Tian Keqin: The War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the Theoretical Foundation of the First Historic Leap in the Sinicization of Marxism

From the September 18th Incident of 1931 to Japan's announcement of unconditional surrender in 1945, the fourteen-year-long War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression constituted a vital component of the New Democratic Revolution led by the Communist Party of China (CPC). During this period, China became the primary eastern theater of the global World Anti-Fascist War. At this historical juncture, as we commemorate the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, it is of profound theoretical and practical value to conduct a deep analysis of the objective demands the war placed on the Party to advance the Sinicization of Marxism.

Such a study must investigate the Party's understanding and practice regarding the three fundamental issues of the Chinese revolution—the united front, armed struggle, and Party building—under wartime conditions, as well as the sublimation of the Party's understanding of the New Democratic Revolution. Systematically elucidating the internal correlation and mutual achievement between the War of Resistance and the Sinicization of Marxism is essential for comprehensively grasping the significant status of the war in the CPC's process of advancing the Sinicization of Marxism. It further allows for a scientific understanding of the laws governing the development of the Sinicization of Marxism, a deep explanation of the great significance of the victory in the War of Resistance, and the inheritance and promotion of the great Spirit of the War of Resistance, all while advancing the great cause of building a powerful country and national rejuvenation through Chinese-path modernization.

I. The War of Resistance and the CPC's United Front Theory

General Secretary Xi Jinping has pointed out that the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression was a great and arduous struggle carried out "under the banner of the Anti-Japanese National United Front advocated and established by the Communist Party of China." Faced with the aggressive acts of Japanese imperialism aimed at turning China into its colony, the question of what policies and strategies the Chinese people should adopt to resist became an urgent issue for all social forces in China. Based on the profound changes occurring among various domestic classes as the national crisis deepened—from the September 18th Incident ^[1] to the North China Incident ^[2] and then the Xi’an Incident ^[3]—the CPC took the lead in raising the banner of resistance against Japanese imperialist aggression. It formally proposed and actively promoted the establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front based on the second period of cooperation between the Kuomintang (KMT) and the CPC, providing the political prerequisite for advancing the war. Simultaneously, the CPC integrated the basic Marxist principles of the united front with the specific realities of the War of Resistance, forming a complete set of policies and strategies to consolidate and expand the Anti-Japanese National United Front, thereby laying an important foundation for the smooth advancement of the Sinicization of Marxism.

1. The rise of the Sino-Japanese national contradiction raised new requirements for a nationwide united resistance

After the September 18th Incident, and particularly following the North China Incident, as "Japanese imperialism moved to change the status of the whole of China from a semi-colony shared by several imperialist powers to a colony monopolized by Japan," the national contradiction between China and Japan transcended domestic class contradictions to become the primary contradiction. New changes occurred across all domestic classes and political forces. The broad masses of the people, including workers and peasants, were unanimous in their demand for resistance, leading to a nationwide upsurge in the movement for national salvation, represented by the December 9th Movement ^[4]. The national bourgeoisie shifted its political stance, moving from following the counter-revolution to advocating for resistance and demanding democracy. Differentiation began within the KMT, as figures like Ma Zhanshan, Cai Tingkai, and Feng Yuxiang emerged to support resistance. These developments made it possible for the CPC to utilize the internal contradictions within the counter-revolutionary camp. Mao Zedong noted: "To sum up this question of class relations: the fundamental change of Japanese imperialism's invasion of China proper has changed the mutual relations among the various classes in China, expanded the forces of the national revolutionary camp, and weakened those of the national counter-revolutionary camp." This required the Party to adjust the united front policies and strategies used since the Land Revolutionary War ^[5] and establish a new united front suited to the developing situation of the War of Resistance.

As early as shortly after the September 18th Incident, the CPC raised the banner of resistance, issuing numerous declarations and resolutions condemning the aggressive crimes of Japanese imperialism, exposing the non-resistance policy of the KMT reactionaries, and proposing "to expel Japanese imperialism from China through a national revolutionary war," calling on the people nationwide to arm themselves against Japanese imperialism. In January 1933, as Japanese invaders advanced toward Chahar and the various passes of the Great Wall, the Party, in the name of the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet and the Revolutionary Military Commission of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army, issued a declaration. It expressed a willingness to unite with any armed force for resistance under three conditions: (1) an immediate stop to the attacks on the Soviet areas; (2) an immediate guarantee of the people's democratic rights (freedom of assembly, association, speech, strike, press, etc.); and (3) the immediate arming of the people to create armed volunteer corps to defend China and strive for China's independence, unity, and territorial integrity.

However, from the reality of that time, the Chiang Kai-shek clique stubbornly adhered to its "communist suppression" stance, and the CPC Central Committee was deeply influenced by "Left" dogmatism; thus, the conditions for realizing the Anti-Japanese National United Front were not yet ripe. Nevertheless, the Party Central Committee dispatched Zhou Baozhong, Zhao Yiman, and other Party cadres to Northeast China to strengthen Party organizations. They established united fronts with various volunteer forces and actively carried out solidarity and education work, gradually transforming independent and scattered anti-Japanese armed units into the Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army under the direct leadership of the Party, which became the main anti-Japanese force in the Northeast. The resistance of the Chinese people in the "White Mountains and Black Waters" ^[6] became the starting point of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and simultaneously raised the curtain on the World Anti-Fascist War.

2. The establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front based on the second KMT-CPC cooperation

In January 1935, during the Long March, the Party Central Committee convened the Zunyi Conference ^[7], which centrally resolved the decisive military and organizational issues of the time, initiating a new stage where the Party solved the practical problems of the Chinese revolution independently. During the conference period, Mao Zedong pointed out in a speech to a public meeting of the people of Zunyi County that "the Communist Party is willing to unite with people of all circles and armies of all sides in the country for a unified resistance." After the First and Fourth Front Armies joined forces, the policy of "going north to resist Japan" was proposed. Once the Central Red Army reached Northern Shaanxi, the Party Central Committee and Mao Zedong, at the Wayaobu Conference ^[8], focused on analyzing the dual nature of the national bourgeoisie and the possibility of utilizing the internal contradictions of the landlord-comprador camp. They criticized the "Left" closed-doorism that had long existed within the Party, which viewed middle forces as the most dangerous enemy. They emphasized that "all these things indicate that the revolutionary situation has changed from a local to a national one, and from a state of imbalance to a certain state of balance," and that "the Party's task is to merge the activities of the Red Army with all the activities of the workers, peasants, students, petty bourgeoisie, and national bourgeoisie across the country to form a unified national revolutionary front." This formally established the CPC's strategy for creating the Anti-Japanese National United Front, laying an important foundation for facilitating the second KMT-CPC cooperation.

In contrast to the CPC’s active response to the new upsurge in the movement for national salvation, the Chiang Kai-shek clique of the KMT, representing the interests of the big landlords and the big bourgeoisie, ignored Japan’s deepening aggression. Still wielding state power, they followed the erroneous policy of "internal pacification before external resistance" (攘外必先安内). Not only did they repeatedly compromise and retreat in the face of Japanese aggression, but they also intensified "encirclement and suppression" campaigns against the main forces of the Red Army. They were slow in making preparations for resistance and persisted in suppressing anti-Japanese democratic movements in various regions. The Xi’an Incident demonstrated that the reactionary policies pursued by Chiang Kai-shek, which harmed the nation, were opposed not only by the CPC and the majority of the people but also by patriotic forces within the KMT. The peaceful resolution of the Xi’an Incident "became the pivot for the change in the situation," greatly accelerating the process of the second KMT-CPC cooperation.

To push for a change in KMT policy, the CPC sent a telegram to the Third Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee of the KMT in February 1937. It requested the KMT to "end all civil wars, concentrate national strength, and unite against foreign aggression," "convene a representative meeting of all parties, factions, circles, and armies to concentrate national talent for national salvation," and "rapidly complete all preparations for the war of resistance against Japan." Simultaneously, it made pledges to "cease the policy of armed insurrection to overthrow the National Government nationwide" and that "the Soviet Government shall be renamed the Government of the Special Region of the Republic of China, and the Red Army shall be renamed the National Revolutionary Army, under the direct guidance of the Central Government in Nanjing and its Military Commission." This clearly showed that the CPC had made full policy preparations for the transition from civil war to the War of Resistance. These necessary concessions, made on a principled and conditional basis, were the inevitable result of the Party’s continuous promotion of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and a vital step in facilitating KMT-CPC cooperation. "Without this step, the establishment of the cooperation between the two parties would inevitably have been delayed." Subsequently, the Party not only continued to press on with contacts and negotiations with the KMT but also defined the struggle tasks of "consolidating peace, striving for democracy, and realizing the war of resistance" under the new situation, calling for the Party to secure its leadership role in the national war through hard work and exemplary actions. The Lugou Bridge Incident ^[9] shattered Chiang Kai-shek’s dreams of seeking peace with Japan, forcing him to issue a statement that essentially recognized the legal status of the CPC. Thus, the Anti-Japanese National United Front based on the second KMT-CPC cooperation was established.

3. The systematization of the policies and strategies of the Anti-Japanese National United Front

During the War of Resistance, the CPC consciously linked the development path of the Chinese revolution with the "correct handling of the question of establishing a united front with the bourgeoisie or being forced to split that united front." It systematically summarized the lessons and experiences of establishing united fronts with the bourgeoisie and other classes since the Party's founding, comprehensively explaining the necessity and possibility of building a solid united front during the Chinese revolution, and constructed the basic framework of a Sinicized Marxist united front theory.

First, because the greatest oppression was national oppression, the Chinese national bourgeoisie was able to participate in the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal struggle during certain periods and to a certain extent. "During such periods, the proletariat should establish a united front with the national bourgeoisie and maintain it as far as possible." Second, due to the economic and political weakness of the Chinese national bourgeoisie, they might vacillate and turn traitor under different historical circumstances; therefore, "the content of the Chinese revolutionary united front cannot remain identical throughout, but must undergo changes." That is, the national bourgeoisie can participate in the united front in one period but not in another. Third, as the various groups of the comprador big bourgeoisie were backed by different imperialist powers, when the spearhead of the revolution was primarily directed against one particular imperialism, "the big bourgeois groups belonging to other imperialist systems might also participate in the struggle against that particular imperialism to a certain extent and for a certain period." Therefore, the Chinese proletariat should establish possible united fronts with such big bourgeois groups and maintain them as far as possible under certain conditions favorable to the revolution. Fourth, because the comprador big bourgeoisie remains reactionary even when participating in the united front and resolutely opposes the development of the proletariat and its party, they must be restricted. "Policies of destruction, such as deception, enticement, 'dissolution,' and blows, must be adopted, using these as preparations for their surrender to the enemy and their splitting of the united front." Fifth, since the firm ally of the proletariat is the peasantry, the worker-peasant alliance constitutes the basis of the revolutionary united front. Sixth, the urban petty bourgeoisie is also a reliable ally. These six regularized understandings were both the sublimation of the Party's experience in leading the revolutionary united front and the guide for establishing, consolidating, and expanding the Anti-Japanese National United Front.

Concurrently, the Party clearly recognized that to always maintain leadership over the united front and ensure the completion of revolutionary goals and tasks, it must "preserve the independence of parties and classes, and preserve independence and initiative within the united front." It must adopt a strategy toward the bourgeoisie that involved both unity and struggle. The Anti-Japanese National United Front led by the CPC was to adhere to "both unity and independence," opposing both "Left" closed-doorism and Right opportunism. Mao Zedong pointed out: "If our Party does not know how to unite with the bourgeoisie in certain periods, the Party cannot advance and the revolution cannot develop; if our Party does not know how to carry out a resolute and serious 'peaceful' struggle against the bourgeoisie while uniting with it, the Party will disintegrate ideologically, politically, and organizationally, and the revolution will fail; and if our Party does not carry out a resolute and serious armed struggle against the bourgeoisie when forced to split with it, the Party will likewise disintegrate and the revolution will fail." It was precisely because the Party correctly analyzed and properly handled its relations with the bourgeoisie during the War of Resistance that the Anti-Japanese National United Front was established, consolidated, and developed, realizing the Sinicization of Marxist united front theory and laying an important foundation for the victory of the War of Resistance and the New Democratic Revolution.

II. The War of Resistance and the CPC's Armed Struggle Theory

The question of what form of struggle to adopt to secure victory in the War of Resistance was a major issue faced by both the Kuomintang and the Communist Party after the formal establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front. The Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, systematically synthesized the experiences and lessons gained from creating the new revolutionary path of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing political power through armed struggle during the Land Revolutionary War ^[10]. By conducting an in-depth analysis of the actual conditions in China and Japan, they integrated the basic Marxist principles of armed struggle with the specific reality of the Anti-Japanese guerrilla war led by the Party. They elucidated the laws governing the development of the War of Resistance, creatively proposed the theory of people's war and a complete set of strategic and tactical principles, and significantly advanced the Marxist theory regarding the seizure of state power by force.

1. The War of Resistance demanded that China implement a line of total resistance

The realization of the second Xi’an-style collaboration marked the formal establishment of the Anti-Japanese National United Front and the basic formation of a pattern of national resistance. However, from the very beginning, a fundamental divergence existed between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party on how to conduct the war. Under the pressure of objective circumstances, Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang initially took a relatively active stance toward the resistance. They organized campaigns such as the Battle of Shanghai, the Battle of Xuzhou, and the Battle of Wuhan, engaging in relatively active resistance and demonstrating certain political progress—such as recognizing the legal status of the Communist Party, releasing political prisoners, and promulgating programs, laws, and regulations conducive to the resistance. However, even while participating in the war, they clung to the reactionary position of the big landlord and big bourgeois classes. They did not fundamentally abandon their basic program of oppressing the people because they feared that the vigorous development of the masses’ anti-Japanese national salvation movement would spiral out of control. They especially feared that the people’s resistance led by the CPC would jeopardize their rule; consequently, they persisted in a "partial" line of resistance ^[11] that relied solely on the government and the army. When the Japanese army pressed in with heavy forces, this partial line of resistance shackled the people's participation and brought many difficulties to the war effort. In contrast, from the very start of the national resistance, the Communist Party proposed a political program of total resistance, emphasizing the need to give the masses a free hand and mobilize the entire nation for a total ethnic-national war.

As early as July 1936, while answering Edgar Snow’s question regarding "under what conditions China can defeat and exhaust Japanese imperialism," Mao Zedong provided a preliminary answer citing three essential conditions for victory: "first, the completion of the Chinese Anti-Japanese United Front; second, the completion of the international Anti-Japanese United Front; and third, the rise of revolutionary movements among the Japanese people and the peoples of Japan's colonies." Among these three, "the great union of the Chinese people is the primary one." In Mao’s view, how long the war would last depended mainly on the strength of the Chinese Anti-Japanese National United Front. If this strength could not be gathered quickly, the war would be prolonged and the people would endure a very painful period; this effectively raised the issue of the protracted and arduous nature of the war. Mao emphasized that only by uniting the people of the whole country and fully mobilizing the masses could Japanese imperialism be defeated. The Ten-Point Program for Resisting Japan and Saving the Nation ^[12] put forward important political propositions such as "overthrowing Japanese imperialism," "total military mobilization of the whole country," "total mobilization of the people of the whole country," "reforming political institutions," and "anti-Japanese national unity," clarifying the necessary conditions for total resistance. The Resolution of the Central Committee on the Present Situation and the Party's Tasks emphasized that "it must be seen that this resistance is a grueling protracted war," and that the central key to winning victory lay in "developing the already initiated resistance into a total national war of resistance." This marked the formal formation of the Party's line of total resistance.

2. China must adhere to the general strategic policy of Protracted War

To mobilize and organize the masses for the War of Resistance, it was necessary to clearly propose a military strategic policy. At the beginning of the national resistance, in the face of the Japanese imperialist invasion, the "Theory of National Subjugation" and the "Theory of Quick Victory" ^[13] both found a significant market. In what manner would the war actually proceed? Would China win the final victory? How could that victory be achieved? These fundamental questions concerning the future and destiny of the war urgently required answers and solutions from Chinese Communists. Mao Zedong scientifically synthesized the experience of the nationwide resistance, refuted various erroneous views prevalent at the time, and systematically elucidated the Party's general strategic policy of protracted war.

Mao Zedong first grasped the different characteristics of the national conditions of China and Japan, scientifically predicting the bright future that "Japan will certainly be defeated, and China will certainly be victorious." Mao pointed out: "The Sino-Japanese war is not just any war; it is a life-and-death war between a semi-colonial and semi-feudal China and an imperialist Japan in the 1930s. Herein lies the basis of the entire problem." In this war, four mutually contradictory basic characteristics existed between the two sides: the enemy is strong while we are weak; the enemy is regressive while we are progressive; the enemy is small while we are large; and the enemy has meager support while we have abundant support. Regarding Japan, its "strength lies in its powerful war capacity, while its weakness lies in the regressive and barbaric nature of its war, its insufficient manpower and material resources, and its meager support in the international arena." As for China, its "weakness lies in its meager war capacity, while its strength lies in the progressive and just nature of its war, in its being a large country, and in its abundant support in the international arena." As Mao pointed out: "These characteristics determined and continue to determine all the political policies and military strategies and tactics of both sides, and they determined and continue to determine the protracted nature of the war and the fact that final victory will belong to China and not to Japan."

Mao Zedong also proposed that the War of Resistance would pass through three stages: strategic defense, strategic stalemate, and strategic counter-offensive. He pointed out that through these three stages, a significant shift in the balance of power between China and Japan would occur: China would evolve from a position of inferiority during the defense stage to a balance of power during the stalemate stage, and finally to a position of superiority during the counter-offensive stage. In this process, the stalemate stage "is the transitional stage of the entire war and will also be the most difficult period, yet it is the pivot of the transformation." China's destiny "is not determined by whether the large cities are lost in the first stage, but by the degree of effort of the whole nation in the second stage. If we can persist in the resistance, the united front, and the protracted war, China will gain the strength to turn from weak to strong during this stage." At the same time, Mao pointed out that "the deepest source of the immense power of war exists among the masses"; "such a great national revolutionary war cannot be won without universal and deep political mobilization." These important judgments fully embody Mao Zedong’s viewpoint that "the army and the people are the foundation of victory," reflecting the historical materialist view that the masses are the creators of history and the subjects of practice. This clarified the only correct path for securing final victory in the protracted war.

3. China must develop and persist in a broad and enduring Anti-Japanese guerrilla war

The War of Resistance was a war of national liberation conducted under the conditions of a united front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party. On one hand, the CPC urged the Kuomintang to implement a line of total resistance; on the other hand, it led by example, modeling the practice of the total resistance line. In terms of military struggle, the CPC transformed its regular army—which had been used in a concentrated manner during the latter period of the Land Revolutionary War—into decentralized anti-Japanese guerrilla forces. It timely completed the military strategic transition from the mobile warfare of the late Land Revolutionary War to Anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare.

Generally speaking, guerrilla warfare is a tactical issue, but the particularity of the Sino-Japanese war gave Anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare a vital strategic status. In this war, China was a large but weak country, while Japan was a small but strong country. Although China was weak, its territory was vast, its population large, and its soldiers numerous. Although Japan was strong, its troop levels were insufficient, "leaving many empty spaces in the occupied areas. Therefore, Anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare was primarily not a matter of coordinating with regular army operations on interior lines, but of independent warfare on exterior lines. Moreover, due to China’s progress—that is, the existence of a strong army led by the Communist Party and the vast masses of the people—Anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare was not on a small scale but on a large scale." Thus, "China’s Anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare stepped out of the tactical scope and knocked on the door of strategy, demanding that the issue of guerrilla warfare be examined from a strategic perspective." After the war entered the stalemate stage, Mao Zedong—based on changes in the domestic and international situation and the balance of forces—theoretically elucidated the important strategic position of guerrilla warfare throughout the entire War of Resistance. He pointed out that guerrilla warfare "is the form of struggle that the people's armed forces must rely on, and thus the best form, to defeat a well-armed enemy and create their own positions in a backward country, in a large semi-colonial country, over a long period." He proposed incorporating Anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare into the "general concept of armed struggle" and linking it closely with the Party's political line and Party building as an important "magic weapon" ^[14] for the Party's growth. He emphasized that "in China, without armed struggle, there would be no place for the proletariat, no place for the people, no place for the Communist Party, and no victory for the revolution."

Mao Zedong's profound understanding of Anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare and people's war realized the integration of basic Marxist theories on armed struggle and military strategy with the specific realities of the Chinese revolution, especially the War of Resistance. This raised the Party's understanding of armed struggle to a new level. In the process of conducting guerrilla warfare, opening up behind-enemy-lines battlefields, and establishing Anti-Japanese democratic base areas, the path of the Chinese revolution was enriched and developed, which was of extremely significant importance for eventually securing victory in the War of Resistance.

III. The War of Resistance and Party Building

As a long-drawn-out national revolutionary war, the War of Resistance was conducted at a time when China already had a Communist Party, and it was carried out through the process of integrating the basic principles of Marxism with China's specific realities. During the war, the Party persisted in using basic Marxist principles to analyze and solve practical problems, continuously deepening its understanding and grasp of Marxism, China's specific realities, and the integration of the two. This led to major breakthroughs in Party building, enabling the Party to become the vanguard of the Chinese people and the Chinese nation while remaining the vanguard of the Chinese working class. It allowed the Party to achieve maturity in its thinking, politics, and organization while winning the support and love of the broad masses.

1. The formal proposal of the proposition "Sinicization of Marxism"

During the War of Resistance, the Communist Party "had generally learned how to use the weapon of ideological struggle of Marxism-Leninism to oppose erroneous ideas within the Party from two sides: opposing right-wing opportunism on one hand and 'left-wing' opportunism on the other." It continuously consolidated and grew in terms of ideology, politics, and organization, laying down the important subjective conditions for the Party's theoretical innovation. Under these conditions, in his report On the New Stage at the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, Mao Zedong presented the whole Party with the urgent task of strengthening the study of Marxist theory. He formally proposed the scientific proposition of the "Sinicization of Marxism" and provided a systematic explanation of its basic connotations and requirements, achieving a major cognitive breakthrough in the Party's first integration of Marxism with Chinese reality.

Mao Zedong pointed out: "To guide a great revolutionary movement toward victory, without revolutionary theory, without historical knowledge, and without an understanding of the actual movement, there can be no victory." First, Marxism must be treated with a scientific attitude. Marxism is not an abstract dogma but a guide to action. Learning Marxism should not involve merely learning words and phrases but mastering the basic stand, viewpoint, and method for analyzing and solving problems. Therefore, "the task of universally and deeply studying theory is, for us, a major problem that urgently needs to be solved and requires concentrated effort to solve." Second, it is necessary to study Chinese history and use Marxist methods to analyze and summarize it. Mao pointed out that "today's China is a development of historical China; we are Marxist lovers of history [historicism], and we should not sever history." He added, "Communists are internationalist Marxists, but Marxism can only be realized through a national form"; "To talk about Marxism apart from Chinese characteristics is only abstract and empty Marxism." Only by rooting Marxism in the soil of Chinese history and culture can a "Chinese style and Chinese flavor that the Chinese common people love to see and hear" ^[15] be formed. Finally, it is necessary to understand the current reality of China and strive to reveal the laws of the Chinese revolution. Using Marxism to guide the War of Resistance requires knowing both Chinese reality and foreign reality, especially that of Japanese imperialism. "If someone refuses to carry out serious and meticulous research on these matters, he is not a Marxist."

As the War of Resistance continued to progress, the Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, deeply elucidated the connotations and requirements of integrating the basic principles of Marxism with China's specific realities, providing ideological guidance for the Communist Party's leadership of the War of Resistance and the entire Chinese revolution.

2. Application of the Principle of "Combining Marxist-Leninist Theory with the Practice of the Chinese Revolution"

After the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression entered the stage of strategic stalemate, conflicts among the various forces within the United Resistance Industrial Front gradually came to light, and the national resistance effort faced a severe crisis. To address this, the Communist Party of China (CPC) held high the clear banner of resisting to the bitter end and focused on seizing the historical initiative in leading the war by strengthening its own Party building. In the article "Introducing The Communist" ^[16], Mao Zedong explicitly proposed the fundamental principle of "combining Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Chinese revolution." He applied this principle to analyze the three fundamental issues of the Chinese revolution—the united front, armed struggle, and Party building—emphasizing that "a correct understanding of these three questions and their interrelationship is tantamount to a correct leadership of the entire Chinese revolution." This enabled the Party to attain a more profound, comprehensive, and complete understanding of the path the Chinese revolution should take, fully reflecting the Party's ideological and theoretical maturity and elevating its grasp of the laws governing the War of Resistance and the Chinese revolution as a whole.

Integrating the new conditions and problems the Party had faced since the start of the war, Mao Zedong insisted on strengthening the Party's own construction in connection with its political line, achieving the combination of basic Marxist principles regarding the construction of a proletarian party with the specific reality of the CPC’s own construction. Under the conditions of the War of Resistance, "the environment in which the Party finds itself and the tasks it shoulders are quite different from those in the past period of domestic revolutionary war; the present environment is much more complex and the present tasks much more arduous." Although "the Party organization has stepped out of its narrow confines and become a major national party," it also faced problems such as the lack of consolidation in many new organizations and the fact that large numbers of new members and cadres lacked an understanding (or had a deficient understanding) of the unity between Marxist-Leninist theory and the practice of the Chinese revolution. Coupled with the fact that "the bourgeoisie, and especially the big bourgeoisie, are constantly attempting to undermine our Party," the construction of a Marxist party that was completely consolidated ideologically, politically, and organizationally became a major issue in urgent need of resolution.

In view of this, the Party Central Committee explicitly proposed the task of advancing this "Great Project" ^[17] of Party building, emphasizing that ideological building should be placed first. It strengthened Party building in connection with the Party's political line and created entirely new forms such as the Yan'an Rectification Movement ^[18] and cadre education, vigorously carrying out the construction of the Party's organization and work style. This allowed the Party to gradually achieve unprecedented growth, solidarity, and unity during the War of Resistance. "Once the universal truth of Marxism-Leninism was combined with the concrete practice of the Chinese revolution, it gave the Chinese revolution a completely new look and produced the entire historical stage of New Democracy." This also gave rise to the CPC’s new work style: "the style of integrating theory with practice, the style of maintaining close ties with the masses, and the style of self-criticism."

3. Theoretical Elucidation of the Basic Standpoint, Viewpoint, and Method of Sinicized Marxism

The Party's understanding of Marxism, China's concrete realities, the theoretical achievements of the Sinicization of Marxism, and its basic standpoint, viewpoint, and method underwent a developmental process. At the same time, due to the rapid development of the revolutionary situation in China, the Party had not yet thoroughly cleared away in an ideological sense the subjectivism—and especially the dogmatism—that had caused great harm to the Sinicization of Marxism. Therefore, after the War of Resistance entered the stage of strategic stalemate, the Party, through the Rectification Movement, thoroughly eliminated non-Marxist ideas represented by subjectivism, sectarianism, and stereotyped Party writing ^[19], and established the basic standpoint, viewpoint, and method of seeking truth from facts, the mass line, and independence.

Seeking truth from facts is the fundamental method by which the Party conducts all its work. Mao Zedong creatively provided a new interpretation of "seeking truth from facts." He stated: "'Facts' are all the things that exist objectively; 'truth' means their internal relations, that is, the laws governing them; and 'to seek' means to study." This profoundly elucidated the ideological line of proceeding from objectively existing facts to explore scientific truth, allowing the Marxist worldviews and methodologies of dialectical materialism and historical materialism to merge into the phrase "seeking truth from facts"—a term with distinct national characteristics ^[20]. This embodies the essence of combining basic Marxist principles with China's concrete realities.

The mass line is the basic path for the Party to advance the Sinicization of Marxism. Addressing the leadership methods of subjectivism, bureaucratism, and formalism that had long existed in the Party and seriously alienated it from the masses, Mao Zedong pointed out: "The more arduous the struggle, the more necessary it is for the leadership of the Communists to be closely combined with the demands of the broad masses, and the more necessary it is for the general calls of the Communists to be closely combined with individual guidance, so as to thoroughly shatter subjectivist and bureaucratic methods of leadership." In Mao's view, one must serve the people wholeheartedly and never for a moment be alienated from the masses; everything must proceed from the interests of the people rather than the interests of an individual or a small clique; and responsibility to the people must be consistent with responsibility to the Party's leading organs. He emphasized, "Every word and action of a Communist must conform to the highest standard of the greatest interests of the broadest masses of the people and must be supported by the broadest masses of the people." These important insights fully demonstrate that the Party's mass line had attained a complete scientific form and theoretical content, becoming the fundamental method for the Party to achieve the unity of the subjective and the objective, and theory and practice, in all its work.

Independence and self-reliance were the footing upon which the final victory of the War of Resistance was achieved. During the war, Mao Zedong criticized the proposal of relying solely on foreign aid for the military resistance and the practice of abandoning the principle of independence in politics, emphasizing that the war should primarily rely on China’s own strength. He stressed, "We do not yet have foreign aid. Even assuming we have foreign aid in the future, we still have to provide our own means of subsistence; there must not be the slightest bit of subjectivism here." Especially when the anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines faced severe difficulties, Mao Zedong put forward the slogan "Ample food and clothing through our own efforts" ^[21] and worked to lead the people in developing agricultural production and other productive undertakings, achieving as much self-sufficiency as possible for the organs, schools, and troops in the base areas. Throughout the War of Resistance, the principle of independence was fully applied and developed alongside the expansion of the Party's work in all areas. The Party's application of the principle of independence evolved from the military sphere to the political sphere and then to the economic sphere, laying an important foundation for the victory of the War of Resistance and the entire Chinese revolution, and forging the spiritual genome of the Chinese nation and the Chinese Communists.

IV. The War of Resistance and the Party’s Understanding of the Entire Chinese Revolution

The War of Resistance was a special stage of the New Democratic Revolution led by the CPC, providing the historical space for the Party to grasp the laws of the Chinese revolution. At the same time, the complex situation of the resistance required the CPC to systematize the rich experience of the Chinese revolution and continuously clarify the Party's program and propositions to better guide the War of Resistance and the revolution. The Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, insisted on using Marxism to deeply analyze China's basic national conditions, continuously revealing the historical characteristics of Chinese social conditions and the Chinese revolution. They creatively proposed the concept of "New Democracy," correctly handled the relationship between New Democracy and Old Democracy, and between New Democracy and socialism, and proposed the "construction of a new society and a new state for the Chinese nation." By elucidating the nature and future of the Chinese revolution, they provided the correct answer to "where China is going" and made theoretical preparations for the victory of the New Democratic Revolution.

1. The Proposal of the Concept of "New Democracy"

An accurate recognition, understanding, and grasp of China's historical and social conditions, as well as the characteristics and laws of the Chinese revolution, are the basic prerequisites for advancing the Sinicization of Marxism. Closely integrating the reality of the War of Resistance, Mao Zedong pointed out, "Present-day China, in the Japanese-occupied areas, is a colonial society; in the Kuomintang-ruled areas, it is still basically a semi-colonial society; and in both the Japanese-occupied and Kuomintang-ruled areas, it is a society where feudal and semi-feudal systems predominate." He further formulated the understanding of "present-day China's national conditions" as a "colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal society," enriching and developing Marxist theory on social formations and grounding the Party’s formulation of the line, principles, and policies of the New Democratic Revolution on a scientific analysis of Chinese social nature and reality.

Siting his analysis on the nature of modern Chinese society as the "crucial, central point" and the "most essential general law," Mao Zedong closely linked the great practice of the War of Resistance with deep reflection on the fundamental issues of the Chinese revolution, bringing the Party to a more comprehensive and systematic understanding of the laws of revolutionary development. First, in semi-colonial and semi-feudal China, the national oppression of imperialism was the greatest oppression. Imperialism colluded with domestic feudal forces and the bourgeois reactionaries who were enemies of the people to jointly oppress the Chinese people; this determined that imperialism, feudalism, and the comprador bourgeoisie in league with them were the primary objects of the Chinese revolution. Second, the extraordinary strength of the enemies of the Chinese revolution determined its cruelty and protracted nature, and dictated that the revolution must take the special path of encircling the cities from the countryside and seizing power through armed struggle. Third, since the enemies of the revolution were primarily imperialism and the feudal landlord class, the basic tasks of the revolution were the national revolution against imperialism and the democratic revolution against feudalism and comprador forces—two tasks that are distinct yet unified. Fourth, the socio-economic status of the various classes in Chinese society determined that the motive force of the revolution should be based on the most revolutionary and conscious class, the proletariat, including the peasantry (who make up the vast majority of the population and have a natural and reliable bond with the proletariat), various segments of the petty bourgeoisie besides the peasantry, and the national bourgeoisie who could participate in the revolution during certain periods. Mao Zedong’s analysis of the objects, tasks, and motive forces of the Chinese revolution is a brilliant example of applying basic Marxist principles to the practice of the Chinese revolution to solve its problems, providing the ideological prerequisite for accurately grasping the nature and future development of the revolution.

On this basis, Mao Zedong creatively proposed the concept of "New Democracy," providing a scientific name for the revolutionary activities of the masses against imperialism and feudalism under the leadership of the proletariat since the May Fourth Movement ^[22]. In Mao’s view, the Chinese revolution was a national revolution to overthrow imperialism and a democratic revolution to overthrow feudal forces; therefore, "the nature of the Chinese revolution at the present stage is not proletarian-socialist, but bourgeois-democratic." However, "the bourgeois-democratic revolution in present-day China is no longer of the old, general type," but "is a new, special type of bourgeois-democratic revolution. This kind of revolution is developing in China and all colonial and semi-colonial countries, and we call it the New Democratic Revolution." This revolution "is a transitional stage for the purpose of ending the colonial, semi-colonial, and semi-feudal society and establishing a socialist society," serving both to "clear the way for capitalism" and to "create the prerequisites for socialism." Because the New Democratic Revolution occurred after World War I and the Russian October Revolution, and because it resolutely opposed imperialism and was linked with the world revolution, it became part of the world proletarian movement and socialist revolution, and its future must inevitably be socialism. The proposal of "New Democracy" was a brilliant example of combining basic Marxist principles with China's concrete reality and an important theoretical achievement in the Sinicization of Marxism, marking a new height in the Party’s understanding of the laws of the Chinese revolution.

2. The Dual Tasks of the Chinese Revolution and the "Two-Step" Strategy

By accurately grasping the era's background of the proletarian socialist revolution and the national liberation movements in colonial and semi-colonial countries, Mao Zedong scientifically divided the Chinese revolution into two stages of development. He clarified that the revolution led by the CPC included the present stage of a bourgeois-democratic revolution (the New Democratic Revolution) and a future stage of a proletarian socialist revolution (the socialist revolution).

For a considerable period after the founding of the CPC, the principal leaders of the Party Central Committee did not have an accurate understanding of the relationship between the dual missions and tasks of the Chinese revolution, which is why [errors] repeatedly occurred since the Party's founding...

The crux of "Left" and Right deviations lies here. "Some immature Communists believe that we have only the task of the democratic revolution at the present stage, and not the task of the socialist revolution at a future stage; or they believe that the present revolution or the agrarian revolution is already the socialist revolution." These two perspectives either severed the connection between the democratic and socialist revolutions, falling into the trap of the "dual revolution theory" ^[23]; or they blurred the distinction between the two, falling into the trap of the "single revolution theory." Both caused immense harm to the Chinese revolution. During the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, properly understanding the historical status of the war, accurately grasping its relationship to the entirety of the Chinese democratic revolution, and recognizing the relationship between New Democracy and socialism—while countering the reactionary propaganda of "one party, one leader, one doctrine" ^[24] advocated by Kuomintang diehards—became urgent theoretical and practical issues.

Mao Zedong pointed out: "It is only by perceiving the difference between the democratic and socialist revolutions and at the same time their interconnection that the Chinese revolution can be correctly led." In his view, the New Democratic revolution (including the War of Resistance) and the socialist revolution are two stages in the process of the Chinese revolution that follow one another but differ in nature. Only after the first stage is completed is it possible to complete the second. That is, "the democratic revolution is the necessary preparation for the socialist revolution, and the socialist revolution is the inevitable trend of the democratic revolution." Regarding the first stage, the fundamental task of the Chinese people was to carry out a bourgeois-democratic revolution under the leadership of the proletariat to overthrow imperialist and feudal exploitation and oppression, fundamentally change the semi-colonial and semi-feudal social form, clear the path for capitalist development, and establish a New Democratic state power characterized by the joint dictatorship of all revolutionary classes under the leadership of the proletariat. Regarding the second stage, because the Chinese revolution existed within an international environment where "capitalism is in decline and socialism is on the rise," and given special conditions such as the weakness and compromise of the Chinese bourgeoisie and the strength and revolutionary thoroughness of the proletariat, this New Democratic state power would necessarily continue to develop. Through the socialist revolution, it would ultimately transform into a state power of a socialist nature. In other words, the Chinese revolution cannot "accomplish its task in a single stroke" ^[25], nor can it allow a bourgeois dictatorship to be wedged between the two stages. It can only develop through the New Democratic revolution into the socialist revolution to establish a socialist society. This was Mao Zedong’s profound exposition of the characteristics of the Chinese revolution and his outlook on its future prospects, which was proven by the development of the situation following the victory of the War of Resistance.

3. The Establishment of the Forward Direction and Basic Goals for a "New Society and New State of the Chinese Nation"

As an important stage of the New Democratic revolution, the War of Resistance set its basic goals based on the fundamental requirements of reforming the old politics, economy, and culture of the Chinese nation and developing the new politics, economy, and culture of New Democracy. This pointed out the forward direction and basic goals of the Chinese revolution.

First, developing New Democratic politics. Due to the semi-colonial and semi-feudal nature of modern China, the national bourgeoisie possessed both a revolutionary and a compromising character. The task of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal democratic revolution could only be led by the most thoroughly revolutionary class—the proletariat—and completed by forming a revolutionary united front with the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie, and the national bourgeoisie. This dictated that the transitional state form following the victory of the New Democratic revolution could be neither an "old-style, European-American, capitalist republic under bourgeois dictatorship," nor a "Soviet-style, socialist republic under the dictatorship of the proletariat." It could only be a New Democratic republic under the joint dictatorship of several revolutionary classes led by the proletariat. The corresponding political system would be the People's Congress system practicing democratic centralism.

Second, developing a New Democratic economy. The fundamental purpose of the revolution was to change the comprador and feudal relations of production to clear away obstacles to the development of productive forces. Because the Chinese economy was extremely backward, the development of national capitalism was an unavoidable historical result of the Chinese revolution. However, "the total result of the Chinese revolution will be: on the one hand, the development of capitalist factors, and on the other, the development of socialist factors." This meant: confiscating large-scale industry, commerce, and banking to establish a state-owned economy of a socialist nature; allowing the development of private capitalist economy beneficial to the national economy and people's livelihood; and replacing feudal land ownership with peasant ownership, allowing a rich-peasant economy to exist while developing cooperative economies with socialist factors on the basis of "land to the tiller."

Third, developing a New Democratic culture. In China, the colonial culture of imperialism and the decadent culture of feudalism formed a cultural alliance to oppose China's new culture. The New Democratic culture that gradually emerged after the May Fourth Movement was an "anti-imperialist and anti-feudal culture of the masses of the people led by the proletariat." It not only opposed imperialist oppression and advocated for the independence and dignity of the Chinese nation, but also waged a resolute struggle against all feudal and superstitious ideas, as well as "all ideas opposed to the War of Resistance, unity, and progress." It advocated for the democratization of culture, "serving the laboring masses of workers and peasants who constitute more than 90 percent of the nation, and gradually becoming their own culture," representing the forward direction of China's advanced culture.

Conclusion

The facts of the great victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression have eloquently proven that Marxism is the cognitive tool and powerful ideological weapon for the Chinese people to understand and transform the world. During the War of Resistance, Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, profoundly grasped the reality of the war, the Party's historical position, and the scientific essence of Marxism. They achieved their own growth while maintaining the overall situation of the resistance and realized theoretical innovation by promoting the integration of the basic tenets of Marxism with China’s specific realities. This laid the ideological and theoretical foundation for the great victory of the War of Resistance and the final victory of the New Democratic revolution. At the historical juncture of the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, profoundly grasping the internal connection between the War of Resistance and the Sinicization of Marxism requires us to deeply understand the important conclusion: "Why the Communist Party of China works, and why socialism with Chinese characteristics is good, comes down to the fact that Marxism works, and particularly Marxism that has been Sinicized and adapted to our times." We must unwaveringly promote the "Two Integrations"—combining the basic tenets of Marxism with China's specific realities and with China’s fine traditional culture. We must persist in using Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era as our guide to continually write new chapters in the Sinicization and modernization of Marxism.