Xiao Jianfei and Liu Haichun: Stepping out of Monotheistic Religion, but not yet out of Monotheism
Zhao Tingyang first met the French anthropologist Alain Le Pichon in 1999. Fifteen years later, these two old friends decided to exchange ideas through correspondence on the theoretical and practical issues of "transculturalism," resulting in the book The Shadow of Monotheism: Correspondence Between a Philosopher and an Anthropologist (hereafter referred to as The Shadow of Monotheism). This book is not a mere cultural exchange in the vein of 18th- and 19th-century European intellectuals, but a three-year-long, in-depth, and experimental transcultural dialogue. Nor does the book simply follow the great French tradition of the Encyclopédie; rather, it possesses an intense concern for contemporary reality. Le Pichon offers a vivid metaphor: the two interlocutors are like players in a card game, each holding a trump card—Zhao Tingyang holds "polytheism," while Le Pichon holds "monotheism." The two men not only review shifts in the history of ideas but also attempt to "prophesy the future" based on the various phenomena manifested in today's "perilous" world. Although monotheism is the central theme, the book is not a purely academic text; it is a conceptual montage composed of philosophy, science, history, religion, and metaphor-rich poetry.
Le Pichon is accustomed to posing questions through poetic thinking, which naturally encompasses "critical attention." Zhao Tingyang’s expertise lies in political philosophy; he is adept at reasoned argumentation, utilizing a set of concepts and keywords to construct theoretical systems that subsume history, narrative, and literature. Le Pichon frankly admits that his letters have a conspicuous "poetic style" and often sidestep the "rigorous logical questions" posed by his interlocutor, leaving Zhao Tingyang to "act as the vanguard in constructing philosophical arguments." Zhao, in turn, benefits from Le Pichon’s imagination and the conceptually potent new terms he proposes, even though his French friend usually "creates without explaining" [1] and "enjoys setting the problem more than solving it."
How does monotheism (as a religion) transform into monotheism (as a logic)? How did modern Western concepts, after subverting the image and status of God, construct the "absolute ego-ism" that constitutes modern monotheism? how does the evolution of the history of ideas influence practice, and what impact has the combination of monotheism and universalism brought to the world? What are the connections between monotheism and the "clash of civilizations" [2], ideological strife, the disordered development of technology, and Super Artificial Intelligence? Reading The Shadow of Monotheism along this chain of questions not only helps one grasp the main thread of the evolution of Western ideas but also provides a theoretical perspective for analyzing current global issues.
I. Core Issues and Key Theoretical Terms
As one half of the dialogue, Le Pichon’s real concern is China. Faced with China’s five thousand years of civilization and its steadily increasing national strength, he asks: "Can Judeo-Christian civilization truly continue to exist and remain full of self-confidence?" As human history entered the twenty-first century, "What is the voice and message that China transmits to the world?" After a long dialogue, Le Pichon summarized his core concern: "What exactly is the status, role, meaning, and function of China and Chinese culture in the world?" In short, Le Pichon is not focused on China’s current role as an engine for the world economy to pull itself out of the mire, nor on China’s expanding political influence, but rather on how China might change the transcultural relations and practices of the world.
As the other half of the dialogue, Zhao Tingyang is concerned with how the world can move beyond monotheistic religion and monotheistic logic—how to escape the "spell" cast by monotheism over the clash of civilizations and ideological disputes to reshape the order of existence under the conditions of globalization. "What kind of universal order is worthy of trust? What kind of universal order can guarantee both our coexistence with others and our own freedom?" These concerns can be translated into a philosophical expression: how to construct an ontology of "co-being" (共在, gòngzài) oriented toward the "life-world." While these seem like "old questions," they remain unresolved and face new challenges today, such as uncontrolled technological development and the possibility of Super AI becoming the master of human thought.
A pair of keywords in this book are "monotheistic religion" (一神教, yīshénjiào) and "monotheism" (一神论, yīshénlùn). Between the two, there are connections in both socio-political history and the history of ideas. Monotheism (as a logic) originates from monotheistic religion but differs from it. Monotheistic religion is a form of religion—contrasted with polytheism, pantheism, and atheism—primarily originating from the Abrahamic traditions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Monotheism (as a logic) derives from these religions, but in the increasingly secularized and de-religionized present, it manifests primarily as an exclusive and dogmatic mode of thinking that integrates political, ethical, and cultural factors. Zhao Tingyang believes that the typical modern monotheistic concepts are the concept of human rights based on absolute individual subjectivity, democratic politics, and the narrative of progress. Regarding epistemology alone, in Zhao’s view, monotheism represents the "boundary of knowledge," whereas polytheism, pantheism, and atheism represent an "open, perpetually unfinished state of dialogue."
The world is as it is, and all things are where they are; the world and all things do not exist because of the problems humans ponder. Humans pose and manufacture problems, or rather, humanity chooses problems for existence. Ontology is the core field of philosophy; it does not focus on specific things but attempts to investigate the ultimate reasons for the fundamental fact of why the world and all things exist. Western ontology is closely related to the basic assumptions of traditional metaphysics: that all things have a "final basis" (最终依据), and the investigation of this final basis constitutes the "ultimate question," the pursuit of which reveals "ultimate principles." In the history of Western ideas, the monotheistic religion and monotheistic logic are the most important types of ontological concepts regarding the understanding of existence. In his book The Fulcrum of First Philosophy, Zhao Tingyang argues that the introduction of the Creator or the concept of God into the history of thought provided an ultimate answer for existence; however, the Creator or God does not require human thought, only human faith. Religious faith thus becomes an "irrational yet powerful spiritual form." Religion and philosophy both compete and exist in a structurally complementary relationship: "Religion provides dubious answers to questions, while philosophy poses questions that have no final answers." Regarding the explanation of ultimate causes, religion ends with "Yes" as a conclusion, while philosophy treats "No" as a mid-point stage. In terms of cultural identity, religion’s influence on the formation of identity is vast and highly stable. Religions say "No" to one another; monotheism is the most typical in this regard, as religion more easily becomes the boundary stone of cultural limits. Although different philosophies also say "No" to one another, the opposition of philosophical concepts usually does not become a boundary for cultural exchange "unless a thought undergoes a mutation into religion through ideologization."
In addition to monotheism, monotheistic religion, and ontology, another important theoretical keyword in The Shadow of Monotheism is "transcultural" (跨文化, kuàwénhuà). The problem-awareness and practical goal of transcultural studies is naturally to transcend monotheism and reconstruct the world’s cultural order. Le Pichon’s transcultural theory is built upon the "reciprocal anthropology" research paradigm he pioneered. Relying on the reversibility of anthropological fieldwork—allowing the observer to be observed and the questioner to be questioned—it achieves the self-transformation of anthropology. "Both sides of the exchange establish a set of anthropological narratives for the other's culture." Westerners cannot merely be "observers"; Westerners and Western society should also become the "observed." Distinct from the "absolute ego-subjectivity" that emphasizes individual rationality, Le Pichon’s "trans-subjectivity" is close to a "refined version" of Habermas’s "intersubjectivity." Zhao Tingyang’s transcultural theory, meanwhile, is built on an ontology of co-being oriented toward the life-world. In his view, transcultural theory should explore further on the basis of confirming fundamental facts such as intersubjectivity and inter-culturality, taking "trans-subjectivity"—more accurately expressed as "conjunctive subjectivity" and "relational subjectivity"—as the philosophical basis for transcultural practice. Transcultural practice then provides a feasible operational model for trans-subjectivity: "co-being with others."
II. The Immediacy or Mediacy of the Relationship between Heaven and Humanity
"The deep grammar of a civilization lies in its faith, philosophy, history, values, and ways of thinking, and it is precisely the differences in these deep grammars that constitute insurmountable cultural boundaries." The differences between Chinese and Western cultural traditions or philosophical concepts can be traced back to different understandings of the relationship between "Heaven and Humanity" (天人关系, tiānrén guānxì). The two interlocutors live in different countries and cultural backgrounds; despite knowing each other for over a decade and corresponding for nearly three years—reaching a twenty-year friendship by the time the book was completed—their deep exchange still faced a massive intellectual chasm. Le Pichon has always sought to solve the core questions of Chinese philosophy. The series of follow-up questions he posed allowed the discussion to deepen layer by layer, rendering the relevant viewpoints more constructive—though the constructive answers were mostly provided by Zhao Tingyang.
As a "metaphysical Catholic," Le Pichon is extremely interested in the traditional Chinese conceptual system of "The Unity of Heaven and Humanity" (天人合一, tiānrén héyī): "What kind of intermediary is needed between Heaven and Humanity? Or, what kind of coordinating medium is required for the connection between Heaven and Humanity?" The Unity of Heaven and Humanity is an unconscious conceptual presupposition for Chinese people, taken as a given. For Le Pichon, however, this unity requires proof.
Zhao Tingyang, who describes himself as a "pantheistic philosopher," briefly reviewed the conceptual system of the Unity of Heaven and Humanity and its branches in the history of Chinese ideas: First, the oldest and most creative explanation is represented by the thought of the Duke of Zhou’s circle: the Mandate of Heaven reaches the hearts of the people, and where the people's hearts incline, there lies the Mandate of Heaven. Second, thinkers represented by Laozi provided the most stable explanation: humans move with Heaven and change in accordance with it. Third, represented by the Han Dynasty Confucians, a "poetic explanation" was provided: after analogizing celestial phenomena with human affairs, they identified numerous similarities or correspondences between the two. Fourth, represented by the Song and Ming Neo-Confucians, the identity and homogeneity of Heaven and humanity were directly presupposed and characterized; the only difference between the two lies in their mode of existence. In terms of explanatory power, "the two older explanations surpass the two relatively recent ones, but none are yet perfect." Within the traditional Chinese conceptual system and intellectual grammar, these explanations share a commonality: in every version, the relationship between Heaven and humanity possesses "immediacy" and "does not require an intermediary or medium (media)." This determines the significant difference between the traditional intellectual contexts of China and Europe.
In the European tradition, the relationship between God and humanity is analogous to the Chinese relationship between Heaven and humanity, yet there must be an "intermediary" or "middleman" to communicate between the two; this intermediary can be a priest, a prophet, the Church, or a minister. This continued until the rise of Protestantism, which opposed the Roman Catholic system and advocated "sola Fide" (by faith alone), "sola Scriptura" (by Scripture alone), and "solus Christus" (through Christ alone), opening a new world that "no longer required intermediaries" and "abolished the middleman." Protestant theorists could cite sociopolitical factors—the wealth-gathering, extravagance, corruption, and decadence of the Catholic Church—as evidence, but these were not necessary reasons in a metaphysical sense. The belief that an "omniscient and omnipotent" God could communicate directly with the hearts of the faithful was merely a new "hypothesis" proposed by Protestant theorists, with evidence drawn from psychological association, empathy, or even hallucination. Regarding the cause of these differences, Zhao Tingyang seems to reach an intellectual limit. He writes that in the European tradition, "Why does the relationship between God and humanity require an intermediary? There is no necessary reason; it is a matter of tradition." Similarly, in the Chinese tradition, "Why does the relationship between Heaven and humanity not require an intermediary? There is also no necessary reason; it is a matter of tradition."
Explaining the divergence between Chinese and Western concepts of the Heaven-humanity relationship as being a "matter of tradition" is not an appeal to agnosticism. Rather, it touches upon the more complex, overall cultural differences underlying religious concepts, including profound disagreements in the field of philosophy. This is because religious conceptual systems must use philosophical concepts and logical argumentation to prove themselves credible and worthy of belief. Closely related to core categories such as "Heaven" (Chinese tradition) and "God" (Western tradition), the Chinese and Western worlds have developed different understandings of highly abstract concepts such as transcendence, perfection, infinity, eternity, existence, and nature. These differing understandings of philosophical concepts lead people to construct different "ontologies" and "histories." The "vast and stubborn differences in faith" are all built upon their respective cultural foundations.
Religions, especially monotheistic ones, are unwilling to face doubt; they will even go so far as to physically eliminate the doubter, because doubt implies that the religion lacks indubitable certainty. Yet religion cannot exempt itself from the challenges of skepticism and must strive to respond to them, a process that has facilitated the development of religious philosophy. Ultimately, however, religion is not philosophy; God only becomes the fulcrum of a philosophical system during specific periods (such as Scholastic theology in the European Middle Ages). Whether one responds to doubt to defend faith, or raises doubts to seek wisdom—this is the conceptual basis upon which religion and philosophy diverge. From this perspective, China has no monotheistic tradition. This is not to say that China lacks "religious" sentiments and concepts, or lacks a transcendent "deep perception." In traditional Chinese concepts of transcendence, there is no established unique being similar to God, nor is it accepted that God is a supreme being; rather, multiple divinities coexist. "Heaven [4] is seen as the greatest transcendent existence." Heaven covers the world and encompasses all things, appearing in myriad and innumerable forms. Heaven can refer to "all possible ways in which all things exist," but Heaven is not an abstract, formless God.
Christianity and Islam are imported religions and cannot represent Chinese modes of thinking or cultural traits. Because Chinese tradition does not believe in a single supreme god—Buddhism and Taoism being polytheistic or pantheistic—they are actually closer to "atheism" within the context of Western religious philosophy. By comparison, Confucianism is better suited to characterize the spiritual world of the Chinese people. However, compared to the Christian tradition, Confucianism is excessively "secularized," focusing intensely on political-ethical issues and "remaining perpetually silent" on questions of transcendence. Confucianism is also not a "religion" in the sense of Western religious philosophy. Zhao Tingyang argues that within the Chinese cultural system deeply influenced by Confucianism, "history" is the most important cultural "foundation stone." Historical reflection or the philosophy of history became the base and source of Chinese culture; from its very origin, Chinese culture "distanced itself" from religion.
The Western Christian tradition concerns itself with necessity, the One, and Being, investing emotion, faith, and intellect into a God who integrates the absolute, the perfect, and the eternal. Chinese culture’s high degree of concern for history, conversely, leads Chinese philosophy toward "possibility, rather than necessity." The core categories of concern for Chinese philosophy "are becoming rather than being, change rather than eternity, flexibility rather than perfection, the indeterminate Dao [5] rather than established law, relations rather than the individual..." Consequently, Chinese culture and ancient Chinese philosophy did not leave sufficient intellectual space for religion, and the political and social space left for religion was also very limited.
III. From Monotheistic Tradition to Modern Monism
In his book Four Bifurcations, Zhao Tingyang gives a clear definition of the concept of modernity: "a complete set of lifestyles and modes of production unfolding with the sovereign individual and the sovereign state as the basic units of existence." Since the world entered the modern era, represented by liberalism originating in Europe, the greatest change in the human conceptual system has been the shift from believing in "God or Heaven and Earth" to vowing for individual reason and subjectivity, accompanied by the confidence that a continuous conquest of nature can be achieved. A new human myth has replaced traditional religious myths. Although most Europeans today would insist that they live in a highly secularized society, rarely go to church, lack religious faith, and have even forgotten God, Zhao Tingyang discovers that the modern West has undergone a transformation from monotheism as a religion to monism as a doctrine. "Monism has creatively reshaped itself, transforming in a more effective way into the deep structure of modernity." Monism is "highly mature and deeply rooted" within the Western conceptual system. For the mental development of people living under a Western cultural background, whether it be monotheism or monism, it is both a shaping force and a constraint.
It is a historical fact that sounds paradoxical: medieval theological research cultivated the "grave diggers" of religious faith. The Western modern concept of subjectivity originated from medieval Christian faith. Cultural elites of the Middle Ages—priests, monastics, monks, and scholars—sought to understand the spirit of God by investigating all things created by God. However, they gradually discovered that compared to researching all things, the more worthy object of study was Man. This sustained investigative activity proposed a proposition with the potential to subvert theology—"Man is the most wondrous existence among all things." Research pursuing religious knowledge degenerated into research deconstructing religious faith; once "reflection on Man became the core of all knowledge," the "problem of Man became superior to all problems." Man eventually replaced God, becoming the foundation and starting point of knowledge.
An examination of the changes in Western ontological concepts reveals that, having cast off the protection of religion and dependence on nature, modernity is a history of humanity achieving individual freedom and also a history of moving toward "individualization." In his book The Fulcrum of First Philosophy, Zhao Tingyang provides a more detailed demonstration of the construction process of absolute subjectivity. The atomized individual based on individual reason replaced God as the logical starting point for constructing modern values. This subversive change did not remain solely at the epistemological level; humanity subsequently attained a core position in the fields of knowledge, economics, and politics: the epistemological expression is "I think, therefore I am"; the expression in the economic field is "maximization of self-interest"; and the expression in the political and legal fields is natural rights and the supremacy of human rights. Internal man, economic man, and political man merged into one. Modernity gives every person a spiritual world and a sovereign world belonging to themselves; the body, the self, property, and power respectively become the individual's natural boundary, spiritual boundary, boundary of disposable space, and political boundary.
The philosophical conceptual basis of modern Western monism is subjectivity. A mature concept of subjectivity starts from the "Cogito" and includes individual reason, independent personality, and moral autonomy. This is an "achievement of modern people," or one might say, an "invention of modern culture." In the book The Shadow of Monotheism, Zhao Tingyang naturally felt no need to define the meaning of subjectivity when facing Lebichon. In a recently published article, he provides a general definition of subjectivity: "a thought-action terminal possessing cognitive sovereignty, moral sovereignty, and self-awareness." Descartes’ "I think, therefore I am" established human subjectivity only at the epistemological level. Thereafter, thinkers continuously excavated the connotations of subjectivity from Man himself, such as Kant’s categorical imperative and the rational strategies for pursuing individual interest in British empiricism. The commonality of these intellectual efforts lies in the fact that "logically and realistically, they reject any concept of the Good that transcends subjectivity."
The process of justifying the subjectivity of the self is a "self-referential story of self-proof," which shares a similar thinking logic with the story in Christian theology proving Jesus Christ as the Son of God. The Trinity of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit witness each other, forming a closed loop of discourse. The self as subject treats the production, life, ideological concepts, and organizational forms of others as epistemological and political problems, which is identical in effect to traditional monotheism treating the lives of heathens as "religious problems": when the self as subject defines truth, truth becomes an "epistemological problem"; when the self judges value, value becomes an "ethical problem"; when the self regards itself as an independent, absolute subject, identity becomes a "political problem." Based on subjectivity, the claim of "natural rights" [6] emerged and drove the practice of related political and legal systems; the concept of "natural rights" became institutionalized and systematized, becoming closer to an institutionalized quasi-religion. From this perspective, the image of the absolute self constructed on individual subjectivity is the object of faith in modern monism; the modern theology of monism remains the West's "cathedral of thought."
In Zhao Tingyang’s view, modern theology has constructed a self-image for humanity and canonized itself, yet it faces several paradoxes in an ontological sense. First, "the absolute ego possesses an internal world of pure thought (cogitatum qua cogitatum)." This internal world of the self exists autonomously and for itself, "self-severed" (rather than "self-aware") from the external world. The self neither wishes to enter the world of others or the external world, nor does it have the power to describe, summarize, or explain them; the world of the self is thus fabricated as the entire world. The paradox inherent in this philosophical view of subjectivity is that "when the world is equated with the self and the Other disappears, the concept of the subject itself will lose meaning due to the loss of contrast." Second, the creed of modern monism is "better to believe in oneself than to believe in God." Zhao Tingyang denounces this as "absurd." Humanity has not provided sufficient reliable evidence that it is worthy of trust; on the contrary, the harm of human-made disasters [7] in history has been even more severe than natural calamities. Regarding important issues in the lived world—such as what are good, truth, and the future—people "know almost nothing," even though some may flaunt themselves as omniscient. Therefore, "believing in oneself" is extremely "unreliable." The world dominated by the subjectivity of the self is at best a "self-referential world of words"; its essence is a world that has replaced real life and in which people are exempt from mutual responsibility. Third, a conceptual system based on individual reason has constructed an ontology of the absolute self; the individual claims to "possess unconditional rights," and the individual crowns themselves as the "master of knowledge" and "moral arbiter," subsequently "almost" attaining a status "on par with God." Zhao Tingyang bluntly calls this a "pseudo-religion."
IV. Monism Creates More Ontological Difficulties
Monism itself is an interesting story about the world, life, and history, and is "one of the most poetic traditional interpretations" given to total existence. Exclusivity comes from monotheism, but monotheism was not exclusive at its inception. Lebichon’s examination of the Book of Deuteronomy in the Bible found that before the appearance of the prophet Moses, although primitive Judaism was monotheistic, it did not exist in a hostile relationship with other religions. In the era of the New Testament, Saint Paul invented a universalist ideology and vigorously promoted monotheism. Thereafter, religious (Christian) universalism combined with political universalism (the Roman Empire), and various parts of medieval Europe gradually became Christianized. With the rise of modern political ideologies, monism inherited the spiritual mantle of monotheism and, as a general methodology of thought, formed cultural boundaries with the civilization as the unit.
The combination of monotheism or monism with universalism forms an "ideological system of concepts." Ideology is actually a conceptual system that self-proclaims absolute leadership over culture—that is, it asserts its own supreme authority. The combination of the two has created massive ontological difficulties for the world and brought disastrous historical circumstances upon humanity. Monotheism not only has the sacred mission of spreading the gospel, changing others, and expanding the congregation, but also has the commandment to "fight to the death for identity and authority." This "arbitrary definition and adjudication of values" was inherited as a cultural gene by modern monism; the self possessing absolute subjectivity became another name for the "dictator." The disasters traditional monotheism created for humanity were the Inquisition and religious wars; the disasters modern monism creates for humanity are the clash of civilizations and ideological struggles—such as launching "Jihads" in the "name of Allah," or mobilizing for anti-terrorist wars under the banners of "human rights" and "democracy."
If it is said that since the Middle Ages, the knowledge-seeking of monotheistic believers toward religion cultivated the "grave diggers of religion," then since the era of Descartes, Hobbes, and Locke in the 17th century, the absolute subjectivity of modern monism, following its own logic of development, has likewise cultivated the "grave diggers of subjectivity." Modern people have constructed an absolute subjectivity of the self; Zhao Tingyang calls this "Self-Made Man." "Self-Made Man" is not only the subject of autonomous will and thought, but also attains complete sovereignty in an ontological sense; he not only rejects the naturalness, historicity, and sociality of human beings, but can even set his own conditions of existence. The logical result of the development of "Self-Made Man" is the gene editing of humans and the development of super-intelligence.
Taking personal rationality, freedom, equality, and human rights from the history of modern Western ideas as theoretical keywords, a "subjective modern theology" has been constructed. This modern monotheistic ideology has manufactured various "logical and ontological fallacies." For example, based on the "biological facts" of individual existence, the concept of human rights and the institutional system of human rights have become a "modern version of a new religion." Regarding the issue of value criticism, if individual value is regarded as absolute, supreme, and legally fictionalized as equal, it will trigger ethical and legal dilemmas such as the "trolley problem." In the modern monotheistic ideology based on self-subjectivity, one person's equal and supreme right to life equals that of five people, which can also be extrapolated to equal all of humanity. One equals five, one equals infinity—this is not only a manifestation of the logical paradox of modern monotheism but also highlights the ontological predicament of the modern world.
The future world is developing in the direction of systematization and technologization. Based on the "union of global capitalists," a "global systematic power" integrates elements such as financial systems, cutting-edge technology, network media, digital technology, and representative systems that usurp the name of democracy to form a diffuse collection of power. "Global systematic power" weakens or even deconstructs the free will of the individual and the autonomous power of the local; traditional political forces with the nation-state as their basic form may also retreat to a secondary position. Since "self-made man" [8] can maintain the consistency of the logic of subjectivity, genetic science can advocate the creation of superhumans, and artificial intelligence can demand the creation of super-intelligence. Represented by the structural logic of AI, frantically developing technology will become a "superpower with a monotheistic mode of thinking." Future monotheism will create upgraded and detailed versions of ontological dilemmas. The most typical dilemma is that information technology and AI make digital ranking effortless; silicon-based life is most adept at making "optimal choices" and making itself the "only" (the one) systematic existence. The "unique system" created by AI "no longer requires politics." Only human beings, as carbon-based life, will recognize that intersubjectivity, interculturality, and transculturality are basic facts in the ontological sense, and will insist on the "many" (the many) of lifestyles, languages, cultures, and value systems, which in turn triggers political questions.
Zhao Tingyang regards the future monotheistic mode of thinking as a terrifying and destructive force. AI, this man-made artifact, can make value judgments about humans and may regard humans as "valueless lower organisms," mercilessly conducting a "Last Judgment" upon humanity; this is the "suicide of civilization." Previously, although inequality of quantity (wealth, status) was widespread in human society, it was still tolerable. Genetic science, however, can create immortal humans, and AI can create super-AI in terms of thought and practical ability. A small number of people can obtain immortality and superior intelligence through high technology, while the majority are downgraded to "locusts." This "qualitative inequality"—the inequality of the right to life—is unbearable.
The liberal view of human rights, this modern new religion, did not directly develop into future anti-human AI, nor is human rights the direct cause of anti-human AI. There is a long road between human rights and AI, and people are misled by many signposts, the "most misleading sign" of which is that liberalism "places human rights and technological progress in a supreme position." Currently, liberalism is not a "theory" but a "popular ideology."
V. Chinese Intellectual Resources for Reconstructing the Ontological Order of the World
It is precisely these global ontological dilemmas of the present and future that prompt Zhao Tingyang to rediscover the value of Chinese intellectual resources. The Western ontological system of concepts is based on "being," and Western philosophy therefore takes "necessity" as its core issue. Since the Western Zhou Dynasty, originating from the I Ching (Book of Changes), the ontology of Chinese philosophy has been based on "becoming" (变易之存在), taking "possibility" as its core issue. Based on keywords such as the relational subject (as opposed to the self-subject) and relational rationality (as opposed to self-rationality), and centering on core propositions such as the ontology of co-existence (non-exclusive ontology) and "co-existence precedes existence" (the other and the self are equally autonomous and free existences), Zhao Tingyang has constructed a "New Tianxia System" [9]. This aims to "replace individual rationality aimed at maximizing interests with relational rationality aimed at minimizing conflict," rejecting a world order where "the strong rule the weak," and creating a "compatible ontological order for the world."
When exploring the ability of the relational subject and the ontology of co-existence to construct an intellectual order, Zhao Tingyang found that self-subjectivity ignores the "other" who is just as autonomous and free as the self, whereas traditional Chinese Confucianism focuses on the problem of interpersonal ethics—the "problem of how to co-exist with the transcendent other." Based on the concept of Ren (仁, benevolence/humaneness), Confucius proposed a rational solution to ontological dilemmas. In the third letter, Zhao Tingyang uses Western philosophical concepts to explain the intellectual connotations of Ren. Literally, Ren refers to the relationship "of-two-persons" (任意两人之间); its theoretical meaning can be further explained: first, in a non-political state, as the "purest and most basic condition and unit," Ren can be used to explain any ethical norm formed between two people; second, the relationship of Ren can serve as the "foundation upon which humanity can form a consensus on mutual obligations"; third, with the help of Ren, one can support the "co-existence conditions for universal ethical laws," which Zhao Tingyang summarizes as "Confucius's Golden Rule"—mutual benefit, with no one harmed; fourth, the relationship of Ren is the "path to achieving self-humanization through the humanization of others." In the fifth letter, Zhao Tingyang uses Western philosophical propositions to explain the two basic principles of Ren: first, the "negative formula," which nearly coincides with the Golden Rule of Christianity—"Do not do to others what you would not have them do to you" [10]; second, the "affirmative formula," which differs significantly from the Christian Golden Rule—"Establish others if you wish to establish yourself; help others achieve if you wish to achieve yourself" [11]. This is a "robust reciprocal strategy."
Taking the protection of human rights as another example, Zhao Tingyang proposes changing the definition of value from "the individual as the unit" to redefining value based on the foundational ethical fact of "mutual relations." This involves changing the demand for rights protection that views human rights as "unconditionally valid," abandoning the ideology that views "human obligations" as "optional," and correcting the imbalance and asymmetry between individual rights claims and the assumption of obligations. He suggests replacing the ideology of "natural rights" (innate rights) with a conceptual system of "prepaid human rights": "a person is entitled to enjoy their human rights if and only if they have fulfilled their obligations as a human being and respect the human rights of others," thereby achieving balance and symmetry between individual rights and obligations.
Judging from the contents of Alain Le Pichon's five letters, he holds extremely optimistic expectations for the influence of Chinese culture: the ancient Chinese language could develop into a "new global Chinese," a "new balanced world" is approaching, and China will become a "super-hegemon" (超级霸主), posing a shock to the legacy of Christian civilization. However, these judgments do not accord with the facts; even if classified as "prospects" or "foresight," they are truly too far ahead of their time. A more factual judgment is the one provided by Zhao Tingyang: contemporary China has neither the ability to "set the agenda or establish rules for the world's game" nor can it, like ancient China, "set a material and spiritual example for other countries." Although there was a "honeymoon period" in Sino-European cultural exchange during the 17th and 18th centuries, Chinese culture "was never truly internalized into the subject of European culture." The cultural keywords provided by Chinese culture and absorbed by European culture are extremely limited, let alone theoretical propositions or conceptual systems.
For over a hundred years, the mainstream of cultural exchange between China and the West has been the "Eastward Transmission of Western Learning" (西学东渐) [12]; an East-West balance has not been formed, and we are still far from the "Westward Transmission of Eastern Learning." Zhao Tingyang uses an ingenious metaphor: if the Chinese cultural tradition is viewed as a "shadow," China has sold its "shadow" to the West over the past century. However, despite the violent battering by Western monotheism, the Chinese "soul" (mode of thinking, intellectual grammar) has survived. The corresponding change is that modern Chinese civilization has been Westernized to a large extent, but at the same time, it still preserves parts of Chinese tradition. In this sense, modern China is indeed a "transcultural existence," and modern Chinese civilization has now become a "cultural hybrid." Chinese intellectual resources and Western intellectual resources coexist within modern Chinese thought, forming an internal structure of "complementarity" or "contradiction." Paradoxically, over the forty-plus years of reform and opening up, the impulse and passion of Chinese people for economic development have once again encountered the exclusivism of Western monotheism: "Although it was the West that initially urged China to become Westernized, when China really became very much like the West, Western society became very displeased." From this perspective, modern Western monotheism only accepts followers and disciples; it cannot accept competitors and rivals. This once again coincides with the concepts of monotheistic religion.
VI. Conclusion
The page of history concerning monotheistic religion has not yet been turned completely, and the conceptual influence of contemporary monotheism is spreading rapidly. Monotheism no longer relies on the single form of religion but instead makes its appearance through various new forms such as global languages, political and legal systems, market rules, technical standards, and popular culture. Monotheistic universalism forms relations of exploitation, enslavement, oppression, dominance, and control over others and alien cultures in the economic, political, intellectual, and conceptual spheres, manufacturing antagonistic dilemmas in these realms. Stepping out of monotheistic religion may only require a little more time, but there is little expectation for stepping out of monotheism.
In the face of the intensifying new round of trade wars and public opinion wars, the "New Cold War" has become a topic of heated discussion worldwide. In this context, the shadow of monotheism flickers—now dim, now bright, seemingly hidden but actually omnipresent. Current discussions on ontology and the world order are not mere academic small talk but serious topics. How to transcend the "clash of civilizations" and move toward a "conjunction of civilizations"—"to be with the others or not to be" is the contemporary version of "to be or not to be."
For a century, China has gradually come to know the West, but the West is not yet able to comprehensively know China. The barrier of "knowledge" (mutual understanding) may be bridgeable, but the barrier of the "heart" (mutual identification and acceptance) is difficult to cross. Transculturalism helps to break the "spell" of monotheism, but "faith is more fundamental than reason"—this is the true problem and the crux of trans-subjective and transcultural practice. As per Zhao Tingyang's judgment, in the history of human culture, successful cases of transculturalism are extremely limited; the mixture of ancient Greek philosophy and Judaism to create Christian theology may be seen as a rare, or even unique, successful case of transcultural creation. Regarding the ten letters exchanged between the two men, their communication cannot be regarded as fully reciprocal intellectual interaction, but rather as an attempt to find more "cultural focal points." This may be seen as the foundational work for the exchange and mutual learning between civilizations.
Online Editor: Tong Xin Source: Science and Atheism, Issue 5, 2023