Qu Xiaoshuang: Ancient Chinese Supervisory System: Evolution, Characteristics, and Insights
The "Recommendations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Formulating the Fifteenth Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development," deliberated and adopted at the Fourth Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee, proposed improving the Party and state supervision systems and strengthening the regulation and supervision of the allocation and exercise of power. The original meaning of "supervision" (监察 jiānchá) involved appearing before water to adjust one's dress or scrutinizing flora; naturally, it carries the connotation of a superior observing an inferior with meticulous detail. Regarding the attributes of power, supervisory power stands alongside legislative, executive, and judicial powers as a distinct political power. It demarcates the different functions of public power, specifically overseeing state public officials, restraining their behavior to improve efficiency, and maintaining political order.
In a narrow sense, the supervisory system is a normative framework for denouncing and sanctioning illegal acts and dereliction of duty by public officials, encompassing personnel staffing, the scope of authority, and the application of law. In a broad sense, it refers to the complete supervisory function—a key link in the national governance system. In ancient China, the supervisory system was primarily used to ensure the normal operation of the ruling class's state machinery. It consolidated the supremacy of imperial power by supervising the unified implementation of laws and government orders, and it regulated the expansion of bureaucratic power by strictly observing discipline and etiquette [N] and severely punishing the fabrication of imperial edicts or the usurpation of authority. It possessed a prominent and independent political status while forming a comprehensive organizational system with a clear division of functional labor. The content of supervision was extensive, involving official duties, finance, military affairs, social customs, ideology, and culture. It covered the fields of legislative decision-making, administrative recommendations, and judicial trials. Methods were diverse, including reporting and accusation, periodic performance evaluations [N], and circuit inspections, achieving internal regulation and a legal basis for action. It is worthy of our deep reflection to continuously promote the creative transformation and innovative development of fine traditional Chinese culture and to draw upon the historical wisdom of the ancient Chinese supervisory system.
I. The Evolution of the Ancient Chinese Supervisory System
The ancient Chinese supervisory system originated early and was rigorously designed, reflecting a highly developed political civilization. In the social form of primitive democracy, supervision relied entirely on the power of worship toward leaders, the power of collective custom, and moral force to fulfill its functions. During the slave society period, there already existed supervision by public opinion, auxiliary supervision, and the appointment of supervisory officials to implement local oversight. Subsequent development can be divided into the embryonic period (Pre-Qin), the formative period (Qin and Han), the maturing period (Sui and Tang), the transitional period (Song), and the finalized period (Ming and Qing). It roughly underwent three stages: the turbulent formation of institutions, the vigorous development of integration and refinement, and the great synthesis of strict regulation. The Han, Tang, and Ming dynasties are the most typical, representing the distinct characteristics of their respective historical stages.
(1) The Embryonic Pre-Qin Period
Regarding the origin of the ancient Chinese supervisory system, the Xia and Shang theory suggests that the Shang Dynasty's supervision of vassal states involved "supervisors" (jiàn) established by the Shang King to oversee sacrifices during inspections. It also utilized "historians" (shǐ) and temporary envoys to monitor local military commanders. The Western Zhou theory posits that during the long era of "rule by rites" (lǐzhì), even the Son of Heaven, as the supreme political leader, was an object of supervision through forms like "Heavenly supervision" or "Historical supervision," which were often not restricted to a single official. The Warring States theory suggests that parallel systems for supervising and inspecting localities existed during that era.
In fact, as early as the legendary era of the Three Sovereigns and Five Emperors, there existed public opinion supervision by the masses. As stated, "Xuanyuan held discussions at the Ming Terrace, and Fangxun made inquiries at the Qu Chamber; both were means to consult widely with subordinates." [1] Historical records mention the "Banner for Reporting Goodness," the "Drum for Seeking Admonitions," and the "Wood for Criticisms" [2] as channels for ancient tribal leaders like Yao and Shun to accept advice, becoming the earliest forms of primitive democratic rights. Regarding official posts, it is said that the Yellow Emperor "appointed Left and Right Grand Supervisors to oversee all states," who were supervisory officials dispatched by the deliberative council, the supreme organ of power. Although later histories inevitably contain elements of retroactive attribution, it was likely already a social consensus that supervision could maintain the common interests of the tribal alliance. Advice became the primary way clan members participated in social management.
Supervision in slave societies included remonstrance, auxiliary oversight, and Theo-supervision. During the Western Zhou, the practice of "presenting poems to observe folk customs" [3] was a way to admonish the Son of Heaven by collecting public opinion. However, as monarchical autocracy intensified, broad public "criticism" was gradually replaced by a small-scale system of remonstrance among the bureaucratic class. Functional auxiliary bodies were formed; high-ranking elders like the "Three Dukes and Four Assistants" [4] played a supervisory role. Religion became an effective means of constraining monarchical power; the Xia had the "Zhong Master" and the Zhou had the "Six Grand Officials," whose functions in correcting errors among monks and nobles cannot be ignored. Furthermore, the Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties established supervisory officials in the capital and localities, such as the Baoshi who admonished the king's evils and the Fangbo who supervised regions. During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, the trend of recruiting talent flourished, and court supervisory organs were increasingly bolstered. The Dahang and Dajian of the State of Qi possessed supervisory powers, laying a solid foundation for the reforms and strengthening of various states. Throughout the Pre-Qin period, the phenomenon of top-down supervision existed long-term, evolving from obscurity to clarity. It included circuit inspections, secret investigations, soft supervisory methods like providing posthumous titles [N], as well as the emergence of Censors (yùshǐ) in charge of inquiries and supervisory regulations for punishing officials.
(2) The Formative Qin and Han Period
As the beginning of unified central-authoritarian dynasties, the status of power supervision in the operation of the state was continuously strengthened during the Qin and Han periods. The differentiation between supervisory organs and executive organs intensified, manifested by an increase in personnel and a clear internal division of labor. A complete supervisory system from the center to the local level was established, such as the Censorate (yùshǐtái) headed by professional supervisory officials and the Regional Coordinator (cìshǐ) system of the thirteen provinces. Simultaneously, relatively independent supervisory regulations were formed concerning crime punishment and official management. However, issues such as overlapping functions and redundant institutions also existed.
Specifically, the deliberative system established in the Qin performed a certain role in remonstrance supervision; the Han even issued decrees to recruit "men of straightforward speech and extreme remonstrance." The Censor system was founded; the Qin established the Grandee Secretary (yùshǐ dàfū) at court, responsible for leading Censors to "denounce and impeach" officials according to regulations, with Commandery Supervisors at the local level. The Han fully utilized the check-and-balance mechanism between the Grandee Secretary and the Chancellor. Central supervisory organs grew larger; during the Eastern Han, the Palace Secretariat Director, the Palace Assistant Secretary, and the Director of Retainers were known as the "Three Independent Seats," all possessing supervisory functions. Their main duties included rectifying laws, managing statutes, impeaching errors, investigating illegal acts, evaluating officials, recommending talent, managing major trials, adjudicating doubtful cases, capturing bandits, and supervising military campaigns. Local supervisory organs also took shape; the "Six Articles of Inquiry" [5] during the reign of Emperor Wu of Han clearly defined the scope of a Regional Coordinator's investigations.
In the Wei, Jin, and Northern and Southern Dynasties, although supervisory organs became organizationally independent and preliminarily unified with expanded powers, local supervision was weakened. Provincial Regional Coordinators even evolved into local administrative chiefs, bringing hidden dangers to the survival of dynasties. The characteristics of military strongman autocracy led to the "clanship" (ménfá-ization) of the supervisory system. The Chancellery (ménxiàshěng) and the Secretariat, charged with "offering advice and rectification," became decision-making bodies for the highest elite rulers; remonstrance grew heavier while impeachment grew lighter. The establishment of Censorate organs was adapted to the needs of powerful ministers, showing strong instability and randomness.
(3) The Maturing Sui and Tang Period
The supervisory system of the Sui and Tang periods was primarily based on the "Three Court System" within the Censorate—the Palace Court, the Administrative Court, and the Investigation Court—supplemented by organizations of remonstrance officials (jiànguān). The local supervisory system of circuit inspectors for the ten circuits also became increasingly complete. This was manifested in the combination of supervisory and judicial powers to constrain administrative power, and the selection and management of supervisory officials formed specific systems. Compared to the Han and Ming, the Tang supervisory system was characterized by a shift from comprehensive scale to a weakening of institutional power and a decline in the status of Censors; it became increasingly independent, standardized, and legalized, with more emphasis on local supervision.
Specifically, the supervisory organs of the Sui were already a key support for imperial power. The Chancellery, which exercised the highest supervisory power in the Tang, became a balancing force within the supreme power structure, possessing legislative functions such as assisting the Emperor, managing official duties, correcting errors, and overseeing rites. The Emperor not only directly controlled central administrative and military power but could also directly wield supervisory power, using the functions of supervisory organs to control the Chancellor's power, reaching the goal of strengthening central authority. The duties of the Censorate included impeaching the hundred officials, conducting judicial interrogations, and reviewing ceremonies. The rigorous supervisory system from the center to the local level was restored; the Sui had the Directorate of Retainers, and the Tang had the Investigating Censors. Local supervisory divisions increased; local supervisory officials possessed supervisory, administrative, judicial, military, and personnel powers, which eventually led the Tang Dynasty to succumb to the fragmented regional commandery (fánzhèn) forces. During the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms, the Joint Secretariat-Chancellery became the highest decision-making body; the Censor system was disrupted by the usurpation of power by regional commanders, and supervisory power gradually withered.
(4) The Transitional Song Period
A major transformation of the supervisory system during the Song Dynasty was the gradual unification of the powers of "Censure" (tái) and "Remonstrance" (jiàn), which had been separated since the Qin and Han. This allowed supervisory power to constitute a greater constraint on administrative power. The judicial power of the supervisory system further expanded, and measures to ensure the implementation of supervisory regulations were improved. An interlaced supervisory network was established at all local levels, reflecting the principle of the separation and balance of powers. The unification of Censure and Remonstrance in the Song was an inevitable result of historical development—namely, to better supervise and restrain imperial, chancellor, and military power, to better maintain court discipline and normal power distribution, and to end the previous fragmentation of supervisory power. The merging of the functions of Censors reporting matters and Remonstrators impeaching officials both raised the status of supervisory power and promoted the development of the system.
Specifically, the Chancellery in the Song opened new functions for correcting the errors of officials, gaining the responsibility of pre-emptive supervision. The remonstrance system reached its peak in the Song, with an unprecedented complexity of institutions. Censors also began to hold remonstrance powers, and specific "Speaking Censors" were appointed with the power to "discuss matters and strike at evil." The practice of "speaking on the basis of rumor" [N] flourished for a time, and rulers mostly adopted protective policies toward those who spoke. Local supervision was directly controlled by the Emperor, with various monitors, vice-prefects, and judicial officers in place. Particularly, the practice of investigating illegal acts in the economic field led the way for the later establishment of separate auditing organs within supervisory departments. During the Liao, Jin, and Yuan periods, Northern and Southern cultures integrated, presenting a supervisory pattern that emphasized impeachment over remonstrance. The Yuan abolished the Chancellery; the once-powerful Supervising Secretaries existed in name only. However, the status of the Censorate rose, standing as one of the three powers alongside the Secretariat and the Bureau of Military Affairs. The duties of Investigating Censors were broad and heavy. The Yuan also established the Branch Censorate system, forming a three-level network of the Central Censorate, Branch Censorates, and District Supervisors. The "Statutes of the Censorate" (Xiàntái Géli) promulgated by Emperor Shizu of Yuan was the basic regulation for the Censorate's exercise of power, totaling thirty-six articles. The constitutional section defined the scope and status of the Censorate, while the regulatory section provided rules for correcting official errors and punishing illegalities, making supervisory work increasingly legislated.
(5) The Finalized Ming and Qing Period
The supervisory system of the Ming and Qing included the "Single Chamber System" of the Court of State Ceremonial (reorganized as the Censorate/Duchayuan), the supervision of the Six Ministries by the Supervising Secretaries of the Six Offices alongside the thirteen circuits of Investigating Censors, and the unification of these "Offices and Circuits." This reflected the high degree of completion of the system. The power of supervisory organs expanded greatly, involving personnel promotion and demotion, judicial auditing, water transport and customs, land reclamation and military affairs, and even ideology and scholarship. Secret service supervision like the "Brocade Guard" [N] also appeared. Under the restraint of extreme monarchical autocracy, the Ming supervisory system was rigorously set and harshly executed; its feelers extended from the various offices even to the common people.
Organizationally, the Ming created the Office of Transmission to manage imperial edicts, communicate lower-level sentiments, and handle memorials. The Supervising Secretaries of the Six Offices (Personnel, Revenue, Rites, War, Justice, and Works) held powers of veto, impeachment, judicial review, and remonstrance. Locally, the Provincial Surveillance Commission managed supervision and criminal justice, while Investigating Censors specifically performed circuit inspections. The system of Grand Coordinators (xūnfǔ) was also created to restrain local power. Regarding regulations, the "Statutes of the Censorate" promulgated by the Zhengtong Emperor and the supervisory sections of the "Collected Statutes of the Great Ming" revised by the Wanli Emperor provided clear stipulations on organization, operation, scope, details, discipline, and rewards, becoming the code of conduct for supervisory officials. In the Qing Dynasty, the institutional reform of unifying Censure and Remonstrance was formally completed, and national centralization was reinforced to an unprecedented degree. Supervisory organs held powers to deliberate on state affairs, correct errors, oversee administration, evaluate and impeach officials, join in trials for major cases, clarify injustices, and audit accounts. Supervisory regulations included the "Imperially Commissioned Regulations for the Censorate" from the Qianlong era, the "Regulations of the Censorate," and the supervisory parts of the "Collected Statutes of the Qing," which can be called the great synthesis of national supervisory legal codes.
II. Characteristics of the Ancient Chinese Supervisory System
In...
Against the backdrop of "the rule of man" as the fundamental political characteristic of feudal society, supervision [11] served as a vital function of state organization in exercising governance. Although the supervisory system of ancient China functioned as a concentrated expression of the ruling class’s state will, it also integrated the demands of society at large, acting as a regulator and stabilizer between various power and interest relationships. Consequently, if one wishes to summarize the historical characteristics of the ancient Chinese supervisory system, it is necessary to grasp the thread of "relationships" based on the expansionary tendencies of power. By cutting in from the perspectives of the boundaries, structures, and subjects of power—and by understanding the internal laws of coordination and fragmentation within power relations—one can focus on the confrontations of power between administration and supervision, central and local authorities, as well as the conflicts of interest between individuals, institutions, and laws. Only then can one achieve a comprehensive understanding through the examination of specific cases.
(1) From the perspective of power boundaries, the problem of the "administratization" of local supervisory power continuously threatened political security.
In ancient China, it was a common occurrence for officials supervising local regions to usurp military and political power, or for high-ranking local administrative officials to oversee local supervisory powers. In his investigation into the political successes and failures of successive dynasties, Qian Mu [12] noted the phenomenon of central supervisory officials becoming local administrative chiefs. The original intent was the centralization of power, but as it evolved to the extreme, the "tail became too big to wag" [13], leading even to rebellion against the center. During the Qin and Han dynasties, regional governors (Shou), chancellors (Xiang), and county magistrates (Ling, Zhang) were both local administrative chiefs and the highest supervisory officers within their jurisdictions. The Regional Coordinator (Cishi) further combined the dual functions of supervision and local administration. This represented a fusion of supervisory and administrative powers within local administrative organs. Subordinate officials such as the Post Inspector (Duyou) and Palace Aide (Tingyuan) served simultaneously as local supervisory officers and subordinates to regional and county chiefs, which even caused supervisory power to succumb to administrative power.
The Cishi system, in particular, was originally designed to have a fixed seat of government to facilitate reports and accusations from officials and the people, to be subordinate to the center to avoid hierarchical conflicts of interest with the locality, and to have a prescribed scope of supervision to prevent the muddled mixing of duties. Although low in rank, these officials held great power and were well-rewarded for their success in oversight and impeachment. Regular inspection tours allowed them to strike at the heart of problems. In practice, however, alienation often occurred, deviating from the original design. From the end of the Western Han dynasty, the Cishi's oversight powers expanded daily, gradually breaking free from the restrictions of the "Six Articles of Inquiry" [14]. By the end of the Eastern Han, the Cishi’s overstepping of authority to intervene in local administration shifted from being illegal to legal; the Emperor explicitly granted them the power to act on behalf of the regional governor and gave them command over troops. During the Wei and Jin periods, Cishi often held generalships and "opened offices" (kaifu), concurrently managing military, political, and civil affairs, commanding over a thousand soldiers and ten thousand officials, and participating in the turbulent struggles for hegemony. By the Tang dynasty, there was the expansion of the Regional Commanders (Jiedushi) and the "fan-zhen" (frontier commandery) forces. The appointment of Jiedushi was originally intended to defend against incursions by ethnic minorities on the borders. Governing a "Circuit" (Dao) as their jurisdiction, they often concurrently served as Observation Commissioners in supervisory districts, holding military, financial, administrative, and supervisory powers, eventually developing into regional warlord forces. The An Lushan Rebellion [15] severely damaged the foundations of the Tang. Zhu Wen, the Prince of Liang and Jiedushi of Xuanwu, eventually destroyed the Tang, ushering in the era of fragmentation known as the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms, where military organs became the pivot of the state machine.
When the Provincial Governor (Xunfu) was first established in the Ming dynasty, it was merely a temporary commissioned post, primarily supervising river works, grain supplies, and military affairs. The Supreme Commander (Zongdu) was likewise a title for overseeing military affairs, to be abolished once the task was complete. However, to suppress local rebellions, these temporary posts gradually became permanent, evolving into the highest local military and political chiefs. In the Qing dynasty, the Zongdu and Xunfu, as high-ranking "frontier officials" (fengjiang dali), were further given concurrent titles as supervisory officials of the central Censorate (Ducha Yuan), enjoying supreme status and power. It is evident that, alongside the simplification of supervisory organs and the diversification of supervisory methods, the ancient Chinese supervisory system exhibited a contradictory trend: the continuous concentration and strengthening of central supervisory power versus the increasing disintegration and weakening of local supervisory power. This was primarily manifested in the evolution of the Han dynasty Cishi (a supervisory role) into the Zhoumu (the highest local administrative chief), the Tang dynasty Dao (a supervisory district) into the highest local administrative division, and the Ming and Qing Ming dynasty Xunfu and Zongdu into the highest-level local administrative chiefs. This altered the relative independence of supervisory power, resulting in feudal fragmentation and corruption in officialdom. While beneficial for suppressing uprisings and resistance, it was essentially a regression in feudal administration.
The root of the problem lay in the system itself: a system determined by a rigorous hierarchy where the "noble govern the humble" and supervision is a one-way, top-down process. This was a problem the feudal ruling class could never resolve. They should have established a relationship of checks where duties were linked but interests differed, restricting powers to prevent excessive intervention and to sever the long-evolved ties of shared destiny and interest. From the perspective of power operation, the systems of central-authorized supervision, central-resident supervision, and central-roving supervision were all limited by the internal administrative oversight system. This also led to the difficulty of curbing inaction, distortion, and the abuse of supervisory power, which in turn influenced the rise and fall of dynasties.
(2) From the perspective of power structure, the continuously improving inspection system favored the maintenance of central authority.
The inspection system (xunshi zhidu) was one of the primary forms of the ancient Chinese supervisory system. Supervisory power was directly held by the monarch, severing the interest ties between the supervisors and the supervised at the local level. Following principles such as "internal and external reciprocity" and "mutual checks between upper and lower levels," it evolved from the temporary dispatch of personnel to permanent residency in localities. Through the combination of routine inspections and specialized inspections, its scope continuously expanded, and the selection of inspection officials became increasingly strict.
From a historical perspective, the ancient Chinese inspection system germinated in primitive society, took shape during the Qin and Han, reached maturity in the High Tang, and was strengthened during the Ming and Qing, gradually evolving into a system of inspection organs, functions, and legal regulations with Chinese characteristics. Legend has it that during the time of Shun [16], there was already a "tour of inspection every five years" to examine the performance and public morality of local feudal lords. The Xia, Shang, and Zhou dynasties had "tours of the four directions." During the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, there was a "system of county inspections" aimed at correcting illegalities and evaluating officials. During the Qin and Han dynasties, imperial "inspection tours" continued, and a clearly layered inspection system was formed. In the Western Han, the Cishi toured their assigned regions to supervise illegal activities, including "counterfeiting coins," "unjust trials," "corruption of officials," "inequality in corvée labor," "predatory behavior against the people," and "spreading inflammatory or supernatural rumors," targeting local "strongmen" (haoqiang) specifically. Furthermore, outside of the legally mandated content, the Cishi were not permitted to overstep their authority in their investigations. For instance, Bao Xuan, the Governor of Yuzhou during the reign of Emperor Ai of Han, was impeached and dismissed for "appointing officials and hearing lawsuits on behalf of the 2,000-picul officials" [17], thereby encroaching on their authority. In the Sui dynasty, the Sili Tai (Directorate of Retainers) exercised supervisory power according to the "Six Articles of Inspection," and the scope of oversight expanded. The Tang dynasty established a regular local roving supervisory system through the "circuit inspection" (fendao xunan). The Song dynasty required supervisory officials to tour their entire jurisdiction within a specified time and prohibited them from lingering too long in one place. The Yuan dynasty had the Su-zheng Lian-fang Shi (Commissioners for Purifying Administration and Consolidating Integrity) to conduct inspections of their regions. In the Ming and Qing dynasties, multiple inspection methods were used interchangeably. The Inspecting Censors (xunan yushi) were directly responsible to the emperor, serving as the "ears and eyes" of the Son of Heaven.
Taken as a whole, the main differences between the ancient Chinese inspection system and the Party’s current inspection system lie in the setup of inspection organs, the power and duties of inspection personnel, and the methods of inspection work. In terms of historical periods, the system underwent important stages from sparse to dense—becoming habitual, institutionalized, independent, professional, standardized, and comprehensive. It is characterized by increasingly sophisticated institutional construction, the growing prevalence of the phenomenon where "the small supervise the great" (officials of lower rank supervising those of higher rank), increasingly rigorous selection, more flexible and effective methods, and clearer definitions of duties and powers. These points offer enlightening lessons for today’s inspection system.
(3) From the perspective of the subjects of power, increasingly strict selection and management strengthened the ranks of supervisory officials.
Ancient China always attached great importance to the selection and management of supervisory officials. Extant literature is replete with records of "virtuous officials" (xunli) and "harsh officials" (kuli). It is said that "Virtue (xun) means following; it means following the public law above and following human sentiment below." Most of these officials had engaged in supervisory work and were characterized by a character of integrity and the courage to speak plainly, a cultural literacy characterized by broad learning and familiarity with ritual and law, as well as rich experience and a good record of governance. Regarding the political morality of censors, the Tang dynasty emphasized uprightness, the Ming emphasized loyalty to the monarch, and the Qing emphasized integrity and diligence. In terms of cultural literacy, during the Han and Wei periods, those who ranked highest in the imperial examinations (duice) were often appointed as censors, while from the Sui and Tang through the Ming and Qing, "presented scholars" (jinshi) [18] were heavily utilized. Regarding administrative experience, there was a general shift from requiring high-level administrative experience to requiring grassroots administrative experience.
Through institutional regulations regarding selection procedures, evaluation, rewards, punishments, and "re-supervision," officials with excellent political morality were frequently promoted. Conversely, punishments for supervisory officials for failures in oversight, false accusations, bribery, or recommending the wrong people were extremely severe. Methods of avoidance and rotation were also utilized to enhance the effectiveness of the supervisory system, playing a certain role in curbing administrative corruption. The appointment of supervisory officials originally had no fixed formula, but with the strengthening of central authority, they were gradually appointed by imperial decree. Behind the phenomenon of rapid promotion lay aggravated punishments for violations of discipline and law. The scope of their job-related avoidance (conflict of interest) was broader than that of general civil officials, including duties, relatives, and place of origin. Strict seniority limits and age requirements also served as important guarantees for a high-quality corps of supervisory officials; for example, officials who had been disciplined were restricted from re-entering the supervisory system.
Broadly speaking, ancient Chinese supervisory officials were both the subjects executing supervisory activities and key players in the chain of national governance and power allocation. A clear and effective selection system for supervisory officials is a successful experience in national governance. The formulation of relevant standards is closely related to the configuration of state power and the requirements of professionalization. Reasonable methods and detailed restrictions provided the guarantee for supervisory officials to achieve independence and fully realize the effectiveness of supervision. Specifically, the management of the ancient Chinese supervisory official system was vertical; officials were simultaneously supervised by the emperor and by law and discipline. Despite many restrictions, their rank showed a trend of gradual increase—by the Qing dynasty, the Senior Censor-in-Chief (Zuo Duyushi) had been raised to a high-ranking official of the "Follows First Rank" (Cong Yi Pin). Furthermore, incentive systems were a vital part of the supervisory system's design. By implementing high-standard selection criteria, high-level appointment procedures, granting important status and significant powers, and rewarding competent officials generously, the sense of honor and mission among supervisory officials could be maximized, leading them to be loyal to the state and diligent in their duties.
III. Insights from the Ancient Chinese Supervisory System
Since the 18th CPC National Congress, we have unswervingly promoted comprehensively and strictly governing the Party and deeply advanced the great new project of Party building in the New Era. We have achieved a series of theoretical, practical, and institutional innovations, constructed a system for comprehensively and strictly governing the Party, and opened a new realm for the century-old Party’s self-revolution. To improve the system for comprehensively and strictly governing the Party means to implement the general requirements for Party building in the New Era, ensuring that the Party remains the leadership core that oversees the overall situation and coordinates all parties within the national governance system. This reflects the high level of consciousness of the Party Central Committee in persisting in governing the Party with the spirit of reform and strict standards, and in leading social revolution through the Party's self-revolution.
By summarizing the achievements in building the system for comprehensively and strictly governing the Party since the start of the New Era, analyzing the new situations and tasks, and researching the ideas and measures for improving this system, we address an inherent requirement for the comprehensive, systematic layout and the coordinated, efficient advancement of Party governance. This is a strategic measure to solve the unique challenges facing a large party and to build a stronger and more powerful Marxist party. It is also an urgent necessity to respond to domestic and international risks and challenges and to advance Chinese-path modernization. General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out that we must use systemic thinking and scientific methods to promote Party governance so that it covers all contents, all subjects, and the entire chain of responsibility, with all systems integrated. We must further ensure that the elements are complete, the functions are well-rounded, the standards are scientific, and the operation is efficient. We must improve the organizational system that links the upper and lower levels and ensures forceful execution; the education system that strengthens the foundation and consolidates the soul; the regulatory system that takes precise action and addresses both symptoms and root causes; the institutional system that is scientific, complete, effective, and useful; and the responsibility system that has clear subjects and requirements.
The ancient Chinese supervisory system was rooted in the soil of the excellent traditional Chinese culture of clean governance. Although it could not escape the cycle of rise and fall across changing dynasties, it exhibited an overall trend toward systematization. Its successes and failures in building leadership systems, forming execution systems, strengthening institutional systems, and optimizing cultural systems can provide insights for contemporary China as it deepens the reform of the national supervisory system and improves the institutional system for the Party's self-revolution.
(1) Construct a centralized and unified leadership system and weave a dense network of supervisory organizations.
In essence, ancient Chinese supervisory power originated from imperial power. Its level of perfection depended on policy, and the exercise of its functions relied on protection. In the absence of a situation where mutual checks were formed between the highly centralized power of the monarch and the application of administrative supervisory power, power corruption often ensued. This made supervision a tool for the emperor to control officials and for officials to attack one another in power struggles, creating a breeding ground for officials protecting one another and for taking bribes and perverting the law. Furthermore, the recurring problem of the "administratization" of local supervisory power often became the last straw that broke the imperial authority, turning a system originally intended to consolidate centralization and stabilize society into its opposite...
"Self-revolution" could otherwise degenerate into a "self-destruction" marked by fragmented authority and seething public resentment. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, by perfecting the system of institutions for Party leadership, the Party's methods of leadership have become more scientific. The entire Party has become more unified in thought, more cohesive politically, and more consistent in action. This has ensured the authority of the Party Central Committee and its centralized, unified leadership, ensuring that the Party plays its role as the leadership core in exercising overall leadership and coordinating all efforts. The Party's capacity for political leadership, ideological guidance, mass organization, and social mobilization has been significantly enhanced.
It is evident that if we wish to escape the "historical cycle" [19] and explore effective paths for the Party’s self-purification, self-perfection, self-innovation, and self-improvement under the conditions of long-term governance—thereby maintaining the Party’s advanced nature and purity—we must adhere to and improve the Party's leadership over disciplinary inspection and supervision work. We must promote the institutionalization and legalization of Party leadership to ensure that government orders at all levels, from the central to the local, are unified, smooth in operation, efficient in execution, and full of vitality. The key to perfecting the system of institutional norms for the Party's self-revolution lies in persisting in institutional Party governance and governing the Party in accordance with regulations, while perfecting a supervision system under the Party's unified leadership that provides full coverage and is characterized by authority and efficiency.
This requires that, in the practice of comprehensively and strictly governing the Party and the comprehensive law-based governance of the country, we focus on expanding the scope of supervision and integrating supervisory forces. We must leverage the political and organizational functions of Party organizations at all levels, using intra-Party supervision to drive other forms of supervision. We should strengthen top-down organizational supervision, improve bottom-up democratic supervision, and utilize the role of peer-level supervision. Furthermore, we must improve the organizational structure of national supervision, making the combination of self-supervision and supervision by the people a powerful driving force for the Party’s self-revolution in the New Era. The first Supervision Law of the People's Republic of China, deliberated and passed in 2018, is a potent realization of the major decision made by the Party Central Committee with Comrade Xi Jinping at its core concerning the deepening of the reform of the national supervision system. The enactment of the Supervision Law adheres to the organic unity of intra-Party supervision and national supervision, codifying the systems and mechanisms for the Party's centralized and unified leadership over anti-corruption work and transforming institutional advantages into governance efficacy. It is a strategic measure for promoting the modernization of China’s system and capacity for governance.
(2) Form an independent and professional execution system to consolidate the foundation of the supervisory workforce
The ancient Chinese supervisory system was aimed at the centralization of power. It regarded supervisory power as the "power to govern power" and supervisory officials as "officials to govern officials," exploring both the independence of the supervisory system and the professionalization of supervisory officers. Although its design sought to ensure there were laws to follow, to promote administration in accordance with the law, to guarantee administrative efficiency, and to punish or sanction administrative failures, it ultimately remained subordinate to imperial power. It suffered from an inherent contradiction between a rigid hierarchy and the dynamics of checks and balances, making it impossible to truly realize supervision over power, especially the supreme power. The strengthening of supervisory power failed to become a panacea for preventing corruption and even disrupted normal administrative and judicial orders. The root cause lay in a political system of integrated power that lacked an internal mechanism for power constraints.
Through long-term, unremitting exploration—particularly the successful practice of comprehensively and strictly governing the Party since the 18th National Congress—the CPC in the New Era has formed a more complete set of systems and mechanisms to effectively constrain and supervise the exercise of power. The primary milestones of this are the Guidelines on Certain Aspects of Political Life Within the Party Under the New Situation and the Regulations of the Communist Party of China on Intra-Party Supervision passed in 2016. History has repeatedly proven that the constraint and supervision of the exercise of state power must begin with the constraint and supervision of the exercise of the governing party's power. Intra-Party supervision is the lifeblood that maintains the health of the Party’s "organism." An absence of intra-Party supervision inevitably leads to the weakening of Party leadership, deficiencies in Party building, and ineffective implementation of comprehensively and strictly governing the Party.
Furthermore, the principle that "the Party manages cadres" is a crucial tenet of upholding Party leadership. The Party must manage not only the cultivation, promotion, and appointment of cadres, but also their education, management, and supervision, and it must take action against cadres who violate discipline or the law. This requires starting from "asking the people about administration" [20], aiming for integrity and efficiency, and taking the capacity for learning as a driving force. Efforts should be directed toward achieving precise supervision, perfecting supporting supervisory regulations, enriching supervisory methods, and rigorously selecting supervisory cadres. We must achieve "pre-emptive arrangement, real-time awareness, and post-facto standardization," resolving issues related to the coverage of supervisory targets and the self-supervision of supervisory organs. Focused efforts should be made to build a high-quality supervisory workforce through ideological and political education, professional capacity training, and the cultivation of professional ethics.
(3) Strengthen a standardized and rational institutional system to tighten the "cage" of the supervisory system
Through thousands of years of evolution, the ancient Chinese supervisory system gradually became interlinked in terms of content, procedures, and scope, systematically covering all fields of official management. The inspection system [21] in particular could both punish local illegal acts and serve the function of recommending talent to the central government, embodying unique institutional advantages. If contemporary China is to solidify the institutional foundation for improving the level and efficacy of national governance and ensure that the power granted by the people is always used to seek their happiness, it must "tighten the cage" of institutions.
This involves establishing and improving the system of intra-Party regulations, taking the maintenance of the authority and solemnity of the Party Constitution as the fundamental requirement. We must improve intra-Party regulations and perfect mechanisms for political supervision that are concrete, precise, and normalized. We must improve the working mechanism for simultaneously ensuring that "officials do not dare, cannot, and do not want to be corrupt," perfect the mechanism for investigating and handling both "unhealthy winds" and corruption, improve the joint punishment mechanism for key bribers, and refine mechanisms for fugitive repatriation and asset recovery. We must also strengthen the primary responsibility [22] and supervisory responsibility for comprehensively and strictly governing the Party, improve supporting systems for the supervision of "top leaders" and leadership teams, deepen the reform of grassroots supervision mechanisms, oppose privilege, and prevent the abuse of power. Furthermore, we must be adept at using rule-of-law thinking and methods to combat corruption, promoting the organic connection between disciplinary inspection, law enforcement, and criminal justice, and advancing national anti-corruption legislation to ensure the rigid operation of the legal system. It can be said that it is precisely the rich practice of comprehensively and strictly governing the Party that has laid a solid foundation for innovation in intra-Party regulations and systems. By promoting the Party’s institutional development, the levels of scientific, institutionalized, and standardized Party building have been significantly improved.
(4) Optimize a cultural system where the ancient and modern illuminate each other to revitalize the source of supervisory culture
Chinese civilization is the only great civilization in the world that has developed continuously to the present day in the form of a state; thus, studying ancient Chinese supervisory culture is an inherent requirement for building the modern civilization of the Chinese nation. As an important component of the national legal system, supervisory functions often use "integrity or lack thereof" as the primary standard for judging the quality of official governance. The overstepping of power is the primary cause of corruption, and the root of its proliferation lies in the weakness of power supervision. From its inception, the ancient Chinese supervisory system formed a power configuration structure in which supervisory power and organs co-existed with state power and institutions. This has a natural relevance to contemporary disciplinary inspection and supervision work.
We should reflect on this from the perspectives of building ethics and the rule of law at the ideological level, constructing supervisory systems at the institutional level, and training professional personnel at the technical level. This necessitates summarizing and refining the basic principles and developmental laws of disciplinary inspection and supervision, examining the evolution and comparison of ancient and modern systems, and conducting research in key areas such as inspections and supervisory regulations. Guided by the development and improvement of the system of supervision with Chinese characteristics, and combined with the achievements and experiences of the struggle against corruption and for a clean government in the New Era—as well as the specific measures taken by the Party Central Committee to continuously deepen the reform of the disciplinary inspection and supervision system—we should strive to form a series of practical, institutional, and theoretical results to continuously improve the level of disciplinary inspection and supervision work.
As an emerging first-level discipline in the philosophy and social sciences, the construction of "Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Studies" should employ cross-disciplinary research paradigms, utilizing methods such as literature research and case studies. Based on the experiences and lessons of the ancient Chinese supervisory system, it should demonstrate a "Chinese style and Chinese flavor." Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era is not only contemporary Chinese Marxism and 21st-century Marxism, but also the essence of Chinese culture and the Chinese spirit in our times. How to further promote the creative transformation and innovative development of ancient Chinese supervisory culture—making it a key link in strengthening the culture of integrity in the New Era and creating a new form of human civilization through a civilization of clean governance—will surely be an important research direction for Disciplinary Inspection and Supervision Studies in the future, deserving our continuous attention and deep reflection.
Author Profile: Qu Xiaoshuang, Lecturer at the Department of Party Building of the Central Party School of the CPC (National Academy of Governance); Researcher at the Anti-Corruption Research Center of the Central Party School of the CPC (National Academy of Governance). Source: Journal of China Jianggangshan Leadership Academy, Issue 6, 2025. Editor: Huihui