Hu Mian, Wu Guolin: The Critical Construction of Engels' Concept of Truth and Its Value Examination
Engels’s view of truth is a significant component of his philosophical thought and a vital constituent of the Marxist view of truth. Current academic research on Engels’s view of truth mostly situates it within the horizon of the Marxist view of truth, holding that Engels’s and Marx’s respective views together constitute the basic content of the Marxist view of truth, often referring to them collectively as "the Marx-Engels view of truth." For example, Zheng Guanghui characterizes the Marx-Engels view of truth as a "praxis-based view of truth," arguing that this perspective transcends the search for truth solely within the horizon of epistemology and expands it into the realm of social practice. Within studies of the social practice dimension, scholars have focused on Engels’s specific discussions of truth in Anti-Dühring. Based on this, direct academic research on Engels’s view of truth can be summarized as studies based on the text of Anti-Dühring—that is, using Anti-Dühring as textual evidence to analyze the specific content of Engels’s view of truth, its important status within the Marxist view of truth, and its contemporary significance. Anti-Dühring is a quintessential representative of Engels’s polemical works. In recent years, research on Anti-Dühring has steadily increased, primarily focusing on Engels’s critiques of Dühring’s concepts of equality, morality, freedom, nihilism, and ideology [1], while paying less attention to Engels’s critique of Dühring’s view of truth. Regarding the development of Engels’s view of truth, Engels continued his consistent critical method: namely, critiquing erroneous understandings of truth and proposing a dialectical understanding of the problem of truth. Engels’s critiques of erroneous trends of thought were very widespread. For instance, Zhang Luesheng discussed from three aspects how Engels developed Marxist theory through the critique of erroneous trends; other scholars have specifically discussed the "triple characteristics" of this critical method of Engels. Taken together, current academic research on Engels’s view of truth suffers from two main shortcomings: first, a failure to see the independence and systematic nature of Engels’s view of truth or to comprehensively grasp his discourses on the problem of truth; second, a neglect of the consistent critical method manifested in Engels’s view of truth.
The author contends that, on the one hand, Engels’s view of truth is an independent system of thought and theory that requires systematic analysis; on the other hand, since Engels’s view of truth originated from his critique of erroneous trends of thought, one must start from this method to grasp the construction of his view of truth and its profound significance for the development of the Marxist view of truth. Based on this, the author intends to use Engels’s critique of "eternal truths" as an entry point to grasp the construction of Engels’s view of truth as a whole and to reveal its value and implications at both the theoretical and practical levels.
I. Engels’s Triple Critique of Eternal Truths
What are eternal truths? In The German Ideology, Engels provided a definition: it is the process of turning objects into various truths and then abstracting a "truth of truths" from them; this resulting truth is "eternal truth." According to this understanding, eternal truth is actually a kind of self-evident, universally applicable, and perpetually correct truth. Throughout Engels’s major texts, there are many instances where he discusses eternal truths and critiques them. For example, in The Communists and Karl Heinzen, Engels proposed that eternal truths are products of their era and society; [2] therefore, as society changes, eternal truths also change, which means that eternal truths do not exist. In The Holy Family, Engels critiqued a metaphysical idealist view of truth—the idea that truth is a metaphysical subject and that truth is self-evident and requires no proof; this self-evident truth is essentially a form of eternal truth. In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, Engels mentioned that "Communism abolishes eternal truths," a view that is consistent with his position in The Communists and Karl Heinzen. In Dialectics of Nature, Engels pointed out that there are no eternal truths in the realm of thought either. In Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy, Engels critiqued "absolute truth" in the Hegelian system; Hegel’s absolute truth was a final truth, which is to say, an eternal truth. Although Engels mentioned the critique of eternal truths in the aforementioned texts, he did not provide a detailed exposition; it was only in Anti-Dühring that Engels launched a specific analysis and critique of eternal truths. In the sections "Classification. Apriorism" and "Morality and Law. Eternal Truths" of Anti-Dühring, Engels systematically critiqued eternal truths, revealing that final, ultimate, and eternal truths are actually an erroneous understanding of truth, and that eternal truth does not exist.
(1) Eternal truth cannot arise from pure ideas
The starting point of Dühring’s eternal truth is the so-called "priority of principles"—that we must first have a world schema composed of general principles and categories before we can apply it to nature and the human world. These principles come from thought, and thought comes from pure ideas (limited to logical schemata and mathematical forms). This implies that eternal truth comes from thought, from pure ideas. In Dühring’s view, "genuine truth is fundamentally immutable"; once it is admitted that eternal truth comes from pure conceptual thought, such truth is unaffected by time, society, or external changes, meaning it is applicable to any era, any field, and any condition. Thus, eternal truth is essentially an unconditional, perpetual, and immutable correct understanding—the so-called "final and ultimate truth."
In Engels’s view, the "priority of principles" and the idea that "principles come from thought" are fundamentally wrong; eternal truth cannot arise from pure ideas. First, principles are not prior; they are "not the starting point of the investigation, but its final result." "Priority of principles" is itself a false starting point, and from this false starting point, one can only reach a false conclusion, which fundamentally undermines the foundation of Dühring’s eternal truth. Second, as forms of being, thought can "only glean and derive these forms from the external world," which means that eternal truth does not come from pure ideas but exists in the external world as the object of thought and cognition. This shatters the unconditionality of eternal truth and further demonstrates that no such truth exists.
Dühring subsumed eternal truth into the realm of pure thought, which bears similarities to "absolute truth" within Hegel's system of the Absolute Idea; both are idealist views of truth. Truth does not exist in the realm of pure thought, nor can it be realized through the self-movement of the Absolute Spirit; truth must be real—truth has its foundation in reality.
(2) Eternal truth cannot be known unconditionally
Dühring’s eternal truth is an immutable and unconditional understanding, and this immutability and unconditionality are established on the cognitive basis of the absolute sovereignty of human thought and the possession of an unconditional right to truth. Only through the absolute sovereignty of thought can the general principles of eternal truth be obtained from thought, ensuring the immutability of eternal truth; only by possessing an unconditional right to truth can the unconditional correctness and immutability of eternal truth be guaranteed. In Engels’s view, "the sovereignty of thought is realized in a series of extremely unsovereignly-thinking human beings; the knowledge which has an unconditional claim to truth is realized in a series of relative errors; neither the one nor the other can be fully realized except through an endless eternity of human existence." This actually contains three layers of meaning: first, the absolute sovereignty of thought or the sovereignty of unconditional thought does not exist, so one cannot obtain so-called general unconditional principles from thought, and the unconditional eternal truth based on this is also unobtainable; second, human being's correct understanding of truth is realized through the dialectical movement between truth and error, thus unconditionally correct eternal truth cannot be known; third, human thought and cognition develop continuously alongside the development of the human world. The development of the human world is infinite, while eternal truth is immutable, ultimate, and essentially infinite. Using the infinite to know the infinite is impossible to achieve, further proving that eternal truth cannot be known unconditionally.
Eternal truth is actually a contradictory thing. On the one hand, eternal truth does not exist, and even if it did, we could not obtain it; on the other hand, even if we obtained eternal truth, we could not know it. This means that eternal truth is actually a "conditional truth," and conditional truth obviously violates the basic definition of eternal truth; therefore, eternal truth is a false concept.
(3) Eternal truth does not exist in the realm of human history either
Dühring attempted to extend the eternal truth of his "philosophy of reality" to the realm of human history, believing that "in the realm of human history there also exist eternal truths, eternal morality, eternal justice, and so on, which demand an applicability and range of validity similar to those of mathematical knowledge and its applications." In Dühring’s system of eternal truth, mathematics, as one of the pure conceptual sources of thought, is also one of the foundations of eternal truth. According to Dühring’s understanding, the realm of human history should also have eternal truths with universal applicability similar to mathematics. Clearly, the foundation of this attempt by Dühring is unstable; eternal truth exists neither in the philosophy of reality nor in the realm of human cognition. Through a comprehensive analysis of the three major areas of human historical cognition, Engels revealed that there is no eternal truth in the entirety of the human historical realm.
First, in the field of "sciences which investigate non-living nature and can be treated more or less mathematically," mathematics and mathematical formulas are usually considered eternal truths. However, mathematics also changes along with human cognition. For example, in the field of geometry, Euclidean geometry is the most common and frequently used system; however, as understanding of different spaces deepened, Lobachevskian geometry and Riemannian geometry emerged, which are applicable to different geometric spaces. They are theoretically complete and logically self-consistent within their respective systems, but they contradict one another. This means these geometric systems are only truths within a certain domain, and it also means that in this field of cognition, as the objects of cognition change and develop and as cognition deepens, what was once called the "final and ultimate truth" will no longer possess that characteristic. Truth is developing and changing; truth is conditional. In a broader sense, there are no eternal truths in this field; even if there were, they would be very difficult for us to discover and know.
Second, in the field of "sciences which investigate living organisms," our understanding of organisms proceeds from observation to proposing hypotheses, and from proposing hypotheses to verifying them, interspersed with competing hypotheses and failures in verification. It is extremely difficult to obtain a so-called eternal truth. As Engels pointed out: "In this field there is such a manifold of interrelationships and causalities that not only does every solution of a problem give rise to a host of other problems, but each separate problem can in most cases only be solved piecemeal, through a series of investigations which often require centuries; and besides, the need for a systematic understanding of the interconnections constantly compels us again and again to surround the final and ultimate truths with a dense forest of hypotheses." Hypotheses are by no means final or ultimate truths; the journey from hypothesis to eternal truth is long and seemingly unreachable. Therefore, Engels concluded here: "Anyone who sets out here to establish really genuine and immutable truths will have to be content with platitudes such as: all men are mortal, all female mammals have mammary glands, and so on."
Finally, in the "historical sciences, which investigate the conditions of human life, social relationships, forms of law and government, with their ideal superstructure of philosophy, religion, art, etc.," Engels believed that cognition in the realm of human history "is essentially relative, in that it is limited to the investigation of the connections and consequences of certain social and state forms which exist only at a particular epoch and among particular peoples and are by their very nature transitory." If eternal truth existed in this field, then this eternal truth would necessarily change along with changes in time and reality. But eternal truth must be immutable and must not change with time and reality; therefore, it is impossible for eternal truth to exist in this field. As with the "sciences which investigate living organisms," "anyone who here hunts for final and ultimate truths, for truths which are genuine and fundamentally immutable, will bring home but little, apart from platitudes and commonplaces."
Clearly, whether in the field of the philosophy of reality or the realm of human history, so-called "eternal truth" is a false term without any practical meaning or content. Therefore, eternal truth is merely empty talk—an erroneous understanding of truth.
II. The Construction of Engels's Outlook on Truth Engels's triple critique of eternal truth reveals that unconditional truth does not exist; there is no unconditional truth in either the realm of human cognitive thought or the realm of social history. Truth is not imagined out of thin air; it has a realistic foundation and is conditional. The conditionality of truth reveals the relativity of truth, and the relativity of truth also means that truth and error coexist; the two constitute a dialectical unity.
(1) The Conditionality and Relativity of Truth From Engels's critique of eternal truth, it can be seen that unconditional eternal truth does not exist, which implies that truth is conditional. The conditionality of truth means that truth possesses relativity. What is the relativity of truth? The relativity of truth cannot be equated with relative truth; relative truth is a form of truth, whereas the relativity of truth is an attribute of truth. The relativity of truth includes the understanding of relative truth. We need to understand the relativity of truth from three perspectives.
First, the relativity of truth stems from the fact that human cognition is a dialectical unity of the finite and the infinite. As mentioned previously, the sovereignty of thought and the absolute reliability of cognition are conditional. Therefore, as both the object and the product of thought and cognition, truth must be limited and conditional, and necessarily relative.
Second, the relativity of truth refers to the fact that any truth is merely a correct understanding of a certain aspect or a certain part of reality. Both the reality and the conditionality of truth imply that truth develops and changes; truth inevitably develops alongside changes in human cognition. Consequently, the truth we can grasp is also developing and changing. Taking physical theories as an example, from the early Aristotelian, Ptolemaic, and Copernican systems to the later Newtonian mechanical system, and finally to the contemporary quantum mechanical system—each different theoretical system represented a correct understanding of the world and its motion under the cognitive conditions of its time. These correct understandings can only be insights into specific problems within a particular space and time; they are not ultimate truths suitable for all fields and all problems.
Third, truth is restricted by certain conditions of social practice. Engels criticized Dühring’s eternal truths for being unaffected by time and realistic changes; in reality, truth is restricted by the era and the conditions of social realization in which it resides, and the understanding of truth is subject to the same. As Marx emphasized in his Theses on Feuerbach, "man must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power... of his thinking in practice" [3]. Truth must both come from practice and be tested in practice. Since practice is conditional, truth is necessarily conditional and relative.
Here, the author believes two issues require further discussion. First, in discussing the relativity of truth, did Engels reveal the definition of relative and absolute truth and the relationship between them? Second, can the relativity of truth be regarded as the essential attribute of truth? Regarding the first question, influenced by discussions of the dialectical relationship between relative and absolute truth in traditional textbooks, the academic community often goes beyond Engels’s specific text here and assumes he is revealing the dialectical unity of relative and absolute truth. However, some scholars, such as Zhao Baoyun, argue that Engels did not discuss the dialectical relationship between relative and absolute truth here, but only the relativity of truth. Feng Laigui argues that absolute and relative truth should not be treated as a pair of corresponding categories. In fact, Engels did not use the term "relative truth" in Anti-Dühring, though he discussed "absolute truth" in several places, always in a critical and negative sense—for instance, stating that "absolute truth... is independent of time, space and the historical development of man," and thus it is purely "a matter of chance" [4] when and where it is discovered. The "absolute truth" here is essentially what Dühring calls eternal truth, which Engels is criticizing. Engels discussed "relative truth" and "absolute truth" simultaneously in Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy. In criticizing Hegel's absolute system, Engels pointed out: "one leaves aside 'absolute truth,' which is unattainable along this path or by any single individual; instead, one pursues attainable relative truths along the path of the positive sciences, and the summation of their results by means of dialectical thought" [5]. Here, "absolute truth" is again discussed in a negative sense. Therefore, the author believes that the outlook on truth Engels constructed through his critique of eternal truth only reveals the relativity of truth; the dialectical relationship between relative truth and absolute truth can only be revealed within the entire system of the Marxist outlook on truth. Regarding the second question, the author believes the relativity of truth can be regarded as its essential attribute. Truth has two dimensions: first, the meaning of truth (its connotation); second, the cognition of truth (what truth is, which can also be understood as the criterion of truth). From the perspective of the meaning of truth, as a reflection of correct human cognition, it is the object of human thought and cognition; since human thought and cognition are conditional and finite, this implies the relativity of truth. From the perspective of the cognition of truth, it must be achieved through practice, and practice can only occur under certain socio-historical conditions. Practice is concrete, historical, and relative; therefore, the truth tested through practice is also concrete, historical, and relative. Clearly, the relativity of truth is its essential attribute. Whether it is the only attribute is a question for further reflection.
(2) The Opposition, Coexistence, and Transformation of Truth and Error Eternal truth, as an unconditional and immutable truth, rejects error. The conditionality and relativity of truth indicate that truth and error are interdependent. This interdependence does not mean that truth is error or error is truth, but rather that every truth contains a certain amount of error, and error contains the seeds of truth. Truth and error have the potential to transform into one another.
First, the opposition between truth and error is conditional. If truth is a correct reflection of cognition, then error is an incorrect reflection. From the perspective of the overall development of science, the division between truth and error is not absolute. The process of scientific development is one of hypotheses being confirmed or falsified; a currently confirmed hypothesis may be falsified after new evidence is obtained. A confirmed hypothesis can be called truth, and a falsified one called error; truth and error coexist and possess the possibility of mutual transformation. The root cause of the coexistence of truth and error is that human cognition, "by its nature, is relative to a long series of generations and must necessarily be gradually perfected, or... even remains forever defective and incomplete due to insufficient historical material" [6]—as is the case in cosmogony, geology, and human history. This is also the reason for the relativity and conditionality of truth. Engels pointed out: "Truth and error, like all determinants of thought which move in polar opposites, have absolute validity only in an extremely limited field" [7]. Since the opposition between truth and error is conditional, if we exceed certain conditions and ranges to absolutize this opposition—assuming truth contains no error at all and error contains no truthful cognition—then the category of "error" loses its meaning for existence. Error would necessarily be discarded, meaning there would be no need to recognize it, and thus the absolute opposition between truth and error would cease to exist. A truth that contains no error is essentially another form of "final, ultimate truth," because it would be absolutely correct and unconditional; thus, such a truth would transform into error. Truth and error must coexist.
Second, truth and error transform into each other under certain conditions. Once the relativity of truth is acknowledged, the truth we recognize can only be a relative truth. The opposite of relative truth is not absolute truth, but relative error. When Engels criticized eternal truth, he also criticized absolute truth; clearly, for Engels, "absolute truth" was simply another term for eternal truth. One cannot treat absolute truth as the opposite of truth, because opposites must coexist, and absolute truth (in the sense of eternal truth) clearly does not exist. The "error" that exists as the opposite of truth is, in essence, relative error, because error must be error relative to truth, and truth is relative truth—that is, truth relative to error. The essence of the mutual transformation of truth and error is the mutual transformation of relative truth and relative error. From the development of all human cognition, a piece of knowledge may present as truthful or erroneous; one might even say that relative truth and relative error are two characteristics of the same cognitive act. Under specific temporal conditions, from the perspective of its certainty and sovereignty, a piece of knowledge is a relative truth; under changed conditions, from the perspective of its uncertainty and non-sovereignty (relative to a higher level of understanding), it becomes relative error. The essence of the coexistence of truth and error is the coexistence and mutual transformation of relative truth and relative error. The process of human cognition is one where relative truth transforms into relative error on the basis of deeper understanding, and relative error continuously transforms into relative truth. Whether it is the transformation of relative truth to relative error or vice versa, conditions are required; human cognition is continuously perfected and developed through this process.
The two parts of Engels's construction of the outlook on truth respond theoretically to the non-existence of eternal truth and the conditionality and relativity of truth; they also respond practically to the continuous development of human cognition, revealing that things which were previously considered truths may contain errors, and that truth is realistic and concrete.
III. The Value and Significance of Engels's Outlook on Truth Within the developmental lineage of the Marxist outlook on truth, Engels's perspective is both a heritage and development of Marx's understanding of truth and the foundation for the development of Lenin's outlook on truth. Engels's outlook on truth plays a role in bridging the past and the future. Studying it helps to further clarify the scientific nature and consistency of the Marxist outlook on truth, thereby grasping its development and latest forms, which has important theoretical significance. Furthermore, the question of truth is not only a theoretical issue but also a realistic practical one. Engels's outlook on truth originated both from a response to theoretical problems and the elucidation of realistic ones. It can serve as a theoretical weapon to respond to certain erroneous trends of thought regarding truth and values in the current era and to guide people's cognition and practice.
(1) The Important Theoretical Position of Engels's Outlook on Truth First, Engels's outlook on truth is a heritage and development of Marx's outlook on truth. This is reflected in both content and methodology. Marx also proceeded from the critique of erroneous understandings of truth to reveal the correct understanding. As early as the Rheinische Zeitung period, in "Comments on the Latest Prussian Censorship Instruction," Marx criticized subjective and abstract truth, pointing out: "Truth is universal, it does not belong to me, it belongs to all; it possesses me, I do not possess it," thereby revealing the universality of truth. Both Marx and Engels elucidated their outlooks on truth by criticizing erroneous understandings; Engels's critical approach is in the same lineage as Marx's, both sharing a common origin in the critique of old materialism and idealism.
In criticizing eternal truth, Engels revealed the conditionality and relativity of truth. The conditionality and relativity of truth are interdependent with its universality and objectivity. The existence of truth is universal and objective; therefore, truth cannot belong to any individual or group in the form of so-called "eternal truth," and truth must stem from realistic, objective social practice. Truth is conditional and relative. From the perspective of universality and objectivity, it is precisely because truth is universal and objective that people can recognize it; yet because human cognition is a dialectical unity of the finite and the infinite, the understanding of truth remains conditional, and truth is relative. Once the conditionality and relativity of truth are understood, one will inevitably recognize its universality and objectivity; conversely, recognizing the universality and objectivity of truth necessitates a further understanding of its conditionality and relativity. Thus, Marx's and Engels's outlooks on truth are closely linked. Engels's outlook is based on inheriting and developing Marx's, continuously providing scientific answers to the question of truth through the development of theory and practice.
Secondly, Engels’s view of truth constitutes an important foundation for Lenin’s view of truth. Similar to the critique and construction of truth by Marx and Engels, Lenin’s view of truth is also a construction through critique. In Materialism and Empirio-criticism, Lenin critiqued Bogdanov’s idealist view of truth and answered two important questions: “whether objective truth exists” and “the reciprocal relationship between absolute truth and relative truth.” He demonstrated the objectivity of truth and revealed the dialectical relationship between absolute and relative truth. This was Lenin’s further elucidation of the view of truth held by Marx and Engels; it also provided the textual basis for the aforementioned debate regarding whether Engels revealed the relationship between absolute and relative truth. That is, the dialectical relationship between absolute and relative truth only received concrete disclosure with Lenin, which further reveals the important interconnection between Lenin’s and Engels’s views of truth. In Philosophical Notebooks, Lenin further elaborated his view of truth—including the meaning of truth and the verification of truth—perfecting and advancing the form of the Marxist view of truth.
Finally, the new developments and new forms of the Marxist view of truth are inseparable from the foundation laid by Engels. Engels’s view of truth revealed a fundamental property of truth: its relativity. The relativity of truth is proven by the development of theory and practice; it indicates that truth has boundaries. If the Marxist view of truth is taken as a theoretical system, the veracity of this system also has boundaries; once it exceeds a certain scope or a certain time and space, it may lose its veracity. To maintain its veracity, this theory must continuously perfect and develop itself, constantly responding to the theoretical and practical problems raised by the times with the latest theoretical forms. Whether viewed from the historical evolution or the contemporary development of the Marxist view of truth, Engels’s view of truth occupies an important status as a theoretical foundation.
(2) Engels’s View of Truth is a Practical Weapon for Critiquing Erroneous Thought
A theory possesses true vitality only if it develops itself through continuous responses to practical problems. Engels’s view of truth is precisely such a theory. Although it is not the final form of the Marxist view of truth, it reveals the foundational content of the Marxist view of truth and constitutes a scientific theoretical system. Neither the Marxist view of truth nor its contemporary forms—including the view of truth in the Sinicization of Marxism—can be separated from the foundation laid by Engels.
Looking at contemporary understandings of truth, there remains a situation where multiple views of truth coexist, such as the so-called postmodernist view of truth. Some scholars refer to this as the view of truth in postmodern philosophy; it differs from the truth of traditional epistemology and from the Marxist view of truth. It should be recognized that from the perspective of the universality of truth, the postmodernist view of truth possesses a certain measure of rationality for its existence, as it originates from certain postmodernist trends [8] and cultures. However, from the perspective of the objectivity of truth, most postmodernist views of truth ground truth in a so-called "context," ignoring the objective, reality-based foundation of truth. This contextualist view of truth does not lead to what Engels called the relativity and conditionality of truth, but rather to a kind of relative truth [9] or even subjective truth; furthermore, these contextual conditions to some extent eliminate the boundary between truth and error. In Engels’s view of truth, the dialectical unity of truth and error is also universal and an objective existence, and the mutual transformation of truth and error requires real practical conditions rather than simple contextual shifts. Therefore, Engels’s view of truth must critique and sublate [10] this postmodernist view of truth. On the one hand, the postmodernist view of truth is a relative truth under certain conditions; on the other hand, such relative truth will inevitably transform into error. Engels’s view of truth possesses practicality; it is our theoretical weapon for the struggle against contemporary erroneous ideas of truth.
The critical method of construction in Engels’s view of truth can also serve as a theoretical weapon to guide struggle; this is both a theoretical requirement for the development of the Marxist view of truth and a practical need for the struggle against erroneous trends of thought. Truth itself concerns both theory and the practice of real life. Therefore, the construction of Engels’s view of truth should have a two-layered system: one layer is the theory of truth, and the other is the practice of truth. The former is constructed by critiquing erroneous understandings of truth; the latter is constructed within real social practice. We may consider the process of critiquing erroneous understandings of truth as the very process of constructing truth. Critique and construction are two aspects of the same process; the method of critique inevitably contains the content of construction. When critiquing erroneous trends of thought, one must sublate and transcend them within the critique to construct a truly scientific system of thought and theory. This is a requirement of both theory and practice. Whether from a theoretical or practical level, only by consistently critiquing and sublating can one master scientific theoretical weapons in theory and in social reality. This also offers an important practical revelation: when critiquing erroneous understandings, it is more important to construct correct understandings—to guide action with correct understandings, which is to say, with truth.
At the same time, Engels’s view of truth must not only struggle against contemporary erroneous ideas of truth but also against certain contemporary erroneous value trends, such as “universal values” [11] and extreme individualism. Truth involves the question of judgment, while value involves the question of evaluation; judgment and evaluation are often linked. although Engels’s view of truth did not involve a specific discussion on the relationship between truth and value, viewed from the critical construction of his view of truth and its guidance of the revolutionary practice of Marx and Engels, truth must necessarily possess value. Only by guiding social practice with truth can genuine value be obtained. Just as only by guiding socialist revolution and construction with genuine truth can we lead the way to true communism. Therefore, the construction of our country into a great modern power must be guided by a scientific view of truth—that is, the latest form of the Marxist view of truth—in order to realize the Dream of National Rejuvenation [12] and the Chinese Dream.