Separation of Church and State, or Unity of Church and State? — Policy Considerations of the National Government on the Relationship between Tibetan Politics and Religion

2011-11-02 Science & Atheism

At the beginning of the 20th century, the Republic of China began implementing a constitutional system. At this time, however, many political systems incompatible with this principle still existed in China’s frontier regions, the most prominent being the system of the "integration of politics and religion" ^[1] in Tibet. There is currently a wealth of academic research on this system, but its evolution after the early 20th century—specifically the Nationalist Government’s attempts to reform it under the principle of the separation of politics and religion for the purpose of political integration—remains a blank spot in scholarly inquiry. This article attempts a general investigation into the process by which the Nationalist Government, grounded in the fundamental spirit of the separation of politics and religion, sought to reform Tibet's system of integrated politics and religion. In doing so, it illustrates the state of Tibetan politics and religion prior to the Democratic Reform ^[2].

The so-called "separation of politics and religion" is a general principle and politico-moral foundation of the secular state. Its significance lies in prohibiting the designation of a specific religion as the state religion, ensuring that the state and religion maintain their respective norms and spheres, and prohibiting the "politicization of religion" and the "religionization of politics." ^[3] The so-called "integration of politics and religion" refers to the specific system of theocratic rule. The seeds of this system in Tibet were sown during the Sakya local regime of the Yuan Dynasty, and the Gelug school's system of integrated politics and religion was formally established in 1751. Under this system, the supreme political and religious power of the Tibetan locality was essentially concentrated in the hands of the Dalai Lama. Officials of the local Tibetan government were drawn from both monastic and lay ranks, with monastic officials holding higher status than lay officials of equal rank. "Although the nobility held actual political power, their actions could never exceed the norms of religion; religious authority truly transcended politics, and politics was merely a tool for religion to expound its teachings and propagate the Dharma." ^[4] As Mr. Liu Shengqi, who worked in Tibet for many years during the Republican period, stated, Tibet was "a land composed of gods, ruled by gods, and serving gods. The power of the monasteries was supreme." ^[5] In the early Qing Dynasty, this system played a positive role in maintaining the stability of the Tibetan locality and consolidating frontier defense. However, in the modern era, as the crisis on China’s frontiers grew increasingly severe, how to consolidate the borders, strengthen effective control over frontier regions, and achieve the political integration of the interior and the frontiers became the primary concern of successive central governments since the late Qing. After the British invasion of Tibet in 1904, the Qing began to change the governing principle of "rule according to local custom." They planned to implement modernizing reforms in Tibet centered on the separation of politics and religion, revere the Dalai and Panchen Lamas as the religious leaders of Tibet overseeing ecclesiastical authority, and transfer their secular powers to the Amban (Resident Minister in Tibet). As it was said then, "It is not necessary to immediately change the Tibetan land into a province, but it is indispensable to govern it by the methods of provincial administration," ^[6] thereby achieving the political integration of Tibet and the interior. This severely undermined Tibet’s system of integrated politics and religion and met with strong opposition from the upper-strata monastic and lay elites of the Tibetan locality. With the outbreak of the 1911 Revolution, the Qing’s vision of implementing the separation of politics and religion in Tibet ended in failure.

In the early days of the Republic, founded under the banner of the "Five Races Under One Union" ^[7], the government continued the Qing policy of political integration. On April 22, 1912, Yuan Shikai announced that the Republican government would no longer treat Mongolia and Tibet as dependencies: "Regarding Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang, unified planning should henceforth be undertaken to seek the unification of internal administration and realize the great harmony of the ethnic groups." To this end, "the Republican government has not established a dedicated department for frontier affairs ^[8], primarily because it views Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang as equal to the various provinces of the interior; in the future, all politics in these areas shall fall within the scope of internal administration," and matters formerly handled by the Court of Colonial Affairs were transferred to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. However, until local systems were uniformly regulated, "Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang" were to continue handling affairs according to old precedents. ^[9] Yuan Shikai viewed Tibet and other regions as equivalent to the interior, seeking to "unify" the local systems of Mongolia and Tibet to achieve the ideal state of "unification of internal administration" and "great harmony of the ethnic groups." In February 1913, in a "practical policy" for governing Tibet sent to the 13th Dalai Lama, the Republican government proposed "restoring the Buddha’s titles and remaining the suzerain of Buddhism," recognizing the Dalai’s supreme status in religion. However, the plan to send personnel to Tibet to discuss "reforms and rehabilitations" revealed that the Republican government had no intention of indefinitely preserving Tibet’s old system of integrated politics and religion ^[10]. To this end, they established the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Bureau (later changed to the Mongolian and Tibetan Academy) to "plan and establish administration" for the region. In 1923, the implementation of the province-and-county system in Tibet and other areas was even explicitly written into the nation’s fundamental law—the Constitution of the Republic of China. ^[11] This indicates that the ultimate goal of the Republican government's reform of the Tibetan administrative system was to match the provincial system of the interior—that is, "unification of internal administration." It also shows that even under the Republican governments characterized by constant warlord strife, there was a pursuit of political integration between Tibet and the interior. The subsequent Nanjing Nationalist Government sought to promote the Three People's Principles ^[12] throughout the country, complete political, economic, and cultural integration, and build a Chinese nation-state, making this their primary governance objective. In March 1929, the Kuomintang announced in a resolution that they would implement the Three People's Principles in frontier regions like Tibet. While the "dialects and customs of the people in Tibet and other places differ from other provinces, and in terms of national administration, they present a somewhat special form, historically, geographically, and in terms of national economy, they are fundamentally part of the Chinese nation." The Kuomintang promised: "We shall sincerely foster the economic, political, and educational development of all ethnic groups, striving for their collective entry into the realm of civilization and progress, creating a free and unified Republic of China." ^[13] This political resolution regarding "Mongolia, Tibet, and Xinjiang" recognized the differences between Tibet and the interior; the so-called "special form" of national administration clearly referred to Tibet's system of integrated politics and religion. The resolution emphasized promoting the Three People's Principles in Tibet to develop its politics, economy, and education, thereby realizing integration with the interior and "entering the realm of civilization and progress." This resolution revealed the Nationalist Government’s basic intention to transform Tibet’s system of integrated politics and religion.

This intention was even more clearly reflected in the administrative programs of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (MTAC), the central agency of the Nationalist Government in charge of frontier affairs. On February 23, 1929, the MTAC, in its administrative program for the Period of Political Tutelage ^[14], planned to "innovate the old administrative systems of Mongolia and Tibet" while simultaneously "protecting Lamaist temple properties" and "extending preferential treatment to religious leaders." ^[15] In this program, the MTAC clearly adhered to the principle of the separation of politics and religion, not only by regulating politics and religion separately but also by explicitly proposing the innovation of Tibet’s old administrative system (i.e., the system of integrated politics and religion). In the view of the MTAC, "The administrative systems and bureaucratic organizations of Mongolia and Tibet constitute a separate system that has persisted to this day and is no longer appropriate. This Commission shall do its utmost in all measures regarding Mongolia and Tibet to promote political tutelage and 'weed out the old to bring forth the new' ^[16]." To this end, in the Schedule for the Distribution of Political Tutelage Work, the MTAC further formulated a six-year plan (1930–1935) to implement the separation of politics and religion in Mongolia and Tibet: Phase I (ending late 1930): 1. Investigate the original administrative systems; 2. Investigate the status of administrative and religious powers; 3. Publicize the innovation of the administrative systems. Phase II (ending late 1931): 1. Determine a new administrative system; 2. Delineate administrative and religious powers. Phase III (ending late 1932): 1. Implement the renaming of administrative organs; 2. Implement the separate governance of politics and religion. Phase IV (ending late 1933): 1. Inspect the administrative status after innovation. Phase V (ending late 1934): Proceed with the respective parts of the overall plan. Phase VI (ending late 1935): Continue the work of phase V. ^[17] The principle of "separate governance of politics and religion" or the separation of politics and religion was clearly articulated here. In June 1929, Liu Puchen, a member of the MTAC and later head of the Special Envoy's Office in Tibet, proposed in a keynote speech titled "The Fundamental Policy of Central Control over Mongolia and Tibet" that the Center "must first separate politics and religion, and then all matters will fall into place." He suggested that, following the model of Mongolia, autonomous bodies such as consultative or advisory councils could be established to "gradually lead the Tibetan people away from the rule of religious leaders." ^[18] This speech further demonstrated that the Nationalist Government's ultimate goal was an administrative reform in Tibet based on the separation of politics and religion.

However, in the early years of the Republic, the local Tibetan government characterized its relationship with the Center as a purely religious "Cho-Yon relationship" ^[19] (Priest-Patron relationship), denying the existence of political subordination in hopes of excluding central interference and maintaining the system of integrated politics and religion. Against this backdrop, the local Tibetan government, headed by the 13th Dalai Lama, began a "patchwork" modernizing reform of the system starting in 1913, seeking to strengthen Tibet's ability to resist foreign interference. However, a military clique that gained strength through these reforms attempted a coup to strip the Dalai Lama of secular political power while leaving only his religious authority. This attempted coup made the Dalai Lama realize that modernization might directly harm the existence and development of the system of integrated politics and religion. Coupled with opposition from conservative forces within the monastic groups, this prompted him to gradually halt the modernization reforms. Furthermore, during the reforms, the Dalai Lama sought to strengthen control over various parts of Tibet, forcing the 9th Panchen Lama to flee to the interior. This resulted in the supreme political and religious power of Tibet being concentrated in the hands of the Dalai Lama alone for the first time in history, having largely excluded both the political interference of the central government and the separate administration of the Panchen Lama. This "created the period of the greatest religious and political power since the time of the 5th Dalai Lama." ^[20] In his Exhortation to All Officials and People of Tibet, the Dalai Lama also summarized: he had "worked tirelessly and to the best of his ability to seek the consolidation of the 'Religion-and-Politics' ^[21] and the development of the people's welfare; for over twenty years now, the 'Religion-and-Politics' has flourished." ^[22] The "flourishing of Religion-and-Politics" was the goal the Dalai Lama tirelessly pursued. It must be said that Tibet's system of integrated politics and religion was consolidated and strengthened during his reign. From the perspective of overall historical development, the system during this period exhibited a "radiance of the setting sun"—a final flash of prosperity. This was the state of the Tibetan system of integrated politics and religion that the Nanjing Nationalist Government faced upon its establishment.

Although the Nationalist Government intended to promote political integration in Tibet based on the separation of politics and religion, the lack of necessary prerequisites—due to the domestic situation at the time and the estrangement between the Tibetan locality and the Center—made implementing such a separation difficult. Therefore, the Nationalist Government adopted a policy of conciliation and jimi ^[23] (loose rein/appeasement), temporarily acquiescing to Tibet’s system of integrated politics and religion. In September 1929, the MTAC acknowledged that "the political and religious authority of the Dalai and Panchen in Tibet remains as before," and "the Center regards the Dalai and Panchen as the leaders of politics and religion in Tibet." ^[24] On July 30 of the following year, the Nationalist Government reaffirmed that "the rights of the Dalai and Panchen in Tibetan politics and religion generally remain as of old." ^[25] In these policies, the Nationalist Government never directly mentioned the "system of integrated politics and religion," using terms like "as before" and "as of old" regarding the Dalai and Panchen's authority to temporarily respect and acquiesce to Tibet’s "special form" of administration. Their hope was to show goodwill toward the local Tibetan government while maintaining the premise of integrated politics and religion, thereby conciliating and winning over the Tibetan upper strata, gradually eliminating the estrangement between the Center and the Tibetan locality, and ultimately seeking to restore the Center's effective sovereignty over Tibet. The reasons for adopting this strategy were inextricably linked to the situation the Nationalist Government faced at its inception.

After the establishment of the National Government, it was first occupied with eliminating the original fragmented forces of the warlords, basically ending the chaotic situation of incessant internal strife and frequent government changes that had plagued China for over a decade. However, it immediately fell into the quagmire of "Communist suppression" campaigns. At this time, the National Government possessed neither the strength nor the leisure to attend to the frontier regions, yet it maintained a relatively clear understanding of the dire situation there. Chiang Kai-shek once pointed out that "problems exist in every aspect of China’s frontiers," and believed that "observing the methods of resolving frontier issues from the perspective of their emphasis, they are none other than two: one is the application of rigid hard power, and the other is the flexible policy of jimi ^[26] (loose rein). If the nation’s power were sufficient and there were leisure to attend to the borders, we could certainly adopt the first method, and everything would be no problem; but we are now in the revolutionary period and our strength is insufficient. To solve the frontier problem, we can only study policy. If there is an appropriate policy, even if the frontier problem cannot be thoroughly solved, it can be prevented from worsening, making it easier to solve in the future." Under the circumstances of that time, Chiang Kai-shek believed one could only adopt a "laissez-faire policy of allowing frontier autonomy," for "with laissez-faire autonomy, the frontier people will enjoy their freedom and follow their traditions, leaving room for loose-rein containment and co-optation." (17) This "flexible policy of jimi" was clearly an inheritance of the basic principles used by various central dynasties prior to the Qing to handle frontier ethnic issues, representing a continuation of traditional Chinese frontier governance policies. The only difference lay in Chiang Kai-shek’s belief that once strength was sufficient, a proactive strategy of forceful frontier integration could be adopted. The principles for handling frontier issues expounded by Chiang Kai-shek profoundly reflected the National Government’s lack of capacity to deal with Tibet and other frontier issues at its inception. However, this did not mean the National Government abandoned its basic policy of reforming the Tibetan politico-religious system and implementing the separation of church and state. In essence, the National Government did not consider the system of the union of church and state to be the natural or permanent system for Tibet during the Period of Political Tutelage ^[27]. The Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China for the Period of Political Tutelage, which held constitutional status and was promulgated on June 1, 1931, stipulated: "The local systems of Mongolia and Tibet shall be separately determined by law in accordance with local circumstances." (18) This provision actually left maneuvering room for the National Government to change Tibet’s system of the union of church and state, and in a certain sense, denied the legitimacy of that system. At the Western Defense Conference in September 1932, the National Government explicitly stated its intention to "improve the Tibetan administrative system" and expressed three expectations for Tibetan compatriots, among which it mentioned: "The Tibetan political system should also be improved to enable Tibetan compatriots to lead modern political and economic lives. While its beautiful culture inherited from history should certainly be preserved, those theocratic or irrational political systems and customs that hinder the progress of civilization have no possibility of existence today, and so forth." (19) These "theocratic or irrational political systems and customs" clearly referred to the social condition of the union of church and state and the supremacy of religion in Tibet. The National Government believed this situation hindered the progress of Tibetan society and thus sought to "improve" Tibet's politico-religious system, peeling politics away from religion and introducing elements of modern society into Tibet. Although this expectation did not explicitly state the implementation of the separation of church and state in Tibet, it contained the value orientation of changing the status of the union of church and state. However, in the historical context of the time, this policy orientation released by the National Government merely indicated the central authorities' basic attitude toward Tibet's original backward system; it held no practical significance for Tibet itself, which remained in a state of estrangement from the center.

At the end of 1933, the 13th Dalai Lama passed away. The National Government dispatched Huang Musong, Vice Chief of the General Staff, to Lhasa to confer titles and offer sacrifices to the Dalai Lama, and to take the opportunity to resolve the relationship between the central government and the Tibetan local authorities. On the eve of his arrival, the Tibetan local government had just thwarted the reform attempts of Lungshar ^[28], which might have endangered the system of the union of church and state. The conservative forces in Tibet were like birds startled by the mere twang of a bowstring, maintaining a high degree of vigilance against any attempt to change the union of church and state. During his life, the Dalai Lama had been extremely worried about Tibet's politico-religious cause, "shuddering" for Tibet's future, and believing that what was happening in Outer Mongolia at the time (20) "could not be guaranteed not to happen in Tibet." If that occurred, "the flourishing religious undertakings, monasteries, and people of our Tibet will all be destroyed without exception; even the noble families will be turned into slaves, and our Tibetan orthodoxy of several thousand years will become a mere historical term. Thinking of this truly brings infinite fear." Consequently, the Dalai Lama proposed that Tibet should seek the "consolidation and development of the union of church and state" and "the dismissal of calamities and the seeking of blessings for all of Tibet." (21) The Dalai Lama had clearly recognized the dangers and challenges faced by the system of the union of church and state in the historical environment of that time. After his passing, the primary responsibility of the Tibetan local government was to "ensure that the integrity of Tibet was maintained just as it was before the Dalai Lama’s death." (22) As Melvyn Goldstein stated, "Huang Musong's entry into Tibet left the Lhasa authorities both hopeful and uneasy." (23) This sentence aptly describes the contradictory mindset of those in power after Tibet lost its politico-religious core.

Huang Musong arrived in Lhasa on August 28, 1934. The National Government expected that politically, Huang’s trip would seek to "restore the original subordinate relationship between the center and Tibet"; and "should there be any unsatisfactory aspects in the local political organization of Tibet, measures for improvement should be discussed in detail based on central laws and regulations, while taking into account local special circumstances." (24) The so-called "local political organization of Tibet" clearly referred to the local government structure under the system of the union of church and state. The National Government intended to "improve" the political situation in Tibet based on central laws and Tibetan local realities. However, no matter the method or degree of improvement, it inevitably conflicted with the mindset of the Tibetan local government, which was bent on strictly maintaining the union of church and state. Adhering to the definition of a "Patron-Priest relationship" ^[29], the Tibetan local government refused to acknowledge the existence of a political subordinate relationship with the center, using this to resist the penetration of central political influence and thereby safeguard the union of church and state. On October 6, 1934, when Huang Musong asked Kalön ^[30] Trimön, "What is Tibet's political relationship with the center?" Trimön, a powerful figure in Tibet, replied: "Externally we can act as a whole, but internally Tibetans very much wish to continue the Patron-Priest relationship and do not want people from the interior to encroach upon the rights of Tibetans." (25) Trimön's words indicate that the Tibetan local government still felt a lingering fear from the modernization reforms carried out under the principle of the separation of church and state during the Late Qing New Policies ^[31]; they were very worried the center would dominate Tibet's local politico-religious power and were thus highly alert to any political intervention by the central government. In a telegram to the Executive Yuan, Huang Musong interpreted Trimön’s words as "advocating for the complete autonomy of Tibet."

Shortly thereafter, Tibet convened a "People's Assembly" and expressed its basic attitude toward the center in the form of a collective resolution: first, that the "Five Races Under One Union" ^[32] was unsuitable for Tibet’s politico-religious system, expressing an inability to cooperate; second, that Tibet was an "independent country" and did not want the central government to interfere, nor could the central government station officials or troops in Tibet; third, that the relationship between the central government and Tibet was a "Patron-Priest relationship." (26) The Tibetan local government clearly believed that the central government under a republican constitutional system practiced the principle of separation of church and state and modern democratic concepts; they feared that acknowledging a political subordinate relationship to the center would endanger Tibet's system of the union of church and state, hence their strenuous adherence to the so-called "Patron-Priest relationship." On October 17, the Tibetan local government stated to Huang Musong that Tibet was a "Buddhist country" and "its implementation path must involve the execution of the union of church and state. Changing to the laws and regulations of the Republic would be extremely contrary to both religion and governance." (27) The Tibetan local government not only regarded itself as a "Buddhist kingdom" but also polarized the union of church and state against the republican system of the Republic, emphasizing the irreconcilability between the two. Regarding these anxieties of the Tibetan local government, Huang Musong repeatedly stated that there was no conflict between the Republic of China and Tibet's politico-religious system, that the center would grant Tibet "appropriate autonomy," and repeatedly declared that "the center has no intention of changing Tibet’s political system to a democratic one," (28) hoping to dispel the doubts of the Tibetan local government, but he was unsuccessful.

On the eve of his departure from Tibet, Huang Musong handed over the central government's policy framework to the Tibetan local government based on the principle of "moderate autonomy." Within this framework, regarding Tibet's politico-religious system, Huang declared: first, to collectively revere Buddhism, maintaining and promoting it; second, to maintain Tibet's original political system, allowing Tibet "autonomy," and within the scope of Tibet's "autonomous" authority, the center could refrain from interfering in administration. (29) Huang Musong separated the reverence for Buddhism from the maintenance of Tibet's original political system, avoiding a direct touch upon the union of church and state while promising "moderate autonomy." However, the center would reclaim certain powers, such as foreign affairs, national defense, communications, the appointment of important officials, and the dispatch of high-ranking officials to be permanently stationed in Tibet. Since this would damage the highly centralized system of the union of church and state, it is no wonder it met with opposition from the Tibetan local authorities. Consequently, until Huang Musong left Tibet, the Tibetan local authorities continued to insist on the keynote of "equal Patron-Priest relationship between Han and Tibet," "no change to Tibet's politico-religious system," (30) and that "the government must promise not to turn Tibet into a province." (31) On the issue of whether to maintain the old union of church and state or to improve Tibet’s system according to central laws, Huang Musong and the Tibetan local authorities had a direct confrontation, each expressing their own views, but reconciliation was difficult.

After Huang Musong returned to Nanjing, he was immediately appointed Chairman of the Mongol and Tibetan Affairs Commission. In the "Instructions for Cheng Yun, Special Envoy for Escorting Master Panchen Back to Tibet," issued by the Executive Yuan on October 2, 1935 (which Huang participated in drafting), it was explicitly proposed that "the National Government may, in accordance with the wishes of the Tibetan officials and people, allow the maintenance of its inherent politico-religious system"; "the National Government, within the scope permitted by national law, shall revere Tibetan religion"; and "the treatment procedures for the Dalai and Panchen and their functions and powers in Tibet's politics and religion shall generally follow the old system." (32) Compared with the instructions issued by the National Government when Huang first entered Tibet, the stance of "discussing in detail the improvement" of Tibetan local political organization had vanished; instead, it announced the reverence for Tibetan Buddhism and conditionally recognized the legitimacy of Tibet's inherent politico-religious system. After the full-scale outbreak of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, the National Government had even less time to handle Tibetan issues and became more explicit regarding its politico-religious system, stating it would be "permitted to be governed according to old Buddhist norms, and the government will absolutely not lightly use New Era political systems or principles to change its inherent political institutions and social organizations." (33) This also illustrates from another angle that the National Government had always held the intention of reforming Tibet's politico-religious system according to the organizational structure of modern society, which naturally contained the basic spirit of the separation of church and state.

From the perspective of Huang Musong's negotiations with the Tibetan local government, there was deep suspicion and misunderstanding toward the National Government center. Therefore, while adhering to the premise that "the center will never abandon its inherent rights over Tibet," (34) the National Government made "winning over people's hearts and establishing credibility" the basic intent of its work in Tibet during the War of Resistance. In this regard, Wu Zhongxin, Chairman of the Mongol and Tibetan Affairs Commission, once pointed out when reviewing the National Government's Tibet policy: "Tibet's politics, religion, language, and customs are different from the interior; thus, the method of dealing with them should be applied according to their nature and habits. Generally, one should first avoid touching upon their taboos, refrain from arousing their suspicion, show them kindness, demonstrate credibility, and explain the pros and cons; then, under the principle of maintaining their politics and religion, gradually guide them toward cooperation and further bring them into obedience." (35) This cautious strategy for governing Tibet was reflected in Wu Zhongxin's "Main Points of the Talk upon the Mission to Tibet." These points only required Wu Zhongxin to insist that "Tibet is a part of Chinese territory, but the center will not turn Tibet into a province; it can be treated as a special local autonomy, allowing Tibet to maintain its politico-religious system." Regarding specific content, except for insisting on the establishment of a resident office for high-ranking officials, the rights to communications, national defense, foreign affairs, and the appointment of important officials were either not mentioned or phrased more cautiously. (36) Compared to the instructions given to Huang Musong and the "moderate autonomy" offered then, this stance was more flexible. It seems the National Government, during the special period of the War of Resistance, placed greater emphasis on the "flexible policy of jimi." However, after the victory of the War of Resistance, this attitude underwent a relatively obvious change.

III

Through the bloody struggle of the Chinese people during the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, China’s international status rose significantly, placing it alongside Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union as one of the world's "Big Four" powers. Consequently, the Nationalist Government grew more confident in handling frontier ethnic affairs. On May 21, 1945, the Sixth National Congress of the Kuomintang passed a declaration announcing the "granting of high-level autonomy to Outer Mongolia and Tibet." ^[33] "High-level autonomy" (高度自治) thus became a foundational policy for the Nationalist Government in addressing the Tibet issue during the immediate post-war period. On August 24, in his speech "On the Realization of Nationalism and the Maintenance of World Peace," Chiang Kai-shek reaffirmed the resolution of the Sixth National Congress and declared: "If the Tibetans express a desire for autonomy at this time, our government will, in accordance with our sincere traditions, grant them high-level autonomy. If, in the future, they achieve the economic conditions for independence, the Nationalist Government, following the precedent of Outer Mongolia, will assist them in obtaining independent status." ^[34] The Nationalist Government’s high-profile announcement of this policy was clearly intended to ensure that, amidst the emerging wave of international nationalism after the war, Tibet would accept the central government’s autonomy framework and avoid the path of secession, thereby bringing Tibet into the constitutional orbit of post-war China. In reality, looking at subsequent historical developments, the "high-level autonomy" policy announced by Chiang Kai-shek was merely a gesture or a propaganda tactic. Given that Outer Mongolia had already seceded under the banner of "high-level autonomy," the Nationalist Government could not—and would not—allow Tibet to use the same pretext to achieve "independent status." Furthermore, this concept of "high-level autonomy" gradually vanished from the Nationalist Government’s policy program, evolving instead into "local autonomy" (地方自治).

In August 1945, the Nationalist Government convened the Mongolian and Tibetan Local Conference, which passed the "Draft Proposal for High-Level Autonomy in the Tibetan Local Area." In this draft, the Nationalist Government declared that "on the premise of national territorial integrity, the Central Government permits high-level autonomy for the Tibetan local area." It explicitly defined the powers of the Tibetan local government, proposing to upgrade the original Tibetan "People’s Assembly" (Gyalpo Luthang ^[35]) into a local parliament. However, it stipulated that Tibet’s national defense and foreign affairs were to be vested in the Central Government, and the appointment of officials was to follow the practices of the interior, being made via "simple appointment" (jiǎnrèn) or "recommended appointment" (jiànrèn) by the Center. It protected the religious beliefs and customs of the Tibetan people but required that the reincarnation affairs of Tibetan religious leaders be handled by the Central Government according to old precedents. ^[36] Within this draft, though titled "high-level autonomy," the Nationalist Government had actually embedded the contents of the "local autonomy" it had long sought to promote, effectively reducing "high-level autonomy" to a more generalized form of "local autonomy." Not only did the draft fail to mention the system of the "unity of church and state" (zhèngjiào héyī ^[37]), but even terms like "the system of religion and politics"—which would place religion on equal footing with politics—were nowhere to be found. It can be said that the Nationalist Government had, at this point, essentially denied the legitimacy of the "unity of church and state" in the New Era. In September of the same year, the Nationalist Government promulgated the "Post-War Political Measures for Mongolia and Tibet," which designated Tibet as a "Special Autonomous Region" and, following the principle of the separation of church and state, further clarified its stance on changing Tibet’s traditional system: "The Central Government shall adopt a policy of absolute non-interference toward the religious development of the Tibetan Special Autonomous Region. However, religion and politics must be governed separately as a matter of principle; religious leaders and monasteries may not interfere in politics or the judiciary." ^[38] Here, the Nationalist Government further clarified its basic attitude toward the Tibetan local system: namely, the implementation of the separation of church and state or the separate administration of religion and politics. The introduction of these schemes indicated that the Nationalist Government had, in a sense, abandoned the policy of "high-level autonomy" and begun considering the implementation of a system in Tibet that was similar to the local autonomy of the interior while retaining certain Tibetan local characteristics.

Following the victory in the War of Resistance, and in accordance with Sun Yat-sen's stages of national reconstruction, the Nationalist Government began implementing constitutionalism across the country, formulating the "Constitution of the Republic of China" in December 1946. This constitution specifically stipulated: "The system of autonomy in Tibet shall be guaranteed." ^[39] As to what exactly this "system of autonomy" referred to, the constitution did not explicitly state it meant the "unity of church and state," thereby leaving room for maneuver to change that system during the implementation of autonomy. At the constitutional reform conference, the Tibetan delegation submitted nine opinions to the Center, describing Tibet as a "land where the Buddha Dharma flourishes" and requesting that the Center "allow the original political and religious powers of Tibet to be managed by the Dalai Lama as of old." In response, the Nationalist Government promised: "Regarding all old established regulations of Tibetan politics and religion, the Central Government has always endeavored to maintain them and has no intention of making changes. The religious authority of the Dalai Lama shall naturally be maintained as before to ensure its prosperity." ^[40] On one hand, the Nationalist Government promised no intention of changing old religious and political precedents, but on the other, it only pledged to maintain the Dalai Lama’s "religious authority" (jiàoquán), while remaining silent on his secular power. This was inevitably somewhat contradictory. Such a declaration showed that the government still desired to implement the separation of church and state in Tibet; its promise not to change old precedents was merely a tactical move to bring Tibet into the central constitutional framework.

In the spirit of the Kuomintang’s "Sixth Congress" and Chiang Kai-shek’s speech of August 24, 1945, the Nationalist Government ordered the Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (MTAC) to "engage in research on Tibet’s autonomy system and prepare the means for its guarantee." ^[41] Regarding the "unity of church and state" practiced in Tibet, the MTAC believed: "This has its historical origins, geographical environment, and social background; it has evolved over a long time, and politics and customs are at peace. The Center’s policy toward Tibet is to respect the people’s beliefs and customs, responding to the inherent local political and religious forms and providing them with legal guarantees to seek local stability and increase people’s welfare." ^[42] Proceeding from this, the MTAC argued that the "system of autonomy" stipulated in the Constitution "naturally refers to the current system of the unity of church and state in Tibet," although "the actual scope of this system and its relationship with the Central Government" remained to be studied. ^[43] However, if it were determined that the "unity of church and state" was indeed the "system of autonomy" guaranteed by the Constitution, the Central Government would be obliged to maintain Tibet’s political status quo. This clearly contradicted the basic concepts of modern constitutionalism and the principle of the separation of church and state previously announced in the "Post-War Political Measures for Mongolia and Tibet." Consequently, on October 26, 1948, the MTAC reconsidered, stating: "Whether the so-called Tibetan autonomy system refers to the current unity of church and state... still awaits research." ^[44] The MTAC wavered between maintaining the "unity of church and state" and integrating Tibet into political unity according to constitutional ideals. This contradictory attitude reflected the difficult dilemma of the Nationalist Government in dealing with the relationship between Tibetan politics and religion.

Regardless of how the Nationalist Government defined the autonomy system, the Tibetan local government believed that Tibet’s system should be its inherent "unity of church and state" and maintained high vigilance against any intention to change it. Especially after the Reting Incident of 1947, what the Tibetan local government sought was no longer "high-level autonomy" but "independence and self-mastery" (zìlì zìzhǔ). It attempted to signal its position to the international community by participating in the Asian Relations Conference and sending a trade mission abroad, hoping to permanently maintain the stagnant and backward system of the unity of church and state. Vis-à-vis the Center, the Tibetan local government repeatedly expressed its stance on maintaining this system, stating: "Tibet is a place where the Buddha Dharma flourishes; we request the Center to allow all original religious and political powers to be managed by the Dalai Lama as of old"; ^[45] "Tibet is a sacred Buddhist land with independent and self-determined political and religious power"; ^[46] and "Tibet is an independent and autonomous country of the sacred Buddha Dharma." ^[47] In response to these claims, the MTAC acknowledged that Tibet had a special system of religion and politics historically, but emphasized that local autonomy should be implemented and opposed Tibet’s claim to be a "country" on the grounds of being a "sacred Buddhist land." ^[48] As the Kuomintang’s military situation worsened in the war against the Communists, the Nationalist Government had the will but lacked the power to change the state of the "unity of church and state" in Tibet. The "Expulsion of Hans" incident on July 8, 1949, marked the end of the Nationalist Government’s role as the Central Government in handling Tibetan affairs.

IV.

The Nanjing Nationalist Government followed the legacy of Sun Yat-sen, hoping to extend modern constitutional thinking throughout the country. By promoting local autonomy, it sought to introduce the concepts of democracy and republicanism to Tibet, transform the original political and religious conditions, and not only reform Tibetan Buddhism itself—to free the people from blind religious devotion and shape democratic concepts—but also to change the long-standing system of the unity of church and state. It aimed to break the political structure where religion and politics were fused and power was concentrated in one person, achieving political integration between Tibet and the interior to resist encroachment and infiltration by foreign powers like Great Britain. It must be said that this principle of the Nationalist Government reflected the historical necessity of building a nation-state in modern China. However, the Nationalist Government lacked effective control over Tibet and was unable to extend its rule there. Under these circumstances, the necessary conditions for transforming Tibet’s "unity of church and state" according to the principle of separation were absent. This led to Chiang Kai-shek’s 1934 proposal of "subtle policies of encirclement and conciliation" (róuxìng de zhèngcè zhī jīmí) becoming the primary thread of the Nationalist Government’s governance of Tibet. Although the Nationalist Government was a republican government with a modern constitutional character, it never escaped the shackles of traditional "appeasement and conciliation" (huáiróu jīmí) in its frontier governance. Thus, removing the "special political forms" of Tibetan administration and peeling away the traditional relationship between Tibetan politics and religion remained merely an ideal goal.

However, under the pretext that its relationship with the Central Government was only a "Priest-Patron relationship" (Chö-yön ^[49]), the Tibetan local government resolutely rejected Central interference in its internal affairs to maintain the system of the unity of church and state. Religion held an unquestionable position of superiority in the daily spiritual lives of the Tibetan clergy and laity, as well as in the political superstructure; maintaining religion—and thus the system of the unity of church and state—was the fundamental mission of the Tibetan local government. Mr. Liu Shengqi once pointed out that a significant portion of the privileged class in Tibet doubted "whether the current Central Government would still maintain their religion." Furthermore, "what they feared most was whether their powers as a special class would be completely eliminated once the Central Government’s influence reached Tibet. They did not quite understand what a democratic republican polity was, but they had personally seen the 'sacred and inviolable' Qing Emperor reduced to a commoner, and all the once-illustrious princes and ministers vanish without a trace. Would they and everything they currently possessed likewise vanish once Tibet was 'normalized' with the interior?" ^[50] This observation by Mr. Liu strikes at the heart of the anxieties hidden deep within the Tibetan ecclesiastical and secular elite. Additionally, the 13th Dalai Lama had instructed Tibetan officials and citizens to strive for the "consolidation and development of the religion and government," which became the central task pursued by the Tibetan local government in the post-13th Dalai Lama era. Would the Central Government, which practiced democracy and republicanism, destroy the system of the unity of church and state and strip the nobility and monasteries of their privileges, much like the Soviet influence had done in Outer Mongolia? These questions haunted the minds of the Tibetan upper class throughout this period. Furthermore, Tibetan society at the time lacked the internal impetus for change. "In this land bathed in the light of the Buddha, secular society exists for the sake of religious society; the order of importance cannot be reversed." ^[51] Under the profound influence of Buddhist concepts of reincarnation (Saṃsāra) and causality (Karma), the people "all believe that what one experiences in this life is the fruit of actions in a past life, and what one does in this life is the cause for experiences in the next life. Thus, people of all classes regard their own class status as predestined, living in peace with one another without grievance." ^[52] In such a situation, implementing the separation of church and state and changing the "unity" system was difficult to achieve without the intervention of an external Central Government. Simply put, the feudal serfdom society under Tibet’s "unity of church and state" lacked the source of strength for self-renewal.

From a historical perspective, since the formation of the "unity of church and state" system in Tibet, every period that saw the separation of religion and politics occurred only after strong intervention by the Central Government. Whether the "unity" or the "separation" was implemented essentially depended on the degree of strength projected by the Central Government. During the Nationalist Government’s reign, internal troubles and foreign aggression were constant; as the Central Government, it had neither the time nor the strength to act as the intervening force to break this "stagnant water." To implement the separation of church and state in a society with such powerful conservative forces required the strong support of a Central Government—not that of the late Qing, nor that of various Republic-era governments, but the New China established in 1949. From the suppression of the rebellion by the Tibetan local elite in 1959 to the formal establishment of the Tibet Autonomous Region in 1965, Tibet truly realized the separation of church and state. Only then did the system of the "unity of church and state," which had lasted for nearly seven hundred years, truly become history.

(This article was written under the careful guidance of my mentor, Mr. Zhou Weizhou, to whom I express my sincere thanks!)

Notes:

Han Daxuan, "On the Constitutional Value of the Principle of Separation of Church and State," Legal Science, No. 10, 2005.

② Government Information Office of the Executive Yuan: The System of the Integration of Religion and Politics in Tibet, November 1947, p. 6. ③ Shen Zonglian and Liu Shengqi, trans. Liu Xiaoqing: Tibet and the Tibetans, China Tibetology Press, 2006 edition, p. 126. ④ China Tibetology Research Center et al., eds.: A Compilation of Historical Archival Materials on the Relations Between the Tibet Local Area and the Central Government Since the Yuan Dynasty, China Tibetology Press, 1994 edition, p. 1622. ⑤ See A Compilation of Historical Archival Materials on the Relations Between the Tibet Local Area and the Central Government Since the Yuan Dynasty, p. 2346. ⑥ See A Compilation of Historical Archival Materials on the Relations Between the Tibet Local Area and the Central Government Since the Yuan Dynasty, p. 2359. ⑦ For details, see the Constitution of the Republic of China (promulgated October 10, 1923), in Xu Zhengguang, ed.: A Compilation of Important Policies Regarding Mongolia and Tibet Since the Republic, published by the "Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission," 2001, p. 10. ⑧ Second Historical Archives of China, ed.: A Compilation of Archival Materials on the History of the Republic of China, Series 5, Vol. 1, Politics (II), Jiangsu Guji Press, 1994 edition, pp. 84-85. ⑨ See Administrative Program of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission of the National Government During the Period of Political Tutelage (February 23, 1929), Archives of the MTAC of the National Government, 141/95, held at the Second Historical Archives of China. ^[53] ⑩ "Explanatory Notes" appended to the Chronological Table for the Distribution of Political Tutelage Work by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission During the Period of Political Tutelage, July 1929, held at the Tibet Autonomous Region Archives. (11) See "Explanatory Notes" appended to the Chronological Table for the Distribution of Political Tutelage Work by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission During the Period of Political Tutelage, July 1929, held at the Tibet Autonomous Region Archives. (12) See The Premier's Legacy Teachings on Mongolia and Tibet and the National Government's Decrees on Mongolia and Tibet, compiled and printed by the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission, 1934, p. 310. ^[54] (13) Zhu Shaoyi: Observations in Lhasa, Commercial Press, 1947 edition, p. 28. (14) A Compilation of Historical Archival Materials on the Relations Between the Tibet Local Area and the Central Government Since the Yuan Dynasty, pp. 2584-2585. (15) A Compilation of Historical Archival Materials on the Relations Between the Tibet Local Area and the Central Government Since the Yuan Dynasty, pp. 2477-2478. (16) A Compilation of Historical Archival Materials on the Relations Between the Tibet Local Area and the Central Government Since the Yuan Dynasty, p. 2518. (17) Chiang Kai-shek: China's Frontier Problems (March 7, 1934), in Qin Xiaoyi, ed.: Collected Thoughts and Speeches of the Late President Chiang Kai-shek, Vol. 12, "Central Cultural Supplies Society," 1984 edition, pp. 105-108. (18) Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China for the Period of Political Tutelage, in Xu Zhengguang, ed.: A Compilation of Important Policies Regarding Mongolia and Tibet Since the Republic, p. 19. (19) Huang Fensheng: New Records of Mongolia and Tibet, Zhonghua Book Company, 1938 edition, p. 430. (20) Refers to Outer Mongolia, under the influence of the Soviet Union, implementing the separation of religion and politics, prohibiting the reincarnation of the Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, confiscating monastic property, and forcing lamas to return to secular life, which caused great damage to Tibetan Buddhism. ^[55] (21) A Compilation of Historical Archival Materials on the Relations Between the Tibet Local Area and the Central Government Since the Yuan Dynasty, p. 2585. (22)(23) Melvyn Goldstein, trans. Du Yongbin: A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951: The Demise of the Lamaist State, China Tibetology Press, 2005 edition, p. 168. (24) Kong Qingzong: "A Factual Record of Huang Musong's Entry into Tibet," in Selected Materials on Tibetan Literature and History, Vol. 5, p. 78. (25) China Tibetology Research Center and Second Historical Archives of China, eds.: Selected Archives on the Funeral Rites of the 13th Dalai Lama and the Reincarnation and Enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama, China Tibetology Press, 1991 edition, p. 80. (26) See Selected Archives on the Funeral Rites of the 13th Dalai Lama and the Reincarnation and Enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama, p. 89. (27) Selected Archives on the Funeral Rites of the 13th Dalai Lama and the Reincarnation and Enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama, p. 91. (28) See Selected Archives on the Funeral Rites of the 13th Dalai Lama and the Reincarnation and Enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama, p. 94. (29) See Second Historical Archives of China and China Tibetology Research Center, eds.: Reports of the Envoys Huang Musong, Wu Zhongxin, Zhao Shouyu, and Dai Chuanxian on Handling Tibetan Affairs, China Tibetology Press, 1993 edition, pp. 41-42. (30) See Selected Archives on the Funeral Rites of the 13th Dalai Lama and the Reincarnation and Enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama, p. 98. (31) See China Philosophy (sic: Tibetology) Research Center et al., eds.: A Compilation of Historical Archival Materials on the Relations Between the Tibet Local Area and the Central Government Since the Yuan Dynasty, pp. 2683-2684. (32) China Tibetology Research Center and Second Historical Archives of China, eds.: Selected Archives on the Activities of the 9th Panchen Lama in the Interior and the Obstruction of His Return to Tibet, China Tibetology Press, 1992 edition, pp. 209-210. (33) Selected Archives on the Activities of the 9th Panchen Lama in the Interior and the Obstruction of His Return to Tibet, p. 428. (34) Selected Archives on the Funeral Rites of the 13th Dalai Lama and the Reincarnation and Enthronement of the 14th Dalai Lama, p. 145. (35) "Review and Opinions on Tibetan Policy Prepared by Wu Zhongxin (August 4, 1939)," Archives of the MTAC of the National Government, 141/2922, held at the Second Historical Archives of China. (36) See Executive Yuan Directive Transmitting the Eleven Key Points of the Conversation of Envoy Wu Zhongxin Upon His Entry to Tibet (September 1939), Archives of the MTAC of the National Government, 141/2935, held at the Second Historical Archives of China. (37) Materials on Successive National Congresses and Central Committee Plenary Sessions of the Kuomintang, Vol. 2, Guangming Daily Press, 1985 edition, p. 911. (38) British India Office Archives, IOR, L/PS/12/4194, Ext. 4789/1945, Pres. Chiang Addresses Supreme National Defence Council, Central News, August 25, 1945. (39) See Draft Proposal for High-Degree Autonomy in the Tibet Local Area Formulated by the Conference on the National Government’s Case for High-Degree Autonomy in Mongolian and Tibetan Local Areas (August 1945), Archives of the MTAC of the National Government, 141/2558, held at the Second Historical Archives of China. (40) "Post-war Political Facilities Program for Mongolia and Tibet," September 8, 1945, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archives, File No.: 172-1/0001/019/48, held at the "Academia Historica." Quoted in Li Yuquan: The Establishment, Functions, and Influence of the Lhasa Office—Simultaneously Discussing the National Government's Tibet Policy (1939-1949), Master’s Thesis, Institute of History, Chinese Culture University, 2004, p. 111. (41) Constitution of the Republic of China (Bilingual Chinese-Tibetan Edition), April 1947, held at the Tibet Autonomous Region Archives. (42) Report on Major Measures of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in 1947 (Tibetan Affairs section) (February 1948), Archives of the MTAC of the National Government, 141/109. (43)(44) Report on Major Measures of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in 1947 (Tibetan Affairs section) (February 1948), Archives of the MTAC of the National Government, 141/109. (45) See Major Work Report of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission of the National Government for the Year 1947 (Tibetan Affairs section), Archives of the MTAC of the National Government, 141/109, held at the Second Historical Archives of China. (46) Draft 1949 Work Plan for the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (Tibetan Affairs section) (October 26, 1948), Archives of the MTAC of the National Government, 141/111, held at the Second Historical Archives of China. (47) Report on Major Measures of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in 1947 (Tibetan Affairs section) (February 1948), Archives of the MTAC of the National Government, 141/109, held at the Second Historical Archives of China. (48) A Compilation of Historical Archival Materials on the Relations Between the Tibet Local Area and the Central Government Since the Yuan Dynasty, China Tibetology Press, 1994 edition, p. 3034. (49) A Compilation of Historical Archival Materials on the Relations Between the Tibet Local Area and the Central Government Since the Yuan Dynasty, pp. 3057-3058. (50) See A Compilation of Historical Archival Materials on the Relations Between the Tibet Local Area and the Central Government Since the Yuan Dynasty, pp. 3057-3058. (51) Liu Shengqi: "Tibetan Politics," in Collected Works of Liu Shengqi on Tibetology, China Tibetology Press, 2008 edition, p. 469. (52) Shen Zonglian and Liu Shengqi, trans. Liu Xiaoqing: Tibet and the Tibetans, p. 123. (53) Government Information Office of the Executive Yuan: The System of the Integration of Religion and Politics in Tibet, November 1947, p. 5.

Responsible Editor: Wang Jiafei

Notes

↩ [1] 政教合一 (zhèngjiào héyī): Often translated as "caesaropapism" or "theocracy," in the Chinese context it specifically refers to the historical Tibetan system where the Dalai Lama held both supreme spiritual (chos) and temporal (srid) authority.
↩ [2] 民主改革 (mínzhǔ gǎigé): Refers to the "Democratic Reform in Tibet" launched by the CPC in 1959, which abolished the 1751 theocratic system and serfdom.
↩ [3] 宗教的政治化与政治的宗教化 (zōngjiào de zhèngzhìhuà yǔ zhèngzhì de zōngjiàohuà): A common formulation in Chinese political science describing the mutual encroachment of religious and secular spheres, which the principle of separation aims to prevent.
↩ [4] These quotes are from contemporary sources cited by the author to illustrate the subordinate nature of politics to religion in old Tibet.
↩ [5] 柳陞祺 (Liǔ Shēngqí): A pioneering Chinese Tibetologist (1909–2003) who lived in Lhasa in the 1940s and wrote extensively on Tibetan social structure.
↩ [6] 因俗而治 (yīn sú ér zhì): A traditional Chinese administrative philosophy meaning "ruling according to local customs," often used by the Qing to govern ethnic frontier regions with a high degree of autonomy.
↩ [7] 五族共和 (wǔzú gònghé): "Five Races Under One Union," the founding principle of the early Republic of China (1912), representing the Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui (Muslims), and Tibetans as a single national entity.
↩ [8] 理藩 (lǐ fán): Referring to the Lifanyuan (Court of Colonial Affairs), the Qing-era body that managed relations with Mongolia, Tibet, and the frontier. Yuan Shikai merged this into the Ministry of Internal Affairs to signal that these regions were no longer "colonies" but integral parts of the domestic state.
↩ [9] 划一 (huà yī): A key term in Republican-era administrative reform meaning "uniformity" or "standardization" into a single national administrative grid.
↩ [10] 实策 (shí cè): Practical or realistic policy/strategy.
↩ [11] 省县制 (shěngxiàn zhì): The "Province-and-County system," the standard administrative hierarchy of China’s interior. Its proposed implementation in Tibet was a move toward direct central administration.
↩ [12] 三民主义 (Sān Mín Zhǔyì): The "Three People's Principles" (Nationalism, Democracy, and People's Livelihood) formulated by Sun Yat-sen, the official ideology of the Kuomintang (KMT).
↩ [13] 民族国家 (mínzú guójiā): Nation-state. In Chinese Marxist and political discourse, this often refers to the transition from a traditional multi-ethnic empire to a modern unified state.
↩ [14] 训政时期 (xùnzhèng shíqī): The "Period of Political Tutelage," the second stage of Sun Yat-sen's three stages of national development (military rule, tutelage, constitutionalism), during which the KMT exercised a one-party dictatorship to "train" the people for democracy (1928–1948).
↩ [15] 蒙藏委员会 (Měng-Zàng Wěiyuánhuì): The Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission (MTAC), the central cabinet-level body of the Nationalist Government responsible for frontier administration.
↩ [16] 除旧布新 (chú jiù bù xīn): Literal meaning "to get rid of the old and spread the new"; used here in the context of administrative modernization.
↩ [17] 政教分治 (zhèngjiào fēnzhì): Separate governance of politics and religion.
↩ [18] 参事会/参议会 (cānshìhuì / cānyìhuì): Councils or assemblies; the Nationalist Government aimed to use these secular collective bodies to bypass the traditional authority of the Dalai Lama.
↩ [19] 檀越关系/供施关系 (tányuè guānxi / gòngshī guānxi): The "Priest-Patron" or "Cho-Yon" relationship. Tanyue (Sanskrit: Dānapati) refers to a lay donor. Tibet used this concept to argue that the relationship with China was one of religious protection/patronage rather than political subordination.
↩ [20] The "5th Dalai Lama" (1617–1682) is significant because he was the first to establish the Gelug school's political dominance over all of Tibet with Mongol military support.
↩ [21] 教政 (jiàozhèng): A contraction of religion (bstan) and politics (srid), reflecting the Tibetan concept of Chos-srid-zung-'brel (the union of religion and politics).
↩ [22] 告全藏官民书 (Gào quán Zàng guān mín shū): The 13th Dalai Lama’s "Last Testament" or "Letter to the Officials and People of Tibet" (1932), a foundational document in modern Tibetan history.
↩ [23] 羁縻 (jīmí): A traditional Chinese diplomatic strategy of "loose rein" or "bridling," involving the granting of titles and autonomy to frontier leaders to maintain a nominal suzerainty when direct control was impossible.
↩ [24] 怀柔 (huáiróu): Conciliation or "winning over through kindness."
↩ [25] 笼络 (lǒngluò): Co-opting or winning over through political maneuvering.
↩ [26] 羁縻 (jīmí): Historically, a strategy used by Chinese central dynasties to manage frontier ethnic groups. Ji means a horse's halter, and mi means an ox's tether. It implies a "loose rein" policy where local leaders retain internal authority while acknowledging the central government's suzerainty.
↩ [27] 训政时期 (xùnzhèng shíqī): The Period of Political Tutelage (1928–1948), the second of Sun Yat-sen's three stages of national reconstruction (military rule, tutelage, constitutionalism), during which the Kuomintang (KMT) governed as a one-party state to "educate" the people for democracy.
↩ [28] 龙厦 (Lóngxià): Reference to Lungshar Dorje Tsegyal, a progressive Tibetan official who attempted to modernize the Tibetan military and government in the early 20th century but was blinded and imprisoned after a failed coup/reform attempt in 1934.
↩ [29] 檀越关系 (tányuè guānxì): Often translated as the "Cho-yon" relationship. Tanyue is a translation of "Dana" (patron/donor). It describes a reciprocal relationship where a secular ruler (the patron) provides political protection and support to a religious leader (the priest), who in turn provides spiritual guidance. The Tibetan authorities used this to argue for a relationship based on religious affinity rather than political subordination.
↩ [30] 噶伦 (gálún): Kalön. A high-ranking minister in the Kashag (the Tibetan cabinet) under the Dalai Lama's government.
↩ [31] 清末新政 (Qīngmò Xīnzhèng): The Late Qing New Policies (1901–1911), a series of radical reforms in education, military, and administration. In Tibet, this involved attempts by the Qing to shift from indirect "loose rein" rule to direct administrative integration.
↩ [32] 五族共和 (wǔzú gònghé): "Five Races Under One Union," the founding principle of the early Republic of China, symbolizing the harmony of the Han, Manchus, Mongols, Hui (Muslims), and Tibetans. Many Tibetan elites viewed this as a secular imposition that threatened their unique theocratic identity.
↩ [33] 外蒙 (Wàiměng): Outer Mongolia. The ROC government’s recognition of Outer Mongolian autonomy/independence was a point of extreme political sensitivity, particularly as it was seen as falling under Soviet influence.
↩ [34] 民族主义 (mínzú zhǔyì): Nationalism. Here it refers specifically to the first of Sun Yat-sen's "Three People's Principles" (Sān Mín Zhǔyì), which evolved from "anti-Manchuism" to the advocacy of a multi-ethnic "Republic of Five Nationalities" (Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui, Tibetan).
↩ [35] 人民大会 (rénmín dàhuì): Referring to the Gyalpo Luthang, a traditional consultative assembly of Tibetan officials and monastic representatives, which the Nationalist Government tried to conceptualize through Western parliamentary terms.
↩ [36] 简任 (jiǎnrèn) and 荐任 (jiànrèn): Terms from the ROC civil service system. Jianren refers to high-level appointments made by the head of state; Jianren refers to middle-level appointments made upon recommendation.
↩ [37] 政教合一 (zhèngjiào héyī): Literally "politics and religion as one." This is the standard Chinese term for a theocratic system or the "unity of church and state," specifically describing the historical Tibetan Lhagyalo system.
↩ [38] 特别自治区 (tèbié zìzhìqū): Special Autonomous Region. An administrative designation used by the ROC to accommodate frontier regions while maintaining nominal central sovereignty.
↩ [39] 中华民国宪法 (Zhōnghuá Mínguó Xiànfǎ): The 1946 Constitution of the Republic of China, which remains the basis of the legal system in Taiwan today.
↩ [40] 成规 (chéngguī): Established rules or precedents. In the context of Tibet, this often refers to the Qing dynasty regulations, such as the 29-Article Ordinance for the More Effective Governance of Tibet (1793).
↩ [41] 蒙藏委员会 (Méng Zàng Wěiyuánhuì): Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs (MTAC). The cabinet-level body in the ROC government responsible for the administration of the Mongolian and Tibetan borderlands.
↩ [42] 政俗 (zhèngsú): Politics and customs. Indicates the intersection of secular administrative affairs and religious/traditional societal norms.
↩ [43] 宪法 (Xiànfǎ): Referring to the 1946 Constitution of the ROC.
↩ [44] 举棋不定 (jǔqí bùdìng): Literal: "to hold a chess piece without making a move." An idiom (chéngyǔ) meaning to be wavering or indecisive.
↩ [45] 佛法 (Fófǎ): Buddha Dharma. Used here politically to emphasize Tibet's status as a religious entity rather than a secular administrative division.
↩ [46] 圣地佛国 (shèng dì Fóguó): "Sacred Land and Buddha Kingdom." This rhetoric emphasizes the religious character of Tibet to justify its political autonomy.
↩ [47] 自治自主 (zìzhì zìzhǔ): Autonomy and self-mastery/independence. The juxtaposition of these terms reflects the ambiguity between requesting internal self-government and claiming external sovereignty.
↩ [48] 一体化 (yītǐhuà): Integration/Unification. In Chinese political science, this refers to the process of making frontier administrations identical to the provincial structures of the interior (provinces and counties).
↩ [49] 供施关系 (gōngshī guānxì) / 檀越关系 (tányuè guānxì): Refers to the Chö-yön (Priest-Patron) relationship. Chö (Priest/Preceptor) is the religious leader; Yön (Patron/Almsgiver) is the secular protector. Tibetans used this to argue that their relationship with the Qing Emperors was a personal religious one, not a political submission of one state to another.
↩ [50] 柳陞祺 (Liǔ Shēngqí): A prominent 20th-century Chinese Tibetologist who spent significant time in Tibet during the 1940s and documented the social structure of the era.
↩ [51] 本末倒置 (běnmò dàozhì): Literal: "placing the root at the end and the tip at the root." A chengyu meaning to confuse the essential with the non-essential or to have one's priorities backward.
↩ [52] 轮回 (lúnhuí) and 因果 (yīnguǒ): Saṃsāra (reincarnation) and Karma (causality). The author highlights these to argue that religious belief functioned as a tool for social stability and the preservation of the feudal hierarchy.
↩ [53] 训政时期 (xùnzhèng shíqī): The Period of Political Tutelage. According to Sun Yat-sen's Fundamentals of National Reconstruction, after the period of military rule and before constitutional democracy, the Kuomintang (KMT) would act as a "tutor" to the people to train them in the exercise of their political rights. This period officially lasted from 1928 to 1948.
↩ [54] 总理 (zǒnglǐ): Generally refers to Sun Yat-sen, who was designated the "Permanent Director-General" (Tsung-li) of the Kuomintang. His teachings formed the ideological basis for the Republic of China's (ROC) nationality policies.
↩ [55] 哲布尊丹巴呼图克图 (Zhébùzūndānbā Hūtúkètú): The Jebtsundamba Khutuktu, the spiritual head of the Gelug lineage of Tibetan Buddhism in Mongolia and the highest-ranking lama in Outer Mongolia. The ROC sources here view the Soviet-backed secularization as a cautionary warning for their own policy in Tibet.