Liu Shaoming: Similarities and Differences: Merleau-Ponty and Marx's Theory of "Object"

Marxist philosophy expresses the object starting from human sensuous activity. Merleau-Ponty argues that “Marx needed to introduce the concept of the human object, which was later adopted and further developed by phenomenology,” and he consciously inherited the theory of treating things as objects of human activity. Therefore, the object theories of both Marx and Merleau-Ponty contain a type of transcendental reduction ^[1]. However, the two philosophers differ in their theories regarding the conditions and modes of the object's appearance; they disagree on the stance toward relations of production as the foundational connotation of the object. Comparing Marx’s and Merleau-Ponty's object theories links the intellectual-historical connection between Marx and phenomenology, demonstrates the complementarity of the two strands of thought, and highlights the advantages of Marxist philosophy.

Convergence in the Mode of the Object's Appearance

Marx maintains that the "object" is always the object of sensuous activity, or the object of labor. Merleau-Ponty argues that the object is the object of perceptual activity. Both treat human "activity" as the condition for the object's appearance, achieving a similar phenomenological transcendental reduction of things. Specifically, the convergence of their object theories manifests in four aspects.

First, sensuous activity is the primordial encounter between man and thing, and the basic condition for the appearance of the object. Marx argues that “how the object becomes his object depends on the nature of the object and the nature of the essential power ^[2] corresponding to it.” The relationship between man’s sensuous active capacity (essential power) and the object possesses immediate reality. This relationship is primordially unified; in activity, neither the essential power nor the object is theoretically separated. Merleau-Ponty believes that the condition for the object's appearance is perceptual activity as the primordial relationship between man and thing. Perception is a "system" of relations formed when the body encounters a thing; in this system, the object and the body are unified. Man has a capacity for sensuous appearance relative to things: the perceptual capacity of the body or the body schema. Since the body and the object exist in a primordial unified relationship, both the perceptual capacity and the object can only emerge within perceptual activity.

Second, the object is the correlate intended ^[3] by sensuous activity; it is a unity of immanence and transcendence. In Marx’s theory, the object generally serves as the "intended" object in sensuous activity: “the senses have therefore become theoreticians in their immediate practice.” Sensuous activity grasps the connotation of the object within the intention; thus, the object possesses "immanence" for sensuous activity. At the same time, the intended object possesses a transcendence "external" to man, but this can only be proven through sensuous passivity and the temporality of sensuous activity. Similarly, Merleau-Ponty argues that the thing, as a correlate of activity, indicates that it can only appear on the basis of perceptual activity. The correlate of perceptual activity is also an object intended in sensation, thus possessing immanence. Furthermore, the object of the activity's intention can also grasp transcendence through temporality: "the real lends itself to an infinite exploration; it is inexhaustible."

Third, tools, as a special kind of object, become part of the human capacity for activity. When man directs himself toward an object through sensuous activity, the tool also becomes a special object. Marx argues that tools are subject to man’s sensuous capacity and are an extension of it: the tool "is gripped by the fire of labor, assimilated as its own body, and infused with vitality to perform functions appropriate to its concept and mission in the labor process." Similar to Marx, Merleau-Ponty believes that the tool, as a special object, has already become part of the perceptual capacity when acting upon things. For example, when discussing the blind man's stick, he argues that "the cane is no longer an object perceived by the blind man, but an instrument with which he perceives. It is an appendix of the body, an extension of the bodily synthesis." Therefore, both believe that tools possess a duality of "capacity" and "object."

Fourth, the way the object appears to humans differs from other species; human manifestation of the object possesses more possibilities. Marx argues that the power of human sensuous activity differs from that of animals: “An animal forms things only according to the standard and the need of the species to which it belongs, while man knows how to produce in accordance with the standard of every species.” Human activity can transcend the limitations of a single mere standard; the appearance of the object in sensuous activity possesses comprehensiveness and more possibilities. Likewise, Merleau-Ponty argues that “what animal behavior lacks is precisely this possibility of various expressions of the same theme”; humans possess the possibility of multiple activities that switch perspectives and paths, so the appearance of the object in human activity possesses diversity.

Differences in the "Object"

Significant differences remain between Marx’s and Merleau-Ponty's object theories. On one hand, the connotation of sensuous activity differs, leading to a distinction between the produced object and the perceived object. On the other hand, the environments in which the object appears differ, producing a distinction between the "relations of production" connotation and the "general spatial" connotation of the object.

1. Produced Object vs. Perceived Object: Differences in the Mode of Appearance. Marx believes the objective world is produced through labor, whereas Merleau-Ponty believes human sensuous activity is first a primordial perceptual unity between man and thing, and the object appears within the intentionality of bodily activity. Specifically, the produced object and the perceived object differ in three areas: mode of existence, historicity, and the way they provide a foundation for natural science.

First, regarding the primordial mode of existence, the difference is between a "sculpted" object and a "manifested" object. Marx states, “In order to appropriate natural matter in a form useful to his own life, he sets in motion the natural forces of his body—his arms and legs, head and hands.” “The product of labor is labor which has been embodied and made material in an object, it is the objectification of labor.” In Marx's theory, the object exists by being sculpted in sensuous activity. In Merleau-Ponty’s theory, the object-thing exists within the active intentionality of the body. For example, in a room, “my body directs toward it a multitude of intentional lines... only then can it continue to exist around me as a familiar domain.” The body schema allows the thing and its attributes to manifest at a pre-logical level.

Second, the two objects differ in their historicity between transparency and semi-transparency. Marx argues that the objective world is the world of sensuous activity: “The sensuous world is by no means a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of industry and of the state of society.” Thus, in Marx’s theory, the historicity of the sensuous object is transparent; it is born in the history of industrial or productive activity. However, in Merleau-Ponty’s theory, the historicity of things is semi-transparent or opaque. He admits that bodily capacities have historical causes: “There is in me a sediment of previously constructed sedimentations.” But the produced object is not the sole cause of the formation of sensuous capacity; the historicity of sensuous capacity and its objects is complex and opaque. Therefore, sedimentation possesses an irreducible "unspoken" quality—an existing state that can only be discovered and used within perceptual activity.

Finally, the two theories provide different foundations for natural science. Marx believes sensuous activity constantly produces materials for scientific activity, laying the foundation for science. These materials serve natural science in three ways: providing objects for study, shaping the "power of intuition" for research, and providing the means of subsistence required by researchers. Therefore, without the industry and commerce of production, there would be no natural science. Merleau-Ponty focuses more on the perceptual manifestation of objects and their relations within natural scientific theory. Any theoretical expression of science has a perceptual-active object as its basis. Perception is "like every physical formula; each of these words presupposes our pre-scientific experience of the world." Thus, the "object" in scientific theory cannot fully explain the "objective basis" of perceptual activity.

2. Foundation in Relations of Production vs. Meaning-Giving via General Environment: Primordial Differences in the Context of Arrival. Marx argues that social relations are the foundational environment determining the meaning of the object, and one must view the object’s role in the reification ^[4] and liberation of man through the relations of production. Merleau-Ponty, carrying the theory of the body schema to its conclusion to elucidate the object’s connotation, believes the object’s role in human reification and freedom lies in human "tolerance."

First, the difference between relations of production as the core horizon of appearance versus a general environment causes a massive disparity in the basic connotation of the object. Marx argues that the sculpting of the object by sensuous activity can only be applied within social relations of production. Social relations determine what one can own and do, limiting man’s sensuous active capacity and fundamentally stipulating the object’s connotation. Furthermore, Marx criticizes capitalists from the perspective of the exploitation of surplus labor time. Merleau-Ponty also acknowledges the environmentality of the object, but he views the environment as a concrete one carried by the body, characterized by change and openness. Meanwhile, the environment itself is complex; any foundational structure of prioritized causality can only "succeed" the appearance of the perceptual environment and is neither unique nor does it possess absolute truth.

Second, the disagreement over the foundational role of relations in the connotation of the object determines the vast difference in their attitudes toward the object's reification of man. Marx argues that the object, as an external "contingency," dominates the worker as its maker. “The whole conditions of existence of the individual proletariat have become something accidental, over which he has no control,” leading man to forget the origin of the object and to a distorted pursuit of it. Merleau-Ponty argues that man necessarily carries an environment, and universal contingency does not lead to human reification. Moreover, the intrusion of the object upon perception is merely a normal mode of perception; while being "intruded upon," man manifests the thing and simultaneously manifests his own capacity. Furthermore, the object’s deception of human consciousness is secondary to perceptual activity and subject to individual differences.

Finally, the affirmation or denial of the relations of production as the object's fundamental connotation leads to divergent views on whether the object can realize human freedom and liberation. Marx argues that under private property, the object reifies man. Changes in a society of private property offer only relative liberation; man remains dominated by accidental social objects. The demise of capitalism and the realization of human freedom and liberation in communism require the development of productive forces as a prerequisite. Merleau-Ponty, however, argues that human liberation cannot be explained through external causal constraints and their removal, for there is no freedom under causalism. The world as a "situation" both limits the history, space, and content of the perceptual situation and is further reconstructed within perceptual activity, through which freedom is displayed. Meanwhile, due to the existence of the situation and human tolerance, freedom and liberation can never be absolute.

The Significance of Comparing Object Theories

Comparing Marx’s theory of the object of labor with Merleau-Ponty’s theory of the object of perception facilitates a deeper grasp of the intellectual-historical connection between Marxist philosophy and phenomenology. Simultaneously, this comparison reflects the mutual complementarity and unity of the two theories. Naturally, it also demonstrates the advantages of Marx’s theory of the object of labor over the theory of the perceived object.

First, it reflects the inheritance and transformation of Marx’s object theory by phenomenology. Marx treated the object as a combination of the sensuous and the rational, as a primordially referred-to object in the encounter between thing and man, laying the cornerstone for Marx’s entry into modern philosophy. Phenomenology inherited Marx’s approach of placing the object on the basis of "the things themselves" where subject and object are not yet divided. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception attaches great importance to the body’s sensuous activity as the primordial phenomenon of the encounter between man and thing, which is extremely similar to Marx. Therefore, revealing the convergence between the two provides a glimpse into the lineage of modern thought—German Classical Philosophy, Marxist Philosophy, and Phenomenology—showing how Marx’s new research path into "thingness" flourished in modern philosophy.

Second, it demonstrates the complementarity between Marx’s and Merleau-Ponty’s object theories. For one, their theories on the mode of existence of the object are complementary. Marx believes the human sculpting of the object is embodied in direct sensuous activity, while Merleau-Ponty focuses on the manifestation of concrete attributes like color and sound in intuition; the two can supplement each other. For another, the two types of historicity are complementary. Marx displays the object’s history as the history of human labor and production, while Merleau-Ponty believes the object’s history is revealed in actions within concrete situations; this concreteness supplements Marx’s universal logic. Finally, their theories on the foundation of natural scientific objects are complementary. Marx grounds the research objects of natural science in the production of tools and materials, while Merleau-Ponty grounds them in pre-reflective perceptual activity. The use of tools and materials are both pre-reflective bodily activities, and these activities change due to the materials produced; thus, the two are mutually reinforcing.

Third, it reveals the theoretical emphasis and advantages of Marxist philosophy relative to Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. For one, Merleau-Ponty underestimates the foundational role of relations of production in the connotation of the object. Merleau-Ponty treats causal "laws" as products of reflective statistics, but this overlooks the relative necessity of artificially arranged "social causality." For another, Merleau-Ponty largely ignores the reification of man by the object and its mechanisms. He does not explain how the object enhances or limits human capacity. Marx, however, elucidates the reification of man by objects such as tools, capital, and money, as determined by the relations of production. Finally, Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the relationship between the object and freedom lacks more multi-dimensional reflection. He provides insufficient elaboration on the degree of freedom and the paths to ending reification. Marx argues that the extension of free time or the expansion of the scale of freedom depends on the transformation and construction of the objective world.