Li Chunmin: "The Disappearance of the Other" and the "Dialectics of Violence"—On the "Other" and Its Critical Dimension in Byung-Chul Han’s Perspective

"The Other" (das Andere) is a significant philosophical category whose problem space can be traced back to Ancient Greece. Conceptualized as a theoretical form, "the Other" has taken many paths of interpretation: from Hegel’s "Other" as a mediation of the self-movement of the Absolute Idea, to the "Other" as the "first object-in-itself" within Husserl’s genetic phenomenology; from Heidegger’s "Other" encountered "from the surrounding world" who shares the world with the "I," to the "otherness" of the text in Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics; and from Sartre’s "Other" as a precondition for the "self," to Levinas’s ethics of the "Other," Adorno’s "Other" under the subjection of "non-identity," and Lyotard’s "Other" leading toward antagonism and heterogeneity. These various approaches—ranging from dialectics, existentialism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics to critical theory and postmodernism—illustrate the multi-dimensional nature of the term. By contrast, Byung-Chul Han’s interpretation of "the Other" both draws upon traditional theoretical resources and endows "the Other" with new characteristics for the present age. In Han's view, "the Other" is not a product of refined theorization but a gateway to multi-dimensional contemporary predicaments. Through the category of "the Other," Han reinterprets the intellectual task of dialectics. I argue that Han’s exposition of "the disappearance of the Other" and the "dialectic of violence" opens an insightful critical path into digital capitalism. Within this framework, both "the Other" and "dialectics" are not only theoretically reconceptualized but are also introduced into a new critical practice. This provides a resource for re-examining digital capitalism not just in theory but in practice, presenting a new "critical power" with a socio-pathological dimension.

I. The "Other" as "Authentic Object" and the "Dialectic of Violence"

The critical dimension of "the Other" is first manifested in the relationship between "the Other" as an "authentic object" and the "dialectic of violence." In Han’s perspective, "the Other" initially possesses the dimension of an object (Objekt). He distinguishes between "authentic objectification" and "inauthentic objectification." In "authentic objectification," the object stands in opposition to the subject; the object refers to a negation and is a heterogeneous entity with an anti-subjective dimension. This means that "the Other" as an "authentic object" exists as an "oppositional thing" (Gegenstand) possessing a "total alterity" that cannot be subsumed by the subject. Here, the "authentic object" is a "pre-object" in the phenomenological sense, a "relative 'present thing'" (das Anwesende). What is meant by "relative"? Han argues that an "authentic object" can only be given in a "relative" sense; it is not a "thing in presence" presented within the subject’s representation, wherein the "alterity" of the object would be suppressed. The object is not an object-in-itself but a "consciousness-only" object, "invaded" by the subject and constructed by it. Conversely, "relativity" opens up an authentic subject-object relationship. In this relationship, what the subject encounters is a "wholly Other" that possesses the attribute of a "riddle." As the "negation" of the subject, it remains in a state of antagonistic tension with the subject, carrying the various "alterities" of the object as object. Here, "alterity" represents a negativity that cannot be dissolved by the subject—this is the internal defining characteristic of the object as such.

First, the contemporary fate of the "authentic object" is prominently reflected in its disappearance and the loss of its inherent negative dimension. Specifically, under the conditions of contemporary capitalism, the experience of the object is an alienated one. In this alienated experience, the "object" as "wholly Other" essentially degenerates into an "object of consumption," namely a commodity. It does not exist as something that resists or limits the subject, but as something dominated by capital—a tamed thing that satisfies the subject’s desires in every form, at all times, and in all places. "As an object of consumption, the commodity completely lacks the negativity of obicere [N1]. It does not accuse me, indict me, or stand against me. On the contrary, it nestles up to please me and entices me to like it." "The absence of opposition and relativity is precisely the cognitive characteristic of today's society." Therefore, although commodities in the age of capital possess the form of an object, they essentially present an anti-object dimension. In this sense, commodities cannot serve as "authentic objects" in Han’s view. A profound paradox arising from the disappearance of the "authentic object" is that the loss of "total alterity" in the "object" implies not only a crisis of the object but also a crisis of the subject. Without "opposition" and "relativity," the subject loses the path to truly reaching the self and is eroded by the infinite expansion of the ego—this is the most significant socio-historical effect of the disappearance of the "authentic object."

Second, digital technology has accelerated the disappearance of the "authentic object." Digital technology has established a new subject-object order. As a combination of consumerism and digital technology, the rise of the "digital object" has initiated a process of the "de-substantialization" of objects, constantly eliminating the "riddle" attribute of the "authentic object." The rise of digital space heralds the disappearance of geographical distance. When all things in the world come rushing toward me and are laid bare before my eyes, it means humanity no longer has any space that can serve as a final buffer of security. Digital technology has, in fact, constructed what Bentham called a "Panopticon"—a "transparent society" with no blind spots—and we are all objects within this "prison," scrutinized from all angles. "There is no so-called 'outside the prison'; the entire earth is a prison. There are no walls separating the inside from the outside. Google and social networks, which present themselves as spaces of freedom, are in fact panoptic." In this process, the world is being penetrated and reconstructed by digital technology in a holistic and three-dimensional way; the space for the "authentic object" is being continuously evicted. Furthermore, in various digital imaging technologies, the object can be cropped at will according to the subject's needs. In this process, the object continuously loses its own qualitative determinations, including its own temporality. "Universal de-temporalization leads to the following: many meaning-constituting stages in time—ending, beginning, and turning point—disappear." The universal "acceleration" driven by digital technology also leads to the deconstruction of real objects. Before us, all things pass by rapidly without leaving any meaning. In the continuous process of "de-thingification" and "de-temporalization," on the one hand, all "things" acquire a virtual identity and lose their weight as resisting objects, making the world appear unprecedentedly "de-objectified." On the other hand, the object itself cannot aggregate into a holistic, organic picture due to the dissipation of time. Both of these aspects cause the object to degenerate into an alienated "smooth object," losing its negativity as an "authentic object."

Finally, the disappearance of the "authentic object" leads to deep "self-alienation." "Self-alienation" is a new form of alienation spawned by neoliberalism, distinct from traditional alienation. In this form, the subject treats "itself" as an "object" to be reshaped, pointing the spearhead of resistance toward the "self." "The hallmark of today's pathological era is not suppression, but depression. Destructive pressure does not come from others, but from within." The concealment of this new form of alienation lies in the fact that it is not an external, explicit alienation, "but is donned in the cloak of freedom, self-realization, and self-improvement." It accomplishes the suppression and destruction of the "self" through seemingly non-alienated means. Here, the "authentic object" is absent. "People willingly offer themselves up for exploitation, while hallucinating that they are achieving self-realization. What maximizes productivity and efficiency is not the suppression of freedom, but the full exploitation of it." The repressive power of this new alienation does not come from outside the subject but from the subject itself; it concerns not external deprivation but self-deprivation. "In the neoliberal regime, exploitation no longer occurs through alienation and de-realization; it becomes freedom and self-realization (Sich-Verwirklichung)." Here, the "self" plays a dual role: it is both the subject of exploitation and the object of exploitation. As an "object of exploitation," the "self" is a "functional object" awaiting transformation. Han emphasizes that compared to traditional alienation, this form is more intense and more concealed. When the formal freedom and equality of digital capitalism dissolve the coerciveness of external oppression, the question of how to resist becomes a problem. When external resistance becomes aimless, it turns into an internal self-attack. This is the deep mechanism of self-alienation under the conditions of digital capitalism.

II. The "Other" as the Antonym of the "Same" and the "Dialectic of Violence"

The second critical dimension of "the Other" is reflected in the relationship between "the Other" as the antonym of "the Same" (der Gleiche) and the "dialectic of violence." Han distinguishes between "the Same" and "the Identical." "The Identical" always exists in opposition to "the Other," whereas "the Same lacks the dialectical opposite that would limit and shape it." Han points out that in authentic dialectics, "aggregation" and "differentiation" are internally unified. If "the Identical" signifies "aggregation," then the role of "the Other" lies in "differentiation." The two are interdependent: without "the Other," "the Identical" degenerates into an abstract "identity." "The Other" is indispensable here precisely because it allows "the Identical" to be confirmed; likewise, without "the Identical," "the Other" leads to an external negativity. What Han calls "the Same" is essentially an absolute identity of de-differentiation caused by the absence of "the Other." It is precisely due to the lack of opposition in the dialectical sense that "the Same" cannot produce internal self-difference. "The negativity of the Other gives the Identical its contour and measure. Without this negativity, homogenization proliferates." The spread of "the Same" is a revolt against authentic dialectics, presenting a dimension of the "dialectic of violence." On this basis, Han critiques the proliferation of "the Same" and the disappearance of "the Other" caused by digital technology.

First, digitalization and the calculative rationality it represents inevitably breed the supremacy of "the Same." Under the rule of various digital technologies, "the negativity of the Other gives way to the positivity of the Same," and everything is quantified, thereby becoming exchangeable and comparable. From social production to daily life, and from social organizations to individuals, all are placed within a massive "digital concentration camp." In this, digital technology serves not only as a medium of communication but actually shapes the forms of communication, to the point where it is difficult for us to imagine or experience a pre-digital life. In this process, heterogeneity with multiple meanings is subjected to a universal calculability: "The digital makes everything countable and comparable. This allows 'the Same' to persist." "Comparability" turns different things into the same things. The proliferation of "the Same" it causes is a process of evicting the "wholly Other" and excluding various types of heterogeneity, whether that heterogeneity manifests as a specific "meaning," "cultural attribute," or "lifestyle." This inevitably brings about the decline of value rationality and the erosion of the space of meaning. Han emphasizes that, driven by digital technology, the spread of "the Same" has become a defining characteristic of our era, penetrating numerous fields from globalization to our bodily spaces, and bringing a series of political, economic, and cultural effects. The spread of "the Same" and its symptoms have become an important dimension for understanding the experience of our times.

Second...

The proliferation of the "Same" renders digital communication and the consensus built upon it fragile. Formally speaking, digital technology has expanded the boundaries of our interaction, but "it creates no relationships, merely connections." Digital space is saturated with imaginings of the "Other," yet it is difficult for us to encounter a genuine "Other" within it. Objects we perceive as the "Other" are essentially just different forms of the "Same"; what we are doing is essentially constant self-repetition, wherein our authentic experience does not expand. In the homogenized space constructed by digital technology, the negative dimension of the "Other" vanishes; amidst the carnival of the "Same," the bond between the liberation of the subject and the "Other" is severed. Digital technology not only constructs the power of the "Same" but also causes this power to expand continuously, spawning the violence of the "Same." In this sense, Han holds a pessimistic view of digital communication and its attendant consensus, because this consensus is essentially a consensus of the "Same." It is built on the basis of "likes," while "listening" is absent. "Listening" is not merely an act of perception; it leads to a creative new system of experience. Digital communication, however, is essentially anti-"listening." Digital space is a space that has lost all hearing, and the subjects within this space are essentially atomized "lonely individuals." Because people cannot engage in dialogue in a true sense, it is difficult to generate a real "listening community," which is the prerequisite for constructing an authentic public space. Digital technology constructs a field in which the "Other" cannot survive; "human 'difference' is increasingly swallowed by the greedy expansion of the capitalist 'artificial space.' A philosophical anthropology associated with socialism must pay high attention to the question of how to preserve human difference."

Lastly, the proliferation of the "Same" brings about an epistemological dilemma. This dilemma is prominently reflected in how the spread of the "Same" is dismantling our system of experience, because "experience" itself primarily means an encounter with the "Other." "Experience" presents an "evental" ^[2] quality with a negative dimension, and this "evental" quality is being continuously reconstructed by digital technology. In digital space, the "Wholly Other" is obscured; what we do is essentially just continuous self-circulation. As information and data invade all fields of social life in various forms, we increasingly become beings coerced by this information and data. Since "calculability" implies the repetition of the "Same," information based on "calculability" cannot produce genuine knowledge. In digital space, thinking is suppressed. Various forms of Big Data and digital models cause our cognitive abilities to degenerate; although massive amounts of information sweep over us, true insight remains difficult to obtain. If "authentic cognition" is linked to a new form of conscious activity, then this activity must lead to the "Wholly Other." We realistically encounter resistance from the "Other"; while we change the "Other," the "Other" also completes the shaping of us. It is precisely this process of bidirectional change that helps us look through the differentiated appearance of things to finally reach their essence. The proliferation of the "Same" makes this state of consciousness impossible. In this process, it becomes increasingly difficult for us to acquire "authentic experience," which is the most noteworthy epistemological effect brought by the spread of the "Same."

III. The "Other" as a Relational Object of the "Authentic Self" and the "Dialectics of Violence"

The third critical dimension of the "Other" is manifested in the "Other" as a relational object of the "authentic self" and the "dialectics of violence." In Han's view, the "authentic self" is not the Cartesian "self" that serves as the prerequisite for the "object" to be presented, nor is it Kant’s transcendental subject as the "legislator" of nature, nor Husserl's "transcendental ego" after phenomenological reduction. The "authentic self" is full of dialectical tension.

On one hand, the "authentic self" completes its self-validation within its relationship to the "Other." An "authentic self" is only possible when it is incorporated into a relationship with the "Other." here, the "Other" and the "authentic self" serve as mediations for one another. If the "authentic self" is interpreted as a "positivity," then the "Other" refers to a "negativity" that arises from within that "positivity." In other words, the negation represented by the "Other" is an immanent negation. Without the "Other" and the dimension of rebelling against the self that it presents, the "authentic self" loses its ground of existence. In this sense, Han’s "Other" is not an "Other" ruptured from the self, and "alterity" is not an "alterity" ruptured from "subjectivity," but rather a mediation to reach "subjectivity." When the "authentic self" relates to the "Other," it means the "authentic self" is not relating to an outside thing, but is relating purely to itself. Han repeatedly emphasizes that the "Other" as a relational object is the mediation through which we reach the "authentic self"; it is precisely by means of the "Other" that we can truly arrive at ourselves. If we explore how a stable "self" is possible, we find that such a "self" cannot be realized if it is confined to the horizon of the pure self; it is only possible by crossing the boundaries of the self and establishing a connection with the "Other." Han cites Hegel and Heidegger respectively to explain the dimensional meaning of the "Other" as a relational object of the "authentic self." In Hegel, "negation" is inherent in the essence of Spirit (Geist); the realization of "Spirit" is a process of continuously reaching essence through negation. "The life of Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itself in it. Spirit wins its truth only when, in utter dismemberment, it finds itself... Spirit is this power only by looking the negative in the face, and tarrying with it. This tarrying with the negative is the magical power that converts it into being." Here, the activity of "Spirit" preserves and confirms its internal determinacy within division; "Spirit" precisely must encounter and face the "negator." Once it becomes a "positor" (an entity of pure positivity), "Spirit" loses its essence. Similarly, in Heidegger, "anxiety" (Angst) only awakens when facing the negativity of the "Wholly Other." The "total alterity of beings"—that is, "Nothingness"—is the prerequisite for "anxiety." "That which anxiety is anxious about is being-in-the-world itself. In anxiety, the things at hand within the environment, and beings within the world in general, sink away. The 'world' can offer nothing more, nor can the Dasein-with ^[3] of others." And death points precisely to this "total alterity."

On the other hand, the "disappearance of the Other" is linked to a crisis of self-production. The "disappearance of the Other" implies an infinite circulation of the homogenized self, thereby constructing a violence of positivity. In Han's view, the problem of the "Other" is a major issue of our era. When the "alterity" inherent in the "authentic self" is hidden, the subject cannot find its own relational object, and life itself inevitably presents a dimension of the "dialectics of violence." Han pays particular attention to the dual effects of technological development on the "authentic self." In the natural field, the technological transformation of nature simultaneously implies the "disenchantment" of nature. In this process, "nature" no longer presents a mysterious "alterity"; that sensory nature, aesthetic nature, and nature as the "place of refuge" for the human spirit vanish, replaced by a nature dominated by technology and ruled by capital. Consequently, nature is alienated into an abstract "functional object." The same situation occurs in the social field. The global flow of capital and the instantaneous, convenient nature of information exchange formally dismantle traditional barriers to communication, imbuing digital space with enormous communicative potential. However, this is merely an "illusion" produced by digital technology. The transparency and hyper-communication of digital networks correspond to "the lowest level of socializing." In digital space, genuine communication is scarce: "people accumulate friends and followers, yet never encounter a single Other." Therefore, whether in the natural or social fields, the "Other" as a relational object of the "authentic self" is increasingly scarce, leading to a pervasive fear. This fear is a "longitudinal" fear—a fear that has broken away from the "Other" and "alterity," and has eliminated negativity. In this sense, reconstructing the "authentic self" not only implies the opening of new subjective experience but also means the rescue of the "Other," the mending of the rupture between "authentic self" and the "Other," and the reaffirmation of the essential internal connection between the two.

IV. The "Other" as "Authentic Eros" and the "Dialectics of Violence"

The fourth critical dimension of the "Other" is manifested in the "Other" as "authentic Eros" and the "dialectics of violence." Under the conditions of digital capitalism, "authentic Eros" is invaded by the power of capital and dominated by consumerism—that is, "authentic Eros" is debased, and the disappearance of "authentic Eros" corresponds to a "pathological self."

The decline of "authentic Eros" is first reflected in the alienation of visual and auditory experience. Han points out that under digital capitalism, "vision" has unprecedentedly become a dominant discourse. Various "visual economies" have risen, and people's visual experiences are shaped by various forms of consumerism. Visual experience has increasingly degenerated into "binge-watching" and "staring." If we say the visual experience corresponding to the "authentic self" is "the gaze" (注视), "the gaze" presents a new ontological experience associated with "negativity." The relationship between subject and object connected by "the gaze" is both a cognitive and a practical relationship. Thus, whether it is "binge-watching" or "staring," both are the cancellation of "the gaze"; both are essentially "anti-gaze" and present a "violence of positivity," ultimately leading to a poverty of the senses. The same situation applies to hearing. In the contemporary era, amidst the roar of various digital information, hearing has become a fading perception. Every moment, various sounds come from all directions, yet we seem unable to hear anything: "the noisy fatigue society is entirely without hearing." Digital space dissolves listening; it is essentially a resonance space constructed by "lonely individuals."

On the basis of exploring visual and auditory experience, Han further moves toward the alienation of the body caused by the disappearance of the "Other." Under the conditions of digital capitalism, the "body" no longer relates to a multi-dimensional ontological narrative but is reduced to a pure "thing" or "flesh." In the contemporary era, the differences of the "body" are degenerating into differences of "flesh." "Today, the body is in a crisis; it is not only decomposed into erotic body parts but also into digitized computer data." The "alterity" of the body is being lost; "the 'quantified self' turns the flesh into a monitoring screen," and the "body" increasingly becomes a space of the "Same." The "body" as a dimension of spatial utopia has disappeared; it increasingly becomes a "naked body," a "reified space" shaped by capital. Correspondingly, the language of the "body" becomes increasingly impoverished, and imaginings regarding the "body" become increasingly scarce. When the "body" increasingly presents itself as a "functional" existence, and the "socio-historical body" increasingly gives way to the "natural-physiological body" (in fact, this "giving way" is itself socio-historical), the "body" increasingly becomes an oppressive force. People are burdened by the "body"—not only by its appearance but also by its language and strategies. From the reified body narratives in contemporary film and television to various commercialized fitness activities, all signify that the sensory "body," which originally possessed multi-dimensional differences, is becoming a "scarce commodity."

Whether it is the alienation of vision, hearing, or the body, all point toward—

The fundamental dilemma of "authentic Eros" is the production of a "pathological self." If "authentic Eros" points toward the internal connection between "Eros" and the "self," then in the "pathological self," the longing for "Eros" is suppressed; this suppressed "self" is a "pathological self," a "depressive self." Specifically, the "self" no longer functions as an "agent" within it; it is unable to essentially externalize itself toward an object, as the "collusion" between capital and technology suppresses this activity of objectification. In this process, the "self" no longer encounters negativity. The result is the total victory of the "pure self," which becomes a homogenized space constructed by "absolute affirmation." This homogenization manifests prominently in the contemporary era as the constant spread of "narcissism" and the production of a massive representational system of "narcissism." Here, Han Byung-chul distinguishes between "need" and "longing": "need" is directed toward the "self" and is associated with the Eros of the "Same," while "longing" is directed toward the "Other"—"longing" is precisely the fundamental orientation of "authentic Eros." If the "pathological self" is linked to "smooth Eros," "smooth communication," "smooth pain," and "smooth needs," then the "authentic self" is linked to "authentic Eros," "authentic communication," "authentic pain," and "authentic longing." "Eros is closely connected to beauty and the appearance of truth. This distinguishes Eros from liking (Gefallen). Heidegger might say that an era dominated by liking and 'likes' is an era that has abandoned Eros and lost beauty." In this sense, the rescue of "authentic Eros" is an important path for emerging from the "pathological self."

V. The "Other" as "Rebellion" Against the Logic of Capital and the "Dialectics of Violence"

The fifth critical dimension of the "Other" is reflected in its role as a "rebellion" against the logic of capital and the "dialectics of violence." Within the logic of capital and its constructed "imperatives" of consumerism, "alterity" is reduced to a "consumable alterity (die Andersheit)." The "Other" as a rebellion against capital logic is concentrated in the revolt against neoliberalism and its constructed performance system.

First, neoliberalism and its dominant process of globalization contain a "violence of homogenization." Han Byung-chul points out that globalization is essentially a process of the infinite spread of homogenization, a process in which the "Other" and "alterity" continuously vanish. Specifically, globalization turns the world into a homogenized space of commodities, a global-scale "department store"; "globalized communication only allows for the existence of the Same Other or other 同者 (tóngzhě; the Same)." Every individual becomes "the They" (das Man); "authentic existence" is forgotten and assimilated within the dictatorship of "the They." Neoliberalism and its dominant globalization process create a formal diversity, but this diversity does not point toward "authentic existence." Within this formal diversity, "alterity" is validated through the "universal exchange" of globalization; all particularities that do not submit to this "universal exchange" are purged or marginalized. "The violence of globalization is the violence of homogenization, which destroys the negativity of the Other, uniqueness, and the incomparable." In this sense, Han points out that the generation of terrorism, beyond religious factors, is also a resistance of "particularity" against the violence of homogenization—that is, a systemic resistance that has always been internal to the globalization process. Han emphasizes that globalization essentially presents an encounter between the "Same" and the "Same," rather than an encounter between the "Identical" and the "Other." This stems from the fact that the encounter between the "Identical" and the "Other" is accompanied by a dilemma of universal comparability, which runs counter to the essential requirements of neoliberalism and its performance system. Amidst the consumerist feast promised by neoliberalism, people remain oblivious to the systematic violence of globalization. Reconstructing the "Other" means re-examining "difference" within the neoliberal horizon, and identifying and resisting the violence of homogeneity.

Second, neoliberalism and its performance system dissolve time as the "Other." Han points out that neoliberalism and its performance system correspond to a specific set of temporal strategies: on one hand, in the spheres of social production and personal life, "acceleration" has become the most prominent experience of time; both capital production and capital circulation rely on this "acceleration" to an unprecedented degree. On the other hand, time, which possesses multiple dimensions of meaning, is rendered one-dimensional. Neoliberalism has reconstructed the "legitimacy" of time, making all time directly embody the production logic of capital and submit to the growth of performance, while marginalizing "heterogeneous time" that does not submit to this temporal goal—such as leisure time, festival time, and ceremonial time. In this process, an "alterity" that naturally grows within the structure of time is suppressed. The individual’s life-time is engulfed by the performance-time of neoliberalism; time becomes a means of exploiting people. Human beings are deeply reified and treated like machine systems; "production" becomes the dominant form of human "life-time." On this basis, Han further points out that digital technology continuously strengthens the temporal strategies of neoliberalism. Digital technology has initiated a "time revolution" that not only focuses our attention on the "now" but also breaks traditional temporal structures, producing a "spatial co-presence." "Digital indifference eliminates all manifestations of proximity and distance. Everything is equally near or equally far." In the pre-digital era, people used clocks to distinguish between work time and rest time; digital technology, however, has constructed a "mobile labor camp," breaking temporal and geographical restrictions and creating the technical conditions for working anytime and anywhere. In this process, every moment of an individual’s life submits to the logic of capital, and the value of life is transformed into the value of a commodity. For the "authentic self," time of this sort is a time of continuous alienation from the "authentic self"—an external, alien time. Reconstructing the "Other" means reconstructing authentic, endogenous time and initiating a new temporal strategy.

Third, neoliberal marketing strategies regarding the "authentic self" accelerate the disappearance of the "Other." Han points out that the "authentic self" wears the mantle of freedom and liberation varnished by neoliberalism, but it is essentially a production strategy of neoliberalism. "Neoliberalism is a 'please me' capitalism. It is fundamentally different from the 19th-century capitalism that operated through disciplinary coercion and prohibitions." The neoliberal "authentic self" is essentially false; "authenticity" here differs from the "authenticity" (Eigentlichkeit) in the Heideggerian sense. The "authentic self" is an "authenticity" saturated with commodities and consumption relations; the experience of the true "Other" is obscured under the rule of capital. Correspondingly, the "true Other" corresponding to the "authentic self" is not a negation of the "authentic self," but a homogenized product of it. In this sense, the "authentic self" is anti-"Other." Han distinguishes between "difference" and "heterogeneity"; the "authentic self" concerns "difference" rather than "heterogeneity." "Difference" within the neoliberal horizon is a diversity subsumed under the framework of capital—it is essentially a diversity of commodities and consumption—whereas "heterogeneity" is anti-comparative and cannot be subsumed by the identity logic of neoliberalism. The contemporary myth of the "authentic self" is exceptionally robust; it promises an imagination regarding the "Other," within which individuals willingly complete various acts of self-display. It is also during this process that individuals continuously accept the discipline of capital. The pathological consequence of excessive self-focus is the generation of a narcissistic subject; immersed in boundless self-indulgence, the individual can no longer identify the "Other," thereby falling into a deeper predicament of reification.

VI. Theoretical Insights and Limitations of Han Byung-chul's "Disappearance of the Other"

In summary, Han Byung-chul's exploration of the "disappearance of the Other," like other Western social critical theories since the 20th century, presents a dimension of social pathology. In his specific path of thought, Han has constructed a unique conceptual system, including the "performance society," the "Same," the "authentic self," and the "dialectics of violence." Through these categories, Han sketches a contemporary picture of the "disappearance of the Other" under the conditions of digital capitalism, in which this disappearance leads to multiple forms of alienation. Unlike traditional forms of alienation, this is a "plural" alienation, an alienation developing toward the depths. In this sense, the "disappearance of the Other" represents not only a politico-economic crisis but also a cultural crisis. In Han's discussion, this crisis is not mitigated under digital capitalism but rather develops in a more hidden and deceptive way toward the depths. Specifically, Han's explorations provide the following important theoretical insights:

First, they present a multi-dimensional critical significance of the category of the "Other" in the contemporary horizon. In Han’s discourse, the category of the "Other" acts like a "reservoir," integrating various intellectual resources from traditional philosophy of consciousness and German Idealism to existentialism and phenomenology. Through his interpretation of the "disappearance of the Other" and the "dialectics of violence," Han reaffirms the epistemological status of the "Other" category. The "Other" possesses not only an epistemological dimension but also an ontological one; as a plural "Other," it leads to the "object," the "self," and "Eros." It is also in this sense that the "disappearance of the Other" in Han’s vision leads not only to an epistemological crisis but also to an ontological one. On this point, Han’s exploration shares an essential commonality with Marx's method of thought. Although Marx did not explicitly use the concepts of the "Other" and "alterity," his category of "practice" already contains the dimension of the "Other." In Marx’s context, the "Other" is internal to the subject’s activity of objectification; the "Other" represents the field of the object, referring either to nature or to actual social relations. The "Other" has an action-oriented directionality and is realistically linked to the subject's self-validation. Therefore, in Marx’s vision, the "Other" is not only epistemological but also ontological.

Second, they rethink and reaffirm the intellectual tasks of dialectics in the contemporary field. Han interprets the "dialectics of violence" resulting from the "disappearance of the Other" from multiple directions. Here, the "dialectics of violence" represents a rebellion against authentic dialectics; this "rebellion" is concentrated in the cancellation of the negativity inherent in authentic dialectics, whether that negativity appears as the "authentic object," the "authentic self," or "authentic Eros." The "dialectics of violence" represents not only a crisis of dialectics but also relates to the multiple alienations of human beings under digital capitalism. Through the interpretation of the "dialectics of violence," dialectics acquires a vivid contemporary form; it acts as both an "observer" and a "diagnostician" of the era, traversing various fields of digital capitalism, including social production and daily life, from globalization and digital communication to bodily discipline. In this process, dialectics releases powerful socio-historical effects, not only actively reflecting reality but also actively criticizing it, and actively reconstructing "reality" in a "normative" sense. Thus, dialectics becomes not only an important path for criticizing neoliberalism and its performance system but also a breakthrough for our understanding of contemporary experience. For Han Byung-chul, the critique of the "dialectics of violence" is simultaneously a rethinking of the intellectual tasks of authentic dialectics and a reconstruction of the realistic path to emerge from contemporary multiple alienations. This is the most fundamental theoretical and practical aim of Han's critique of the "dialectics of violence," and it is also his most noteworthy and affirmative theoretical contribution regarding the "disappearance of the Other" and the "dialectics of violence."

Third, they deepen the critique of digital capitalism from an aesthetic and sensory dimension. Cutting into the critique of digital capitalism from the crisis of the senses is a basic characteristic of Han Byung-chul's critique of digital capitalism. In Han's vision...

The "Other" leads toward "authentic eros"; thus, the "disappearance of the Other" simultaneously signifies the devaluation of the sensuous. By "striking out on a new path," Byung-Chul Han presents the manifold crises under the conditions of digital capitalism. This path is centered on a critique of digital capitalism that is not a macroscopic, totalizing critique, but rather a microscopic critique with the sensuous as its core. Within this critique, the various sensuous dimensions of digital capitalism are unveiled, and the socio-historical critique as a grand narrative is organically integrated with the cultural critique that permeates daily life. What is digital capitalism? It is not a supersensible object; on the contrary, it is precisely that which we hear, see, touch, and resist. It is not that digital capitalism is outside of us, but rather that we are situated within it. With his characteristic keen observation of contemporary features and an essayistic style of writing, Han presents the evils of digital capitalism in an all-encompassing manner. This grants his critique of digital capitalism a certain theoretical "affinity" with 20th-century Western social critical theories, including the Frankfurt School. Using the perspective of the sensuous to enter the critique of capital is not Han's original invention, but he has clearly enriched the connotation of this critique and elevated its level, making it more dynamic.

Nevertheless, Han’s interpretation of the "disappearance of the Other" and the "dialectic of violence" also possesses theoretical limitations, manifested specifically in the following aspects:

First, the explanation regarding the root causes of the "disappearance of the Other" is somewhat weak. Han attributes this disappearance to the evils of digital capital, yet his presentation of the antagonism between digital capital and labor is clearly insufficient. In Han’s inquiry, the key category of "labor" appears only sporadically within his discussions of other categories; "labor" and its opposition to capital never attain a foundational status. This leaves his critique of digital capitalism feeling like "scratching an itch through one's boot" ^[9]. If one does not proceed to the new forms of labor under the conditions of digital capitalism and the new forms of its confrontation with capital—if one does not penetrate into the essential predicament of contemporary capitalism—it is difficult to truly clarify the root causes of the "disappearance of the Other." In this sense, although Marx’s critique of capital is an important intellectual resource for Han, Han’s critique never arrives at the historical depth of Marx’s critique of capital.

Second, there is insufficient attention paid to the positive effects of digital technology. In Han’s interpretation, digital technology appears in the contemporary era in a state of "collusion" with capital, becoming the actual carrier of various new alienations under the rule of capital, constituting the "original sin" of digital technology. As a technological pessimist, Han to some extent underestimates the capacity for self-correction and self-upgrading within contemporary digital technology, including the fact that digital technology itself is an important path toward the actual liberation of contemporary people. More importantly, an unprecedented era of digital technology has already fully unfolded. Rather than hesitating before the castle of technological pessimism, it is better to grasp the dual effects of digital technology, fully utilize its positive effects, and overcome the various negative effects it may bring. This constitutes a truly dialectical attitude toward digital capital.

Third, there is a lack of theoretical originality, and the overall interpretation tends toward fragmentation. Han’s exploration of the "disappearance of the Other" not only draws upon the philosophical resources of Hegel, Marx, Husserl, and Heidegger but also maintains explicit or implicit theoretical links with numerous Western critical discourses since the 20th century, including those of Simmel, Weber, Lukács, Horkheimer, Adorno, and Fromm. Although Han’s theory integrates these different resources, the theoretical originality displayed is insufficient, lacking truly original concepts or categories. This weakens the critical power of Han’s "disappearance of the Other" to a certain degree. His essayistic writing style has both established his reputation and become a bottleneck restricting the profound development of his theory. Due to the lack of deep structural analysis and a holistic grasp of internal operating mechanisms, his critique of digital capitalism formally devolves into a nostalgic longing for aesthetic modernity—though this was clearly not Han’s theoretical intention.