vital positions. Germany’s conservative CDU/CSU topped the polls with 30%, while the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) came in second with 15.9%, winning 15 of the 96 available seats—more than the Social Democratic Party (SPD) led by incumbent Chancellor Olaf Scholz. In the Netherlands, the Party for Freedom (PVV) ranked second with 16.97% of the vote, securing 6 seats. Furthermore, compared to the 2019 elections, right-wing populist parties in several countries achieved their first-ever representation; in Cyprus, Croatia, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, and Romania, right-wing populist forces won various numbers of seats in the European Parliament.
In fact, the rapid rise of right-wing populist political forces within EU countries over the past few years has already profoundly altered national political landscapes, allowing them to intervene in national economic and social institutional reforms through their political power. Currently, right-wing populist parties in over a dozen European countries have experience participating in government. Between 2000 and 2023, right-wing populist parties appeared in almost all EU member states and gained immense popularity.
Before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, several European countries had already elected right-wing populist governments. In 2015 and 2019, Poland’s Law and Justice (PiS) party won consecutive presidential and parliamentary elections; in 2017, the Austrian Freedom Party entered a governing coalition; and in 2018, Viktor Orbán, chairman of Hungary’s Fidesz, was re-elected as Prime Minister. Simultaneously, right-wing populist political forces achieved striking results in other European countries or at the EU level. The UK Independence Party (UKIP) became a major driving force behind "Brexit" in 2016, and right-wing populist parties in France, Germany, Portugal, and Spain achieved significant breakthroughs in various political elections, particularly by expanding their presence in national parliaments. It can be said that the rapid strengthening of right-wing populist parties within the EU and its member states had already become a widespread phenomenon before the pandemic.
Following the outbreak of COVID-19, the development and activities of right-wing populist parties were suppressed to some extent, but they staged a strong comeback after 2022 due to the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis. The most representative event was Georgia Meloni, leader of the Brothers of Italy, winning the parliamentary elections in September 2022 and becoming the first female Prime Minister in the country's history. The Meloni government has been described as Italy’s "most right-wing" since the end of World War II, marking the beginning of right-wing populist parties holding power in Western European nations. Furthermore, in the Dutch House of Representatives elections held in November 2023, the right-wing populist Party for Freedom won 37 of the 150 seats, becoming the largest party in the House and significantly increasing its influence.
In summary, right-wing populist parties have profoundly reshaped the European political ecosystem. The reasons for the sharp rightward shift in European public opinion and the rise of right-wing populist forces are diverse and complex, involving multiple factors across politics, economy, and society within nations, as well as at the European and international levels. These factors have undergone a process of continuous development and change, exerting different stimulative effects in both the long and short term.
Economic and Social Stagnation Fueling Nationalist Sentiment
Since 2008, the financial crisis, Eurozone debt crisis, and refugee crisis have erupted in succession. Coupled with the failure of neoliberal economic policies, European countries have long been mired in dilemmas such as economic downturns, severe unemployment, shrinking welfare, intensifying inequality, a widening gap between rich and poor, reduced public investment, slowing social mobility, and class stratification. This has become the fertile soil for the rapid growth of right-wing populist forces in Europe. More recently, the crises in health, livelihood, energy, and security resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ukraine crisis have provided a strong short-term stimulus for the rightward shift in public opinion. Against this backdrop, the European public generally perceives an increasing uncertainty regarding the future of their countries and their individual destinies, leading to a greater emphasis on "national preference" and a shift toward conservatism in value demands.
In May 2024, the French market and opinion research agency BVA Xsight conducted a survey across the 27 EU member states regarding the concerns and perceptions of EU citizens. The results showed that 57% of respondents believed the economic situation of the EU as a whole had worsened, and 63% felt their own country’s economic situation had deteriorated. Among the issues of public concern, the top three were health, war, and purchasing power, reaching 41%, 38%, and 24% respectively, followed closely by security, taxation, immigration, and terrorism at 20%, 18%, 17%, and 16%. Clearly, the issues focused on by right-wing populist parties—such as purchasing power, security, and immigration—have been widely accepted and categorized as important political and social agendas, becoming non-negligible considerations for the public in political elections. Simultaneously, the continuous acceleration of population aging has triggered conflicts between different groups and generations over issues such as finance, welfare, employment, and retirement. Consequently, even some moderate conservatives and voters who previously supported the left have been successfully attracted by right-wing populist parties.
From a longer-term perspective, the rise of right-wing populist parties reflects the "malaise" [3] felt by the European public regarding the modernity of European society. Economically, the entire skeleton of industrial capitalism has disappeared in all modern European economies, giving way to post-industrial capitalism. In this post-industrial capitalist society, the massive development of the service economy, the fragmentation of the labor market (with the lower classes engaged in low-skilled, precarious, and marginalized work), and the emergence of a "dual" society have left a large part of the populace with a strong sense of abandonment, along with various anxieties and feelings of nostalgia.
Faced with the current dilemmas of economic and social development, traditional political parties have failed to provide satisfactory governance solutions. The various reforms they have led have yielded little result, triggering continuous demonstrations and protests. In this situation, right-wing populist parties that emphasize nationalism and "national interests first" have found political opportunity; the alternative solutions they offer correspond to the expectations of the public. In reality, the economic and social dilemmas faced by European countries are, to an extent, the "backlash" [4] of neoliberalism. Under the drive of neoliberalism, technological progress and economic globalization have not benefited the European middle class; only a small group represented by emerging technology industries and the financial sector has become the true beneficiaries. The industrial workers and middle class, who once formed the backbone of the social structure, are increasingly weakened, which fundamentally shakes the social foundations of traditional political parties.
In this context, the transition to modernity—characterized by the decline of industrial capitalism—has brought various anxieties and nostalgia to the European public. Right-wing populist parties have seized the opportunity to transform these emotions into slogans for political elections and actions after winning. The conservative posture of right-wing populist parties often manifests as a condemnation of current "decline" and a nostalgia for a past "Golden Age," attracting voters from different perspectives. To the working class, right-wing populist parties usually advocate for the construction of a protective state, emphasizing that welfare state mechanisms should be reserved exclusively for national citizens. To the independent petty bourgeoisie (artisans, merchants, small business owners, and freelancers), they emphasize the functions of the state and government, asserting that the state is the bearer of "law and order," and present programs that cater to public sentiment. It could be said that the "alliance of shops and workshops" [5] is the winning formula for European right-wing populist forces in political elections.
Clearly, the rise of right-wing populist parties owes much to their own pragmatic reforms and "mainstreamization" [6] transformation, particularly through proposing economic and social reforms to improve their extremist image caused by an excessive focus on immigration and identity issues. In recent years, the political programs and policy propositions of right-wing populist parties have generally shown a tendency toward de-radicalization and pragmatism. They have adopted a "pro-people" posture on many economic and social issues, demonstrating not only a keen ability to capture various problems in economic and social development but also success in transforming these into political issues favorable to themselves. By proposing alternative policy measures to cater to the expectations of the grassroots, they have won their trust. In France, for example, many voters no longer view the National Rally as "extreme right," but as a normal force dedicated to defending French values. Consequently, the nationalist stance that serves as the core demand of the National Rally is increasingly recognized by the general public, creating the conditions for it to win voter support.
For a long time, as the continuous influx of immigrants and refugees has persisted, the ethnic and demographic structures of European nations have undergone a transformation. the scale of foreign-born minority populations continues to expand, while the population growth rate of native ethnic groups continues to decline. The sharp contrast between the two has sparked anxiety among a segment of the populace. Since the beginning of the second decade of the 21st century, the issue of illegal immigration and refugees, alongside incidents such as terrorist attacks involving foreign ethnic groups, has remained a constant presence. These have been accompanied by numerous problems including robbery, rape, abandonment, domestic violence, and public disorder, causing immense social trauma to European nations. This has triggered serious anxieties regarding national identity, national security, and social stability, leading to a surge in xenophobic sentiment among a deeply unsettled public. It is noteworthy that behind this phenomenon lie issues of discrimination, exclusion, and racism directed at ethnic minorities (both foreign migrants and native-born minorities), which deepen ethnic rifts. A survey conducted by Eurobarometer in 2023 showed that 60% of respondents believed discrimination based on ethnic origin was widespread in their country, with a further upward trend observed after 2019. Given the existence of these two phenomena, the tension between the growing minority populations and the native ethnic groups within European societies has fallen into a persistent vicious cycle.
In fact, the tension between native populations and ethnic minorities in European countries has had high social visibility since the 1980s; it was precisely against this backdrop that European right-wing populism began to achieve gradual political breakthroughs. Since the early 1990s, the native European population has experienced continuous negative growth, yet the economic and social development of various countries at that time required a large labor force, making the absorption of foreign immigrants a national policy for many. While foreign immigration alleviated the pressure of labor shortages caused by the decline in the native population to some extent, it also brought about problems for the native population such as reduced job opportunities, lowered welfare benefits, and a decline in living standards. This triggered dissatisfaction among native ethnic groups and led to rising xenophobic sentiments. A portion of the public gradually turned toward supporting xenophobic right-wing populist movements, thereby providing a political stage for right-wing populist parties. In particular, the massive influx of refugees and migrants in 2015 brought a severe shock to European society. This not only made the ethnic diversity within national demographic structures more complex but also further impacted the already declining living standards, job opportunities, and welfare benefits of native citizens. Resentment among the native populace toward foreign ethnic groups—and even native-born minorities—rose sharply, and right-wing conservative ideology became increasingly entrenched. Furthermore, the "close connection" between certain minority populations and internal security threats in European society has long served as "rationalizing" evidence for the xenophobic propositions of right-wing populism. How to properly resolve this issue is the key to reversing the xenophobic mindset of this segment of the public.
In a poll conducted by BVA Xsight in May 2024, 56% of respondents stated that Europe needs immigrants to fill labor shortages in certain sectors, but 53% also believed that immigration brings other problems; 71% of respondents felt their country had accepted too many immigrants and favored strengthening immigration controls; 85% believed it was necessary for the EU to take measures to control illegal immigration, and 20% did not want the EU to adopt a common immigration policy, so that countries could independently control their borders. According to Eurostat data, as of January 1, 2023, a total of 27.3 million non-European citizens resided within the 27 EU member states, accounting for 6% of the total population; among them, 1.265 million were residing illegally, an increase of 12.9% compared to 2022.
Clearly, with the intensification of migration waves, increased population mobility, and the diversification of social strata, European society is increasingly becoming an "open society." However, this "open society" itself contains structural contradictions—namely, an internal split caused by the divergence between the concepts of accepting "pluralism" and returning to "closure." A segment of the native populace feels unbalanced, anxious, and uneasy due to the ethnic diversity within the "open society," and prefers to return to the stable and relatively closed society of the past. These sentiments are exploited by right-wing populist parties, who serve as advocates for a "closed society" and maintain a long-standing position of "closed nationalism." Right-wing populist parties attract voters who wish to return to a "closed society" precisely by sensationalizing various social problems brought by refugees and immigrants and by promoting political propositions such as restricting illegal immigration and cutting immigrant welfare. In this way, they gradually consolidate their base of public opinion, aggregate internal momentum, and thereby win electoral victories. The political manipulation of refugee and immigrant issues and the identity politics propositions of right-wing populist parties have attracted a large number of voters, forcing traditional establishment parties to adopt hardline stances on these issues to cater to voters in order to win elections. Driven by right-wing populist parties, and in order to effectively respond to the challenges brought by ethnic and religious diversification, the internal and external policies of EU countries regarding immigration, borders, ethnicity, and religion have shifted markedly toward positions characterized by greater conservatism, nationalism, and realism.
The Deficit in Representative Democratic Governance Provides Space for the Rise of Right-Wing Populist Parties
Right-wing populism possesses a distinct anti-traditional elite and anti-establishment orientation. In recent years, the governance deficit caused by traditional parties in the practice of representative democracy has created opportunities for the rise of right-wing populist parties.
On the one hand, the practice of representative democracy has made the contradiction between ordinary people and traditional political elites increasingly acute, leaving political space for right-wing populism. The numerous problems caused by shifts in ethnic structures in EU countries have made the grassroots classes—who face existential hardships—and the middle class—who feel their status is threatened—profoundly realize that a vast chasm exists between the representatives of public opinion and the public opinion being represented. This is one of the inherent maladies of representative democracy. In the eyes of many citizens, the elected political elites do not seek the welfare of ordinary voters but rather serve the large corporations and big capital behind them; their greed for power and interest often results in professional corruption and the abuse of power for personal gain. This has caused the public to feel immense loathing for political elites, which in turn breeds dissatisfaction with the existing political system. Within this "democracy deficit," large numbers of people have lost trust in traditional political elites and their respective parties, turning instead toward right-wing populist parties.
In the practice of representative democracy, electoral politics has become an important means for European citizens to periodically engage in political self-rescue. Faced with various dilemmas, the European public hopes to use voting and elections to change the status quo and elect representatives and governing teams who can represent them and seek their welfare. In fact, it is precisely because traditional parties have consistently failed to provide answers to these dilemmas that many voters are desperate for change; they may not entirely agree with the policy propositions of right-wing populist parties, but they are willing to give them a chance, even as a trial-and-error experiment.
In recent years, an increasing number of supporters of traditional parties have expressed their dissatisfaction and disappointment by refusing to vote. Conversely, supporters of right-wing populist parties have maintained a high level of political participation. Although their total numbers are not very large, in a "one person, one vote" system, the low turnout of voters from other camps indirectly increases the vote share of right-wing populist parties, creating the conditions for them to win seats. Furthermore, right-wing populist parties are highly adept at using social media for political catalysis of public opinion, strengthening discourse dissemination and political mobilization to shape voter behavior and influence voting tendencies.
On the other hand, as an expression of the representative democracy mechanism at the supranational level, the EU's deprivation of and interference with the sovereignty of member states in its practice of representative democracy has also stimulated public support for right-wing populist forces. As European integration proceeds, the supranational nature of the EU has led to the intensification of contradictions between EU governing power and the sovereignty of individual member states. Marked by the 2016 "Brexit" of the United Kingdom, countries such as Poland and Hungary have successively had frictions with the EU. Citizens in these countries believe that EU policies do not align with their national or personal interests, and that EU governing power should not override national sovereignty. As the refugee crisis continues to ferment, this public disapproval of EU policies and governance has transmitted to almost all EU member states, further stimulating nationalist sentiments. In the practice of representative democracy, this is reflected in voters casting ballots for right-wing populist parties that advocate for "country first," hoping that by supporting them they can reclaim control over their own national destiny. In a poll conducted by BVA Xsight in May 2024, 19% of respondents felt they did not belong to the EU at all, and another 38% identified more with their national identity than with their status as EU citizens; among respondents who support right-wing populist parties, the proportion of these two cases was as high as 72%. Doubts about the role and function of the EU have caused a portion of the public to align with right-wing populist parties, undoubtedly boosting their momentum.
Regarding how to "discipline" the EU as a supranational entity, right-wing populist parties are often able to accurately echo the demands of a segment of the public. For instance, some of the propositions put forward by France's National Rally [7] (Rassemblement National) in the 2024 European Parliament elections are quite representative: reaffirming the primacy of the French Constitution; proposing a series of suggestions to "return power to the people"; calling for the transformation of the European Commission into a "General Secretariat" without "decision-making power or legislative initiative"; and advocating for a "Tricolor Strategy" regarding the construction of the EU without a complete break from its various systems. This strategy uses three colors—green, yellow, and red—to label positions on the reform of the EU's existing roles and policies: green indicates support, yellow indicates limited support, and red indicates prohibition. They have expressed a "red light" position on several fields, intending to reduce the EU's governing power relative to national sovereignty in areas including foreign policy, defense, migration management, and energy sovereignty, which they argue should be decided by the nation itself. They disagree with any reforms aimed at enhancing the powers of the European Commission, as well as bonds issued or taxes established by the Commission, and oppose the abolition of the member states' right of veto. Overall, the vision for EU construction proposed by the National Rally is to limit the EU's decision-making power, reduce the surrender of sovereignty by member states to the EU, decrease the erosion of national sovereignty by the EU, and transform it into an administrative body that executes the collective decisions of the member states. From a nationalist perspective, until European integration reaches a certain depth, the rebuttal and regulation of the EU will remain one of the important reasons for the political survival of right-wing populist forces.
Conclusion
Although right-wing populist parties cannot yet dominate the European Parliament, as an opposition force they can largely constrain the decision-making of the European Parliament, particularly on issues such as immigration and refugees, environmental protection, and the green transition. If right-wing populist parties oppose them, it will be very difficult for the European Parliament to pass relevant bills, and this influence will also transmit to the level of member states, especially in countries where right-wing populist parties are in power or relatively strong. However, as reflected in the European Parliament elections, the European right-wing populist camp is not a monolith; they exist in a state of both cooperation and mutual restraint. Right-wing populist parties must both oppose the establishment on common topics and restrain each other when their interests—especially the conflicting interests of their respective countries—are involved. This is determined by their nationalist positions. To what extent these divisions will drive changes in the European political situation warrants continuous attention. The rise of right-wing populism reflects the gradual failure of the existing "contractual order" in European society; many of its political propositions are precisely efforts and attempts to reshape this "social contract." As a mirror of the Western democratic system, right-wing populism will repeatedly reappear and impact the established order, becoming one of the driving forces for the reconstruction of social order.