Xu Yihua: Religion and International Relations in the Era of Globalization
Regarding the impact of the global religious resurgence since the second half of the 20th century on traditional religious studies and international relations (IR) theory, one IR scholar remarked: “We live in a world that is not supposed to exist.” [1] Ever since the birth of IR as a discipline in the West, religion has long been a research subject ignored, marginalized, or even “exiled” by Western IR theory. This exclusion of religion can be traced back to the origins of modern international relations. In the Westphalian system of international relations—which emerged from the end of European wars, the birth of the nation-state, and the “sanctification” of state sovereignty—religion no longer held a place. Naturally, in the state-centric IR theories that reflected this system, religion was seen as insignificant. However, the global religious resurgence and the trend toward world-wide de-secularization in recent decades, particularly the occurrence of the September 11 attacks, have to a significant extent altered perceptions of religion and international issues, bringing religion back from its so-called “Westphalian exile” to the “center of international relations.” Religion is now regarded not only as a “continuation of politics by other means” but has also become a resource for which all parties on the international stage compete. [2] In the view of some IR scholars, “the challenge posed by the global resurgence of religion to IR theory is comparable to the theoretical challenges triggered by the end of the Cold War or the first appearance of globalization.” [3]
This article attempts to provide a relatively comprehensive analysis of the current status and research approaches regarding the influence of religion on international relations in the era of globalization. First, it elaborates on how the “religious return” of international relations challenges—and even subverts—traditional conceptions of religion and existing international relations. Second, it introduces and discusses research approaches to religion and international relations. Finally, it briefly analyzes the impact of the global religious resurgence and the “religious return” of international relations on China.
I. The “Religious Return” of International Relations
Scott M. Thomas, a scholar of religion and international relations, once defined the phenomenon of the “global resurgence of religion” as follows: “The global resurgence of religion refers to the increasing prominence and persuasiveness of religion, such as religious beliefs, practices, and discourses becoming increasingly important in personal and public life; the growing role of religious or religion-related figures, non-state groups, political parties, communities, and organizations in domestic politics; and the fact that this resurgence is occurring in a way that has significant implications for international politics.” [4] Since the 1970s, and particularly since the end of the Cold War, the global resurgence of religion has been transforming the global religious landscape and even the face of international relations in multiple ways. It is exerting a partially subversive or “semi-subversive” influence on the current structure of international relations and on traditional conceptions of religion. We can understand this “semi-subversiveness” through the following five aspects:
(1) To a certain extent, the global resurgence of religion has subverted traditional secularization theory.
For a long time, it was believed that religion would decline along with modernization and economic development. However, the reality has been the opposite; under the impact of modernization and economic development, religion has not diminished but ascended. Large-scale religious resurgence has occurred primarily in Christianity (especially Pentecostalism), Islam, and folk religions. The sustained growth and political awakening of conservative factions within Christianity and Islam are the two most eye-catching spectacles in the field of world religion since the second half of the 20th century. Some Western scholars have even made the alarmist claim that if these religious growth trends continue, by 2020, 54.2% of the world’s population will be Christian and 37.76% will be Muslim. [5] Even in “godless Europe”—long cited as the classic case of “secularization” and the negative textbook example of “sacralization,” where “Christian faith has already collapsed”—not only are “immigrant churches” and new religious movements [N] growing continuously, but traditional religions such as Catholicism are showing signs of revival. [6] Consequently, terms like “the re-enchantment of the world,” “religious transnationalism and the decline of the state,” “religious nationalism versus the secular state,” and “the New Cold War in which religious conflicts replace ideological conflicts” have spread quickly. These terms have begun to fill news reports and academic publications worldwide, almost entirely replacing the discourse that was popular fifty years ago concerning the “decline of Christendom,” “the death of God,” and “the coming of a post-Christian or even post-religious era” as the new labels of the age. Various theories of “de-secularization,” “anti-secularization,” “post-secularization,” and “sacralization” have been introduced one after another, seemingly becoming the dominant paradigms for religious studies in academic circles globally. The global religious resurgence provides the sociological basis for religion influencing international relations, replacing ideology as the means for large-scale political mobilization of the masses, and “changing foreign policy debates regarding diplomacy, national security, democracy promotion, and development aid.” [7]
However, amid the various academic and non-academic clamors of the “Globalizing God,” traditional secularization theory has not disappeared. Instead, it has made a comeback through various revised versions such as “new secularization,” “elite secularization,” “long-term secularization,” and “rich-country secularization,” all of which, like various de-secularization theories, seek support from countless opinion polls and empirical studies. [8] For instance, the sociologists of religion Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart pointed out in their widely cited work that the trend of secularization among the global intellectual elite stands in sharp contrast to the general religious orientation of the masses in various countries. With few exceptions, the widening gap between rich countries (“secular societies”) and poor countries (“sacred societies”) is not only economic but also religious and theological. Based on extensive empirical research in 76 countries representing nearly 80% of the world’s population, these two scholars proposed the “existential security hypothesis.” This theory posits that the life experiences of people in poor, weak, and insecure societies differ from those in rich, strong, and secure societies; the former enhances the importance of religious values, while the latter diminishes it. [9] In fact, the distinction between secularization and sacralization is not absolute. Another pair of sociologists of religion, N. J. Demerath III and Rhys H. Williams, take a more moderate stance, arguing that a dialectical relationship exists between the two—they are mutually dependent rather than mutually exclusive. In practice, one trend can only be fully understood against the backdrop of the other. Based on extensive empirical research in Springfield, Massachusetts (in the New England region of the United States), these two scholars criticized the traditional secularization model for overemphasizing the opposition between secularization and sacralization. They argued that, in reality, there are both secularizing and sacralizing trends across four levels: the individual, the institution, the community, and the culture. However, on the whole, the secularization trend remains stronger than the sacralization trend; thus, the so-called religious resurgence is merely a short-term sacralizing reaction to the long-term secularization trend that American and Western societies are undergoing. [10] Indeed, does the so-called sacralization or de-secularization model not also play up the binary opposition between the sacred and the secular? This article does not intend to intervene in the theoretical debate over secularization; it merely aims to show that the controversy over the so-called global religious resurgence is far from settled, and therefore its impact on traditional secularization theory is only “semi-subversive.”
(2) To a certain extent, the global resurgence of religion has subverted the Westphalian system of international relations.
Modern international relations are built upon the so-called Westphalian assumptions. The global religious resurgence has, to some degree, partially subverted the unwritten rules of international relations that dictate religion should not intervene in international affairs. As a product of the end of the European Thirty Years’ War, the Peace of Westphalia and the legacy (or Westphalian consensus) established over nearly two centuries replaced the supremacy of divine power with the supremacy of sovereignty. It recognized and established the principle of state authority to replace transnational religious authority, no longer treating religion as the foundation of foreign policy or a source of legitimacy for international conflict. The core of the modern international system, based on the Peace of Westphalia, is to ensure the principle of state sovereignty by establishing a comprehensive set of international rules and systems, and it does not recognize transnational ideologies that challenge state sovereignty regarding people’s political loyalty. Ironically, although the political and legal structures constructed by the Peace of Westphalia privatized religion and restricted its role in international affairs, they “nationalized religion by using it as a basis for organizing the modern state.” [11]
However, religion, which played an important role in forming the concept of state sovereignty, is now turning back to challenge it. The global resurgence of religion is changing the “empty public square” in the international relations system, posing a threat to existing principles and regulations of international relations. Regarding its oppositional aspect, it is generally believed that the challenge of transnational religion currently manifests as non-Western religions or civilizations opposing the Western beliefs and values upon which the international community is built, or challenging Western secular interpretations of international institutions. Thus, the “New Cold War” is sometimes interpreted as a war of the religious East against the secular West. For the vast number of non-Western countries, what transnational religion currently undermines is actually not yet state sovereignty, but rather the secular nation-state or the so-called “hegemony of the totalitarian state.” [12] However, on the issues of human rights—especially religious freedom—the spearhead of the “New Cold War” is mainly directed at non-Western countries. Since the end of the Cold War, so-called violations of human rights and religious freedom have become increasingly “acceptable” reasons for certain Western countries to conduct political and military intervention in other nations. Since the 21st century, advocating the so-called “responsibility to protect” has become popular in Western countries. Some scholars have even claimed that “perhaps with the exception of the prevention of genocide after World War II, no idea in the field of international norms has spread faster and wider than the Responsibility to Protect (R2P).” [13] Various religious organizations based on faith and values naturally became active advocates of this “international norm.” The Sudan movement initiated by American religious groups in the early 21st century was a comprehensive practice of the “Responsibility to Protect” doctrine, advocated primarily by the West, which posits that the international community has a responsibility to protect civilians in sovereign states from mass atrocities based on humanitarian principles. However, because of unilateral actions by the West in places like Kosovo and Iraq without United Nations authorization, the pursuit of an “imperialist agenda” based on self-interest, and the so-called militarization of humanitarian intervention, the status of the West as the bearer of the “Responsibility to Protect” international norm has been deeply questioned. This has also made the strengthening of sovereignty the “last line of defense against an unequal world” for developing countries. [14] Some scholars point out that although “globalization” and transnational actors/processes—including religion—have become very important in shaping the foreign policies of various countries, the prevailing view in academia remains that the nation-state, which occupies a dominant position in the international system as the “primary unit of territorial security and administration,” still “sets the basic rules and defines the environment in which transnational actors must operate.” [15] In current international relations, the religious factor remains a secondary or less-considered factor, whether in the diplomacy of various countries or in bilateral or multilateral relations. Religion is far from being a “hard currency” in contemporary international relations that can be ranked alongside political, military, and economic factors.
(3) The shift in the center of gravity of the global religious population has partially subverted the traditional layout of world religions.
Globalization has brought about a great global migration of people, a great global shift of industries, and a great global transfer of religion, and these three great shifts are extremely closely linked. According to Andrew F. Walls, a leading scholar of the international missionary movement, the so-called “Great European Migration” of people lasted for five centuries. This not only redrew the map of world trade and the geography of international politics in a way favorable to Europe but also expanded the sphere of influence of Christianity globally. The so-called “Great Reverse Transfer” that began in the second half of the 20th century—namely, large-scale migration from Asia, Africa, and Latin America to Europe and America—has changed the flow of global culture and religion. While causing Western Christianity to adopt more and more non-Western forms and expressions, the traditional religions of the aforementioned regions have gradually become religions of Western countries. [16] The southward movement of Western dominant religions (Christianity, Mormonism, etc.) and the northward movement of Eastern dominant religions (Islam, Buddhism, Baha’i, Hinduism, Taoism, and several new religious movements) have intersected, rewriting and expanding the roster of world religions and becoming one of the most prominent signs of the global religious resurgence. [17]
Just as with the historical Great Migration of European populations, the so-called "Great Reverse Migration" carries profound implications for politics, economics, religion, and international relations. The rise of developing-world Christian churches—often referred to as the "Third Church"—and the new missionary movements they drive have, to a large extent, upended traditional images of missions and missionaries. The traditional centers and peripheries of Christianity have undergone a transposition; as a result, global Christians increasingly occupy the role of "victims" of religious persecution rather than "perpetrators." This shift has significantly fueled the international religious freedom movement, which originated in Western countries, particularly the United States. The global expansion of Christianity and Islam, along with changes in the demographic structure of their believers, has made the relationship between these two faiths, religious freedom, and religious pluralism "increasingly important issues in 21st-century international politics." [18] For instance, migration trends and the formation of international diasporas have embedded Eastern religious and ethnic conflicts back into the heart of the Western world, making "Islamophobia" a pervasive phenomenon across European nations. This has created massive shocks to the traditional religious and national integration models of host countries such as Britain, France, and Germany. However, it remains premature to assert either that the 20th century was the last century of white-domination in Christianity, or to claim that Christianity has decoupled from the West to become a "post-Western religion" or a "polycentric religion"—or even that a "post-religious West" has emerged. The center of gravity for global Christian theology, institutions, and economic resources remains in the "Global North," and the southward shift of the Christian population has not truly shaken Western control over the faith.
(4) The trend toward the politicization of religion has, to some extent, subverted the traditional positioning of religion in international relations.
Accompanying the global religious revival has been a global tendency toward the politicization of religion and the religionization of politics. This has largely overturned the traditional image of religion as quietist, passive, and apolitical, even making fundamentalism (so-called "strong religion") and extremism the prevailing explanations for the role of religion in international relations. The worldwide politicization of religion manifests in various ways: the universalization of religious extremism and fundamentalism; the "political awakening" of religious groups and their large-scale intervention in domestic politics (particularly in foreign policy); the increasingly important role played by faith-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) on the international political stage; the formation of transnational religious advocacy networks and international religious human rights mechanisms promoted by these NGOs; and the "fourth wave of international terrorism" and the resulting trend toward the securitization of international religious issues. Religious ideological trends—such as Latin American Liberation Theology, political Islam, and the American Religious Right—along side events closely related to or driven by religion—such as the Iranian Revolution, the upheavals in Poland and Eastern Europe, and the September 11 attacks—have become prominent hallmarks of religious politicization and radicalization since the second half of the 20th century.
In recent years, religious NGOs have been exceptionally active. They mobilize public opinion, social elites, and foreign policy makers to achieve policy goals through influential resources such as information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, accountability politics, and global campaign networks. Working alongside Western "middle powers"—the so-called "Good Samaritan states" that promote global social-democratic values and policies—they are becoming significant factors in promoting global governance and the common good outside the great-power-centered international system. As new types of international actors, religious NGOs represent a certain "power transition" in current international relations. although religious NGOs do not possess the traditional resources of legitimacy enjoyed by nation-states, they can realize their agendas by resorting to economic sanctions and "humanitarian intervention," and some even exhibit "humanitarian fundamentalist" tendencies, such as "using any means to justify the end." Nevertheless, these organizations have fully exerted the positive functions of religion in international relations by crossing regional, racial, and cultural boundaries to promote economic empowerment, social reform, cognitive liberation, political democracy, freedom of belief, transnational relief, international exchange, global governance, and world peace. Consequently, while various religious actors are "summoning the wind and rain" [19] on the current international stage, many more are quietly laboring in various ministries; their fundamental attributes as "messengers of peace," their quietism, and their apolitical nature have not been weakened by the news cycles surrounding international "identity wars."
(5) The Religious Internet has partially subverted traditional models of international religious dissemination.
If globalization has boosted the transnational flow of religion, then the internet has brought about another significant union of media and religion since the Reformation, even being hailed by some as triggering a "Second Reformation." In the words of Michael Slaughter, a prominent pastor in the United Methodist Church: "Electronic media is to the 21st-century Reformation what Gutenberg’s movable type was to the Reformation of the 16th and 17th centuries." [20] Cyber-religion (also known as "computer religion" or "virtual religion") has an "amplifying effect" on the dissemination of various faiths, greatly increasing the volume of religious activities among the public and becoming "God's microphone." The alignment of the internet's "world-wide" nature with religion's "universality" has given cyber-religion a greater capacity to cross borders than any previous missionary method. It has enhanced the direct proselytizing capabilities of religious organizations, as well as their ability to mobilize at the grassroots, influence political agendas, and participate in global affairs, while allowing any religious issue anywhere in the world to be rapidly made transparent, internationalized, and politicized. Whether as a new subject of missionizing or as a new tool for traditional missionary organizations, cyber-religion has demonstrated immense potential in contemporary missionary movements.
However, it is currently difficult to sustain the argument that cyber-religion—with its revolutionary characteristics of low barriers to entry, low cost, and immediacy—should be termed a "Second Reformation" on par with that of the 16th and 17th centuries. First, in today’s highly multicultural world where the vast majority of countries practice the separation of church and state, religion and the church are no longer the center of society (or are merely one center among many). Religious critique and revolution are no longer the prerequisites for social critique and revolution, and the conditions for Reformation-style social change no longer exist. Second, although cyber-religion possesses creative and generative functions and features so-called "negative congestion costs" (meaning online information does not decrease as people access it, but rather increases), there is no qualitative difference between the internet and other new media or electronic communication means that followed print media, such as radio, television, and the telephone. In other words, the step-by-step development of media has diluted the impact of cyber-religion. Finally, the Reformation of the 16th and 17th centuries was an all-encompassing transformation involving dogma, ecclesiastical systems, political change, economic modes, thought, culture, and the nation-state, whereas the influence of cyber-religion is currently confined primarily to the field of communication. Thus, what cyber-religion has brought about is merely a change in instrumental dissemination and social interaction, rather than a major socio-cultural transformation that includes religion.
II. Research Approaches to Religion and International Relations
For a long time, social science theories rooted in Western experience since the Enlightenment have viewed religion as a dispensable epiphenomenon. The "Westphalian exile" of religion existed not only within the Western-dominated system of international relations but also within Western social science theory. Current major theoretical schools of international relations research all, to varying degrees, ignore the role of religion and culture in international relations. In fact, in many non-Western countries and religious traditions, and even in some Western countries, modernization has not led to the marginalization or privatization of religion. Consequently, the large-scale global religious revival has been described not only as "God's revenge" but also as "the revenge of the East" or "the rebellion of the East." [21] As Desmond Tutu, Archbishop Emeritus of the Anglican Church of South Africa, said: "It is only a determined secularism, which so permeates the media and social sciences, at least in Western countries, that makes people blind to what we from Africa and other parts of the developing world have the privilege of knowing so much about." [22] Peter Berger, the renowned professor of sociology of religion at Boston University, pointed out even more incisively that religious fundamentalism is not a strange curiosity in history or reality; on the contrary, what is strange are those who do not recognize this. Therefore, "the phenomenon that is difficult to understand is not the Iranian Mullah, but the American university professor." [23]
Ironically, although religion is prevalent in American society, religious studies occupies a quite marginal position within the discipline of political science. Two scholars of American politics and religion, after researching the American Political Science Review, the flagship journal of the field, noted: "Aside from economics and geography, one would be hard-pressed to find a social science less concerned with religion than political science." They attributed the neglect of religion in American political science to the intellectual origins of the discipline (influenced by behaviorism, positivism, and modernization theory), the relatively secular educational and social backgrounds of professional political scientists (most are either uninterested in or hostile to religion), the complexity of religious issues (particularly religious measurement, such as the diversity of denominations), and the "event-driven" or "event-oriented" research cycles and agendas of political science (religion was not headline news in the past and often received no research funding). [24] The dominance of a secular worldview in universities and the secularization of American elite culture can also be traced back to the European, especially German, origins of traditional American disciplines, including political science. Some scholars view the so-called "culture wars" demarcated by religion in recent decades in the U.S. as a "derivative and delayed reaction to the Great Migration of influential European intellectuals in the 1930s." [25]
The global religious revival and three highly religious events—the Iranian Revolution, the upheavals in Eastern Europe, and the world-shaking September 11 attacks—have dealt a sharp blow to international relations theories that ignored religion. Neoliberal institutionalist theorist Robert Keohane admitted: "The September 11 terrorist attacks showed that all mainstream theories of world politics are resolutely secular when discussing motivation. They ignore the influence of religion, even though political movements shaping the world have so often been fueled by religious passion." [26] Jonathan Fox, a scholar of religion and international relations, also stated that the September 11 attacks "promoted a paradigm shift that broke the taboo of openly linking religion to international relations, and opened the floodgates for studying various aspects of religion's impact on international relations." [27]
At present, the study of religion and international relations in Western academia is unrecognizable from what it once was; relevant works, or even series of works, are emerging continuously. Data shows that the number of books published on Islam and war after September 11 exceeds the total from any previous period. Works on religion and international affairs rose from an average of one per year between the 1970s and 1990s to an average of six per year since 2002. Papers on religion published in major international relations journals also increased from 15 per year before September 11 to 60 per year thereafter. [28] Regarding the correlation between religion and international relations, the analyses of Western scholars, particularly IR specialists, though not identical, are broadly similar. It is generally believed that religion acts upon foreign policy and international relations through paths such as religious worldviews, sources of legitimacy, institutions and leaders, group identity, diplomatic soft power, and transnational religious movements and issues. [29] The manifestations of the internationalization of religious issues are diverse and overlapping. While religion often does not act in isolation, the subject—which was once treated as a sub-category or dependent variable associated with secular phenomena like terrorism and civilization—has now entered the mainstream of international relations scholarship and begun to become a relatively independent category of research.
However, both religious studies and International Relations (IR) are "low-threshold" disciplines that various other fields can easily influence, and the same holds true for the study of religion and international relations. Regarding how to study religion and international relations, the academic community holds a diverse range of opinions and has proposed various research paths and programs. Some scholars divide the study of religion and international relations into two major segments: history and current affairs. The historical segment explores the religious roots of international relations concepts as well as the religious origins of international relations [theory] or modernity itself. The current affairs segment primarily explores the contemporary global religious resurgence and the role of religion in current international politics and international systems. [61]
At present, the research paths adopted by the academic community are primarily the so-called "genealogical" or "archeological" paths—investigating the aforementioned "roots of religion"—or the "organizational path," which studies various religious actors in international relations. There is also the "positivist approach," which places the study of religion and international relations upon the foundation of positivist and functionalist research, such as rational choice theory. All three of these paths suffer, to varying degrees, from the flaws of reductionism or "reducing the sacred to the profane." In fact, a fundamental tension does exist between religious studies and IR, because it is truly "impossible to resolve the conflict between the transcendent and the secular on ontological and epistemological grounds." [62] Research methods for religion are generally categorized into three paths: humanistic, theological, and scientific (or empirical). IR, as a social science, more easily accepts the scientific (or empirical) study of religion, but finds it more difficult to accommodate humanistic and theological studies. Consequently, the first two "turns" in IR—the "political economy turn" and the "sociological turn"—were relatively easy to integrate as "merging similar terms" (tónglèi xiàng hébìng) [30]; however, while a "religious turn" in IR has been proposed, the two fields are "dissimilar terms" (yìlèi xiàng), making their merger more difficult. Furthermore, advocating for interdisciplinary research to break through the disciplinary boundaries of IR likewise faces the question of whether non-empirical research on religion and international relations is feasible. [63]
Some scholars have provided other critical methodological summaries of current research on religion and international relations. For example, political scientist Ron E. Hassner has proposed three routes: broad, deep/narrow, and thick. Researchers taking the "broad route" focus their attention on the stage of international relations without delving deeply into religion itself; their analysis tends to highly essentialize religion and reduce religious effects to social, economic, or political influences. Representative figures and works of this route include Samuel Huntington, the founder of the "Clash of Civilizations" thesis, and the "Culture and Religion in International Relations" series published by Praeger in New York. To use a common expression, this route "sees the forest of international relations but misses the trees of religion." Researchers taking the "deep route" (deep and narrow) usually focus on detailed investigations of a specific religious movement or a regional religion, but fail to provide inductive or general conclusions for the field of IR. Representative works of this route include the multi-volume Fundamentalism Project chaired by American religious scholars Martin Marty and R. Scott Appleby, and Vali Nasr’s famous study of Shiism, The Shia Revival. While these studies may be authoritative in the field of religious studies, they fail to draw inferences from a single case (jǔyī fǎnsān) to refine universal theories that contribute to IR theory. Hassner advocates for a middle ground, the "thick route." This route combines the "deep route" (which delves into religion and emphasizes domestic and regional factors) with the "broad route" (which emphasizes positivism and has an international and universal orientation). At every intermediate level of this research process—from the state to the region and then to the international level—it gradually integrates reflectivism with positivism, and religious epistemology with IR epistemology. Representative authors include Mark Juergensmeyer and Daniel Philpott, who study religious terrorism and the Reformation, respectively. Although the term "thick" is derived from the famous anthropologist Clifford Geertz’s term "thick description," these five English letters also carry special meaning, representing Theology, Hierarchy, Iconography (or symbol), Ceremony, and Knowledge (or belief). This implies the need to refine broader theories that explain international relations phenomena based on a full emphasis on religious case studies. [64]
However, while the aforementioned "thick route" attempts to balance the two types of research—religion and international issues—it still does not answer how IR theory should view and handle religion and the global religious resurgence. A decade after scholars announced that religion had returned to international relations, religion’s impact on the discipline of IR remains relatively limited. "Mainstream IR scholars still find it difficult to integrate religious issues into their usual conceptual frameworks," and the three major paradigms of IR (realism, liberalism, and constructivism) not only fail to "provide clear guidance" for such integration but "in some cases even imply that within the logic of their paradigms, the status of religion may not be recognized." Columbia University IR scholar Jack Snyder summarized four research paths or attitudes toward religion within the IR theoretical community: (1) discussing the role of religion in the state system within traditional paradigms, which could be called the "Traditionalists"; (2) arguing that religion should replace existing paradigms to become the primary lens for viewing international relations, which could be called the "Reformists"; (3) advocating for the adjustment of basic views of the world due to religion while absorbing insights from traditional paradigms, which could be called the "Eclectics" or "Revisionists"; and (4) avoiding paradigm issues to study more specific hypotheses where religion serves as an independent or dependent variable, which could be called the "Pragmatists." [65] The disagreement between the Reformists and the other three groups lies in whether to use religious factors to "reconstruct the discipline" (i.e., taking religion as a non-positivist guide to redefine and transform IR, such as the reform proposal of establishing an international political theology [66]), or whether IR should "face up to" and "co-opt" religion (i.e., treating religion as an important object of study or "mainstreaming" it in IR research). The latter, especially the Eclectics or Revisionists, believe that although the three major theoretical paradigms of IR appear to ignore or even reject religion on the surface, in reality, they have already "provided the solid cornerstone upon which a framework for studying religion and international relations can be built," and religious research is fully capable of "constructing core hypotheses for each major disciplinary paradigm" and "enriching the insights of their paradigms." [67] Currently, the mainstream IR academic community clearly identifies with the latter rather than the former; thus, the global religious resurgence is, at most, only partially "subversive" to the discipline of IR.
The intervention of IR theory is undoubtedly an important factor in deepening the study of religion and international relations and "mainstreaming" it within the IR discipline. I have previously pointed out that the study of religion and international relations (or international issues) can be divided into a narrow sense and a broad sense. In the narrow sense, it refers specifically to the study of international religious issues based on the disciplines of international relations or political science. In the broad sense, it refers generally to the study of international religious issues by disciplines outside of IR. Regarding the topics involved, the aforementioned fields can also be divided into "primary issues" and "shared issues." [68] Although such distinctions contain arbitrary elements, they help in understanding the current state and prospects of the study of religion and international issues. Generally speaking, the former—the narrow-sense study of religion and international relations—developed later abroad; this lagging situation only began to change at the end of the 20th century, particularly since the 9/11 attacks. The latter—the broad-sense study—developed earlier and is relatively advanced, mainly thanks to contributions from disciplines such as theology/philosophy, religious studies, sociology, history, and diplomacy. In the West, these two categories of research currently stand on equal footing; in fact, many related works are the joint crystalization of both types. While IR as a discipline cannot encompass all research in this field, the study of religion and international relations can only obtain indispensable and even more powerful analytical tools once it is fully integrated into the IR discipline. [69]
III. The Impact of the "Return of Religion" in IR on China
Parallel to the global religious resurgence since the 1970s, and especially since the end of the Cold War, Chinese society has entered a period of unprecedented development and transition. Economically, China has replaced Japan as the world’s second-largest economy. Politically, China has to some extent become a successful model for emerging and developing countries, with international discussions even referring to the "China Experience" and the "Beijing Consensus." Culturally, following the "going out" (zǒu chūqū) strategy [31] in the economic sphere, the strategy for Chinese culture "going out" has also reached a significant scale, an obvious example being the increasing number of Confucius Institutes across the globe. Religiously, all authoritative data indicate that China is not only a traditional but also an emerging "major religious country" (zōngjiào dàguó); the growth of mainstream religions, the rise of new religious movements, and the revival of folk beliefs are interwoven [70], constituting a component of the global religious resurgence. The "return of religion" in international relations, the trend of the politicization of religion, and changes in the domestic religious landscape have made religion a prominent issue in China's domestic and foreign affairs. Religion involves the spiritual needs and lifestyles of hundreds of millions of people. In the political and social spheres, it concerns the overall work of the Party and the state. It is one of the five major relationships (the relationships between political parties, ethnic groups, religions, social strata, and compatriots at home and abroad) that must be fully grasped and correctly handled in United Front [32] work. Therefore, if it is said that "one cannot understand international relations without paying attention to religion," [71] then similarly, we cannot understand contemporary Chinese society without paying attention to religion.
The global resurgence of religion has exerted a degree of impact on China's religious ecosystem [33] and its pattern of church-state relations. First, since the Chinese government explicitly prohibits foreign churches from proselytizing in China, missionaries are no longer the primary spiritual link between China and the outside world. Since the beginning of Reform and Opening-up, religious exchange between China and foreign countries has entered what is called the "post-missionary era." Western (as well as Eastern) Christian mission boards have receded from the front of the stage to behind the scenes, yet substantive exchanges have become more diversified and complex than ever before. (43) The transnational spread of religion has disrupted the relatively stable religious ecosystem that existed prior to Reform and Opening-up, creating a major impact on China's current "five major religions" [34] framework and generating tension with China's religious management model. Second, the barrier-free dissemination of online religion—along with its openness, virtuality, transnationality, and permeability—has rendered most of China’s current laws and regulations, which limit religious activities to physical spaces and concrete forms, in a state of lag, posing challenges to both religious and internet management by the Chinese government. Third, since the end of the Cold War, the role of religion in Western, and especially American, foreign policy has become increasingly prominent. The "evangelization" of U.S. foreign policy has made religion a salient issue in Sino-US relations; this has not only led the U.S. to designate China as a "Country of Particular Concern" regarding the so-called "religious freedom issue," but has also "internationalized" China's domestic religious issues, attracting intense scrutiny from the international community. Fourth, international religious movements and extremist religious forces both at home and abroad have forced China to face a situation in the field of national security where "traditional and non-traditional security threats are intertwined." (44) Fueled by international political and religious forces, the "three evil forces" [35] of religious extremism, ethnic separatism, and terrorism have continuously escalated their political and violent actions against China, currently constituting the most direct, sudden, and violent threat to China's national security. Meanwhile, various international religious human rights movements and religious NGOs are generally non-violent, but they have a broader range of influence or possess a wide mass base [36], and carry the potential to fuel "color revolutions." Therefore, they have become a more regular factor affecting China's national security. In fact, for China's national security, violent organizations often carry out their activities precisely by means of modern technology such as the Internet and with the support of so-called religious freedom advocacy groups. (45)
As a carrier of traditional culture, a spiritual bond for national unity, and an element in shaping China's international image, Chinese religion also enjoys unprecedented developmental space in the era of globalization. China is a major religious country with rich religious resources. The growth of China's national strength has created the conditions for the outward projection of religious influence. The growth of various religions within China and the vast number of overseas followers of Chinese religions and folk beliefs could be said to constitute an "invisible defense line" for Chinese national sovereignty and interests. Speaking on the growth of Chinese Christianity, Andrew Walls reminded observers not to forget that "Chinese Christianity is not limited to China; the number of Christians among the overseas Chinese population throughout Asia and beyond is now enormous," which is a major development of Christianity in the 20th century. He even argued that the interaction between Christianity and ancient Asian cultures "has inaugurated an era in terms of theological creativity comparable to the encounter between Christianity and Greek culture in the 2nd to 4th centuries AD." (46) Various Chinese traditional religions and beliefs, which have longer histories and larger numbers of followers, have long been the primary way for people in other countries—especially neighboring ones—to understand and engage with China at the grassroots level, and they are important resources for China’s public and people-to-people diplomacy. A "Religious China" or "Faith-based China" is steadily growing, existing alongside the global "Chinese Economic Circle" and "Cultural China" as their value-based and institutional foundation. Today, China is already the world’s largest producer and exporter of Bibles, and one of the world's largest producers and exporters of religious products such as Buddhist relics, Hindu icons, Russian icons, and Christmas gifts. However, these are still the commercialization or objectification of religion and lack theological and cultural value-added. Chinese religion is still in an extensive and inward-looking stage of development and currently lacks sufficient capacity for international academic dialogue. However, this situation will change significantly as Chinese religion increasingly "goes global." Given time, the traditional Chinese concepts and practices of "diverse harmony" (多元通和) and "harmonious co-existence" (和合共生) [37] are bound to exert an important influence on global religious exchange and dialogue. It will "send the wind of harmony to the West" (和风西送), providing a model of religious harmony for the international community to resolve religious relations. (47) This will challenge the so-called international formula that suggests a religious minority reaching 10-20% of a country's population is "enough to resist policies promoting religious harmony or even support liberation struggles," (48) and will realize a shift in identity from a global provider of religious commodities to a provider of institutional religious public goods.
Currently, China's international participation is no longer limited to the political and economic spheres but increasingly involves the cultural and religious spheres. With the deepening of China's Reform and Opening-up, the prioritization of China's national interests in the post-Cold War period has changed and become increasingly diversified. Safeguarding national sovereignty and unity, upholding the leadership of the Communist Party of China and the socialist road, promoting harmonious economic and social development, and shaping the image of a major power have come to constitute the four major components of China's current national interests. National interests are formed through a two-way construction; once internal survival and economic development are secured, the pursuit of national interests naturally incorporates more external construction factors, such as international status and image. International image is an important source of a country's soft power, and religious image is a heavily weighted component of that image. Therefore, properly handling domestic and international religious issues has become an important link in China's efforts to establish its image as a responsible major power. (49) The Chinese religious scholar Zhuo Xinping once pointed out that acknowledging and handling domestic religious issues must consider their international significance and impact. Furthermore, the treatment of religious issues should be linked to China's "cultural strategy," ensuring that the positive role of religion is leveraged to become an important component of China's "soft power." (50) China's "Going Out" strategy should be all-encompassing and systematic. It is difficult to imagine a sustainable economic "Going Out" strategy without the support of traditional culture, and similarly difficult to imagine traditional culture lacking a religious background and a foundation of values. Religion has always been an important part of cultural exchange between China and foreign countries. Public and people-to-people diplomacy, both past and present, are the main channels for religions and religious groups to intervene in China's foreign relations, yet this has been an overlooked topic, becoming a weakness or gap in the practice and theoretical research of Chinese public diplomacy.
The religious exchange between China and foreign countries in the so-called "post-missionary era" has greatly promoted religious studies in China, narrowing the gap with the international academic community. The level of religious research in domestic universities and relevant research institutions has gradually risen; the number of religious research projects and courses offered in some universities is now comparable to, or even exceeds, those in private comprehensive universities in the United States. To some extent, this means that in the era of global religious resurgence, Chinese universities and research institutions possess high foresight and adaptability. They not only have the capacity to provide academic support and talent reserves for China’s foreign strategy in the field of religious studies, but they have also themselves become platforms for academic exchange and authoritative channels for mutual recognition between China and foreign countries. International relations and religious studies, both old and new disciplines, are currently relatively "hot" subjects in Chinese academia, but there has been little interaction between them, leading them to be described as "cars running on two different tracks." (51) In recent years, many scholars, especially those in religious studies, have actively intervened in discussions on religion and international relations, shifting their focus from what is "close at hand" to what is on the "horizon." Meanwhile, the international relations community has progressed from completely ignoring religious issues to a certain degree of attention, shifting from the "secular" to the "sacred." Not only are there signs of religious studies and international relations learning from each other, but a trend of cross-pollination has begun between broad and narrow research paths in religion and international relations. Influenced by the global resurgence of religion, drawing upon China’s profound religious traditions, based on the needs of disciplinary development, and driven by China’s strategic external interests, the study of religion and international relations is entirely capable of attracting increasing attention from the academic community.
⑨ See Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide, New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004. For detailed discussion and critique of this work, which represents the "revisionist school of secularization theory," see Scott M. Thomas, "Outwitting the Developed Countries? Existential Insecurity and Global Resurgence of Religion," pp. 21-45; see also Eva Bellin, "Faith in Politics, New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics," World Politics, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2008, pp. 331-334.
⑩ N. J. Demerath III and Rhys H. Williams, A Bridging of Faiths: Religion and Politics in a New English City, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992, pp. 255-301.
(11) Scott M. Thomas, "A Globalized God: Religion's Growing Influence in International Politics," Foreign Affairs, Vol. 89, No. 6, 2010, pp. 97-98.
(12) Scott M. Thomas, "Religion and International Conflict," in Ken R. Dark, ed., Religion and International Relations, pp. 14-18; Richard Falk, "A Worldwide Religious Resurgence in an Era of Globalization and Apocalyptic Terrorism," in Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, eds., Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 181-205; Jeff Haynes, "Transnational Religious Actors and International Politics," Third World Quarterly, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2001, p. 157.
(13) The "Responsibility to Protect" was initially proposed by the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS). See Thomas G. Weiss, "R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit," Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 24, No. 3, 2006, p. 741.
(14) Thomas G. Weiss, "R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit," pp. 748-749.
(15) Jack Snyder, ed., Religion and International Relations Theory, New York: Columbia University Press, 2011, Introduction, p. 5.
(16) Andrew F. Walls, "The Dynamics of Christianity and Culture in the Context of Five Centuries," paper presented at International Symposium on Christianity and Sino-US Relations, May 21-22, 2011, Beijing, Symposium Proceedings, pp. 69-70.
(17) Xu Yihua, "The 'Four Leaps' in the Study of Contemporary International Missionary Movements" (当代国际传教运动研究的“四个跨越”), in World Religious Cultures (世界宗教文化), No. 1, 2010, p. 65. [38]
(18) Scott M. Thomas, "Outwitting the Developed Countries? Existential Insecurity and Global Resurgence of Religion," p. 30.
(19) See Robert Wuthnow, Boundless Faith: The Global Outreach of American Churches, Berkeley: University of California Press, 2009.
(20) Western "middle powers" or "Good Samaritan states" refer to countries such as Norway, Switzerland, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Canada. See Steven L. Lami, "The Role of Religious NGOs in Shaping Foreign Policy: Western Middle Powers and Reform Internationalism," in Patrick James, ed., Religion, Identity, and Global Governance: Ideas, Evidence, and Practice, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011, pp. 244-254.
(21) See Laurence Jarvik, "NGOs: A 'New Class' in International Relations," Orbis, Vol. 51, No. 2, 2007, p. 217.
(22) Quoted in Norman E. Thomas, "Radical Mission in a Post-9/11 World: Creative Dissonances," International Bulletin of Missionary Research, Vol. 29, No. 1, 2005, p. 4.
(23) Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century, p. 42.
(24) Scott M. Thomas, The Global Resurgence of Religion and the Transformation of International Relations: Struggle for the Soul of the Twenty-First Century, p. x.
(25) As cited in Douglas Johnston and Brian Cox, "Faith-Based Diplomacy and Preventive Engagement," in Douglas Johnston, ed., Faith-Based Diplomacy: Trumping Realpolitik, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2003, pp. 11-12.
(26) Kenneth D. Wald and Clyde Wilcox, "Getting Religion: Has Political Science Rediscovered the Faith Factor?" American Political Science Review, Vol. 100, No. 4, 2006, pp. 523, 525-529.
(27) Derived from chapter 4, pp. 46-47 of the lecture transcripts for "Religion in Contemporary America," a series of lectures delivered by Professor John F. Wilson at the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in April 2007. The transcript is forthcoming from Shanghai People's Publishing House.
(28) Robert O. Keohane, "The Globalization of Informal Violence, Theories of World Politics, and the 'Liberalism of Fear'," International Organization, Dialog-IO, Vol. 1, No. 1, 2002, p. 29.
(29) Jonathan Fox, "Religious Discrimination: A World Survey," Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 1, 2007, p. 48.
(30) Ron E. Hassner, "Religion and International Affairs: The State of the Art," in Patrick James, ed., Religion, Identity, and Global Governance: Ideas, Evidence, and Practice, pp. 38, 41. (31) Xu Yihua, "Religion and Contemporary International Relations," in International Studies (Journal of the China Institute of International Studies), Issue 2, 2010, p. 45. (32) Petr Kratochvil, "The Religious Turn in IR: A Brief Assessment," Perspective, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2009, pp. 5-12. (33) Vendulka Kubalkova, "Towards an International Political Theology," in Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, eds., Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, p. 89. (34) See Xu Yihua, "The 'Religious Return' in International Relations Research," in Chinese Social Sciences Today [39], July 8, 2010, Section 4. (35) Ron E. Hassner, "Religion and International Affairs: The State of the Art," in Patrick James, ed., Religion, Identity, and Global Governance: Ideas, Evidence, and Practice, pp. 43-51. (36) Jack Snyder, ed., Religion and International Relations Theory, Introduction, pp. 2-3. See also Eva Bellin, "Faith in Politics, New Trends in the Study of Religion and Politics," World Politics, Vol. 60, No. 2, 2008, pp. 313-347. (37) The term "theology" here does not refer to a system of faith, nor does it even involve religion or rest on religious premises; rather, it refers to the study of meaning that has been neglected by the research methods of positivist social science. See Vendulka Kubalkova, "Towards an International Political Theology," pp. 79-105; Terry Nardin, "Epilogue," in Pavlos Hatzopoulos and Fabio Petito, eds., Religion in International Relations: The Return from Exile, pp. 277-278. (38) Jack Snyder, ed., Religion and International Relations Theory, Introduction, pp. 6-7. (39) "Primary topics" refers to research agendas on religion and international relations dominated by International Relations (IR) theory, including religion and contemporary international institutions, the international system, national/international security, the diplomacy of various states, and geopolitics. "Shared topics" refers to research agendas where other disciplines are fully involved or even dominant, such as religion and global governance, international organizations, globalization, international law, and international conflict and dialogue. (40) Xu Yihua, "Religion and Contemporary International Relations," in International Studies, Issue 2, 2010, pp. 48-49. (41) See Jin Ze and Qiu Yonghui, eds., Blue Book of Religions: Annual Report on Religions in China (2008/2009/2010/2011), Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, editions 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011. (42) Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler, Bringing Religion into International Relations, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2004, p. 7. (43) Regarding the "post-missionary era," see Xu Yihua, "Religious Factors and Current Sino-US Relations," in International Studies, Issue 3, 2011, pp. 30-31. (44) Hu Jintao, "Speech at the Seminar for Primary Leading Officials at the Provincial and Ministerial Levels on Improving the Capacity to Build a Socialist Harmonious Society," in People's Daily, June 27, 2005. (45) Xu Yihua, "Contemporary Chinese Religion and National Security," in Yan Kejia, ed., Sixty Glorious Years: Chinese Religion and Religious Studies [40], Shanghai: Shanghai People's Press, 2010 edition, pp. 163-164. (46) Andrew F. Walls, "The Dynamics of Christianity and Culture in the Context of Five Centuries," p. 75. (47) Wang Zuoan, "Exploring the Path for Religious Dialogue in China," in China Ethnic News, April 2, 2007. (48) Scott M. Thomas, "A Globalized God: Religion's Growing Influence in International Politics," p. 101. Another religious scholar also claims that missionary work and religious migration movements may cause massive shifts in global politics. For instance, among the 25 most populous countries in the world today, at least 10 are experiencing serious confrontation between Christianity and Islam; therefore, these countries could all become "stages for serious religious conflict." See Philip Jenkins, The Next Christendom: The Coming of Global Christianity, New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 166-167. (49) Xu Yihua, "Several Issues Regarding Religion and International Relations at Present," in Chinese Academy of Social Sciences News, April 3, 2008; Xu Yihua and Zhang Yuan, "A Discussion on the Pathways and Paradigms of Religious Influence on China's National Security," in Fudan Journal, Issue 4, 2009, p. 113. (50) Zhuo Xinping, "Globalized" Religion and Contemporary China, Beijing: Social Sciences Academic Press, 2008 edition, pp. 276-277. (51) Regarding the status and problems of domestic research on religion and international relations, see Xu Yihua, "Religion and Contemporary International Relations," in International Studies, Issue 2, 2010, pp. 47-48.
Web editor: Jia Fei