Yang Weihua: The Formation of Anti-Religious Theory in China: An Analysis of Non-Religious Discourse in the 1920s
Yang Weihua: The Formation of Anti-Religious Theory in China: An Analysis of Non-Religious Discourse in the 1920s
[Abstract] The 1920s was the formative period for anti-religious theory in China; since then, all Chinese anti-religious discourse can be traced back to this era. During the 1920s, however, political discourse occupied the dominant position in public speech. In particular, the theory of religion as a tool of imperialist aggression obscured other voices; to a certain extent, it was a critique wrapped in politics. Naturally, based on different perceptions of religion and various interest considerations, the anti-religious orientations of various sectors of society also exhibited significant differences. Furthermore, the intellectual resources used by the "Non-Religious" (Movement) included not only foreign imports but also indigenous discourses catalyzed by the specific realities of China. These anti-religious discourses exerted a broad influence on China both at that time and in subsequent periods. [Keywords] Non-Religious Movement; Anti-Christian Movement; Nationalism; 1920s
In traditional China, different eras exhibited various forms of anti-religious rhetoric. Upon entering the modern era, due to the intervention of Christianity and the eastward influx of various Western trends of thought, anti-religious theory became increasingly pluralistic and complex. However, the true formation of Chinese anti-religious theory occurred in the 1920s. It was during this period that, while inheriting past anti-religious orientations, many new anti-religious theories were generated. While making Chinese anti-religious theory comprehensive, it also exerted a massive influence on subsequent Chinese history; thereafter, Chinese anti-religious rhetoric did not move beyond this scope, failing to add new theoretical elements. Even during the various religious trials following the founding of the People’s Republic of China, these were merely continuations of the anti-religious theories of the 1920s.
In the China of the 1920s, the fate of religion underwent a rigorous interrogation and challenge. Driven by the organized Non-Religious Movement and the Anti-Christian Movement, the critique of religion became a fashionable mode of speech that occupied the center of public discourse, attracting the participation of various intellectuals who held the power of discourse. Whether in debates, books, newspapers, or magazines, the presence of religious critique could be frequently discovered. This article focuses primarily on the level of discourse, conducting a textual analysis of the discourse itself to explore its value orientations, examining the subjects who utilized anti-religious discourse and the differences in their orientations, and tracing the origins of anti-religious intellectual resources and the shadows they cast upon modern China.
I. The Value Orientations of Non-Religious Demands
In the historical imagery of modern China, anti-religious scenes are frequently encountered. The emergence of an idea cannot come from nowhere; it must be the eruption of historical accumulation and a response to reality. In this regard, anti-religious manifestations since the modern era have exhibited a certain identity. However, compared to the anti-religious sentiments of the Boxer Movement [1] and those preceding it, the anti-religious landscape of the 1920s presented a more complex face.
In the China of the 1920s, the New Culture Movement raised the banner of science and rationality, allowing them to gradually occupy the center of people's beliefs while simultaneously arousing concern and reflection on cultural issues. People's minds and hearts underwent a comprehensive liberation almost imperceptibly. The May Fourth Movement caused a surge in nationalism, and anti-imperialism became the strongest note of the era; the May Thirtieth Movement [2], the Movement to Recover Educational Sovereignty, and the Northern Expedition formed a series of undulating anti-imperialist symphonies. Furthermore, after the Chinese versions of the British, French, and American revolutionary reforms failed one after another, the "blast of the guns of the October Revolution" [3] attracted the attention of the Chinese people. Russia became the focus of imitation, and the spread of Marxism and the rise of the Communist Party of China quietly shifted China's historical course... Everything of the era was reflected in the critical demands of the Non-Religious. To a certain extent, the Non-Religious [Movement] was a miniature of the intersection of contemporary realities and intellectual trends. Organizations such as the "Non-Religious Federation," the "Anti-Christian Federation," and the "Anti-Christian Student Federation" were precisely the results of the call of the times.
1. The Participation of Nationalism—Opposition to Imperialism
Among the various anti-religious voices, although Chinese people targeted all religions to avoid being criticized for prejudice, hatred of Christianity undoubtedly occupied the center. Christianity played the leading role in catalyzing the prevalence of anti-religious sentiment: "Christianity is a type of religion, and the harm Christianity does to the Chinese people is even more severe than all other religions." [4] Due to the entanglement of Christianity with imperialism, the tide of anti-imperialism stirred by nationalism made it difficult for Christianity to escape the fate of a "Last Judgment." Simultaneously, opposing imperialism through anti-Christianity became an important component of anti-imperialism, with the two reflecting one another. In various non-religious discourses, the atmosphere of anti-imperialism was pervasive everywhere. The very term "Anti-Christian" (非基督教, fēi Jīdūjiào) was itself a nationalist slogan. Because this discourse was used so frequently, I can only select a few representative examples for a brief description.
Using the Great Convention of the World Student Christian Federation, held at Tsinghua University on April 4, 1922, as a fuse, the Chinese people began a grand anti-religious movement. Although the intensity of anti-religious voices waxed and waned, it continued intermittently until the end of the 1920s. After the initial explosion in 1922, a new climax was reached after the May Thirtieth Movement in 1925, and things would turn lively during the "Anti-Christian Movement Week" around Christmas each year. After the "Anti-Christian Student Federation" was established in 1922, it published the "Circular Telegram of the Anti-Christian Student Federation" in The Pioneer (先驱, Xiānqū) on March 15: "Governments and great merchants used it as a vanguard for colonization; thus, the Four Gospels arrived in the East carrying the might of gold and iron. Money enslaves us materially; the Gospels enslave us spiritually." [5] They recognized Christianity as a tool of aggression, a vanguard, and a spiritual shackle for enslaving the Chinese people. The most concise exposition was found in the text of The Guide (向导, Xiàngdǎo): "Religion is, on one hand, a form of hypnotism used by imperialism to daze the masses of the colonies, and on the other hand, it is the exploratory party and vanguard of imperialist aggression against the colonies." [6] This not only revealed Christianity's direct political participation in China but also perceived the political significance hidden behind the spread of Christianity: by spiritually hypnotizing the people of the colony, they would not think of resistance, thereby benefiting imperialist control over China. It was even elevated to the level of "cultural aggression" [7], recognizing that beyond political and economic aggression, imperialism utilized a more hidden yet more effective "cultural aggression": "In addition to using political and economic aggression to carve up China, imperialism further uses Christian cultural aggression to anesthetize the Chinese people, causing them to forever submit to the enticements of foreign godfathers, pastors, and Western missionaries without generating any resistance." [8] Furthermore, they saw the danger of this cultural aggression: that one might unknowingly become a "slave of a lost nation" (亡国奴, wángguónú).
In the review of historical materials, almost all anti-religious writings were saturated with deep traces of anti-imperialism. These were basically directed at Christianity, while traces of attacks on other religions are almost impossible to find. This shows the weight that politics occupied therein. As a foreign import, Christianity's entanglement with imperialism doomed it to a miserable fate in China.
2. The Pervasiveness of Class Consciousness—Opposition to Class Oppression
Before Marxism entered China, a conscious class awareness among the Chinese people did not seem prominent. However, after the October Revolution, as Marxism gradually gained widespread recognition among the Chinese, the word "class" (阶级, jiējí) became prominent in Chinese discourse and left a heavy mark on modern history. People began to consciously use "class" to explain history and analyze reality. In the anti-religious discourse of the 1920s, religion was depicted as a tool of class oppression, which became a major crime attributed to religion. Based on a class-based ideological stance, strengthening the connection between religion and class oppression was likewise an important part of anti-religious discourse.
The "Manifesto of the Anti-Christian Student Federation," published at the same time, declared: "On one side there is the predatory class and the oppressive class; on the other side, there is the predated class and the oppressed class. And current Christianity and the Christian Church are the 'demons who help the former prey upon the latter, and help the former oppress the latter'." [9] It is evident that at the inception of the Non-Religious [Movement], the theory of religion as class oppression was a major anti-religious weapon. The opposition between the oppressive class and the oppressed class was readily at hand in the speakers' choice of words, and religion played the role of an instrument of oppression in the conflict between the two. In the overwhelming anti-religious discourse that followed, the figure of class oppression theory appeared even more frequently. For instance, one anti-religious manifesto stated: "Use it (Christianity) to anesthetize the domestic working class, making them believe that the poverty or wealth of society arises from divine will, and that one should not destroy the current social system through class struggle." [10] The frequent appearance of the term "working class" in the text shows the influence of Marxism-Leninism. Such statements not only filled various manifestos but also appeared frequently in general anti-religious writings: "Based on its (Christianity's) doctrine, firstly it can anesthetize the domestic working class, making them believe that class disparity is arranged and determined by God and is irrevocable by humans, thereby mitigating class struggle." [11] Religion was widely criticized as a tool of class oppression; it asked people to remain on the "other shore" of religion and forget the hardships of reality, thereby benefiting class rule. This was a truly important element in various anti-religious discourses.
From the above materials, it is evident that the consciousness of religion as a tool of class oppression was already very thick and bore a deep Marxist imprint. This reveals from one perspective that class concepts had a certain level of acceptance in 1920s China, and simultaneously, Marxism-Leninism was an ignore-proof, fashionable language. It is worth noting that anti-religious sentiment was basically directed at Christianity. Besides Christianity being a foreign import, this was likely a result of Marxist influence, as the class conflict between the Chinese bourgeoisie and proletariat was not as prominent as in the West.
3. The Remonstrance of Science and Rationality—Opposition to Superstition and Ignorance
At a time when the authority of science and rationality was being questioned and interrogated in the West, in China, it was gradually establishing its own authority and receiving widespread recognition and reverence. Once the Chinese people had initially grasped the spirit of science and rationality, they began to use it as a weapon to throw themselves into the torrent of the Non-Religious [Movement]. Thus, science and rationality became an important intellectual resource that could be utilized for anti-religion. Judging religion based on the standpoint of science and rationality was likewise a fashion.
The manifesto published by the "Non-Religious Federation" stated: "Ridiculous religion is incompatible with scientific truth." [12] It is clear that the antithesis between religion and science was an important reason for the Chinese people's opposition to religion; everything on the opposite side of science was categorized as "non-scientific" and refuted. Furthermore, it was believed that in the age of science, religion was already obsolete and had no reason to exist: "In the era of modern science, it has been proven that religion is an obsolete relic with the scent of superstition. Is Christianity not a religion? Why do we, the youth who are generally hailed as the intellectual class, oppose old ladies worshipping the Buddha on one hand, mocking them as superstitious and not being people of the twentieth century, while on the other hand boasting of ourselves as supreme figures for having entered Christianity?" [13] This equated religion with superstition; religion is superstition, and science and superstition are natural enemies. Superstition was also "rubbish" in 1920s China that urgently needed to be swept into the dustbin of history, which served as another important reason for the Chinese people's non-religious stance.
In an era when science and rationality were championed and people used them to judge everything, religion—as the opposite of science—naturally could not escape the fate of being maligned. Religion was considered an obstacle to the unfolding of science; standing on the ground of science and rationality to oppose religion was an inevitability of the era. This anti-religious orientation occupied a very high proportion of non-religious discourse, and Christianity was likewise the primary target in this critique.
4. The Desire for Individual Freedom—Opposition to the Devastation of Body and Mind
The 1920s was an era of intellectual liberation, where the value and desires of the individual self were noted and championed. All things that hindered the liberation of personality—be they institutions or ideas—were confronted and attacked. Similarly, religion was depicted as a poisonous substance that shackled the spiritual nature (性灵, xìnglíng), encountering critique and rejection. Some writings directed the edge of their critique toward religion from the standpoint of physical and mental freedom.
For example, Yu Jiaju wrote: "As for Christianity, from morning to night it never leaves God or 'Our Father'; its shackling, devastating, and corrupting of the human heart is more severe than all other religions. This is also the reason why we must exert our full strength to reject Christianity." [14] It is clear he believed that Christians, living all day in a religious atmosphere and controlled by it, suffered devastation of body and mind. Cai Yuanpei even elevated religious intrusion to the level of violating human rights: "Presently, all religions are detached and cling to obsolete doctrines, using ghostly and absurd ceremonies and exaggerated propaganda to provoke the blind faith of the uneducated to maintain the livelihoods of the clergy. This is entirely an intrusion of external forces into the spiritual realm of humans and can be considered a violation of human rights." [15] As a form of spiritual control, religion was undoubtedly the enemy of mental freedom and individual liberation.
The "Anesthetic Theory" (religion acts as an anesthetic) and the "Opium Theory" (religion is the opium of the people), which are frequently seen in anti-religious discourse, actually recognized the immense harm of religion in terms of spiritual control over people.
In summary, there were four primary orientations in the anti-religious discourse of the 1920s: first, the view that religion was a tool of national oppression—used by colonizers to plunder and enslave the people of colonized lands; second, the view that religion was a tool of class oppression—used by the ruling class to exploit the subaltern classes; third, from the standpoint of scientific rationality, the characterization of religion as superstition and an enemy obstructing China's progress; and fourth, from the perspective of physical and mental freedom, the claim that religion destroys the human spirit and is detrimental to the liberation of the individual personality. Naturally, the positions these four orientations occupied within non-religious discourse varied, exhibiting an uneven state of distribution.
II. Discursive Utilization: An Analysis of the Subjects of Non-Religious Critique
The religious critique of the 1920s was massive in scale, with individuals from all walks of life participating in this critical performance. Among them, young students, the Communist Party of China (CPC) and its closely linked Socialist Youth League of China, segments of the Kuomintang (KMT), and certain members of the centrist intelligentsia constituted the backbone of this force. However, based on different standpoints, different perceptions of religion, and different considerations of interest, various social sectors exhibited significant differences in their value orientations toward anti-religion.
Young students possessed the loudest voice in the anti-religious movement; they were the authors, recipients, and disseminators of many anti-religious articles. Youthful passion compelled them not to let anti-religion remain merely at the level of words but to put it into action. In addition to the establishment of the headquarters of the "Anti-Christian Student Federation" (Fei Jidujiao xuesheng tongmeng) [16], anti-Christian student organizations were established across the country. Indisputably, they were the main force of the non-religious movement. In their non-religious discursive expressions, traces of all four orientations summarized above can be found. Frequently, the theory of national plunder and the theory of class oppression were intertwined: "First, it is used to anesthetize the domestic working class, making them believe that the wealth and poverty of society stem from divine will and should not destroy the current social system through class struggle; second, it is used to anesthetize the masses in conquered colonies and semi-colonies, making them believe that warships and armies come to bestow the Gospel of God, education, and all culture, rather than to rob money, so that they will remain forever grateful and never think of resisting." [17] Of course, even among the youth, it was difficult to hear a single, unanimous voice; young people also exhibited differences due to different intellectual influences and identities. However, driven by national consciousness and steeped in the New Culture Movement [18], there was a consensus that religion was the vanguard of imperialism used to soften the Chinese people, that religion should be blamed from a standpoint of scientific rationality, and that religion was a toxin hindering physical and mental freedom. It was primarily among students under the influence of the CPC that the view of religion as a tool of class oppression was most prominent. The Socialist Youth League of China was extremely active in the "Anti-Christian Movement" [19] and seized a significant portion of the right to non-religious discursive expression, exerting a great influence on other non-religious groups.
Next was the Communist Party of China. The CPC directly guided the "Anti-Christian Movement" and provided it with public opinion guidance and theoretical preparation; many individuals participated directly in the critique of religion and occupied important positions within the non-religious federations. Regarding anti-religious orientations, the CPC launched a comprehensive assault, utilizing all four orientations with ease. For instance, Qu Qiubai [20] wrote: "The ruling class uses it to intimidate the ruled class into submission, suppressing their will to drive them... the bourgeoisie wants to use these religious beliefs and church propaganda to blind the masses and wear down their revolutionary sentiment." [21] This criticized religion as a tool of class oppression from a class standpoint; the theory of religion as a tool of class oppression was expressed most clearly and profoundly by the CPC. The descriptions of Yun Daiying [22], however, revealed a nationalist anti-religious flavor: "Every additional Christian is one more foreign lackey; foreigners want to use this bait to make the Chinese people completely soften toward them, so we must oppose it... Christianity is truly just a tool for foreigners to soften China." [23] National independence was also its goal. The CPC was comprehensively anti-religious; this was manifested not only in general propaganda but also entered many Central Committee documents. For example, the July 1926 "Documents of the Enlarged Plenary Session of the CPC Central Executive Committee" stated: "The church is the vanguard of foreign imperialism's devastation of the Chinese people... using pleasant terms like peace and universal love... they seek to deceive all the oppressed masses together, leading them to forget the actual suffering of their own lives to ensure the consolidation and permanence of the imperialist foundation for oppressing the masses." [24] Many document contents also embodied the anti-religious spirit, such as the November 1923 "Resolution on Issues of Educational Propaganda" of the First Plenum of the Third CPC Central Executive Committee, which recorded "opposition to Christian doctrine and its organizations (YMCA)," [25] and the 1926 "Resolutions of the Third Enlarged Plenary Session of the CPC Central Executive Committee," which stated: "We cannot make the slightest concession to the KMT Right, the Nationalists (guojia zhuyi pai), or the Christians." [26]
The situation of the Kuomintang was more complex; they were far less active in anti-religion than the Communist Party. The KMT party charter was not in conflict with religion, and there were many religious believers within the party itself, which caused the KMT's attitude toward religion to diverge. Yet, a small number of people still supported the Anti-Christian Movement and declared their non-religious stance. For example, Dai Jitao [27] stated: "I especially admire the movement recently initiated by students of the Sacred Heart and Holy Trinity mission schools to resist imperialist cultural aggression... foreigners coming to China to engage in the business of training slaves has been going on for nearly a hundred years." [28] He identified Christianity as a tool of imperialist cultural aggression against China. Liao Zhongkai [29] was another high-ranking party and state official who favored anti-religion; in July 1925, during a lecture at the Whampoa Military Academy [30] titled "Talks on the History of Imperialist Aggression," he pointed out that religion was a tool for national destruction: "He (the Kangxi Emperor) used religion to reduce the Mongol population... using Lamaism [Tibetan Buddhism] to destroy them by giving them a source of faith... the Mongols almost faced extinction. This is the same method used by European countries to destroy Black people in Africa... sending missionaries to convert them and later using religion to destroy them... therefore, the intellectuals of China must advocate anti-Christianity." [31] From the discourse of these two men, it can be seen that the KMT opposed Christianity only because of its relationship with imperialism; their orientation was relatively simple, without any other thematic flavor, which differed greatly from other anti-religious groups. As Liao Zhongkai stated: "We oppose Christianity from a political standpoint... [if it] occupied a position like Buddhism or Islam in present-day China, we would not oppose it." [32] It was advantageous for the KMT to oppose imperialism from a nationalist standpoint; in the tide of anti-imperialism, various political forces could use this as a resource to gain identity and support.
The centrist intelligentsia is even harder to grasp because their attitudes toward religion were diverse, including supporters, opponents, and moderates, and these views would change over time. Specifically regarding the opponents, most were "trend-setters" of the New Tide of Thought (xin sichao) and were steeped in new ideas. Their opposition to religion focused more on cultural considerations and theoretical refutations with less emotional venting; thus, their anti-religious orientation was primarily based on scientific anti-religion and the recognition of religion's harm in terms of spiritual destruction. The anti-religious manifesto of the "Non-Religious Federation" (Fei zongjiao tongmeng) can roughly represent their position: "Humanity is fundamentally evolving, yet religion insists on saying 'humanity and all things were created by Heaven.' Humanity is fundamentally free and equal, yet religion insists on binding thought, destroying individuality, worshipping idols, and following a single supreme ruler. Humanity fundamentally loves peace, yet religion insists on attacking those who differ and forming cliques, inciting war while using 'universal love' as a mask to deceive people. Humanity fundamentally loves life and goodness, yet religion insists on luring people with heaven and frightening them with hell, utilizing an inhuman authority and morality... Laughable religion is incompatible with scientific truth; detestable religion is completely contrary to humanitarianism." [33] One sees little nationalist clamor here, nor any trace of the theory of religion as an instrument of class oppression; it was primarily a rational appeal with fewer political considerations.
In short, although the groups opposing religion all lacked favorable feelings toward it, they differed greatly in their anti-religious orientations. Within the Non-Religious Movement and the Anti-Christian Movement, political desires for anti-religion basically overwhelmed the voice of reason. From the texts, the theory of religion as a tool of imperialist aggression and the theory of religion as a tool of class oppression occupied the dominant position—especially the former, which became the leading voice directing the anti-religious trend, corresponding to the rising reality of anti-imperialism.
III. Origins, Influence, and Evaluation of Non-Religious Discourse
According to the consolidation of anti-religious texts, the intellectual resources used in the anti-religious discourse of the 1920s were extremely diverse. Some were imported from abroad, while others were catalyzed by reality, but they were mainly influenced by scientific rationalism and Marxism-Leninism following the Western Enlightenment. These two "-isms" were fashionable trends of thought at the time. Additionally, with the rise of Chinese nationalism in the 1920s and the strong catalysis of reality, China produced its own anti-religious language—the theory of religion as a tool of imperialist aggression—which, of course, also corresponded to Lenin’s theory of imperialism.
The anti-religious language that frequently appeared in the discourse—such as the "anesthetic theory," the "opium theory," and the theory of religion as a tool of class oppression—which bore obvious Marxist-Leninist traces, was undoubtedly a product of Marxist-Leninist influence. The Marxist-Leninist view of religion was an important intellectual resource for anti-religion; these theories were primarily imported from Russia during the process of China's study of Marxism-Leninism, and also included the efforts of students on the Diligent Work-Frugal Study Movement in France. In June 1922, the "Non-Religious Federation" published On Non-Religion (Fei zongjiao lun), which included a portrait of Marx and his famous anti-religious quote: religion is the opium of the masses. [34] The "opium theory" (Marx) and the "anesthetic theory" (Lenin), which carried a similar meaning, were used very frequently in the anti-religious discourse of the time. Many people directly cited Marx’s famous quote, such as Pi Li: "Therefore Marx said: 'Religion is the poison or opium of the people'; this statement is indeed accurate." [35] Sha Luo: "'Religion is the poison of humanity,' this sentence by Marx is an eternal truth." [36] Instances of the "anesthetic theory" are even more numerous; many of the citations above contain the word "anesthetize" (mazui). The theory of religion as a tool of class oppression is even more a result of the reflection of Marxist-Leninist thought; using the method of class analysis to dissect religion was a Marxist-Leninist specialty.
Enlightenment discourse was primarily the result of the New Culture Movement importing new foreign ideas, which goes without saying. Regarding the theory of religion as a tool of imperialist aggression against China, this was primarily the product of China's reality. In the 1920s, Chinese nationalism was surging. After the Christian enterprise in China reached its "Golden Age," slogans appeared such as "China for Christ" and the "Christian Conquest of China," which the Chinese perceived as arrogant, sparking anxiety among the populace over Christian expansion. Thus, in the tide of anti-imperialism, due to the entanglement between imperialism and Christianity, public opinion inevitably emerged claiming that religion was a tool for imperialist aggression and the enslavement of the Chinese people; the then-popular theory of cultural aggression is one example. This was a product of China's specific reality; Russia and Western countries did not face the problem of foreign religions expanding within their own borders. One additional point to note is that Bertrand Russell’s visit to China at the time also exerted a certain influence on the anti-religion of the Chinese people. Russell was famously anti-religious; Tu Xiaoshi once said: "Reading the manifesto of the Non-Religious Federation published in various newspapers, I know that the reasons they oppose religion are mostly based on Russell's lecture at the Young China Association last year." [37] Those influenced by him were primarily members of the Non-Religious Federation.
The anti-religious critiques of the 1920s and the debates they triggered were helpful in deepening the populace’s cognition and understanding of religion. In particular, the critique of Christianity deepened the understanding of imperialist aggression and cleared the minds of some Chinese people, making many realize that "Christianity and the aggressive policies of imperialism are essentially two sides of the same thing. That is to say, Christianity is one of the tools of imperialist aggression against weak and small nations. This form of aggression is more potent than political or economic aggression because the latter are visible and easily provoke resistance movements among weak and small nations. In contrast, Christian aggression is invisible and works from the bottom up. They—the imperialists—use many enslaving Bibles to dim the minds and anesthetize weak and small nations, so that the invaded nations not only fail to resist but even go so far as to praise them" [65]. This promoted Chinese people's reflections on cultural aggression, thereby further deepening and globalizing the anti-imperialist struggle. Religion does indeed have a side that invites passivity, and given the internal troubles and external threats [38] of the time, what was needed were active, worldly pioneers; thus, this Chinese indictment of religion possessed a certain degree of rationality. Religion did indeed cause some individuals to draw closer to foreign powers, even to the point of becoming "foreign lackeys" [39] immersed in a religious "beyond," which objectively benefited foreign control of China and disadvantaged realistic movements. Even within the Christian community of that time, many progressive Christians called upon their fellow believers not to be immersed in the narrowness of the Gospel and the spirit, but to move toward society and focus on material and social transformation. One mission school student said: "I used to be a powerful opponent of Christianity, but after entering university, they treated me very well and did not charge me for tuition or meals (Note: this is precisely the poison, the fatal dose—original text), so I feel my previous opposition was wrong; it is actually good" [66]. Many such people existed at the time. However, through anti-religious propaganda, many began to awaken and extricate themselves from the embrace of religion. One person wrote: "The cage of Christianity is one I once mistakenly entered, but now I have completely jumped out" [67]. This propaganda also played a huge role in prompting the Christian community itself to rectify its own image.
Naturally, because the critique of religion at that time was primarily directed at Christianity, it was inevitable that political orientation would outweigh all else. There was not much focus on religion itself; the discourse primarily lingered on the periphery of religion. "The basic idea of anti-Christianity was anti-imperialism" [68]. There were too few theoretical demands: "We have no time to discuss the question of whether religion has the value of existence; we only know that Christianity is a tool of foreign imperialist cultural aggression. As for what the doctrines of Christianity are, we need not concern ourselves, because regarding doctrines, we oppose them whether they are good or bad" [69]. There was no excessive attention paid to the theory itself; various viewpoints were merely employed as slogans. At the time, some people used the criticism that "they are not specialized experts in the science of religion" [70] to reproach the anti-Christians. For instance, regarding the theory of class oppression: in reality, religion emphasizes equality, whether in Buddhism or Christianity, and at that time many people drew ideological resources from religion as evidence for claims of equality. Furthermore, there was no differentiated treatment of imperialism, Christianity, and missionary work; everything related to Christianity was totally negated, which brought some disasters to beneficial Christian endeavors in China. Young students, who were the most vehement in their opposition to religion, were easily driven by passion and intellectual deficiencies toward a kind of emotionalism. Of course, any attempt to harshly criticize the use of these slogans on the grounds of theoretical insufficiency or fallacy is futile; reality did not allow for excessive entanglement in theory—those are the arguments of a pedant [40] (fūzǐ zhī lùn). Reality required the political bias of these concepts, for that was the task of the era.
In summary, although the anti-religious discourse of the 1920s presented a diversity of voices, these voices were in a state of imbalance. Political discourse occupied the dominant position, particularly the theory of religion as a tool of imperialist aggression, which overshadowed other voices; this corresponded with the high tide of nationalism in the 1920s. Secondly, due to the spread of Marxism and the influence of the Russian Revolution, the theory of religion as a tool of class oppression also carried significant weight. Critique truly directed at religion itself was minuscule; therefore, to a certain extent, it was a critique encased in a political shell. This was the product of the turbulent reality of China in the 1920s and the ideological reflection of the requirements of the times. Nevertheless, the depth and comprehensiveness of this anti-religious movement prompted the formation of Chinese anti-religious theory. The anti-religious discourses that reappeared after the 1920s basically did not move beyond this scope. Therefore, the 1920s was truly a turning point that influenced the religious outlook of the Chinese people.