Wu Yunxi: The 2024 European Parliament Elections and the Development Challenges for Left-wing Parties
The European Parliament elections are a hallmark event of the global "mega-election year" of 2024 and are regarded as a "weather vane" for European politics. In June 2024, the 10th European Parliament elections saw 720 seats contested. Voter turnout increased for the second consecutive time, reaching its highest level since 1999, reflecting a rise in public attention toward European issues and a shift in the perception of the European Union's role. Judging from the results of this election, while center-right parties stabilized and recovered and far-right parties continued to climb, the overall decline of left-wing parties slowed down, though they remained markedly fragmented and in a stage of deep adjustment.
The Electoral Performance of Left-Wing Parties Continues to Fragment
The European Parliament is the supervisory, consultative, and legislative body of the EU, with members directly elected by voters of the 27 member states for five-year terms. The number of seats for each member state is determined through negotiation based on population. In the 10th European Parliament, Germany, France, Italy, Spain, and Poland have 96, 81, 76, 61, and 53 seats respectively, while the less populous Cyprus, Luxembourg, and Malta have only 6 seats each. According to European Parliament regulations, elected members carry out daily work by organizing into transnational parliamentary groups based on party affiliation. The 2024 election results showed that after four consecutive elections of declining seat numbers and percentages, the European People's Party (EPP) group gained 9 seats, maintaining its position as the largest group with 188 seats and a 26.11% share. The centrist Renew Europe (RE) group saw a significant decrease, dropping 21 seats to leave only 77.
Social democratic parties, green parties, and radical left parties are the primary types of European left-wing parties. They have formed transnational party alliances such as the Party of European Socialists (PES), the European Green Party (EGP), and the Party of the European Left (EL), respectively. Correspondingly, they have formed parliamentary groups: the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D), the Greens/European Free Alliance (Greens/EFA), and the Left in the European Parliament – GUE/NGL (The Left). Regarding these groups, the center-left S&D lost 2 seats, obtaining 136 seats and an 18.89% share; since being relegated to the second-largest group in 1999, it has suffered five consecutive electoral declines in seat numbers and percentages. This election was the first since the United Kingdom formally completed "Brexit," leading to corresponding changes in seat distribution; the strong domestic rebound of the British Labour Party could not translate into European Parliament results. The Greens/EFA lost 17 seats, leaving only 53, interrupting their upward momentum and falling from the fourth-largest to the sixth-largest group. The Left group gained 9 seats for a total of 46 and a 6.39% share, remaining below its 2014 levels.
From a regional and national perspective, the overall performance of left-wing parties in Western and Central-Eastern Europe was sluggish. The vote shares for the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) fell to historic lows for European elections. The New Left (Poland), the Democratic Coalition (Hungary), the Bulgarian Socialist Party, the Social Democrats (Slovenia), and the Social Democratic Party "Harmony" (Latvia) all received less than 10% of the vote, while the Social Democratic Party (Czech Republic) failed to win any seats. Center-left parties in a few countries showed signs of recovery: the electoral alliance led by the Socialist Party (France) increased from 5 seats and a 6.19% share to 13 seats and 13.83%. Smer–SD (Slovakia), which had been expelled from the S&D group, grew from 3 seats and 17.52% to 5 seats and 24.76%. Support for green parties in Germany, France, Ireland, Belgium, and Austria receded, while newly established green parties in Croatia, Latvia, and Lithuania are in their infancy, each winning one seat. Die Linke (The Left) in Germany received only 2.7% of the vote, and the electoral alliance including La France Insoumise (LFI) also polled under 10%, while the Workers' Party of Belgium (PTB/PVDA) maintained its upward momentum, winning 10.7% and 2 seats.
Northern Europe is a region where left-wing parties hold traditional advantages (Norway and Iceland have not yet joined the EU). Except for the Social Democrats (Denmark) and the Green League (Finland), the electoral performance of most left-wing parties rebounded. The Left Party (Sweden) saw its vote share increase from 6.8% to 11.06%; the Socialist People's Party (Denmark) jumped to first place with 17.42%; and the Left Alliance (Finland) rose from 6.9% to 17.3%.
In Southern Europe, social democratic parties generally performed stably. Support for PASOK–KINAL (Greece) saw a recovery, but radical left parties that rose during the sovereign debt crisis, such as SYRIZA (Greece), and populist parties like the Five Star Movement (Italy) continued to decline. Left-wing forces in Spain underwent fragmentation and reorganization: the representative left-wing populist party Podemos received only 3.3% of the vote, while the left-wing alliance Sumar, participating in its first European election, received only 4.67%.
The European Parliament elections not only affect the selection of new EU leadership but are also seen as a test for national incumbents and a preview of the next general elections, triggering chain reactions in the domestic politics of member states. Some ruling parties suffered defeats while far-right parties gained ground, adding uncertainty to domestic political situations and the future direction of the EU. In the snap National Assembly elections called in France, the far-right National Rally (RN) showed a clear advantage in the first round, triggering a joint boycott by the left-wing alliance and centrists, who mobilized candidates to strategically withdraw from the second round. Ultimately, the newly formed left-wing alliance "New Popular Front" (NFP) won 182 of the 577 seats, while the ruling party alliance won 163. The RN and its allies obtained 143 seats, still a significant increase compared to the 89 seats in the 2022 National Assembly elections. The French election produced a "hung parliament" [1]; the move of the far-right toward the mainstream, intensified political fragmentation, and the lack of consensus among major political factions will increase the difficulty of forming a government and passing proposals, leaving Macron’s remaining presidential term facing constraints.
This European Parliament election basically conforms to the general characteristic of European politics shifting to the right and the realistic trends of party politics in various countries. Combined with domestic and regional elections in EU member states since the 2008 international financial crisis, left-wing parties have not only experienced cyclical phenomena such as political pendulum effects and organizational fragmentation and reorganization but have also been continuously affected by deep-seated issues in the European development process and structural changes in party politics.
The Political Ideals of Left-Wing Parties are Constrained by Reality
Entering the third decade of the 21st century, Europe’s multiple crises have not been fundamentally resolved, and a series of new situations and problems have emerged. First is sluggish economic growth. Since the 2008 international financial crisis, the EU economy has been persistently weak, with slow productivity growth and declining competitiveness, falling into negative growth multiple times. After the 2019 European Parliament elections, Europe suffered consecutive shocks from the COVID-19 pandemic and regional conflicts, falling into its most severe economic recession since the end of World War II. Although the European economy saw a phased rebound in 2021, the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis in 2022 brought pressure on energy supplies. Combined with the weak recovery of the world economy and soft external market demand, European exports showed a shrinking trend, and economic growth gradually slowed. In 2023, the GDP growth rate of EU countries was only 0.4%, with Germany, Austria, Sweden, and Finland entering recession again. Factors such as high inflation, high interest rates, pressure from economic transformation, and weak external demand pose severe challenges to stable economic growth in Europe.
Second is the risk of debt crises. According to the EU's "Stability and Growth Pact," member states' public debt must not exceed 60% of GDP, and the annual fiscal deficit must not exceed 3% of GDP. Impacted by the pandemic, energy crises, the loosening of fiscal discipline, and persistent economic stagnation, fiscal expenditures of EU member states have increased and their fiscal burdens have grown heavier. The fiscal deficit rate of the 27 EU countries increased from 0.4% in 2019 to 3.5% in 2023, even reaching 6.7% at its peak. The public debt ratio rose from 77.8% in 2019 to 90% in 2020, before falling back to 81.7% in 2023. The Eurozone's public debt ratio once reached 97.3%. Public debt ratios in Southern European countries like Italy, as well as in France, are generally higher than 100%, making issues of excessive new debt and high fiscal deficits particularly prominent.
Third is the issue of social livelihoods. Affected by the global economic recovery and supply chain bottlenecks, inflation in the EU gradually rose from 1.4% in 2019 to 2.9% in 2021, breaking the 2% target established by the European Central Bank and reaching a ten-year high. The outbreak of the Ukraine crisis led to rising energy costs in Europe, further driving up consumer prices. In 2022, the inflation rate in EU member states soared to 9.2%, the highest level in forty years. In 2023, the inflation rate fell to 6.4%, but remained significantly higher than pre-pandemic levels. The Spring 2024 "Eurobarometer" survey showed that 38% of respondents still regard "rising prices, inflation, and the cost of living" as the most important issue facing their country, 20 percentage points higher than the second-place "economic situation." The dismal economic situation, coupled with the surge in the cost of living and a decline in real income, has increased the burden on ordinary households and amplified social inequality. While EU countries introduced a series of relief policies, such as energy subsidies and food stipends, to cope with the pandemic and inflation, long-accumulated problems in public services and welfare systems remain prominent. The living conditions of the younger generation and vulnerable groups urgently need improvement.
Economic development, full employment, and social stability were once the important foundations for European left-wing parties to promote social reform, maintain social justice, and alleviate social contradictions after the end of World War II. Today, the normalization of economic crises, the privatization of public services, an aging population structure, and the process of European integration have profoundly changed the economic conditions, social foundations, and external environment for European states to implement government intervention and maintain welfare systems. To overcome the impact of the pandemic and promote economic recovery, the EU has launched a 750 billion euro economic stimulus package—the largest in its history—and passed a 1.07 trillion euro long-term budget for 2021–2027. Facing temporary and structural problems such as low economic growth, public finance risks, high inflation, and industrial transformation pressures, the space for implementing the political ideals and policy propositions of left-wing parties is limited. It is difficult for them to further propose large-scale expansionary fiscal policies to stimulate the economy and improve livelihoods. Compared to center-right parties that uphold liberalism or conservatism, left-wing parties face greater internal and external pressure to maintain a dynamic balance between economic development, public finance, and social welfare. The traditional approach of significantly raising taxes to increase fiscal revenue and secure expenditure often increases corporate costs and discourages investment, leading competitors to question the sustainability of public finances. Conversely, implementing fiscal austerity and cutting social welfare would betray their own ideals and lead to a loss of voters. European left-wing parties have eventually fallen into a dilemma.
The Voter Base of Left-Wing Parties Lacks Stability
Left-wing parties emphasize social progress and social justice and are important representatives of the lower and middle social strata. As the traditional parties of the European left-wing camp, social democratic parties—in the face of changes in industrial and social structures, transformations of development models and the welfare state, and shifts in political culture and mobilization—have seen their ideological and class-political colors fade, their political ideals and policies move toward the center, and their party images and leadership memberships become more elite. The voter base of social democratic parties after their transformation expanded from the working class to the general populace, and their core voters shifted from industrial workers of the industrial era to the middle class of the globalization era. However, they still find it difficult to escape the dilemma of identity positioning and lack effective means to solve the problem of declining votes. Beyond the differences between the working class and the middle class, social democratic parties must also deal with the problem of balancing the interests of different groups, such as "gig" workers, those in stable occupations, and the long-term unemployed. In a context of fragmented party landscapes and cutthroat political competition, social democratic parties often rely on the law of political alternation, divisions in the right-wing camp, and adjustments in electoral strategy to return to power. The Social Democratic Party of Germany, the Spanish Socialist Workers' Party, and the Social Democratic Party of Denmark all won general elections with historically low vote shares and needed to rely on center-right parties with clearly different political positions, or even regional parties with secessionist tendencies, to complete the formation of coalition governments. Once governing performance is poor or political scandals are exposed, these parties face immense pressure or even "electoral punishment." For example, in November 2023, Portuguese Prime Minister Costa resigned due to involvement in a corruption investigation; the Socialist Party lost the election and its nine-year governing status, and its exploration of a "Fourth Way" [2] to effectively balance economic development, public finance, and social justice had to come to a halt.
The Green Party is a product of post-industrial society and new social movements, and its influence has risen steadily since the beginning of the 21st century. In recent years, the frequent occurrence of extreme weather and its derivative effects have allowed more and more Europeans to perceive the harmfulness and urgency of climate change issues more intuitively. In the 2019 European Parliament elections, the Greens achieved a remarkable performance thanks to widespread concern over environmental issues, their image as a proactive reformist party, and strong support from young voters. However, the Greens' electoral advantages have also become constraints on their further development. As the EU vigorously promotes the "Green New Deal" and introduced the European Green Deal [3] to tackle climate change and promote green growth, center-left and center-right parties have also placed greater emphasis on incorporating green transitions into their policy platforms, resulting in a weakening of the Greens' issue-specific advantage. Urban residents and the middle class are the target voters for both the Greens and the Social Democrats; as the decline of the Social Democrats stabilizes, it means increasing support for the Greens has become more difficult. Furthermore, the geographical distribution and voter composition of the Greens are relatively concentrated, with strength and influence in Western and Northern Europe significantly higher than in Southern or Central and Eastern Europe. The young voters they rely on are characterized by unstable levels of political participation and loyalty. Moreover, the green transition implies a profound transformation of modes of production and lifestyles; the Greens' radical climate policies tend to impact the practical interests of certain industries and groups, triggering resistance. This European Parliament election coincided with an energy crisis and inflation, where issues such as poverty, healthcare, employment, and national defense received high attention. Significant disagreements exist among the public regarding the cost-sharing, timeline, and specific measures of the green transition, leading the Greens to lose support from some voters.
Radical left-wing parties—as political forces opposed to neoliberalism, fiscal austerity, and social inequality—adhere to traditional left-wing political philosophies and policy positions. They once made prominent progress in European Parliament elections as well as national elections in Western and Southern Europe. However, in limited practices of governing or participating in government, nascent parties represented by the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) in Greece were unable to propose scientific theories, systematic programs, or feasible paths as alternatives to the existing development model. They exposed shortcomings such as a lack of governance experience, excessive political compromise, and limited governing capacity. Their electoral performance fell back to varying degrees compared to the period of the sovereign debt crisis, with a significant portion of voters flowing toward Social Democratic or right-wing populist parties. Traditional radical left parties, primarily represented by former Communist Parties and their successors, have fallen into the trap of marginalized political positions and an aging voter base. Meanwhile, newly established radical left parties lack sufficient theoretical preparation and possess incomplete organizational systems; by relying too heavily on charismatic leadership or trending issues, they find it difficult to generate lasting and widespread political influence. Taking the Spanish party Podemos (Podemos) as an example: after experiencing shocks such as the withdrawal of its founder from politics and the rupture of a left-wing alliance, its electoral performance plummeted, and it currently holds only five seats in the national parliament and two in the European Parliament.
Furthermore, the intensification of geopolitical gaming, continuous regional conflicts, and the blurring of boundaries between domestic and foreign policy have exacerbated political and social polarization within EU countries. Under domestic and international pressure, some left-wing parties find it difficult to maintain traditional diplomatic stances and fulfill a peace-keeping role; they have actively or passively adjusted their policy positions and discourse to align with their national governments and official EU positions. Latvia's "Harmony" Social Democratic Party (Saskaņa), originally the political spokesperson for the ethnic Russian population in Latvia, lost a large number of members and supporters due to a shift in its diplomatic stance, leading to poor electoral performance. Compared to pro-Russian left-wing parties, pro-Russian radical right-wing parties have generally been more successful electorally. The latter not only avoided losing their base due to being "pro-Russian" but even succeeded in expanding their voter base after the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis by successfully utilizing nationalist discourse.
Against the backdrop of a fragile voter base for left-wing parties, the characteristic of competition outweighing cooperation among political forces within the left-wing camp remains prominent. Traditional issues of economic and social policy, along with new problems triggered by migration and refugees, climate change, the Ukraine crisis, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, have amplified the ideological differences between left-wing parties and weakened the foundation for left-wing alliances. Italy’s Five Star Movement (M5S) withdrew from a coalition government due to policy disagreements over the energy crisis and refused to cooperate electorally with the Democratic Party, resulting in a crushing defeat in the general election. Portugal saw its first instance of a Socialist Party government’s budget being rejected by the Unitary Democratic Coalition (CDU) and the Left Bloc (BE), leading to the dissolution of parliament and early elections. Denmark’s Social Democratic government faced a motion of no confidence from the Social Liberal Party (Radikale Venstre) within the center-left alliance over pandemic prevention policies, forcing an early election. In France, the Socialist Party and "France Unbowed" (LFI) experienced friction over the Israeli-Palestinian conflict during the period of the "New Ecologic and Social People's Union" (NUPES), and then fell into a struggle for left-wing leadership after the "New Popular Front" (NFP) won the parliamentary elections.
Left-wing parties face the continuous impact of populism
The voter bases of left-wing parties and populist parties overlap significantly; the practical problems of the former become the advantageous issues of the latter. The insufficient responsiveness and crisis of representation of left-wing parties have caused industrial areas and social groups hit by multiple crises of deindustrialization to turn toward supporting conservative and extremist forces. Meanwhile, the mainstreaming of populist parties impacts the political landscape and reshapes the political ecosystem, further weakening the issue-based advantages and voter bases of left-wing parties. If left-wing populist parties rose in Western and Southern Europe alongside the sovereign debt crisis, then right-wing populist parties possess more lasting and widespread influence due to the continuous fermentation of migration and refugee issues.
The deep development of economic globalization and European integration has promoted the international movement of people. Facing population aging and labor demand, the net number of immigrants in Europe shows an upward trend. Due to restrictions on movement during the pandemic prevention and control period, the number of immigrants to the EU once dropped to 3.268 million in 2020, but quickly rebounded to 6.977 million in 2022, significantly higher than the 2.89 million in 2013. The number of immigrants in Germany and Spain climbed from 692,000 and 280,000 in 2013 to 2.071 million and 1.258 million in 2022, respectively.
The deterioration of the geopolitical environment and surrounding instability have led to a refugee crisis in Europe of a scale unprecedented since the end of World War II. The number of asylum applications once exceeded 1 million in 2015, after which the number of refugees decreased somewhat. Following the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis, the EU activated the "Temporary Protection Directive" mechanism, lowing entry thresholds and simplifying application processes to allow Ukrainian refugees to move freely within EU member states and obtain rights to employment, housing, education, and healthcare. In 2023, the number of refugees in Europe once again surpassed 1 million. Against a backdrop of weak economic growth and high inflation, the rapidly growing foreign-born population has exacerbated a series of problems, including refugee resettlement, strain on public resources, competition for jobs, worsening public security, and cultural and religious differences. This continuously impacts Europe’s pluralist traditions, erodes the open and inclusive social atmosphere, and nurtures the social foundation for populism.
The de-radicalization strategies of right-wing populist parties, combined with the polarization of European society, have allowed them to continuously break through the "firewalls" [4] established by mainstream parties against populism, exerting growing influence in Northern, Western, and Southern Europe. The migration and refugee policies of the Social Democrats in Sweden and Denmark have trended toward conservatism, yet they could not stop the rise of the Sweden Democrats or the emergence of the Denmark Democrats. In particular, the Sweden Democrats have, for the first time, exerted actual influence over government formation and operation by signing governing agreements, providing parliamentary support, and stationing commissioners. During the Socialist Party's governance in Portugal, even as economic and social indicators improved, it could not prevent the "Enough" (Chega) party from making continuous electoral gains.
In the Central and Eastern European regions, because member states joined the European integration process relatively late, their national conditions vary, their demands differ, and they have benefited unequally. They hold different views on the EU’s ability to respond to crises, its methods of handling problems, and its mechanisms for distributing interests, and they place greater emphasis on national sovereignty, security, and identity. Parties with populist colors and nationalist tendencies possess a stable social support base and play important roles in the politics of countries like Poland and Hungary. "Under the impact of nationalism, populism, and right-wing extremism, anti-establishment parties have risen in Central and Eastern Europe, causing a severe impact on traditional parties, especially left-wing ones."
In the 2024 European Parliament elections, the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group, led by Italy's governing Brothers of Italy, won 78 seats, an increase of 9. The newly formed Patriots for Europe group now has 84 MEPs, ranking as the third-largest group, with participating parties including France's National Rally, Hungary's Fidesz, the Dutch Party for Freedom, Belgium's Vlaams Belang, and Portugal's Chega. While constrained by political culture and mainstream parties, right-wing populist parties will continue to seek greater influence through policy adjustments, issue reshaping, organizational building, online mobilization, and inter-party cooperation.
Conclusion
Countries across Europe have experienced several election cycles attempting to alternate governance between the left and right, yet traditional parties and their political elites have still not effectively solved structural problems or achieved sustainable growth. Their governing philosophies, capacities, and styles are under heavy scrutiny. The public’s desire for change and the emergence of a younger generation of voters have accelerated the rise of populist parties, breaking the balance between the left and right camps in European politics. The 2024 European Parliament elections once again confirmed the coexistence of polarization, fragmentation, and populism in party politics, presenting a structural transformation characterized by the contention among three political forces: the center-left and center-right in decline, and a mainstreamed far-right. Under the pressure of cyclical competitive elections and the impact of far-right parties, some Social Democratic parties have adopted pragmatic adjustments—moderately shifting back to left-wing traditions in the economic and social dimensions while trending toward right-wing conservatism in cultural and diplomatic dimensions. The Greens and radical left parties face the challenge of a diversifying transformation of political issues and voter bases as they strive to play a greater practical role. Their choice of specific policy adjustments and reform paths may lead to a further weakening of the traditional advantages of left-wing parties, a further deepening of the party crisis, and a long-term predicament for party development. In the future, left-wing parties urgently need to adapt to increasingly fierce political competition, explore new paths for party reform and national governance, achieve strong political leadership and effective organizational mobilization, and promote social inclusion, stability, and progress through the reshaping of the political agenda.