Wang Xiaofei and Zhuang Ying: Research on the Rule-of-Law Definition of the Concept of Extremism: Rules and Definitions
For a long time, the academic community and legal practitioners have called for China to formulate specialized anti-extremism or de-radicalization laws. The "effectiveness of law should first depend on the clarity of terminology, that is, the clarification of legal concepts." Among these, an important concept requiring clarification is extremism. Although legal norms such as the Criminal Law, the Counter-Terrorism Law, and the Regulations on Religious Affairs frequently use the term "extremism," none have provided a satisfactorily clear legal definition. From the perspective of legislative history, Article 104 of the Counter-Terrorism Law of the People's Republic of China (Draft) once explicitly provided that extremism "refers to thoughts, speech, and acts that distort religious teachings and promote religious extremism, as well as those that advocate violence, harbor hatred toward society, and oppose humanity." However, based on various considerations, the final adopted legal text did not incorporate this definition, which has resulted in the clarification of the concept of extremism remaining an issue. Regarding international anti-extremism cooperation, the clarification of the connotation of extremism in domestic law constitutes the basis and prerequisite for deepening international cooperation. Although documents such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) Convention on Countering Extremism provide a definition of extremism, they do not restrict member states' domestic laws from expanding that definition based on their national realities. How, then, should China define the concept of extremism within a rule-of-law framework?
Current academic research on the concept of extremism mainly focuses on perspectives such as comparing it with the concept of terrorism, exploring its essence based on historical materialism, and determining its genus concept. These are fundamentally the products of single disciplines such as philosophy, political science, or law, but few studies specifically explore the issue of defining extremism through the lens of the rule of law. Defining extremism under the rule of law involves at least the disciplines of philosophy, law, and criminology, because the nature of the concept of extremism is a conceptual one, its rule-of-law transformation turns it into a legal concept, and the extension [1] of extremism manifests as a phenomenon of crime. Therefore, this study adopts an integrated research perspective to analyze the viewpoints of domestic and foreign scholars and the legal texts of representative countries. It proposes the rules that must be followed in the rule-of-law definition of the concept of extremism and attempts a preliminary definition of the connotation of extremism, with the aim of laying a foundation for China’s future formulation of specialized anti-extremism or de-radicalization laws.
I. An Examination of Theoretical Perspectives on the Concept of Extremism
(1) The Concept of Extremism: Genus Concepts and Essential Differences
A genus concept is a superordinate concept, while a species concept is a subordinate concept. The genus concept is the prerequisite for accurately understanding the connotation of the species concept and also determines its nature. As extremism is a subordinate concept, what is its genus concept? Five main viewpoints exist in academic circles. First is the "Advocacy and Act Theory." This view holds that extremism belongs to advocacies and acts; it is expressed or articulated externally and can be perceived, but it does not belong to the realm of "thought." For instance, some research suggests: "'Extremism' generally refers to advocacies and acts that take certain extreme political views or ideologies as a faith and intentionally choose extreme means, particularly violent means, to express those views or bring about political or social change." Other views suggest: "Extremism refers to advocacies and acts that distort religious teachings, use the name of religion as a pretext, or use other methods to incite religious fanaticism, incite ethnic hatred or discrimination, advocate violence, or incite the implementation of terrorist activities." Second is the "Act Theory." This view holds that extremism consists of acts carried out under the governance of a certain subjective consciousness or idea. For example, some research points out that extremism refers to: "Any act taken by individuals or organizations against themselves or a third party using violent or other non-violent means to achieve something that seriously deviates from socially recognized values and rejects any inconsistent ideas, thereby causing serious social consequences." "Extremism is an illegal act built upon thoughts that run contrary to the dominant ideology of a country." Third is the "Theory/Advocacy and Act Theory." This view is specifically divided into two categories; the commonality is the recognition that extremism is a "theory or advocacy," while the main difference lies in whether it is recognized as having the attribute of an "act." For example, some research suggests: "Extremism should refer to any systematic theory or advocacy and act that seriously runs contrary to the recognized values accepted by the vast majority of a country's citizens or the international community." Others believe extremism refers to "theories or advocacies that use extreme means to achieve certain ends." Fourth is the "Ideology and Belief Theory." This view places extremism in the fields of philosophy or psychology, viewing it as a set of ideas or a personality tendency. For instance, some scholars believe that extremism is essentially a conceptual ideology, or a belief that the success and continuation of an in-group must be achieved through hostile actions against an out-group. Fifth is the "Blank Theory" [2]. This view places extremism within a sociological field of vision, describing the connotation of extremism without clearly defining its genus concept. For example, some scholars point out: "'Extremism' refers to adopting extremely radical attitudes and methods toward a specific target group to satisfy certain social, political, ethnic, or religious demands, or even inflicting threats or harm upon them." "Extremism refers to a deviation from the general behavioral or attitudinal patterns commonly existing under a specific social background."
The term being defined is the definiendum; with the genus concept as its superordinate concept, the essential difference between the definiendum and other species concepts belonging to the same genus is called the "differentia." To accurately understand the concept of extremism, one must also take the reasonable determination of the differentia as a prerequisite; otherwise, it is difficult to clarify the boundaries between it and related concepts. The aforementioned academic viewpoints mainly include four categories. First is the "Single-Element Theory," which holds that the essential difference between extremism and other species concepts in the same genus lies only in the ideological basis—its content runs contrary to a country's ideology or socially recognized values. Second is the "Two-Element Theory: Target/Purpose + Means." This view emphasizes that "target or purpose" and "means" are the essential differences between extremism and other species concepts. "Means" are characterized by diversity, hostility, and extremity; the content of "target or purpose" is characterized by fanaticism, violence, discrimination, and hatred. Third is the "Three-Element Theory." This view adds either "ideological basis" or "object of the act" as a differentia on the basis of "purpose" and "means." In the first scenario, it is emphasized that the ideological basis must be a certain faith with extreme political views or ideology as its content; the means must manifest as violence or other extreme measures; and the purpose is to propagate views or cause political or social change. In the second scenario, it is emphasized that the purpose is to realize social, political, ethnic, or religious demands; the means are extremely radical; and the object of the act is a specific target group. Fourth is the "Four-Element Theory: Subject + Purpose + Means + Consequence." The subject can be any individual or organization; the purpose seriously violates socially recognized values and is exclusionary; the means can be violent or non-violent; and the consequences have serious social harm.
(2) The Concept of Extremism: Consensus and Divergence
Regarding the superordinate concept—the genus concept—of extremism, there is significant divergence in the academic community, making it difficult to reach a consensus. The divergence manifests in two specific aspects: First, whether the nature of extremism is singular or composite—for example, whether extremism is an act, a belief, or an ideology, or whether it is "advocacy and act," or even "theory, advocacy, and act." Second, whether extremism is a purely or non-purely subjective or objective thing—for example, views that extremism is a belief or a theory consider it to have subjectivity, while views that it is an act consider it to be objective. What are the reasons for these divergences? The single-genus concept viewpoints mainly include the Act Theory, the Ideology Theory, and the Belief Theory. The composite-genus concept viewpoints mainly include the Advocacy and Act Theory, the Theory/Advocacy and Act Theory, and the Theory and Advocacy Theory. Furthermore, these different genus concepts entail different understandings of the subjectivity or objectivity of extremism. From the perspective of value judgment, single-genus viewpoints differ in their prioritization or emphasis on different values. The Act Theory holds that extremism belongs to objectified acts rather than subjective thoughts or ideas; it opposes bringing the cultural-spiritual sphere of human beings under the adjustment of anti-extremism or de-radicalization laws, emphasizing the protection of human cultural-spiritual freedom. The Ideology Theory and Belief Theory hold that extremism belongs to ideas, bringing the cultural-spiritual sphere under legal adjustment and emphasizing the protection of national or social public interests harmed by extremism. Regarding the composite-genus viewpoints, "advocacies" (主张 zhǔzhāng) refer to opinions and views held toward things, and opinions and views are products of subjective thinking. "Theories" (理论 lǐlùn) refer to systematic rational knowledge, and knowledge is a type of thinking activity. All three composite-genus viewpoints emphasize the protection of national or social public interests while weakening the protection of human cultural-spiritual freedom to varying degrees. Therefore, taken as a whole, the reasons for these divergences are primarily different value rankings regarding the cultural-spiritual freedom of individuals versus national or social public interests.
Can the genus concept of extremism be two or more simultaneously? According to the rules of definition, a genus concept must be one level higher than the definiendum. Therefore, composite viewpoints are suspected of failing to comply with these rules; it is difficult for extremism within the same domain of discourse to have two or more superordinate concepts one level higher than it. The aforementioned composite views may have failed to accurately clarify the boundaries or relationships between two genus concepts—for example, "acts and advocacies," "theories or advocacies," and "acts." Conversely, adopting a single-genus concept conforms to the rules of definition (e.g., the Act Theory, Ideology Theory, or Belief Theory); the approach of not defining a genus concept for extremism fails to meet these rules. While these various viewpoints seek a superordinate concept for extremism from different disciplinary perspectives, it remains necessary to demonstrate the rationality of whether that superordinate concept is an "act" or an "ideology" and which discipline's genus concept is more reasonable to adopt. Is extremism a purely or non-purely subjective or objective thing? Based solely on the classification of genus concepts, three types exist: first, purely subjective things (e.g., the Belief Theory or Ideology Theory); second, purely objective things (e.g., the Act Theory); and third, non-purely subjective or objective things (e.g., the Act and Theory perspective). It would be inconsistent with reality to view extremism as merely a purely subjective or purely objective thing, because the subjective and objective are unified. For example, a theory is subjective in form, but its content reflects the objective world; an act's external manifestation is objective, yet it is carried out under the governance of subjective consciousness—it is the objectification of subjective consciousness. However, this is distinct from the third type mentioned above, which defines extremism as a non-purely subjective or objective thing from the level of the genus concept; rather, it is a conclusion reached by analyzing the structural levels or elements of the thing itself.
Regarding the essential difference between extremism and other species concepts in the same genus, almost all viewpoints consider it to be "purpose and means." The divergences among these views manifest in two aspects. First, while purpose and means are the essential characteristics of extremism, are elements such as the subject, consequences, and object of the act necessary? This question must be predicated on the determination of the genus concept of extremism, because only by comparing species concepts within the same genus can the essential characteristics of extremism truly be found. Second, while the purpose and means of extremism can be clarified from the perspectives of both content and characteristics, every viewpoint differs slightly, which affects the extension of the extremism concept. For example, the aforementioned viewpoints differ on whether the "purpose" refers only to political or social demands or change; characters of the "means" also vary on whether they should include hostility in addition to being extreme or radical. What can be determined at present is that the content of the purpose of extremism must directly involve public interests or matters and be characterized by injustice; means can include violence and non-violence; and the typical external manifestation is the use of unnecessary or disproportionate violence to pursue an unjust cause. The reasons for these two divergences are mainly different understandings of the degree or scope of interference with human cultural-spiritual freedom and the degree of protection of national or social public interests, as the number or identification standards of essential characteristics will affect the scope of extremism’s extension. The divergence over purpose and means can be resolved according to the rules of definition—namely, that the extension of the definiendum must equal the extension of the definiens. One can make a reasonable choice regarding the content or characteristics of purpose and means by comparing their extensions. The different understandings of purpose and means in the various viewpoints mentioned above also indicate that some views may not have strictly followed the rules of definition.
II. An Examination of Practical Perspectives on the Concept of Extremism
Investigation into the practical viewpoints regarding the concept of extremism is primarily conducted through the lenses of legislation, judicature, and law enforcement. However, as judicial and enforcement activities are both carried out in accordance with the law, the following analysis primarily utilizes the concept of extremism found in legal texts as a sample. Currently, several countries or regions with an urgent need for anti-extremism or counter-terrorism efforts have already enacted specialized anti-extremism or de-radicalization laws. Examples include the Kyrgyz Republic’s Law on Countering Extremist Activity (2023), Tajikistan’s Law on Countering Extremism (2020), Uzbekistan’s Law on Countering Extremism (2018), and Kazakhstan’s Law on Countering Extremism (2020). Regarding how these legal texts define the concept of extremism, five main scenarios exist: the evasive type, the blank-leaving type, the transfer type, the specific-difference-defined type, and the fully determined type.
(1) The Evasive Type The evasive type does not explicitly define the concept of extremism, nor does it specify its genus [3] or specific difference [4]. For example, Article 4 of the Kyrgyz Republic’s 2023 Law on Countering Extremist Activity, which stipulates the basic concepts used in the law, includes only seven concepts: extremist activity, extremist organization, extremist materials, paraphernalia and symbols of extremist organizations, prevention of extremist activity, combating extremist activity, and warnings. This approach essentially evades the controversy surrounding the concept of extremism and fails to solve the problem. As extremism is the core legal concept of de-radicalization or anti-extremism laws, the practice of evasion not only affects the definition or understanding of related concepts such as extremist activity and extremist materials but also leads to ambiguity in legislative purpose and inconsistency in the standards of legal application, which is detrimental to the protection of human rights.
(2) The Blank-leaving Type The blank-leaving type does not explicitly define the genus of the concept of extremism, while simultaneously using the word "etc." (等, děng) to provide a limited stipulation of the constituent elements of extremism’s essential characteristics. This is done to manage various disagreements by leaving room for subsequent discussion or interpretation. For example, Article 4, Paragraph 2 of China’s Counter-Terrorism Law stipulates: "The state opposes extremism in all forms—such as the incitement of hatred, the incitement of discrimination, or the advocacy of violence through the distortion of religious doctrines or other methods—and shall eliminate the ideological foundation of terrorism." It uses only two elements—means and ends—to define extremism, followed by the word "etc." This approach represents a significant advancement over the evasive type. However, because the genus of extremism is not explicitly stipulated, it remains difficult to effectively clarify the essential differences between extremism and other species belonging to the same genus, as a comparison object cannot be effectively selected. Furthermore, leaving blanks through the use of "etc." essentially means that only a certain category of extremism has been explicitly defined; "other methods" and "etc." both require the use of legal interpretation methods for clarification. This essentially pushes the difficult problem onto practical departments, and it remains a question whether legal interpretation methods can effectively resolve the aforementioned disagreements. In short, while the core connotation of such concepts is relatively certain, the marginal areas possess high ambiguity, which can easily lead to violations of human rights due to the improper application of legal interpretation methods.
(3) The Transfer Type The transfer type treats "extremist activity" as a component of the connotation of extremism and positions extremism as the expression of extremist activity. It no longer explicitly defines the genus of extremism and utilizes only "purpose" as the essential difference between extremism and other concepts. For example, Tajikistan’s 2020 Law on Countering Extremism stipulates: Extremism is the expression of extremist activity, the purpose of which is to use violence or other illegal acts to resolve political, national, or religious issues. Thus, one need only define the connotation of extremist activity to clarify the concept of extremism. Compared to the disagreements surrounding the concept of extremism, the concept of extremist activity is less controversial: its genus is "conduct" and its specific difference is primarily composed of "subject" or "purpose." Furthermore, the purpose of extremism is consistent with the purpose of extremist activity. For example, Uzbekistan’s 2018 Law on Countering Extremism stipulates: Extremist activity is activity aimed at establishing or participating in illegal armed groups, or the production, storage, dissemination, and display of the features and symbols of extremist organizations. Compared to the first two types, although this approach appears to reduce the difficulty of defining extremism, the view that "extremism is the expression of extremist activity" is actually debatable. This view assumes that extremism is regarded as a thought or theory; if it is regarded as a conduct, a logical problem arises. Moreover, defining the concept of extremist activity still requires defining the concept of extremism as a prerequisite, because the essential core of extremist activity is extremism. Therefore, it is suspected of being a circular definition.
(4) The Specific-difference-defined Type The specific-difference-defined type explicitly stipulates the essential differences between extremism and other species-concepts but does not stipulate the genus of extremism. For example, in Kazakhstan’s 2020 Law on Countering Extremism, the definition of extremism’s connotation includes specific differences regarding the subject and the purpose. The subjects are manifested as natural and (or) legal persons, joint action entities of natural and (or) legal persons, combinations of entities and (or) action entities, etc. The purposes are primarily manifested as inciting religious hatred or schism, inciting racial or ethnic disputes, violently changing the constitutional system, or infringing upon the sovereignty and integrity of the Republic of Kazakhstan. Compared to the blank-leaving type, this approach is more explicit regarding the specific difference and does not use "etc." However, whether the specific difference of extremism can accurately or reasonably explain the essential difference from other species belonging to the same genus without an explicit genus remains debatable.
(5) The Fully Determined Type The fully determined type explicitly stipulates both the genus and the specific difference of extremism. For example, the Draft Opinion on the Amendment to the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Countering Extremist Activity—CDL(2012) defines "extremism" as "conduct aimed at seizing or maintaining power or violently changing the state’s constitutional system through the use of violence, as well as conduct that violently infringes upon public security." Compared to the previous four types, the connotation of extremism here is more explicit: it defines the genus of extremism as "conduct" and uses "purpose" as the specific difference. However, it still fails to explain why it is not categorized as "advocacy," "theory," or "belief," leaving its rationality open to doubt.
Among the five aforementioned scenarios, there is less disagreement and higher consensus regarding the essential characteristics of extremism than its genus. Regarding the genus, the prevailing view is that the law should avoid explicitly stipulating the genus of extremism; only the "fully determined type" explicitly defines the genus as "conduct," while the other four do not. Regarding the essential characteristics, almost all types regard "purpose" as the essential characteristic of extremism, with the exception of the "evasive type." However, from the perspective of value judgment, the lack of an explicit genus in the law or the use of "purpose" as the sole essential characteristic indicates a priority on protecting the interests of the state or the public. This may lead to situations where an individual's cultural-spiritual freedom and other rights are infringed upon.
III. Rules for the Rule-of-Law-based Definition of the Concept of Extremism
The definition of the concept of extremism in theory and practice primarily exhibits five characteristics. First, practical application places more importance on defining the essential characteristics of extremism rather than its genus, whereas theory treats both as equally important. Second, both suffer from violations of the rules of conceptual definition. Third, a large number of evaluative or vague concepts are used to define extremism. Fourth, there is a low level of consistency between theory and practice in their understanding of the concept of extremism. Fifth, a balance is struck between human cultural-spiritual freedom and the interests of the state or society. Facing the many problems in defining extremism, if it is to be treated as a legal concept in a legal text, one must consider general definition rules, legal concept theory, the weighing of interests, and the characteristics of criminal phenomena within the extension of extremism. Generally speaking, a rule-of-law-based definition of the concept of extremism must at least adhere to the following rules.
(1) The genus of extremism must be one level higher than the concept itself Regarding the controversy over the genus of extremism, various viewpoints can be discussed according to the definition rule that the genus of the term being defined (the definiendum) must be one level higher. Before this discussion, the literal meaning of the word "extremism" (jíduān zhǔyì) must be analyzed to more easily determine the concept one level higher. The basic meaning of "extreme" (jíduān) refers to the peak or limit of a thing's development. In essence, it contradicts the "Doctrine of the Mean" (zhōngyōng) in traditional Chinese culture [5]. The basic meaning of the "Mean" is to have neither excess nor deficiency—to be upright and balanced. This includes the perspectives of neither "overstepping" nor "falling short," specifically requiring harmony in "symbiosis" (gòngshēng). This "symbolizes the cosmic ideal of all things growing together and indicates the thoroughfare where things proceed without conflict." Therefore, in the context of anti-extremism or de-radicalization, "extreme" is actually a violation of the idea of "symbiosis" and is essentially a form of "exclusion" (páichì) or "singular existence" (dúshēng). The term "ism" (zhǔyì) has multiple layers of meaning, primarily including a specific system of thought, theory, or doctrine; a specific social system; a specific mode of behavior or style of work; or an advocacy/proposition regarding a matter. An extensional relationship exists between these: for example, usually there is first a system of thought, theory, or doctrine whose content is defined by "extremity," and then, based on this, social systems, modes of behavior or styles, and advocacies are generated. The latter expresses the former, and the former serves as the ideological foundation or content of the latter. Therefore, defining only conduct, advocacy, or theory as the genus of extremism would risk being one-sided and incomplete. Social systems belong to the realm of ideology, but the concept of ideology itself suffers from problems such as high ambiguity, exclusiveness, and a broad extension, making it unsuitable as the genus for extremism. Belief is an individual’s conviction or personality inclination; it and extremism are two different concepts, making it difficult for belief to be the genus of extremism. In order to understand extremism objectively and comprehensively, it is more appropriate to determine its genus as a "complex" (fùhétǐ), which is a complex whole composed of different or multiple elements or parts. Thus, extremism can be expressed as a complex with "exclusion" or "singular existence" as its content, possessing different expressions or forms of manifestation.
(2) The extension of the defining term must be equal to the extension of extremism If certain things fall within the genus of extremism and conform to its essential characteristics, then they belong to extremism. According to the rules of definition, with extremism as the definiendum and the connotation as the definiens, a reasonable definition of extremism requires that the extensions of both be equal. The extension of the connotation cannot be smaller or larger than the extension of the definiendum. The genus of extremism is a "complex," including theories, thoughts, and systems of doctrine, conduct or styles of work, social systems, and advocacies. In fact, these are also the external manifestations or forms of expression of extremism, which are observable or perceptible. However, not all theories, behaviors, or advocacies belong to extremism; this depends on the essential differences between species-concepts belonging to the same genus. Yet, the genus of extremism is a complex containing multiple elements, making it difficult to directly conduct a comparison between such species-concepts. Therefore, according to the expressions or forms of manifestation of extremism, it can first be divided into several categories: theories, thoughts, and systems of doctrine; conduct or styles of work; social systems; and advocacies. Then, by finding the commonalities of each category, the essential characteristics of extremism can be abstracted—which are actually the content or meaning behind the forms—namely, "exclusion" or "singular existence." However, it is still necessary to limit these essential characteristics to prevent over-generalization. Specific exemption scenarios should at least include: first, self-protection based on legitimate, reasonable, and legal purposes; second, phenomena naturally formed by the normal development of society; third, that the exclusion must be a last resort; fourth, that the exclusion must not exceed a certain limit; and fifth, situations where the other party has promised consent on the premise of not violating ethics or the rule of law. Theoretical and practical viewpoints often refer to only one or several forms of extremism; for example, the "theory, advocacy, and conduct theory," which covers more forms, still leaves things out. Under the restriction of the genus, the more essential characteristics there are, the smaller the extension; conversely, the extension becomes broader. Therefore, the extension of the aforementioned theoretical and practical viewpoints is not equal to the extension of extremism; they basically only contain a portion of the extension of extremism.
(3) Consistency between the characteristics of legal norms, purpose, and nomenclature
"The legislative purpose clause constitutes the statutory intent of the law, serving to manifest the spirit and objectives of the legislator in crafting the entire legal instrument." The objectives of anti-extremism legislation primarily comprise three types: first, preventing or eliminating extremist activities along with their causes and conditions—for example, Article 2 of the 2023 Law of the Kyrgyz Republic On Countering Extremist Activity provides for the "prevention, detection, and suppression of extremist activity and the elimination of causes and conditions conducive to the commission of such acts." Second, regulating anti-extremism legal relations—for example, Article 1 of the 2018 Law of the Republic of Uzbekistan On Combating Extremism states that the purpose of the law is to regulate relations in the field of combating extremism. Third, de-radicalization—for example, Article 1 of the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region De-radicalization Regulations states the purpose is "to curb and eliminate extremism, prevent extremist harm, and achieve social stability and long-term peace and stability [6]." Since the constituent elements of a normative legal document’s title include the matter, content, or theme of the law, the legislative purpose and the title's constituent elements must correspond to one another—namely, as "anti-extremist activity," "anti-extremism," or "de-radicalization." Given the variation in these legislative purposes or themes, which one is more rational? Establishing "anti-extremism" as the purpose and defining extremism as a "complex" (复合体) is more rational for three reasons.
First, it is more conducive to advancing the governance of extremism at its source. The connotation and extension of "extremism" are broader than those of "extremist activity" or "extremism-ization" (de-radicalization). Extremist activity emphasizes behavioral attributes, while de-radicalization emphasizes the process and state of being "polluted" by extremist ideology. Anti-extremism cannot be simply equated with anti-extremist activity or de-radicalization; extremist ideology itself is the more essential or fundamental issue. Extremism, understood as a complex, precisely highlights the "ideological" element. Second, it reduces legislative costs. If anti-extremist activity and de-radicalization are taken as the legislative purposes, then in addition to defining the connotations of both, one must also specifically define "extremism" as the foundational concept and clarify the boundaries between the three. It is better to directly treat extremism as the core concept; as a complex, it essentially encompasses the meanings of extremist activity and de-radicalization and points to their essence. Should specific details be required, they can be resolved through the less difficult method of enumeration. Third, it better conforms to the characteristics of "crime governance law." Specialized anti-extremism legislation takes the phenomenon of extremist crime as its object of governance and is a typical "crime governance law." This differs from the traditional model where the government monopolizes crime governance, as it requires the substantive participation of society or the market. The phenomenon of crime is a complex system composed of people, psychology, behavior, objects, time, and space. Adopting the concept of extremism (as a complex) as the legislative purpose and the content of the legal title is more consistent with the systemic nature of the phenomenon of crime.
(4) Reducing Linguistic Ambiguity and the Difficulty of Legal Interpretation
"Indeterminate legal concepts are a special type of legal concept whose connotation and extension are uncertain and whose semantics are fuzzy." Specifically, these are divided into empirical indeterminate legal concepts and normative (value-based) indeterminate legal concepts. As a value-based indeterminate legal concept, extremism is difficult to clarify through perceptible empirical facts, but its uncertainty can be reduced through conceptual design and legal interpretation. Currently, many viewpoints define extremism using a large number of value-evaluative terms, which can be divided into four categories: first, content-evaluative (e.g., "ideology," "social values"); second, behavioral-evaluative (e.g., "violence," "inciting hatred or discrimination"); third, degree-evaluative (e.g., "extreme bias"); and fourth, purposive-evaluative (e.g., "social, political, or religious transformation or demands"). Most of these belong to the vocabulary of political science or sociology, and some terms are already subject to significant internal academic controversy. Using these terms in legal concepts undoubtedly introduces such controversy into the law. In the context of legal interpretation, a simpler method might be to directly use the technical meaning from the parent discipline; however, the result may not necessarily conform to the rules of legal interpretation—for instance, it may not align with the spirit of the Constitution, the legislative purpose, or general social conceptions, and it is even less conducive to the masses' participation in anti-extremism work. Therefore, conceptual design should strive to minimize the use of highly ambiguous vocabulary at its source, while simultaneously performing the work of lexical conversion and the construction of specific determination indicators.
The concept of extremism as a complex is the result of a preliminary effort in this direction. The essential characteristics of extremism primarily consist of three elements. First, the means are exclusionary. Exclusion refers to incompatibility, causing departure, preventing entry, or resistance. The exclusion represented by the means is consistent with the extremist objective, because the means are the path to realizing a specific goal and are essentially an infringement upon the interests of the state or the public. Therefore, the identification of extremist means must consider not only the inherent exclusionary nature of the behavior but also the actual harmful results and state of realistic danger already caused, as well as the causality between the behavior and the results. Second, the objective violates the "symbiotic" (共生) [7] thought characterized by "all things being nourished together without injuring one another, and paths being pursued in parallel without collision." This is the result that extremist criminal groups and their members hope to achieve through the commission of criminal acts. As an extremist objective, it must possess manifest anti-sociality, pursue material results or specific psychological effects, and be externalized in its content. Third, it takes theories, ideologies, systems of doctrine, behaviors or styles of work, social systems, and propositions as its form of expression or manifestation. Extremism must be understood within the context of traditional Chinese culture. Consequently, this definition does not directly use the aforementioned political or sociological terms but converts them into the vocabulary of traditional Chinese culture. At the same time, while the basic meanings of terms like "theory," "behavior," and "social system" are relatively clear, this concept still requires the formulation of specific standards of determination, as the use of abstract vocabulary in law is unavoidable.
(5) Balancing the Protection of Human Cultural-Spiritual Freedom with the Interests of the State or the Public
The divergence in the connotation of extremism is essentially the result of weighing human cultural-spiritual freedom against the interests of the state or the public. "The process of weighing interests is a process of continuous comparison, balancing, and trade-offs." The prerequisite for legislative interest-weighing is that the human cultural-spiritual realm should and can be regulated by law, which "depends both on the formal rationality and humanistic dimension of the law, and on the legitimacy of human cultural-spiritual interests." The aforementioned views that extremism belongs to the realm of thought or theory essentially approve of anti-extremism or de-radicalization laws regulating the field of extremist ideology. Conversely, views that extremism belongs to the realm of behavior oppose legal regulation of the field of thought. However, based on the aforementioned basic principles of the law's regulation of the human cultural-spiritual realm, the arguments of the opposing side are limited to the general theory of behavioral regulation in traditional jurisprudence and fail to consider the "criminal subculture" attribute that extremism possesses in criminology, as well as its theoretical and practical value as an object of cultural law regulation. One reason extremist crime is difficult to eradicate is that the extremist criminal subculture is continuously produced, disseminated, and identified with; extremist thought, meanwhile, is the product of mental activity within the individual’s cultural-spiritual realm.
Regarding the rules of weighing, legislators must adhere to the principles of maximizing social interests and minimizing the loss of individual interests. Viewpoints that fail to clearly define the proximate genus (属概念) of extremism are suspected of violating the rule of minimizing the loss of individual interests. Viewpoints that only define the superordinate concept of extremism as "behavior" run the risk of violating the rule of maximizing social interests. Even viewpoints that define the proximate genus of extremism as "thought" may violate the rule of minimizing the loss of individual interests due to an irrational selection of essential characteristics. From the perspective of the essential characteristics of extremism, which elements are suitable to be determined as essential characteristics and how many there should be must be determined according to the aforementioned rules of interest-weighing. To ensure the application of these rules, two safeguard mechanisms must be maintained. First, post-hoc punishment (事后追惩). This ensures that while the criminal subculture is controlled in accordance with the law, it will not cause harm to people's cultural or freedom of expression. Second, indirect intervention. Extremist thought arises under the influence of a series of subjective and objective factors. By regulating the factors or causes that influence the production of extremist thought, the adjustment of extremist thought can be achieved indirectly; however, it is not appropriate for the law to directly and explicitly provide for intervention in the subjective process of the production of extremist thought.
In summary, anti-extremism legislation concerns national security, and defining the concept of extremism is an unavoidable issue in such legislation. The definition of the concept of extremism must be based on China's traditional culture and national conditions while also aligning with international standards and adhering to the rules of the rule of law. Subsequently, it remains necessary to formulate various supporting normative legal documents, such as specific identification standards for various types of extremism and a dynamic catalog of extremist materials. Only in this way can we fully exert the safeguarding role of the rule of law in "consolidating the foundation, stabilizing expectations, and benefiting the long term."