Hou Huiqin: Marx's Judgment on Ideological Falsity and Contemporary Ideological Disputes
Critique of ideology has always possessed a dual meaning: the first is the qualitative definition of ideology—that is, how to understand it; the second is the critique of hostile ideologies—which is the functional characteristic of the critique of ideology. Although these two meanings unfold from different perspectives, they are closely linked. If one maintains a negative attitude toward the qualitative definition of ideology, then the critique of hostile ideologies is based on reducing hostile thoughts and cultures to "ideology." If one maintains a neutral attitude toward the qualitative definition of ideology, then the critique of hostile ideologies is clearly not a simple matter of categorizing the opponent's thought and culture as ideology, but rather necessitates a demonstration that it is an unscientific ideology. The former generally views its own perspective as a scientific theory that transcends ideology, while the latter views its own perspective as a specific type of ideology—namely, a scientific ideology. The qualitative characterization of Marx’s theory of ideology is directly related to how one perceives the function and value of Marxist ideology; all major disagreements and debates in the contemporary ideological sphere are related to this.
I. The Basic Meaning of the Falsity of Ideology
Various "endism" theories share a common theoretical premise: the "pejorative theory of ideology." This view holds that ideology is essentially a "false consciousness" appearing in the guise of ultimate universal concepts; it is a "political myth" that is subordinate to certain interest groups while concealing its true nature and denying its own limitations. It is thus regarded as the root of modern superstition, prejudice, and dogma. This theoretical premise is a one-sided understanding of the concept of ideology. Marxist ideological theory scientifically reveals the essence of ideology and serves as the theoretical premise for our analysis and critique of the "end of ideology."
Undoubtedly, since the French sensationalist philosopher Destutt de Tracy (1754–1836) first used the term "ideology" and defined it as the "science of ideas"—intending to conduct an empirical analysis of human mental activity—divergent understandings of "ideology" have proliferated. In its original sense, ideology emerged as a kind of scientific spirit that reduced the essence and origin of all ideas to experience and sensation, opposing all illusory notions. Precisely because of this, during the French Revolution, it became a powerful weapon used by revolutionary leaders to declare war on official politics and religion. However, subsequent facts showed that the "ideology" of the French Revolution was itself a false concept. Not only was the "millennial kingdom of reason" it so vigorously promoted a "Nanke Dream" [1], but the "revolution" itself eventually lost its humane luster and became cruel and terrifying. It was also for this reason that during the Napoleonic era, "ideology" became a synonym for fanatical revolutionary faith and thus acquired pejorative characteristics. Since then, the multiple meanings of ideology have caused constant debate, while a mysterious veil has increasingly shrouded the term. What exactly is ideology? Is it a system of belief or a system of science? Is it an expression of experience, sensation, and the irrational, or of reason? Is it official political thought or the embodiment of a free spirit? Is it a false conceptual system or a real environment of existence? Opinions are many and varied, and no consensus has been reached.
In The German Ideology, Marx’s definition of "ideology" is by no means so singular. A "false conceptual system" is undoubtedly one of its basic meanings. In the book, Marx repeatedly points out that while German philosophy descends from "heaven to earth," we set out from the earth (i.e., from the real basis). Therefore, the basic stipulation of the falsity of "ideology" undoubtedly refers primarily to its "inverted" nature—that is, it fundamentally inverts the relationship between existence and consciousness, and between life and ideas. It does not proceed from the practice of production and life, but from illusory ideas, even substituting ideas for reality. Clearly, the "falsity" spoken of here refers mainly to the failure to put ideas in their proper place, resulting in a fundamental confusion between subject and object, the fundamental and the incidental, and the head and the feet. This stipulation itself undoubtedly contains a sense of evaluative negation. However, this does not yet touch upon the question of whether the content of these thoughts and ideas is itself correct or incorrect, true or false. Therefore, one cannot simply equate the falsity of ideology with "erroneous ideas." Furthermore, Marx’s account of the falsity of ideology includes charges regarding its "mysteriousness" and "pseudo-criticality." The issue of "mysteriousness" involves the possibility of science penetrating into metaphysics and requires separate treatment; the crux of "pseudo-criticality" lies in its severing of the relationship between interpreting the world and transforming the world, manifesting as a defensive stance and conservatism under the guise of radicalism.
In addition to "false conceptual system," there are at least two other meanings of ideology in The German Ideology. First, it refers to the ideas of the ruling class—that is, the dominant ideas—and thus it must constitute a part of the existing social system and social relations. Marx believed that "the class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one..." [2] From this perspective, ideology cannot be called "false," because it is not only the conceptual expression of existing economic relations but is also itself a constituent part of existing relations of dominance. Simply put, ideology as the thought of the ruling class is actually an "institutionalized system of thought"; it is the basis of legitimacy for a social system, functioning as a value system that causes people to identify with the existing social order. The subsequent opposition between ideology and the free spirit was derived from this sense. Although many people use this to imbue ideology with a pejorative meaning, when Marx views ideology as the ruling ideas of every society, it is actually a relatively objective judgment and does not contain a sense of evaluative negation. This laid the foundation for his third stipulation of ideology.
Second, it refers to the class consciousness of the revolutionary class—that is, the ideas and slogans by which every class leading a revolution recognizes its mission and unites the masses. Consequently, it must be the public opinion base upon which every revolution succeeds. Based on this, Marx wrote: "Each new class which puts itself in the place of one ruling before it, is compelled, merely in order to carry through its aim, to represent its interest as the common interest of all the members of society, that is, expressed in ideal form: it has to give its ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid ones." If representing one’s own ideas and demands as the demands of the whole of society were merely a trick, then investigating it would have no universal significance, for deceptive tricks are inexhaustible, and a fraud cannot last. The revolutionary ideas of a revolutionary class are not like this; their ability to mobilize the masses in the name of social representation and declare war on the old society is not reliant on promotional tricks. "It can do this because, to start with, its interest really is more connected with the common interest of all other non-ruling classes, because under the pressure of hitherto existing conditions its interest has not yet been able to develop as the particular interest of a particular class." [3] Therefore, the difference between the proletarian revolution and the revolutions of other classes lies not in the fact that it does not need ideology or to appear as the sole representative of the whole of society, but in the fact that its class interests are truly the embodiment of the fundamental interests of humanity. Thus, it can maintain close ties with the masses not only during the revolutionary period but also after the revolution.
Since revolutionary ideology is always connected to the universal or common interests of humanity, its change and development also possess certain regularities. First, "the existence of revolutionary ideas in a particular period presupposes the existence of a revolutionary class," and the premise for the existence of a revolutionary class is the emergence of a new mode of production. [4] Therefore, liberating the productive forces and adjusting the corresponding social relations of the class representing the new mode of production becomes the absolute requirement of any revolutionary ideology. Because in any mode of production, the laborers are the basic productive forces, any revolution requires the participation of the masses, and the power of any revolutionary ideology always lies in its ability to win the support of the masses and awaken their historical initiative. Second, precisely because of this intrinsic link between revolutionary ideology, the revolutionary class, and the new mode of production—and because the continuous expansion and socialization of productive forces is an absolute trend—the trend toward the weakening of common human interests after the division of human society into classes will surely be reversed and realized anew. Expressed in revolutionary ideology, this means that revolutionary concepts become increasingly humanistic and universal; the general trend moves from the liberation of laborers to the liberation of the working class, and from the liberation of some to "human liberation." However, once universal human interests truly become a reality, the falsity of ideology will cease to exist. "As soon as it is no longer necessary to represent a particular interest as general or the 'general interest' as ruling, the appearance that the rule of a certain class is only the rule of certain ideas will, of course, end of itself." [5]
II. The Extended Meaning of the Falsity of Ideology
The above analysis allows us to see more clearly the essence of Marx’s views on the falsity of ideology. In history, ruling classes (all of which were exploiting classes), during their revolutionary or ascending periods, had particular class interests that had not yet completely diverged into interests fundamentally opposed to those of the broad masses of laborers. They thus always took the historical stage as representatives of the people's interests and gained the identification of the masses through ideas that were more "pro-people" in nature. However, with the formation and expansion of their particular class interests, their ideological concepts inevitably formed a huge contrast with social reality, and the falsity of ideology emerged as requested by the times. This falsity stems from the illusory nature of the common interests of existing society and from the opposition between the living conditions of the majority and their needs. But even at this time, the falsity of ideology should not be understood as a pile of deceptive lies, but rather as providing a kind of false consolation for people suffering in reality, guiding them toward a path of resignation, making them content with the status quo and their fate, and preventing them from seeing a real way out.
From this, two conclusions can be drawn: First, ideology is not predestined to be a false conceptual system; only when it defends an obsolete social system does it appear as a false and illusory concept, an inverted world of ideas. Therefore, the opposition between ideology and science is not absolute, while the organic unity of the proletarian worldview with science, and of its belief system with the critical spirit, is inevitable. Second, to re-invert the real world that has been inverted by ideology, one cannot rely on the weapon of critique but must resort to the critique of weapons—that is, real revolutionary practice. Ultimately, the inverted world of ideas is caused by an inverted real world; in this sense, the inverted world of ideas actually "faithfully" reflects the state of the real world upon which it depends. Therefore, without carrying out a fundamental revolutionary transformation of the existing world, the falsity and illusidness of ideology cannot be overthrown; even if it is momentarily exposed "beyond recognition," it will eventually be reborn. This includes religion; although it is merely a false consolation for the oppressed creatures in reality, it is nonetheless a spiritual consolation. "The demand to give up illusions about its condition is the demand to give up a condition that requires illusions." "State and society produce religion, which is an inverted world-consciousness, because they are an inverted world." [6]
When speaking of the inversion of the capitalist world, it finds concentrated expression in Marx’s analysis of the structure of capitalist commodity production. Marx later summarized the two major characteristics of the capitalist mode of production in Capital: "The capitalist mode of production presents itself from the start with two characteristic features. First, it produces its products as commodities. The fact that it produces commodities does not distinguish it from other modes of production; what distinguishes it is that being a commodity is the dominant and determining characteristic of its products. ... The principal agents of this mode of production itself, the capitalist and the wage-labourer, are as such merely embodiments and personifications of capital and wage-labour..." "The second characteristic of the capitalist mode of production is the production of surplus value as the direct objective and determining motive of production. ... This is a specific form for the development of the social productive forces of labor, but these social productive forces of labor appear as the independent power of capital over against the worker, and therefore in direct antithesis to the worker's own development." [9] (P994-996)
From the first characteristic of the capitalist mode of production, we can derive its first "inversion": the inversion of the use-value and exchange-value (more accurately, "value") of the commodity. We know that the reason a commodity can be exchanged lies in its use-value—its ability to satisfy the needs of human survival and development—and in the fact that it is essentially a product of labor. Therefore, use-value is the base of value. In simple commodity production, this logic remains clear; the goals of all commodity exchangers are quite explicit: to obtain products they themselves need. Thus, Marx called the formula for simple commodity production "selling in order to buy." However, in capitalist commodity production, a fundamental reversal occurs. The production of exchange-value rises to the primary position, while use-value is merely an adjunct for obtaining exchange-value. Marx referred to this as "buying in order to sell." Viewed objectively, "buying in order to sell" makes the decoupling of production and consumption possible, thereby harboring the hidden danger of economic crisis. Viewed subjectively, it causes an inversion in the relationship between people and things; the human-centered nature of commodities is obscured, and what appears instead is a relationship between things and things.
From the second characteristic of the capitalist mode of production, we can derive its second "inversion": the "inversion" of living labor and dead labor, or the fundamental "inversion" of the relationship between labor and capital. The exchange of commodities is the exchange of labor; thus, labor is the substance of the value of commodities, and living labor is the source of all value—this is a basic fact. However, in capitalist commodity production, all of this is also fundamentally distorted. Since "labor is assumed to be in the form of wage-labor, and the means of production are assumed to be in the form of capital," not only is capital treated as a value that can self-valorize and produce surplus value, but wage-labor is also ultimately reduced to a part of the total social capital, completely losing its existence as the source of surplus value. Thus, in the process of capitalist economic operation, "the growth of the social productive forces of labor appears only as the continuous growth of the productive forces of capital." This "inversion" creates an illusion: that capitalist society is exceptionally fair and free of exploitation, because the worker's labor has been compensated by an equivalent return in the form of wages. This not only completely masks the true origin of surplus value but is so absurd that it essentially denies the worker's surplus labor. This is the most fundamental "basis" for the "end of ideology" thesis.
Starting from limited empirical facts of inversion, the conclusions reached are inevitably unscientific. In contrast, Marxist ideological theory starts from the capitalist mode of production and transcends limited empirical facts, achieving a true unity of the empirical and the transcendental, and of value and truth. As long as the capitalist mode of production undergoes no substantive change, Marxist ideological theory will inevitably not lose its scientific value. By comparison, the so-called "end of ideology" is merely a simple empirical induction.
As a socialist ideology, Marxism differs from previous ideologies in two respects. First, the proletarian practice upon which it stands is actually the form of practice for progressive humanity in the modern age; thus, it has no vested interests that require special concealment or defense. This fundamentally breaks the closed nature of ideology and opens it toward practice. Second, the conceptual premises upon which it conducts its critique are not themselves self-evident premises that require no proof, but are subjects that accept the critique of practice. This internal mechanism of self-critique fundamentally breaks the dogmatism of previous ideologies, preventing it from becoming a rigid dogma. However, the lesson of the dogmatization of Marxism-Leninism shows that the nature of Marxism is not identical to its actual state. To avoid the fate of becoming rigid in the historical process, the key lies in exercising its defensive function with a Marxist scientific attitude. Therefore, the issue is not to negate ideology itself, but to construct a system of meaning and values consistent with socio-historical development. Marxism, in defending the cause of socialism with Chinese characteristics, will surely break what some predict as the "fate of isms" (i.e., that any "ism" will inevitably exceed its applicable historical limits and become a rigid system of absolute truth). In the process of confidently upholding the interests of the socialist state and the fundamental interests of the masses, it will continue to maintain its vigor by advancing with the times.
III. Marx's Judgment on the Falsity of Ideology and Contemporary Ideological Debates
At the dawn of the new century, "ideology" seems to have become a synonym for "Cold War mentality," "self-deception," and "empty preaching." A trend of downplaying or even discarding ideology has begun to spread, while talking about ideology often feels like it lacks confidence. Looking for the reasons at the practical level, people ask whether the "Leftist" errors of socialist states originated from the "ideologization" of Marxism. At the theoretical level, the question is whether the value orientations contained in ideology can truly be unified with science, ideal goals, and realistic paths. In fact, many commentators have made negative judgments on this. Therefore, theoretical clarification is necessary.
- Can the scientific function and the ideological function of Marxism be unified?
Some believe that the past errors and setbacks of socialist countries were the result of the "ideologization" of Marxism. They attribute "Leftist" [7] errors to transcending reality—and thus to ideological idealism. Consequently, they believe that correcting "Leftist" errors requires the abolition of ideology; only then can the scientific nature of Marxism be restored. This view is an erroneous understanding of Marxism and its theory of ideology. Socialist practice shows that "Leftist" errors are not the inevitable product of Marxist ideology, but are rather due to the fact that the practices of some socialist countries deviated from the basic spirit of Marxism in their guiding ideology and violated the laws of economic development. Attributing "man-made" errors entirely to necessity is clearly an erroneous method of thinking. Therefore, the key to correcting "Leftist" errors is to act according to objective laws, and it depends on our ability to truly unify the scientific function of Marxism-Leninism with its ideological function.
This unity depends on two aspects. First, the basis of the interests for which the ideology defends. If an ideology defends narrow group interests, it cannot be a science. Whether socialist ideology degenerates depends on whether the object of its defense is the fundamental interests of the broadest masses of the people—whether it is the real, universal interest of the people. Second, the realistic basis of the political enthusiasm inspired by the ideology. If the ideology inspires false sentiments and hollow energy, once these collapse, it can no longer inspire people's enthusiasm. Therefore, moving from idealism toward empiricism becomes a historical necessity. The problem of the unity of ideology and science is transformed into the question of whether there are real universal interests and whether there are ideals and beliefs established on the basis of historical regularity. It transforms into the major question of whether the basic Marxist historical outlook holds true.
Because Marx revealed the falsity of ideology in The German Ideology, some scholars seem to have found a basis for the opposition between ideology and science. They believe that all ideology is "pre-scientific" and thus completely oppose the scientific function of Marxism to its ideological function. The consequence of this is not only a failure to defend the scientific nature of Marxism but also a self-abandonment of the ideological defensive function of Marxism. Today, when various anti-Marxist and non-Marxist ideologies are rampant, voluntarily abandoning the ideological defensive function of Marxism is tantamount to self-destruction. If we start from reality—from the economic and political practice of contemporary China—the ideological defensive function of Marxism must be strengthened rather than weakened. This is because the socialist market economy is different from both the traditional socialist planned economy and modern Western market economies; naturally, it requires the support and maintenance of a specific system of meaning even more. As Daniel Bell said: "Every society seeks to establish a system of meanings by which people show their connection with the world. These meanings define a set of purposes, which either explain the character of common experience, as in the case of myths and rituals, or transform nature through the magical or technical powers of man." "The loss of meaning in these areas creates a situation of bewilderment. This situation is so intolerable that it forces people to seek new meanings as quickly as possible, lest everything that remains turns into a sense of nihilism or emptiness." [10] (P197)
In different societies, different systems of meaning will emerge; however, a society whose system of meaning has collapsed is certainly an unstable society. Therefore, any social system that still possesses vitality must have a powerful system of meaning. Today, defending the existence of socialism is by no means an easy task of "parroting"; it is a form of creative labor. If we could reach a consensus in the past by quoting classical works, then today—not to mention that political preaching does not work—even ideological works that lack original demonstration will find it difficult to exert influence. If, at certain times in the past, it required courage to exercise the revolutionary critical function of Marxism to critique reality, then today, it likewise requires courage to exercise the ideological function of Marxism to defend reality. In fact, the critical function and the defensive function are inseparable; the key lies in whom you are defending. When we promote revolutionary traditions and strive to identify with the socialist system of our country in practice, we are undoubtedly bravely critiquing some current popular fashions. The revolutionary critical spirit of Marxism is a practical spirit that scientifically transcends the narrow horizons of the bourgeoisie. It is neither a "nihilism" that negates everything nor a "pragmatism" constrained by self-interest. History has repeatedly proven that it is not difficult to transcend the existing through one's own imagination, and it is even less difficult to identify with reality by letting oneself be dictated by spontaneity; what is difficult is truly transcending the existing. The organic unity of materialism and idealism, and of the scientific spirit and the critical spirit, is an important feature of Marxist ideology. It is also the only path of scientific socialism opened by Marx that can transcend the capitalist path of development. From this, we can see that the scientific function and the ideological function of Marxism are unified. Severing the unity of the two will inevitably lead to the "fragmentation" of Marxism and endanger the development of the socialist cause.
- Is the conflict between Marxism and anti-Marxism a dispute over means and techniques, or a dispute between "universal real interests" and vested interests?
Contemporary ideological conflicts primarily consist of the clash between three theoretical forces: Marxism, liberalism, and conservatism. The most acute conflict is that between Marxist ideology and liberal ideology. This conflict has never been a word game devoid of substantial value; rather, it represents a major divergence concerning the understanding of social development and the historical process. Through scientific research, Marx pointed out for us the only path [8] for the development of human society. Conversely, Western liberal theorists believe that the Western liberal democratic system is the final system for humanity, and that human reason is no longer capable of making substantive improvements to it. From this, they conclude that acute ideological conflict no longer exists because liberal ideology has occupied a position of absolute dominance. The so-called "end of ideology" and "end of history" theories emerged from this context. This "endism" is not merely the optimistic imagination of theorists; it has become a pervasive sentiment in Western society, from the grassroots to the government.
Max Weber was among the earlier thinkers to touch upon the issue of the end of ideology. He argued that since the onset of the modern era, the process of modernization in Western society—shifting from an emphasis on value rationality [9] in pursuit of certain supreme values toward an emphasis on instrumental rationality [10], or the effective means of achieving goals—objectively predicted that the holistic decline of ideology in modern society was an inevitable result of modernization. Various systems of belief and value were ruthlessly "disenchanted" by instrumental rationality. Following Max Weber, Karl Mannheim was the first Western scholar to systematically propose the end of ideology. In Ideology and Utopia, Mannheim discussed the reasons for the "decline of ideology" and the "disappearance of utopia," pointing out that integrated theories were being fragmented into partial, pragmatic doctrines. The logical foundation of Mannheim’s analysis actually re-substantiated Weber's view: industrialization inevitably leads to a shift from value rationality to instrumental rationality. He anticipated that if a society could develop to a superior stage of industrial structure—thereby possessing a certain flexibility and enabling the lower strata of society to live slightly better lives—then the impulse of the lower classes to seek communism and socialism due to unsatisfied desires would gradually weaken. Whether this superior form of industrial social organization is a capitalist society that guarantees a relatively good standard of living by granting lower classes certain rights, or a society where such capitalism is first transformed into communism, there is no difference between the two on this point. Mannheim further noted that this development in the political sphere would necessarily run parallel to the forms of spiritual life, and the intelligentsia would increasingly lose their ideological elements and utopian impulses.
The social trends noticed by Mannheim in 1929 seemed to become reality in Western society after the end of World War II. In religious, economic, and political spheres, people no longer believed that various forms of "value rationality" possessed charismatic appeal. The orthodoxy of social thought and political power were increasingly expressed through secular "instrumental rationality." What people fervently concerned themselves with was no longer the question of the legitimacy of interests, but the operational question of how interests are distributed.
To be sure, contemporary conflicts of interest involve questions of means and technique; for example, without development and efficiency, interests are out of the question. However, in the final analysis, the issue remains the legitimacy of interests. First, there has always existed a distinction between two modes: acquiring wealth through legitimate means such as production to satisfy the needs of survival and development, and possessing wealth through illegitimate means such as plunder to satisfy malignant, expanding selfish desires. The contemporary era is no exception. Second, the opposition between these two types of interests inevitably manifests as a conflict between the universal interests of the majority and the particular interests of a minority. Third, every interest needs to defend its own existence. That the universal interest of the majority is the most vital factor is the defense provided by Marxism; that individual interest possesses ultimate and supreme value is the defense provided by liberal ideology. Fourth, under economic globalization, the coexistence of economic growth and the widening North-South gap proves that the contemporary world is far from solving the problem of fairness. Unconditionally identifying with economic globalization and the current global political and economic order is itself a product of Western ideological domination. Therefore, today, ideology has not been—and cannot be—dissolved.
(The author is the Director of the Center for National Cultural Security and Ideology Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences [CASS], President of the Chinese Society of Historical Materialism, and Distinguished Chair Professor at the School of Marxism, University of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences.)
Online Editor: Tongxin Source: Journal of Henan University (Social Science Edition), Issue 2, 2002.