Huang Meidi: Habermas's Revision of the Consensus Theory of Truth and Its Contemporary Implications
The development of Habermas's theory of truth can be roughly divided into three stages: the period of Knowledge and Human Interests, the period of the consensus theory of truth, and the period of Truth and Justification (Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung). Domestic [1] academic circles have mostly focused their investigations of his theory of truth on the first two periods, while lacking a detailed examination of his important discourses in the third period. During the Truth and Justification period, Habermas made significant revisions to his consensus theory of truth, turning instead toward an understanding of truth as a concept of action norms built upon the foundation of everyday practice. This theory breaks through the epistemological framework of truth, emphasizing its practical and ethical nature. It provides crucial logical support for the political philosophy and social-critical domains of his later period, while also paving the way for his attempt to reconstruct democratic politics by means of achieving universal interests. Therefore, it is particularly necessary to clarify the logic behind the revision of Habermas's consensus theory of truth.
Furthermore, through this revision, Habermas not only transcends traditional conceptions of truth but also provides important theoretical resources for addressing the challenge of the regression of intersubjective communicative action in the digital age. The rational dialogue, consensus building, and reflexive critique he emphasizes can help subjects verify the authenticity of information through dialogue and practice in an environment of information overload and misinformation, thereby rebuilding the rationality of a consensus on truth. Therefore, based on the elucidation of its inner theoretical logic, further reflecting on how this theory provides a vital theoretical basis and practical guidance for addressing the regression of intersubjective communicative action in the digital age is also a major thematic direction of this article.
Consequently, clarifying why Habermas, in his 1999 publication Truth and Justification, negated the epistemological concept of truth and asserted that truth is a concept of action norms founded upon the lifeworld [2] of everyday practice carries significant theoretical importance for mapping the logical trajectory of Habermas's theory of truth. This article attempts to expound upon his unique theoretical characteristics by analyzing the logical approach through which Habermas revised the consensus theory of truth. On this basis, it further reflects on how the rational dialogue, consensus building, and reflexive critique he emphasizes provide a vital theoretical foundation and practical guidance for addressing the challenge of the regression of intersubjective communicative action in the digital age.
I. The Self-Negation of the Consensus Theory of Truth
By drawing upon the positive achievements of the linguistic turn in modern philosophy, Habermas's consensus theory of truth sought to construct a brand-new theory of consensual truth to break through the theoretical dilemmas faced by traditional theories of truth. However, because the logical approach of its theoretical construction contained inherent contradictions and lacked a realist foundation, it eventually led him toward the negation and revision of the consensus theory of truth.
Within the epistemological turn of modern philosophy, the most influential theories of truth include the correspondence theory, the coherence theory, and the pragmatic theory. In Habermas's view, however, each of these theories suffers from insurmountable theoretical difficulties. First, the correspondence theory maintains that "if a proposition corresponds to a fact, then it is truth." But Habermas argues that this claim is essentially an ontological theory of truth (ontologischen Wahrheitstheorien). It possesses significant defects: it relies excessively on the empirical intuition of naive realism; it lacks an objective standard to determine whether linguistic statements correspond to real objects; and it falls into a linguistic vicious circle when judging truth and falsehood. Second, the coherence theory holds that truth manifests as the coherence within a system of propositions: "A proposition is true if it coheres with other propositions." Yet both its rationalist and empiricist variants have unsolvable problems. Rationalist coherence theory only explores formal truth in the sense of pure ideas, failing to explain the problem of empirical truth. Empirical truth, meanwhile, must not only conform to linguistic and logical conditions but also take the reality described by the proposition as the final basis for judgment. Finally, the pragmatic theory of truth asserts that "what is useful is true," emphasizing the judgment of the truth of theories, propositions, and ideas from the level of utility. Habermas, however, believes that treating instrumentality and pragmatism as the primary characteristics of truth is an infinite subjectivization and vulgarization of truth.
In response to these issues, Habermas explicitly proposed the primary (and essential) core thesis for the construction of his consensus theory of truth: the theory aims to achieve consensus and demonstrate a concept of consensual truth in an epistemological sense. As he put it: "I may predicate something of an object if and only if any other person who could enter into a dialogue with me would predicate the same thing of the same object. In order to distinguish true from false consensus, I must rely on the judgment of others—specifically, the judgment of all others with whom I might engage in dialogue (here I counterfactually include all potential partners as if my own life history [Lebensgeschichte] were coextensive [koextensiv] with the history of the human world [Menschenwelt]). The condition for the truth of statements is the potential agreement (Zustimmung) of all others." To realize this theoretical goal, certain methodological tools are required.
Drawing on the relevant achievements of linguistics and hermeneutics, Habermas proposed universal pragmatics as a methodological foundation. This constitutes the second core thesis in the construction of his consensus theory of truth. Analysis based on universal pragmatics primarily involves two issues. First, based on the theoretical requirement of "reaching intersubjective consensus," the analysis of speech in universal pragmatics takes "mutual understanding" as its premise. In the sense of universal pragmatics, mutual understanding involves the following validity claims: truth (Wahrheit), rightness (Richtigkeit), and sincerity (Wahrhaftigkeit). Thus, the meaning of truth is manifested as the redemption of the validity claim of discourse within speech acts. Here, "redemption" of validity claims means that in communicative action, the speaker's statement must simultaneously satisfy the above three validity claims for the communicative action to proceed. Second, to demonstrate an epistemological concept of consensual truth, truth must be reducible to the meaning of epistemological "truthfulness."
From this, it is evident that achieving consensual truth requires demonstrating that the speaker of the discourse possesses the characteristic of truth. At the same time, however, whether a speaker's discourse possesses the characteristic of truth can only be judged within an ongoing speech act or dialogue. Therefore, once the claim to truth is questioned, we cannot accurately distinguish whether the achieved consensus is a true (wahren) or a false (falschen) one. To address this, Habermas subsequently proposed the third core thesis of his consensus theory: an "ideal speech situation" (ideale Sprechsituation) is required to test the aforementioned validity claims. This so-called ideal speech situation means that every participant has an equal and open opportunity to enter the discourse; meanwhile, within the ideal speech situation, participants are free from any external coercive or manipulative forces while engaging in dialogue and argumentation.
To better articulate these three core theses, Habermas proposed two attitudinal presuppositions: the "performative attitude" (Performative Einstellung) and the "reflexive attitude" (Reflexive Einstellung). The performative attitude emphasizes the irresistible presupposed beliefs held within everyday practice. We must believe a proposition "$p$" is unconditionally true under the "performative attitude," whereas we question whether proposition "$p$" is false under the "reflexive attitude." For example, that "the sky will not fall" is a latent performative attitude: "In everyday practice, as we have seen, socialized individuals depend on the certainty of action; as long as they are supported by knowledge that is accepted without reservation, these certainties can maintain themselves. The corresponding grammatical fact is that when we make the assertion '$p$' in a 'performative attitude,' we must unconditionally believe '$p$' to be true." However, relying solely on the performative attitude cannot explain why the proposition "the sky will not fall" is correct—that is, "why, once a proposition is rationally accepted under conditions of rational discourse, we can consider the explicitly raised claim that '$p$' is true to be correct." This requires a reflexive attitude to examine "why proposition '$p$' is true," wherein the reflexive attitude focuses on testing validity claims within the ideal speech situation.
However, the above discussion contains two implicit presuppositions, which led Habermas to conflate the performative and reflexive attitudes, thereby causing logical contradictions in his theoretical demonstration. First, he presupposed a rejection of skepticism. In his discussion, Habermas only pointed out that skepticism faces the dilemma of self-defeat without further demonstrating his own view, which is akin to saying, "I know all the words in the world because any word I don't know is not a word"—that is, he is suspected of "begging the question" [3] by directly treating his own view as evidence. Second, the "necessary apriority" he presupposed is limited to the formal level. If pragmatics only emphasizes formal meaning, then it does not necessarily entail validity claims with substantive content. Starting from these two presuppositions, Habermas believed there existed a relationship of "material implication" between the performative attitude and the reflexive attitude.
Yet it was precisely this conclusion that brought about the self-negation of the consensus theory of truth. Regarding this conclusion, an extreme skeptic could completely refuse to acknowledge these two validity presuppositions, and a moderate skeptic could choose to acknowledge the first while rejecting the second. However, the second validity presupposition is precisely the prerequisite for Habermas to demonstrate his principle of universality. Obviously, if the performative attitude and the reflexive attitude are in a relationship of "material implication," then it is equivalent to saying that truth is identical to justification. Yet, in an epistemological sense, truth necessarily requires that it can be reduced to the meaning of truthfulness. According to Habermas, justification is essentially a rational consensus reached intersubjectively, and this rational consensus simply cannot be reduced to the meaning of truthfulness. One could say that if Habermas starts from the conclusion that "truth is identical to justification," he not only fails to cogently demonstrate a normative truth in the epistemological sense but also fails to make his own consensus theory of truth self-consistent. Naturally, Habermas soon realized this problem and rapidly turned toward the self-critique and revision of the consensus theory of truth.
II. The Unthematized and Contextualized Nature of the Lifeworld
As previously mentioned, the conflation of the performative and reflexive attitudes was the key to the problems in Habermas's demonstration. To solve the problem, it is necessary to restate these two attitudes and their relationship. In Habermas's view, the reason he conflated them was that his demonstration lacked a realist foundation. Accordingly, he chose to introduce the concept of the "lifeworld" as the realist basis for his discourse, viewing the lifeworld as a "quasi-transcendental" existence situated between the transcendental and the empirical. He regarded it as the prerequisite for pragmatics and semantics, thereby providing a restatement of the performative and reflexive attitudes.
In essence, the dual characteristic of the lifeworld lies in the fact that it "simultaneously constitutes the horizon of the speech situation and the source of interpretive achievement, while it is itself reproduced only through communicative action." On the one hand, the objective reality of the world always appears as necessary presupposed "background knowledge"; on the other hand, the lifeworld as this background knowledge is always the source through which participants in communicative action define and determine the situation in which they find themselves.
From the first dimension, the lifeworld constitutes the realist foundation of Habermas's pragmatic argumentation. It possesses the essential characteristic of being "unthematized" and emphasizes a "performative attitude." As a form of background knowledge, it serves as the latent background prerequisite for people's everyday communicative action; thus, one must adopt a performative attitude and unconditionally believe in its certainty. Through this, Habermas emphasizes that in the performative speech acts of individuals, background knowledge with normative content is always presupposed a priori as a pragmatic condition, thereby explaining the "always-already" [4] nature of the performative attitude. It must be noted, however, that while the lifeworld consists of "unthematized" knowledge, this does not mean it will forever remain unthematized or in a state of "overgrowth." This is because problematic nodes [质疑] continuously emerge from the lifeworld alongside the subject's everyday communicative practices—that is, they undergo constant "thematization." This suggests that problematic nodes are doubts, suspicions, or issues that stand out from the lifeworld; they are the thematized manifestations of problems. Consequently, eliminating these problematic nodes becomes the key to revising the consensus theory of truth, which necessitates an explanation of the second dimension (the contextualized dimension of the lifeworld).
From the second dimension, once participants in communicative action encounter a "sudden" situation, they require a "reflexive attitude" between the dialogical subjects to repair the ruptured background knowledge. Social interaction must occur within a specific context; therefore, participants in communicative action must constantly determine the situation they inhabit based on the lifeworld. Generally speaking, time and space are relatively fixed and determinable contexts. For example, if a teacher asks a student to go to the laboratory to retrieve experimental tools and limits the return time to ten minutes, assuming the teacher’s speech act satisfies the validity claims of discourse (truth, rightness, and sincerity), the student first considers the distance from the classroom to the nearest laboratory and the time required for the round trip. Since the spatial distance is fixed, the travel time can generally be determined. This validates the validity of the teacher's utterance within a determined context.
However, beyond time and space, there exist certain indeterminable and emergent situations. For instance, if the nearest laboratory is closed today, the student must modify the plan and re-determine the space and time in which the tools can be obtained. Such indeterminate situations change as different themes become prominent. Habermas defines these as "situations of action," which possess a dynamic, horizonal [5] character. This dynamic horizon generates various situations, large and small, which constitute the center of the lifeworld and represent partial reflections of the lifeworld limited to a specific theme. This dynamic context breaks the certainty originally accepted as a matter of course within the lifeworld. "Once these certainties are removed from the framework we take for granted in the lifeworld and are thus no longer naively accepted, they turn into many questionable hypotheses." In today's era of rapid information development, information has become a computer language that can be encoded and reduced. When subjects engage in communicative action, they often do not even need to determine spatial-temporal contexts; yet, more emergent situations in the digital world continue to surface incessantly, making the discussion of dynamic situations even more necessary.
We can understand the aforementioned definition of context as follows: if the unthematized nature of the lifeworld is a manifestation of a static "viewing" horizon, then the problematic node is the manifestation of a dynamic "action" situation. The situation of action demonstrates that "the truth or untruth of a proposition can only become a topic of discussion when practice fails and contradictions appear." Therefore, relying solely on the unthematized character of the lifeworld cannot resolve our challenges to validity claims; to eliminate problematic nodes, one must proceed within the situation of action. The emergence of an action situation signifies the prominence of a problematic node, and to eliminate it, one must engage in "discourse" [6] between participants of communicative action. Thus, discourse—while validity claims remain unchallenged—is extracted from the lifeworld and specifically utilized to handle emergent problematic nodes.
One might say that the function of discourse lies in eliminating the uncertain "contextualized" features that emerge from the lifeworld; it is the arena where the reflexive attitude comes into play. When validity claims that were taken for granted in the lifeworld are challenged, communicative action is temporarily extracted from the lifeworld and enters into intersubjective discourse. In discourse, problematic nodes must be eliminated through the process of reflective dialogue and argumentation between speakers. At this point, the participants in communicative action undergo a temporary identity shift, transforming from actors into interlocutors participating in discourse, and they engage in dialogue and debate regarding the emergent problem. In this way, the performative attitude and the reflexive attitude are respectively placed within the lifeworld and discourse, forming a new set of correspondences:
Performative attitude → "Asserting that ‘p’ is true" → Lifeworld Reflexive attitude → "The assertion that ‘p’ is true is correct" → Discourse
It is not difficult to see that Habermas’s classification of the determined situations of the lifeworld is relatively coarse. This is closely related to his borrowing of the "lifeworld" [生活世界] concept from Husserl and Alfred Schutz. On one hand, he sought to introduce the lifeworld concepts from phenomenology and social phenomenology to explain his own rational theory of social critique; on the other hand, he believed the phenomenological lifeworld was "a concept for constructing the world borrowed from epistemology" that had to be transformed to be applicable. In other words, he wanted to incorporate both the "viewing" perspective of the lifeworld in the phenomenological sense and the "action" perspective in the social phenomenological sense into his own theory, yet he did not fully identify with either. This led him to a somewhat simplistic partitioning of Schutz’s and Husserl’s views when distinguishing between time, space, and action situations. He retained Schutz’s distinction of the social world based on time and space but discarded Schutz’s deeper distinctions regarding the four worlds (the world of contemporaries, consociates, predecessors, and successors); simultaneously, he retained only the dynamic "horizonal" quality of Husserl’s lifeworld.
The aforementioned moves fully reveal Habermas’s theoretical intention: to extract discourse from the lifeworld, viewing it as a temporary arena for resolving problematic nodes emerging from the lifeworld, and thereby resolving the logical problems that arise in the process of justifying validity claims. This is, in effect, using a "theory of truth as the elimination of problematic nodes" (Entsorgungstheorie der Wahrheit) to revise his consensus theory of truth. Of course, after eliminating the problem, we must still return to the lifeworld: "even if we can choose to withdraw from discourse and discussion, we can never withdraw from the practical requirements of the lifeworld." Evidently, the unthematized character of the lifeworld holds a more foundational status relative to the contextualized theme of discourse. Viewed this way, the lifeworld, as the background knowledge from which problematic nodes emerge, can also be understood as a "situation." However, unlike discourse as a concrete situation, the lifeworld is a "Situation" with a capital S that encompasses all situations; discourse aimed at eliminating problematic nodes presupposes the existence of the lifeworld.
III. "Action Truth" in Contextual Transition
In Habermas’s work, truth is always a "regulative idea" (Regulative Idee), which requires truth to possess an inherently normative dimension. After re-explaining the performative and reflexive attitudes, he began to provide a new normative definition of truth. At the same time, he opposed Gadamer's approach of choosing between "truth" and "method," advocating instead for the integration of epistemology and methodology. This requires that normative truth must simultaneously contain a factual dimension. To this end, Habermas attempts to argue from two aspects:
On one hand, the justification for the normative meaning of truth shifts from the cognitive to the non-cognitive. According to the consensus theory of truth, a proposition is correct because it can be agreed upon or recognized by all relevant persons. In reality, however, this is not the case; it is precisely because a proposition is correct that we should agree with it. Habermas realized that the concept of truth does not necessarily have to be epistemological. Consequently, Habermas further adopted the "pragmatic turn" (Pragmatischer Wende), pointing out that truth is not an epistemological concept but a concept of action-norms in a pragmatic sense. Habermas’s move stemmed from his critique of Richard Rorty’s view of truth. In his view, Rorty’s "pragmatic turn" was not a turn toward pragmatics, but toward empirical pragmatism. What Habermas wanted to do was to transcend this pragmatist turn and, as a "realist after the pragmatist turn," propose an action-truth that leaves room for the problems of normative validity and the foundations of discourse.
Regarding the aforementioned revision, Karl-Otto Apel commented that the key term used in Habermas's German text was Entsorgung rather than the English "disposal." This is a "theory of elimination" (Entsorgungstheorie) of argumentative discourse, which "will enter into the theory of universal pragmatics (and Peirceanism), according to which the process of argumentation is guided by the 'regulative idea' of seeking truth." Through Apel’s analysis, we can see: first, Habermas no longer regards truth as an epistemological concept but as a pragmatic action-norm; second, although truth is no longer an epistemological concept, it retains its justificatory function in the epistemological sense. Thus, Habermas replaced the previous concept of "epistemological truth in a pragmatic perspective" (Der epistemische Wahrheitsbegriff in pragmatischer Perspektive) with the concept of "pragmatic truth/action truth" (Der pragmatische Wahrheitsbegriff).
At this stage, Habermas stopped fixating on defining cognitive truth and began to emphasize the actual utility truth can exert within the lifeworld and discourse. In discourse, we can know "the 'cautionary' use of the truth-predicate and the fallibility of our claims"; whereas in the practical situations of everyday life (the lifeworld), "the unconditionality of truth will clearly manifest itself." In the process of action, we have no room to doubt the truth; once we stop crossing a bridge or stop driving a car, it must be "based on a position of hypothetical judgment arising from our doubts." In this context, the dual attributes of truth naturally emerge.
On the other hand, a normative truth must demonstrate two attributes: reflexivity and action-certainty. How then can one discuss a truth that both emphasizes normative meaning and satisfies the demands of everyday action? Habermas focused his attention on the participants in communicative action, attempting to make a breakthrough through their identity transformation (i.e., the shift between "actor" and "interlocutor") within the lifeworld and discourse. (Table 1 omitted)
First, from the perspective of the lifeworld, communicative action is "a general mechanism of social integration in everyday life," while the lifeworld is the background arena deeply rooted in the communicative action of people's daily practical lives. Simultaneously, the lifeworld possesses three basic characteristics—absoluteness, totalizing power, and a holistic conception—requiring a conviction in the reality of the objective world; that is, it requires the participant in communicative action to exist as a realist. This means that what the lifeworld requires is not a reflective subject, but a subject of action. As Wittgenstein put it, "If I do an experiment, I do not doubt the existence of the apparatus before my eyes," because the fact that "the apparatus truly exists and is precise" is a latent condition for the practical feasibility of the action of "doing an experiment."
Second, from the perspective of discourse, such unquestionable validity claims in the lifeworld are merely a "naive" attitude—a naivety that limits the motivation of participants in communicative action to engage in critique or reflection. Therefore, when "doubts" in the lifeworld become problematized, the subjects of action must enter into discourse: "Only when they transition from action to discourse do participants adopt a reflexive attitude and, based on reasons for and against, contest the now-thematized truth of a disputed proposition." At this point, the identity of the participants in communicative action temporarily shifts from subjects of action to subjects of reflection—that is, from actors to interlocutors. The task of the interlocutor is to grasp "all relevant information and consider all relevant reasons," to be convinced that "potential objections to the proposition 'p' have been exhausted," and to eliminate the "motivation to continue arguing," thereby "relieving the uncertainty highlighted by the lifeworld." This suggests that "when a participant in argumentation becomes convinced of the justification of a previously disputed validity claim, they can be brought by the unforced force of the better argument to that nodal point of perspective-switching." At this juncture, the participants in communicative action shift back from interlocutors to actors, returning once more to the everyday lifeworld.
Third, after completing this identity transformation of "actor-interlocutor-actor," the participants in communicative action can strip away the temporary reflexive attitude and return to the process of communicative action convinced of the reality of the objective world, dealing with the world "naively" once again. At this time, whether the disagreement is between "us" or between "us" and "them," the possibility arises for different worlds to merge together once the dispute is resolved.
Habermas maintains that this skillfully resolves the contradiction between truth and justification: on the one hand, the unconditionality of truth is placed within the performative attitude of being convinced of the reality of the objective world in everyday practical life; on the other hand, the rational acceptability of justification is limited to the reflexive attitude of discourse. Consequently, the unconditionality of truth and the rational acceptability of justification are respectively established through the shifting identities of the participants in communicative action. The contradictory relationship between truth and justification is thus transformed into a learning process of constant "perspective-switching" (Wechsel der Perspektive) within the processes of daily communicative action and discourse. (Figure 1 omitted)
Once we accept this setup, we no longer seek the meaning of truth in an epistemological judgment that is "no longer fallible." Instead, we emphasize the continuous elimination of doubt and the achievement of consensus through discourse, converting this consensus into the certainty of action. Consensus thus becomes the bridge for participants in communicative action to return to the lifeworld; it redeems the validity claim of truth within discourse and therefore possesses a trans-subjective universal validity.
At this point, the logical thread of Habermas’s revision of the consensus theory of truth has fully emerged. First, the consensus theory of truth lacked a realistic foundation when arguing for "cognitive truth," leading to its self-negation. Second, Habermas introduced the concept of the "lifeworld," setting about his revision from its two dimensions: "unthematized" and "situated." Finally, through the identity transformation of participants in communicative action between the lifeworld and discourse, he proposed a non-cognitive concept of "truth in action." If Habermas’s logical exposition holds, then the certainty and reflexivity of action can be simultaneously incorporated into the concept of truth and manifested through "truth in action." We can not only mutually recognize the truth of a proposition in communicative action but also avoid measuring this truth by a purely epistemological standard.
It can be said that amidst the many voices questioning, dissolving, and deconstructing truth, Habermas has consistently maintained a pro-truth stance, continuously exploring the possibility of a "social action turn" in philosophical epistemology—a process that is itself of particular significance. This represents a proactive attempt to break away from the "logic of the bystander" inherent in the philosophy of pure consciousness and move toward the "context of action" in social action theory. His reason for proposing "truth in action" is to endow social action with normative significance, emphasizing continuous critique and reflection within action. In fact, the problem of action is the problem of practice. Through "truth in action," Habermas not only links his own epistemology with critical social theory but also lays the theoretical foundation for his subsequent development of discourse ethics and political philosophy. On a concrete level, based on the non-cognitive turn in the meaning of truth, he uses the validity claims of rule-following speech acts as a condition and the normative content implicit in the pragmatics of speech acts as a clue to realize the pursuit of the normative meaning of truth. If we pay attention not only to how language represents but also to its role as a medium of communication, then even if we ultimately cannot exhaustively prove a concept of truth in the epistemological sense, we can still jointly unfold interpretations of the objective world in communicative action mediated by language and interact with others in the practice of daily life. In this way, the validity claims raised in communicative action can equally exert their realist foundation, promoting solidarity in the life-practice between subjects.
IV. Challenges and Responses to the Regression of Intersubjective Communicative Action in the Digital Age
Overall, the "action turn" in Habermas's consensus theory of truth demonstrates unique theoretical characteristics over the course of his intellectual development. As a breakthrough for his own theoretical dilemmas, this theory not only reflects his profound understanding of the close integration of truth and method but also highlights his theoretical orientation of guiding social action through philosophical reflection. Entering the digital age, the regression of intersubjective communicative action has become a realistic challenge that cannot be ignored. This regression is manifested not only in the reduction of rational dialogue and consensus-building between subjects but also poses a profound threat to social harmony and stability. In this context, Habermas’s thought on "truth in action" reveals unique theoretical value. The rational dialogue, consensus-building, and reflexive critique he emphasizes provide precisely the theoretical foundation and practical guidance needed to meet the challenges of communicative regression in the digital age.
First, while the information explosion of the digital age has expanded the boundaries of human knowledge, it has increased cognitive load, hindering the process of rational reflection and consensus-building. More importantly, although access to information has become unprecedentedly convenient, truly deep and truthful knowledge often requires a significant investment of time and energy to obtain. As people's dependence on the internet and the digital world deepens daily, the problems of information overload and the proliferation of misinformation have become increasingly prominent. This not only makes information filtering difficult but may also lead to individual cognitive fatigue or even trigger negative social emotions, severely affecting communicative action between subjects. For example, after information is disseminated and reposted online, the original speaker's intention is often stripped away, thereby affecting or even obstructing communication and exchange between subjects. Language is the primary carrier of human communication; its digital transformation detaches information from the subject itself, further impacting social and trust relationships between subjects. As the scholar Byung-Chul Han [7] has noted: "Digital total-networking (Totalvernetzung) and total-communication (Totalkommunikation) have not made it easier for people to encounter 'the other.' On the contrary, it makes it easier for people to pass by strangers and 'others'—ignoring their existence—to find 'the same' or like-minded individuals, thereby leading to an increasingly narrow horizon of experience." Once misinformation saturates the lifeworld, it affects the rationality and fairness of intersubjective communicative action. In the face of this reality, Habermas's reflection on the identity transformation of actors between the lifeworld and the discursive context appears particularly important. When actors cannot distinguish the truth or falsehood of information, they can temporarily withdraw from the certainty of the lifeworld and enter a discursive context to engage in reflection and dialogue with other actors, reaching a rationality that both parties can mutually accept, thereby enhancing their ability to identify misinformation. This dialogical way of thinking provides a vital theoretical resource for dealing with the challenge of misinformation in the digital age.
Second, the operation of algorithmic mechanisms further dissolves the shared context upon which intersubjective communicative action relies. Social media platforms construct customized information streams by collecting data on user behavior and preferences, forcibly transforming the originally "unthematized" background of the lifeworld into thematized content. This transformation turns societal norms, values, and other presuppositions—which originally functioned as background knowledge—into specific themes within an information stream. The result is that users gradually become passive recipients of recommended content, finding it difficult to maintain an attitude of unconditional acceptance toward background knowledge. Simultaneously, algorithmic recommendation mechanisms cause the information and views users encounter to converge, leading them into the predicament of "information cocoons." [8] This not only weakens the foundational role of the intersubjective "shared lifeworld" but also seriously affects the development of critical thinking. The "reflexive attitude" proposed by Habermas can play a significant role here. The core of his reflexive attitude lies in the activation of the subject's agency and critical thinking, as well as the importance of dialogue. Through a reflexive attitude, the subject no longer passively accepts the background knowledge of the lifeworld but actively judges its truth and validity, questioning and revising background knowledge that was originally taken for granted, thereby promoting intersubjective communication and mutual understanding. This stimulation of critical thinking and promotion of dialogue helps subjects recover their cognition of the shared lifeworld foundation within an environment of algorithmic recommendations and information cocoons, rebuilding rational consensus and social ties between subjects.
Finally, the continuous reinforcement of algorithmic recommendations and information cocoons has also driven the rise of dataism and "data fetishism," [9] making intersubjective digital consensus on truth increasingly fragile. It is evident that in the digital age, consensus on truth is more likely to fall prey to technological manipulation rather than being a manifestation of truth itself. This trend deeply echoes Albrecht Wellmer's [10] critique of the "ideal speech situation" in Habermas's consensus theory of truth. Even if algorithmic platforms formally satisfy the procedural conditions of an "ideal speech situation"—such as open registration and equal rights to speak—it may still lead to the production of false consensus. Therefore, consensus on truth in the digital age needs to transcend pure verbal argumentation and turn toward a verification paradigm of "collaborative action." To this end, Habermas's important revision of the consensus theory of truth—especially the dual perspective of "cognition-action"—provides an important theoretical and practical framework for addressing the fragility of truth-consensus and the problem of false consensus. Through this perspective, users can actively engage in practice and collaborative action during dialogue and communication with other actors, verifying whether the information streams brought by algorithmic recommendations and "information cocoons" conform to the logic and validity of the real world, identifying false information, and avoiding the production of false consensus. At the same time, the dual perspective of "cognition-action" not only protects the user's capacity for independent thought and critical judgment but also enables users to better understand the connotation of truth through practical action in digital environments, achieving the maintenance and development of a consensus on truth.
In summary, the concept of building rational consensus through dialogue and communication can reconstruct cognitive resonance and social ties between subjects in the digital age, effectively curbing the trend of communicative regression. The innovativeness of Habermas's theory lies in its ability to both maintain the inheritance of the critical spirit of traditional Marxism and adapt to the new practical requirements of the digital age, providing theoretical support and practical guidance for solving real-world problems.