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Xi Wuyi: A Brief Review of the United States' International Religious Freedom Act of 1998

Science & Atheism

The legislation by a superpower to periodically review the religious status of countries worldwide represents a significant strategic shift on the international stage following the Cold War. This "faith-based diplomacy" has become the latest iteration of historical "missionary diplomacy" and contemporary "human rights diplomacy." A key case study in this trend is the "cult issue" in contemporary China, which has long been subject to scrutiny under the U.S. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.

I. The Global Expansion Strategy of American Christian Neoconservatism

Since the 1990s, the most significant change in the international strategic landscape has been the attempt by American neoconservative forces to establish a unipolar era of global hegemony. Certain authoritative figures have advocated for unilateralist hegemonic policies and implemented a strategy of "liberal interventionism" (new interventionism). This theory rests on two pillars: first, the defense of "universal human values," asserting that Western "human rights" and the "rule of law" are "universal values"; second, the notion that "human rights transcend sovereignty," positing that "human rights have no borders." A major feature of contemporary American-style human rights standards is the treatment of "religious freedom" as the primary cornerstone of human rights. An alliance between American Christian neo-fundamentalist forces and political neoconservative forces jointly pushed Congress to pass the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998, making it a tool for the global strategic expansion of Christianity through state power.

During the Cold War, Christianity was treated as a "critical foothold for the United States against atheistic communism" [1]. Following the Cold War, as bipolar confrontation vanished and geopolitical factors weakened, religious factors in international relations have become increasingly prominent. The issue of so-called "international religious freedom" has become a mantra for certain individuals.

One American scholar, providing a commentary on the legitimacy of this "faith-based diplomacy," stated: "The struggle for the soul of the new world order has already begun; taking cultural and religious pluralism seriously has now become one of the most important foreign policy challenges of the 21st century" [2]. In his view, one of the most critical foreign policy challenges of the 21st century is this "struggle for the soul of the new world order." However, from the perspective of those who preserve their indigenous national cultures, the use of state administrative resources—such as diplomatic means or even the initiation of war—by certain countries to "struggle for the soul of the new world order" by spreading a specific religious culture is absolute hegemonism.

(1) Historical Trends in the Evolution of World Religions in the 20th Century

Looking at the trends in the evolution of world religions throughout the turbulent 20th century, a complex situation of pluralization emerged. Three major characteristics warrant attention: first, the shift of the primary Christian population from the Northern Hemisphere to the Southern Hemisphere; second, the ebbs and flows of the Islamic revival movement; and third, the rise of various religious fundamentalist sects, which has become a significant factor in intensifying social conflict [3].

(2) The Landmark of U.S. Religious Forces Influencing National Foreign Policy: The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998

The rapid rise of American Christian Evangelicalism and its active expansion into the political arena has been one of the most striking phenomena in American social life over the past 30 years. Compared to religious liberals, the zealously proselytizing Christian Evangelicals are more conservative. They have allied with right-wing forces of various traditional religions—such as the "Voice of the Martyrs" and "Open Doors"—to launch a high-profile "legislative movement against religious persecution."

1. The "Legislative Movement Against Religious Persecution" Led by American Christian Evangelicals

Using Congress as their primary stage, American Christian Evangelicals launched a massive "legislative movement against religious persecution," which culminated in the passage of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998. The establishment of this act was a landmark event in the influence of U.S. religious forces over national foreign policy.

2. The Contents and Core Values of the U.S. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998

The U.S. International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 consists of seven titles and runs to 12,000 words. Its primary contents include: (1) establishing the Office of International Religious Freedom within the Department of State and creating the position of Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom; (2) requiring the Department of State to issue an Annual Report on International Religious Freedom; (3) requiring the President to take action against so-called "countries that violate religious freedom"; (4) establishing the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and creating a Special Assistant to the President within the National Security Council to specifically handle international religious freedom affairs; (5) requiring the U.S. government to take actions to promote international religious freedom; and (6) requiring amendments to asylum and refuge procedures to ensure that applications for religious asylum are not subject to discrimination.

This act established a brand-new framework for U.S. human rights policy. Its purpose is to "condemn violations of religious freedom, and to promote, and to assist other governments in the promotion of, the fundamental right to freedom of religion." According to the drafters of the act, "the cornerstone of the act is taking action in response to violations of religious freedom" [4]. Under the design of the act, practical actions the government should take include: improving the training of officials in diplomacy, immigration, and planning bureaus; engaging with non-governmental organizations and religious prisoners; providing economic assistance to groups that support religious freedom; treating religious groups' use of embassy facilities on an equal basis with non-religious groups; establishing a list of religious prisoners; promoting international exchanges in the religious field; and providing incentives to diplomatic personnel who promote religious freedom.

In the implementation of this act, designating certain countries as "Countries of Particular Concern" (CPC) or placing them on a "Watch List" has become an "important tool" for the U.S. government [5].

Subsequently, the International Religious Freedom Reports issued by the U.S. government further elaborated on these values. In the introduction to the 2001 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom, the U.S. State Department declared its intent to "make religious freedom the first freedom in the Constitution." The U.S. authorities utilize state power to consolidate American values within the field of international human rights. For instance, the 2006 International Religious Freedom Report proclaimed: "Religious faith, as a personal choice and a fundamental freedom, is a cornerstone of the American character, rooted in the ideals of our nation's Founding Fathers. From our founding to the present, religious freedom has remained one of our nation's most primary freedoms. The resolve of the American people to defend religious freedom—not only at home but throughout the world—remains steadfast. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice said: 'For America, there is nothing more fundamental than religious freedom and religious conscience. Our nation was built on this foundation. Religious freedom is the heart of democracy'" [6].

Now, U.S. authorities are further elevating the strategic value of "international religious freedom," advocating that "religious freedom is the promotion of national security." For example, in 2008, Thomas F. Farr, former Director of the State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom, publicly called for U.S. diplomacy to make "the protection and expansion of religious freedom one of its core elements" and declared that "the central issue of U.S. national security is Islamic terrorism" [7]. Regarding the status of religious issues in international strategy, the views of the U.S. government and the public are increasingly aligned. "Faith-based diplomacy" has become the latest version of contemporary "human rights diplomacy" [8]. Republican strategist Karl Rove explained: "Rationality may be good for studying and analyzing history and politics, but it is different for practicing and creating history and politics. Perceived and anticipated faith, which cannot be proven or demonstrated in the earthly realm, is now more effective at mobilizing people to create change" [9]. American politicians use the Christian "universal values" to inspire the public to create history, a practice rooted in a specifically American political ecosystem ([1]). However, when certain U.S. rulers take these religious values as the foundation of diplomacy and forcefully promote them to the entire world, how far can this hegemonic diplomacy go? The author believes that the phenomenon of Christian faith becoming ideologized reflects the extension of history through its own twists and turns. The revival of contemporary religious neo-fundamentalism and its expansion into the political sphere has once again made the question of whether modern states can adhere to the principle of the separation of church and state a focus of attention. Since the 1970s, the revival of American Christian neo-fundamentalism and its alliance with political conservatism has attempted to use state power to spread the Christian Gospel to the world, creating a new crisis for the separation of church and state.

3. The National Interests Behind American-style "Religious Freedom"

The author believes it should be pointed out that the "international freedom of religious belief" vigorously promoted by the U.S. government is based on the standard of U.S. national interests. For example: the 2002 Annual Report on International Religious Freedom published by the U.S. State Department listed Burma, China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, and Sudan as "Countries of Particular Concern." The 2004 annual report then removed Iraq from the list. In reality, in an Iraq occupied by U.S. forces, where "jihadist" killings were constant and the basic safety of the people’s lives could not be guaranteed, did religious belief somehow gain greater freedom? From the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq to the present, at least 660,000 Iraqi civilians have lost their lives in this war, which international human rights organizations have criticized as the "greatest humanitarian disaster of the first decade of this century." Phrases like "fighting terror only creates more terror" have become international catchphrases. According to research by scholars at the University of Chicago, there were only five suicide attack incidents worldwide in the 1980s; this rose to 50 in the 1990s, and by 2009, "human bomb" incidents worldwide reached as high as 500. The most important reason for this is resistance against occupation by foreign troops [10]. The U.S. government vigorously implements the International Religious Freedom Act, claiming that "countries that respect religious freedom rarely pose a security threat to other nations" [11]. These self-righteous preachments, in the face of ironclad facts, are like the Emperor's New Clothes—deceiving oneself as much as others. It is clear that the standards for examining international religious freedom fluctuate solely according to U.S. interests.

Since the end of the Cold War, the core discourse of Western powers has shifted toward human rights "with religious freedom as the cornerstone." Christian "universal values" are being increasingly abstracted, becoming a totem of the Western-style democratic system, just as former U.S. Secretary of State Rice said: "Religious freedom is the heart of democracy." These symbolic "universal values" attempt to strip the core social value system away from the basic social relations of various countries, becoming a weapon for "new interventionism" on the international stage. This tendency toward the ideologization of religion has affected the development of cultural pluralism in international society and caused global instability.

II. The "Cult Issue" as a Major Pretext for U.S. Accusations Against China

The International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 passed by the U.S. Congress attempts to "legalize" the use of religious issues to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries through domestic legislation. In the implementation of this act, China has consistently been one of the primary targets of accusation. Since 1999, the U.S. State Department has published its International Religious Freedom Report every September and its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices every March; the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom publishes its own International Religious Freedom Report every May. These reports published by the U.S. over the years have all listed China as one of the "countries with the most serious violations of religious freedom." This reflects the convergence of Christian neo-fundamentalism and political neoconservatism, which has added fuel to the fire, turning religious issues into a tool for the U.S. to distort, attack, and slander China. In the implementation of this act, relevant agencies have constantly used "human rights and religious freedom" as a pretext to challenge China, creating friction and obstacles in Sino-U.S. relations.

If we search online, we see that in the annual "International Religious Freedom" reports published by the U.S. government over the years, the "cult issue" in contemporary China has always been a major focus of its attention. For example: the U.S. State Department claimed in an International Religious Freedom Report that "since 1999, the Secretary of State has designated China as a 'Country of Particular Concern' (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) for having engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom" [16].

This report enumerates many so-called "cases" of "serious violations of religious freedom" in China. Among them, cases involving the so-called "cult issue" occupy a significant position. The report claims: "In 1999, the [Chinese] government began a crackdown on organizations defined as 'cults' (邪教), though it did not publicly define the term 'cult.' The [Chinese] government continues to suppress organizations designated as 'cults,' including several Christian groups and Falun Gong. The government has never released the criteria for identifying religious groups as 'cults'" [13].

(1) The Chinese Government's Defined Criteria for "Cult" Organizations

I suggest that the authors of the U.S. State Department’s 2007 International Religious Freedom Report, when passing judgment on the affairs of other nations, should acquire more rudimentary knowledge and indulge less in the absurdity of "calling a rabbit a horse" [2]. Has the Chinese government never publicly defined the criteria for "cult" organizations? Anyone with a modicum of common sense regarding contemporary Chinese law would answer in the negative. As policy researchers, expressing dissent regarding the Chinese government's laws for governance of "cults" may be viewed as a "letting a hundred flowers bloom" [3] approach to thinking; however, arbitrarily labeling the situation a "blank slate" is inconsistent with reality.

  1. The Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China as revised in 1997 To govern "cult" organizations gestating during the period of social transformation, the Ministry of Public Security of the Chinese government first proposed the concept of "cult" (xiejiao) in November 1995. In its official documents, a "cult" is defined as: "A small number of lawless elements who violate the Constitution and laws, donning the cloak of religion, plucking isolated words and phrases from religious classics, mixing in a large amount of feudal superstition and heterodox heresies to delude people and deceive the masses, and secretly banding together to establish illegal organizations and engage in illegal and criminal activities" [14]. In March 1997, the Fifth Session of the Eighth National People's Congress (NPC) revised the Criminal Law of the People's Republic of China, where Article 300 specifically made clear provisions for the punishment of criminal acts involving the organization and utilization of "cult" organizations.

  2. The 1999 NPC Standing Committee Resolution and the Legal Interpretations of the "Two Supremes" In the spring of 1999, the power of the "Falun Gong" organization expanded, and its followers gathered for a sit-in outside Zhongnanhai [4], shocking China and the world. This indicated that the "cult issue" in contemporary China had surfaced as a problem affecting social development and stability. On October 30, 1999, the Standing Committee of the NPC made a decision to ban cult organizations and to prevent and punish cult activities. Simultaneously, the Supreme People's Court and the Supreme People's Procuratorate (the "Two Supremes") issued interpretations on the specific application of the law. Article 1 defined a "cult organization" as: "An illegal organization established by falsely using the name of religion, Qigong [5], or other names, deifying its leading members, and utilizing means such as fabricating and spreading superstitious heresies to delude and deceive others, recruit and control members, and endanger society" [15]. This judicial interpretation provided specific explanations for the clauses in Article 300 of the Criminal Law regarding the punishment of cult crimes, providing a legal basis for governing the "cult issue" according to the law. The judicial interpretations of the Two Supremes marked the fact that China's work in governing "cults" was accelerating its pace toward legalization and institutionalization.

I believe that the definition of "cult" in contemporary Chinese mainstream society differs from the historical concept of "cult," as it has been endowed with new connotations. It has transcended ideology and has become an operable modern legal concept, the purpose of which is to govern the criminal behavior of "cults."

(2) “Cults” in Contemporary China: “Destructive Cult Groups”

I believe it is particularly necessary to emphasize that the "cults" defined by Chinese officialdom cannot be equated with "cults" (worship groups) as commonly understood in the Anglophone sphere, or "cult-sect" (worship sects) in the Francophone and German spheres. Language is a carrier of culture and a form of expression for cultural traditions. The differences between Chinese and Western languages reflect differences in cultural traditions.

  1. The concept of "cult" in the historical origins of Chinese national culture History was my first professional background. Interpreting from the perspectives of Chinese historiography and linguistics, I believe that "xiejiao" (cult) is originally a term unique to Han Chinese culture. In the historical origins of Chinese national culture, "xiejiao" is primarily a political concept; investigating its implications for endangering social stability far outweighs the analysis of its distortion of religious doctrines. Chinese folk secret religions have a long history; through the Ming and Qing dynasties, they developed rapidly with numerous sects, becoming a folk social movement with tenacious vitality. The rulers of the feudal dynasties regarded all non-orthodox folk secret sects as "xiejiao."

In the modern era, Chinese society underwent violent upheaval, and folk secret religions and secret societies became more complex as they changed in nature. After the May Fourth Movement [6], trends of science and democracy entered China, and the modernization movement became the mainstream of historical development. Yet most folk secret sects remained obstinately stalled, with even more confused and chaotic doctrines. According to the latest research results, in the last hundred years, there have been as many as 4,500 types of recorded huidaomen [7] (syncretic societies and sects) in archival documents, forming a massive social force [16]. Their influence penetrated all strata of society, and their remnants continue to this day.

How the Chinese word "xiejiao" should be translated into English is still being explored. In the official English version of China's New Criminal Law, "xiejiao" was translated as "Weird Religious Organization." While this translation took a unique path internationally, it failed to integrate into mainstream discourse.

  1. Differences between the Chinese "xiejiao" and the English "cults" The English word "cult," like the German Kult and the French culte, originates from the Latin cultus, the original meaning of which is colere (to cultivate/to till), extending to "culture." The ancient Romans referred to the worship of gods as cultus. According to ancient Jewish and Christian traditions, the sacrifices held in temples in regions such as the Near East and Israel were called "cults." Later, the Christian cultural sphere used "cult" to refer to mystical worship or idolatry, imbuing the word with a specific "heretical" color. After the 1960s, as social and economic development accelerated in Europe, America, and other developed countries, changes occurred in social structures and lifestyles, and a certain crisis appeared in cultural forms and value systems. Traditional religions were gradually neglected, and many new religious movements emerged. Based on characteristics such as the surge of small religious groups and the prevalence of fanatical worship in New Religious Movements (NRMs), Western societies holding a critical attitude began to use the word "cult," which contains a clearly derogatory connotation.

In 1999, after "Falun Gong" was characterized as a "cult" and banned, many important international news agencies immediately labeled it a "cult." Subsequently, some Chinese translators, legal scholars, journalists, and religious workers held specialized seminars. Participants believed that while "Falun Gong" should be translated using Hanyu Pinyin, "cult" could be used when characterization was required [17].

I believe that although translating "xiejiao" as "cult" has some basis, many ambiguities remain. First, "cult" contains connotations centered on Christian culture and is primarily used to criticize opposing religious ideologies. In contrast, the Chinese "xiejiao" basically belongs to the category of political science, mainly referring to "folk secret sects that use superstitious heresies and heterodox paths to recruit followers, amass wealth, gather crowds to form cliques, or even subvert state power" [18]. The meanings of the two are not entirely identical.

Second, in contemporary Western contexts, "cult" can imply a fanatical pursuit of fashion, and is sometimes used to describe the public's adoration of stars or philosophers.

  1. "Xiejiao" should be translated as "destructive cults" (破坏性膜拜团体) Some scholars have proposed using modifiers like "crazed," "dangerous," or "destructive" to limit the scope of "cults." Among these, an increasing number of scholars advocate for the term "destructive cults," because such a definition can clearly highlight the criminal nature of "xiejiao." The English name of the international symposium on the "cult issue" held in Beijing in November 2000 was the "International Symposium on Destructive Cults." Therefore, I believe that "cult organizations" in contemporary China can be explained as "destructive worship groups," and the English translation should be "Destructive Cults" [18].

Regrettably, to this day, official Chinese and foreign documents still translate the Chinese "xiejiao" as "cults." From the perspective of Western sociology of religion, "cults" (worship groups) is a concept within the linguistic system of religious studies. Cults are also called marginal religions; they are often small in scale, low in institutionalization, led by a charismatic leader, and exhibit a tendency toward mystical salvation, focusing on individual spirit and mystical experience, with some adopting esoteric or closed activities. Among them, some factions move further toward extremes and become "cult" organizations that violate the law. Therefore, in external propaganda work, the proposition that "Falun Gong is a cult, not a religion" (法轮功是邪教，不是宗教), when translated as "Falun Gong is a cult, but not a religion," presents a logical contradiction from the perspective of Western sociology of religion.

In contemporary Western society, the "cults" that have emerged question and challenge mainstream culture, and most entities—from civil society to state power apparatuses—hold a derogatory attitude toward them. For example, in January 1989, a public opinion poll in the United States showed that 62% of citizens expressed resentment toward "new religions—cults." However, most cults hold a legal status in Western society; only a very small number of destructive cults are subject to legal sanctions. Therefore, simply translating "xiejiao" as "cults" can easily lead the Western public to misunderstand, thinking that the Chinese government's use of legal means to sanction "xiejiao" (i.e., cults) is an interference with the freedom of religious belief.

Viewed from an international academic perspective, I believe the "cult issue" in contemporary China can be explained as the "destructive cult issue." Why must a social problem germinating on Chinese soil now be placed within an international academic context, or to some extent, be examined by borrowing certain Western academic paradigms? This is because, in my view, the problems raised by real life should be the weather vane for academic research. With the development of globalization, the "cult issue" in contemporary China has already become an international social issue. Over the past thirty-odd years, some of these groups were founded overseas and penetrated inland, while others were founded inland and spread overseas. Their practical activities cross national borders, and the trend of internationalization is increasingly evident. For example, the "Shouters" (呼喊派), a Protestant sect founded in California in 1962, has spread to mainland China since the beginning of reform and opening up in the 1980s, affecting more than 20 provinces and cities. In recent years, the "Shouters" have continuously fragmented, evolving into many branches: such as "Established King" (被立王), "Lord God Sect" (主神教), "Almighty God" (实际神/Eastern Lightning), and so on. They are blood-linked and continuous. Why do these sects have such tenacious vitality? How do they stimulate the piety of believers? How should we deal with them in the 21st century?

III. Attention Should be Paid to Christian-type "Destructive Cults"

I believe that a blind spot in the research on contemporary Chinese "destructive cults" is the Christian-type "destructive cult." Based on the current domestic and international situation, such groups will have considerable room for development, and the destructive factors within them will become important factors affecting social stability.

(1) Christian-type "destructive cults" will become an important factor affecting social stability

I believe that Christian-type "destructive cults" will become an important factor affecting social stability. This judgment is based on the following two reasons:

First, on the international stage, "Falun Gong" will face an increasing decline. Its political nature is intensifying rapidly, far exceeding its religious character. Henceforth, if one needs to study the fate of "Falun Gong," it will require scholars of international politics rather than scholars of religion. "Falun Gong" has repeatedly claimed that it is not a religion. On the international political stage, it is preoccupied with political actions that treat China as an enemy. As noted by the Russian scholar Professor Alexander Dvorkin, it treats not only the Chinese government as an enemy, but the Chinese people as well [8]. For example, when Beijing was bidding for the 2008 Olympics, polls conducted by independent international media showed a support rate among ordinary Chinese citizens as high as nearly 99%; yet certain overseas "Falun Gong" elements campaigned everywhere in an attempt to strip Beijing of its right to host the 2008 Games. By setting itself against the will of the vast majority of the people, how can it avoid increasingly losing the hearts and minds of the local population? Currently, relations across the Taiwan Strait are becoming increasingly relaxed, and the Chen Shui-bian administration, which once vigorously supported "Falun Gong," has long since become a "thing of the past" [9]. "Falun Gong" "relies on foreign backing to bolster its own prestige" [10]; in a future where contemporary Chinese nationalism is rising daily, how much space for survival will it have left? As "Falun Gong" falls into increasing decline and its internal cohesion withers, how much utility value does it still possess?

Second, due to complex internal and external factors, certain "destructive cults" of the Christian type will have considerable room for growth and will become an important phenomenon warranting attention in the work of governing "heretical cults" [11].

(II) International Factors in the Development of Christian-type "Destructive Cults"

Analyzing international factors, Christianity—as the world's largest religion—possesses a strong inherent desire to proselytize. The United States, the most powerful country in the world today, serves as the base for Christianity's global missionary strategy.

  1. The United States is the base for Christianity's global missionary strategy. Since the establishment of the U.S. "International Religious Freedom Act of 1998," the forces of American Christian New Fundamentalism and political New Conservatism have further integrated, utilizing state power to promote American-standard "freedom of religious belief" values to the entire world. The essence of this so-called "faith-based diplomacy" is the combination of "religious belief" with "Western democratic political systems." As former U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, "religious freedom is at the heart of democracy." The focus of so-called "faith-based diplomacy" is on the "universal values" of Christianity. This was evident in the title of a 1997 U.S. State Department report: United States Policies in Support of Religious Freedom: Focus on Christian Communities. This culture of religious belief is constantly being abstracted into a totem of the Western-style democratic system and a strategic tool for the U.S. to implement hegemonism. Certain Christian New Fundamentalist organizations emphasize the "universality" of their religion, showing high missionary enthusiasm and mobilizing massive resources to proselytize throughout the world.

  2. Christian-type "destructive cults" have become one of the primary targets of funding by overseas right-wing forces. Since 1999, the International Religious Freedom Reports published annually by the U.S. government have devoted dozens of pages to listing various so-called "cases" to accuse the Chinese government of "serious violations of religious freedom." For example, the U.S. State Department claimed in its 2007 International Religious Freedom Report (henceforth "the Report"): "The [Chinese] government maintained its ban on the Falun Gong, the Guanyin Method, and Zhong Gong. The government considers certain Protestant groups to be 'cults,' including the Shouters, Eastern Lightning, Society of Disciples [Mentuhui], Full Scope Church, Spirit Sect, New Testament Church, Three Grades of Servants, Association of Disciples, Lord God Sect, Established King Church, Unification Church, the Family of Love, and the South China Church." [19] Aside from "Falun Gong," which is defined as a "spiritual movement," the U.S. government is quite concerned with certain Protestant groups.

While the U.S. State Department sternly accuses the Chinese government of "serious violations of religious freedom," it simultaneously refuses to provide concrete evidence. To my knowledge, apart from "Falun Gong," the Chinese government has not investigated or handled any other qigong-type organizations under the label of "heretical cult." It can be inferred that the authorities have discovered that the cost of governance is too high when using large-scale political movements to investigate such organizations. The Report lists 13 such Protestant groups. To date, I have found no data on the "Association of Disciples" (Mentuhui Lianhehui); it is possible the Report contains an error, but the other 12 are all targets investigated by relevant government departments. Among them, "The Family of Love" is officially translated in China as "The Children of God" (Tianfu de ernü). To my knowledge, there are actually at least 19 such Protestant groups, including their mutated organizations.

Against the broad backdrop of China's Reform and Opening Up, these Protestant groups began to enter mainland China from abroad, taking it upon themselves to overthrow the existing socialist system, which has aroused the vigilance of the ruling party. The progenitor was the "Shouters," founded in California in 1962. It should be noted that the "Shouters" were investigated by the Chinese government not because of their alternative style of religious belief, but because of their political actions to overthrow the government. When such organizations bind religious belief to a certain political system, is religion utilizing politics, or is politics utilizing religion? How many differences exist between these organizations? Should they be treated differently? Can the Chinese government's investigation of such religious organizations be summarized as a "serious violation of religious freedom"? Many international Christian organizations, without distinguishing right from wrong, actively seek to provide funding to such organizations—how can this not exacerbate the tension between them and the Chinese government?

(III) Domestic Factors in the Development of Protestant "Destructive Cults"

Analyzing domestic factors, as a broad social background, the phenomenon of Christianity in mainland China has been steadily heating up since Reform and Opening Up; this is an obvious fact for all to see.

  1. Since Reform and Opening Up, the Christian phenomenon in mainland China has been steadily heating up. Whether in cities or rural areas, the number of Christians, churches, and meeting points has shown a clear upward trend. Regarding the scale of contemporary Chinese Christian development, the statistical figures published by the Chinese government, religious circles, and academia vary. Figures released by the official authorities are relatively low-key and cautious. For instance, in 2008, Wang Zuoan, Director of the State Administration for Religious Affairs, wrote that there were 16 million Christian believers nationwide, which represents very rapid growth compared to the 700,000 believers in the early period of the founding of New China. Because these statistics do not include Christians in churches not registered with the government, "the actual number of Christians is therefore larger than this statistical figure" [25].

Survey data from academia regarding contemporary Chinese Christians is significantly higher than official statistics. From 2003 to 2006, under the leadership of Professors Tong Shijun and Liu Zhongyu, a research team from East China Normal University conducted a sampling survey of 4,569 samples across 30 provinces and cities in China. They estimated the number of religious believers in contemporary China to be approximately 300 million, of whom about 40 million are Christians. Another set of survey data organized by foreign scholars is close to the conclusion of the East China Normal University team. "China Partner," an organization founded by Dr. Werner Burklin, conducted a sampling survey of 5,430 samples in 30 provinces and cities (excluding Tibet) in 2007. The conclusion reached was that "the number of Protestants in China is now 39 million, with a 3% margin of error." Dr. Burklin believes that "in the history of the Church, the development speed of the Chinese Church is higher than anywhere else in the world" [27].

In the eyes of most scholars, the majority of Christian churches in contemporary China possess Evangelical characteristics, displaying conservative theological tendencies, adhering to the literal word of the Bible, being keen on intense individual mystical experiences, and emphasizing miraculous healing, and so forth. This strong Charismatic tendency and focus on the coming of the end times can easily develop into heresy. In social surveys, scholars have found that in religious practices at the grassroots level, although various Christian sects have differences, they are difficult to distinguish under the guidance of basic Christian doctrine; the vast majority exist in a state of compatible symbiosis. In vestigative reports by contemporary scholars on the current status of Chinese Christianity, the relationship between Christianity and "destructive cults" (heretical cults) falls into two types. One type is a state of survival intertwined with conflict; the other is a symbiotic state of "harmony without uniformity" [12].

  1. The state of intertwined conflict between Christianity and "destructive cults." There are many field reports regarding the first type. In November 2008, the author and Dr. Zheng Yonghua went to Zhangjiajie, Hunan Province, to investigate the current status of Christianity. During our research at the Cili County Gospel Church, the clergy there told us that many "heretical sects" (heretical cults) were active in the Cili area. Those that frequently came to the Gospel Church to win over believers included "Three Grades of Servants," "Mentuhui," "Eastern Lightning," "Lord God Sect," and others. These "cult organizations" "wave the banner of Christianity, quote the Bible out of context, and seek personal gain." They often come to "steal sheep from the church [13], making them hard to guard against and very secretive" [27].

This situation is a relatively universal phenomenon across the country. In the Changde area of Hunan, clergy from the True Light Christian Church said that "heretical fallacies" surround the church like an "inescapable net" [14]. "Eastern Lightning, Mentuhui—they have everything." The local Mentuhui operates under the name of "Three Redemptions" (San xiu). As the name implies, "Three Redemptions" refers to three salvations: the first redemption was Noah's Ark; the second was the birth of Jesus; the third is the "Three Redemptions Christ" who saves humanity when the end times arrive—namely, the organization's founder, Ji Sanbao, a farmer from Yao County, Shaanxi Province. Ji Sanbao was originally a Christian believer who participated in the "Shouters" in 1982. On the 15th day of the first lunar month in 1989, he held a meeting at his home and claimed, "Jehovah has spoken directly to me, has appointed me as a prophet, and I am the substitute for God." He chose "Twelve Disciples" and founded the "Mentuhui" (Society of Disciples). "Three Redemptions" stipulates that believers must not eat more than 0.1 kilograms (two liang) of grain per day; hence, the sect is also known as "Two-Liang Grain." The less one eats, the higher one's spirituality is said to be; exceeding two liang indicates that one has not yet truly repented. The sect forbids believers from going to church, opposes baptism with water, and advocates that believers "pass through fire." Researchers found that a significant number of believers in the True Light Church had participated in "Three Redemptions" activities [27].

These "heretical sects" (destructive cults) emphasize practices such as speaking in tongues, singing spiritual songs, dancing spiritual dances, seeing visions, and exorcising demons to heal illnesses. These modes of activity not only easily mix with traditional Chinese folk beliefs but also cater to the utilitarian motives for belief held by the Chinese populace. They focus on using miracles and the supernatural to eliminate suffering and heal diseases. If someone's family member is ill or hospitalized, or if an accident occurs, they will arrive upon hearing the news, being tirelessly attentive and showing great concern, citing numerous cases of healing through prayer and avoiding disasters—all for the purpose of persuading people to join the group. To some ordinary believers who lack the ability to discern, as long as these groups can solve practical problems, they see no harm in participating.

  1. Christianity and "destructive cults" in a symbiotic state of "harmony without uniformity."

Regarding this type, there are also numerous investigative reports. From 2005 to 2006, Dr. Li Shunhua, a specialist in the sociology of religion from Peking University, conducted fieldwork on Christianity in her hometown of Weihui City, Henan Province. In her doctoral dissertation, she writes: "Based on a common core of religious belief—given that 'Eastern Lightning' [15] is viewed by them as a heresy—rural Christian churches in Weihui do not believe the aforementioned sects pose any substantial threat to them. In the view of the Weihui Christian churches, atheism, evolutionary theory, and folk beliefs are the greatest obstacles and threats to their survival and development. Therefore, in the sanctification activities of rural Christian churches and their choirs, their spearhead is naturally and primarily directed at atheism, evolutionary theory, and folk beliefs. This is a strategy that rural Christian churches must adopt in constructing group self-identity and during other sanctification activities; it is also a necessary means of survival when facing external threats." [34] This fieldwork report points out that, in the eyes of rural Christian churches in Weihui, "Christian heretical sects" like "Eastern Lightning" share a common foundation of religious belief with them, and thus they do not consider these sects "to pose any substantial threat." Conversely, they believe "atheism, evolutionary theory, and folk beliefs are the greatest obstacles and threats to their survival and development."

Whether in a state of intertwined contradictions or a symbiotic state of "harmony without uniformity," [16] the continuous development of Christianity in Mainland China—particularly in the vast rural areas—provides fertile social soil for the survival and expansion of various Christian-type "destructive cults."

(IV) Exploring an Academic Paradigm for Cross-Cultural Research on the "Cult Problem"

The author believes that using the Western religious studies concept of "destructive cults" to examine China's "evil cult" (xiejiao) [17] problem, and striving to explore an academic paradigm for cross-cultural research, is a field of study worth developing. This will help promote the study of the "cult problem" in contemporary China and bring it into the discourse of international academic research.

First, the author identifies with the following view: "Religious phenomena are a cultural phenomenon that appeared when human society reached a certain stage of historical development; they belong to social ideology." [36] As a scientific atheist, the author believes that with the development of modernization in contemporary society, the forms of religion are also constantly evolving. Their social functions can be described as "a mixed blessing," and are by no means "perfect and supreme" as some theologians claim.

Second, from the perspective of religious studies, contemporary China's "evil cult" organizations cannot be simply viewed as criminal organizations engaged in "deception and swindling." They are a type of destructive extremist religious organization. These organizations possess unique religious cultural characteristics; their emergence, development, and malignant transformation involve complex social factors that merit scholarly study. This line of inquiry at least helps people understand this complex social phenomenon: Why do "evil cult" organizations possess the "charisma" to attract the masses? In contemporary society, why do these organizations "rise again as soon as they are suppressed," remaining "impossible to eliminate"? In the 21st century, how should we treat these complex social phenomena?

Third, among the organizations identified as "evil cults" by the Chinese government—excluding "Falun Gong," which operates under the banner of qigong; "Guanyin Famen" (including its derivative "Yuandun Famen") and "Lingxian Zhenfo Zong" [18], which appear in the name of Buddhism—all others are "heretical sects" of Protestant Christianity. In contemporary China, there are at least 19 such Protestant "heretical sects," accounting for over 85% of such illegal organizations. Analyzing these Christian-type illegal organizations by applying the Western religious studies concept of "destructive cults" will help people gradually recognize the "commonalities" and "particularities" of this complex social phenomenon under different Chinese and Western cultural backgrounds. In Mainland China, this can help explore more rational working ideas for governing such social problems. On the international stage, it can help seek a certain consensus and expand the space for cooperation in governing "destructive cults." Based on these reasons, the author believes that the "blind spot" in the study of contemporary Chinese "destructive cults" lies in the "heretical sects" of Protestant Christianity. Western sociologists of religion have expounded on the concept of "cults" (or "cultic groups") through the investigation of various organizational forms of Christianity. The author borrows such an academic concept with Christian cultural genes to analyze contemporary Chinese "destructive cults" of the Christian type, hoping to achieve the result of "using a stone from another mountain to polish one's own jade." [19]