Huang Kui: The Scenery of China's Contemporary Religious Ecology • Christianity • Atheism
I. The Landscape of Contemporary China's Religious Ecosystem
Over the past thirty years in contemporary China, profound changes have occurred in social structure, forms of social organization, and the pattern of social interests. The independence, selectivity, variability, and diversity of the ideological activities of the Chinese populace have markedly increased. Echoing the international backdrop of surging interactions between various ideologies and cultures throughout the process of economic globalization, transitions in core values and ideology within Chinese society have made the landscape of pluralistic belief an increasingly undeniable fact in present-day China. Institutionalized traditional religions and diffuse folk beliefs [1] have remained vital and are seeking to expand their influence; meanwhile, emerging religions, suspicious cultic groups, and even heterodox sects [2] have been growing clandestinely, waiting for an opportunity to act. This pluralistic landscape of belief, or "religious ecosystem," as some researchers in political and academic circles have pointed out, is primarily characterized by "a continuous growth in the number of believers, a marked change in the demographic structure of practitioners, a religious landscape facing significant impacts, more prominent foreign influence, and increasingly complex religious contradictions."
Specifically, among the five major religions commonly cited in our country, the number of Muslims has basically grown steadily alongside the population, currently standing at approximately 21 million. Buddhism and Taoism have vast numbers of followers, but it is impossible to accurately count lay believers. The Catholic population is characterized by family inheritance; it numbered about 3 million in the early period after Liberation [3] and stands at about 5.5 million today. The number of Protestants was approximately 700,000 in the early post-Liberation period but has grown explosively in recent years, with official statistics reaching 16 million—a figure that does not yet include believers in "unregistered churches." Regarding the composition and distribution of religious believers, the past was characterized by the "five manys": the elderly, women, those with low education levels, rural residents, and people in old revolutionary base areas, ethnic minority areas, and border/impoverished regions. In recent years, a trend of diffusion and penetration toward the whole of society has emerged, particularly among young and middle-aged groups, urban residents, the "new social strata" [4], and economically developed regions.
The religious ecosystem has become variegated and multifaceted due to social change and international exchange. To speak of its primary features: Buddhism in certain regions has become extremely wealthy and is second to none in terms of charitable donations during natural disasters and man-made calamities, which is a commendable spirit; however, it is more often a case of "religion providing the stage for the economy to perform the play." In some locales, certain forces from the religious, political, business, and academic sectors enter into collusive interests for mutual gain. The stench of money mingles with Buddha statues, and superstition breathes in unison with corruption. Tibetan Buddhism is occasionally exploited by "Tibetan Independence" forces; some monasteries have become the source of "Tibetan Independence" riots (such as the March 14 incident in Lhasa in 2008), and the Dalai Lama still wields significant influence over Tibetan areas. Islam possesses clear ethnic attributes and relatively stable regional characteristics; in recent years, it has spread to the southeastern coast (such as Yiwu, Zhejiang) via Northwest Muslims engaged in trade. Domestic and foreign religious extremist organizations, using Islam as a cover, are "recruiting soldiers and buying horses" in Xinjiang to build up strength, frequently manufacturing or plotting to instigate "Xinjiang Independence" incidents (such as the July 5 incident in Urumqi in 2009). Overseas Christian extremist forces utilize religious exchange, the dispatching of missionaries, business, investment, education, tourism, culture, sports, charity, and online proselytizing to "clear the wilderness and preach the path" of the Gospel. Their goal is "China for Christ" and for the "Lamb of Christ" to conquer the "Chinese Dragon." Domestic Christian "house churches" rely on foreign support to aggrandize themselves, resisting the Chinese "Three-Self" (self-governance, self-support, and self-propagation) tradition. Traditional religions like Eastern Orthodoxy and Judaism, as well as emerging religions like the Baháʼí Faith and Mormonism, have begun to develop followers among the Chinese populace. Cult organizations such as Falun Gong are "dead but not stiff" [5], still struggling under the protection of hostile foreign forces. Some folk beliefs are conducive to United Front [6] work across the Taiwan Strait (such as Mazu worship) or for networking with overseas compatriots (such as Lord Guan worship); some can be upgraded to "intangible cultural heritage" and thus receive support from relevant authorities. Overall, however, they can be viewed as the deep social soil for the "religious fever" of recent years.
II. The International Background of the Unconventional Expansion of Christianity in China
All signs indicate that the "religious fever" appearing domestically in recent years, especially the phenomenon of the unconventional expansion of Christianity in China, has a profound international background. The end of the Cold War, the low ebb of the international communist movement, and the end of the US-Soviet bipolar structure have caused ethnic and religious contradictions, which were not prominent in the past, to become increasingly salient. To maximize their own interests, certain Western powers utilize religious and human rights issues as a major strategy in their plots to "Westernize" and "split" China. They link so-called "international religious freedom" with human rights, using the "new interventionism"—where "human rights are superior to sovereignty"—as a weapon to crudely interfere in China's internal religious affairs. They openly support some domestic and exiled dissidents draped in the cloak of Christianity, attempting to brand the Chinese government and the Three-Self churches with the infamy of "persecutors of religion." By manufacturing religion-related chaos within China, they aim to contain China's rise, posing a serious threat to China's national security and national interests.
We believe that the analytical framework for church-state relations generated in the Western context is not entirely suitable for China. If we do not confidently emphasize "Chinese characteristics" on religious issues, then whether we discuss the "separation of church and state" or "harmony between church and state," we cannot escape the discursive traps and cognitive ruses of certain Western countries regarding church-state relations. In the 170 years since the outbreak of the Opium War in 1840, the Chinese nation has basically solved the problems of "being beaten" and "starving"; now it still faces the problem of "being scolded." No matter what China's governors do regarding religious human rights, it is difficult to meet the standards of certain countries. Only by breaking the Western discourse hegemony can we escape this predicament. The Three-Self system, the Three-Self banner, and the Three-Self model with Chinese characteristics are the concrete manifestations of China’s national sovereignty in the religious field and a continuation of the tradition of Chinese Christian patriotism; they must be upheld and consolidated.
III. Atheism in the Contemporary Chinese Context
We find that the phenomenon of "believing in the Lord" or "Christian fever" in contemporary rural China is mostly a mixture of utilitarian choice and herd behavior under conditions of poverty, illness, or lack of livelihood. Jesus Christ or God is regarded as a "Savior," becoming a substitute for "The Great Savior of the People" Chairman Mao or the "Bodhisattva of Compassion" Guanyin; he is even metaphorically called the "Ji-Bodhisattva" [7]. Conversely, the conversion of some urban intellectuals to Christianity is often to express dissatisfaction with certain realistic problems. For some dissidents, the identity of a Christian is both a fashionable mask of a pseudo-"world citizen" and serves a clear protective role in the current context of Sino-Western relations. Thus, transforming into a member of a "house church" becomes a cheap and effective survival strategy. These two types of religious belief have their own very realistic economic or political reasons. The question now is: Why do they turn to or invoke a God that essentially does not exist? The investigation yields no simple answer, but a certain deficiency or drain in the mainstream ideology and a lack of sufficient charismatic appeal may be among the important reasons.
Contemporary Chinese society is undergoing profound changes. During a period of comprehensive structural reform, religious theism is indeed an excusable and irreproachable option for those who lose out in competition or for vulnerable groups outside the system. However, we believe that scientific atheism is a more meaningful and valuable option—because atheism is a system of thought closely related to scientific rationality and is one of the important intellectual achievements of human civilization’s progress. Some people believe that as long as it helps alleviate social contradictions or create economic benefits, both theism and atheism are acceptable and can be utilized; they even view religion as a form of "social capital" for maintaining the status quo. This pragmatic rhetoric and practice is not only short-sighted but is akin to "drinking poison to quench thirst" [8], which is concerning. Truly acting responsibly toward the masses, toward the country and the nation, and toward history means creating conditions so that the public has sufficient opportunities to encounter atheism and scientific rationality.
We believe that conducting scientific atheism education for adolescents, allowing a correct worldview to permeate the childhood and teenage memories of every educated person, is equivalent to injecting a low-cost ideological "vaccine" as early as possible. For the entire body of Party members and even the whole of society, conducting "mending the fold after the sheep are lost" [9] style scientific atheism education to establish an ideological "firewall" will help people return to common sense and rationality. This undoubtedly plays an irreplaceable role in "addressing the root cause" by dispelling religious delusions, suppressing religious fanaticism, and reducing the future costs of maintaining order.
In the contemporary Chinese context, the "invisible hand" under market economy conditions and the omnipresent contingencies of natural and man-made disasters will push many into the embrace of religious theism. The future fate of atheism is fundamentally related to the economic and social policies and corresponding institutional arrangements (such as the universal social security system) of the governing party. We are still very far from realizing the social ideal proposed by Marx and Engels in the Communist Manifesto—the abolition of private property and a complete rupture with traditional property relations and traditional ideas. The political puzzle of "Socialism and Religion" proposed by Lenin is far from being completely solved, and the task of "critiquing theology" proposed by Mao Zedong is also far from completed. Regardless, scientific atheism should occupy its deserved place within a continuously improving mainstream ideology, because "there has never been any Savior, nor do we rely on gods or emperors; to create human happiness, we must rely entirely on ourselves" [10].