Yu Min: The Formation and Essential Content of Lenin's Thought on the Long-term Leadership of the Communist Party over All Undertakings of the Workers' and Peasants' State

According to the ideas of Marx and Engels, when the "transition period" from capitalist society to the first stage of communist society concludes, the political instruments of the proletariat—including the proletarian state and the proletarian party—will wither away. In other words, in the first stage of communist society, namely socialist society, there would already be no proletarian state or proletarian party. In his practice following the October Revolution, Lenin proposed that after the victory of the proletarian revolution and the establishment of worker-peasant power, the proletarian state and the proletarian party would need to exist for a long period. Communist Party leadership exists not only during the "transition period" but also throughout the first stage of communist society—socialism—and it is essential to uphold the Party's leadership over all undertakings of the worker-peasant state. These ideas of Lenin hold important enlightening significance today.

I. The Formation of Lenin’s Thought on the Necessity of Long-term Adherence to Communist Party Leadership after the Establishment of Soviet Worker-Peasant Power

Lenin led the Russian proletariat through the practical struggles of seizing power, establishing worker-peasant power, and consolidating that power. By summing up experience through practice, he formed the idea that after the proletariat establishes worker-peasant power, it must adhere to Communist Party leadership over the long term.

Between August and September 1917, on the eve of the October Revolution, Lenin proposed in The State and Revolution that the proletarian state and the proletarian party would not wither away until the arrival of the higher stage of communist society. At that time, Russia faced the revolutionary task of the proletariat seizing power. While reflecting on the tasks of the Russian revolution, Lenin considered that Russia was an economically and culturally backward country; he realized that after the victory of the revolution and the establishment of worker-peasant power, the "transition period" to a socialist society would be a very long process, and the dictatorship of the proletariat and the proletarian party would correspondingly exist for a lengthy historical period. Furthermore, after the transition period ended and the first or lower stage of communist society was entered, the dictatorship of the proletariat and the proletarian party would continue to exist until the arrival of the higher stage of communism. He wrote in this work that although Marx and Engels said the state of the proletarian dictatorship would wither away of itself ^[1] once the proletariat grasped power and completed the task of society as a whole taking possession of the means of production, this would not be the case for Russia. We can only see the necessity of the state’s withering away, and we must also see the protracted nature of this process; we must leave the question of the "date of this withering away or its specific forms as an open question ^[2], because there is as yet no material for the solution of these questions." He also pointed out: "It is clear that there can be no question of specifying the moment of the future 'withering away,' the more so since it will obviously be a lengthy process."

The connotations of the above assertions are quite rich: First, after the Russian proletariat grasped power, one could only speak of the necessity of the state’s withering away, not the actuality of its withering away. To speak of necessity means seeing the inevitability of its eventual disappearance, while the inability to speak of actuality means it cannot wither away at present or in the near future. Second, the existence of the dictatorship of the proletariat is a long process; it exists not only in the transition period but also in the first or lower stage of communist society. Third, the date and form of the state’s withering away must be left as "open questions" for future generations to explore and resolve through practice. In Lenin’s view, the state will only completely wither away when the principle of "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" has been realized in society, when the basic rules of public life can be consciously observed by members of society, and when members of society can voluntarily participate in labor to the best of their ability, while their labor productivity has greatly increased and the produced means of subsistence can fully satisfy the needs of all members of society. That is to say, only in the higher stage of communist society will the state wither away. Since the proletarian party shares the same nature and mission as the dictatorship of the proletariat—both being instruments for the proletariat to conduct revolution and construction—it can be affirmed that, in Lenin's view, the proletarian party will not wither away before the arrival of the higher stage of communist society. Or, to put it another way, leadership by the Communist Party must be unwaveringly upheld until the higher stage of communist society arrives.

After Soviet Russian history entered the period of the Civil War ^[3], Lenin, in view of the cruelty, complexity, intensity, and the emerging long-term trend of class struggle in real life, raised the importance and urgency of the proletarian party’s leadership for consolidating the dictatorship of the proletariat and the people's status as masters of the country to an unprecedented height. The political and military situation at the time was as follows: the landlords and the bourgeoisie were unwilling to accept their fate of extinction; they plotted and launched military rebellions in an attempt to overthrow the Soviet regime. For example, on the very night the Soviet regime was established, Kerensky ^[4], former "leader" of the bourgeois Provisional Government, fled to the headquarters of the Russian Northern Front and gathered a counter-revolutionary army consisting of 12 cavalry companies and a light artillery unit. Under the command of Krasnov, a former Tsarist general, this counter-revolutionary army advanced directly on Petrograd. Simultaneously, the reactionary organization "Committee for the Salvation of the Fatherland and the Revolution" inside Petrograd launched an uprising in coordination with the enemies outside the city. Relying on the Red Guards and revolutionary soldiers, the Russian worker-peasant power quickly defeated these military attacks. Thereafter, enemy agents continuously engaged in assassinating Communist leaders, blowing up bridges, and burning factories, striving to completely collapse the worker-peasant power. Uritsky ^[5] (Chairman of the Petrograd Cheka), one of the leaders of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks), was murdered by the enemy in August 1918. On the same day, Party leader Lenin was shot and seriously wounded by the enemy while delivering a speech to the masses at a factory in Moscow. Former Tsarist Admiral Kolchak controlled vast territories in the Urals, Siberia, and the Far East, possessing a White Guard army of 250,000 soldiers. In early March 1919, Kolchak's White Guards advanced from east to west along a 2,000-kilometer front. In May, Yudenich's White Guards launched an offensive against Petrograd and Moscow from the northwest, supported from the sea by a British fleet of 12 cruisers, 20 destroyers, and 12 submarines. In July, Denikin's White Guard army, with a force of 150,000, launched an offensive from the south to the north. The Soviet regime was in an extremely critical situation. However, under the leadership of the RCP(B), a powerful Red Army was built. The Red Army and the masses of the people waged a heroic revolutionary war and achieved victory, effectively consolidating worker-peasant power.

Through these facts, Lenin profoundly realized that because the landlord and bourgeois classes had seen their power overthrown, the resistance and struggles they would engage in would be "ten times more fierce." The dictatorship of the proletariat is a "most determined and most ruthless war" waged by worker-peasant power and the people against the bourgeoisie. He said: "For all these reasons the dictatorship of the proletariat is essential, and victory over the bourgeoisie is impossible without a long, stubborn and desperate war of life and death, a war demanding perseverance, discipline, firmness, indomitability and unity of will." This assertion that the dictatorship of the proletariat is a "long, stubborn and desperate war of life and death" indicates that Lenin had developed a new understanding—one not previously held by Marx and Engels—regarding the cruelty of class struggle during the transition period and the importance and necessity of the dictatorship of the proletariat. This new understanding accorded with the historical facts of Russia at that time.

It must be pointed out that, proceeding from this new understanding of the dictatorship of the proletariat, Lenin innovated his theoretical understanding of the proletarian party’s leadership over worker-peasant power. In 1920, Lenin pointed out in “Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder that because the dictatorship of the proletariat is a cruel and heroic struggle, "without a party of iron that has been tempered in the struggle, a party enjoying the confidence of all honest people in the class in question, a party capable of watching and influencing the mood of the masses, such a struggle cannot be waged successfully." He further noted that our Party possesses extremely strict, truly iron discipline and has received the wholehearted support of the entire working class; were it not so, "the Bolsheviks could not have maintained themselves in power for two and a half years, let alone two and a half months." The idea he expressed here is that the proletarian party is a party with "iron discipline," a party wholeheartedly supported by the masses, and a party of iron tempered in struggle. The reason why Russia's worker-peasant power and the people's status as masters could be consolidated was, crucially and importantly, the leadership of the Communist Party.

When the Communist International (Comintern) was founded in 1919, certain "Left-leaning" figures appeared within the proletarian ranks in Germany and other Western countries. Given that leaders of the Second International and some national Social Democratic parties had been bought off by the bourgeoisie, betrayed the interests of the proletariat and the masses, and formulated policies to maintain the bourgeoisie and its regime, these figures proposed slogans and positions that negated the party and negated discipline. In the aforementioned work, Lenin critiqued this erroneous ideological tendency, saying: "From the standpoint of communism, the repudiation of the Party means attempting to leap from the eve of capitalism’s collapse (in Germany) to the highest stage of communism, skipping the lower and intermediate stages. In Russia (in the third year after the overthrow of the bourgeoisie), we are making only the first steps in the transition from capitalism to socialism or the lower stage of communism." Lenin's logic was as follows: Only when history enters the higher stage of communist society will the proletarian party wither away. The "Left-leaning" German revolutionaries' denial of the necessity of the party's existence showed they believed Germany could directly enter the higher stage of communism. This view was completely contrary to reality and was profoundly mistaken. Here, Lenin once again emphasized that the condition for the withering away of the proletarian party is that society has entered the higher stage of communism. Simultaneously, Lenin emphasized here that Russia was "making only the first steps in the transition from capitalism to socialism or the lower stage of communism." This was a view consistent with Russian reality and a new formulation that previous socialists had not used.

Marx and Engels had previously specified that after the victory of the proletarian revolution and the seizure of power in a certain country or region, that society enters a "transition period." Only when the "transition period" ends does society enter the first or lower stage of communist society. Lenin, here, specified that Russia was currently in the "first steps" (or early stage) of the "transition period," implying that in his view, the transition period itself is divided into different stages. Moving forward from the "first steps," it might sequentially enter intermediate and advanced stages before finally entering the first stage of communist society. This also demonstrates that, in Lenin's view, the "transition period" is a very long historical stage. Throughout the entirety of the transition period and the first stage of communist society, the Communist Party's leadership over the undertakings of the proletariat and all the people must be maintained.

Lenin's aforementioned ideas enriched and developed the thoughts of Marx and Engels regarding the withering away of the state and the party. Marx and Engels envisioned that after the proletariat seized power through revolution and established a new regime, it would enter a "transition period" during which the dictatorship of the proletariat must be maintained, and the duration of this period would not be particularly long. As Engels pointed out: transforming the nature of the ownership of the means of production—taking possession of the means of production in the name of society—is the "first act" the proletarian state performs, and it is also the "last independent act" of the proletarian state, after which "state interference in social relations becomes, in one domain after another, superfluous, and then dies out of itself." Here he says that abolishing capitalist private ownership and establishing public ownership of the means of production is the first task of the proletarian state and also its last. Seen this way, the dictatorship of the proletariat has only one task: to change the nature of ownership and establish public ownership. Engels further stated: "Once society has taken possession of the means of production, the production of commodities is abolished, and with it the mastery of the product over the producer... The struggle for individual existence disappears. Then for the first time man, in a certain sense, is finally marked off from the rest of the animal kingdom, and emerges from mere animal conditions of existence into really human ones." Thus, it appeared that changing ownership was the key, primary, and sole task of the "transition period" or the dictatorship of the proletariat. Once this task was completed, the dictatorship of the proletariat—the proletarian state—would head toward withering away. When the dictatorship of the proletariat, as an instrument of proletarian struggle, withers away, the proletarian party, as another instrument of that struggle, would naturally wither away as well. Clearly, Lenin's thought on the necessity for the worker-peasant state to adhere to Communist Party leadership over the long term enriched and developed these ideas of Marx and Engels.

II. Lenin’s Thought on the Communist Party’s Leadership over the Various Affairs of the Worker-Peasant State

After the RCP(B) became the ruling party, how to lead the construction of the new system—or rather, in which specific areas to exercise leadership—was a question that required strenuous exploration. Lenin led the Party in conducting bold inquiries and proposed several important new ideas.

1. The Communist Party must lead the worker-peasant state and the state apparatus.

The worker-peasant state is a political entity and a political force in which workers and peasants act as masters of their own affairs. The worker-peasant state apparatus consists of a series of working bodies that execute and implement the laws and decrees formulated by the state power, such as the All-Russian Central Executive Committee of the Soviets of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies and its various specialized committees, the executive committees of local soviets at all levels and their specialized committees, and the Council of People’s Commissars (the central government apparatus) along with its relevant committees (at that time, local levels did not have "Councils of People’s Commissars"). In Lenin's view, the Communist Party had to lead the worker-peasant state and all state apparatuses. In November 1919, Russia faced the danger of hostile forces at home and abroad subverting the new regime, the threat of famine, and severe difficulties regarding fuel. With a focus on overcoming these threats, Lenin issued a "circular letter" to Party organizations at all levels on behalf of the Central Committee of the RCP(B). He pointed out: "Comrades! Our Party is the organized vanguard of the proletariat, and its task is to unify and lead the struggle of the working class for the victory of the worker-peasant Soviet power." This judgment indicated that the victory of the working class's struggle to consolidate the worker-peasant Soviet power must be carried out under the leadership of the Communist Party, because the Party is the vanguard of the proletariat. This assertion explicitly expressed the idea of the Communist Party leading the worker-peasant state. During the same period, in his political report to the Eighth Congress of the RCP(B), Lenin noted while discussing the Party’s tasks that the strength of the Russian working class had been weakened by the brutal Civil War and natural disasters, "but only the advanced section of the working class, only the vanguard of the working class, can lead its own country." Here, the "advanced section" and "vanguard" of the working class referred to the RCP(B). He meant that although the strength of the Russian working class was diminished, the Communist Party still existed, still led the country, and would certainly be able to lead the worker-peasant state out of its predicament.

In 1920, while discussing the organizational methods of the RCP(B) in his writings, Lenin pointed out: "Our Party holds an annual congress (the most recent one was attended by one delegate for every 1,000 members), which elects a Central Committee of 19 members to lead the entire Party, and the daily work in Moscow is conducted by a smaller collective—the so-called ‘Org-Bureau’ and ‘Politburo’ elected by the Plenum of the Central Committee, each consisting of five Central Committee members... Not a single state apparatus in our Republic may decide any major political or organizational issue without instructions from the Party Central Committee." This judgment, first, emphasized the vital role and profound authority of the Party Congress, the Central Committee it elects, and the Politburo and Org-Bureau elected by the Central Committee in leading the entire Party. Second, it emphasized the vital role and profound authority of the Communist Party in leading the worker-peasant state and its various state apparatuses. He stated that the resolution of any major political or organizational issue must receive instructions from the Party Central Committee. "Major political issues" refer to matters of the state’s developmental direction, strategy, and the social forces it relies upon. "Major organizational issues" refer to the establishment of high-level leadership bodies and positions, as well as the selection and appointment of high-level leaders. The aforementioned issues could only be resolved under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Communist Party. This judgment and thought of Lenin's constitutes a serious, solemn, profound, and highly concrete exposition of the idea that the Communist Party must lead the worker-peasant state and the state apparatus. It accorded both with the reality of the RCP(B) at that time and with the general laws governing the operation of state leadership mechanisms, especially high-level leadership mechanisms, in a country where the Communist Party holds power.

In the spring of 1921, the Tenth Congress of the RCP(B) made the decision to end the policy of War Communism ^[6] and implement the New Economic Policy (NEP). Major measures included replacing the surplus-appropriation system ^[7] with a tax in kind ^[8], allowing free trade within local limits (which developed into state-regulated commercial activity after October of that year), supporting the development of small-scale private industrial enterprises in cities, and implementing state capitalism in forms such as concessions and leases. In his report to the Tenth Congress, Lenin, while discussing the necessity of these policies and measures, proposed that "our Party is a ruling party, and the decisions passed by the Party Congress are mandatory for the entire Republic." Lenin’s emphasis on this issue stemmed from his consideration that with the implementation of the NEP, various negative sentiments—stemming from a lack of understanding or even opposition to the new policy—would continuously emerge (e.g., as the NEP was implemented, some within the Party and the working masses argued that capitalist economic elements had been resurrected and the fruits of the October Revolution would be lost; they argued that concessions allowed foreign capitalists to operate enterprises in Russia, but Russian workers could not bear to suffer exploitation by foreign capitalists again). He clarified that the entire Republic must implement the resolutions passed by the Tenth Party Congress and seriously carry out the NEP, which was determined by the nature, role, and authority of the Communist Party. Since the entire Republic must comply with Party resolutions, then every Party member, cadre, state official, worker, and peasant must comply without exception. This thought is the idea that the Communist Party must lead the worker-peasant state, the state apparatus, and the entire masses of the people.

2. The Communist Party must lead the work of economic development in the worker-peasant state.

After the Civil War ended, Russia’s primary task was the recovery and development of the national economy. However, serious differences of opinion arose within the RCP(B) regarding how to recover and develop the economy, and specifically, which institution should lead economic work. The Trotskyite faction advocated for the "statization" of trade unions—that is, they proposed merging state economic apparatuses with trade union organizations according to different industrial sectors, with the merged bodies performing economic management functions; in other words, this body would lead the economic work of the state. They also suggested a "shake-up" ^[9] of the trade union organizations, placing those skilled at "tightening the screws"—those accustomed to advancing work through coercive commands—into leadership positions to militarize trade union work. The "Workers' Opposition" ^[10] advocated for the "syndicalization of the state"—that is, they proposed that the state's economic apparatuses should be subordinate to trade union organizations, handing the power of managing the national economy over to an All-Russian Congress of Producers. They denied the leading role of the Communist Party and state power organs in economic work. Their proposal was, in essence, anarcho-syndicalism. The "Democratic Centralist" group ^[11] also opposed the Communist Party’s leadership over state economic work, advocating that the Presidium of the Supreme Council of the National Economy (the organ of the worker-peasant state leading economic work) be elected by the trade unions, and that their nominated candidates be accepted unconditionally.

In the process of criticizing the erroneous views of these various factions, Lenin expounded the idea of the Communist Party leading and managing economic work. For example, in his reports to relevant meetings at the time, he proposed: "To manage, one needs an army of steeled Communist revolutionaries; such an army exists—it is the Party." In Lenin’s view, the ranks of the Communist Party had been steeled and tested over a long period, and the Party had to lead the economic work of the worker-peasant state. In criticizing Trotsky’s proposal regarding the "statization of trade unions," he said that the state is a sphere of coercion, and although coercion is necessary during the transition period, trade union organizations must never be allowed to participate in the sphere of implementing coercion. He also pointed out that the trade union is a school—a school for young people to learn the basics of communism, a school for workers to learn economic, social, and state management, and a link for the Party to connect with the working masses. He then said: "As for the Party, the Party is the directly ruling vanguard of the proletariat; it is the leader." The idea Lenin expressed here is that neither state power nor trade union organizations are the leaders of state economic work. The Communist Party is the vanguard of the proletariat; it holds state power and is the leader of state economic work. During this period, in speeches at relevant meetings discussing the significance of ending War Communism and implementing the new policy, Lenin said: The Party and the people should part with the past and devote themselves to genuine economic construction, transforming Party work according to the change in tasks "so that the Party can lead the Soviet economic construction, achieve practical results, and conduct propaganda with more action and fewer words." Here it was already indicated that the Communist Party can and must lead the economic work of the worker-peasant state and achieve successes. In November 1921, in a speech discussing how the RCP(B) must lead the practice of commercial accounting and trade, Lenin said: "Now we must do this. Why? Because we are leading and must lead economic construction. Economic construction compels us to utilize not only the unpleasant means of leasing but also the distasteful business of trade." During the same period, Lenin wrote in a relevant article that historical events appear as a chain with many links: "Among the various transitional forms of our socialist construction in 1921–1922, trade is precisely 'the link that we must grasp with all our might'—we, the proletarian state power, and we, the leading Communist Party."

Lenin’s aforementioned judgments indicated that the Communist Party is the "leading" party, that it must lead economic construction and firmly grasp the link of developing trade, profoundly expressing his thought that the Communist Party must lead the worker-peasant state’s economic development.

3. The Communist Party must lead the cultural and educational work of the worker-peasant state.

At the time of the victory of the October Revolution, Russia was a country where the vast majority of the population was illiterate. To carry out socialist construction, this situation had to be changed first, and it could only be changed relatively quickly under the leadership of the Communist Party. In response to this, Lenin proposed the idea that the Communist Party must lead the cultural and educational undertakings of the worker-peasant state. In 1919, while drafting the Draft Programme of the RCP(B), Lenin wrote: "In the field of public education, the RCP sets itself the task of carrying to completion the work begun with the October Revolution of 1917—that is, transforming the school from a tool of bourgeois class rule into a tool for destroying that rule and for the complete elimination of social class divisions." Here, he had already indicated that developing public education was the Party's task. This was because this undertaking was a continuation of the October Revolution; it was a matter of whether the school could be transformed into a tool of the proletarian dictatorship and a tool for eliminating class divisions, and whether the school could train successive cohorts of builders for the new society. Clearly, he had already proposed the idea of the Communist Party leading cultural and educational undertakings. During the same period, in a speech to the First All-Russian Congress on Adult Education, Lenin said: "Since we call ourselves the Communist Party, we should understand that only now, when we have cleared away the external obstacles and destroyed the old system... should we finally set out on the correct path to overcome those phenomena of incivility, ignorance, and coarseness from which we have always suffered." He meant that since the Soviet regime had driven out the foreign armed interventionists and destroyed the old political system, it should put cultural and educational work—important work that could rid the people of incivility, ignorance, and coarseness—on the agenda. He pointed out that the Communist Party should understand how to do this work—that is, he believed the Party should and must lead this work. In his speech at this meeting, he also stated that leadership organs at all levels should set about the simple and urgent matter of eliminating illiteracy, and should utilize existing books—every single available book—to promote cultural and educational work: "This small matter reflects the fundamental task of our revolution."

After entering the period of the New Economic Policy (NEP) ^[12], Lenin advocated for the integration of political education with cultural education. In his report to the Second All-Russian Congress of Political Education Departments, he pointed out: "With the transition to the NEP, we must constantly propagate the idea that political education necessitates a raising of the cultural level. One must use the ability to read and write to raise the cultural level, and the peasant must be given the possibility of using this literacy to improve his own farming and the condition of his state." In his thinking, both political and cultural education were undertakings led by the Communist Party; therefore, the conditions and justifications existed to conduct both successfully so as to promote economic progress. At this same meeting, Lenin also noted that bureaucratic phenomena ^[13] had emerged within the Party: some leaders had become infected with "red tape" (procrastination), and some in power were even guilty of bribery. A struggle against such phenomena was essential. "The whole work of the Political Education Departments must be adapted to this purpose. Illiteracy must be wiped out, but mere literacy is not enough; we also need the culture that teaches people to fight red tape and bribery. These are maladies which no military victory and no political reform can cure. In fact, they cannot be cured by military victories and political reforms, but only by raising the cultural level. This task falls upon the Political Education Departments." Here, Lenin argued that the struggle against red tape and bribery must be conducted through Party-led political and cultural educational work. While military struggle and political upheaval cannot eliminate these vices, political and cultural education can elevate the level of civilization in society as a whole and the ideological and political quality of Party members and cadres, thereby reducing and eliminating procrastination and corruption. Clearly, his thought in this regard emphasized that the Party must lead and excel in political and cultural educational work.

During the 11th Congress of the RCP(b) ^[14], Lenin proposed that Party leaders at all levels must significantly improve their cultural quality and their competence in managing economic work. At this time, the NEP had been in effect for one year, and Communist leaders were engaged in a fierce competition with capitalists in the field of industrial production. For enterprises implementing state capitalism, Party organizations dispatched cadres to participate in management. In these enterprises, Party leaders competed with owners in economic work. Due to the low cultural quality and poor management skills of Party cadres, they were often reduced to a passive position. For instance, some owners would push Party leaders to the front as "shields" while they themselves engaged in illegal dealings behind the scenes. In his report to the 11th Congress, Lenin pointed out clearly what was missing: "the Communists who are in management positions lack culture." He noted that the competence of Communists playing leading roles in economic work was inferior to that of old shop assistants. "We must start learning from the beginning. If we realize this, we shall pass our examination—a severe examination conducted by the approaching financial crisis, an examination conducted by the Russian and international markets to which we are subordinated and with which we are indissolubly linked. This is a severe examination, for here they may beat us economically and politically." This was Lenin's call at the Party Congress to all members and cadres to study, raise their cultural level and management competence, and pass this severe "examination."

Lenin proposed that a cultural revolution ^[15] must be carried out in Russia, particularly in the countryside. He suggested establishing stable links between urban and rural Party branches so that the former could assist the latter in promoting cultural construction. Given the advantages of cities over the countryside, urban branches possessed superior working foundations and conditions; thus, urban support for rural cultural construction was one of the methods he proposed. To this end, Lenin asked: "Is it not possible to ‘assign’ every urban cell to a rural cell, so that every working-class cell ‘assigned’ to a corresponding rural cell may constantly utilize every opportunity, every occasion, to satisfy this or that cultural need of its brother cell?" He affirmed this approach and demanded it be carried out earnestly. From this, one can see that in Lenin's view, advancing cultural and ideological work through the active efforts of primary-level Party branches embodied his idea that such work must be led by the Communist Party.

Lenin also posited that the Party must persist in its leadership over work in philosophy and the social sciences. In Russia at that time, there was a journal for the propagation of Marxism—i.e., the Party’s ideology—titled Under the Banner of Marxism (Pod Znamenem Marksizma), which operated under the leadership of the RCP(b). The contributors to this journal included many Party members as well as many non-members. These two groups worked together, forming an alliance between Communist and non-Communist authors. In his March 1922 article "On the Significance of Militant Materialism," Lenin pointed out: "I think that such an alliance between Communists and non-Communists is absolutely necessary... The vanguard performs its tasks as a vanguard only when it is able to avoid becoming isolated from the mass it leads and is able really to lead the whole mass forward." In his view, this "alliance" meant that Communist authors would influence non-Communist authors and unite with them to perform their work well. He further specified that the Communist Party acts as a vanguard in philosophy, social sciences, and ideological work because it does not detach itself from the masses but closely unites them, always staying ahead of them in practice and playing a leading and guiding role. This reflects Lenin’s thought on the Communist Party’s leadership of ideological work and philosophy and the social sciences.

4. The Communist Party Must Lead the Diplomacy and Foreign Trade of the Workers' and Peasants' State

When the October Revolution succeeded and the workers' and peasants' state was established, the First World War, in which Western powers were carving up the world, was still ongoing, and Germany and Russia remained in a state of war. Lenin had previously held the view—and now emphasized it further—that this was an imperialist war for the re-division of the world, and that the Communist Party and the proletariat should not support, much less participate in it. At the same time, because Russia’s national strength had been exhausted during the Tsarist and Provisional Government periods, it was unable to continue the war. Furthermore, the frontline troops belonged to the former Tsarist or Provisional governments and would not obey the commands of the workers' and peasants' regime. With the Red Army not yet established, the regime lacked any conditions to continue the war against Germany. Moreover, consolidating the regime required exiting the war to gain a "breathing spell." Consequently, the Russian state sent a delegation to negotiate with the Germans to sign a peace treaty and exit the war. However, because the German delegation proposed predatory terms, some petty-bourgeois political factions in Russia opposed accepting them. Within the RCP(b), a "Left Communist" group also formed in opposition to signing the treaty. Lenin insisted on the Party's leadership over this work, adhering to the Party's political and organizational principles. On January 8, 1918, at a meeting of the Party Central Committee, Lenin read his "Theses on the Question of the Immediate Conclusion of a Separate and Annexationist Peace," which he had drafted on behalf of the Party, demanding the immediate signing of a peace treaty with Germany. On January 11, he spoke three times at a Central Committee meeting, criticizing the proposal for immediate war and emphasizing the importance of peace. On February 18, he spoke again, stressing that the regime was not prepared for war. On February 19, at a meeting of the RCP(b) group of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, he pointed out there was no other choice but to sign immediately. On February 23, he spoke eight times at a Central Committee meeting, stressing the urgency. That meeting passed the resolution to sign the treaty by a majority vote. In March of that year, the Seventh (Extraordinary) Congress of the RCP(b) was held, where Lenin discussed the significance of the treaty in his report. He also drafted documents such as the "Resolution on War and Peace." The signing of the peace treaty ^[16] with Germany was the first attempt at diplomacy by a workers' and peasants' state in socialist history. Looking at the process, Lenin and the Central Committee led every stage, vividly embodying the idea that the Party must lead the state's diplomatic work.

Given that several Western countries planned to hold an international economic conference in Genoa, Italy, between April and May 1922, the RCP(b) and the government decided to send a delegation. Lenin attached great importance to this conference and demanded the Central Committee strengthen its leadership over the delegation's work. In his report to the 11th Party Congress in March of that year, he noted: "Our Central Committee has taken very great care to organize a delegation of our best diplomats (now we have a fair number of Soviet diplomats, unlike the early days of the Soviet Republic). The Central Committee drew up very detailed instructions for our diplomats going to Genoa; we spent a long time discussing them and went over them again and again." This statement shows that the preparations—including forming the group and drafting specific instructions—were meticulously discussed at Party meetings. This demonstrates that Lenin advocated for the Central Committee to strengthen its leadership over both the overall task and the specific work of the delegation. In practice, the Central Committee had already carried out these tasks, showing it had effectively led the work. Lenin also mentioned at the 11th Congress that some comrades did not know much about the Genoa Conference or the Party’s work regarding it but wished to know more; he suggested they form a committee to request materials from Party organs. As he said: "It goes without saying that those comrades who wish to study this question in greater detail and who are not satisfied with the list of delegates published in the newspapers may elect a committee or a group to examine all the Central Committee's materials, correspondence, and instructions." His intention in allowing more comrades to understand the situation was to facilitate the smooth passage of resolutions and the strengthening of leadership. In his report, Lenin provided tactical and strategic guidance. He noted that in the bourgeois world, there was one camp keen on war and another inclined toward pacifism. Whether the Russian delegation, acting as "merchants," dealt with the bellicose camp or the pacifist camp made a difference. "A merchant who does not know how to grasp this distinction and who cannot adapt his tactics to it so as to achieve his practical object is a poor merchant." His meaning was that one must carefully and correctly identify different factions among international hostile forces and exploit their contradictions to protect the interests of the state. The Russian delegation worked diligently according to these tactics. On April 16, 1922, the Russian and German delegations signed an agreement ^[17] reflecting mutual understanding and cooperation. It included terms where both sides waived claims for war costs and damages; Germany waived claims for nationalized property; diplomatic and consular relations were restored; and economic cooperation was encouraged based on the most-favored-nation principle. This treaty was a major achievement of the RCP(b)’s leadership in diplomacy and a significant victory for the government.

5. Must Strengthen the Communist Party’s Leadership over the Red Army

After the October Revolution, and especially after the outbreak of the Civil War, Lenin and the RCP(B) led the creation of a powerful Red Army, utilizing it as the core force to wage war against foreign armed intervenors and domestic reactionary forces. In military practice, Lenin expounded the idea that the Communist Party must strengthen its leadership over the Red Army. The "Program of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks)," drafted by Lenin and adopted by the Eighth Congress of the RCP(B) in 1919, stipulated: "Establish Communist Party branches in every unit to build internal ideological links and conscious discipline." To build Party organizations within Red Army units, Lenin demanded that great importance be attached to the work of Party members joining the Red Army. In the summer of 1918, Lenin led the Party Central Committee in passing a resolution to dispatch large numbers of Party members to the Eastern Front. Subsequently, in Moscow, Petrograd, and other central regions, one-fifth of the Party members were dispatched to Red Army units on the Eastern Front. Simultaneously, almost all Party members in the Volga and Ural regions were also transferred to the Eastern Front. It can be said that the construction of Party organizations in the Red Army units in the East and on various fronts was significantly strengthened, injecting firm political convictions and combat will into the Red Army, ensuring the Party's absolute leadership over the military, and laying a solid foundation for the Red Army's major victory in the Don region in March 1919. Lenin said with great pleasure: "Establish Communist Party branches in every unit... Our victory in the Don region was entirely due to the strengthening of Party work and cultural-educational activities in the Red Army units. This brought about a change in the mental outlook, and the result is that our Red Army won the Don region for us." This judgment attributed the Red Army’s victory in the war to the leadership of the Party organizations within the units and the Party’s cultural and ideological propaganda work.

In July 1919, Lenin pointed out in a drafted document that disagreements regarding military issues could occur both within the Party and within the military. Due to these differing perceptions, some friction and conflict would arise. "We shall solve these frictions and conflicts, both now and in the future, through Party channels, and we demand that Party organizations at all levels do the same... remaining unwavering in implementing the principles of the military policy we have prescribed." The idea expressed here is to resolve divergences in people’s perceptions of military issues through the channel of Party leadership, thereby promoting military work; furthermore, people should persist in the Party’s leadership "unwaveringly" when deciding important military policies and handling specific military affairs. During this period, Lenin led the Red Army in creating a system unique to proletarian armies—the system of political commissars. This involved local Party organizations sending outstanding Communists to the Red Army to serve as political commissars at all levels, who would lead the work of Party organizations and ideological-political work within the Red Army. Relevant resolutions passed by the Eighth Congress of the RCP(B) pointed out: "The political commissar is not only a direct representative of Soviet power but, above all, the embodiment of the spirit of our Party, its discipline, and the determination and courage of the Party in the struggle to achieve its set goals." This discourse is an embodiment of Lenin’s thought on strengthening Party leadership over the Red Army. During the same period, when the Soviet regime faced the frantic offensive of Denikin’s White Guards ^[18], Lenin proposed that leading organs at all local levels should greatly streamline their personnel and transfer Communists out, "sending hundreds and thousands of people in the shortest possible time to work in the military political departments, to serve as political commissars, and so on. In this way, we will have a practical guarantee of defeating Denikin just as we defeated the more powerful Kolchak ^[19]." It can be seen that, in Lenin's view, strengthening the Party’s leadership over the Red Army, reinforcing the construction of the political commissar system, and intensifying ideological-political work for Red Army soldiers were the sources of the Red Army's combat effectiveness and important means and measures for the Red Army to overcome the enemy and achieve victory.

III. Contemporary Enlightenments of Lenin’s Thought on the Long-Term Leadership of the Communist Party Over the Various Undertakings of the Workers' and Peasants' State

1. The CPC’s Consolidation of its Long-Term Governing Status is both an Inherent Requirement of the Cause of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics and a Basic Principle of Scientific Socialism

As previously mentioned, Lenin believed that the withering away of the state and the political party as proletarian tools is a long-term process; before the arrival of the higher stage of communist society, the proletarian party will not wither away. In other words, Party leadership must be consistently upheld until the higher stage of communist society is reached. Contemporary CPC thought on consolidating the Party's long-term governing status is highly consistent with and descended from this idea. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out in the report to the 19th Party Congress: "The basic national condition that our country is in, and will remain in for a long time, the primary stage of socialism, has not changed... the whole Party must firmly grasp this basic national condition... firmly base ourselves on this greatest reality... and firmly adhere to the Party’s basic line, which is the lifeline of the Party and the state and the line of happiness for the people... to strive to build China into a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful." Here, he proposed that China will be in the primary stage of socialism for a "long time" and that the whole Party must firmly adhere to the "Party's basic line." The idea of consolidating the Party's long-term governing status is the thought of persisting in the Party's long-term leadership over the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics. In the report to the 20th Party Congress, he further pointed out: "Our Party, as the world’s largest Marxist governing party, must always win the people's support and consolidate its long-term governing status; we must remain sober and determined in solving the unique challenges facing a large party." This clarifies that for the Party to always win the people's support and consolidate its long-term governing status, the profound implication is that the Communist Party’s leadership over reform, opening up, and Chinese-path modernization must be persisted in over the long term. The CPC’s consolidation of its long-term governing status—or persisting in the Party’s leadership over the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics—is an inherent requirement of that cause. On the road ahead for the Party and the people, there are many new things to be understood, many difficulties to be overcome, and many hardships and obstacles to be crossed. Only by persisting in the leadership of the Communist Party can the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics tackle tough challenges and advance from victory to victory. Although the road ahead is very long, as long as there is Party leadership, the people's cause will be invincible. Furthermore, viewing China and the world through the basic principles of scientific socialism, the proletarian party and the proletarian state cannot wither away before the arrival of the higher stage of communist society. The CPC’s consolidation of its long-term governing status and long-term persistence in Party leadership conforms to the basic principles of scientific socialism. Clearly, studying and mastering the aforementioned thoughts of Lenin is conducive to people deeply understanding these issues.

2. Persisting in the Party’s Overall Leadership Is Both a Reflection of the Experience of the Chinese Revolution and Construction and a Profound Summary and Innovation of the Important Experiences in the History of Scientific Socialism

As previously mentioned, Lenin advocated for the Communist Party to lead the various undertakings of the workers' and peasants' state—that is, the Communist Party must lead the state and state organs, lead the work of developing the economy, lead cultural and educational work, and strengthen leadership over the Red Army. His ideas and practices have revelatory significance for the contemporary CPC in strengthening the Party's overall leadership. General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out in the report to the 19th Party Congress: "Uphold the Party's leadership over all work. Party, government, military, society, and education; east, west, south, north, and center—the Party leads everything. We must strengthen the political consciousness, the consciousness of the big picture, the consciousness of the core, and the consciousness of alignment ^[20], and voluntarily safeguard the authority of the Party Central Committee and its centralized, unified leadership." The leadership over "all work" mentioned here refers to the Communist Party's "overall leadership" over the various undertakings of national development. In the report to the 20th Party Congress, he also pointed out: "Uphold and strengthen the Party’s overall leadership. Firmly safeguard the authority of the Party Central Committee and its centralized, unified leadership, implement Party leadership in all fields, aspects, and links of the cause of the Party and the state, ensuring the Party always remains the most reliable 'backbone' ^[21] for all people when storms strike, ensuring the correct direction of China’s socialist modernization, ensuring we possess strong political cohesion and development confidence for united struggle, and gathering the majestic power of a million hearts acting as one to overcome all difficulties." Here, he not only put forward the judgment of strengthening the Party’s "overall leadership" but also expounded on the meaning of this judgment—namely, that the authority of the Party Central Committee and centralized, unified leadership must be effectively maintained, and Party leadership must be implemented in all fields, aspects, and links of the cause of the Party and the state. Only in this way can the majestic power of a million hearts acting as one be gathered to overcome difficulties. Contemporary CPC thought on strengthening the Party's overall leadership is derived from the Party's profound summary of revolutionary experience, especially the experience of socialist construction and reform and opening up; it is also derived from the summary of the history of scientific socialism, particularly the experience of exploring the path of socialist construction during the Lenin period. Confronted with Russia’s state of being riddled with holes and having a thousand things waiting to be done, Lenin strengthened the RCP(B)’s leadership over all aspects of work, rapidly advancing the work and accumulating experience for the Communist Party in exercising leadership over various undertakings after seizing power. However, Lenin did not have the time to summarize the experience of the Party strengthening its leadership over all aspects of work—that is, the various undertakings of the state—and did not explicitly and directly put forward the judgment of strengthening the Communist Party’s leadership over all national undertakings. Contemporary Chinese Communists have deeply summarized the history of scientific socialism, particularly the experience of strengthening Party leadership over state undertakings during Lenin’s time, and the experience of strengthening the Party’s overall leadership in China during the period of socialist construction and especially since reform and opening up. By explicitly putting forward the thought of strengthening the Party’s overall leadership, they have developed and innovated upon Lenin’s thought and practice.