Rectifying "Religious Research" is Urgently Needed; "Critical Theology" Must Catch Up With Remedial Lessons
Du Jiwen, born in 1930 in Qingdao, Shandong Province, is a member of the Communist Party of China (CPC). He graduated from the Department of Philosophy at Peking University in 1958 and subsequently served as a teacher, associate professor, and deputy director of the Department of Philosophy at Inner Mongolia University. In 1984, he was transferred to the Institute of World Religions at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS), where he served as Director and Research Fellow; he is now retired. He currently serves as a doctoral supervisor, an Honorary Member of the CASS, Vice Chairman of the Chinese Atheism Society, and Editor-in-Chief of Science and Atheism. His primary monographs include An Analysis of Qigong and Supernatural Powers: New Carriers of Theism and New Religious Movements in the New Era, Stepping Out of the Zone of Ignorance, and An Analysis of Modern Superstition. He also serves as the Standing Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the Chinese Supplement to the Zhonghua Da Zang Jing (Great Buddhist Canon) [1], a project of the National Publication Foundation. His edited and co-authored works include A History of Buddhism (Editor-in-Chief), A General History of Chinese Zen Buddhism (Co-author), Chinese Buddhism and Chinese Culture (Essay Collection), and The Multi-ethnic Nature and Sectarian Characteristics of Chinese Buddhism. Additionally, he was a lead writer for the Dictionary of Religion, the History of Chinese Buddhism (Volumes 1–4), and High Technology and Religion.
▲ (Interviewer, hereafter abbreviated as ▲): This year marks the 120th anniversary of Mao Zedong's birth and the 50th anniversary of his written instruction to establish the Institute of World Religions—both events worthy of commemoration. As the second Director of the Institute following Mr. Ren Jiyu, could you discuss the significance of that instruction and its implementation in the context of the overall progress of religious studies in our country?
● (Interviewee, hereafter abbreviated as ●): My term as Director was from 1985 to 1988. Although my tenure was not long, I have never left the field of religious studies, so I maintain a good understanding of the national situation. Looking at the country as a whole, the present truly cannot be compared to the past. Fifty years ago, there was only one professional religious research institution; today, they are found across the nation, with most higher education institutions and social science research units housing religious research offices or full-time researchers. Original religious texts of all kinds circulate everywhere, and there is even a state publishing house dedicated to religious books. We have moved from a void to prosperity—so much so that some have praised religious studies as a "prominent branch of learning" (xianxue).
▲: What exactly did Mao Zedong say in his instruction, and is today’s situation related to it?
●: The instruction stated: "Regarding the three major world religions, which still influence vast populations today, we remain ignorant." This judgment was based on the fact that China was "standing up" and moving toward the world stage; it was spoken in terms of the need for a global strategy. We could not remain ignorant in the face of the three major religions that influence so many; that situation had to change. Genuine religious research in our country actually began with Mao Zedong's instruction on December 30, 1963. Today's situation is certainly related to it. However, it cannot be denied that many individuals and institutions in religious studies today have gone astray—I will elaborate on that later if there is an opportunity.
▲: After Mao Zedong's instruction, how was this problem of being "ignorant" of religion resolved?
●: During Mr. Ren Jiyu's leadership of the Institute of World Religions, our institute made great efforts. This included editing the Dictionary of Religion and the Great Dictionary of Religion, as well as compiling and writing histories of the three major religions—A History of Buddhism, A History of Islam, and A History of Christianity. These played a major role in our understanding of religion. Later, following instructions from central leadership, we organized the publication of popular reading materials on the three major religions, which were well-received. Concurrently, we began a comprehensive recruitment of graduate students in religion and took the lead in establishing religious studies majors within the Peking University Philosophy Department to train a core force for comprehensive and in-depth research. Soon, religious research and teaching flourished across many universities and social science research units.
▲: Judging from the current situation, would you say the problem of the shortage of religious knowledge has been basically solved?
●: You cannot look at it that way. Recently, our Atheism Research Office conducted a rough survey at three universities in Beijing. Preliminary statistics showed that in one university, the number of religious students was as high as over 11%; yet most students did not know what religion actually is. Why are there so many religious students while religious knowledge is so scarce? I believe this is primarily related to changes in social conditions, where the transmission of religious knowledge has mutated into the transmission of religious faith. With the opening and expansion of the market economy, a significant number of people have turned religious knowledge into a tool for making money. The "law of value" of "generating income" and "living off religion" [2] increasingly dominates the nature and orientation of religious research. Economic interests have led religious research and the popularization of religious knowledge to become dependent on religion itself. The effect of "taking someone's money to avert their disasters" [3] quickly became apparent: scientific research, which should be objective, independent, and strive to grasp the true face of religion, has to varying degrees degenerated into hagiography for religion—missionary activities that sing the praises of beliefs in ghosts and gods. Scientific knowledge about religion has mutated into an object of faith for some people.
▲: How, then, do we define the boundary between religious propaganda and religious research?
●: This boundary is indeed difficult to delineate clearly, but it is by no means the case that there are no principles to follow. The "Basic Viewpoints and Policies on Religious Issues During Our Country's Socialist Period" (referred to as Document No. 19), issued by the CPC Central Committee in 1982, contains many authoritative regulations. Certain historical archives can also serve as references, such as the Outline for Educational Affairs formulated in the late Qing Dynasty, or Cai Yuanpei's 1922 essay "On the Independence of Education"—these are perhaps the most valuable documents in this regard. Recently, Science and Atheism published an excellent piece by faculty and students from Beijing Normal University titled "Research on the Nanjing Nationalist Government’s Policy of Restricting Campus Proselytization."
▲: So, the issue is no longer a shortage of religious knowledge, but rather how to handle the problem of religious knowledge?
●: No. My point is that as missionary forces expand within the fields of culture and education, religious history and facts are being arbitrarily added to, deleted, or severely distorted. The image of religion presented to the public is chaotic and untruthful; knowledge that reflects the actual reality of religion is becoming increasingly scarce. Let me first mention a few arguments regarding the guiding principles of religious research to see what kind of information they might provide.
An older argument suggests that if one does not have faith in a religion, one cannot "enter into" it, making research impossible—much like how you cannot be a doctor if you are not a patient. An argument from those with a bit of "traditional culture" knowledge is that researching religion requires an attitude of "sympathetic resonance" and "experiential understanding of the mind-nature" [4]; otherwise, it is labeled "Ultra-Left." A more Western-aligned argument is that religious research should adopt the "standpoints, viewpoints, perspectives, and methods" of "Western Religious Studies." The first two of these three arguments establish a premise of subjective emotion—either one must have faith first or possess a sympathetic heart. Consequently, the knowledge they provide is filtered and selected. The last argument is more fashionable and "Westernized." The so-called "Western Religious Studies" is, in essence, a type of Christian theology birthed by Max Müller; it deduces through comparative religion that all other religions are "finite," and only God is the "ultimate" and "infinite" worthy of faith. From this kind of religious studies, many theological philosophies have developed, such as systematic theology and religious hermeneutics, which are currently popular in China.
▲: These ideas are a bit abstract. Could you provide some specific examples?
●: Take a common perception today: the idea that religion "exhorts people to be good." This sounds correct, for instance, in its prohibitions against killing, stealing, or lust. However, these are merely appendages to the doctrine. To quote the Bible: "Whoever sacrifices to any god other than the Lord must be destroyed." "Destruction" is not just a curse; it has been followed by countless religious massacres and wars. Or take: "Whoever believes and is baptized will be saved, but whoever does not believe will be condemned." The highest penalty for "condemnation" is being cast into hell; even after being "destroyed," one must suffer eternally. In other words, the basis for religious reward and punishment is whether or not one believes in its god. The words and deeds of a believer are "good," while those of a non-believer are "evil." According to the doctrine, killing those who "ought to be killed" is also considered "good."
There are many high-ranking officials and famous literati who professionalize social harmony and world peace upon religion. While this can be understood as a good wish and effort, defining it as an inherent attribute of religion is too far from the facts. Again, quoting the Bible: "Do not suppose that I have come to bring peace to the earth. I did not come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to turn a man against his father, a daughter against her mother, a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law—a man’s enemies will be the members of his own household." If one can read "peace and harmony" into this, they are either lying or mentally distorted. In Christianity, there is "Thanksgiving"; the vocabulary of "gratitude" is popular throughout society, but its opposite—"vengeance"—is completely erased. This vengeance goes as far as killing every newborn male child without exception. Such severe doctrines leave no impression at all on the general public; this bias arises from disguising religious preaching as religious knowledge.
▲: We often see reports in the media about religious conflicts occurring abroad, but domestic relations between religions, or between believers and non-believers in our country, are relatively harmonious, aren't they?
●: We must first look at how people understand the term "religion." Usually, we say China has five major religions, and that these five major religions are equivalent to "religion in China." Discussing "religious harmony" in this context is basically consistent with the facts, because they are all legal and protected by national law. However, there also exist a large number of theistic groups that reject the supervision of national law and are not protected by it—such as underground churches, cults, and extremist or terrorist elements. These are not within the view of the religious affairs authorities. Yet, some forces at home and abroad recognize them. For instance, the "Religious Market Theory" that was once popular divides Chinese religion into "three colors" [5] and advocates for free competition among legal religions, underground churches, and cults within the same social market. The cults and underground churches fostered by the United States but banned by our country, as well as the "Tibet Independence" and "Xinjiang Independence" movements they support, are all carried out in the name of religion. These are not harmony; they are threats. The resulting ambiguity in the concept of religion directly determines the actual meaning of any discourse concerning religion.
▲: Legal and illegal are completely different; the boundaries are clear, and the state has specialized agencies in charge. There shouldn't be a problem, right?
●: There are still problems. One problem lies in the discourse system. Relevant state departments speak of "religious harmony," and certain social forces also speak of "religious harmony," but the "religion" referred to by the two is not the same concept. The latter treats religion as a "good thing" to promote the expansion of "three-colored" religion and to open up public space for "contextual theology." This is a question of the extension of religion; then there is the question of its connotation. What is religion? Authoritative experts say "religion is culture," a phrase that has been popular for a time—but this is actually a classification of religion, not a definition. The characteristics that distinguish religion from other cultural phenomena are the essence of religion. What is the characteristic that only religion possesses? It is generally acknowledged to be the recognition of the actual existence of ghosts and gods and the belief in them. Highlighting that "religion is culture" masks the theistic nature of religion, allowing it to be treated on par with general culture and education, thus enabling it to flow smoothly into the systems of higher education and scientific research. One of our tasks in atheism is to expose those who utilize the official meaning of "religious harmony" to hawk the "religious harmony" of the religious market theory. When we propose the implementation of the "separation of education and religion," we are primarily referring to "academic proselytization." The individuals pushing for clergy to enter the realm of national education do not belong to legal religions either. Therefore, saying that we are "anti-religion"—specifically limiting it to legal religions—is a tactic of estrangement, not a fact.
▲: Are you saying that although religious research has made progress, its subsequent evolution lost the "Marxist guidance" required by Mao Zedong, leading to deviations that necessitate strengthening Marxist research to restore the true face of religion?
●: Exactly. However, in recent years, due to the Central Committee's emphasis on Marxist guidance, the term "Marxist View of Religion" (Makesizhuyi zongjiaoguan) has appeared in religious research. This indicates a change in the wind, which is a good thing. Yet, what exactly constitutes the "Marxist View of Religion" has itself become a problem, because it can be interpreted in two ways. One case is treating it as the study of Marxist doctrines or viewpoints on religion; here, the Marxist View of Religion is the object of research. For example, there is an article titled "The Marxist View of Religion Should Advance with the Times." This "Marxist View of Religion" is researched by the author from the personal perspective of "advancing with the times," so the conclusion is open to discussion—some even believe it is essentially anti-Marxist. The other case is equating the "Marxist View of Religion" with the Marxist doctrine on religion itself, serving as the guiding ideology for researching religion—beyond doubt and beyond opposition. This difference is so vast that if they are confused, academic questions can turn into questions of principle.
▲: This is a very fresh perspective. Could you explain it in more detail?
●: Here is a more complete formulation: “The Marxist view of religion is an important constituent part of the Marxist theoretical system, and is also the guiding ideology for Marxist political parties in approaching and handling religious issues.” More concisely: “The Marxist view of religion is the guiding ideology for Marxist political parties in approaching and handling religious issues.” The question is, why not simply say “The Marxist theoretical system is the guiding ideology for Marxist political parties in approaching and handling religious issues”? Why go to such lengths to pack the “Marxist view of religion” inside the “Marxist theoretical system”? This is likely more than just a word game.
Allegedly, the purpose of “upholding and developing the Marxist view of religion” is to “provide an ideological, methodological, and decision-making basis for strengthening and improving religious work under the new situation.” We know that the so-called “new situation” generally refers to the situation since the Reform and Opening-up [6]. Document No. 19, mentioned earlier, was the guiding document for the socialist period. Now, by providing a basis for the Party’s religious work in the name of a “view of religion,” is this meant to provide continuity or a replacement?
▲: What is your take on this?
●: That requires a comparison; it is a long story. What I am noticing now is: what kind of concept is this “Marxism” that has already been “view-of-religion-ized”? You are a researcher of Marxism—I will quote a sentence for you to look at: “The Marxist view of religion was gradually formed and established by Marx, Engels, and other Marxist classical writers...” What is the deal with adding an “and others” after Marx and Engels? In the history of the Communist Party of China (CPC), "Marxist classical writers" referred to Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin; since the 1960s, Stalin has been gradually phased out, but Lenin’s status has never wavered. In recent years, there have been anti-Leninist voices within China, and I believe placing this tendency within the “guiding ideology” of the Party and the state is no small matter. One scholar once asked to my face: Is this so-called Marxist view of religion using Marxism to view religion, or using religion to view Marxism? It was a profound question.
It is common knowledge that Marxism has three sources and three component parts [7]. This "view of religion," however, uses this to define "Marxism" as having three stages: “using enlightenment and humanist thought as weapons to conduct a philosophical critique of religion, and using historical materialism and dialectical materialism as weapons to conduct a political critique of religion.” It is also common knowledge that Marxist philosophy is dialectical materialism and historical materialism. How could the weapons of the Marxist critique of religion become the ideas of the Enlightenment? And how did the critique by dialectical materialism and historical materialism become a "political critique"? If even the basic terminology of Marxism cannot be used accurately, yet one insists on making this a “guiding ideology,” is it not farcical? Putting Marxism into the basket of some “view” is like taking plants growing from the earth and putting them in a vegetable basket—how can they be the same thing? As for how this is interpreted, there may be even more problems.
Take the interpretation of “historical materialism” as an example. Currently, there is an interpretation that goes: social existence determines social consciousness, meaning if “society is bad,” it produces “bad” religion; Marxism saw the “bad” society of Europe at the time through “bad” religion, which was “correct” and “objective.” Today, the development of religion in China has “normal,” “good,” and “positive” aspects; from “good religion,” we can know we are a “good society.” The conclusion is self-evident: one can only say “good” things about our current religion and cannot say “bad” things, otherwise one is saying our society is bad. However, “religion” is a polysemous word. Does such an interpretation have any relationship with historical materialism? According to this reasoning, could one also say: Marxism was produced in a bad society, so it is a bad -ism; or Marxism is a good -ism, so the society that produced it is a good society? It is clear that this logic is utterly absurd.
In short, regarding the response to Mao Zedong’s call to “study religion,” although certain achievements have been made, much of the religious knowledge provided now is distorted and needs to "return to the source" (正本清源) [8]. In terms of advocating Marxist guidance, there are also phenomena of reckless interpretation and distorted claims that require "rectifying external interference and returning to the correct path" (拨乱反正) [9].
▲: In his instructions, Mao Zedong also spoke of the need to “critique theology.” How are we doing in this regard nowadays?
●: Mao’s original words were: “Without critiquing theology, one cannot write a good history of philosophy, nor a good history of literature or world history.” My initial impression of this sentence was that it was very novel, but it seemed only related to historiography—a matter for the ivory tower. Therefore, the early Institute of World Religions did not pay it enough attention, and there were almost no achievements to speak of. Now I find that this may have been an enormous oversight on our part.
▲: Is it really that serious? Why do you say so?
●: Neglecting theology has caused us to lose our discernment and our right to speak on theological issues. The consequences are terrible, extending far beyond the academic realm. Reference books like the Great Chinese Encyclopedia (Religion Volume), the Encyclopædia Britannica, and the English-Chinese Dictionary of Western Philosophy all provide explanations of theology, but the evaluative answers tend toward two extremes: one of extreme contempt, and one of extreme praise.
Holbach said, “There is a science whose object is incomprehensible. In total opposition to all other sciences, this science only studies things imperceptible to the human senses. Hobbes called it the kingdom of darkness”; in this kingdom, “the laws of reason turn out to be incorrect, and sound thought becomes absurd thought. This science is called theology, and it constantly ravages human reason.” Engels said, “The first word of religion is a lie... religion is hypocrisy, and theology is the blueprint for all other lies and hypocrisy.” Is this the case? Let us take an example from a praiser. There is a famous work of Christianity, On the Flesh of Christ, which states: “The Son of God died; it is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd. And He was buried, and rose again; the fact is certain, because it is impossible.” The author was Tertullian, known as the “Latin Father”; he believed that theology is built upon “it is credible because it is absurd” and “it is certain because it is impossible.” This is taking pride in anti-rationalism.
The reason Mao Zedong’s attitude was different—demanding “study” for religion but “critique” for theology—can be roughly understood from the brief introduction above.
▲: Does religion not include theology? Why mention it separately?
●: I believe that as a far-sighted politician, Mao Zedong first considered the status and role of religion in society and history. If one does not understand religion as a socio-historical existence, one will fall into strategic blindness. But at the same time, he was a very sensitive thinker; religious doctrine is filled with absurdity and ignorance, and theology is absolutely unacceptable. In reality, theology is the soul through which various different religious sects maintain their independent existence; it is the internal basis that distinguishes them from one another, and the spiritual pillar that attracts followers and maintains their own interests. The development and changes of the world's three major religions—their continuous fragmentation, disputes, and even endless hatred, conflicts, and wars—certainly have social causes, but the internal root is dogmatic theology. Most contemporary secular states follow the principle of freedom of religious belief, viewing the rise or fall, interpretation, or revision of theology as a private matter for the church and the believers, and the state provides legal protection. Generally, the public and different sects are not allowed to interfere recklessly. However, if the boundaries of the law are crossed, and private matters of faith are pushed into the public sphere and used as public discourse to be preached everywhere, then not only must the state exercise management according to law, but public opinion also has the right to raise differing views, including open critique. What I call our failure in the “critique of theology” mainly points to those theological preachings that exceed legal boundaries, rather than to church theology.
▲: What is “theological preaching”?
●: There are roughly two situations: one is high-profile advocacy of theology to the whole of society, such as the large-scale publication of theological papers and books; the other is entering national universities and research units to carry out theological education and construct a new theology. Both situations are very active and, in a sense, hold the dominance and the right to speak (话语权) in the field of so-called “religious studies.” The momentum formed and the results achieved could, without exaggeration, be said to have shaken the Western Christian world and are regarded as an important force for changing the face of Chinese culture. Because the public’s knowledge in this area is insufficient and ordinary people do not belong to those circles, most people do not understand it well, allowing it to spread unchecked. For instance, do you know the term “Cultural Christians”? Do you know of a “Sino-Christian Theology Movement”?
▲: I’m not sure. Could you give a brief introduction?
●: The term “Cultural Christian” appeared around the late 1980s. Whether they were baptized Christians is unclear, but they all advocated Christian culture in their capacity as intellectuals. What they advocated was not the organizational level of Christianity but the spiritual level, and the method they adopted was not homiletic but scholarly. Let me quote one scholar’s description of them.
We cannot deny the "great wisdom" of this author (a Cultural Christian), “but what kind of wisdom is this? The writer is reminded of what Voltaire said to Rousseau: No one has ever used such great wisdom in an attempt to turn us into beasts; reading your book, I really want to walk on all fours. To paraphrase Voltaire: except for foreign missionaries like Matteo Ricci and Nicolò Longobardo, no Chinese person has ever used such great wisdom in an attempt to turn us into Christians; reading your book, I really want to rush to the Cross.” This group of people has almost all received high-level foreign theological education, they have produced voluminous translations, have excellent foreign language skills, hold the status of experts and professors in prominent positions, and appear full of the wisdom of the Holy Spirit. Thus, Cultural Christians can also be mockingly referred to as intellectuals who use the appearance of "great wisdom" to spread the Christian faith to the Chinese people.
What factors led to the emergence of this phenomenon in the 1980s? A doctoral student from the Philosophy Department of Peking University wrote an analysis, stating it is related to China’s “modern Chinese linguistic context”: “In this humanist context with a strong atheistic tradition, Christians who hold fast to monotheistic faith first face the problem of their own identity recognition.” Cultural Christians were produced to solve this identity problem. Now we must first clarify what their “context” refers to. In a word: “The discourse hegemony of Enlightenment and the ideological demand for humanism in the modern Chinese intellectual world.” This context directly created the predicament of Christian propagation in China. The author made many statements about this context, which were quite brilliant; unfortunately, I cannot repeat them all here. The essence is that science, reason, atheism, evolution, Marxism, the Chinese humanist tradition, and even the discourse of “progress” have all become expressions of cultural and political discourse hegemony. In such a “Chinese linguistic context,” what role were Cultural Christians to play? It was that, in the process of “reflection on ideologized Marxism,” the “influx and spread of modern Christian theology played an important role.”
▲: Does no one raise objections to this social trend?
●: The current environment for public opinion is very relaxed, with freedom of speech and cultural pluralism. Even if people raise differing opinions, even quite sharp ones, one rarely sees a reaction. However, the reaction from the orthodox church may be significant. Church figures in Hong Kong and Taiwan call them the “Chinese Apollos”—meaning “specious” or “seeming to be but not truly so.” The mainland church probably does not buy into it much either, but I don’t know much about that. In short, for various reasons, the name “Cultural Christian” is gradually fading, and what has succeeded it is the “Sino-Christian Theology Movement.”
▲: Oh, then please talk about the current situation of this movement.
●: It is like a play; we can only see a limited stage and parts of the script. We are entirely ignorant of the behind-the-scenes planning, and even for the script, some parts are only half-understood, while others we haven’t seen or heard at all. Its connections—at home and abroad, inside and outside the border, inside and outside the Party, inside and outside the church—spanning all directions, combined with the prestigious status of its members, makes it a delusion for people of our status to expect to even touch its periphery. Let me give you some superficial impressions.
The initiators of the “Sino-Christian Theology Movement” were Cultural Christians, and their backbone without exception belongs to this circle. But as a movement, first, it has planning and organization; second, it has the ability for sustainable growth.
▲: What are its planning and organization?
●: The initial planning took place in Hong Kong. In 1992, using a certain "Christian jungle" in Hong Kong as a base, the plan was conceived alongside "cultural Christians" [10] from the mainland residing in Hong Kong. Starting in 1993, they "utilized the facilities and resources of this institution to launch a series of academic projects, thereby accelerating the promotion of this emerging academic trend." By 1995, the "Institute of Sino-Christian Studies" (汉语基督教文化研究所) was established with the expectation of "focusing energy and resources on formulating a long-term ministry strategy." They stated: "We call this emerging academic trend the 'Sino-Christian Theology Movement.'" They further noted: "From the perspective of the division of labor, mainland scholars are the proponents of this movement, while the Institute is the promoter; the two are both separate and unified." The principle was: "Each expresses their own views, each takes what they need, and cooperation and separation complement one another." Simply put, the base is in Hong Kong, playing the role of the promoter, while the movement is in the mainland, playing the role of the proponent. The content is the development of a theology named "Sino-Christian."
What were the specific measures? I will mention only two here. First was the translation and introduction of Western theological works to the mainland. Primarily through the publishing houses of prestigious universities and national publishers, they published a massive volume of Christian theological works, often in large batches. This continues to this day. Even the "Collection of Christian Classics through the Ages" [11], which the China Christian Council (中国基督教两会) [12] began publishing in translation on the mainland in 2003, was "authorized" for publication by our current national publishers via a Hong Kong Christian publishing house. This is truly incredible. In tandem with this, any university or social science research unit in the interior that hung a "Christian Studies" shingle competed to send people to this base in Hong Kong for visits, training, and research projects—all with free hospitality and additional stipends. By 2008, the leading figures of the base jubilantly announced: "After years of cultivation by various academic circles, the scholars participating in the 'Sino-Christian Theology Movement' have grown from a few core figures into a quite considerable academic group. Among them, a new generation of young scholars is constantly emerging, demonstrating the tenacious vitality and sustainability of this emerging academic trend."
I believe their basis for such a declaration is well-founded. The scale of this movement's development has already greatly exceeded the expectations of the Hong Kong base. Its "promotional" role cannot be overlooked, and the tasks it prescribed for this movement have been progressing silently, gradually infiltrating our religious teaching and academic research, extending to all disciplines related to the West. This has gone as far as influencing the minds of our management levels, forming an almost overwhelming dominance of public opinion within religious studies circles.
▲: They even prescribed tasks? What were they?
●: Among the fundamental problems they sought to solve, two were key. First: "How can intellectuals outside the ecclesiastical system and laypeople within the system innovate the theological tradition of the church, and even trigger successive theological turning points?" Second: "How will the rich intellectual resources of the Chinese language, after encountering the external intellectual resource of Christianity, carry, transform, and create new thoughts, thereby enriching the intellectual heritage of the Chinese language itself?" The text in quotes is the original; I must provide some explanation.
Let me explain the first one first. The "cultural Christians" take the reconstruction of Sino-Christian theology as their mission, specifically targeting the existing church theology on the mainland. The so-called "ecclesiastical system" (教制) refers to the legally recognized national churches. "Intellectuals outside it" refers to the cultural Christians, while "laypeople within the system" refers to general clergy, excluding the national church leaders. Combining these two groups constitutes the dependent force of this "movement." The goal is to "innovate the theological tradition of the church" and continuously trigger "theological turning points"—a "turning point" is essentially a revolution. Why does this movement take the "turning" of the national church's theology as its primary task? An article by a Peking University doctoral student hit the nail on the head: "In order to reject so-called theological indigenization or Sinicization," and to "step out of the cognitive framework of indigenization or Sinicization to directly face the Christ Event." In fact, "indigenization" and "Sinicization" are not entirely the same. The latter emphasizes not only liberating church positions and funding from Western control but also adapting theology to Chinese soil, shedding the biases of "foreign religion," and thoroughly realizing "the Sinicization of Christianity." The so-called "directly facing the Christ Event" belongs to Christian fundamentalism; it is actually the theology believed by the American Christian Right—the Evangelicals. Its manifestation in China is that religious faith is higher than secular ideals, and the Bible is higher than the Constitution. Therefore, the church and its believers can only obey religious dogmas; that is, "the Christianization of China." Whether it is the "Sinicization of Christianity" or the "Christianization of China" has always been a serious issue facing Chinese Christianity.
▲: How is this manifested?
●: Let me first introduce some similarities and differences between "non-church" theology and our country's "church theology."
Since both are theology, their internal content should be the same. For instance, the catalog of "theological" propositions being constructed by non-church theology includes: "Theology proper (Study of God)," "Christology," "Pneumatology," "Anthropology," "Soteriology," "Creationism," "Eschatology," "Ecclesiology," "Sacramentology," etc. In this, there is no difference from church theology. Even when focusing on constructing a theology "of multifaceted significance" for Chinese modernization—the so-called "concepts of original sin, salvation, transcendence, ultimate concern, and universalism"—it does not exceed the scope of church theology. But why do they not recognize church theology and insist on parting ways with it? For example, there is a proposition in Western theology called "justification by faith" [13], meaning that a person can become a "righteous person" simply by believing in God. Chinese church theology believes this proposition should be used with caution, because the vast majority of Chinese people do not believe in the deity Christ; one cannot say there are no "righteous people" among such Chinese. That is to say, doing good for society should equally be considered "justification" (称义). This is actually very beneficial for expanding the influence of Christianity. But this will not do; it needs to be "revolutionized" and brought back to fundamental dogmas.
In fact, the essence of the problem is whether Chinese Christianity needs to be established on Chinese soil and adhere to a patriotic stance. "Love the country and love the religion" [14] is the fundamental principle for the Chinese church to create and interpret theological doctrine; it is the basis upon which Christianity can survive and persist in China, and it reflects the aspirations of the masses of believers. This principle, established through the efforts of several generations of patriotic church leaders, allowed Christianity—which once played the role of a tool of aggression—to take root in China. Yet, it has consistently faced malicious attacks from certain forces domestic and abroad.
The Sino-Christian Theology Movement advertises its non-church nature, but its target is precisely "loving the country and loving the religion." However, it phrases this less crudely. Let's look at a passage: "'Loving the country and loving the religion,' with 'loving the country' coming first and 'loving the religion' second, has been the formula for the existence and development of religion in Mainland China for decades. In today's 'globalized' universal demand for religion to cross borders, nations, and regions, although many countries and regions still rely on their religion to maintain and protect the survival and development of their 'state,' there are also many countries and regions where 'universal faith' has supported a trend of 'loving the religion' diluting, hollowing out, or abandoning 'patriotism.'" This implies that "globalization" brings about human "universality" and the "universal faith" of believers, and that "loving the religion" has already diluted, hollowed out, or replaced "patriotism." Then comes a turn: "In a contemporary society trending toward greater democracy, freedom, and equality, 'church-state relations' have undergone diverse transformations and become increasingly complex. China's past situation of 'politics' dominating 'religion' or 'politics' determining 'religion' is currently facing a challenge." This seems like another attempt to offer unsolicited advice to the authorities. To this, I want to add two more points.
"Democracy, freedom, and equality" were slogans used to end theocratic autocracy and to strive for and perfect constitutional systems. Reflected in religious issues, this involves: first, establishing the state principle of the separation of church and state; and second, establishing the civil right of freedom of religious belief. The result of this implementation is that, with the exception of the Vatican, every country in Europe and America has seen a "situation of 'politics' dominating 'religion' or 'politics' determining 'religion.'" Why is the fact exactly the opposite of the Sinto-Christian movement's arbitrary assertion? It is because this movement has provided its own interpretation of the separation of church and state and freedom of religious belief.
The essence of freedom of religious belief is to make religious belief "a private matter for the citizen"—this is common practice in constitutional states. Based on this, the essence of the separation of church and state is to disallow religious interference in state affairs. As freedom of religious belief is a right of the citizen, the state must protect it. As religion exists as a social organization, it must submit to state management. Interpreting the separation of church and state as a stand-off, mutual restriction, or even confrontation—as Sino-Christian theology does—reflects the social system of the Western Middle Ages.
▲: The second basic problem regarding the promotion of the Sino-Christian Theology Movement was also phrased very obscurely. Could you provide an interpretation of that as well?
●: Once interpreted, their true intentions become clear. For instance, the first sentence: "After the rich intellectual resources of the Chinese language encounter the external intellectual resource of Christianity"—this describes the situation. What is noteworthy here is the positioning of Christianity as "this external intellectual resource," which clearly excludes the current Chinese church. Adding the demonstrative "this" before "external"—besides specifically referring to the Sino-Christian theology brought by this movement—one wonders if it also refers to underground churches or cults originating from abroad; it is unclear. So, what happens "after"? Then comes the second sentence: to see how Chinese culture "will carry, transform, and create new thoughts, thereby enriching the intellectual heritage of the Chinese language itself." There is a specific discipline for solving this problem called "Integral Theology" (融贯神学). This brand of theology is divided into two sects. One I call the "Replacement School," which rejects Chinese culture from antiquity to the present entirely; because China traditionally lacks a concept of God and original sin, it is impossible for it to accept Christian faith at its roots, so it must simply be replaced. The other school can be called the "Attachment School." Based on God's omniscience and omnipotence and Christianity's self-proclaimed status as a universal religion, how could China not have the possibility of hearing the Gospel? For example, they translate "God" as China's Tianzhu (天主) or Shangdi (上帝) [15], and argue that China's theory of the goodness of human nature can be coordinated with and complemented by the Christian theory of original sin. However, all of this is for the purpose of making Chinese culture "carry, transform, and create" the "new thoughts" of Christian theology. To say this is used to "enrich" the intellectual heritage of the Chinese language itself is an act of excessive modesty.
▲: What do you mean by "excessive modesty"?
●: Hong Kong may just be a bridgehead for Western Christianity to land on the mainland. Western colonialism has long used Christianity as a vanguard for cultural aggression. When Christianity "entered China riding on cannons," from the continuous engineering of "Religious Cases" [16] to the Eight-Nation Alliance’s bloodbath in Beijing, the United States was particularly optimistic about the advantages of cultural missionizing, such as operating publishing houses and founding schools, focusing on seizing the "backbone" and "heads" of the Chinese people. By the early 20th century, the "Christian Occupation of China Movement" was launched, which became a long-term US strategy toward China. Today, it has even risen to the level of a US national policy—this is centrally reflected in its "International Religious Freedom Act of 1998" and the various "International Religious Freedom Reports" it has issued. The "Sino-Christian Theology Movement" promoted by Hong Kong is in fact a continuation of the "Christian Occupation of China"; they only say "enrich" because they are not being entirely candid.
▲: Is this only your personal inference?
●: Let me give a few more examples. Just as the promotion of this movement in Hong Kong was seeing some results, in 2003, a conference titled the "Sino-Nordic Conference on Chinese Contextual Theology" was held in Finland. The topic was how to carry out the "Christian Theological Construction Movement" under the "Chinese context." What is the difference between this "Christian Theological Construction Movement in the Chinese Context" and the "Sino-Christian Theology Movement"? The only difference is that the location moved from Hong Kong to Europe, and in one stroke, a movement led from a peripheral corner was upgraded to an "internationally" led movement. Look at the lineup: the Chinese representatives in attendance included figures from Peking University, Tsinghua, (Renmin) University of China, Minzu University of China, Fudan, and the Institute of World Religions at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences—mostly leading figures from relevant departments. On the Western side, the attendees were a uniform block of theologians from the University of Helsinki, and various divinity schools in Finland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, the UK, and the US. Additionally, there were personnel from American Christian organizations, Russian Orthodox institutions, the Lutheran World Federation, and Trinity Theological College in Singapore. There were also representatives from two Hong Kong universities, certain mainland officials stationed in Hong Kong, and pastors from the China Christian Council, invited perhaps as a form of "window dressing." A conference specifically organized for intellectuals from Chinese higher education and research units to brainstorm on how "Christian theological construction" should develop in China's current situation is a record-breaking event—and certainly not an isolated one. Why were the representatives they selected so accurately matched to the conference theme, and why was the speaking order arranged as it was? In fact, there are many such international conferences overseas, and even more held domestically. People have come to see them as the norm.
During the Ford administration, the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam likely influenced the American obsession with "weaponry determinism." When Carter took office in 1977, the official founding of Regent University [17] perhaps signaled a further strengthening of the U.S. religious strategy. This university describes itself as a "world center for Christian thought and action"; its goal is to cultivate "leaders of high achievement who are equipped with Christian thought" for the entire world. It currently has 4,000 undergraduate and graduate students from 57 countries, with over 10,000 alumni distributed globally. Its "mission is to integrate Christian doctrine with world-class education." Whether by coincidence or not, the theological construction movements promoted in Chinese universities and social science units by Hong Kong and European entities are consistent with this university's "mission." From public information, however, we have not found a single case of a person from Mainland China being associated with this university. Yet, a theological college with the same name in North America is the most frequented base for the Sino-Christian Theology movement [18] outside of Hong Kong—this is Regent College in Canada. It has specifically established a "Chinese Studies Program," whose primary task is to recruit and host various scholars of different backgrounds from Mainland China for visits or training. Of the prestigious universities and research institutes that participated in that contextual theology conference in Northern Europe, there are likely very few that have not sent newly minted scholars to this location to have their eyes opened and receive training. It is said that domestic links with this college have now been severed.
▲: We are indeed not very familiar with these types of situations.
●: I do not know the fine details either; I am only speaking of things that have occurred right before my eyes. Let me mention something else right before us: the capital Western Christianity is investing to occupy China. In early 2007, a news report was posted online, roughly stating: "In the past 20 years, Western capitalism has made great progress in China, yet the philosophical foundations of Western society have rarely been explored. Calvin College has received a new grant from the John Templeton Foundation, which is expected to change this status quo." This grant amounts to 2 million USD for the implementation of a project titled "Science, Philosophy, and Belief: The China Scholars Program," which is "specifically operated by the Nagel Institute for the Study of World Christianity at Calvin [University]." It is planned for completion within three years. The goal is "to train scholars, strengthen the education of Chinese university students, and maintain and deepen research in China." The "philosophical foundation" to be provided to China here is precisely Christian theology. There is a certain trick to why the project title begins with "science": in their view, the status of science in the minds of the Chinese people is supreme, and currently the "Strategy of Invigorating the Country through Science and Education" [19] enjoys deep popular support. Therefore, the first obstacle Christian theology needs to clear in its expansion into China is science; moreover, using the name of science greatly diminishes the public's sensitivity toward the propagation of theology.
As for the specific implementation measures and steps, the plan is as follows: "24 Chinese graduate students and 9 post-doctoral fellows will be invited to visit and study at Baylor University, the University of Notre Dame [20], and Calvin College"; "A series of lectures and seminars will be held in China, with 12 scholars selected and dispatched by the Society of Christian Philosophers to teach in rotation. During the summer of 2008, an intensive seminar will be held at Calvin College for 24 selected Chinese scholars to engage in dialogues with some of the top Western experts in the field"; "In the summer of 2009, a major academic conference is planned to be held at Peking University, where members of the Society of Christian Philosophers will be present to introduce and discuss new work." The conference papers are to be published by Peking University Press and "will be widely adopted as textbooks." In short, the aim is to let Chinese "intellectuals realize that their country urgently needs to find certain methods to integrate culture and provide public norms for society." I will not go into the details of the implementation. There are many institutions in the U.S. alone that provide such generous funding as the John Templeton Foundation, and their targets are all the "cultural workers" (intellectuals) in universities and research units.
▲: Why did Mao Zedong say that without criticizing theology, one cannot write good histories of philosophy, literature, or the world?
●: Because as an ideology, theology's most prominent function is its ability to penetrate into the very marrow of culture. Setting aside specific problems in the history of philosophy, the fact that philosophy departments in universities across the country have one after another hung up "Department of Religious Studies" signs is quite revealing. As for theology infiltrating the history of philosophy, literature, and world history, this has long ceased to be news; even in the emerging fields of sociology and jurisprudence, some are already using theology to interpret our society and our Constitution.
▲: Why is theology considered an ideology?
●: This is naturally related to the worldview and values that theology carries. But even so, if it were a matter of purely private religious belief, we would certainly not be so concerned. The problem now is that theological propaganda and construction have moved from the church into the national education system and social science research institutions; we must pay attention. The Atheism Society and our journal have, in recent years, continuously called for the implementation of national legislation on the "separation of education and religion," insisting that the Constitution and laws should not be treated as mere paper ornaments—this was done in view of this situation. But it is not only because of this.
▲: They claim that the theology they advocate is "academic for academic's sake." What is your view?
●: This is pure self-deception. They themselves declare that their "academic goals lie beyond the academic." Responding to the reality of foreign theology infiltrating China, Sino-Christian theology is called "contextual theology" (处境神学); this theology assumes the name of culture and is also called "cultural theology"; to facilitate activities in the halls of academia, it is also called "academic theology." "Academic" is the banner they fly most often, but the goal definitely does not stop at academia, even though some of them claim it is "academic for academic's sake" and "value-neutral." So, where do the goals beyond the academic lie? The more precise answer is "the public context and problems of contemporary Chinese society." What is this "public context of society"? What are the "problems"? Are they the economic structure, the political system, the cultural form, or the masses? The interpretive space here is infinitely large, but it absolutely cannot be limited to the scope of Christianity. On the contrary, "context" is precisely the object that theology needs to examine; "problems" are the issues that theology needs to raise and provide answers for. Therefore, they emphasize that "Chinese Christian studies, including Sino-Christian theology, should inherently propose Christian interpretations and propositions for this context." What are Christian interpretations and propositions? Each of them has their own background and their own performance. A speech I once gave had the "honor" of being published four times—because a certain passage was deleted and then added back several years later. This passage illustrates quite well one group's "interpretations and propositions" regarding Christianity, so it is worth repeating: "Recently, I saw a gentleman claiming to be Chinese offering advice to the U.S. President, saying: 'President Reagan became one of the greatest presidents in American history because he buried the communist systems of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. Helping China undergo such a change is perhaps the historical mission God has given to the President.' Why should the U.S. President help China complete such a 'historical mission'? This gentleman said: because it 'both conforms to God’s justice and conforms to the national security of the United States.'" To date, we do not know if any figures in the Sino-Christian theology movement have had the honor of being received by the U.S. President, but the Sino-Christian theologians who express similar "propositions" domestically are well-known to everyone, and the "interpretations" of the current Chinese context by others among them are perhaps the logical premise for such "propositions."
Of course, I am not saying everyone in this movement is anti-system, but it would be factual to say they are keen on participating in politics. They generally believe that China's legal churches only focus on religious faith and the church's own activities, so they mock church theology as "talking to oneself" (自说自话). Sino-Christian theology will never just "talk to itself"; rather, it aims to "express the targeted significance of its own values within the reality of the context, carrying a heterogeneous tension." For example, the "reality of the context" in China includes "putting people first" (以人为本); Christianity advocates "putting faith in God first." Values built on a theocentric foundation are "heterogeneous" to human-centered values, and thus possess a "targeted significance" that disparages the "human-centered." A clearer way of putting it is: "Theology must provide an interpretation of the universal context of modern man, and cannot 'reduce religious language to a self-enclosed language game.'" To realize these tasks of "contextual theology," they have "spawned what is called 'public theology'": "Its discourse mode can be understood, discussed, and respected by people outside the church"—to put it bluntly, it is a way of entering the social public sphere to proselytize and preach in a theological form. The emphasis is on "letting theology enter the field of the humanities"—"Only by moving toward the 'public sphere' to engage in humanistic concern can contemporary Christian thought achieve meaningful results; it is also the inevitable path for humanistic disciplines to solve the numerous perplexities and dilemmas encountered today." "If theology does not focus on or solve earthly problems, it cannot manifest the spirit of God's love for the world"—from these kinds of expressions, the Sino-Christian movement is also a socio-political movement, and its core members are shifting from appearing as scholars to looking more and more like political activists.
▲: Viewed this way, Mao Zedong's proposal to study religion and criticize theology is even more urgent today?
●: I feel there is deep significance in CASS rescuing atheism as an "endangered discipline," because science and atheism are the natural enemies of theology. The support provided by the Institute of Marxism Studies for the development of the discipline of atheism, though preliminary, has been very effective. Under the guidance of the spirit of the 18th Party Congress [21], there will certainly be even greater progress.