Hao Wenli: Refuting McClellan and Rosen's "Plagiarism Theory"
For a long time, represented by domestic scholars such as Niu Sulin, Jia Runguo, and Lü Daji, the "Introduction" to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right (hereafter referred to as the Introduction) has been generally regarded by the Chinese academic community as the founding work of the Marxist view of religion. As a sister piece to the Introduction, Marx's On the Jewish Question (hereafter referred to as the Question) features a concentrated critique of Bruno Bauer's view of religion, a point also noted in articles by domestic scholars such as Long Qun, Zhang Shuanli, Li Shumei, and Yang Ying. Deeply interpreting the originality of Marx's religious thought in the Introduction and the Question holds important theoretical and practical significance for our profound understanding of the Marxist view of religion.
In contrast, within Western academia, the British scholar David McLellan has, in his works, excessively disparaged the status of Marx’s critique of religion. Basing his argument on the text of the Introduction, he claims that Marx borrowed Bauer’s original words on multiple occasions, and further suggests that Bauer remained an important exemplar for Marx in the field of religious critique at that time. The Polish scholar Zvi Rosen also maintains that Marx’s discourses on religion were mostly plagiarized from Bauer. This article attempts to refute these challenges in order to defend the independent status of Marx's early religious views. Generally speaking, Marx’s view of religion during this period was a more precise expression based on a correction of Bauer, embodying his transcendence of Bauer’s religious perspective.
I. The Connotations of Bauer’s View of Religion
When discussing the religious thought of Bruno Bauer (1809–1882), David Friedrich Strauss (1808–1874) is an unavoidable figure. Bauer’s religious views developed through polemics with Strauss; their opposition can be viewed as an antagonism between the perspective of "self-consciousness" and the perspective of "substance." Bauer’s critique of religion includes four layers of meaning:
First, regarding the attitude toward Gospel narratives, Strauss believed that Gospel stories were actually the unconscious expression of collective religious feelings within a religious community, rather than the product of active creation by individual consciousness; he called this the principle of "substance." Bauer, however, argued that Gospel stories were artificial and conscious fabrications arising from "self-consciousness," which distinguished his view from Strauss’s "collective unconscious."
Second, regarding the driving force of historical development, Bauer attributed it to the drive of "self-consciousness." He believed that history is advanced through the pure critical activity of "self-consciousness," which falls into the trap of historical idealism. Conversely, Strauss believed the driving force of historical development was "substance." The "self-consciousness" frequently mentioned by Bauer is actually a developmental stage of Hegel’s "Absolute Spirit." Regardless, neither Strauss nor Bauer truly managed to transcend the framework of Hegelian speculative idealism; instead, they each seized upon one part of Hegel’s philosophy to oppose another.
Third, regarding the status of the masses and eminent intellectuals, Bauer viewed the masses as an obstacle to historical development and eminent intellectuals as the driving force. He believed only intellectuals were capable of critical thinking and possessed "self-consciousness." Bauer attached great importance to the role of eminent intellectuals, believing the masses always revolved around them. He also endowed the Kingdom of Prussia with a glory that did not match reality, believing that Prussia, like the intellectuals, possessed "self-consciousness," which reflected the limitations of his bourgeois standpoint.
Bauer believed the masses invested their energy in supporting religion rather than focusing on progressive causes. The masses were unable to perceive the ills of religion and could only be deluded by it. He expressed dissatisfaction with this conservative practice and viewed the masses as the enemy of the spirit. He even attributed the failure of great historical undertakings to the arousal of the masses' enthusiasm, reflecting his extreme disparagement of the people. Following this logic, the proletariat—as the primary representative of the masses—was naturally untrustworthy.
Fourth, Bauer held an oppositional stance toward communism. He expressed strong dissatisfaction, particularly targeting communism’s emphasis on the power of the proletariat. He himself opposed class struggle and advocated treating imaginary ideas in the mind through critique, believing this could change reality. This claim is clearly absurd and reflects his position of upholding reactionary rule in Germany.
II. Marx’s Transcendence of Bauer’s View of Religion in the Introduction
The author believes that Marx’s creation of the Introduction was based on his own independent thinking and demonstrates a transcendence of Bauer’s view of religion, rather than being "plagiarism" as McLellan and Rosen suggest. Specifically, Marx’s transcendence of Bauer is reflected in three aspects: the transcendence of materialist thought, the transcendence of the idea of historical driving forces, and the transcendence of communist thought.
(1) Transcendence of Materialist Thought
Marx argued that religion, as an inverted world-perception, originates from an inverted real world; it is not, as Bauer suggested, a product of "self-consciousness." Marx moved from the critique of religion to the critique of actual society, which already shows signs of materialist thought. Marx clearly defined the relationship between religious critique and social critique, whereas Bauer’s definition of the relationship between the two was blurred. In the very first sentence of the Introduction, Marx clarified the status of religious critique, suggesting that enough attention had already been paid to this issue and that a shift in focus was now required—from religious critique to social critique. After all, excessive focus on religion is a manifestation of being led astray, only causing people to be obsessed with illusions. For Marx, the critique of religion was merely a means; his goal was to implement social critique. Thus, the priority of social critique was highlighted. This is different from Bauer, as in Bauer’s works, the relationship between religious and social critique is unclear; he even believed that religion sometimes possesses decisive significance.
Human essence was originally meant to be realized in actual society, but due to irrational state and social systems, this ideal cannot be achieved. To control the populace, backward countries utilize religion in an attempt to use it as spiritual solace. Influenced by Ludwig Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity, Marx solemnly explained the relationship between God and man, pointing out that it is man who creates God, and that God is the projection of human essence in a world beyond [1]. Religion plays a dual role: on the one hand, it reflects real suffering, and on the other, it embodies the protest and struggle of the believer. Opium is something that makes people addicted; a populace that has lost its self-consciousness cannot find a place for its suffering self in reality, so it uses self-constructed illusions—or religion—to achieve self-anesthesia, pinning its hopes on a world beyond to seek temporary satisfaction. When discussing the critique of religion, its essence is the critique of the backward state behind religion. Marx explicitly proposed the conduct of real-world critique, demanding the disclosure of how religion masques the wretched conditions of the sorrowful earthly world.
Marx has a sentence discussing the relationship between religion and self-consciousness that seems colored by Bauer’s influence, stating that where religion exists, self-consciousness is "nothing," whether it is a "nothing" that has not yet gained itself or a "nothing" that has lost itself again. However, the key to Marx’s expression lies in the part after the "but." He points out that since man exists in the real world, he will inevitably be influenced by the objective world; therefore, man's self-consciousness is necessarily rooted in the real world. In this sense, the real world is the fundamental source of illusory religion. This turn is precisely where Marx transcends Bauer. Marx focused on the levels of actual society and the political state, unlike Bauer, who stopped at the level of self-consciousness. The logic here is: an inverted real world suppresses human self-consciousness, forming inverted ideas—namely, religion.
There is another point in the Introduction where Marx transcends Bauer: the discourse on the transition from "illusory happiness" to "real happiness." The "chain" refers to the actual systems that make people feel oppressed and enslaved, while "illusory flowers" refers to religion. Marx’s demand for the critique of religion does not mean letting people simply coexist with the backward real system; rather, it means thoroughly critiquing the real system and "plucking the living flowers." The author believes "living flowers" specifically refers to the truth of this world that replaces religion, representing true happiness in the real world. It is not about pinning hopes on the illusions of a world beyond or religious faith—thereby submitting to the actual feudal autocratic system—but about facing the irrationality of the real society. Led by the proletariat, the people, on the basis of rational critique, seek real happiness in this world.
What does Marx mean by the "truth of this world"? In the Introduction, it refers to launching a critique of reality on the basis of shattering religious illusions, realizing that "man is the highest essence for man," and overthrowing all relations that enslave humans. It is precisely in the sense of this critique of reality that Marx’s Introduction already shows signs of materialist thought.
(2) Transcendence of Historical Driving Forces
Bauer believed that historical progress is driven by the critical activity of self-consciousness. Marx, from a realistic perspective, pointed out the need to critique—in practice—Germany’s backward real-world systems and the speculative philosophy of law and theory of the state that were synchronized with the times, thereby pushing history forward.
At that time, countries that had already undergone bourgeois revolutions were ahead of Germany in terms of political systems. Marx employed irony regarding Germany’s stagnant status quo to make the oppressed realize their slave-like condition, thus preparing them to rise in resistance. This resistance would be beneficial not only to Germany but also to other countries that had already established capitalist systems. Because Germany’s present was equivalent to other countries’ past, as long as feudal remnants existed in Germany, the bourgeois revolutions of other countries faced the risk of regression. Therefore, the German feudal autocratic system had to be resolutely abolished.
The only thing in Germany synchronized with the times was its speculative philosophy of law and theory of the state. Marx pointed out that while conducting an open critique of German institutions, one must also launch a critique of Germany’s philosophy of law and state. If critiquing German institutions is a struggle against the past of other capitalist countries, then critiquing German philosophy of law and state is a struggle against the present of those countries. Although Germany’s philosophy of law and state had not yet been realized in Germany, it had already become reality in other capitalist countries and would subsequently become the real system of Germany’s next stage. To critique German philosophy of law and state is, in fact, to critique those countries that have completed bourgeois revolutions; the systems and development of those countries are Germany’s future. Therefore, a thorough critique must be conducted to truly bring the critique to the height of the times.
Marx critiqued both the "theoretical party" and the "practical party," both of which were biased and failed to correctly recognize the relationship between philosophy and reality. The practical political party directly negated philosophy, failing to realize philosophy's important guiding role for the German revolution; after all, in German history, theory had played a major role, and the past Reformation was guided by theory. In Marx’s view, German philosophy should belong to the category of reality—even if it is reality within the mind. For Germany is a nation that values philosophy, often producing ideas in the mind to subsequently transform society. The theoretical political party also had limitations, failing to continue negating philosophy after affirming it, which also demonstrated a lack of critical spirit. Marx revealed the narrowness of the theoretical political party: they only aimed their critique at the practical political party while being overly indulgent toward themselves.
Marx emphasized the need to launch a critique—in practice—of Germany’s speculative philosophy of law and state, and this must be a critique at the "height of principle" to drive historical progress. To this end, the masses need to grasp a thorough theory. This returns to the critique of religion at the beginning of the Introduction: the so-called "thorough theory" ultimately boils down to the supreme anthropological guiding principle that "man is the highest essence for man." Specifically in practice, this means abolishing religion and overthrowing all relations that enslave humans, allowing human essence to return to man himself. Just as the Reformation once pushed the Pope off the altar and turned the devout belief in religion into an undertaking that people could complete within themselves, humanist philosophy will now liberate the people and allow them to break the spiritual shackles brought by religion.
(3) Transcendence of Communist Thought
The critique of German philosophy of law and state has profound significance. It is equivalent to Germany performing a "somersault" over the dual obstacles of the feudal and capitalist systems, continuing to complete human liberation after achieving political liberation. This raised the goal of the communist revolution.
The German revolution required a material basis. As early as his period working for the Rheinische Zeitung [2], Marx had observed the reactionary nature of the Prussian government and the hardship of the people living under this backward system. In October 1843, Marx had his first direct contact with workers in Paris, attempting to gain a deep understanding of their living conditions and participating in their revolutionary activities. The more deeply he connected with workers, the more he realized the impracticality of a "partial, purely political revolution." This was because the situation in Germany differed greatly from that in France, and because the proletariat had begun its struggle against the bourgeoisie almost simultaneously with the bourgeoisie’s opposition to feudalism. Regarding the goal of achieving human emancipation, the weak, egoistic, and narrow-minded bourgeoisie was incapable of shoulder this heavy responsibility or becoming a thoroughly revolutionary class.
The actual possibility of German liberation lay with the proletariat. This was not only because the proletariat emerged alongside the rise of industry, but also because the disintegration of the middle estates [3] produced an "artificially pauperized" population; the poor and the serfs also joined in, expanding the ranks of the existing proletariat. The unique position of the proletariat determined that their cause of liberating all humanity would be completed simultaneously with the goal of liberating themselves. Therefore, their perspective was, from the outset, superior to that of the narrow bourgeoisie.
Marx viewed the proletariat, positioned at the absolute bottom of society, as the subjective force for transforming society. He called upon the proletariat to arm their minds with anthropological thought [4], carry out social revolution, and achieve human emancipation. His communist thought is reflected here.
III. Marx’s Transcendence of Bauer’s View of Religion in the Question
On the Jewish Question and the Introduction are both works from the period of the Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher (German-French Annals). While writing the Question, Marx directly expressed his dissatisfaction with Bauer. Since these are sister pieces created at the same time, it implies they are mutually complementary and closely linked. It is clearly untenable to suggest that Marx would vigorously refute Bauer in one piece while plagiarizing him in the other. Specifically, in On the Jewish Question, Marx corrected Bauer across three progressive dimensions.
(i) Political emancipation can be achieved without renouncing Judaism Bauer believed that before political emancipation was achieved in Germany, Jews should not selfishly seek a special emancipation for themselves. In his view, the antagonism between Jews and the Christian state lay in the religious opposition between Judaism and Christianity. Bauer hoped to achieve emancipation through the mutual renunciation of religion by both Jews and Christians, believing that only then could a true, real state be established and political emancipation completed. In short, Bauer believed that only by abolishing religion could a real political state be founded.
Marx disagreed with this one-sided understanding, pointing out that Bauer confused political emancipation with human emancipation. Even in states where political emancipation had already been completed, religion still existed—it had merely shifted into civil society. The establishment of a political state does not take the abolition of religion as its prerequisite; the abolition of religion belongs to the category of human emancipation. Marx did not believe that political emancipation must be achieved through the renunciation of religion because, in his view, in a completed political state, the privilege of faith should be respected as a universal human right.
In sum, the core difference between Bauer and Marx lay in the sequence of abolishing religion and achieving political emancipation. Bauer believed religion must be rooted out to achieve political emancipation, while Marx believed political emancipation could be achieved without renouncing Judaism.
(ii) The Jewish question is closely linked to the question of human emancipation Bauer's goal was political emancipation, so he stopped at the critique of the so-called Christian state without shaking the foundations of the capitalist state or continuing to explore the issue of human liberation, reflecting his distinct bourgeois stance. Marx believed that only by continuing political critique on the basis of the completed political state could one truly reach the essence of the Jewish question and achieve human emancipation.
For Marx, political emancipation and human emancipation were two distinct concepts; the Jewish question belonged to the category of human emancipation. In a completed political state, the state is liberated from religion, yet the real person is not. Religion continues to exist in civil society as what Marx called a "secular deity." Marx emphasized that the essence of the Jewish question is the contradiction between a certain religious believer and their citizenship—the contradiction between the political state and civil society—which is also the question of human emancipation.
In a completed political state, Jews faced a contradiction between monetary power and political rights. Even if, conceptually, political rights stood above, in practice, economic strength outweighed political rights. Jews held large amounts of money economically but lacked power politically. What ruled secular society was the secular god of the Jews: money. Marx noted with irony that the Jewish nation is one that finds its pleasure in the acquisition of wealth.
Christianity caused the spiritual externalization of human essence; Judaism alienated this externalization in practice. Man shifted from being dominated by religion to being dominated by money. Only by eliminating this monetary control over humanity and destroying the profit-seeking "Jewish spirit" to effectively complete human emancipation would the Jews naturally be liberated. This was Marx’s method for solving the Jewish question.
(iii) The Jewish question is a secular problem rather than a theological one Bauer viewed the Jewish question as a purely theological problem. His belief that emancipation could be achieved by renouncing religion ran directly counter to Marx's view. In fact, in a completed political state, religion and private property still exist, and the members of civil society, as real people, are not "citizens" in the true sense. Because they do not enjoy true sovereignty and are merely immersed in religious imagination, their real individual lives are alienated.
In this environment, the person as a believer does not enjoy civil rights; Marx attributed this to the split between the political state and civil society. Bauer stopped at political emancipation, thus allowing this split to persist without realizing the need to continue the political critique. Marx realized that political life, which ought to be the "end" in practice, was placed behind civil society and became a "means," while the pursuit of profit in civil society became the "end." This phenomenon of political life being theoretically reduced to a means was significantly reflected in the French Declaration of the Rights of Man of 1791 and 1793.
In capitalist states where feudal rule had been overthrown, what existed was the egoistic man of civil society. In civil society, man remains subject to religion and has not escaped private property, as his profit-seeking activities still embody egoistic characteristics. The secular god of the Jews is money, and the basis of this secularity is the practical need of self-interest. Only by liberating oneself from this profit-seeking mindset can true human emancipation be achieved. Marx referred to this profit-seeking characteristic as the essence of "Judaism" (the Jewish spirit).
Marx believed that only by continuing the critique of the political state and liberating humanity from the profit-seeking "Jewish spirit" within civil society—ensuring that members of civil society enjoy true citizenship—could the Jewish question be truly resolved.
IV. Illegitimacy of McLellan and Rosen’s "Plagiarism Thesis"
A careful study of Marx’s texts reveals that the "plagiarism thesis" of McLellan and Rosen is untenable for the following reasons:
First, Marx had his own practical activities and writing pace. His view of religion was the result of the collision between his own practical experiences and independent thinking; it cannot be stigmatized as plagiarism.
Bauer and Marx once planned to co-author the second part of The Trumpet of the Last Judgment [5] (hereafter referred to as the Trumpet). Bauer had completed his own chapters for the second part of the Trumpet by late 1841 and had been waiting for Marx's contribution. However, before Marx could deliver the manuscript, the book was banned. According to an February 1842 letter to Ruge [6], Marx was busy during this period writing Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction and was bedridden with illness, lacking energy. It can be seen here that Marx had his own independent developmental trajectory and writing schedule; he was by no means following in Bauer’s footsteps.
Why did Marx prioritize writing the Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction? In fact, during this period, he had already begun to feel repelled by Bauer’s high-handed approach to "Self-Consciousness" [7]. He had new perplexities and wanted to think through the more urgent issues he wished to express—namely, his reflections on "material interests." In March 1842, Marx wrote to Ruge stating that the article On Christian Art, originally intended as the second part of the Trumpet, "ought to be completely rewritten," as it was too saturated with the tone of the first part of the Trumpet. He was willing to rethink the issue with his new perspective and break free from the limitations of the Hegelian narrative style. Thus, it is evident that had Marx managed to finish and publish On Christian Art, he would have inevitably expressed his divergence from Bauer. Regrettably, due to the turbulent political situation, we did not see the final manifestation of this divergence. As [the scholar] Labin commented, the absence of Marx’s chapters directly led to the failure of the second part of the Trumpet, as the work made no substantial progress beyond the first part.
Second, Marx’s break with "The Free" [8] during the Rheinische Zeitung period shows he had already drifted away from Bauer.
In late 1841, the small "The Free" circle was established in Berlin, composed of core members of the Doctors' Club [9], including both Marx and Bauer. In October 1842, Marx became the editor-in-chief of the Rheinische Zeitung and subsequently clashed with Bauer over their attitudes toward "The Free."
Marx criticized the concept of freedom held by "The Free." Centered on the "Self-Consciousness" philosophy of the Young Hegelians, the group aimed to achieve freedom through theoretical critique. "The Free" advocated the abolition of the state, which leaned toward anarchism politically. Of course, the "political struggle" as understood by "The Free" was primarily a critique of ideas and did not involve changing actual conditions. This so-called freedom could only remain a subjective freedom at the level of thought, failing to reach true freedom in reality. In contrast, Marx had already emphasized the realization of freedom in "determined existence" (Dasein) in his doctoral dissertation. By the Rheinische Zeitung period, he further proposed the realization of freedom of speech and the press in reality.
"The Free" frequently sent articles to the Rheinische Zeitung that were radical and empty. Marx opposed such articles and offered his own advice: "publish fewer vague generalities." However, such reminders were not taken seriously by "The Free," who instead accused Marx of being a conservative. Marx once hoped Bauer would intervene in the actions of "The Free," but Bauer expressed his approval of them. Consequently, as Marx broke with "The Free," he also drifted further away from Bauer.
The Introduction was written between mid-October and mid-December 1843. As shown above, the divergence between Marx and Bauer had appeared well before this time; in the Question, Marx directly began refuting Bauer’s view of religion. Therefore, when McLellan claims that Marx’s discourse on religion in the Introduction is a plagiarism of Bauer, he is actually erasing the independence of Marx’s thought, which is truly inappropriate.
Third, a direct rebuttal of the "plagiarism thesis."
Take the famous saying "religion is the opium of the people" as an example. McLellan believes Marx plagiarized Bauer, arguing that Bauer had said in The Merit of Freedom that religion "in its destructively mad, opium-addicted intoxication, talks grandly of a future life where all will be made new," and also spoke of the "opium-like influence" of theology on humans in The Christian State.
However, in reality, similar views had been proposed by others long before Bauer. D'Holbach, in Christianity Unveiled, proposed that religion is an art for drugging people; Maréchal, in the Dictionary of Ancient and Modern Atheists, said humanity was ruled by religion to numb them and explicitly mentioned "opium"; Hegel, in the Philosophy of Religion, said that Hinduism strives to create a phantasmagoric world through intoxication.
If Marx’s formulation were indeed a plagiarism of Bauer, then could we not also say that Bauer was plagiarizing Hegel, Holbach, and Maréchal? If we trace back in this manner, must we conclude that only the person who first uttered a similar statement is original, and everyone thereafter is merely plagiarizing? McLellan and Rosen did not continue this forward-looking trace; they clearly bestowed an unrealistic reputation upon Bauer, excessively elevating his status. In reality, Marx’s discourse on religion in the Introduction was based on his own independent reflection, the result of a selective analysis of his predecessors' arguments. His ideas were meticulously filtered; they were not, as McLellan and Rosen distortingly claim, a thoughtless plagiarism of Bauer. The "plagiarism thesis" errs by unilaterally exaggerating Bauer’s role and disparaging Marx’s independent thought.
V. Conclusion
In summary, domestic scholars generally believe that Marx criticized Bauer’s religious views to a certain extent in the Introduction and On the Jewish Question. However, there is a lack of deep and meticulous analysis regarding the exact nature of the relationship between Marx’s religious views and those of Bauer. This has led to an inability to provide a powerful rebuttal when faced with Western scholars like McLellan and Rosen, who stigmatize the Introduction by claiming it "plagiarized" Bauer's religious views. This article attempts to refute this challenge, thereby defending the original contribution of the Introduction to the Marxist view of religion. Through an in-depth reading of On the Jewish Question, it clarifies the true relationship between Marx and Bauer on religion, neither excessively exaggerating nor disparaging Bauer’s role in the formation of the Marxist view of religion. This clarification holds significant theoretical and practical importance for accurately understanding the Marxist view of religion and establishing a firm conviction in it.
Online Editor: Tongxin Source: Science and Atheism, Issue 6, 2022