The Atheistic Characteristics of Marx's Philosophy from the Perspective of Its Developmental Logic
Maintaining a thoroughgoing atheism is an inherent quality of Marx's philosophy, and transcending the religious conception of history was a vital prerequisite for the founding of historical materialism. Marx’s systematic critique of the religious conception of history is concentrated primarily in early works such as On the Jewish Question, the "Introduction" to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, and "The Past and Present by Thomas Carlyle." In this process, Marx and Engels gradually realized that exploring the origins of religion was more important than a mere external critique of it: "Religion is no longer the cause of secular narrowness, but only its manifestation. ... once they have eliminated the secular restrictions, they will be able to eliminate their religious limitations." [1] "We demand that the content of history be restored to history, but we find that history is not the revelation of 'God,' but the revelation of man, and can only be the revelation of man." [2] Thereafter, Marx's philosophy focused on an in-depth analysis of the social foundations upon which religion arises. Rooted in the base of practice [N] and adopting a perspective of historical generation [N], Marx's philosophy emphasized revealing the internal contradictions of capitalist society, thereby exploring the laws of development of human society and the path to true human emancipation, thus prompting religion to reach its own self-extinction.
Through an interpretation of important texts from different periods of Marx’s philosophy, one finds that the scientific quest for the developmental laws of human society to achieve the true freedom and emancipation of humanity is the most fundamental value-claim of Marx’s philosophy. This value-claim remained consistent, but its final realization underwent three stages: from a value-call for the liberation of individual subjectivity, to the establishment of the social-historical generative paradigm of man based on the foundation of practice, and finally to the formation of a path for the real liberation of man based on the unity of the individual and society. The process of the formation and development of Marx’s philosophy is precisely the process of the unfolding of his thoroughgoing atheistic thought. Presenting this process of logical unfolding is the prerequisite and key to clarifying and grasping the atheistic character of Marx's philosophy.
I. The Value-Call for the Liberation of Individual Subjectivity
Marx’s doctoral dissertation, The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, marks the starting point of Marx’s philosophical construction and the sign of the formation of theoretical self-consciousness regarding the value-claim of the complete emancipation and comprehensive freedom of humanity. In the preface, Marx adopts Prometheus’s confession—"In a word, I hate all gods"—as philosophy’s own maxim. He argues that Epicurus corrected Democritus’s mechanical determinism with the argument that atoms undergo a swerve from a straight line, breaking the shackles of fate and articulating the freedom of individual will, individuality, and independence from a natural perspective. In particular, Epicurus believed that the atoms constituting the human soul have a tendency to swerve from a straight line; thus, human action can potentially break away from fated necessity and obtain freedom of will and action. He denounced the worship of gods and superstition, despised fate, and emphasized that "men make their own way," [3] asserting that humans should understand nature and life through philosophy and use reason to plan their own lives. In effect, by defending Epicurus’s atheism, Marx was conducting a thorough critique of religion in real life and the Hegelian system in theory, pointing out: "Because nature is ill-arranged, God exists." "Because an irrational world exists, God exists." [4] The task of philosophy is to overcome objectively existing irrationality and make the world and man himself rational. By highlighting the philosophy of self-consciousness and expressing atheistic thought, Marx manifested his value-claim for subjective freedom and individual liberation. However, because Marx at this time had not yet come into direct contact with social reality and lacked personal experience of real social life, he believed the freedom of self-consciousness was complete and true freedom. His philosophical thought, and even the force of his analysis of reality, remained largely at the level of the "ought" [N] of value presupposition.
During his tenure at the Rheinische Zeitung (Rheinische Zeitung), Marx came into contact with problems of real material interests. He gradually realized that only by critiquing religion in closer connection with the critique of political conditions could the principles of communism and socialism be discussed more effectively. He specifically pointed out that "Religion itself is without content; its root is not in heaven but on earth, and with the elimination of the distorted reality for which religion is the theory, religion will vanish on its own." [5] Thus, the young Marx shifted from the critique of religion to secular political opposition movements, from the realm of pure theory to the direct realm of practical politics, and from spiritual liberation to the real liberation of human beings. This shift is concentrated in the book Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and the two essays On the Jewish Question and the "Introduction" to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right.
Through personal investigation of various social and economic issues during the Rheinische Zeitung period, Marx recognized in social practice that Hegel mysteriously derived various elements of the state from the Absolute Idea and speculatively explained the separation of the state from civil society [N], which inverted the relationship between civil society and the state. Marx believed that before a scientific analysis was made of the foundation of various societies (including bourgeois society)—the relations of production—it was impossible to conduct independent scientific investigations into law, morality, politics, and other categories of the superstructure. Linking his critique of Hegel’s political views with his critique of speculative idealism, he pointed out that legal relations, just like forms of the state, are rooted in the material conditions of life: "The anatomy of civil society is to be sought in political economy." [6] This paved the way for Marx’s philosophy to delve into specific, real social fields thereafter to seek the path to human emancipation.
In On the Jewish Question, Marx pointed out that religion is no longer the cause of secular narrowness, but only its manifestation; religion is not the cause of political oppression, but its expression. Therefore, it is not that the religious limitations of free citizens must be eliminated to eliminate their secular restrictions, but rather "once they have eliminated the secular restrictions, they will be able to eliminate their religious limitations." Thus, one cannot reduce secular questions to theological ones, but should reduce theological questions to secular ones; one should not explain history through superstition, but superstition through history. Political oppression must first be eliminated before religious narrowness can be overcome. "Critiquing the secular structure of the political state also critiques its religious impotence." [7] Unlike Bruno Bauer, Marx no longer let the path of Jewish emancipation remain at the thorough elimination of religion—letting the Jews be liberated from their own religion—but rather organized social forces. He believed that "if a social organization were to eliminate the prerequisites of huckstering [N], and thus the possibility of huckstering, then this social organization would also make the Jew impossible. His religious consciousness would dissipate like a thin mist in the real, life-sustaining air of society." [8] Marx believed the secular basis of Judaism was practical need and self-interest, the secular cult of the Jew was huckstering, and their secular god was based on money. Therefore, Marx believed that liberation from huckstering and money was liberation from practical, real Judaism, and thus modern self-emancipation would be achieved. He concluded that the emancipation of the Jews, in its final sense, is the emancipation of humanity from Judaism. At this time, Marx had still not proposed a scientific path for the social liberation of man.
As his understanding of society deepened, Marx gradually realized the importance of philosophy connecting with reality. He further pointed out that the struggle against religion is actually indirectly a struggle against that world for which religion is the spiritual aroma, but he emphasized even more that philosophy should focus on secular and earthly affairs. He noted: "Once the 'beyond' of truth has vanished, the task of history is to establish the truth of this world. Once the holy form of human self-alienation has been unmasked, the immediate task of philosophy, which is at the service of history, is to unmask self-alienation in its unholy forms. Thus, the critique of heaven turns into the critique of the earth, the critique of religion into the critique of law, and the critique of theology into the critique of politics." [9] Unlike the Rheinische Zeitung period, when he did not yet view the proletariat as a brand-new social class, Marx’s understanding of the proletariat had now undergone a qualitative leap; he saw the power and prospects of the proletariat, finding a real force and engine for human emancipation.
At the same time, Engels also clearly pointed out the absurdity of the religious conception of history that ignores real history. He focused on analyzing the origins of the religious conception of history, pointing out: "Religion by its essence involves draining man and nature of all content, transferring it to the phantom of a god beyond, who then, out of his great mercy, lets man and nature receive a little of his abundance in return." [10] Engels believed that the so-called God was actually nothing more than a creation through man’s reflection of himself in the chaotic matter of his own underdeveloped consciousness. The delusion of things in man and nature wanting to be superhuman and supernatural is the root of all untruth and lies. Contrary to Christians who declare the world, man, and human life to be a lie and thereby make the world and man dependent on the grace of some god, he proposed that we demand the content of history be restored to history; history is not the revelation of "God," but the revelation of man, and can only be the revelation of man.
In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx critiqued the alienated social system through an analysis of alienated labor. He understood wage labor, capital, and ground rent as the categories determining the class structure of capitalist society. Through the analysis of wages, profit on capital, and rent, he revealed the economic roots of the opposition between workers, capitalists, and landowners. He pointed out that because the relationship between capital and wage labor leads to alienated labor, the subjectivity of the worker is severely obscured.
The evolution of the early thoughts of Marx’s philosophy underwent a process: from pursuing individuality and freedom through the freedom of self-consciousness; to deriving the analysis of civil society from political economy during the critique of Hegel’s philosophy of right; from political liberation to the liberation of man; and then to discovering the proletariat as a real force of liberation and conducting an in-depth analysis of alienated labor. Although Marx’s philosophy at this time had not yet completely escaped the influence of Hegel’s way of thinking and Feuerbach’s anthropology—with his philosophical method characterized by the coexistence of a real-historical approach and a humanist approach—the value-claim of Marx’s philosophy regarding the liberation of individual subjectivity on the path to human emancipation laid the foundation and direction for its further development.
II. The Practical Turn and the Establishment of the Perspective of Historical Generation
The liberation of man is not merely a value-claim or a movement of thought, but a historical, real social movement. It requires, on the basis of a scientific analysis of the basic structure of society and the basic laws of human historical development, reliance on the real force of transforming the world to be completed. The mark of Marx’s quest for the path of human liberation becoming scientific—and thus the mark of the true foundation of historical materialism—lies in the fact that Marx’s philosophy established an analytical paradigm of the social-historical generation of man on the foundation of practice. The systematic expression of this scientific method was completed primarily in The German Ideology.
Marx and Engels pointed out that although the Young Hegelians launched a critique against the conservatism of Hegelian philosophy and the backwardness of the German feudal autocratic system, they accepted the viewpoint repeatedly emphasized within the Hegelian system—namely, that "ideas, thoughts, and concepts produce, determine, and rule the real life of men, their material world, and their real relations." [15] Consequently, "not one of them has thought of inquiring into the connection of German philosophy with German reality," which led their theoretical critique to inevitably remain "on the terrain of philosophy" throughout. Whether it was Strauss attempting to critique Christianity through rationalism, Cieszkowski advocating for the use of rational laws to guide the future through a philosophy of action, Bauer aiming to eliminate alienation by igniting a revolution within self-consciousness, or Stirner’s exaltation of the "Unique One"—the struggles waged by the Young Hegelians were "confined to the criticism of religious conceptions." [16] Starting solely from actual religion and genuine theology, they sought to "criticize everything by declaring it to be theological or by replacing everything with religious conceptions." [17]
Therefore, despite the "world-shattering" phrases uttered by these Young Hegelian ideologists, because they merely fought against phrases with other phrases, they were in fact the greatest conservatives. Since they were only fighting against the phrases of this world, they were by no means fighting against the real existing world. "Despite these ideas of change having been expressed a thousand times, they have no significance for actual development." [18] Logically, the Young Hegelians could only present a moral demand to the people: to replace their current consciousness with this human, critical, or egoistic consciousness, thereby eliminating the constraints that fettered them. This demand to change consciousness is a demand to interpret what exists in a different way—that is, to recognize it by means of a different interpretation. Marx and Engels argued that the only result this philosophical critique could achieve was to provide some explanations of Christianity from the perspective of religious history, and even these were one-sided. As for all their other assertions, they were merely further embellishments of an ambition: to make world-historical discoveries using such insignificant explanations. Marx and Engels maintained that this "philosophical critique," remote from social reality, could not exert any substantive influence on transforming the world: "if they dissolve philosophy, theology, substance, and all that trash in 'self-consciousness,' if they liberate 'man' from the dominion of these phrases—under which he has never been subjugated—then the 'liberation' of 'man' has not advanced a single step." [19]
Marx and Engels believed that to stand upon the foundation of material practice and historically reflect on the basis and laws of human existence and development, one must first emphasize the following fundamental fact: "In order to 'make history,' men must be in a position to live. But life involves before everything else eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself." [20] Moreover, this historical activity of producing material life—which humans must perform every day and every hour simply to sustain life, from thousands of years ago until today—is the fundamental condition of all history. This is both the first premise of human existence and the first premise of all history. The first task of any historical outlook is to note the full significance and scope of these fundamental facts and give them due weight.
Next, Marx analyzed the dynamic and process of the evolution of ownership. He pointed out that as a historical process, the evolution of ownership was primarily driven by the division of labor. The division of labor caused mental and material activity, enjoyment and labor, and production and consumption to be devolved upon different individuals. This inevitably led to certain contradictions between the productive forces, the state of society, and consciousness. This contradiction is based on the naturally evolved division of labor within the family and the separation of society into individual families opposed to one another. After clarifying the driving force behind ownership, Marx and Engels examined the evolutionary process of ownership from the perspective of historical development. They argued that the various stages of development in the division of labor were at the same time different forms of ownership; each stage of the division of labor also determined the mutual relations of individuals to one another with reference to the material, instrument, and product of labor. The first form of ownership is tribal ownership; the second is ancient communal and state ownership; the third is feudal or estate-based ownership. By highlighting the logic of historical generation, Marx critiqued the kind of abstract idealism that treated communism merely as a value-based postulate (to which reality should conform). "Communism is for us not a state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions of this movement result from the premises now in existence." [21] What Marx and Engels were concerned with was not merely the clarification of the content of what ought to be, but rather a move toward a concrete, realistic, and historical approach within the dissection of social laws. They sought to demonstrate that "genuine liberation can only be achieved in the real world and by using real means," striving to find a scientific path to human liberation by revealing the internal contradictions of real social existence and the means to overcome them.
III. The Rationalization of Real Social Relations and the Path to Human Liberation
Marx and Engels established philosophical inquiry upon a solid foundation of practice. Through the analytical method of historical generation, while dissecting the production and reproduction of the material conditions of human existence, they explored the production and reproduction of capitalist relations of production that produce these material conditions. They conducted a thorough, exhaustive, and penetrating multi-dimensional analysis of the internal contradictions of capitalism. Through the discovery of surplus value, they revealed the root of proletarian poverty under capitalist conditions and pointed out that the rationalization of human social relations is the key to human liberation. Only by overthrowing capitalist society can the organic unity of man and society be realized and actual human liberation be achieved. The scientific grasp of essential, concrete, and historical social relations—leading to the gradual peeling away of the historical illusions masking the surface of capitalist society—and the eventual path toward realizing one’s value-claims by resorting to the rationalization of social relations, was a process only fully completed through the period spanning The Poverty of Philosophy, the Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858, and finally Capital.
In The Poverty of Philosophy, Marx pointed out that Proudhon did not understand the connotation of real social relations. Proudhon could only explain the logical relations between economic categories from the theoretical standpoint of an abstract human "Ego." Facing the internal contradictions of economic categories in reality, and the situation where workers under real modes of labor could not solve the problem of poverty, Proudhon could only select so-called "good" and "bad" sides using the abstract development of the human Ego as a frame of reference, and then manifest the "good" side through a synthesis of categories. That is to say, "snatching this secret thought from God and then applying it, and all is well." [22] The result is that for Proudhon, the historical movement to transform the modern world was merely a matter of discovering the correct balance or synthesis of two bourgeois ideas. He substituted the "miraculous movement" in his own head for the great historical movement arising from the conflict between the productive forces already acquired by men and their social relations, which no longer correspond to these productive forces. In reality, Proudhon did not solve social problems through social action, but through the "dialectical rotation" in his own mind. He was merely dedicated to finding a new formula, treating the constituent parts of social life as eternal categories, believing that balancing these categories would solve the problem—for instance, by finding a true formula to "balance social estates, nobility, kings, parliaments, etc., so that the next morning kings, parliaments, and nobility would all have disappeared." [23] Marx, however, argued that "the true balance of this antagonism is the overthrow of all social relations—the foundation of these feudal institutions and the antagonism within them."
Having critiqued the metaphysics of economics and discovered class antagonism between capitalists and workers in the spheres of distribution and exchange, Marx’s philosophy sought the root of this antagonism deep within the sphere of production. He believed that to resolve inequalities in the spheres of distribution and circulation, one must resolve the inequality in the sphere of production. In the "Introduction" to the Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858, Marx clearly stated: "The object before us, to begin with, material production. Individuals producing in society—hence socially determined individual production—is, of course, the point of departure." [24] Marx revealed the scientific connotation of social relations and subsequently discovered the true cause of proletarian exploitation precisely by exploring the interrelationships between distribution, exchange, and production. When discussing the capitalist production process, Marx emphasized that its significance was manifested even more in the production and reproduction of relations of production: "The result of the production process and the process of valorization is, first and foremost, the reproduction and new production of the relation between capital and labor itself, of the relation between capitalist and worker. This social relation, this relation of production, is in fact a more important result of the process than its material results. That is to say, in this process, the worker produces himself as labor-power and also produces capital as a power opposed to him; likewise, on the other side, the capitalist produces himself as capital and also produces the living labor-power opposed to him." [25] Clearly, Marx had shifted his focus from the material products of labor to the reproduction of relations of production. Crucially, while focusing on the concrete social relations of material production, Marx highlighted that "whenever we speak of production, then, what is meant is always production at a definite stage of social development." [26] Specifying a "definite stage of production" clarifies the connotation of real social relations even further. Only after this did Marx speak of "production in general," which covers commonalities of production across different eras while also identifying the specific production processes that carry particular, real relations of production. Classical economists, however, lacked this perspective on the specific production process of real relations of production in their understanding of "production in general." Consequently, the relations of production they spoke of remained merely fixed, innate, and "natural" relations. Their so-called material production process clearly did not include the production and reproduction of relations of production; they interpreted the material production process solely through material forms. Thus, Marx pointed out several times that classical economics was merely "the science of wealth-getting."
Bourgeois economists explored the material production process only at the level of material forms, pursuing only the accumulation of wealth. When they discussed economic categories such as capital and labor, they failed to see the connotations of real relations of production embedded behind them. For example, in his understanding of capital, the bourgeois economist Adam Smith believed capital to be "a certain quantity of labor stocked and stored up," [27] a kind of past, objectified labor. Since any process of productive labor cannot be separated from some form of accumulated labor existing as a means of labor, they viewed the relation of capital as a general, eternal, natural relation applicable to all societies. Marx, however, pointed out that accumulated labor becomes capital only within certain relations of production; it becomes capital only under capitalist conditions. Therefore, "capital is not a thing, but a relation," [28] and what is hidden behind capital is the exploitative relationship of the capitalist over the worker. Bourgeois economists "exactly leave out the specific difference which alone makes 'instruments of production' and 'accumulated labor' into capital" [29]—that is, they leave out the real "relation of production" that makes accumulated labor into capital. Clearly, by the time Marx realized that accumulated labor becomes capital only within a certain relation of production, his understanding of "relations of production" already carried real socio-historical content (such as the production relation between the capitalist and the worker). Consequently, Marxist philosophy holds that the critique of capital must be grounded in a critique of the specific capitalist relations of production that make money into capital, rather than a critique of the money appearing on the surface of society. The search for the path to human liberation must also go deep into the exploration of the reproduction of capitalist relations of production. Because production is not merely a process of creating or transforming natural products governed by natural laws, the cause of inequality between direct labor and accumulated labor in the distribution of products can only be found in the inherent contradictions of capitalist relations of production.
Marxian philosophy begins with the most abstract concept of the commodity and proceeds to complete the disclosure of the mystery of the essence of money and capital. It explicitly points out that capital is not a thing, but a social relation between people mediated by things. The exchange between labor and capital is not a general exchange of commodities, but an exchange between wage labor and capital within the historically and economically unique capitalist relations of production. Marx thus solved the contradiction between the law of value and the exchange of labor and capital, which classical economists were unable to crack. Using the method of ascending from the abstract to the concrete, Marx completed a scientific analysis of the total process of capitalist production. Through an anatomical study of the reproduction of capitalist relations of production, he discovered the secret of capitalist exploitation—surplus value. He pointed out that only by relying on the concrete force for transforming the world—the proletariat—and overthrowing the irrational social system of capitalism to establish a communist society, can the genuine liberation of the individual be achieved on the basis of the unity between the individual and society.
Through an examination of the history of the formation of Marxian philosophy, it is not difficult to see its development: from abandoning the idea that equates the freedom of self-consciousness with human freedom and the sublation [30] of alienated labor as the path to human liberation; to grounding itself in a perspective of concrete practice and historical generation to analyze the internal contradictions of capitalist society; and finally to emphasizing that the rationalization of social relations is the key to human liberation. At no stage in the logic of its philosophical unfolding does it entrust human liberation to any supernatural or mystical forces. The process of the formation and development of Marxian philosophy is the process of the thorough unfolding of its atheistic thought. Only by profoundly understanding the atheistic character of Marxian philosophy based on this process can we better understand the conclusion of a Western scholar: "Atheism is essentially linked to Marx's Marxism." {24}
Elucidating the atheistic character of Marxian philosophy holds significant revelatory meaning for current social construction in China. First, to realize human freedom and liberation, one cannot place hope in any mystical power—just as the "Internationale" sings: "There has never been any savior, nor do we rely on gods or emperors. To create human happiness, we must rely entirely on ourselves!" [31] Exerting our own subjectivity and agency is the only path to achieving beautiful goals. Second, to realize human freedom and liberation, we must base ourselves on reality and practice, focusing on grasping the laws of social development to achieve comprehensive and sustainable development, and effectively solving the practical problems of the masses' production and life. Third, to truly realize human freedom and liberation, it is necessary to effectively resolve issues of justice and fairness in actual society, achieve the rationalization of real social relations, and truly "put people first" (yi ren wei ben [32]) within harmonious development. Only in this way will religion and other forms of theism naturally lose the soil for their emergence and survival.
References (1) Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 3, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2002, p. 169. (2) Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 3, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2002, p. 520. (3) Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 1, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1995, p. 101. (4) Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 27, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1972, p. 436. (5) Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 2, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1995, p. 32. (6) Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 3, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2002, p. 169. (7) Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 3, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2002, p. 192. (8) Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 3, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2002, p. 200. (9) Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 3, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2002, p. 517. (10) Wataru Hiromatsu (ed.), The German Ideology in a Philological Context, trans. Peng Xi, Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2005, pp. 3–5. {11} Wataru Hiromatsu (ed.), The German Ideology in a Philological Context, trans. Peng Xi, Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2005, p. 12. {12} Wataru Hiromatsu (ed.), The German Ideology in a Philological Context, trans. Peng Xi, Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2005, p. 52. {13} Wataru Hiromatsu (ed.), The German Ideology in a Philological Context, trans. Peng Xi, Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2005, p. 160. {14} Wataru Hiromatsu (ed.), The German Ideology in a Philological Context, trans. Peng Xi, Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2005, p. 22. {15} Wataru Hiromatsu (ed.), The German Ideology in a Philological Context, trans. Peng Xi, Nanjing: Nanjing University Press, 2005, p. 37. {16} Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 4, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1995, p. 537. {17} Selected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 4, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1995, p. 541. {18} Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 46 (Part 1), Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1979, p. 18. {19} Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 46 (Part 1), Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1979, p. 455. {20} Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 46 (Part 1), Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1979, p. 22. {21} Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 3, Beijing: People's Publishing House, 2002, p. 239. {22} See Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 46 (Part 1), Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1979, p. 212. {23} Collected Works of Marx and Engels, Vol. 46 (Part 1), Beijing: People's Publishing House, 1979, p. 22. {24} [France] Raymond Aron, Main Currents in Sociological Thought, trans. Ge Zhiqiang et al., Shanghai Translation Publishing House, 2005, p. 169.