The Development of New Theism and Related Laws and Policies Since the Reform and Opening-up
The development of "new theism" since the reform and opening-up [1] and its related laws and policies:
Theism, in Western discourse, is generally used to refer to monotheism. In the Chinese cultural context, we usually use this term more broadly: any belief involving ghosts or gods [2] is considered theism. This article primarily discusses the theistic beliefs that have emerged, organized, and operated in mainland China since the reform and opening-up, mainly including: qigong, "special functions" [3], and cults such as Falun Gong. The five major religions currently existing and recognized by the state in our country are naturally also theistic, but their development is not the focus of this investigation.
Scholars have already summarized the historical development of the contemporary rise of qigong and special functions and analyzed the reasons for their emergence; others have systematically analyzed the development of special functions from the perspectives of the history and philosophy of science. Some scholars have conducted investigative analyses of the proliferation of qigong and special functions from the perspective of theism and New Religious Movements (NRMs). After the appearance of the Falun Gong phenomenon, many scholars concentrated their attention there, conducting extensive analyses, mostly from the perspective of governing cults. Many scholars have also researched the Sinicized Marxist view of religion or the theory of religion with Chinese characteristics. Still others have summarized and synthesized the historical course of the Sinicization of Marxist atheism. Generally speaking, from the perspective of scientific atheism, systematic research that investigates phenomena such as qigong, special functions, and Falun Gong as manifestations of "new theism" while reflecting on our country's policy and legal responses remains rare.
I. A Brief Account of the Development of New Theism
Beginning in the 1980s, activities promoting theism outside of religious venues and not under the name of religion increased daily, reaching a peak in the 1990s and exerting a broad impact on Chinese society. These theistic propaganda activities mainly included:
Qigong. Qigong was originally a traditional Chinese medicine exercise method used to strengthen the body and maintain health, primarily employing the adjustment of breathing, physical movement, and consciousness (known as tiao xi, tiao xing, and tiao xin [4]) as its means. In the religious practices of Taoism and Buddhism, certain forms of qigong are also included. However, starting in the latter half of the 1980s, qigong practice swept across China. By the early 1990s, the number of qigong groups—including both registered and unregistered—reached 2,000, creating a distinct "qigong fever" phenomenon. With tens of millions of practitioners, organizations with a religious nature gradually formed. These qigong groups shared a common characteristic: they possessed obvious religious or spiritual belief factors, and most were similar to cultic groups in Western society. Typical examples included Zhang Xiangyu’s "Natural Center Gong," Gao XX’s [5] "Information Gong," and Zhang Hongbao’s "Zhonghua Yangsheng Yizhi Gong" (China Health Care and Wisdom Enhancement Gong). These so-called "Gongs" were not names from traditional qigong; they were all self-created. They often created a set of supernatural "doctrines" by cobbling together and integrating certain contents from various religions. In the process of teaching the "Natural Center Gong" and recruiting disciples, the atmosphere was saturated with theistic color, possessing the characteristics of preaching and proselytizing. In 1990, this organization and Zhang Xiangyu were investigated and handled by public security organs. By switching their names, these "Gongs" not only included content regarding ghosts and gods in their propaganda but also possessed the characteristics of religious organizations in their organizational form, often obtaining illegal wealth through lecturing, recruiting disciples, or opening companies. Most of these "Gongs" failed to exist for long, usually becoming unsustainable after a few years of fervor due to their illegal activities, but the rise of similar organizations one after another was a major feature of Chinese society in the 1990s.
Special Functions. "Special functions" were sometimes linked with qigong, suggesting that certain "Great Qigong Masters" possessed extraordinary capabilities. However, looking at the history of their discovery and performance, those with "special functions" were not necessarily "qigong masters." The earliest report on "special functions" appeared on March 11, 1979, in the Sichuan Daily, which stated that "Dazu County recently discovered a child who can identify characters and distinguish colors with his ears." Although hospitals and other organizations later proved through testing that this phenomenon was fake, reports of children with "special functions" across the country subsequently sprang up like bamboo shoots after a spring rain. Academic units later held discussions on this, theoretically denying the existence of "special functions." However, some held an affirmative attitude toward this research. Consequently, despite great controversy, research into "special functions" attracted many participants, and many research groups or associations were established throughout the country. It can be seen that at the time, "special functions" were being researched as a scientific phenomenon. We know that those "extraordinary intelligences" are, in fact, the abilities attributed to ghosts and gods in religious theology. Therefore, within these so-called "scientific researches," some assumed the existence of ghosts and gods, believing that the realization of such functions was the result of communicating with them. Such research naturally could not achieve any scientific progress.
Falun Gong. Among the religious organizations or activities labeled as "cults" and dealt with accordingly, the one with the greatest influence was the domestically developed Falun Gong. In addition, there were some organizations or movements of a Christian nature, such as the Family of Love (formerly "Children of God"), the Shouters, the South China Church, and so on. The emergence of Falun Gong was not unrelated to the two aforementioned forms of theism. Li Hongzhi was also one of many qigong practitioners. In 1988, Li Hongzhi began practicing qigong. In May 1992, he founded the "Falun Dafa Research Association," which was affiliated with the China Qigong Scientific Research Association, and began promoting Falun Gong. He organized seminars, gave speeches, performed supernatural demonstrations, published books, and distributed study aids and other materials. By 1994, Falun Gong claimed to have hundreds of thousands of followers. By 1998, it claimed to have 100 million. The belief system and spiritual practice of Falun Gong is an eclectic mixture of many traditions including Buddhism, Taoism, and qigong. Whether in the published book Zhuan Falun or in his speeches and performances, Li claimed to possess supernatural powers, and the content of the belief was theistic. On July 22, 1999, the Chinese government ordered the banning of the "Falun Dafa Association and the Falun Gong organizations under its jurisdiction." Previously, while qigong and special function organizations and research had been investigated, criticized, and questioned, they had not disappeared; it was only after the banning of Falun Gong that these phenomena rapidly dissipated across China.
The three forms of theism mentioned above are not "feudal superstition" [6] in the traditional sense, nor are they entirely Western cults or sects, and they differ significantly from traditional religions. However, these organizations, activities, or movements all possess the substance of theism.
II. Related Policy and Legal Responses
Since the Falun Gong incident, people have asked why these forms of "new theism" were so prosperous throughout the 1980s and 1990s. This naturally has causes rooted in our country's economy, politics, society, and culture. Policies and laws are both expectations and norms for future social development and reflections of and responses to the social reality of the time. Therefore, we can look at the Chinese government's response to the aforementioned theism through the lens of relevant national policies and laws.
Regarding the issue of religious belief, our country implements the principles of the separation of church and state and the freedom of religious belief. Both the Constitution and the laws of our country contain relevant provisions. For example, Article 36 of the 1982 Constitution stipulates:
Citizens of the People's Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief. No state organ, public organization, or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion. The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens, or interfere with the educational system of the state. Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.
Article 8 of the "Education Law of the People's Republic of China," adopted in 1995, stipulates that "the state implements the separation of education and religion," and Article 9 stipulates that citizens enjoy equal educational opportunities according to the law regardless of religious belief. Meanwhile, Article 12 of the "Labor Law," implemented on January 1, 1995, stipulates that laborers shall not be discriminated against in employment due to differences in religious belief. Similarly, Article 251 of the "Criminal Law," revised in 1997, prohibits state organ personnel from illegally depriving citizens of their freedom of religious belief.
In addition to constitutional and legal provisions, the CPC Central Committee has also issued a series of documents regarding religion. Among them, the "Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question during Our Country's Socialist Period" (Document No. 19), issued in 1982, stated in detail the basic policy of respecting and protecting the freedom of religious belief. For instance, it made detailed provisions for the freedom of religious belief and proposed that the essence of this policy lies in making religious belief a private matter for citizens. At the same time, it emphasized that Communist Party members may not believe in religion and maintained that Communists are atheists and should unswervingly propagate atheism. Furthermore, it distinguished folk religions, superstitions, and cults from the five major religions—Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Catholicism, and Protestantism—emphasizing the protection of normal religious activities while striking out against activities that harm society under the guise of religion.
In 1991, the "Circular of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council on Further Improving Religious Work" (Document No. 6) placed great emphasis on the management of religious affairs according to the law. It maintained that "the purpose of implementing the management of religious affairs is to bring religious activities within the scope permitted by laws, regulations, and policies, not to interfere with normal religious activities or the internal affairs of religious organizations." It proposed "resolutely stopping the proselytizing and preaching activities of self-appointed preachers and various other illegal proselytizing activities" and "resolutely banning illegal religious organizations."
In 1997, the "White Paper on the Status of Freedom of Religious Belief in China," issued by the State Council Information Office, proposed that the Chinese government advocates for religion to adapt to the construction of a socialist modernized country with Chinese characteristics. It also emphasized that since the 1980s, some cult organizations had emerged, engaging in illegal and criminal activities under the banner of religion, and that judicial organs had struck out against and punished them.
On October 30, 1999, the 12th Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress adopted the "Decision on Banning Cult Organizations, Guarding Against and Punishing Cult Activities" (the '99 Decision), identifying Falun Gong and other cult organizations (including the Lingling Sect, the Disciples Society, the Born-Again Faction, Eastern Lightning, the Elijah Gospel, Guogong, Cibeigong, Zhonggong, and Xianggong, etc.) as illegal and imposing severe punishment on their activities. This was the first time the National People's Congress used the form of special legislation to announce the prohibition of cult organizations and take measures to prevent and punish cult activities. The '99 Decision provided four principles for future legislation and implementation: (1) "Resolutely ban cult organizations according to the law and severely punish various criminal activities of cult organizations"; (2) "Persist in the combination of education and punishment, uniting and educating the vast majority of the misled masses while severely punishing the very few criminal elements according to the law"; (3) "Conduct in-depth and long-lasting propaganda and education on the Constitution and the law among all citizens to popularize scientific and cultural knowledge"; (4) "To prevent and punish cult activities, the forces of the entire society must be mobilized and organized to carry out comprehensive governance."
On May 28, 2004, the Organization Department, the Publicity Department, the Central Civilization Office [7], the Central Party School, the Ministry of Education, and the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) jointly issued the Notice on Further Strengthening the Research, Publicity, and Education of Marxist Atheism. First, the notice affirmed the great significance of strengthening the research, publicity, and education of Marxist atheism. Second, it proposed that these efforts must be guided by Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong Thought, Deng Xiaoping Theory, and the "Three Represents" [8]; they should focus on popularizing basic materialistic viewpoints and general scientific knowledge, prioritize the elimination of ignorance and superstition, and center on the themes of publicizing scientific thought, promoting the scientific spirit, popularizing scientific knowledge, and disseminating scientific methods. Third, it maintained that schools of all levels and types are important fronts for the publicity and education of Marxist atheism; they must adhere to the principle of the separation of education and religion, incorporate Marxist atheistic education into the syllabi of political theory classes, moral education classes, and relevant specialized courses, and earnestly ensure that teaching content and requirements are implemented. Fourth, it regarded mass spiritual civilization creation activities [9] as an important carrier for carrying out Marxist atheistic education. Fifth, it proposed making the publicity and education of Marxist atheism a regular part of the work of mass media. Sixth, it proposed strengthening the disciplinary construction and personnel training of Marxist atheism, improving atheism research institutions and related majors in universities, and establishing a contingent of atheism researchers armed with Marxism. Finally, it emphasized that Party committees at all levels must regard atheism as an important component of developing advanced socialist culture. The broad ranks of Party members, especially leading cadres, must continuously strengthen their Party spirit [10], firmly establish a materialistic worldview, and consciously set an example in learning and publicizing Marxist atheism.
On November 20, 2007, the United Front Work Department [11] of the CPC Central Committee, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Public Security, and the State Administration for Religious Affairs jointly issued the Opinions on Educating and Guiding University Students to Correctly Understand and Treat Religious Issues (Document No. 16 [2013]). It proposed adhering to the principle of the separation of education and religion, resolutely resisting penetration activities [12] carried out by overseas hostile forces using religion, and training students to establish correct views on the world, ethnicity, and religion. On May 15, 2011, the General Offices of the CPC Central Committee and the State Council forwarded the Opinions on Successfully Resisting the Use of Religion by Overseas Forces to Penetrate Higher Education Institutions and Preventing Campus Proselytization (Document No. 18), produced by the United Front Work Department and the Ministry of Education. This document explicitly stated that Marxist atheistic education should be treated as the fundamental work for resisting penetration and preventing campus proselytization. The document proposed many specific measures to block the channels of overseas religious penetration and campus proselytization and emphasized the legal handling of penetration and proselytization issues.
From the aforementioned legal provisions and documents, it can be seen that while the restrictive or negative clauses in the Constitution limit religion or religious activities, most other laws (except for the 1999 Resolution [13]) are restrictive primarily to guarantee the realization of freedom of religious belief. The explicit principle of the separation of education and religion in the Education Law can also be seen as a reflection of the state of social religious activities at that time. The passage of the 1999 Resolution was primarily intended to crack down on and handle cult organizations and their activities, such as Falun Gong, which was clearly a response to the development of theism at the time. The documents from various periods reflect both the CPC’s continued adherence to the standpoint of Marxist atheism and the thinking and response of the Party and government regarding the development of theism (including religion) in China.
III. Several Reflections
In summary, we can see that the Party Central Committee and the State Council attach great importance to religious issues as well as the research and publicity of atheism, having made corresponding responses to the development of Neo-Theism since the reform and opening up. However, looking at the history of these theistic developments and our responses, and combining this with the current state of religion and other forms of theism, we may offer the following reflections.
First, there is a need for clearer definitions and legal regulations regarding the essence of religion and its organizations and activities. Whether in laws or Central Committee documents, although there are descriptions of religion, there is no explicit definition of its essence and connotation. That is to say, there is no clear statement on what constitutes a religion and what does not; what constitutes religious belief, religious activity, or a religious organization. Furthermore, there are no corresponding policies or legal regulations for those organizations and individuals who do not use the name of "religion" but actually promote "theism," thereby engaging in activities that are essentially religious or quasi-religious. Additionally, there needs to be clear legal regulations on how to handle activities conducted in the name of legal religion that do not comply with existing laws. We should revise relevant laws and regulations based on the current state of religious development in China, focusing on solving new situations and problems, rather than allowing them to remain in a state of lag. The 1997 white paper, Freedom of Religious Belief in China, stated that "Protestant Christians holding prayer and Bible study meetings in their own homes, mainly attended by relatives and friends (customarily called 'home meetings' in Chinese Christianity), are not required to register." However, the current development of Christian "house churches" has long exceeded the scope of activities attended mainly by relatives and friends; they have become a major channel for the spread of Christianity. Because the specific circumstances of different house churches are extremely complex, how to regulate and manage them is an issue that relevant departments in our country cannot avoid facing.
Second, it is necessary to earnestly carry out the research, publicity, and education of scientific atheism. For a considerably long period, the publicity and education of atheism has been absent from China’s public sphere. During the period of "setting things right" [14] after the Cultural Revolution, there was a heavy emphasis on implementing the policy of freedom of religious belief. Few people, however, comprehensively understood the "freedom of religious belief" stipulated in our Constitution; most understood it only literally, believing that any talk of religion must emphasize absolute freedom. In China, where Marxism is the guiding ideology, we emphasize freedom of religious belief and advocate for guiding religion to adapt to socialist society and bringing out its positive factors—but this is directed at the religious sphere, not the public sphere. The publicity and education of atheism, conversely, is directed at the public sphere. Conceptually, atheism stands in opposition to ghosts and gods; discussing atheism does not mean targeting religious organizations or activities. Scientific atheism promotes atheism from a scientific rather than a political level, serving the national strategy of "invigorating the country through science and education." Crurently, there is significant research on religious theology in China with considerable influence, whereas research on scientific atheism is markedly insufficient and lacks the corresponding right to speak [15]. Although relevant documents exist, a significant gap remains in the implementation of these policies. Various departments and localities still lack sufficient understanding of this issue.
The "Neo-Theism" movement that emerged in the 1980s was related to the New Religious Movements overseas; it was a reflection in China of a movement that swept the world. However, due to a lack of attention and systematic research by scholars in the field of scientific atheism, China had an insufficient understanding of the rise of this Neo-Theist movement. Today, the rise of the "religious fever" in China is not unrelated to international religious development strategies, especially those of the United States. If we still lack corresponding research, our response strategies will lack a solid foundation.
Finally, we must vigorously strengthen the construction of the socialist core value system. Since the reform and opening up, our country has achieved great success in economic construction, but many problems exist in the construction of socialist spiritual civilization. The institutional changes brought about by economic reform have significantly altered people's living conditions. When analyzing the reasons for the rise of Falun Gong, many Chinese and foreign scholars have focused on the economic, political, and social environment of China since the reform and opening up, particularly the changes in people's lives and ideological concepts brought about by social system transformation. To build a harmonious society, we cannot rely on the development of religion, but must rely on the construction of the socialist core value system. There are factors within religion that promote harmony, but we must not ignore that, historically and presently, religion is one of the important factors generating conflict. In contrast, atheism advocates for the dignity and value of human beings, faces real-world problems head-on, and emphasizes care for reality. This should rightfully become an important component of the socialist core value system.
Responsible Editor: Wang Jiafei