Seymour Hersh: Why the United States Supports Islamic Terrorism
Seymour Hersh: Why the United States Supports Islamic Terrorist Forces
[Translator's Note] On March 5, 2007, the American magazine The New Yorker and its website published an article titled "The Redirection: Is the Administration’s new policy benefitting our enemies in the war on terrorism?" by Seymour M. Hersh—the top American investigative journalist who exposed the truth behind the My Lai Massacre during the Vietnam War and won the 1970 Pulitzer Prize for International Reporting. The article revealed that after the overthrow of the Saddam regime, the rise of the Shia in Iraq objectively strengthened Iran's influence in the Middle East. Consequently, in early 2007, the George W. Bush administration decided to undertake clandestine operations to bolster extremist Sunni forces to eliminate Shia Iran. This policy would lead to U.S. support for Sunni Muslim extremist groups that sympathized with Al-Qaeda.
Since the "July 5th Incident" [1] in 2009, the situation in Xinjiang has continued to deteriorate; since 2011, the Greater Middle East has fallen into continuous turmoil, followed by the outbreak of the wars in Libya and Syria; in 2014, Iraq fell into crisis once again... In this series of major events, Sunni extremist forces have played a key role, with the United States acting as the "black hand" [2] behind the scenes. Hersh's 2007 report is of great benefit to our deep understanding of the Middle East and global situation since 2007, as well as our recognition of the true nature of the United States. Huaxia.com (www.hxw.org.cn) has invited relevant scholars to provide an exclusive full translation of this article for our readers.
The effort to contain Iranian influence has involved the United States in the tensions between Sunnis and Shias.
Over the past few months, as the situation in Iraq has deteriorated, the Bush administration—through public diplomacy and clandestine operations—has undergone a major shift in its Middle East strategy. "The Redirection," as some White House insiders call this new strategy. This strategy has pushed the United States into the widening sectarian conflict between Sunni and Shia Muslims in parts of the region, making the U.S. more inclined toward open confrontation with Iran.
The Bush administration has decided to destroy Shia-dominated Iran, which means the administration has reconfigured its priorities in the Middle East. The government has cooperated with the Sunni Saudi government to launch clandestine operations aimed at weakening Hezbollah in Lebanon—a Shia organization supported by Iran. Monitoring the U.S. has also participated in clandestine operations targeting Iran and its ally Syria. A collateral result of these activities is that Sunni Muslim extremist groups, which have long embraced radical Islamic ideology, remain hostile to the United States, and sympathize with Al-Qaeda, will receive American support.
The contradiction of the new strategy lies in the fact that the vast majority of violence in Iraq is committed by Sunnis, not Shias. But for the Bush administration, the greatest unforeseen negative consequence of the Iraq War has been the growth of Iranian power: Iranian President Ahmadinejad issued a provocative statement regarding the destruction of Israel and Iran's right to develop its nuclear weapons program. Last week, Supreme Leader Ayatollah Sayyid Ali Khamenei said on national television: "The realities of the Middle East region show that the arrogant front [3] led by the United States and its allies in the Arab region will be the main losers in this area."
After the 1979 Revolution, when a religious government gained power, the United States broke with Iran and cultivated close relationships with Sunni leaders in places like Sudan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. But this relationship became exceptionally complicated after "9/11," especially with the Saudis. Al-Qaeda is a Sunni organization, and most of its members come from Saudi Arabia. Before the invasion of Iraq, neoconservative government officials in 2003 believed that a pro-American Shia government could effectively serve as a counterweight to Sunni extremist forces, as the vast majority of Iraqi Shias were under the tyranny of Saddam Hussein. However, it is evident that they ignored warnings from intelligence agencies regarding the close ties between Iraqi Shia leaders and Iran, some of whom had lived in exile in Iran for many years. Today, to the great distress of the White House, Iran has established a close relationship with Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s Shia government.
The general outlines of the new American policy have been widely speculated upon and publicly discussed. Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee made it public in January, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated that "the administration has conducted a new strategic positioning in the Middle East" to distinguish between "reformers" and "extremists"; she pointed out that Sunni regimes compose a moderate center, while Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah are at "the other pole" (the Sunni majority in Syria is controlled by the Alawite sect). She said Iran and Syria "have made their choice; they have chosen 'instability'."
However, the core components of "the redirection" strategy have not been made public. According to several current and former government officials, in certain cases, clandestine operations—carried out either by giving orders to the Saudis or providing them with funds, and by bypassing normal Congressional appropriation procedures—have remained secret.
A senior member of the House Appropriations Committee told me he had heard of such a new strategy, but he and his colleagues did not know the details. "We haven't been told anything," he said. "When we ask what is being done, they answer 'nothing.' When we ask specific questions, they answer 'we'll tell you later.' This is so frustrating."
The key figures behind "the redirection" are Vice President Dick Cheney, National Security Advisor Elliott Abrams, the outgoing U.S. Ambassador to Iraq (now U.S. Representative to the UN) Zalmay Khalilzad, and Saudi National Security Advisor Prince Bandar bin Sultan. Although Rice appears on the surface to be deeply involved in this strategic reconfiguration, according to former and current officials, the true secret driver behind the scenes is Cheney. (Cheney’s office and the White House refused to comment on this; the Pentagon did not respond directly to the issue, stating only that the U.S. has no plans to launch a war against Iran).
The shift in U.S. policy has facilitated strategic cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel, largely because both countries view Iran as an existential threat. The Saudis and Israelis have begun negotiations. The Saudis believe that the more stable Israel and Palestine are, the less strategic balancing power Iran will have.
The new strategy is "a major shift in American policy—practically a tectonic shift," according to a U.S. advisor close to Israel. Sunni nations "are stunned by the Shia resurgence, and resentment is growing over our bet on the Shias in Iraq. We cannot reverse the Shia advantage in Iraq, but we can contain them."
Vali Nasr, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations who has written extensively on Iran, Iraq, and the Shia, told me: "There is currently a debate within the administration about who the primary danger is—is it Iran, or is it radical Sunni forces?" He added, "The Saudis and some officials in the administration believe the greatest threat is Iran and that the Sunnis are merely a secondary enemy. This is a victory for the Saudi line."
Martin Indyk—a senior State Department official and director of the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution, who served as Ambassador to Israel during the Clinton administration—believes that "the Middle East is falling into a harsh Sunni-Shia cold war." In his view, it is unclear whether the White House fully realizes the strategic implications of its new policy. He said, "The White House is not only doubling down in Iraq, it is doubling down across the entire region. This will make the situation very complicated. Everything is upside down."
The administration's intent to bring Iran into its strategic targets complicates the strategy for winning the Iraq War. Patrick Clawson—an expert on Iranian issues and deputy director for research at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy—believes that the close relationship between the U.S. government and moderate or radical Sunnis will inject "fear" into Prime Minister Maliki's government "and make him worry that the Sunnis will win" the Iraqi civil war. Clawson believes this will give Maliki the incentive to join the U.S. government in suppressing radical Shia militias, such as Sadr's Mahdi Army.
Nonetheless, at this moment, the United States still relies on cooperation with Iraqi Shia leaders. The Mahdi Army may be in open opposition to the U.S., but other Shia militias still count on an alliance with America. Both Sadr's Mahdi Army and the White House support Maliki. National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley suggested that the government detach Maliki from his more radical Shia allies to build his power on a base of moderate Sunnis and Kurds. But currently, the situation is moving in the opposite direction. As the Iraqi army continues to fight the insurgents, the strength of Shia militias continues to grow steadily.
Flynt Leverett, a former Bush administration National Security Council official, told me that this new policy regarding Iraq is "neither a coincidence nor an irony." "The administration is creating the impression for the public that Iran is more dangerous and incendiary to American interests in Iraq than the Sunni insurgents. But if you look at the actual casualty figures, the Sunnis are the greatest threat to the United States." Leverett says this is a promotional step toward increasing pressure on Iran. He believes that by conventional logic, the Iranians will react, which provides the United States with an opportunity to strike them.
President George W. Bush clarified this approach in a January 10th speech: "Two tyrannical states"—Iran and Syria—"allow terror and insurgents to move in and out of Iraq across their territory." "Iran is providing material support for attacks on American troops. We will disrupt their attacks on us. We will cut off the support from Iran and Syria. We will find and destroy the networks providing advanced weaponry and training to Iraq's insurgents."
Over the next few weeks, a chorus of accusations arose from the U.S. government alleging Iranian involvement in the Iraq War. On February 11th, reports surfaced that the government had intercepted sophisticated explosive devices in Iraq that supposedly came from Iran. According to government sources, the bleak situation in Iraq was essentially not due to the failure of government planning and execution, but because of Iranian interference.
The U.S. military arrested and interrogated hundreds of Iranians in Iraq. "Last August, the army's line was to snatch as many Iranians in Iraq as possible," according to a former senior official from an official think tank. "We would arrest 500 people at a time. We interrogated these people and squeezed information out of them. The White House goal was to create a pretext—that the Iranians were behind the insurgency, as they always are—and that Iran is the real killer of Americans." A Pentagon consultant confirmed that in recent months, hundreds of Iranians have been captured by American troops. However, he also told me that these included humanitarians and aid workers who were "released shortly" after being interrogated.
"We have no plans for a war against Iran," newly appointed Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced on February 2nd. According to current and former U.S. intelligence and military officials, clandestine operations in Lebanon are simultaneously aimed at Iran. U.S. military and special operations teams have escalated operations to gather intelligence on Iran. According to a Pentagon consultant on terrorism and former senior government intelligence official, U.S. military and special operations teams have crossed borders to track Iranian agents coming from Iraq.
Delaware Democratic Senator Joseph Biden questioned Secretary Rice during her January Senate appearance, challenging the plans to conduct pursuit operations across the borders of Iran and Syria. Rice replied: "Clearly, the President is not overstepping the law to protect our troops, but there is indeed a plan to destroy the intelligence networks in Iraq." Rice added: "I think every American can understand—and the American people and I believe that Congress wants the President to make the necessary efforts to protect our troops."
Rice's ambiguous answer drew criticism from Senator Chuck Hagel of Nebraska, a Republican: "Madam Secretary, some of us remember Cambodia in 1970. At that time, our government lied to the American people, saying 'we are not crossing the border into Cambodia.' But the fact is that we did. I happened to know something about that and wanted to say it at a hearing like this. Therefore, Madam Secretary, when you put emotion into policy decisions, it is very, very dangerous."
The administration’s fixation on Iran's role in Iraq is inextricably linked to its long-standing vigilance regarding the Iranian nuclear program. In a January 14 Fox News report, Cheney warned of the possibility that, in the coming years, "an Iran with nuclear weapons and sitting across the world’s oil supply is going to be in a position not only to affect the global economy but to threaten neighbors and the rest of the world through terrorist organizations as well as nuclear weapons." He added, "If you go and talk to the Gulf states, or if you talk to the Saudis, or the Israelis, or the Jordanians, the entire region is worried... the threat from Iran is rising."
The administration is currently examining a batch of new intelligence regarding Iran's nuclear weapons program. Several current and former U.S. officials told me that the intelligence came from Israeli agents inside Iran, suggesting that Iran has developed a three-stage solid-fuel intercontinental ballistic missile capable of launching small warheads—each with limited accuracy—at targets within Europe. The reliability of this intelligence remains under debate.
There is widespread controversy regarding the use of unverified and dangerous information provided by intelligence departments—namely, that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction—as the justification for the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Some members of Congress have shown a cautious attitude toward the alarms sounded by intelligence agencies regarding Iran; during a Senate session on February 14, Hillary Clinton stated, "We must take the lessons we learned from the Iraq conflict and apply them to the growing crisis with Iran. Because, Mr. President, we must be wary of making decisions based on intelligence that later turns out to be false."
Nevertheless, the Pentagon continues to formulate plans for intensive sustained bombing of Iran. This planning began last year under the direction of the President. In recent months, a former intelligence official told me, a special planning group has been established in the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, specifically tasked with implementing bombing raids on Iran within twenty-four hours upon the President’s order.
Last month, an Air Force consultant on targeting, who also serves as a Pentagon consultant on terrorism, told me that the Iran planning group has received a new mission: to identify targets related to Iran's potential provision of weapons and combatant training to Iraq. Previously, the group's operational objectives had been the destruction of Iranian nuclear facilities and the subversion of the Iranian regime.
Two carrier strike groups—the Eisenhower and the Stennis—are currently in the Arabian Sea. Sources indicate that their original plan was to take leave earlier this spring, but due to the uncertainty of future military actions, they must remain on station until new carriers arrive (war games have shown that carriers are vulnerable to a new technique practiced by the Iranians in the past—swarming carriers with large numbers of small boats; carriers have limited maneuverability in the narrow Strait of Hormuz, far from the southern seas of Iran). A former senior intelligence official said that current contingency plans involve an attack this spring. However, he added that senior officers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are counting on the White House "not to be so stupid as to do this while facing the Iraq problem, which would create a massive dilemma for the Republican Party in 2008."
Prince Bandar’s Game
The administration’s efforts to weaken Iran in the Middle East rely primarily on Saudi Arabia and Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi National Security Advisor. Prince Bandar served as the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. for twenty-two years until stepping down in 2005. He has long maintained a close friendship with President Bush and Vice President Cheney. In his new position, he continues to maintain these close personal ties. Senior White House officials have visited Saudi Arabia numerous times, some of which were conducted in secret.
In November 2006, Cheney made a surprise visit to Saudi Arabia to meet with King Abdullah and Prince Bandar. According to Time magazine, the King warned Cheney that if the U.S. withdrew its troops from Iraq, Saudi Arabia would support its Sunni [4] compatriots in that country. A European intelligence official told me that during this meeting, the Saudis expressed fear and apprehension regarding the "Shiite [5] rise." In response, the Saudis began to use their leverage—money.
Bandar relied on his years of close relations with the U.S. to build a solid power base within the competitive royal family; the relationship with the U.S. is simply too vital for the Saudis. Bandar’s successor was Prince Turki al-Faisal; Turki left after eighteen months and was replaced by Adel al-Jubeir—a colleague of Bandar’s. A former Saudi diplomat told me that during Turki’s tenure, he became "unhappy" when he realized how close Bandar’s relationship was with senior White House officials. However, he added: "I don’t think Bandar will leave on his own." Although Turki disliked Bandar’s presence, Bandar indeed played a critical role in Saudi efforts to counter the spreading power of the Shiites in the Middle East.
The divide between Shiites and Sunnis dates back to a painful split in the 7th century AD regarding who should succeed the Prophet Muhammad. Sunnis ruled the medieval empires and the Ottoman Empire, while Shiites were traditionally regarded as "outsiders." Worldwide, 90% of Muslims are Sunni, but Shiites constitute the majority in Iran, Iraq, and Bahrain, and the largest Muslim group in Lebanon is also Shiite. In this highly unstable and oil-rich region, the emergence of a "Shiite Crescent" has triggered concern from the West and Sunnis and increased Iran's geopolitical weight.
Frederic Hof, a retired military officer and Middle East specialist, told me: "The Saudis still view the world through the eyes of the Ottoman era, which is to say, Sunni Muslims reign supreme while Shiite Muslims are at the bottom." If Bandar can facilitate a tilt in U.S. policy toward the Sunnis, Hof added, it would greatly enhance his status within the royal family.
The Saudis fear that Iran will not only break the regional balance in the Middle East but also the internal balance within the Saudi state. In Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province—the country’s primary oil-producing region—there is a large concentration of Shiites; sectarian tension in this area is high. The Saudi royal family believes that Iran, along with local Shiites, is the mastermind behind multiple terrorist attacks within the kingdom. Vali Nasr believes that "the only military force capable of containing Iran today"—the Iraqi army—"was destroyed by the United States. Currently, Iran has nuclear strike capabilities and a standing army of 450,000." (By contrast, Saudi Arabia has only 75,000).
Nasr continued: "The Saudis have considerable financial means and close ties with the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists" [6]—Sunni extremists who view Shiites as apostates. "To counter Iran, the Saudis are not above mobilizing the worst forces among Muslim radicals. However, once you let them out of the box, it is impossible to put them back in."
The Saudi royal family is a patron of Sunni extremists but is also their target—they oppose the corruption and hereditary system of the royal family. The Prince is betting that as long as they continue to support religious schools and charities linked to extremists, the government will not be overthrown. The U.S. government’s new policy depends heavily on the outcome of this gamble.
Nasr compared the current situation to when Al-Qaeda first emerged. In the 1980s and early 1990s, the Saudi government secretly funded the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency to oppose the Soviet war in Afghanistan. Hundreds of young Saudi men were sent to the Pakistani border regions, where they opened religious schools, training bases, and recruited personnel. Naturally, some of them were Osama bin Laden and his associates, who founded Al-Qaeda in 1988.
At this time, a U.S. government consultant told me, Bandar and other Saudis have assured the White House that "they will keep a close eye on the religious fundamentalists. The message they convey to us is, 'They started this movement, and we can control it.' It’s not that we don’t want the Salafists to throw bombs; it’s who they throw them at—we hope it’s Hezbollah, Sadr’s Mahdi Army, Iran, and Syria—if they continue to cooperate with Lebanese Hezbollah and Iran."
The Saudis say that from the perspective of the Saudi people, following the U.S. in challenging Iran is a political risk: in the eyes of the Arab world, Bandar has already become too close to the Bush administration. "We have two major nightmares," the former diplomat told me, "Iran possessing a nuclear bomb and the U.S. attacking Iran. I would rather the Israelis bomb the Iranians; that way we could blame them. But if the Americans do it, the blame will fall on us."
In 2006, the Saudis, the Israelis, and the Bush administration reached a series of informal understandings on a new strategic direction. A U.S. government consultant told me at least four main factors are at play. First, to ensure Israeli security, Washington, the Saudis, and other Sunni nations must jointly target Iran.
Second, Saudi Arabia will urge Hamas (the Iranian-backed Palestinian Islamic party) to curtail actions against Israeli incursions and begin a series of power-sharing dialogues with Fatah (the more secular Palestinian organization). (In February, the Saudis acted as intermediaries for negotiations between the two factions. However, Israel and the U.S. were dissatisfied with the terms reached).
Third, the Bush administration's direct cooperation with Sunni states offsets the Shiite advantage in the region.
Fourth, the Saudi government, with Washington’s approval, will provide funding and logistical assistance to the opposition to weaken the government of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. The Israelis believe that exerting pressure on the Assad government in this way will make it more moderate and willing to accept negotiations. Syria is a vital corridor for shipping weapons to Hezbollah. The Saudi government and the Syrians are at odds over the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri in Beirut; the Saudi government holds the Syrians responsible. Hariri was a Sunni billionaire close to the Saudi regime and Prince Bandar (a UN investigation suggested Syrian involvement in the assassination but provided no direct evidence; there is currently another investigation planned by an international tribunal).
Patrick Clawson of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy described the Saudi cooperation with the White House as a major breakthrough. "The Saudis understand that if they want the U.S. government to provide more generous political aid to the Palestinians, then they must persuade Arab states to provide more generous aid to the Israelis," Clawson told me. "Who is taking the bigger risk—us or the Saudis? The U.S. position in the Middle East was once very low, and the Saudis took us in. We have to repay that."
A Pentagon consultant, however, holds a different view. He believes that the administration’s turn toward Bandar is a "step backward" because the administration has realized that the failure of the Iraq war has left the Middle East up for grabs.
Lebanese Jihadists
After Iran, the focus of the U.S.-Saudi relationship is Lebanon. Saudi Arabia is deeply involved in the U.S. government's plan to support the Lebanese government. Lebanese Prime Minister Fouad Siniora is struggling to protect his power against the sustained resistance forces led by Hezbollah. Hezbollah is a Shiite organization led by Hassan Nasrallah. Hezbollah is estimated to have 2,000 to 3,000 active combatants and thousands of peripheral personnel.
In 1997, Hezbollah was placed on the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organizations. The group was implicated in the 1983 Beirut Marine barracks bombing, in which 241 service members died. The organization is also accused of kidnapping Americans, including the imprisonment and death of the CIA's Lebanon station chief, and the killing of a Navy captain on a UN mission. Nasrallah denies his organization was involved in these events. In the eyes of some, Nasrallah is a die-hard terrorist who has even stated that Israel has no right to exist as a state. In the Arab world, especially in the eyes of Shiites, Nasrallah is seen as a leader of the resistance who withstood the 33-day war launched by Israel last summer, while Siniora is seen as a weak political leader who can only rely on U.S. support yet is unable even to persuade Bush to demand that Israel end its bombing of Lebanon.
By the summer of 2006, Bush had already publicly committed $1 billion in aid to the Siniora government. In January, a donor conference in Paris organized by the United States raised $8 billion in pledges, of which more than $1 billion came from Saudi Arabia. The U.S. also promised the Siniora government over $200 million in military aid and $40 million in internal security assistance.
According to former senior intelligence officials and U.S. government consultants, the United States also provided covert support to the Siniora government. The former senior intelligence official said: "We have a program to enhance Sunni strength as a counterweight to Shiite influence, and in this plan, we are throwing as much money at it as we can." The problem is that such money "always ends up costing more than you think." He said, "In the process, we always end up funding bad guys with potential unintended consequences. We don’t have the ability to get receipts from the people we like and keep it away from the people we don’t like. It's a high-risk venture."
U.S., European, and Arab officials I spoke with told me that the Siniora government and its allies had agreed to help keep under control the growing Sunni radical groups emerging around Palestinian refugee camps in northern Lebanon, the Bekaa Valley, and the south. These groups, though small, could be seen as a buffer against Hezbollah; at the same time, they have ideological links to Al-Qaeda.
In the course of my conversations, a former Saudi diplomat condemned Hezbollah for trying to "hijack the state," but he also opposed the sponsorship of Sunni jihadist organizations in Lebanon by Lebanon and Saudi Arabia. "The Salafists are loathsome and obnoxious, and I am very much against the practice of flirting with them," he said. "They hate the Shiites, but they hate Americans even more. If you try to subdue them, they will try to control us. The result will be very ugly."
Alastair Crooke, who served in Britain's MI6 for nearly 30 years and now works for Conflicts Forum (a Beirut-based think tank), told me, "It is extremely dangerous for the Lebanese government to open the door and let these people in." Crooke said that a Sunni extremist group—Fatah al-Islam—split off from its pro-Syrian parent organization, Fatah al-Intifada, in the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp in northern Lebanon. Its membership was less than 200. Crooke said, "I was told that within 24 hours of their split, some people representing Lebanese government interests immediately provided them with weapons and money—primarily to be used against Hezbollah."
The largest organization, Asbat al-Ansar, is located in the Ein el-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp. Asbat al-Ansar receives weapons and supplies from Lebanese national security forces and militias closely associated with the Siniora government.
In 2005, according to a report by the International Crisis Group, Saad Hariri—the leader of the Sunni majority in the Lebanese parliament (and son of the assassinated former Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, who inherited a fortune of over $4 billion after his father's assassination)—paid $48,000 in bail for four Islamic extremists from Dinniyeh [7]. These individuals had been arrested for attempting to establish a small Islamic caliphate in northern Lebanon. The International Crisis Group noted that many of the militants had previously trained in Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan.
According to the report, Saad Hariri used his parliamentary majority to grant amnesty to 22 Dinniyeh Islamists and seven terrorists suspected of planting bombs at the Ukrainian and Italian embassies in Beirut several years prior. (He also pardoned Samir Geagea—a Maronite Christian militia leader convicted for four murders, including the 1987 assassination of Prime Minister Rashid Karami). Hariri told the press his actions were humanitarian.
In an interview in Beirut, a senior official of the Siniora government admitted there are Sunni jihadists active within Lebanon. "We maintain a tolerant attitude toward the presence of Al-Qaeda here," he said. He simultaneously expressed concern that Iran and Syria might turn Lebanon into a "center of conflict."
The official believed his government had no chance of victory unless there was a political settlement with Hezbollah. He argued that Lebanon would "slide into conflict," with Hezbollah in open struggle with Sunnis, leading to potentially horrific results. But if Hezbollah agrees to a political settlement yet retains its independent military and its alliance with Iran and Syria, "then Lebanon will become a target. In short, in both scenarios, Lebanon becomes a target."
The Bush administration portrays its support for the Siniora government as the President’s faith in democracy and his hope to prevent other powers from interfering in Lebanon. When Hezbollah led street demonstrations in Beirut last December, John Bolton—then U.S. Ambassador to the UN—called it "part of an Iranian-Syrian inspired coup."
Leslie H. Gelb, former president of the Council on Foreign Relations, argued that "administration policy is less about democracy than it is about U.S. national security. The fact is, it would be very dangerous if Hezbollah controlled Lebanon." The fall of the Siniora government would be seen as "a signal of American decline in the Middle East and the rise of the terrorist threat. Therefore, any move to weaken and disperse Lebanese political power will be met with U.S. opposition—we will help non-Shiite parties resist such moves. We should say so openly, instead of the original talk about democracy."
Martin Indyk of the Saban Center said: "The United States does not have enough power to stop Lebanese moderates from dealing with extremists." He added: "The President draws a clear line in the region between moderates and extremists, but our regional partners see this opposition as Sunni versus Shiite. Our Sunni allies view those we see as Sunni extremists simply as 'Sunnis'."
In January, after violent street clashes broke out in Beirut between supporters of the Siniora government and Hezbollah, Prince Bandar flew to Tehran to discuss the Lebanese political deadlock and met with Larijani, Iran’s nuclear negotiator. According to a Middle East ambassador, Bandar’s trip had White House backing—the goal was to "create problems between Iran and Syria." Due to peace talks between Syria and Israel, tensions had appeared between Syria and Iran, and the Saudis' aim was to exacerbate this rift. However, the ambassador said: "It didn't work. Syria and Iran do not want to betray each other. Bandar's method is difficult to succeed with."
Walid Jumblatt, leader of the Druze minority in Lebanon and a staunch supporter of Siniora, attacked Nasrallah as a Syrian proxy and repeatedly told foreign journalists that Hezbollah is under the direct control of Iran’s religious leaders. In a meeting with me last December, he described Syrian President Bashar al-Assad as a "butcher." He said Nasrallah was the perpetrator of Hariri’s assassination and the murder of Pierre Gemayel (a member of Siniora's cabinet) last November.
Jumblatt later told me that he had met with Vice President Cheney in Washington last spring to discuss, among other things, the possibility of removing Assad. He and his colleagues suggested to Cheney that if the U.S. were to confront Syria, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood could be viewed as a "force to be recruited," Jumblatt said.
The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood—an offshoot of the radical Sunni movement founded in Egypt in 1928—has engaged in a struggle against the regime of Hafez al-Assad (Bashar’s father) for decades. In 1982, the Brotherhood took control of the city of Hama; Assad bombed the city for a week, killing between 6,000 and 20,000 people. Joining the Brotherhood is punishable by death in Syria. The Brotherhood is also an avowed enemy of the United States and Israel. However, Jumblatt said: "We told Cheney that the essential link between Iran and Lebanon is Syria—if you want to weaken Iran, you must open the door for the Syrian opposition."
Evidence suggests that the administration’s "redirection" strategy has already benefited the Brotherhood. The National Salvation Front is a Syrian opposition coalition whose main members are a faction led by former Syrian Vice President Abdul Halim Khaddam (who defected in 2005) and the Brotherhood. A former senior CIA official told me, "The United States provided political and financial support to the organization. The Saudis provided the main financial support, and the Americans provided a portion."
He said Khaddam now lives in Paris and, with White House approval, receives money from the Saudis (according to news reports, National Security Council officials met with a delegation of Front members in 2005). A former White House official told me that the Saudis provided travel documents for members of the Front.
Jumblatt said he understood this was a sensitive issue for the White House. "I told Cheney that in the Arab world, it is mainly the Egyptians"—whose moderate Sunni leaders have fought the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood for decades—"who would be unhappy if the U.S. helped the Brotherhood. But if we don't support the Syrian Brotherhood, we won't win the long-term standoff with Hezbollah in Lebanon."
The Sheikh
On a warm, clear evening last December, a few kilometers outside the bombed-out suburbs of Beirut, I learned the outline of how the government intended to implement the new strategy in Lebanon. Hassan Nasrallah—the Hezbollah leader who was in hiding—agreed to an interview. The security for the meeting was secret and complex. I sat in the back of a darkened car, was taken to a damaged underground garage somewhere in Beirut, was scanned by a handheld sensor before moving to a second car, arrived at another bomb-damaged underground garage, and then transferred again. Last summer, there were reports that the Israelis wanted to kill Nasrallah, but his extreme caution was not just due to that threat. Nasrallah's aides told me they believed he was a primary target of "fellow Arabs." These "fellow Arabs" consisted primarily of Jordanian intelligence agents and Islamic jihadists with ties to Al-Qaeda (a retired four-star general and government consultant told me that Jordanian intelligence, with U.S. and Israeli support, was trying to infiltrate Shiite organizations to turn them against Hezbollah. King Abdullah II of Jordan had warned that a Shiite-run Iraqi government closely linked to Iran would lead to the emergence of a "Shiite Crescent"). This is an ironic reversal: Nasrallah’s struggle with the Israelis last summer made him—a Shiite—the most popular and influential figure among both Sunnis and Shiites in the Middle East. In recent months, however, he has been increasingly seen by some Sunnis not as a symbol of Arab unity, but as a representative in a sectarian war.
Wearing religious robes, Nasrallah was waiting for me in an unremarkable apartment. His advisors reminded him he could not stay the night; he had been constantly on the move, changing hiding places since last July, when Hezbollah’s cross-border raid and kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers sparked the 33-day war. Nasrallah has stated publicly—and repeated to me—that he miscalculated the Israeli reaction. "We just wanted to capture two people for a prisoner exchange," he told me. "We never intended to drag the region into war."
Nasrallah accused the Bush administration and Israel of deliberately inciting fitna [8], an Arabic term referring to "the deliberate incitement of division and rebellion within Islam." He said, "In my view, there is a massive effort, utilizing the world's media, to confront and strike at opponents. I believe U.S. and Israeli intelligence agencies are behind this incitement" (though he provided no evidence). He said the U.S. war in Iraq had exacerbated sectarian tensions, but Hezbollah would try its best to prevent this sectarian strife from spreading to Lebanon (weeks after our conversation, violent Sunni-Shiite clashes intensified).
Nasrallah said he believes President Bush’s objective is “to draw a new map for the region. They want the partition of Iraq. Iraq is not on the brink of civil war; it is already in a civil war. Ethnic and sectarian cleansing is underway. The daily killings and displacements occurring in Iraq will carve the country into three parts; this religious and ethnic purification is the prelude to partition. In one or two years at most, Iraq will be divided into a Sunni region, a Shiite region, and a Kurdish region. There is even a fear that Baghdad will be split into two regions, one Sunni and one Shiite.”
He continued, “President Bush says he does not want the partition of Iraq, but he is lying. With all the facts laid out before me, I can swear that he is partitioning Iraq. When the day truly comes that Iraq’s dismemberment is complete, he will say, ‘I was powerless, because the Iraqis wanted to re-divide their country, and I am merely respecting the will of the Iraqi people.’”
Nasrallah said he believes the United States also intends to dismember Lebanon and Syria. Syria would be pushed toward “turmoil and civil war, just like Iraq.” Lebanon “will be carved into a Sunni state, an Alawite state, a Christian state, and a Druze state.” However, he said, “I do not know if a Shiite state will emerge.” Nasrallah told me he suspects the purpose of Israel's bombing of Lebanon last summer was to “blow up the Shiite regions and drive the Shiites out of Lebanon. The ultimate goal is to expel the Shiites of Lebanon and Syria to southern Iraq,” which is Shiite-dominated. “I cannot be certain, but I feel it,” he told me.
He said that after the aforementioned process of dismemberment is complete, Israel will be surrounded by “small and quiet states.” “I assure you, the Saudi Kingdom will also be partitioned, and this ‘carving’ will extend to the nations of North Africa. At that time, a large number of small ethnic and religious states will appear. In other words, Israel will become the most important and powerful state in the region, while all other countries are dismembered into small ethnic and religious states. This is the New Middle East.”
In fact, the Bush administration refuses to publicly discuss plans for partitioning Iraq; its public stance is to position a future Lebanon as an intact nation where Hezbollah’s domestic power is diminished and disarmed, or at least plays only a small political role. Currently, there is no evidence to support Nasrallah’s view that the Israeli objective is to expel the Shiites to southern Iraq. However, Nasrallah’s vision—the emergence of greater sectarian conflict involving the United States—also portends the potential consequences of the White House’s new strategy.
During the interview, Nasrallah made peaceful gestures and promises that would be met with skepticism by his opponents. “If the U.S. government believes that talking to an organization like ours is useful and will influence American Middle East policy, we do not oppose dialogue or peace talks,” he said. “But if their purpose in convening peace talks is to impose their policies on us, then it is just a waste of time.” He pledged that unless attacked, Hezbollah’s militants would operate only along the Lebanese border, and promised to disarm when the Lebanese army was truly capable of protecting its own country. Nasrallah said that launching another war with Israel would be of no benefit to him. However, he added that he was preparing an attack against Israel for later this year.
Nasrallah stated resolutely that the street protests in Beirut would continue until the Siniora government fell or the demands of Hezbollah and its political allies were met. “Frankly speaking, this government cannot rule the country,” he told me. “It can still issue orders, but the majority of the Lebanese people will not obey the government's laws or recognize its legitimacy. Siniora remains in power because of international support, but that does not mean Siniora can continue to rule Lebanon.” Nasrallah said President Bush's repeated praise for the Siniora government “actually benefits the Lebanese opposition. Because in the eyes of the Lebanese people and the peoples of the Arab and Islamic worlds, being too close to the United States weakens the Siniora government’s position. They think we are tired, but we did not grow weary during the war; would we grow weary because of street protests?”
Regarding how most effectively to deal with Nasrallah, and whether Nasrallah could become a political partner for the United States, there are deep divisions both within and outside the Bush administration. The outgoing Director of National Intelligence, John Negroponte, said in his farewell remarks to the Senate Intelligence Committee that Hezbollah is “at the center of Iran’s strategy of terrorism... Hezbollah sees itself as a partner of Tehran and would launch attacks against the United States for its own survival or when Iran is threatened.”
In 2002, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage called Hezbollah the “A-team” of terrorists. In a recent interview, Armitage acknowledged that the issue has become increasingly complex. Armitage told me that Nasrallah has “become an increasingly unavoidable political force due to his role in Lebanese politics.” Armitage said that his flexible handling of public relations and use of political maneuvering made Nasrallah “the smartest man in the Middle East.” But, he added, “As a staunch opponent, Nasrallah must understand when to stop. In my view, he still has a blood debt to pay”—the murder of colonels and the bombing of barracks.
Robert Baer, a former CIA case officer stationed in Lebanon, has long been a critic of Hezbollah and has warned of its close ties to Iranian-sponsored terrorism. But today, he told me, “We have learned that the Sunni Arabs are preparing to create a catastrophic conflict, and someone is needed to protect the Christians in Lebanon. In the past, it was the Americans and the French who protected them; today, it is Nasrallah and the Shiites.”
“Nasrallah’s evolution from a street thug to a leader, and from a terrorist to a politician, is the most compelling story in the Middle East.” What Baer fears about Nasrallah, beyond firing rockets at Israel and kidnapping soldiers, is the possibility of him launching worldwide terrorist attacks against Israel and the United States.
The vast majority of diplomats and intelligence personnel acknowledge that Hezbollah and Iran are in close contact. However, there is disagreement over the extent to which Nasrallah would set aside Hezbollah's interests to satisfy those of Iran. A former CIA official who worked in Lebanon for a long time described Nasrallah as “a Lebanese phenomenon,” adding that while Nasrallah indeed receives support from Iran and Syria, Hezbollah is merely using them. He told me that in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the CIA station in Beirut had secretly monitored Nasrallah’s conversations. He described Nasrallah as “a gang leader capable of making deals with other gangs. He can deal with anyone.”
Telling Congress
The Bush administration's clandestine operations have not been reported to Congress, and its deals with intermediaries that do not align with the formal agenda have been disclosed. Twenty years ago, the Reagan administration illegally funded the Nicaraguan opposition and secretly sold weapons to the Iranian opposition. Saudi funds were involved in the notorious Iran-Contra scandal, and the backstage supporters of that era—the famous Prince Bandar and Elliott Abrams—are both involved in today’s dealings.
Lessons from the Iran-Contra scandal were drawn during discussions on the veteran scandals two years ago. Abrams led these discussions. The content of the discussions was eventually exposed—the conclusion reached at the time was to act without informing Congress. Participants summarized that future clandestine operations needed to apply the following lessons: “First, you cannot trust your friends; second, it [the operation] must have nothing to do with the CIA; third, do not trust the guys in uniform; fourth, it must have nothing to do with Vice President Cheney's office”—regarding the role Cheney played, a former senior intelligence official said.
Two former government consultants and senior intelligence officials told me that the negative impact of the Iran-Contra scandal was an important factor in Negroponte’s departure from the National Intelligence Agency to accept the post of Deputy Secretary of State (Negroponte declined to comment on this).
The Pentagon consultant added that, from a covert perspective, one of the difficulties is explaining the secret funding. He said, “A large amount of black money is scattered in many places, funding the execution of many secret missions.” According to information provided by a former senior intelligence official and a retired four-star general, Iraq’s finances are in total chaos, with billions of dollars unaccounted for.
“This goes back to Iran-Contra,” a former National Security Council official told me: “What they are doing is dissociating themselves from the operations.” Congress has not been informed of the full details of the U.S.-Saudi operations.
Congress is increasingly concerned with the issue of oversight. Last November, a congressional research agency released a report arguing that the administration is blurring the lines between CIA activities and strictly military activities. The Senate Intelligence Committee, led by Senator Jay Rockefeller, has already planned a Department of Defense intelligence hearing for March 8.
Senator Ron Wyden of Oregon, a Democrat and member of the Intelligence Committee, told me: “The Bush administration often fails to fulfill its legal obligation to fully and timely inform the Intelligence Committee. Instead, it repeatedly says, ‘Trust us.’” Wyden said, “For me, it is very difficult to trust the government.”
Web Editor: Jia Fei