Huang Chao: The Historical Evolution of Ideology in Chinese American Christian Churches
There is no point in mincing words: religion is an ideology, and religion is inextricably linked to politics. Many scholars in our country fear that emphasizing the ideological characteristics of religion will hinder our efforts to rectify the "Ultra-Left" line toward religion that formed historically; consequently, many advocate for the view that religion is merely a culture and has nothing to do with politics. In fact, this is not only a failure to seek truth from facts and an obstacle to objectively understanding the ideological nature of religion, but the "exclusion" of religion from politics also fails to capture the true connotation of the principle of the "separation of church and state." It creates new misunderstandings in both theory and practice. Especially in a context where "theocracy" has gradually come to occupy a dominant position in the political life of certain Western countries, gaining a deep understanding of the history and current state of religious ideology in these nations possesses significant theoretical and practical importance.
From the mid-19th century to the 1950s, the main force of proselytization in China consisted of Western missionary organizations and missionaries. From the latter half of the 20th century to the beginning of the present century, overseas Chinese Christians have gradually replaced white people as the primary force in mission work toward China. The United States was founded as a Christian nation and possesses a strong tradition of outward proselytization; the religious ideology and forceful "religious diplomacy" formed under this tradition exert a major influence on other countries, especially developing nations. Consequently, the community of Chinese Christians in the U.S. occupies an especially prominent position in mission work toward China. Early Chinese in America were passive subjects of religious ideology and policy. From the arrival of the first batch of Chinese "coolies" [1] in the United States in 1849, racial and religious discrimination made their situation precarious; the Chinese churches established in this context were indelibly stamped with this ideological brand. For over a hundred years, the social status of Chinese Americans has improved significantly, and the composition of Chinese Christians has undergone fundamental changes. Particularly since China's Reform and Opening-up, the U.S. has become the largest destination for Chinese students studying abroad, and Chinese scholars in America have become the largest group among international students there. These Chinese scholars in the U.S. are viewed as "China's future leadership class," and "spreading the Gospel" to them is the most important task of Chinese Christian churches in America. The participation of a large number of Chinese scholars is greatly transforming and reshaping the ideology of the Chinese Christian community in the U.S.—an ideology that, along with the increasing number of "scholar-Christians" returning home, is exerting an increasingly obvious and profound influence on Chinese Christianity.
Currently, there is a lack of general historical research on the history of Chinese churches in the United States; however, there is widespread attention to and concentrated research on the development of "overseas scholar churches." Since the large-scale entry of students into the U.S. began in the second half of the 20th century, research on the history of these churches primarily begins in this period. For example, Mr. Su Wen峰 (Su Wenfeng), founder of Overseas Campus, argues that overseas scholar ministries can be divided into seven stages: 1) 1945–1950: Student evangelical ministry begins in mainland China but leaves after the founding of the People's Republic of China; 2) 1950s: Student evangelical ministry develops extensively in Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, with campus evangelical fellowships and English Bible study classes becoming the primary forms (which later influenced Chinese scholar fellowships in the U.S.); 3) 1960s–70s: With the wave of emigration from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau, a large number of scholars enter Europe and America, establishing numerous scholar fellowships on campuses; 4) 1978–1989: Following China's Reform and Opening-up, mainland visiting scholars and students enter Europe and America; while some show interest in Christianity, most feel a sense of estrangement; 5) 1989–2001: Due to political turmoil on the mainland and the passage of special acts by the U.S. Congress targeting Chinese scholars, large numbers of Chinese scholars join churches; 6) 2001–2007: A large number of scholar-Christians return to China to evangelize, driving the rise of many urban house churches; 7) 2007–present: Marking the 200th anniversary of Christianity's arrival in China, a global mission wave emerges in Chinese churches under the slogan "Back to Jerusalem" [2], with many scholar-Christians dedicating themselves to global mission work. Similarly, Zhang Boli, pastor of Harvest Chinese Christian Church, believes that although the first batch of Chinese students arrived in the U.S. in 1979, the mass "movement of turning to the Lord" began after 1990. Hong Yujian divides this so-called "conversion movement" into three stages: 1990–1993, the stage of individual evangelism by Chinese and Western churches toward Chinese scholars; 1993–1996, the emergence of campus Bible study groups dominated by mainland scholars and the baptism of many; 1996–present, the occasional appearance of churches dominated by mainland scholars, though more commonly, the demographic structure of North American Chinese churches changed, with Chinese scholars often making up over 60% of newly baptized Christians. From the analyses of Su Wenfeng, Zhang Boli, and Hong Yujian, it is evident that they view the "June Fourth" incident [3] as a watershed in scholar ministry; this precisely illustrates that this influential group of Chinese Christian leaders possesses a very strong ideological coloration.
To more comprehensively understand the ideological evolution of Chinese Christians in the United States, we must adopt a broader historical perspective. Therefore, we divide the formation and historical evolution of the ideology of Chinese Christian churches in the U.S. into three major stages, each of which endowed the Chinese church ideology with different content.
Stage One: Racial and Religious Discrimination — 1849 to 1942
In the history of Chinese diplomacy, the Chinese Exclusion Act passed by the U.S. Congress in 1882 is deeply worthy of reflection; some of the ideological factors it contained continue to influence China-U.S. relations today. However, most Chinese scholars have ignored or deliberately avoided this history, with only a few American scholars offering reflections in their works.
In the second half of the 19th century, the United States gained "equal sharing of interests" in China through the "Open Door" policy and obtained religious privileges in China through "Toleration Clauses." Ironically, in 1882, the U.S. passed the only law specifically targeting a foreign ethnic group—the Chinese Exclusion Act. The concepts expressed in this act were a strange mixture; its core ideology came from several contradictory sources. On a religious level, it viewed the Chinese as dangerous pagans; on a national-cultural psychological level, it contained the demagoguery of the "Yellow Peril" threat; while its racism stemmed from Social Darwinism, which was incompatible with Christian creationism. Michael H. Hunt, in his book Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, points out that racial discrimination is one of the three basic ideologies of American foreign policy. The American racist ideology held that people of color were at a lower stage of the evolutionary sequence, with Anglo-Saxons at the top of the racial hierarchy. Other "lower" races had to either follow the leadership of Anglo-Saxons or fall to the bottom of the hierarchy to face ultimate extinction. [4] Under the dominance of this ideology, which possessed a thick "theocratic" hue, the Chinese were severely demonized as stubborn heathens, lewd, shameless, and morally decadent. They were depicted as huddling like rats in plague-ridden slums; "Chinatowns" were considered a serious threat to the health, morals, and well-being of white communities. In 1784, the geographer Elson described the Chinese in his book Guardians of Tradition as "the most dishonest, low-class, and thieving people in the world." [5] "Therefore, dealing with the Chinese required a dual approach: on one hand, the religious rituals of Christian missionaries; on the other, the strict exclusion of the Chinese from the remote areas of civilization in Hawaii and the West Coast." [6]
The American missionary community in China played a crucial role in shaping the image of China and the Chinese people among the American public. Some contemporary American scholars have noted: "Those articulate and opinionated missionaries spread their impressions widely across the United States. These evangelical pioneers reported to America that China was a 'moral desert' and its people were ignorant, morally corrupt, and filthy." [7]
Against this ideological backdrop, Chinese laborers entered the United States in large numbers starting in 1849. To Americans, Chinese laborers presented two characteristics or threats: First, they were a steady stream of cheap labor; when the American labor market was scarce, they were a "lifesaver," but when the economy stagnated, they "stole the livelihoods of white workers and destroyed their dignity." Second, as stubborn pagans, "the hope of assimilating these aliens was impossible and not worth the effort." Therefore, excluding the Chinese was both reasonable and should be made legal. Chinese laborers were, on one hand, left isolated and helpless against the physical persecution of white mobs and, on the other, subjected to the comprehensive exclusion of the Chinese Exclusion Act. The ideological consequences of the latter were far more profound than the political and legal goals sought by the promoters and framers of the law. Of course, the Chinese Exclusion Act was a disgrace to American democracy and was always criticized and resisted by some upright Americans. The liberal theological tendencies of early Chinese Christians in the U.S. and the "Three-Self" movement of the Chinese Christian church in the early 20th century should be understood in relation to this.
At the end of the 19th century, missionaries also sensitively discovered China's great geopolitical significance. China had enormous potential; Asia would change, and China would be the fulcrum of that change. The United States, they argued, should exert greater influence on China through diplomatic investment, economic trade, and Christian proselytization. Two different voices were intertwined in American ideology toward China: first, that the Chinese were loathsome creatures to be distanced at all costs; and second, that China was a "responsibility ward" for which Americans held a special mission—Americans had a responsibility to teach and protect them, and even to punish their "misdeeds." [8]
This ideology had a profound impact on Chinese churches. First, the Chinese Exclusion Act severely distorted the identity and interests of Chinese Americans. Because of the Act, Chinese laborers had no civil rights; the primary goal of many white missionaries was not to help Chinese integrate into American society, but to hope they would return to China to spread the Gospel. "Spreading the Gospel to China and changing China's pagan culture" was established as the primary goal of Chinese churches in the U.S., a feature that distinguishes them from other ethnic minority churches in America. Other ethnic minority churches in the U.S. rarely possess a conservative right-wing coloring on the faith spectrum; they generally prioritize defending their legitimate rights within the U.S. as their primary political demand. Second, under the ideological oppression of the Chinese Exclusion Act, "anti-religious persecution" paradoxically became a tool for Chinese people to protect their interests. Seeking political asylum and obtaining residency or citizenship in the U.S. by accusing the Chinese government of religious persecution became a kind of "business" among some Chinese. Third, white American missionaries played a key role in shaping the early image of the Chinese people. Although this role has gradually been taken over by Chinese missionaries, we see the shadow of white missionaries in many of them. They habitually refer to the Chinese government as "uncivilized" and spare no effort in calling on the U.S. Congress, the White House, and religious groups to take more punitive measures against China's "bad behavior," easily copying the image of the Chinese as seen through white eyes. They even denounced President Obama's courteous treatment of China as "kowtowing," because in their eyes, it is only natural for the Chinese to be "servile."
Objectively speaking, in the late 20th century, mainstream American society underwent a degree of reflection and correction regarding racism, one of the three basic ideologies of American foreign policy. However, regarding the deeper "theocratic" political ideology contained within racism, there has not only been a lack of true self-awareness, but it has actually intensified under the impetus of various political forces. We can clearly see that traditional religious discrimination and exclusive ideologies have gradually evolved into the modern "Clash of Civilizations," while the ancient "Yellow Peril" threat has evolved into the 21st-century "China Threat Theory." In reshaping the image of Chinese people in the minds of Americans, Chinese Christians in the U.S. should possess greater self-awareness, as this is where the true interests of Chinese Americans lie. A minority of Chinese Christians should not, in a state of collective unconsciousness, recklessly point the "weapon of mass destruction" of "anti-religious persecution" at China—for this was the justification for the Crusades and the pretext for the Eight-Nation Alliance’s sacking of Beijing. Many emphasize the benevolence of the U.S. in returning the "Boxer Indemnity" and the important role missionaries played in it, but where is the root of the disaster that preceded that benevolence?
Phase II: Puritan Fundamentalism and the Evangelization of China (1942–1989)
In 1942, following the outbreak of war between Japan and the United States, China and the U.S. fought together against Japanese aggression. Against this backdrop, the United States repealed the Chinese Exclusion Act, leading to an improvement in the status and image of Chinese people in America. After 1949, American missionaries in China returned to the U.S. in succession, and some Chinese preachers also entered the country. After 1960, a large number of Chinese international students and immigrants from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau entered the United States. In this context, Chinese churches in the U.S. began to develop rapidly, with both the number of churches and believers growing quickly. This phase established the basic model for Chinese Christian churches in America; numerous Chinese missionary organizations were founded, and several influential Chinese preachers emerged. Constrained by the ideology of the first phase, a Chinese theology and ideology characterized by the promotion of Puritan fundamentalism and "WASP" [9] supremacy began to take shape.
Chinese churches actively participated in the evangelical movement initiated by figures such as Billy Graham and promoted it among Chinese people worldwide. Evangelical theology became the dominant theology of Chinese churches in the U.S. Furthermore, even within the spectrum of evangelical theology, Chinese churches tended toward far-right fundamentalism, to the point of viewing the U.S. as a "non-Christian" or "anti-Christian" country and proposing that the Gospel be "sent back to America." This theological choice is particularly evident in the tension with the Chinese Three-Self Church [10]. The theology of the mainland Three-Self Church is criticized as liberal theology and "unbelieving theology," while mainland "house churches" [11] are criticized for Pentecostalism and isolationism. Most of the theological thought influencing mainland urban house churches in recent years is related to this. Within this theological context, a mystical ideology has formed. This ideology posits that the greatest tragedy in modern Chinese history was the choice of the Franco-Russian or German-Japanese models for development, thereby missing the great Puritan model of the English-speaking countries. Therefore, the only way out for China is evangelization. In the process of evangelization, the only correct choice is Puritan Reformed theology, while in political practice, only the superior Anglo-Saxon model should be chosen. China, it is argued, should take the baton of the Gospel from the United States and become the final or penultimate stop in the return of Christianity to the Middle East and Jerusalem. Regarding Sino-U.S. relations, if China were to become a Christian country, the friendship between China and the U.S. would surpass that of Japan and the U.S., because Japan is a non-Christian nation; whereas if China cannot become a Christian country, the U.S. will forever view China as an enemy. Furthermore, a few extremists even advocate that "the development of an atheistic China will become a scourge to the world, a scourge even greater than that of Nazi Germany or the Soviet Union."
Corresponding to Puritan fundamentalism, the most representative ideology regarding missionary work in China is the "Triple Vision" (三化异象) proposed by Pastor Jonathan Chao (Zhao Tianen): the evangelization of China, the "Kingdomization" of the church, and the Christianization of culture. "Evangelization means bringing the Gospel to every Chinese person, giving them the opportunity to know Christ." "Therefore, our vision is to train ministry workers in China and Hong Kong so that the harvest can be gathered on the soil of the Divine Land [12]." "Kingdomization means the church allows God's power to rule, participating in God's redemptive work in Chinese history. Service is not limited to individuals, local churches, denominations, institutions, or movements, but is about equipping and mobilizing believers to spread the Gospel and establish churches. God is the Lord of the Chinese church and the Lord of Chinese history; only the spiritual kingdom of Christ can change the human heart and bring about social, moral, cultural, and institutional renewal." However, "once we have workers for evangelization and Kingdomization, we should have a more long-term goal: the Christianization of Chinese culture and society." American missionary organizations to China simultaneously adjusted their strategies. While emphasizing "the evangelization of China" and "the Gospel entering China," they placed "the Gospel exiting China" in a prominent position. "Back to Jerusalem," as the westward plan for "the Gospel exiting China," does not merely mean "spreading the Gospel to Jerusalem," but "spreading the Gospel to every country, city, town, and ethnic minority between China and Jerusalem, and establishing fellowship with those believers." Sending at least 100,000 missionaries from China to Islamic, Hindu, and Buddhist countries is the core part of this plan. During this period, representative figures influencing the ideology of American Chinese Christianity, besides Jonathan Chao, included Stephen Tong (Tang Chongrong), Thomas Wang (Wang Yongxin), and other overseas Chinese preachers.
In 1978, China began its Reform and Opening Up. Advocated by some Chinese missionaries, American Chinese churches adopted a missionary strategy of total negation and criticism of the Three-Self Church while vigorously supporting house churches, striving to influence Chinese house churches with evangelical theology. However, most Chinese students who came to the U.S. in the early stages of Reform and Opening Up had a poor impression of Christianity. First, they considered religion to be superstition; second, they saw that Chinese churches were still "launching movements," as if the mainland's Cultural Revolution were continuing within the American Chinese churches; third, there were conflicts in political stance. Chinese churches, colored by backgrounds from "Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau," possessed strong political ideological characteristics, particularly regarding cross-strait relations and political systems, creating an unbridgeable divide with mainland scholars.
The ideology of Chinese churches in this phase had two characteristics: First, Chinese churches formed a quasi-Christian "fundamentalist" ideology that aligned with the political claims of conservative and right-wing religious forces in the U.S., representing the hawks in America's China strategy and failing to play a positive role in Sino-U.S. exchanges. Second, the ideology of Chinese churches did not represent the self-interests of Chinese Christians but became a tool for the United States to contain China. Consequently, despite strong support from the American right wing, its influence within the Chinese church remained minimal. Most mainland believers strongly disagreed with the political performance shows of certain church leaders. The self-interests of the Chinese church could not be reasonably expressed in American society, let alone actively defended. The author believes this is the most important reason leading to "internal strife" within Chinese churches.
Phase III: Theocratic Politics and New Cold War Ideology (1989–Present)
After 1989, American Chinese churches and Western churches intensified their missionary work toward mainland scholars. they began to avoid certain political topics, especially refraining from debating cross-strait issues with mainland scholars, while concentrating political discourse on "religious freedom," "democracy," and "human rights." After 1989, many democracy activists entered the U.S., and some Chinese church leaders paid special attention to recruiting and cultivating a core group of these activists. After the 1990s, the number of Chinese students going to the U.S. increased rapidly, and churches primarily composed of Chinese scholars began to appear, leading to new characteristics in religious ideology. The ideology of this phase manifests as a "New Cold War ideology" centered on theocratic politics, using "religious freedom and democratic human rights" as its slogans. The consistent logic of theocratic politics and New Cold War ideology is: based on the premise that absolute divine authority is higher than secular political power, it relativizes state power, law, and ethics, and then sanctifies secular opposition movements. Promoting the liberalization, unification, and "movement-ization" of Chinese house churches has become the primary ideological goal of certain missionary organizations and individuals. In a sense, the traditional stage of "religious infiltration" has concluded, and radical political participation and a comprehensive "struggle for power" are gradually unfolding.
In 1998, President Clinton’s signing of the International Religious Freedom Act marked the official formation of a U.S.-led "New Human Rights Strategy" centered on "international religious freedom." George W. Bush, taking office in 2000 as the religious right's "own man in the White House," provided his supporters with "faith-based war, faith-based law enforcement, faith-based education, faith-based healthcare, and faith-based science" [14]. As the White House and Congress competed to please influential evangelical activists, American church-state relations suffered a serious imbalance. Christian Right supporters "had their hands on the policy process" [15], to the extent that American evangelical right-wing preacher Jerry Falwell directly declared that "the idea of the separation of religion and politics was invented by the devil." This trend toward the theocratization of politics alerted some of the American public. In the 2008 U.S. presidential election, Obama’s pastor, Rev. Jeremiah Wright, forcefully expressed his reflections with the slogan "God Damn America," standing in direct opposition to George W. Bush. In Wright’s view, the ideology of theocratic politics led the U.S. to slaughter innocents internationally and treat its people inhumanely domestically. The crux of this ideology lies in the fact that "the United States consistently acts as if it is God and prides itself on being supreme" [16].
Among American Chinese churches, most Chinese Christians view the Christian faith as a lifestyle; they neither identify with nor care about the U.S.-led International Religious Freedom movement (the New Human Rights Movement). To resolve the lack of motivation for political participation commonly found in Chinese churches, and under the deliberate guidance of some missionary organizations, the "Christianization of the overseas democracy movement" has become a "win-win" political engine for implementing New Cold War ideology. "Specifically conducting evangelical work among democracy activists" and "fighting side-by-side with overseas democracy activists" have become important steps in the "political Christianization" of China. After more than 20 years of careful cultivation, many democracy activists "participate in various overseas democracy movements and call for religious freedom in the name of Christian organizations" and "are playing a huge role within Christianity and the overseas democracy movement." They vigorously advocate that "Chinese Christians should put all their effort into learning and planning a political system based on the Bible and the fundamental values of public interest." "Transform Chinese culture with the Christian faith, and provide the contribution of, and leadership for, the Christian faith in the fields of culture, thought, education, politics, and society" [17]. "When an atheistic socialist state promulgates laws banning religion or issues policies resisting the progress of the Kingdom of God, Christians should protest to the government and help the government not to resist the Lord who gave them authority." "The attitude of Christians toward an atheistic government that persecutes the church must be directed at the anti-Christian evil spirit behind the government" [18]. It is not only necessary to further expand missionary work toward urban universities, intellectuals, and overseas students, but also necessary to launch a global, sustained movement "to preach the Gospel to Communist Party members" both inside and outside China.
To adapt to the U.S.-led New Human Rights Strategy, the United States has reconstructed religious infiltration organizations against China that possess distinct "de-religionized" and "politicized" characteristics. Internationally, with the U.S. government, Congress, and relevant religious institutions as leaders, and "ChinaAid" as the organizational core, a pressure group targeting "China's religious issues" has been formed. Within China, "ChinaAid" on one hand covets leadership over Chinese house churches, attempting to establish a national religious leadership organization that "integrates urban and rural areas" to complete the "Kingdomization of the church" under its control. On the other hand, it attempts to use house churches as a base to transcend the religious sphere, "cleverly editing various liberal elements of Chinese society" to form a "rights defense" (weiquan) political organizational system including "the internet, the political-legal system, house churches, and the media."
Theocratic politics and New Cold War ideology mark a new stage in U.S. religious infiltration against China. This stage is characterized by the demand for "religion as the first freedom," reliance on overseas democracy movements, and the manipulation of mainland house churches to integrate domestic and foreign anti-China forces, aiming to promote radical social change in China. The main focus of this ideology lies in demonizing the Communist Party of China, severing "love for the country" from "love for the Party," and criticizing Chinese nationalism and patriotism. Facts show that this ideology is increasingly becoming a rootless one, gradually being discarded by the vast majority of Chinese people and Chinese Christians. China's development and growing strength have become the pride of overseas Chinese; the consensus that the Chinese government and people have the capacity to solve the problems encountered in their own development has become widespread among overseas Chinese.
Conclusion
The importance of religion in political participation is a major topic in contemporary Western political science. Many political scientists have found in their research that even if individuals possess the character and need for full political participation, it cannot be implemented without external incentives, and these external incentives often come from ideology and organizational mobilization. Religious leaders are usually the providers of these two needs. They provide ideology by creating topics and provide organizational incentives through the activities of religious organizations themselves. Therefore, clergy acting as political leaders, religious activists, social activists with religious backgrounds, and religious institutions are the primary means of religious political participation [19].
Influenced by Western religious ideology, certain religious activists within China who actively promote religious political participation have also come to fully recognize the unique role and status of religion. They believe that in domestic mass incidents [14] driven by rights-defense [15] demands, the vast majority of the masses are motivated by specific, material interests; consequently, these rights-defense activities are temporary and localized. In contrast, rights-defense groups centered on Christian house churches [16] possess long-term, holistic political demands and mobilization capacities. According to these activists, the fundamental reason for this lies precisely in religious ideology and religious organizational mobilization. Therefore, it is imperative to fully recognize and attach high importance to the evolutionary trends of Western Christian ideology and its impact on China’s ideological security.