Sun Leqiang: The Theory of Fixed Capital in the "Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858" and Its Contemporary Interpretation
In Marx’s categorical system, constant capital and variable capital represent an essential division based on the production of surplus value, while fixed capital and circulating capital are merely outward distinctions based on differences in the consumption of use-value and the modes of value turnover. However, a new trend has emerged within contemporary Western Leftist thought that seeks to activate the category of fixed capital to reconstruct the contemporaneity of Marx’s thought. This activation, however, is achieved not through Capital, but through the Economic Manuscripts of 1857–1858 (hereinafter referred to as the Grundrisse). The Japanese scholar Hiroshi Uchida, drawing on Hegel’s logic of universality, particularity, and individuality, interprets the triple definition of fixed capital in the Grundrisse; David Harvey reinterprets the contemporary value of fixed capital theory based on the Grundrisse, further advancing the spatial turn in the critique of the logic of capital; while Antonio Negri and others, based on the "Fragment on Machines" and combined with the evolution of labor forms under Post-Fordism and cognitive capitalism, have endowed the category of fixed capital with new connotations, realizing a transformation from machines to the human being itself. Given the current era, how should we view and respond to these new interpretations and constructions? This is a major question we must address today.
I. The Demarcation of Fixed and Circulating Capital: Clearing the Mist and Defining Connotations
Unlike Roman Rosdolsky, Harry Cleaver, and Antonio Negri, the Japanese scholar Hiroshi Uchida neither agrees with reading the Grundrisse by using Capital as a reference, nor with interpreting Capital based on the Grundrisse, and even less with setting the two in opposition. Instead, he advocates starting from the overall framework of the critique of political economy and interpreting the thoughts of the Grundrisse based on its own logic. Regarding the theory of fixed capital, Uchida believes that, compared to Volume II of Capital, the Grundrisse reflects the processual, fluid, and open nature of Marx’s efforts to clarify the connotation of fixed capital. If the connotation of fixed capital in Capital possesses determinacy and uniqueness, then fixed capital in the Grundrisse is polyphonic and polysemic.
To grasp this polysemy, Uchida utilizes Hegel’s logic of "universality" [1], "particularity," and "individuality" to distinguish three different levels: "First, accepting the definition of the generation of capital as value up to now, as long as capital possesses the nature of constantly changing form to circulate and valorize, it is circulating capital; however, when capital value assumes a specific form at a given moment, it is fixed—this is the 'universal' definition of circulating and fixed capital. Second, when the value of capital as a whole is put into production, it is actually divided into several parts. Each part is defined by its own unique use-value; the part where value flows quickly is called circulating capital, and the part where it flows slowly is called fixed capital (the 'particular' definition). Third, these two parts of capital, in the turnover-cum-reproduction of productive capital, transform into one another and unify once again into a single whole, returning to the single entity of the beginning (the 'individual' definition)." The so-called "universality" refers to the demarcation from the perspective of the unity of the production process and the circulation process—that is, the total process: capital must flow from one stage to another, and from this perspective, all capital in motion can be called circulating capital, while capital fixed at a certain stage or in a specific form constitutes fixed capital. The so-called "particularity" refers to the demarcation from the perspective of the circulation process (including the "small circulation" of exchange between capital and labor-power and the "large circulation" of capital): the difference between the objects of labor and the instruments of labor in terms of use-value evolves into a difference in the existential forms of capital; the part with fast value-flow is called circulating capital, and the part with slow flow is called fixed capital. The so-called "individuality" is demarcated from the perspective of their mutual transformation: specifically, circulating capital can be transformed into fixed capital, and fixed capital can likewise be reduced to circulating capital, the two being mutually unified.
While Uchida’s use of Hegel’s triple logic to interpret Marx’s three-fold demarcation of fixed and circulating capital is innovative, it is also suspect of over-interpretation. In reality, these are not views Marx put forward as his own positive exposition; rather, he departs from the demarcation logic of bourgeois economics to conduct a step-by-step analysis, thereby anchoring the fallacies in the understanding of fixed and circulating capital within bourgeois economics. Uchida, however, mistakenly regards these points as Marx’s own positive understanding of fixed capital.
First, the demarcation made from the total process, i.e., the unity of the production and circulation processes. Marx points out that the movement of capital manifests as the unity of the production process and the circulation process. As capital in motion, it must move from one stage to another and transform from one form to another; this is circulation and capital in flux. Meanwhile, capital fixed at each specific stage, or capital tied to a specific form and determinacy, constitutes a formal determination distinct from capital in motion—that is, fixed-up capital. Based on this difference, one can derive the division between circulating and fixed capital; this is a common trope in the demarcation of circulating and fixed capital by bourgeois political economists (such as J.S. Mill, Say, De Quincey, etc.). According to this logic, "capital as the subject passing through all stages, as the moving unity of circulation and production, as the unity of circulation and production in process, is circulating capital; capital as itself tied to each such stage, as capital possessing its own differences, is fixed-up capital, tied-up capital." Fixed capital is "capital fixed up in its original sense." Uchida’s understanding of this view as Marx’s universal definition of fixed and circulating capital is inaccurate. Here, Marx only intends to follow the bourgeois logic to draw out the irrationality of such a definition. In Marx's view, understanding fixed and circulating capital as general forms of capital is significant for dissecting capitalist circulation and the total production process. The problem, however, is that dividing fixed and circulating capital based on the total process is actually irrational because the "fixed capital" derived this way is merely capital fixed at a certain stage or specific determinacy—such as commodity capital, money capital, and capital as a condition of production—and there remains an essential difference between this and fixed capital in the true sense.
Second, the demarcation made from "small circulation" [2], i.e., the exchange between capital and labor-power. Cherbuliez, Ramsay, and others believed that once the exchange between capital and labor is completed, this portion of capital is transferred from the hands of the capitalist to the hands of the worker, transforming into the worker’s fund for means of subsistence, and thus "does not enter the reproduction process at all." From this, they argued that only the portion of capital exchanged with workers constitutes genuine circulating capital; other capital, while contributing to the future production of commodities, has no direct relationship with the worker’s own consumption and therefore belongs to the category of fixed capital. Cherbuliez pointed out even more directly: "Circulating capital is the consumable part of capital, and fixed capital is the non-consumable part... one part is edible, and the other part is not edible." From this perspective, the approach of demarcating fixed and circulating capital based on small circulation ultimately boils down to the issue of productive consumption versus personal consumption: capital used for personal consumption constitutes circulating capital, while capital used for productive consumption constitutes fixed capital. Marx believed this demarcation was clearly problematic because, by this logic, various materials used for productive consumption would also be classified under the category of fixed capital. In this regard, it is incorrect to demarcate fixed and circulating capital solely based on productive and personal consumption, and to positively understand this dimension as Marx's logic of "particularity" for demarcating fixed capital is an even greater error!
Third, the demarcation made from "large circulation" [3], i.e., the movement outside the stage of capitalist production. On the basis of a critical reflection on bourgeois economics, Marx offered his own judgment: one can rely neither on the total process nor on small circulation; instead, fixed and circulating capital must be demarcated from the perspective of large circulation. (1) From the perspective of use-value, fixed capital remains in the hands of the capitalist and never leaves the production process; whereas circulating capital must be alienated as use-value and must enter circulation—only after the use-value represented by circulating capital is alienated can the value it represents be transformed into real value. For example, the part of circulating capital used for exchange with workers or for purchasing raw materials remains potential value if it is still held by the capitalist; if the commodity capital after raw material processing does not enter circulation as use-value, the value and surplus value contained within it cannot be realized. (2) From the perspective of value, fixed capital enters the circulation process only as value; the amount of value that fixed capital enters into the product and circulation depends on the portion of value consumed as use-value in the production process, while the unconsumed part of the use-value remains in the production process and the value it represents does not enter circulation. In contrast, circulating capital does not have this distinction; it must enter circulation as both use-value and value simultaneously. (3) From the perspective of the reproduction cycle, the return of fixed capital’s value depends on the consumption time of its use-value in the production process; therefore, the value of fixed capital returns bit by bit in succession, and its reproduction time depends on the consumption time of the use-value. In contrast, "the reproduction of circulating capital depends on the circulation time"; each of its circulations is a complete life cycle, and its value returns in full as a one-time event within a short period.
On this basis, Marx derived his own understanding of fixed and circulating capital. First, the distinction between fixed and circulating capital arises because of the different ways in which use-value and value are transferred across different components of capital, rather than because of their different roles in the process of value production or valorization. Therefore, the fundamental difference between fixed and circulating capital lies in their different material compositions (use-values), which in turn leads to different modes of value circulation. Second, the division of fixed and circulating capital is, to some extent, only applicable to productive capital; such a distinction does not exist for commodity capital or money capital. This once again demonstrates that the practice of bourgeois political economy in dividing fixed and circulating capital based on the total production process and small circulation is untenable, and Uchida’s interpretation of Marx’s fixed capital based on Hegelian triple logic is likewise untenable. Third, does political economy actually need to study use-value? Classical political economy always excluded use-value from the scope of its research. Through the investigation of fixed and circulating capital, Marx realized that one must not use a "one-size-fits-all" approach [4] like the classical economists. When use-value acts merely as use-value—such as the use-value of natural objects, labor products, or use-value in simple commodity circulation—it does not bear corresponding economic determinacy; therefore, such use-value does not constitute an object of study for political economy. However, when use-value bears specific economic determinacy, it must enter the scope of political economic research. In the case of fixed and circulating capital, "use-value itself plays the role of an economic category." The difference between the objects of labor and the instruments of labor in terms of use-value evolves into a difference in the existential forms of capital; such use-value is not only use-value but also bears specific economic functions.
II. Two Forms of Fixed Capital and Their Contemporary Significance: Harvey’s New Interpretation
Marx points out that while the distinction between fixed capital and circulating capital is made with regard to productive capital, this by no means implies that fixed capital takes only one form. It exists in another form: "Fixed capital does not appear merely as a tool of production within the production process, but also as an independent form of capital, such as railways, canals, highways, irrigation works, etc.—that is, as capital incorporated into the land, and so on." Unlike machinery serving as a means of production, railways and highways are not used by a single capitalist as fixed capital alongside circulating capital; rather, they are "used by different capitals simultaneously as their common conditions of production and circulation. ... Fixed capital does not appear as something contained within a specific production process, but rather as the connecting artery of a mass of such production processes of specific capitals. ... It can only be sold in the form of fixed capital itself." If one says that fixed capital enclosed within the production process can only be used for productive consumption and never for individual consumption, the case is different for fixed capital as an independent form. Marx notes: "This by no means implies that fixed capital, in every determination, is capital that is not used for individual consumption but only for production. A house can be used for production or for consumption, and the same is true of all means of transport: ships and vehicles can be used for tourism or as means of transport; a road can be used as a means of communication for production in the proper sense, or for taking a walk, etc." Take the railway as another example: on the one hand, it serves as a means of transport for some people within the production process and as a means of circulation for some producers; on the other hand, it "serves others as a means of consumption, as a use value, such as for tourists, etc." Marx believes that this independent form of fixed capital provides an important channel for the transfer of surplus capital.
Viewed this way, fixed capital enclosed in the production process and fixed capital as an independent form are two different types of fixed capital, and the resulting modes of value turnover and reflux also differ. Fixed capital enclosed in the production process achieves value reflux gradually, primarily by transferring the portion of value consumed during the production process into the final product. In contrast, fixed capital as an independent form can only be replaced through the circulating capital it indirectly facilitates: "Fixed capital does not enter into the immediate production process but appears as a general condition for many production processes, such as buildings, railways, etc.; in such cases, its value can only be compensated through the circulating capital it indirectly helps to create." For instance, a house can "circulate as a use value"; through leasing, it achieves value reflux gradually via the collection of rent. To take another example, fixed capital itself contains both value and surplus value; it can be "sold in the form of its use value" or "lent out," achieving gradual value reflux "in the form of an annuity," where "interest represents surplus value, and the annuity represents the gradual reflux of the advanced value."
If Henri Lefebvre [5], through his research on the actual evolution of 20th-century capitalism, observed the crucial role of the production of space in the survival of capitalism—thereby pioneering the "spatial turn" in historical materialism—then David Harvey [6] seized upon the issue of fixed capital to open another path for this spatial turn. This is most centrally reflected in The Limits to Capital, published in 1982, and his new A Companion to Marx's Grundrisse, published in 2023. Integrating the developmental conditions of contemporary capitalism, he deeply excavated the problem of fixed capital in the Grundrisse, particularly making fresh explorations around those "blank spaces" mentioned by Marx but not elaborated upon at the time. As he put it himself: "I find Marx’s treatment of fixed capital in the Grundrisse to be much more sophisticated than his treatment in Capital. I prefer to take my ideas from the Grundrisse rather than from Capital."
First, he analyzes the relationship between fixed capital, technological change, and capital accumulation. Harvey points out that understanding fixed capital is inseparable from two mechanisms: capital accumulation and technological change. The fact that fixed capital can emerge from numerous fields to become an independent sector of production itself requires surplus capital and surplus population as prerequisites. To alleviate overaccumulation, the transfer of surplus capital to fixed capital production sectors inevitably occurs; thus, fixed capital provides a favorable channel for absorbing surplus capital and "serves as a powerful lever for capital accumulation." However, as Harvey notes, this alleviation is merely "temporary," because the practice of mitigating contradictions through fixed capital investment only further expands them. Rather than fundamentally overcoming the problem of overaccumulation, it triggers even larger crises on a broader scale. Based on this, Harvey concludes: "In the long run, the switch from circulating to fixed capital only deepens the problem of overaccumulation. ... This short-term solution to the overaccumulation problem deepens the long-term difficulties and involves push-ing the general burden of periodic devaluations to some extent onto the fixed capital." This assertion is undoubtedly a further substantiation of Marx's views.
Here, Harvey further dissects the impact of technological change on the turnover of fixed capital. From a technological perspective, fixed capital is undeniably the product of technological change. In Marx's era, the index of technological change was incomparable to today's, and at that time, intellectual property and patent laws had not yet been enacted. Therefore, when examining the depreciation and value transfer of fixed capital, it was impossible for Marx to consider so many complex factors. Harvey argues that in Marx's framework, the circulation of fixed capital unfolds according to the dual logic of use value and value: based on the degree of consumption of use value, value is transferred part by part into the product, achieving value reflux gradually. In other words, for Marx, the turnover time of fixed capital depends more on the durability of the machine itself and the time over which its use value is consumed. Although he recognized the economic lifespan of fixed capital—namely, the impact of the profit differential between new and old machines on turnover—he did not provide extensive analysis. Based on this, Harvey contends that Marx's understanding of fixed capital depreciation was based entirely on physical lifespan, thereby forming a "linear value transfer" model. This model "places the physical and material existence of fixed capital in an autonomous and seemingly determinative role. It is as if Marx fell into the trap of fetishism." Harvey argues that the focus should be on analyzing the economic lifespan of fixed capital on the basis of its physical cycle, because in the eyes of the capitalist, the economic lifespan—the amount of profit brought by fixed capital—is more important than the physical cycle. To do this, it is inevitable to study "changes in the design and cost of machinery systems, and the overall pace and form of technological change." In this sense, Harvey believes this is precisely the important reason for the emergence of patent law: to strictly control the pace of technological change and expansion through legal means. However, he maintains that this does not change the "fundamental contradiction between the evolution of productive forces and capitalist social relations. ... The pace of technological change—which itself is mainly related to the pursuit of relative surplus value—remains a major lever of capital accumulation and a significant force contributing to unevenness." The significance of introducing technological change is to prove that Marx's method of demonstrating capitalist crisis through the physical cycle of fixed capital has become outdated. At this point, "the entire material expression and temporal rhythm of the crisis formation process have undergone a fundamental change. In such a situation, Marx’s 'first-block' theory of crisis ... clearly will not work." Consequently, Marx’s crisis theory must be reshaped based on technological change. This is precisely the work Harvey has vigorously promoted and is an important factor in understanding the crisis of Fordism.
Second, he deeply excavates independent types of fixed capital and their different roles. In Marx's view, fixed capital includes not only machinery and factory buildings in the production process, but also other types of fixed capital, such as railways, canals, highways, irrigation channels, dams, houses, roads, ships, and vehicles. Unlike fixed capital enclosed in the production process acting as tools of production, this type of fixed capital performs a very special function, namely, acting as "conditions of production and circulation." If the conversion of circulating capital into fixed capital enclosed in the production process is to some extent an important way to alleviate overaccumulation, then the conversion of circulating capital into independent forms of fixed capital—that is, "a large portion of capital converted into fixed capital that does not act as an immediate factor of production"—is an important method for stopping the fall in the general rate of profit and delaying crisis. Harvey elaborates further from two aspects: First, the lending of fixed capital—that is, leasing out fixed capital (rather than selling it) according to its use value to obtain the corresponding monetary equivalent. He points out that in this case, "the capitalist is purchasing the use-value of such fixed capital on an annual basis or as a service charge—buildings in which to house production are rented by the year; fork-lift trucks are rented by the week; containers are leased to take commodities to their final destination." This leasing method of annuities or weekly fees plus interest not only allows the value of fixed capital to be effectively recovered during its service life but also brings in a certain amount of interest. The interest here is not the total surplus value contained in the fixed capital but only a part of it; the remaining surplus value is distributed among different capitalists. Thus, this remaining portion of surplus value participates in the formation of the average rate of profit, effectively arresting the decline of the profit rate in the short term. Second, from the perspective of the individual capitalist, his profit rate is measured against his total capital. The more he invests in fixed capital, the more the profit rate falls; conversely, if he does not purchase fixed capital but instead leases independent forms of fixed capital, then his total advanced capital contains only the cost of leasing the fixed capital for a certain period. This reduces the total capital he employs, thereby effectively slowing the decline of his profit rate. Harvey believes this phenomenon is very common in developed capitalist countries.
Third, he elucidates the fixed capital used in consumption activities and its forms of action. In the Grundrisse, Marx explicitly points out that fixed capital can serve not only as a tool of production and a general condition of production but also for consumption. For example, "A house can be used for production or for consumption, and the same is true of all means of transport: ships and vehicles can be used for tourism or as means of transport; a road can be used as a means of communication for production in the proper sense, or for taking a walk, etc." Unfortunately, due to the constraints of his subject matter, Marx did not conduct an in-depth discussion at the time. Regarding this, Harvey comments: "Marx has a lot of very interesting things to say about this. He distinguishes between fixed capital of a machine-technology sort in production and the fixed capital in the built environment. Within the built environment, there is fixed capital which is used by producers, and fixed capital which is used by consumers. Actually, you can distinguish between fixed capital which is used in production and fixed capital which is used in consumption." Following this line of thought, he deeply explores "fixed capital used in consumption." Once fixed capital is introduced into consumption, Harvey opens up a completely new horizon. Just as fixed capital acting as tools and conditions of production can be completed through purchase or leasing, certain items acting as the consumption fund [7] can also be completed through leasing or purchase—housing, for instance, can be rented or bought. However, for capitalists and individual consumers, the costs they must bear are different. For an average person, it is extremely difficult to buy a house entirely with their own accumulated cash; in this situation, the financial and credit systems must be introduced. For individual consumers to purchase expensive consumer goods, they must borrow: "The immediate consequence of this is that the use of much of the consumption fund is integrated into the circulation of interest-bearing capital. ... many consumption fund items (housing, cars, and the like) are purchased on the basis of debt financing, so that the formation of second-hand markets for them is a necessary outcome." In this case, the purchase or leasing of fixed capital and consumer goods must be discussed within the framework of interest-bearing capital. Consequently, a new problem arises: if fixed capital investment might trigger overaccumulation, then debt-fueled consumption might trigger over-indebtedness. The 2008 subprime mortgage crisis confirms the correctness of Harvey’s judgment.
Finally, he explicates the significant meaning of the built environment as an integration of production, exchange, and consumption. In [David] Harvey’s view, some fixed capital may merely be instruments of production, some may function only as conditions of production, and some may be mere instruments of consumption; however, a vast amount of fixed capital exists as a complex of production, exchange, and consumption—namely, the artificially constructed system of the “built environment.” He points out that “the built environment is composed of a vast array of different elements: factories, dams, offices, shops, warehouses, roads, railways, docks, power stations, water and sewage systems, schools, hospitals, parks, cinemas, restaurants... at any one moment, the built environment appears as a potpourri of many landscapes, shaped according to the requirements of different modes of production at different stages of their historical development. Yet within capitalist social relations, all elements take the form of commodities.” This built environment is organized according to spatial configurations; spatial order constitutes the fundamental attribute of the built environment and is the primary factor determining its economic value. “All aspects of the production and use of the built environment are brought into the orbit of capital circulation.” Capital disposes fixed capital precisely according to this spatial distribution, and the deployment of fixed capital is, in turn, an important way for capital to realize spatialization. Based on this, Harvey argues that without understanding fixed capital, it is impossible to fully comprehend the urban problems of modern capitalism.
Based on the Grundrisse, Harvey deeply excavates arguments that Marx mentioned but did not develop in depth, further enriching and advancing fixed capital theory. These analyses remain commendable even today. Furthermore, his analysis of the problem of over-accumulation caused by over-investment in fixed capital, and the problem of excessive debt within consumption funds, provides an explanatory path for us to grasp the crisis of Fordism and the 2008 subprime mortgage crisis in depth, which is also worthy of affirmation. More importantly, by firmly grasping the issue of fixed capital, he introduces the city and space into the critique of Marxist political economy; this path is more reliable than [Edward] Soja’s postmodern geography centered on "spatial ontology." However, the deficiency lies in the fact that the dominant logic and starting point of Harvey’s analysis of fixed capital is neither the logic of surplus value production nor the logic of value valorization, but rather the logic of use-value. This marks a significant divergence between him and Marx on the issue of fixed capital.
III. From "Machines" to "Humans": Negri’s Contemporary Reconstruction of the Category of Fixed Capital
In the Grundrisse, Marx not only expounded the distinction between fixed and circulating capital from the perspective of circulation, but also explicated—from the perspective of the immediate production process—the intellectual sources of fixed capital and its intrinsic impact on the production process. This is primarily reflected in the section "Fixed Capital and the Development of the Productive Forces of Society," known by the Western Left as the "Fragment on Machines" [8]. Specifically: first, in Marx’s view, the emergence of fixed and circulating capital means that the difference between the means of labor and the materials of labor in terms of use-value develops into a difference in material form characterized by formal determinations, marking the transition of the capitalist mode of production to a brand-new stage. Second, once fixed capital intervenes in the production process, it leads to a significant divergence between the labor process and the production process. Labor gradually recedes into a secondary element of production, and fixed capital replaces original labor as the important hallmark for measuring the level of development of capitalist productive forces. Third, fixed capital is the capitalized attribute of the machinery system, and the machinery system is essentially the product of the objectification of knowledge. Consequently, scientific knowledge as common wealth (at a time when intellectual property rights and their privatization had not yet emerged) was absorbed under the power of capital, becoming an externalized force opposed to labor. Fourth, the development of the machinery system and fixed capital depends on the level of development of scientific knowledge and "general intellect" [9]; since scientific knowledge is created and produced by subjects and human beings, the level of development of scientific knowledge and general intellect ultimately depends on the degree of development of the human being themselves. This degree of development, in turn, depends on the saving of labor time and the increase of free time: more free time means more time for individuals to engage in scientific research, thereby allowing them to fully appropriate scientific knowledge and promote the development of social general intellect. Conversely, the more general intellect and scientific knowledge develop, the more advanced the machinery system (as the objectification of knowledge) becomes, and thus fixed capital develops further. Based on this, Marx concluded: "The saving of labor time is equal to an increase of free time, i.e., time for the full development of the individual, which in turn reacts upon the productive power of labor as itself the greatest productive power. From the standpoint of the direct production process, it can be regarded as the production of fixed capital, this fixed capital being man himself." Therefore, when Marx said "fixed capital is man himself," he primarily meant that the development of fixed capital ultimately depends on the development of the human being, or that the development of science, technology, and machinery systems ultimately depends on human development—not that the human being has literally become fixed capital.
If Harvey grasped Marx’s partition of the two types of fixed capital and their different functions (especially fixed capital as an independent form) to concentrate on excavating Marx’s theory and its contemporary value, then [Antonio] Negri and the school of "cognitive capitalism" have combined the era-defining characteristics of post-Fordism and cognitive capitalism to reinterpret the contemporary significance of the proposition that "fixed capital is man himself," based on the issue of general intellect, thereby endowing the category of fixed capital with new connotations.
Negri and the cognitive capitalism school argue that the production Marx spoke of primarily referred to the production of material goods, where fixed capital manifested as visible machinery systems; however, the dominant production in contemporary capitalism has transcended material forms, manifesting as the production of immaterial products—such as knowledge, ideas, programs, software development, data, information, taste, and culture. These intangible products cannot be produced by machines; they can only rely on the subject themselves, who possesses knowledge and general intellect. If the past involved using things to produce things and tangible commodities to produce tangible commodities, today involves using knowledge to produce knowledge and living intellect to produce living knowledge. In this new productive activity, fixed capital has transcended its original machine form and acquired a completely new form of existence: those subjects possessing general intellect and social creativity have replaced the original machinery system to become the highest form of fixed capital. Thus, when Marx asserted that "fixed capital is man himself," "he predicted the development of capital in our time." Negri uses computer programs as an example to illustrate this. In his view, both computer programs and machinery systems are products of general intellect and belong to fixed capital, but the intellect they represent and the social relations they shape are different.
First is the difference between "dead knowledge" and "living knowledge." Regarding machinery systems, once scientific knowledge and general intellect are objectified into a machinery system, the knowledge and intellect contained therein are transformed into static, dead knowledge. In Negri’s words, "industrial machines embody past intellect in a relatively fixed and static form." Even if new knowledge emerges, it cannot be re-objectified into the original machines; one can only produce new machinery systems. This is the problem of fixed capital renewal that traditional factories must face. In contrast, as a form of digital fixed capital, the computer program initiates a new, open, and dynamic construction process. It is not only the product of past intellect but can continuously inject new knowledge into past results, realizing the continuous development of general intellect and the update and upgrade of the program. This knowledge and intellect are no longer dead knowledge within a machine, but living knowledge that is constantly activated.
Second is the change in the relationship between fixed capital and the laborer. Negri points out that from Marx’s time to the Fordist period, the relationship between fixed capital and workers was an external, alienated relationship: (1) From the source of intellect, workers at that time were primarily industrial workers dominated by manual labor; they did not possess scientific knowledge or general intellect, so it was impossible for them to directly participate in the R&D and design process of objectifying knowledge into machinery. (2) From the perspective of fixed capital as a product, the production process of fixed capital was not a labor process dominated by workers, but rather an objectification process using machines to produce machines, in which the worker was merely an inconsequential cog. (3) Regarding fixed capital acting as an instrument of production, the production process in modern factories was merely a process of workers obeying and serving machines. But in the era of post-Fordism and cognitive capitalism, everything has changed. The dominant form of labor is no longer the manual labor of Marx’s day, but intellectualized immaterial labor and cognitive labor. The production of digital fixed capital is no longer a process external to the laborer, but directly manifests as the product of the "collaborative social intellect" of immaterial laborers and cognitive workers. They directly participate in the design, R&D, and production of digital fixed capital; or rather, "living labor is the root of this process. Without living labor, there is no computer program." Therefore, "fixed capital now appears to exist inside the body, inscribed upon them, while simultaneously subject to them... these tasks are not embodied in a material product separate from the worker; they exist in the brain and cannot exist apart from the person." Marx’s statement that "fixed capital is man himself" is no longer an indirect inference but has been transformed into a generalized objective reality. Furthermore, regarding the relationship between fixed capital and the subject, the laborer no longer merely serves the machine as Marx described, but uses their own and collective intellect to continuously perfect and update digital fixed capital. In this way, subjectivity permeates fixed capital, thereby flipping fixed capital—which was originally external to the subject—into a human-machine assemblage that highlights subjectivity.
Finally, there is the fusion of fixed capital and variable capital. In Marx’s work, fixed and variable capital belong to two different systems of classification, and the distinction between them is clear. However, Negri argues that in contemporary capitalist society, this distinction has lost its established meaning. Regarding digital products, variable capital still manifests as the subject’s own labor power and creativity, but digital fixed capital is no longer an intellectual force external to the subject; rather, it is an internal force residing in the subject’s brain and body. Thus, variable capital (labor power) and fixed capital (the subject's own intellect) have achieved fusion. "What is called immaterial or intellectual capital is actually essentially contained within the person, and thus it corresponds in a fundamental way to the intellectual and creative capacity of labor power. We find ourselves before the collapse of the concepts of constant capital and the organic composition of capital inherited from industrial capitalism. In the relationship $c/v$ (constant capital/variable capital), which mathematically represents the organic social composition of capital, it is precisely $v$ (labor power) that manifests as the primary fixed capital, presenting itself as the 'body-machine'." Consequently, the boundary Marx demarcated between "fixed capital and variable capital... has become thoroughly blurred." On this basis, Negri believes that today, the appropriation of fixed capital is no longer an empty phrase or an illusory metaphor, but a realistic strategy of struggle and a political program: namely, that subjects, through association, realize the appropriation of their own general intellect, thereby achieving the return from fixed capital to the subject itself. In this way, "the power of machinic subjects and their collaborative networks can be fully realized. The combined machinic power, collaborative productive forms, and the ontological foundation of common rights are intertwined in the closest way," eventually breaking through the cage of capital and realizing the transition from the "bio-power" [10] dominated by capital to a "bio-politics" of subject autonomy.
How should we view this perspective? Contemporary Western Leftists have provided different responses. Bernard Stiegler notes: "Cognitivism is built upon the information and computer technologies revealed by Negri surrounding 'cognitive capitalism.' Negri developed Marx’s concept of 'general intellect' to understand current cognitive capitalism. Within cognitive capitalism, especially since the establishment of the World Wide Web in 1993, two important contradictory trends have emerged: one is that cognitive capitalism has produced new modes of value production where the content of value production is also entirely new; the other is exactly the opposite—cognitive capitalism has caused proletarianization in all fields, pervading planning, production, and consumption. These two contradictory trends result in a very specific combination of the three constituent elements: fixed capital, general intellect, and living labor." Based on this, Stiegler highly evaluates Negri’s thesis, believing he has grasped the core issue of contemporary capitalism: namely, the problem of general intellect and knowledge production.
In contrast to Stiegler, Moishe Postone and David Harvey have critiqued Negri from different angles. They argue, first, that Negri excessively exaggerates the connotation of "general intellect." Marx "used the term 'general intellect' only once... the Italians may have indeed reified this term." Negri endows general intellect with excessive meanings and connotations, constituting an over-interpretation. Second, Negri confuses the essential difference between value and wealth. Postone believes that in the "Fragment on Machines," Marx attempted to critique the narrowness of capitalist value production through the tension between such production and genuine human wealth. Negri, however, reduces Marx’s critique of value production to a critique of wealth production, which represents a "regression" in critical logic. Negri has acknowledged this point, though in his view, focusing on common wealth such as knowledge and general intellect is not a "regression" but rather the inevitable development of constructing a critique of contemporary cognitive capitalism along Marx's path. Third, Negri distorts the connotation and significance of fixed capital. Postone points out that constant capital and variable capital are the key categories for understanding the production of capitalist value and surplus value; these are essential categories, and thus their "difference does not manifest empirically." Fixed capital and circulating capital, however, represent an external formal division. "Marx’s formulation of this issue in Capital could not be clearer; here I agree with Harvey that Marx regards fixed capital as a sort of fluid category; the superficial [division of] fixed and circulating capital obscures the difference between constant and variable capital—that is, it obscures the part that actually produces value." When Negri argues that today’s fixed capital and variable capital have merged into one, he confuses categories from two different levels; and when he understands fixed capital as the human being itself, he falls even further into the traps of empiricism and fetishism.
Conclusion
To conclude the above arguments:
First, in Marx’s view, fixed capital includes two forms: first, fixed capital acting as instruments of production alongside circulating capital; second, fixed capital in an independent form acting as conditions of production or circulation. The former transfers the value it represents into the final product according to the degree of consumption of its use-value, thereby gradually realizing the reflux of value; the independent form of fixed capital realizes value reflux through sale, lending, or leasing. As a means of production, the former can only be confined within the production process for productive consumption; the latter can be used for both productive consumption and personal consumption. As the product of the objectification of scientific knowledge, the degree of development of fixed capital depends on the level of social intellect, while the level of social intellect in turn depends on the development of the human being. Therefore, in Marx’s view, the development of fixed capital ultimately depends on the development of the human being. Nevertheless, the division between fixed capital and circulating capital remains merely an external division and cannot replace the categories of constant and variable capital as the key to perceiving the essence of the capitalist production process.
Second, Hiroshi Uchida’s interpretation of the theory of fixed capital in the Grundrisse based on Hegel’s [categories of] universality, particularity, and individuality, while innovative, risks over-interpretation and consequently confuses the views Marx intended to critique with Marx’s own views. David Harvey, based on the Grundrisse, has deeply excavated those issues mentioned but not explored in depth by Marx at the time—such as the relationship between fixed capital and technological change, fixed capital for productive consumption versus personal consumption, independent forms of fixed capital and interest-bearing capital, and fixed capital and urban space. These have further enriched and developed Marx’s theory of fixed capital, opening a logic of the "spatial turn" different from that of Henri Lefebvre and Edward Soja, which is worthy of affirmation. However, compared to Marx, a major change has occurred in Harvey’s narrative logic: Marx distinguished fixed capital from circulating capital and their differing modes of value turnover based on use-value for the purpose of revealing their impact on the immediate production process and the reproduction process of total social capital—that is, his starting point was the problem of value. Harvey, however, directly employs use-value to explore the value-realization of fixed capital itself and its impact on the spatial expansion of capital.
Finally, Negri and the school of cognitive capitalism have elaborated on the transformation of fixed capital, labor power, and the relationship between the two based on the digital era, endowing fixed capital with a brand-new connotation and thereby reintroducing subjectivity into fixed capital. This interpretation has practical significance, but its flaws are also prominent. First, it underestimates the degree to which capital subsumes general intellect. Although immaterial laborers are the owners of their own general intellect, as long as living labor remains subject to the value mechanism and the logic of capital, such living labor and general intellect will inevitably be transformed into nourishment for the valorization of capital; a fundamental reversal of the kind Negri expects cannot occur naturally simply because laborers own their general intellect. Second, while the system of machinery and digitalized fixed capital are indeed the results of the objectification of general intellect, we cannot conversely say that the human being has directly become fixed capital—just as money is the result of the externalization of the human essence, but we cannot conversely say that the human being has directly become money. In this sense, I agree with Postone’s judgment that Negri’s interpretation is undoubtedly a form of "intellectual fetishism." Third, Negri’s claim that fixed capital and variable capital have merged in the production of immaterial products is also untenable. In immaterial and cognitive labor, whether the means of production are in physical or digital/intelligent forms, they still maintain the attributes of fixed capital in the Marxian sense, while labor power—as the sum of physical and mental strength—still performs the function of variable capital. The two cannot merge, either at the level of reality or theory.
(Author Profiles: Sun Leqiang, PhD in Law, Deputy Director, Professor, and Doctoral Supervisor in the Department of Philosophy at Nanjing University)
(Funding Projects: National Social Science Fund Project "Research on the Theoretical Reconstruction of Marx’s ‘Fragment on Machines’ by the Contemporary Western Left and the Contemporary Transformation of the Social Critical Paradigm" (17BZX031); National Youth Talent Support Project "Research on the Development Trends and Major Issues of Foreign Marxism since the New Century")
Web Editor: Tongxin Source: Study & Exploration, Issue 6, 2023