Qi Xiangyang and Zhang Rui: On the Internal Logic of the Atheistic Thought in the Laozi

Since the modern era, influenced by Western intellectual trends, the academic community has debated extensively whether the Laozi maintains a theistic outlook. The focus of this debate primarily centers on the philosophical nature of "Dao." The resulting viewpoints can generally be divided into three categories. The first view asserts that the Laozi represents idealist theism. For instance, in the late 1950s, during a major debate over the philosophical nature of the Laozi, Guan Feng and Lin Yushi proposed that "Dao is absolute spirit rather than a material category," thereby affirming the divine essence of Laozi’s thought ^[1]. The second view maintains that the Laozi represents materialist atheism. In the current century, for example, Mr. Yun Peiji affirmed the materialist essence of "Dao," thereby affirming the atheistic position of the Laozi. The third view affirms both the materialist essence of "Dao" and Laozi’s acknowledgment of the existence of ghosts and spirits (guishen). In the 1980s, Mr. Wang Yousan affirmed the materialist essence of the Laozi, arguing that it replaced the traditional divine Heaven with "Dao" and is thus anti-theological; simultaneously, he acknowledged an incomplete aspect of Laozi’s atheism, suggesting that "the Laozi still did not completely break free from the mystery of the Way of Heaven, ghosts, and spirits, though these only occupy a very subordinate position here."

The first two perspectives utilize the philosophical nature of "Dao" as the criterion for judging whether the Laozi holds to theism—if "Dao" is spiritual, it is theic; if not, it is atheistic. This evaluative standard originates in the West and cannot be fully applied to the thought of the Laozi. As the third perspective suggests, the materiality of "Dao" and the existence of ghosts and spirits coexist within the Laozi. How, then, should we correctly understand this seemingly contradictory thought? This requires integrating the metaphysical and physical realms of the Laozi rather than focusing purely on the metaphysical realm of "Dao." In the physical realm, the dialectical view that "the myriad things carry the yin and embrace the yang, and through the blending of qi they achieve harmony" ^[2] constitutes Laozi’s fundamental cognition of the world’s mode of existence. This affirms the dominance of objective laws over the operation of things and strips ghosts and spirits of their power to govern affairs, which further leads to the thorough de-divinization of the metaphysical world in the Laozi.

I. The Regularity of the Dialectical View

The text of the Laozi contains a large number of statements expressing the idea of the transformation of opposites. Some regard these as Laozi’s "primitive dialectics" and have provided extensive dialectical interpretations. However, in the process of interpretation, it was discovered that this thought on the transformation of opposites seems to seriously neglect necessary conditions for such transformation ^[3]. Based on this perceived flaw, some argue that such thought cannot be called "dialectics" (bianzhengfa) but should rather be termed a "dialectical view" (bianzhengguan). For instance, Mr. Zhang Maoze believes that Laozi’s dialectical thought did not rise to the level of methodology; it possesses only a primitive nature-dialectical view without the method of dialectics. In fact, Laozi’s so-called dialectics not only lack the conditions for the transformation of opposites but also involve almost no mention of the law of the transition from quantitative to qualitative change or the law of the negation of the negation. It merely states the fact that contradictions transform into one another, and thus can only be called a dialectical view.

However, is such a dialectical view an intellectual incompleteness or flaw? From the perspective of modern dialectics, it certainly is. But from the perspective of the Laozi’s thought itself, it is not. The listing of contradictory categories in the Laozi is intended only to reveal the inherent contradictory nature of things, thereby transcending these contradictions to articulate its political proposition of "non-action" (wuwei). Its purpose lies in solving the problem of "how to govern the myriad things that possess a contradictory nature," rather than intentionally researching dialectics. This primitive, seemingly flawed dialectical thought is sufficient for the theory of the Laozi and requires no further scrutiny. At the same time, however, Laozi’s dialectical view is a cognition of the regularity ^[4] of the world. We may deny that it constitutes dialectics in the modern sense, but we cannot deny its regularity.

First, this recognition of regularity includes the relationship of transformation between contradictions. Chapter 2 of the received text states: "Being and non-being produce each other; difficult and easy complete each other; long and short contrast each other; high and low rest upon each other; voice and sound harmonize each other; front and back follow each other." Opposing categories can transform into one another. For example, "being" (you) and "non-being" (wu) seem to contradict the unidirectional generative relationship stated in Chapter 40: "Being is born from non-being." In fact, this is not the case; it is merely an erroneous alteration during the transmission of the text. The earliest Guodian Chu bamboo slips read: "The things of the world are born of being, [and being] is born of non-being," which is not contradictory ^[5]. Furthermore, Chapter 58 says: "Bad fortune is what good fortune leans upon; good fortune is what bad fortune hides in. Who knows its limit? Does it have no 'correct' (zheng)? The correct turns again into the heterodox (qi), and the good turns again into the monstrous. People's confusion has indeed lasted for a long time." Within this, the phrase "Does it have no 'correct'?" appears in the Mawangdui Silk Manuscript version B as "It has no 'correct'"—a declarative sentence rather than a question, directly negating the "correct." People have long been obsessed with seeking the so-called "correct," neglecting the law of the transformation of opposites in all things, failing to understand that even if one establishes a "correct," a "heterodox" is simultaneously produced. What is "correct"? There is no "correct," only the objective law of the transformation of opposites.

Second is the relationship of unity between contradictions. The transformation of opposites does not necessarily lead to a negative outcome; it depends on how the subject responds to this universal law. The Laozi does not adopt measures to obstruct transformation because of the opposition; rather, it views them as a whole, dealing with the transformation between contradictions from a holistic perspective. Contradictions are inherently unified within the whole of a thing. The second half of the phrase "the myriad things carry the yin and embrace the yang" is "and through the blending of qi they achieve harmony." "Harmony" (he) emphasizes the relationship of unity between contradictions. Fan Yingyuan of the Northern Song Dynasty said: "Whenever there is a thing with form, the formless resides within it; therefore, the qi of yin and yang interact to achieve harmony." Although this interpretation is from the perspective of qi theory, it still asserts the relationship of unity between contradictions. Furthermore, in Chapter 58, immediately following the text cited above is: "Therefore, the sage is square but does not cut." "Therefore" (shiyi) indicates that the subsequent content is inferred from the preceding text. "Square but does not cut" means not severing the whole. For the sage to achieve this non-severance of the whole, in Laozi’s view, he must practice "non-action." This proposition is expressed even more clearly in Chapter 2, where the cited passage is followed by: "Therefore, the sage dwells in the affair of non-action." This follows the same logic as Chapter 58: after discussing the necessity of the law of transformation of opposites, it infers how the sage should respond—namely, by starting from the unity of contradictions and according with this necessity that exists within the whole. The so-called transformation of opposites is itself a law existing within the whole. By looking at problems from the perspective of the whole, one can transcend the quagmire of opposing transformations and rise to the level of governance through "Dao."

Additionally, it must be clarified that Laozi’s view that "the soft and weak overcome the hard and strong" does not belong to the content of his dialectical view. The dialectical view described above is an acknowledgment of both sides of a contradiction, where one side is not superior or stronger than the other. However, "the soft and weak overcome the hard and strong" is different; it makes a clear hierarchical distinction between the two sides of the contradiction. Does this indicate that Laozi’s theory is self-contradictory? In fact, no. "The myriad things carry the yin and embrace the yang" and "the soft and weak overcome the hard and strong" are discussed at different levels. The former pertains to the "myriad things"—the governed—and is their universal law. The latter pertains to the ruler’s means of governance—namely, that the ruler’s soft means of governance are superior to hard methods of rule. For example, Chapter 36 says: "The soft and weak overcome the hard and strong... the sharp instruments of the state should not be shown to the people." This means that coercive or "hard" laws and regulations cannot be used to govern the common people. Similarly, Chapter 43 states: "The softest thing in the world gallops over the hardest thing in the world. That which has no substance enters where there is no crack. I thus know the benefit of non-action." Here, "softness" has already become a synonym for "non-action," highlighting the benefits of "softness" through comparison with "hardness." Furthermore, Chapters 76 and 78 use examples of humans, plants, and water to illustrate the importance of "softness and weakness," all of which are intended to demonstrate the rationality of "non-action." "Non-action" is a negation of traditional power politics, requiring rulers to reduce coercion and control, while the relationship between "softness" and "hardness" serves as an analogy for this negation.

In summary, Laozi’s dialectical view reveals an objective law universally followed by the myriad things. It is his recognition of the regularity of the world and constitutes his fundamental understanding of reality. When Engels elucidated the general scientific nature of the connections in dialectics, he said: "The laws of dialectics are abstracted from the history of nature and the history of human society. The laws of dialectics are nothing but the most general laws of these two aspects of historical development, as well as of thought itself." This kind of dialectics is an objective dialectics, and moreover, a scientific dialectics, distinguished from Hegel’s idealist dialectics. Looking back at Laozi’s dialectical view, although it is highly primitive in color—only preliminarily involving the transformation and unity of contradictions while ignoring the existence of conditions—it can nevertheless be called a truthful recognition of the objective world. It is the "myriad things" that "carry the yin and embrace the yang"; it is the myriad things of the world that possess a contradictory nature. Therefore, we can also say that his dialectical view preliminarily possesses a scientific character. This scientific dialectical view prompted Laozi to form a rationalist worldview, parting ways with traditional Heavenly Mandate and ghosts and spirits—the mode of existence of the myriad things is regular, and it is this regularity that governs and determines the operation of all things, rather than so-called ghosts and spirits.

II. The De-divinization of the Empirical World

The term "dialectics" (bianzheng) does not appear in the text of the Laozi, nor do terms like "opposition" or "contradiction." Instead, it uses the two characters "yin" and "yang" to summarize its contradictory thought. Yin-yang thought was not invented by Laozi; it was produced long before him—the I Ching (Classic of Changes) used "yin" and "yang" as basic symbols to represent all contradictions in the world. To a large extent, the Laozi inherited the methods and thoughts of the I Ching. By saying "the myriad things carry the yin and embrace the yang," it uses "yin and yang" to represent the contradictory attributes of all things, thereby initiating a recognition of the world’s regularity. Simultaneously, the Laozi was influenced by the naturalist and humanist intellectual trends of the time, allowing its understanding of the world to basically break free from the dominance of divine will. Why say "basically"?

On one hand, the Laozi did not thoroughly negate the existence of ghosts and spirits. The views in Chapter 39—"The spirits attained the One and became divine"—and Chapter 60—"Its ghosts are not divine... its spirits do not harm people"—seriously weaken the role of ghosts and spirits, yet they still leave room for their existence. This is a reflection of the persistence of traditional mystical beliefs within Laozi’s thought. We need not deliberately distort the text to affirm Laozi as a thorough atheist; the existence of these views does not affect the de-divinizing revolution of Laozi’s worldview. As Mr. Wang Yousan argued, the Heavenly Mandate, ghosts, and spirits still have a place in Laozi’s philosophy, but it is a very subordinate one. Mystical beliefs have existed since antiquity, largely born to explain natural phenomena, such as gods of rain, the sun, and the moon. The rise of humanism and naturalism led people to discover things with greater explanatory power for natural phenomena—namely, laws like yin-yang and the Five Elements. For instance, Bo Yangfu of the Western Zhou explained earthquakes through the laws of change of the yin and yang qi, which weakened the dominance of the Heavenly Mandate, ghosts, and spirits over the human world. However, the development of humanism and naturalism in the late Spring and Autumn period did not thoroughly negate the existence of spirits. In such an era, it was reasonable for progressive thinkers to leave room for the existence of spirits—just as Confucius only "respected the ghosts and spirits but kept them at a distance" ^[6].

On the other hand, the Laozi upholds a dialectical and regular worldview that prevents the Heavenly Mandate, ghosts, and spirits from exerting their influence. First, Laozi’s way of viewing things is no longer confined to a single side but possesses a dialectical perspective. Chapter 11 says: "Thirty spokes share one hub; in its 'nothingness' (wu), there is the utility of the carriage. Knead clay to make a vessel; in its 'nothingness,' there is the utility of the vessel. Cut out doors and windows to make a room; in its 'nothingness,' there is the utility of the room. Therefore, what 'is' provides advantage, but what 'is not' provides utility." These three things are listed to discuss the dialectical relationship between "being" (you) and "non-being" (wu). People usually notice only the importance of "being" and thus pursue it, but Laozi noticed the importance of "non-being" as the opposite of "being"—without "non-being," so-called "being" cannot function. Only their unity allows their true function to be realized. Precisely because of this dialectical perspective, Laozi viewed things more comprehensively and objectively, making holistic judgments rather than being confined to one aspect. Of course, this is not to say that his dialectical view has risen to the level of methodology, but only that such dialectical thought exerted a certain degree of influence on his way of viewing things.

Secondly, through a dialectical lens, the Laozi finds that the operation of society possesses its own internal logic: society itself is a unified whole characterized by contradictions. Rulers should respect this contradictoriness and practice a governance of "non-action" (wuwei), rather than relying on the mystical revelations of the Mandate of Heaven ^[7], ghosts, or gods. As an exercise in political philosophy, the Laozi divides political relations into the rulers and the ruled. The rulers include the "sage" (shengren), the "highest" (taishang), and the "dukes and kings" (houwang); the ruled include the "common people" (baixing), the "myriad things" (wanwu), the "folk" (min), and the "multitude" (zhongren). Notably, many designations for the ruled appear as collective concepts, referring to a totality rather than a specific individual. The ruled, as a whole, contain internal contradictions primarily expressed through value-level oppositions, such as "beauty" (mei) versus "ugliness" (e) and "goodness" (shan) versus "lack of goodness" (bushan) in Chapter 2, or "orthodoxy" (zheng) versus "heterodoxy" (qi) and "excellence" (shan) versus "monstrosity" (yao) in Chapter 58. These differing value orientations exist in a state of dialectical transformation; once a ruler mandates a certain value orientation, its opposite will inevitably arise. Therefore, the Laozi opposes "purposeful" (youwei) politics wherein the ruler stipulates values—for instance, Chapter 3’s "not exalting the worthy... not prizing rare goods... not displaying the desirable." Similarly, regarding the critique of "cleverness" (zhi) and "sophistry" (bian), the opening line of the Chu Silk Manuscript (Version A) of the Laozi says "discard cleverness and abandon sophistry" ^[8] precisely because cleverness and sophistry often only account for one side of a contradiction and cannot encompass the whole. Wang Bi provided a penetrating explanation of this, stating: "If one moves the people with clever techniques, their wicked hearts will be stirred; if one then uses ingenious techniques to guard against their fraudulence, the people will recognize the technique and evade it. The more meticulous the ingenuity, the more treachery and fraud will flourish." Rulers who fail to respect the inherent contradictoriness of society and try to "govern the state through cleverness" find that their subjective will not only fails to change objective dialectical laws but draws them into the quagmire of contradictory transformation, leading to social chaos and strife.

However, as stated above, such a dialectical view is not necessarily a "bad" dialectic; it depends on how the ruler responds. According to the view of the Laozi, governance does not require a god or the will of a Mandate of Heaven; rather, one should model oneself after the Way (Dao) and practice "non-action." From beginning to end, Chapter 2 expresses this proposition—confronted with the objective laws of contradiction, a ruler should not practice "purposeful" politics by establishing value orientations like "beauty" or "goodness." Instead, they should respect their objectivity and practice "governance through non-action" and "teaching without words." Yet, this does not mean the objective laws revealed by the dialectical view disappear. "Non-action" does not eliminate this contradictoriness; rather, it views it as the inherent logic of the ruled as a whole or as a system. In this way, one transcends contradictory oppositions and enters a holistic, systemic perspective. When the Laozi views things that are contradictory by nature from a systemic perspective, it has already transcended the habitual binary mode of thinking. Viewing problems from such a perspective is the perspective of the "Way."

Finally, the Laozi developed a recognition of the regularity behind natural phenomena. The traditional "view of the Mandate of Heaven" took "Heaven" (Tian) or the "Heavenly Emperor" (Tiandi) as the master of the world, but the Laozi frequently refers to "Heaven and Earth" (Tiandi) together, treating their cooperation as the natural condition for the production of all things. Chapter 5 states: "The space between Heaven and Earth—is it not like a bellows (tuoyue)? Empty yet never exhausted, moving and only producing more." Here, "Heaven" and "Earth" are used in a naturalistic sense. According to the research of Mr. Wang Youde, as an ancient tool for blowing air, the bellows operates through a repeated cycle of emptiness and fullness, opening and closing. This infinite creativity does not derive solely from "Heaven" or "Earth," but from the "space between Heaven and Earth"—the union of the two poles of "Heaven" and "Earth" allows natural things and phenomena to occur. This mode of "Heaven and Earth" joining involves a naturalistic worldview on the one hand, and is a result of the application of the dialectic of Yin and Yang on the other—the mutual unity of "Heaven" and "Earth" is what creates the myriad things. With such a worldview, specific natural phenomena can be explained. For example, Chapter 32’s "Heaven and Earth join to send down sweet dew" attributes the production of rain to the result of the unity of Heaven and Earth, which remains an application of the dialectical view. Consequently, ghosts and gods lose their function of controlling natural phenomena; they no longer exist as masters of nature, replaced by a dialectical view characterized by regularity.

To summarize, the dialectical view of the Laozi led to a recognition of regularity in the empirical world, thereby negating traditional mystical views of experience. Ghosts and gods thus lost their original utility. Although the Laozi did not thoroughly negate the existence of ghosts and gods, those stripped of their power over the human realm are no different from symbolic icons of belief. Thus, the traditional "Heaven," "Mandate of Heaven," or "Heavenly Emperor" that possessed divine sovereignty no longer fit its basic cognition of the world. Therefore, in its transcendental realm, a further process of atheization took place.

III. Atheization in the Realm of the Primordial Origin

Some believe that the thought of the Laozi should be a top-down penetration—that is, the "Way," free from divine content, came first, followed by the negation of ghosts and gods in the empirical world. This is not actually the case. The "Way" in the Laozi was not imagined out of thin air but was abstracted from a critique of the empirical world. Mr. Feng Youlan believed that the grasp of the "Eternal Way" (changdao) came from the observation of empirical things; Mr. Xu Fuguan believed that Laozi traced upward from the realm of phenomena to discover the "Eternal Way" that brings forth the myriad things; Mr. Guo Qiyong, combining the views of the previous two scholars, proposed: "Deriving constant laws of change from the observation of empirical things is one source of Laozi's philosophical concepts; the 'Way' is a philosophical elevation of empirical life." The proposal of the "Way" takes the critique of the empirical world as its premise; it is a bottom-up philosophical abstraction. Therefore, the recognition of regularity in the empirical world must have come first, followed by the atheization of the primordial realm. This atheization of the primordial origin is profoundly reflected in the Laozi’s thorough negation of the traditional "Heaven" which possessed divine content. The regularity of the dialectical view allowed the Laozi to have a regularized understanding of the empirical world; the metaphysical foundation established therefrom no longer required a "Heaven" with divine content, but rather an atheized "Way."

On the one hand, the traditional concept of "Heaven" with divine content was no longer applicable to the Laozi’s regularized understanding of the empirical world. Over the long course of historical development, "Heaven" had been burdened with too much divine content, exhibiting a strong tendency toward intervention and sovereignty over the human world, with a thick color of "purposefulness" (youwei). For example, during the Western Zhou period, people worshipped "Heaven," which was endowed with various powers to master the human world. Mr. Zhu Fenghan summarized these into three points: first, Heaven masters the rise and fall of dynasties; second, Heaven selects and establishes kings; third, Heaven sends down blessings or disasters upon the world. Such a "Heaven," after the impact of the "Way of Heaven" (tiandao) concept during the Eastern Zhou, became a category with multiple attributes by the end of the Spring and Autumn period. For instance, Feng Youlan believed that the concept of "Heaven" in the Spring and Autumn period involved at least five meanings: "Material Heaven," "Sovereign or Willful Heaven," "Fatalistic Heaven," "Natural Heaven," and "Ethical or Moral Heaven." The "Heaven" in the eyes of the Laozi also possesses multiple attributes; although the "Heaven" it advocates is more naturalistic, it still retains a certain degree of personality or even sovereignty. Expressions like "In governing people and serving Heaven, there is nothing like frugality" in Chapter 59, "Heaven will save them" in Chapter 67, and "What Heaven hates" in Chapter 73 still contain a certain degree of personality. Such a "Heaven," on the one hand, does not conform to the Laozi’s ideal of "the highest ruler is barely known to exist by those below" ^[9]; instead, it falls into the situation of "the next, they feel close to and praise; the next, they fear; the next, they revile." On the other hand, in its capacity as the ruler of all things, it is "purposeful"; it still cannot thoroughly transcend the inherent contradictory nature of things. Thus, a "Heaven" that itself possesses divinity and is widely judged by people was, in the view of the Laozi, unsuitable as the supreme foundation of the empirical world.

On the other hand, compared to the traditional "purposeful" Heaven of divinity, the "Way" created by the Laozi completely negated divinity or personality, completing the atheization of the primordial realm. Since the May Fourth Movement, the academic community has discussed the question of whether the "Way" is idealistic or materialistic at length, yet no consensus has been reached. The reason is largely as Mr. Liu Xiaogan stated: the Laozi never considered whether the "Way" was idealism or materialism; forced questioning is an act of "reverse analogical interpretation" (fanxiang geyi) ^[10]. However, if one must examine the "Way" in the Laozi from the perspective of Marxist philosophy, it could be said to be materialistic for three main reasons: first, sentences in the Laozi text such as "There was something nebulous yet complete" and "The Way as a thing," a point which predecessors like Zhang Xiangsheng have already discussed extensively; second, the "Way" is abstracted from experience, and the "Way" proposed by the Laozi by inducing from a regularized empirical world should also be regular; third, the "Way’s" mode of action upon the empirical world is "non-action," exhibiting no personality, sovereignty, or divine content. This third point is also the evidence within the Laozi text that can demonstrate the atheization of its primordial realm, which will be discussed in detail below.

There are not many direct descriptions of the "Way" in the Laozi text, and it does not directly tell us what the "Way" is; however, there are many expressions concerning "non-action" (wuwei). The governance philosophy of "non-action" originates from the "Way." It was originally a major characteristic of the way the "Way" governs the myriad things—"the nature of the Way is non-action"—which was discovered by the Laozi and subsequently taken as the ideal way to govern society. "Non-action" is not doing nothing; it is a negation of the "purposeful" (youwei) reckless actions of rulers. Past rulers lacked a dialectical way of thinking and were unable to perceive the objective mode of existence of all things as a "unity of opposites." They always intervened in and controlled the survival of all things with their subjective will to satisfy their own private desires; this is falling into the quagmire of contradictory transformation without realizing it. The "Way" is different; it respects the contradictory nature of all things and the objectivity of the law of the unity of opposites without imposing intervention, allowing all things to develop freely. The "Way’s" mode of "non-action" toward all things demonstrates its lack of purpose and will. It is no longer like the traditional "Heaven" where "heavenly affairs must manifest images" ^[11], showing its own subjective will and value orientation; people also cannot obtain some mystical revelation according to the "Way." For example, Chapter 5 says: "Heaven and Earth are not humane (ren); they treat the myriad things as straw dogs." Heaven and Earth follow the "Way"; saying "Heaven and Earth are not humane" actually negates the idea that the "Way" has value orientations or personality. Furthermore, Chapter 38 places the "Way" before humanity (ren), righteousness (yi), and ritual (li), demonstrating its transcendence of values. The "Way" does not distinguish between "orthodoxy" and "heterodoxy" or "goodness" and "badness" in the human world; instead, "those who are good, I treat with goodness; those who are not good, I also treat with goodness." All existences with oppositional differences are embraced under the "Way." This "Way," lacking personality and subjective will, does not require people to praise or sing of it; rather, the "Way is hidden and nameless," and it is sufficient for people's recognition of it to reach the level of "barely knowing it exists." This does not mean the "Way" is a black-box manipulator skilled in political stratagems, but because it is closer to a regularized existence, it does not manifest purpose or private desire. The character "Way" (Dao) itself contains the meaning of "law" or "regularity," and the Laozi's naming it with this character was to an extent intended to borrow its connotation of "regularity." That the "Way" can "stand alone and never change" is precisely because it is close to objective law; it is the Laozi’s regularized understanding of the world. Thus, starting from a regularized empirical world, the world-origin ultimately established is also a regularized existence. Such a world does not need the control or intervention of divine content; it realizes its own ceaseless generation through laws. The primordial realm thus completes its atheization.

IV. Conclusion

Prior to the Laozi, atheistic thought consisted primarily of isolated perspectives. For example, Zichan ^[12], although he proposed the view that "the Way of Heaven is distant, while the Way of Man is near," nonetheless affirmed the dominion of gods over natural phenomena; the power or function of traditional nature deities to govern the sun, moon, mountains, and rivers remained intact. Similarly, while the thought of Yan Ying ^[13] flashed with the brilliance of atheism—seen in his refutations of superstitions such as astrology, praying for rain, and dream divination—he simultaneously agreed with the connection between ghosts and spirits ^[14] and human affairs. In short, none of these figures formed a systematic atheistic worldview; in particular, they failed to break through the shackles of a "Heaven" (天 tian) saturated with divine will, thereby preserving the ultimate basis for people to argue for the rationality of mysticism.

The Laozi, however, broke through the fetters of "Heaven" to establish the "Way" (Dao), proposing a systematic and law-based worldview. By bringing the emergence and operation of things under the governance of objective laws, it stripped the Mandate of Heaven (Tianming) and the ghosts and spirits of their ability to control worldly affairs, reducing them to mere symbolic markers of traditional belief. This constitutes the realization of the value of the Laozi’s atheistic thought in its own time. It was precisely the pioneering work of the Laozi that inspired a path for understanding cosmogony ^[15], placing ghosts and spirits in a subordinate position beneath the origin of the universe.

For instance, The Great One Gave Birth to Water (Taiyi Shengshui) ^[16], likely composed during the early-to-mid Warring States period, clearly drew upon the thought of the Laozi to construct a cosmogonic sequence: "The Great One, water, heaven, earth, gods and spirits (shenming), yin and darkness, yang and light..." Here, "gods and spirits" were integrated into the generative sequence and relegated to a secondary position. Another example is the "Dao Yuan" chapter of the Four Classics of the Yellow Emperor ^[17], which is completely devoid of the shadow of ghosts and spirits in its understanding of the universe’s origin, attributing the cause of the existence and emergence of all things to the "Great Void" (Taixu). It states: "The ten thousand things obtain it to be born; the hundred affairs obtain it to be completed." The word "it" here refers to the Great Void. Furthermore, the Huainanzi ^[18] borrowed from the thought of the Laozi to construct a cosmogonic sequence where "the Way began in the Void and Vastness... Heaven has nine fields... the five planets... their spirit is the Year Star (Jupiter)." Spirits remained integrated into the generative sequence in a subordinate capacity.

This logic of cosmogony has continued to the present day; when combined with Western philosophy, it has further sublimated the rational spirit of the Laozi’s thought. For example, Hegel understood the "Way" of the Laozi as "primordial reason" (die ursprüngliche Vernunft) possessing the function of generating the universe. Similarly, Mr. Chen Guying ^[19], starting from the perspective of modern philosophy, has profoundly elucidated the cosmogony of the Laozi, arguing that the "Way" is a "real existing thing" that possesses regularity and creates heaven, earth, and the ten thousand things. In sum, the rationalist worldview of the Laozi not only became the most systematic atheistic worldview of the Spring and Autumn period but also exerted a profound influence on the development of subsequent cosmogonies. Because of it, humanity gained an additional rationalist path for explaining the world.