Yan Shaohua: Historical Experience and Enlightenments of the CPC's Handling of Religious Issues in Southern Xinjiang in the 1950s
The southern region of Xinjiang (Southern Xinjiang) is an area where ethnic minorities live in concentrated communities. Historically, religion has exerted a profound influence on the politics, economy, law, culture, and social customs of the region. In the 1950s, particularly after the establishment of the socialist system, Southern Xinjiang faced the major historical task of guiding religion to adapt to socialist society. The Southern Xinjiang region conscientiously implemented the Party’s policy of freedom of religious belief, persisted in the separation of church and state, and united and educated personages from religious circles to establish an anti-feudal united front. This brought about a fundamental change in the local religious situation: individuals gained the freedom not to believe in religion, and whether or not to believe became a matter of personal choice. A significant group of non-believers emerged among the ethnic minorities, a phenomenon unprecedented in Southern Xinjiang's history. During this stage, the Party’s handling of religious issues in Southern Xinjiang was characterized by a cautious, steady, flexible, and progressive approach. It successfully achieved its objectives without causing major social fluctuations, and ensured that people of all ethnic groups in Southern Xinjiang truly enjoyed the freedom to believe or not believe in religion. This historical experience still provides important enlightenment for handling religious issues in Xinjiang under the new situation today.
I. Propaganda and Implementation of the Policy of Freedom of Religious Belief
Respecting and protecting the freedom of religious belief is one of the basic policies of the Communist Party of China toward religion. In the 1950s, the ethnic minority masses in Southern Xinjiang "generally believed in Islam, and religious concepts were deeply rooted." [1] To effectively carry out work among the masses, unite the broad populace, stabilize social order, promote social democratic reforms, and complete socialist transformation, the Southern Xinjiang region adhered to the principle of the separation of church and state. Adopting a cautious, steady, and flexible guideline, it propagated the policy of freedom of religious belief and guided religion to gradually adapt to the fledgling socialist society.
(1) Strategically Propagating the Party’s Policy of Freedom of Religious Belief
During the Republican period, in order to oppose the spread of Marxism-Leninism in Xinjiang and to counter the Soviet Union and the Three Districts Revolution [2], the Kuomintang reactionaries had ulterior motives in exploiting the differences in belief between the Communist Party and religion. They spread rumors that communism intended to eliminate religion. Therefore, Wang Enmao, then First Secretary of the Southern Xinjiang Regional Party Committee, pointed out that during the initial period of entering Xinjiang, the focus of propaganda among the masses should be on the freedom to believe, while the freedom not to believe should temporarily not be emphasized. He stated: "Propagate the policy of freedom of religious belief to help the masses understand that this freedom is guaranteed by the laws of the People’s Government. This will shatter the rumors spread by counter-revolutionaries that the People's Government is 'anti-religion' or 'seeks to eliminate religion,' and strengthen the intimate relationship between the People's Government and the people." [3] Comprehensive propaganda and implementation of the Party's policy of freedom of religious belief were to wait until conditions were fundamentally ripe. The Party's propagation of this policy in Southern Xinjiang broke the "Communist Party wants to destroy religion" rumors manufactured by the Kuomintang reactionaries and stabilized the religious sentiments of the believing masses. During the early days of the Party's governance in Southern Xinjiang, this policy laid a solid mass foundation for believers to enthusiastically participate in socialist construction and respond to the Party's various calls; it also helped consolidate the Party's governing foundation and maintain ethnic unity and the unification of the motherland.
With the successful completion of democratic reforms and socialist transformation, social conditions in Southern Xinjiang underwent significant changes. On the one hand, backward socio-economic conditions had improved considerably, the political consciousness of the masses had risen, and Party organizations had seen substantial growth. Party organizations at all levels had been universally established throughout the region, a large number of Party members from various ethnic groups had been recruited, and the Party had established high prestige among the masses of all ethnicities. The Party's policy of freedom of religious belief was understood by more and more people, providing a preliminary foundation for the work. On the other hand, democratic reforms and socialist transformation objectively weakened the influence and base of religion and touched the vested interests of the feudal religious privileged class. Stubborn elements within the feudal landlord class, unwilling to accept the elimination of the system of exploitation, attacked the Party’s leadership and the socialist system, utilizing religion to carry out various sabotage activities. Meanwhile, backward elements within religious circles, unwilling to see religious power weakened, attempted to restore certain abolished feudal religious privileges, forcing adolescents to study scriptures, forcing others to observe fasts or perform prayers, and wantonly attacking and slandering Party and Youth League members who did not believe in religion. Between 1952 and 1955, a series of separatist and sabotage activities using religion occurred, such as four consecutive organized, programmatic, and planned counter-revolutionary riots in the Hotan region. In response to these issues, on March 5, 1958, the Regional Party Committee issued the "Opinions on Comprehensively Propagating Freedom of Religious Belief Among the Masses in Connection with the Socialist and Communist Education Movements." This document exposed and criticized bad people and wrongdoings within religious circles, struck at the reactionary arrogance of stubborn elements, and decided to fully propagate the Party's policy of freedom of religious belief across Xinjiang. It emphasized that propaganda must include both the aspect of freedom to believe and the aspect of freedom not to believe. The sequence of propaganda was determined to be Party and League members first, followed by the general public, thereby ensuring the smooth progress of the education movement.
At the same time, the Southern Xinjiang Regional Party Committee attached great importance to the propaganda and education of Marxist atheism. In March 1950, in the "Report Requesting Instructions on Religious Issues" written to the Xinjiang Sub-Bureau [4], Wang Enmao emphasized: "We Communists do not believe in religion. On the contrary, according to the perspective of historical materialism, we believe that religion, like political parties and the state, will eventually wither away." However, this withering away would only occur after long-term education and continuous social progress. Therefore, in the long run, the propaganda and education of atheism were also necessary. From the second half of 1958 to the end of 1960, Southern Xinjiang continued to implement the policy of freedom of religious belief. In combination with the rectification of people's communes, the socialist and communist education movements, and the development of industry, agriculture, science, education, culture, and health, atheism education was conducted first within the Party. This helped Communist Party members draw a clear line between communism and religious belief, while simultaneously launching struggles against bad actors and bad deeds among the upper strata of the religious circles. On June 6, 1959, while carrying out reforms of the religious system, the Regional Party Committee proposed starting atheism education within the Party, in universities and colleges, and among cadres at or above the county level, noting that atheism education is a long-term process of ideological education.
In short, the Party's flexible and strategic approach to propagating the policy of freedom of religious belief in Southern Xinjiang not only upheld the Marxist view of religion and the guiding ideology of the CPC's scientific atheism but also successfully caused the reactionary rumors that "the Communist Party wants to eliminate religion" to collapse. It thoroughly dispelled the doubts and worries of religious masses and personages of all ethnic groups that "the Communist Party does not allow people to have religious beliefs," unified ideological understanding, stabilized the religious sentiments of the masses, and greatly won the trust and support of the people and religious circles for the Party and the government.
(2) Persisting in the Separation of Church and State, and Correctly Handling Religious Interference in Administration, Judiciary, Marriage, and Education
In the early years of the People's Republic, the phenomenon of religion interfering in administration, the judiciary, marriage, and education was still widespread in Southern Xinjiang. While protecting legitimate religious activities, the Communist Party of China consistently adhered to the principle of the separation of church and state. It extensively and deeply propagated to the masses of all ethnic groups in Southern Xinjiang that religious belief is a private matter for individual citizens, and no one may use religion to interfere in administration, the judiciary, marriage, or education. At the same time, based on the principle of "acknowledging history and considering reality," the Party adopted a practice of allowing temporary existence followed by gradual abolition, effectively avoiding conflicts between religious figures/believing masses and the Party and government.
First, persisting in the separation of education and religion. In the early days of New China, modern schools in Southern Xinjiang had not yet been properly established, and it was impossible to expand and develop them on a large scale immediately. Most children of the common people preferred to enter scripture schools (madrasas), and the consciousness of the broad masses had not yet reached the level of demanding the abolition of these schools. Therefore, the Southern Xinjiang District Party Committee believed that conditions for abolishing scripture schools were not yet ripe. However, "it is possible and necessary to carry out reforms in various scripture schools, such as opposing forced attendance, abolishing reactionary preaching, and adding courses with New Democratic political content." [5] Meanwhile, in accordance with the education policies of the Common Program [6], the old education system was reformed, various old-style schools were transformed, and universal education was implemented in a planned and step-by-step manner. Secondary and higher education were strengthened, technical education was emphasized, and spare-time education for laborers and in-service education for cadres were strengthened, with great efforts made to train teachers. By the late 1950s, all levels and types of education in Southern Xinjiang had been vigorously developed, a relatively complete modern national education system was initially established, and religion and education were gradually separated.
Second, persisting in the separation of the judiciary and marriage from religion. In August 1952, during the process of implementing the spirit of the Second Regional Party Congress, some personages from religious circles proposed the establishment of religious courts and requested that the government recognize "Triple Talaq." [7] On June 18, 1953, the United Front Work Department of the Xinjiang Sub-Bureau of the CPC Central Committee gave a clear response: "Regarding the issue of religious courts, it should be explained to the religious circles that our country can have only one law; two laws cannot coexist. Therefore, all legal disputes involving marriage, land, property, and civil matters shall be handled by the People's Courts, and religion shall not interfere with the state judiciary. ... Regarding marriage issues... all divorce and marriage procedures should be managed by the relevant government organs." [8]
The Party's implementation of the policy of freedom of religious belief in Southern Xinjiang was of epoch-making significance for the ethnic minorities there. Religion no longer interfered in administration, the judiciary, marriage, or education, and religious belief truly became a personal choice for citizens. The Party's religious work in Southern Xinjiang received the heartfelt support of the people of all ethnic groups, laying a mass foundation for rent reduction, the fight against local despots, land reform, socialist transformation, and the democratic reform of the religious system.
II. Cautiously and Steadily Advancing Religious Democratic Reforms
In Chinese history, religion was often linked with feudal political and economic systems, becoming a tool for the oppression and exploitation of the broad masses of believers. After the founding of New China, these feudal privileges and systems of exploitation were detrimental to the political, ideological, and economic liberation of the believing masses. When promoting democratic reforms, the Southern Xinjiang Regional Party Committee and government fully considered the mass character and complexity of religion and adopted more cautious and steady steps.
(1) Cautiously and Steadily Handling Religious Issues within Democratic Reforms
After the founding of New China, the CPC Central Committee instructed that democratic reforms in Xinjiang must resolutely implement the guideline of "cautious and steady progress," deeply mobilizing the people of all ethnic groups, uniting all forces that can be united, and carrying out the struggle under leadership and in stages. A series of steady and progressive measures were taken to successfully complete the task of overthrowing the landlord class and create a solid social foundation for the reform of the religious system.
In carrying out democratic reforms in Xinjiang, the primary issue was how to handle the Waqf land [9]. The Waqf land system was a system of feudal exploitation cloaked in Islamic guise, a tool used by a few religious feudal lords and the upper religious strata to exploit the broad masses of Muslim laborers. There were many types of Waqf land; a 1052 investigation by Deng Liqun and Gu Bao identified 24 different names, which could be roughly categorized into six types based on ownership nature. [10] There were numerous flaws and much confusion regarding the ownership, management, and distribution of income from Waqf lands. Its existence, like the general feudal exploitative land ownership system, seriously hindered the development of agricultural productive forces in Southern Xinjiang and had been a major social problem in the rural areas.
Given the religious nature and complexity of Waqf land, and following the guiding principle of "cautious and steady progress," the Southern Xinjiang Regional Party Committee and government issued an instruction on August 11, 1951, regarding mobilizing the masses for rent reduction and the struggle against local despots. They proposed policies and slogans to adjust land tenancy relations, first reallocating various Waqf lands occupied or used by the landlord class to peasants with little or no land for cultivation. Once proposed, this measure immediately mobilized the broad peasantry, fundamentally reforming the Waqf system that the landlord class had used for years to annex land and plunder peasant property. During the Land Reform movement, parts of the Waqf land continued to be reallocated to local peasants, giving former landless serfs their own land. At the same time, mosques and lamaserys were permitted to retain a portion of temple land and property to maintain temple expenses and the livelihoods of religious professionals. These measures were approved and supported by believing masses and religious figures, allowing Land Reform to proceed smoothly. At the height of the socialist transformation movement, under its influence, the ideological outlook of most religious figures showed varying degrees of progress compared to before, and they behaved quite actively. Between 70% and 75% of rural religious professionals successively joined agricultural producer cooperatives. In cities, some religious professionals joined agricultural cooperatives or public-private partnerships (including cooperative stores, groups, and distribution agents) according to their family circumstances (e.g., those primarily engaged in farming or commerce). [11] At the same time, to increase their income, some religious professionals began to actively participate in productive labor.
Religious professionals were gradually decoupled from religious Waqf land and actively threw themselves into socialist construction to adapt to democratic reforms. This laid the foundation for the subsequent thorough abolition of the system of religious exploitation.
(2) Promoting the Democratic Reform of the Religious System
In 1956, the socialist transformation was basically completed and the socialist system was fundamentally established; the various ethnic groups of Southern Xinjiang, along with the people of the entire country, entered into a socialist society. Under the Party’s leadership, the socialist consciousness of the masses in Southern Xinjiang saw a significant increase, and the abolition of religious feudal privileges and the system of feudal exploitation became an inevitable requirement. In January 1959, the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) convened the Seventh United Front Work Conference. Based on the spirit of the "Report on Issues Concerning Current Work on Islam and Lamaism" [20] submitted by the Party Group of the State Nationalities Affairs Commission and approved by the CPC Central Committee, and combined with the realities of Xinjiang, the committee put forward a targeted proposal for the reform of the religious system in Xinjiang. In April, the XUAR Party Committee issued the "Directive on the Reform of Islamic and Lamaist Systems," deciding to carry out religious system reform in conjunction with various other tasks.
1. Gradually Abolishing Religious Feudal Privileges
First, the feudal privilege system of "issuing the huanyuan" (granting permission) was abolished. In the Islam of that time, systems of religious privilege such as "issuing the huanyuan" and "casket money" were very serious. Every move of the believers and the appointment or removal of mosque imams had to seek the "permission" (huanyuan) of the religious leader. The religious ward (jiaofang) system severely interfered in all aspects of the believers' lives, using arbitrary threats or even punishments against those deemed to have violated religious doctrines or rules. Tibetan Buddhism (Lamaism) similarly possessed religious privileges, such as the occupation of large numbers of livestock and grasslands where hired laborers were made to herd without pay. Every year, funds for grand sutra-chanting [12] were apportioned to the masses five times, with costs ranging from 1,000 yuan to 300 yuan per instance. For chanting sutras for the deceased, in addition to the dead person’s clothing and horses being given to the lamas free of charge, a fee ranging from 100 to 700 yuan had to be paid. Chanting was also required during droughts or seasonal pasture transitions, costing several hundred yuan each time. The "Report on Issues Concerning Current Work on Islam and Lamaism" pointed out: "Abolish all feudal privileges of religion, including the unauthorized appointment of tribal headmen and the private stockpiling of weapons by imams." In the main contents of the religious system reform proposed by the Seventh United Front Work Conference of the Autonomous Region Party Committee, the first item was the abolition of all religious feudal privileges, such as the unauthorized appointment of imams and the granting of "permission" [21]. Following the spirit of these directives from the Central and Autonomous Region Party Committees, the Southern Xinjiang Regional Party Committee resolutely abolished feudal religious privileges such as hereditary religious leadership and the "issuing of permission."
Second, the privilege of forced religious belief was abolished. Before the founding of New China, the religious privileged class forced the masses to engage in religious activities; those who did not believe or did not participate faced severe punishment. According to the recollections of a resident in a village in Kashgar, in the past, if a grown man did not go to the mosque to perform namaz (prayer), the village landlord would order people to seize him and paint his face black. If it happened in winter, they might pour cold water on him or simply throw him into a laoba (stagnant pond) [13] to soak. At that time, if a man did not go to prayer and wanted to avoid punishment, his only options were to flee to a distant land or lie in bed feigning illness [22]. The Southern Xinjiang Regional Party Committee resolutely implemented the spirit of the "Directive on the Reform of Islamic and Lamaist Systems." On the basis of protecting the people's freedom of religious belief, they also emphasized the people's freedom not to believe. They stipulated that children must not be forced to chant sutras or attend scripture schools, youth must not be forced to become manla (students) or lamas, and no one may discriminate against lamas who return to secular life to start families and careers. Temples and mosques were forbidden from forcing people to become lamas, forcing the fast, or forcing children to study scripture. Lamas were given the freedom to return to secular life.
Third, the privilege of religious interference in secular life was abolished. Traditionally, religious figures held great power and constantly interfered in every aspect of the lives of ethnic minority masses. Beyond punishing artisans and peasants who did not perform namaz or observe the fast, they also managed transactions in the bazaar (market). Imams had to be invited to chant prayers or affix seals as witnesses for marriages, divorces, births, circumcisions, funerals, inheritance distribution, tenancy, pawning, land sales, loans, and the slaughter of livestock. In many matters involving Muslim marriage, property inheritance, debt, and neighborhood disputes, "arbitration" was often carried out by religious judges. According to the aforementioned conference spirit and documentary directives, all such religious feudal privileges that interfered in secular life in Southern Xinjiang were abolished after 1958.
Fourth, the privilege of religious leaders to privately establish religious schools was abolished. Before the founding of New China, religious leaders established private religious schools where children as young as four had to study scripture. The religious system reform required the abolition of this privilege. Simultaneously, a large number of public schools, community-run schools, and literacy classes were established, and the vast majority of people entered national education schools or joined the workforce.
Due to the abolition of the religious leaders' feudal privileges, the civil rights, personal freedom, and private property of the laboring people were guaranteed. The phenomenon of religious institutions infringing upon judicial, financial, educational, and even diplomatic powers ceased to exist. All of this merely removed the feudal privileges of religious leaders and did not hinder the normal religious beliefs of the people in the slightest. Mosques and mazars (shrines) remained open as usual, and religious masses had full freedom to engage in religious activities. Therefore, the abolition of the feudal privileges of religious leaders also received the heartfelt support of the religious masses.
2. Gradually Abolishing the Feudal Management System of Temples and Mosques
In the early period of the founding of New China, mosques in Southern Xinjiang were primarily divided by parish. Within each parish, mosques were further categorized into different grades. Mosques were not independent of one another but existed in a hierarchical relationship. The Annals of Aksu City record: In the old days, the division of parishes in Aksu County existed at three levels: administrative district, county, and sub-county district. County and district-level parishes had Imam Offices responsible for managing religious affairs in that area and appointing subordinate religious personnel. The Qazi Guzat [14] was the supreme imam and the head of religion for the entire county, managing all religious activities, appointing or removing district-level heads and various imams, and certifying various contracts and documents [23].
The internal hierarchical system of the mosques was also prominent. The Orthodox (Sunni) sect in various locales had imams such as Alem, Mufti, Qazi, and Rais to manage local religious affairs [24]. During the Qing Dynasty, these imams were appointed by princes and beys (local officials); during the Republican period, they were appointed by the county governments of the time. High-ranking county imams had the power to appoint or remove religious leaders such as the Alem, Qazi, and Rais in the districts below the county level.
Mosques also possessed a system for punishing believers through religious courts. Any believer who violated religious law was interrogated by the Qazi, sentenced by the Mufti, and approved by the Alem, after which the Rais would organize people to carry out the sentence. Minor offenses resulted in fines, while serious ones involved both beatings and fines. Religious courts handled cases according to religious law and could hand out death sentences, imprisonment, fines, corporal punishment, and various other penalties.
In addition to Islam, the feudal management system in Lamaist (Tibetan Buddhist) temples was also prominent, featuring systems such as corvée labor (where believers performed periodic manual labor for the temple) and the "son-dedication" system (where religious rules dictated that if a family had two sons, one must be sent to become a lama). Strict constraints were placed on both the spiritual and material lives of believers through religious rules and discipline.
By January 1959, through the democratic reform of the religious system, temple management systems that were out of step with the times were basically abolished. Democratic Management Committees were generally established in mosques and temples. Within the scope of the Constitution, laws, and regulations, these committees led the temples/mosques in conducting normal religious activities and protecting the legitimate rights and interests of the religious masses.
3. Gradually Abolishing Religious Exploitation
Before the founding of New China, the religious income of Islamic clergy primarily came from three sources: first, collecting rent and interest from property owned by religious institutions, collectively known as waqf. This primarily consisted of waqf land, but also included waqf housing and water mills. Second, religious taxes and tithes. Third, other religious income. These were the primary channels through which religion oppressed and exploited believers under the feudal system. Abolishing the economic roots of religious oppression and exploitation became one of the key components of the religious system reform.
During the democratic reform, a portion of waqf land was redistributed to peasants with little or no land, earning the support and advocacy of the broad masses. In 1958, following the spirit of the Central Committee's directives on religious system reform, the Southern Xinjiang region began taking measures to thoroughly abolish the remaining feudal religious system of land exploitation. During the People’s Commune movement, religious land belonging to temples and mosques was converted to collective ownership, bringing a complete end to the religious feudal land system.
In addition to waqf land, religious taxes were a heavy burden on the backs of the Muslim masses. Before the founding of New China, the religious taxes collected year-round primarily included ushur (grain tax), zakat (alms-tax), fitr, qibul grain, livestock slaughter tax, Eid al-Adha gifts, nazir, and ziyat. After the founding of New China, although the religious burden on the masses was much reduced, it had not been fundamentally eradicated. In December 1958, the "Report on Current Work on Islam and Lamaism" pointed out that it was necessary to abolish "the ownership of means of production, usury, corvée labor, and other exploitative systems by Lamaist temples and mosques, and to ban illegal commerce," and to abolish "the extortion of the masses' property by temples... but voluntary almsgiving by the masses shall not be interfered with." The Seventh United Front Work Conference of the Autonomous Region Party Committee explicitly proposed the "abolition of the ownership of means of production, land leasing, and corvée labor by monasteries and temples. Religion must not be used to invent pretexts for forced levies or the extortion of property from the masses; religious taxes such as ushur and zakat are abolished." From then on, all types of religious taxation systems incompatible with the socialist system were thoroughly abolished.
By 1960, the Southern Xinjiang region had basically completed the democratic reform of the religious system. Through this reform, religious feudal privileges, the feudal temple management system, and the feudal system of exploitation were fundamentally abolished. The economic burden on the laboring people was greatly lightened, creating favorable conditions for the masses of all ethnic groups to develop production and improve their lives. It also laid the political foundation for religion to adapt to a socialist society.
III. Establishing an Anti-Feudal United Front with Religious Personages
The united front is a political advantage and strategic policy of the Communist Party of China to rally people's hearts and aggregate strength. Since religious personages hold a special status and play a specific role among ethnic minority masses where the majority are believers, the Regional Party Committee and government of Southern Xinjiang fully considered the specific circumstances of religious personages and established an anti-feudal united front with them. Consequently, the Party's governance in Southern Xinjiang gained the understanding and support of a wide range of religious personages, greatly reducing various forms of resistance.
(1) Dispelling the Doubts of Religious Personages
In the early years of New China, religious personages in Southern Xinjiang generally lacked a clear understanding of the Party's religious policies. Rumors circulated in society saying that imams and all those who made a living through religion would be classified as "landlords," and that mosques would be turned into warehouses. In a township in Tashkurgan District, Shule County, a symposium for religious figures was held; of the 20-plus imams in attendance, only a few wore their white turbans, while the others did not dare to. In the Sa’ai District of Shufu County (a pilot area for Land Reform), an imam with "middle peasant" status heard the Land Reform team was coming; he sat at home praying and weeping, fearing he would be classified as a "landlord" and subjected to a struggle session. Among the Xinjiang representatives attending the Second Expanded Plenary Session of the China Islamic Association, some believed that after the implementation of socialist transformation, there would be no freedom of religious belief and no one would become an imam in the future.
In response to this situation, Wang Enmao [15] wrote in a March 1950 report to the Xinjiang Bureau of the CPC Central Committee: "I believe the method of holding imam conferences is a good one." In September, at a meeting of Southern Xinjiang county Party secretaries and officers of regiment rank and above, he pointed out: "We should not only refrain from opposing imams, but we must unite with and utilize progressive imams to participate in patriotic movements, the defense of world peace, and work supporting the various policies and decrees of the People's Government. Through them, we can overcome certain bad behaviors among the ranks of the imams" [25]. On October 22 and November 20, 1951, the Xinjiang Bureau successively required Party committees at all levels to use symposiums with imams and mullahs to propagate the justice of the movements to "reduce rent and oppose local tyrants" and explain relevant policies and laws. This was intended to dispel their ideological anxieties and win their support for the peasants' liberation movement, while ensuring that religious personages and their families were given due consideration during the struggle.
(2) Distinguishing Religious Clergy from Landlords and Tyrants
During the "reduce rent and oppose local tyrants" movement, peasants in Southern Xinjiang, due to a lack of understanding during the struggle against the landlord class, sometimes acted without restraint, struggling against anyone who had oppressed them—including imams who engaged in religious exploitation—treating them the same as "local tyrants." Secretary Wang Enmao carefully considered these phenomena and pointed out: "Not every imam is a landlord, nor is every landlord an imam." He emphasized: "We must conduct a specific analysis of imams. Do not casually raise slogans opposing imams, and we cannot eliminate them. During the rent reduction, anti-tyrant movement, and the subsequent Land Reform, attention should be paid to uniting with religious personages... appropriate consideration should be given to their interests, provided it does not affect the progress of the rent reduction, anti-tyrant movement, and Land Reform" [26].
Secondly, distinct approaches were adopted based on the different categories of religious personnel. General religious professionals in rural areas were permitted to receive the fruits of land reform just like ordinary peasants. For religious figures whose family backgrounds were of the landlord class, even if they had committed misdeeds in the past, they were given consideration during the confiscation and distribution of property, provided they strictly obeyed the law and repented; furthermore, the masses were persuaded not to launch "struggle sessions" against them [31]. During the period of agricultural cooperatives, religious personnel with the capacity to labor were encouraged to actively join the cooperatives, participate in productive labor, and become self-reliant. For those who were elderly, had lost the capacity to work, lacked a source of income, or lived in towns without conditions for labor, living subsidies were issued. Regarding the few "landlord-hegemons" [16] among the akhunds [17] who truly required legal handling, the authorities emphasized only their status as landlord-hegemons during the processing and public propaganda phases, without mentioning their identity as akhunds. This approach united the vast majority of law-abiding religious figures and the broad masses of religious believers.
The Party committees and governments in the Southern Xinjiang region politically distinguished religious clergy from landlord elements. This significantly splintered the landlord class, narrowed the "target of attack," and expanded the "circle of unity." By stabilizing the thinking of religious figures, this became the key to advancing democratic reforms in Southern Xinjiang.
(3) Absorbing Representative Religious Figures into Land Reform Committees at All Levels
In the early stages of land reform, religious figures, landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, and poor and landless peasants all held varying mindsets. By convening symposiums for religious figures, absorbing them into Land Reform Committees, and organizing observation tours, the Southern Xinjiang region enabled them to understand the policies of land reform (as well as the socialist transformation of animal husbandry and private industry and commerce) and to participate in land reform propaganda. Consequently, they became an important force in promoting the smooth progress of land reform. On November 17, 1952, the United Front Work Department of the Southern Xinjiang Regional Party Committee held a symposium for democratic personages from 30 counties and one city. A total of 119 people attended, including 43 religious professionals, and participants were organized to visit the land reform sites in nearby rural areas. Following in-depth and meticulous propaganda, figures from Islamic circles expressed their support for land reform to government staff [32].
In January 1953, Wang Enmao, then First Secretary of the Xinjiang Sub-Bureau, pointed out at the fifth meeting for cadres above the county level in Southern Xinjiang that the trial land reform from September to December 1952 was victorious and healthy. He noted that one reason for this was the emphasis placed on the anti-feudal united front work: through convening symposiums and various united front meetings, absorbing democratic personages into Land Reform Committees, and adopting a policy of "differentiated treatment" toward the landlord class, resistance to the land reform movement was reduced while support increased. This garnered broader social sympathy and was more conducive to fully mobilizing the masses [33].
(4) Strengthening Policy Education for Religious Figures
Valuing ideological education—breaking down narrow nationalism and the remnants of feudal exploitation left over from history, and gradually guiding religious figures to establish the path of socialism and accept the leadership of the Communist Party of China—is the way to consolidate and develop the Party’s united front with religious circles. In the early period of the People's Republic, the Party primarily integrated various social reforms with ideological education, using organized study sessions and observation tours to publicize relevant Party policies to patriotic religious figures, enabling them to gradually accept socialist thought. As the cause of socialism developed in depth, the ideological education of religious figures was progressively regularized. From 1954 to 1955, localities held study sessions to conduct universal propaganda and education on socialist transformation policies for religious figures. This helped them understand the policies and raise their awareness, persuading religious clergy to actively participate in the "Three Great Transformations" [18] and use their influence to publicize Party policies to the masses, encouraging their active participation in socialist construction. Starting from February 1955, propaganda and education on patriotism and the policy of Regional Ethnic Autonomy were carried out among people of all strata in Xinjiang, including religious figures, further strengthening unity among ethnic groups and maintaining social stability. In 1956, the Autonomous Region held the first study session for Islamic personages. Through these sessions, religious figures changed their erroneous concepts and actively participated in productive labor and socialist construction. According to statistics from the Kashgar City Gazetteer, in October 1953, the United Front Work Department of the Kashgar Municipal Party Committee held a study class for 37 religious figures, organizing them to study the Party’s principles and policies to enhance their political and ideological consciousness. Subsequently, from 1956 to 1965, more than 10 study classes were held, reaching 50 to 60 people per session for durations of two to three months. These classes organized democratic, ethnic, religious, and industrial/commercial figures to study the Party’s line, principles, and policies of various periods, ensuring they followed the Party and the evolving situation. In 1959, Kashgar established a "study day" system for religious circles [34]. Through "rectification" (zhengfeng) [19], religious figures generally improved their ideological awareness. For instance, in Poskam (Zepu) County, the positive phenomena of the "Four Absences" and "Four Abundances" emerged among religious figures [35].
IV. Historical Lessons and Enlightenment from the Party’s Handling of Religious Issues in Southern Xinjiang in the 1950s
History is the best textbook. The successful practice of the Party's handling of religious issues in Southern Xinjiang in the 1950s represents an important experience and a precious asset in the Party's religious work. Conducting a historical investigation and summarizing these experiences remains significantly relevant today for the complete, accurate, and comprehensive implementation of the Party's Strategy for Governing Xinjiang in the New Era, and for handling religious issues under new circumstances.
(1) Religious Work Must Submit to and Serve the Party’s Central Task in Specific Periods
Marxism consistently maintains that the handling of religious issues must submit to and serve the Party’s central task during a given period. The Communist Party of China persists in continuously advancing the Sinicization and modernization of Marxism, integrating the basic tenets of Marxism with the specific realities of Chinese religion. Throughout a century of the Party’s religious work, it has proposed and developed a series of fundamental viewpoints and policies on religious issues, gradually forming a theory of religious work consistent with China's national conditions—namely, the theory of religion with Chinese characteristics and the Party’s theory of religious work in the New Era.
During the period of socialist revolution and construction, the primary task facing the Party was to realize the transition from New Democracy to socialism, carry out the socialist revolution, and promote socialist construction, thereby laying the fundamental political prerequisites and institutional foundations for the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation [36]. Therefore, the main task of the Party’s religious work during this period was the reform of the religious system for the purpose of "prospering the country." The Party Central Committee fully considered the particularity and complexity of religious issues in Xinjiang, believing that conditions were not yet ripe for religious system reform there. It was deemed necessary to handle the matter with caution and stability, flexibly addressing religious issues according to the central tasks of different stages. In the early 1950s, to shatter rumors that "the Communist Party wants to eliminate religion," to win over and unite the broad masses of religious believers, and to consolidate the Party’s governing foundation, the focus of the Party's work was on publicizing the freedom of religious belief. To ensure the smooth progress of land reform, it adopted the policy of establishing an anti-feudal united front with religious figures and absorbing them into Land Reform Committees, thereby ensuring the smooth completion of democratic reforms. After 1958, greater emphasis was placed on publicizing the "freedom not to believe in religion" to the masses, and propaganda and education on atheism were strengthened. By the end of 1958, the socialist system was basically established, and the political, social, and mass foundations for religious system reform were largely solidified, making such reform an inevitable requirement for social progress.
The Communist Party of China has never viewed religious issues in isolation; rather, it has linked the handling of religion with the cause of revolution and construction. The specific tactics for implementing religious policy serve the central task of a particular period. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a New Era. The main task facing the Party is to achieve the First Centenary Goal, embark on the new journey toward the Second Centenary Goal, and continue advancing toward the grand goal of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Therefore, the key task of the Party’s religious work is to fully implement the Party’s theory of religious work in the New Era, better organizing and guiding religious believers to work together with the masses to build a modern socialist power and realize the Chinese Dream. In Xinjiang, implementing the Party's theories and policies on religious work in the New Era must also submit to and serve the general goal of Xinjiang work—achieving social stability and long-term peace and security. The key task is to persist in the direction of the Sinicization of religions in China and actively guide religion to adapt to socialist society.
(2) The Principle of the Separation of Church and State Must Be Upheld
The state’s implementation of the separation of government from religion, and education from religion, is one of the basic principles and attitudes of a Marxist party toward religion. In the 1950s, the CPC's religious work in Southern Xinjiang was highly effective. The previously widespread phenomenon of religious interference in administration, justice, marriage, and education was gradually eliminated, and the principle of the separation of church and state was effectively reflected. Ethnic minority masses bid farewell to the history of "universal religious belief," gained the freedom not to believe, and gradually changed the situation where ethnicity and religion were indistinguishable.
In the New Era, the Party must uphold the principle of the separation of church and state in the process of implementing the policy of freedom of religious belief, ensuring that religion truly becomes a private matter for individual citizens. Regarding the relationship between government and religion, all religions must conduct activities within the scope permitted by national laws, regulations, and policies. They must not interfere in politics or government affairs, nor in the implementation of state functions such as administration, justice, education, marriage, and family planning. Religion must not be used to obstruct normal social, work, or living order, nor to interfere in the secular life of citizens. Religion must not be used to oppose the leadership of the CPC or the socialist system, nor to undermine ethnic unity or national unification. Regarding the relationship between religion and ethnicity, religion should no longer carry the ethics and value pursuits of an entire ethnic group or collective in the form of belief. It should not exist as an institutionalized "sacred" form, but should become entirely a private matter for citizens in the modern sense—serving only individual life by providing self-cultivation, self-discipline, psychological comfort, and spiritual support. Religion must not be bundled with ethnicity; there is no such thing as a "Muslim ethnicity" (musilin minzu). Members of the Uyghur and other ethnic minorities are free to either believe or not believe in a religion, and can believe in Islam or any other religion. No person may compel another to believe or not believe in a religion.
(3) Advancing the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang Must Persist in the Party’s Leadership
After Islam was introduced to the Xinjiang region, it began a process of localization, manifesting regional characteristics and ethnic flavors. The localization of Islam in Xinjiang was completed within the inertia and logic of Chinese history and culture; it was a gradual historical process moving from the surface to the core. Historically, due to the mutual exploitation between the ruling classes and religion, Islam in Xinjiang never underwent major reforms of its religious system. It was even less possible for Islam to actively develop a doctrine or system where "the state is primary and religion subordinate" or where church and state are separated. This is one reason why the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang lacked depth, had a weak foundation, and progressed slowly. After the establishment of the socialist system, to conform to the fundamental changes in the political and economic systems, the CPC set about reforming the religious system. Since then, the face of Islam in Xinjiang has undergone a fundamental change, and the process of Sinicizing Islam in Xinjiang has achieved a qualitative leap. The root cause lies in the Party’s cautious, steady, yet resolute democratic reform of the religious system, which abolished religious institutions that were incompatible with the socialist political and economic systems.
In the New Era, to deeply advance the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang, we must persist in the Party’s leadership over religious work. Historical experience and realistic practice have repeatedly proven that for the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang to advance effectively, the principle of "state presence" must be upheld, highlighting the state's prominent position and the effectiveness of its role. The most essential characteristic of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China. The Party’s comprehensive, systematic, and holistic leadership over religious work is a vital link in the Party’s leadership over all work in the New Era. We must strengthen and improve this leadership. Establishing and improving a powerful leadership mechanism is a major component of the Party’s theory and policy on religious work in the New Era, and the fundamental political guarantee for doing this work well. As the guiding subject of the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang, Party and government departments must think deeply, see clearly, and act accurately in their "guidance" (dao). They must ensure that guidance is methodical, powerful, and effective, firmly maintaining the initiative in religious work and ensuring the correct political direction for the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang. Specifically, Party and government departments mainly guide the general situation and direction of the interpretation of religious classics, firmly establish state authority, and enhance consciousness of the state, citizenship, and the rule of law. They guide Islam to submit to and serve the overall situation of national governance, improve the religious governance system, and guide the Islamic community to consciously love the country and the Party, respect and abide by the law, adapt to society, and integrate into culture.
(About the Author: Yan Shaohua is an Associate Professor at the Party School of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Battalion Committee and a PhD candidate in Religious Studies at Minzu University of China)
Third, firmly holding the leadership of the United Front is the fundamental guarantee for the effective resolution of religious issues. In the 1950s, the Party’s governance of Southern Xinjiang demonstrated that the most significant advantage of the United Front lies in its ability to "unite all forces that can be united" [20]. By implementing the policy of "uniting, educating, and transforming" the upper strata of the religious community, the Party succeeded in transforming most of them from "wavering elements" into a positive force for social stability and development. In the work of the United Front, "leadership" is not an empty slogan, but is reflected in the Party's political guidance and ideological influence over the personages of the religious world. On the one hand, the Party adhered to the principle of "both unity and struggle," resolving ideological differences through "criticism—unity—criticism" [21] to ensure that religious work always followed the correct political direction. On the other hand, the Party respected the social influence and unique roles of religious figures, actively providing them with opportunities for political participation and livelihood security, thereby tightening the bond between the Party and the personages of the religious world. Historical experience indicates that the more complex the situation, the more the Party must strengthen its centralized and unified leadership over United Front work. Only by ensuring that the "steering wheel" of the United Front is firmly in the hands of the Party can we effectively prevent and resolve various risks and challenges in the religious sphere, maintaining the healthy and orderly development of the religious ecosystem.
Fourth, persisting in "seeking truth from facts" is the basic principle for formulating and implementing religious policies. In the 1950s, the Party’s religious work in Southern Xinjiang did not mechanically apply the experiences of the interior, nor did it pursue a "one-size-fits-all" [22] approach. Instead, it proceeded from the reality that Southern Xinjiang was a concentrated area of ethnic minorities and religious believers, adhering to a strategy of "steady progress" and "caution and prudence." Whether in the implementation of the "Land Reform" [23] or in the "Democratic Reform" of the religious system [24], the Party always placed the protection of the masses' freedom of religious belief in a prominent position, strictly distinguishing between religious beliefs and feudal exploitation, and between normal religious activities and counter-revolutionary activities using the cloak of religion. This spirit of seeking truth from facts ensured that the religious policies were both grounded in China's national conditions and responsive to the specific realities of the border regions, winning the sincere support of the people of all ethnic groups. In the New Era, as we promote the Sinicization of religion and resolve religious issues, we must consistently uphold the principle of seeking truth from facts. We must accurately grasp the laws of religious development and the characteristics of the current stage, formulate science-based policies tailored to local conditions, and ensure that every measure can withstand the test of history and practice.
In conclusion, the historical experience of the Communist Party of China in handling religious issues in Southern Xinjiang during the 1950s is a valuable spiritual asset. It provides profound insights for us today: we must maintain our "original aspiration and founding mission," rely closely on the masses, strengthen the leadership of the United Front, and persist in seeking truth from basics. Only by doing so can we consistently promote the Sinicization of religion, maintain social harmony and stability, and contribute to the realization of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation.