Li Shenming: An Analysis of the Major Views of the U.S. Ruling Group on War and Peace Issues After the Cold War

World War II made the United States the dominant power in the world capitalist system and the leader of the West. After the war, in order to establish a "world family" under its own leadership and create a global order under its own dominance, the United States employed the dual means of war and peace to pursue a foreign policy aimed at securing the "global political and economic interests" of the U.S. and its allies. Consequently, U.S. foreign and military policy shifted to primarily target socialist countries and the Third World. Starting with the Truman administration, U.S. politicians, major news media, and certain scholars continuously proposed a wide variety of so-called "perspectives" on the issues of war and peace—far exceeding any previous period—to provide a theoretical basis for the policy choices of successive postwar U.S. governments. Among all postwar U.S. presidents, Richard Nixon authored the most books and theories. Although Nixon resigned due to the "Watergate scandal," successive U.S. presidents consulted him on major international issues throughout his lifetime, which demonstrates Nixon's influence within the American ruling group. Therefore, Nixon's views on war and peace represent the outlook of the American ruling class in a relatively comprehensive and systematic manner. Due to the power status and leadership role of the United States, these views were fundamentally accepted by U.S. allies and became the mainstream perspective of the West.

I. "War is a tool for obtaining power and influence"

U.S. political figures believe that war is a tool, a means by which to obtain power and influence and to advance national interests. They hold that war is caused by political differences and that the use of military means is intended to achieve specific political objectives; U.S. leaders can only engage in war with the firm support of public opinion; and regarding involvement in Third World conflicts, the U.S. must be selective. Nixon stated, "When a nation goes to war, achieving victory is of paramount importance," and "victory should be defined as the use of military means to obtain specific political goals." He argued that when U.S. "interests are threatened," the "capacity and will to resort to force should be the primary means," which "will reduce the ultimate possibility of resorting to force," while "always keeping the use of force as a last resort." Furthermore, "the greatest danger of war breaking out between superpowers is that when their interests conflict, a small war might escalate. Small wars always possess the potential to ignite a world war."

(1) After World War II, the United States launched a global Cold War against communism

Nixon believed that in the 20th century, the United States "already experienced three great wars—World War I, World War II, and the Cold War." After World War II, the U.S. "launched a global Cold War against communism."

First, the Cold War was a total war involving an intense struggle between political concepts and economic systems. On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill's speech in Fulton, Missouri, raised the curtain on the Cold War. On March 12, 1947, President Truman delivered a message to Congress (later known as the Truman Doctrine ^[1]), marking the formal beginning of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. "The Cold War covered every region of the world and involuntarily embroiled most of them in this intense struggle between political ideas and economic systems." From the Truman administration’s initiation of the Cold War to its end during the George H.W. Bush administration, political figures in every U.S. government during this period were active promoters of the Cold War.

Nixon believed that the Cold War was not a conventional war as defined in our history books, but rather "a war called peace." He argued, "If this war is not to escalate to the level of actual armed conflict, we must wage it effectively in non-military dimensions." This was "a conflict on which depends not only our own freedom but the freedom of every nation in the world"; it was a great struggle to decide the fate of all nations, and "the survival of freedom depends on the actions of the United States." To this end, U.S. politicians primarily held the following views:

One, the Cold War was a substitute for a hot war—particularly nuclear war—between the two superpowers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union. "The Cold War catalyzed an intense arms race and triggered hot wars in Korea and Vietnam" as well as dozens of smaller military conflicts, yet "it did not bring the superpowers into combat against each other."

Two, the United States had to resolve the question of what kind of country would dominate "the fate of the world." Therefore, the U.S. had no choice but to make achieving victory in the Cold War the primary objective of its foreign policy.

Three, the Cold War combined military, economic, philosophical, political, and diplomatic power; every single element was vital to the outcome of the war and would dominate the global situation.

Four, the United States must distinguish between vital interests, important interests, and peripheral interests. So-called vital U.S. interests refer to those that are vital not only to the U.S. but also to the Free World ^[2]; they are part of the great struggle between two worlds. The highest priority for defense should be these vital U.S. interests.

Five, the United States not only "saved the world from the clutches of communism but also helped transform the world into one where freedom is no longer threatened."

Second, the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of conflict between regions and small nations; the threat of small-scale wars grew sharply. Nixon believed that the end of the Cold War did not usher in a "New World Order." He noted, "In the 'New Era' of world history, ideological conflict might not be dominant, but the violence of this era may become more intense than the previous one." He argued that "the collapse of communism in the Cold War" and "the tendency of the Cold War to disappear does not mean the end of international conflict," and that "instability in the developing world will continue to pose a major threat to U.S. interests," as "dozens of civil wars and regional wars are still caused by ancient struggles based on tribal, ethnic, national, or religious hatreds."

On one hand, in a world of competition between states, conflicts of interest and national conflicts are inevitable and a necessity of affairs. Nixon believed that the core of international relations is competition, which makes conflict "a necessity of affairs in the world." He argued that "certain countries are dissatisfied with what they already possess" and "attempt to acquire more through various reasons and means," while other countries "resist the designs of these reaching nations," leading to "inevitable conflict between countries in these two positions." Furthermore, "if they cannot resolve their conflicts peacefully, they will ultimately attempt to resolve them through violent means." The "end of the Cold War between the superpowers does not mean the end of conflicts between small nations."

On the other hand, the United States must absolutely not let a "clash of civilizations" become the defining characteristic of the post-Cold War era. Nixon agreed with the view proposed by Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington and others that a "'clash of civilizations' would put the West and the Islamic world in a state of hostility," noting that since the 1990s, "military conflicts have confirmed this argument." Nixon stated that if the U.S. "continues to allow" such conflict to proceed, it will "inevitably bring fire upon itself, leading to conflict between the Muslim world and the West." He argued that "the civilized world must establish a unified policy for dealing with terrorism," and "once military retaliation is appropriate, they should be prepared to act together."

(2) The developing world is the current battlefield of the East-West struggle

U.S. political figures believe that "before the end of World War II, the war in the Third World had already begun," a war to decide "the future of developing countries" and to "save freedom." The "developing world" has become "the current battlefield of the struggle between East and West." John F. Kennedy said, "This kind of war is unique," "its intensity is new," and it requires "a completely new set of strategies" and "a fundamentally different kind of force."

First, the United States cannot remain aloof or stand on the sidelines of the war in the Third World. U.S. politicians believe that between peace and war, there exists a vast grey area of "neither-war-nor-peace," and that the competition between the U.S. and communism "will be primarily concentrated in the Third World." The Third World is the epicenter of global war and revolution, and "the struggle will be largely decided in this realm... we must engage our opponents within this realm." The importance of the Third World means the U.S. cannot "remain aloof" or "stand on the sidelines" in this war; if the U.S. remains aloof, the West is certain to lose. Since the "cost of open aggression will become increasingly high" in the 21st century, if we "expect to win without fighting, or even just expect to avoid losing without fighting," we "must be determined to use our power in ways other than waging war." The U.S. must not merely defend front lines anywhere in the world, but more importantly, expand "freedom" globally.

Second, the goal of the U.S. in the East-West struggle is to establish a "world family" that includes all nations and is fundamentally identical to the U.S. political system. U.S. politicians believe the U.S. must "do everything in our power" to build a world family including all nations—an "ideal world" where "all nations have free economic and political systems and remain forever faithful to social justice and human rights," essentially mirroring the U.S. political system. This has been the "purpose since the founding of the nation," and in pursuing "these unchanging purposes, every generation of Americans has encountered different problems. Although the problems change, the purpose remains the same." The U.S. goal is the opposite of the Communist goal; the relationship between the U.S. and socialist countries is a "struggle between two incompatible systems and concepts," a struggle that "will continue until freedom achieves victory."

Nixon stated that in the second half of the 20th century, "we have lived in a world dominated by the conflict between two superpowers caused by two contradictory ideologies. The East-West struggle is the prominent feature of this era." Walt Rostow, former Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, argued that the "ultimate question" of the struggle is whether "this small planet should be organized according to the principles of the Communist bloc, or according to the principles of voluntary cooperation between independent states committed to human freedom," moving toward a "family of free nations."

U.S. politicians believe the "root of the conflict" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union "lies in the profound differences in ideology, interests, and intentions between the two superpowers"; it is "part of a great struggle between two worlds" that "directly involves our own most vital interests." They argue "the Soviet Union attempts to expand communism" while "the U.S. seeks to block communism"; "the U.S.-Soviet conflict is not a problem but a condition"; "problems can be solved, but conditions can only be managed." Competition is the core of Soviet-U.S. relations and will determine who triumphs in the superpower struggle.

More importantly, we must recognize that U.S. politicians, represented by Nixon, believe that although war as a means of pursuing policy has become obsolete, the instruments of war must continue to play a role in maintaining peace. "The era in which war was an optional alternative has passed. Peace is the only choice for the future. We are currently in a dangerous middle state between peace and war," and "military deterrence, including nuclear forces, is an essential component of any lasting peace. When each side holds an equally strong hand, potential aggressors will likely not dare to act rashly."

II. "Real peace is a means of tolerating conflict"

Among all U.S. presidents, Nixon is the one who discussed the issue of peace most extensively and with the clearest views. His views on peace lacked much of the usual camouflage, hypocrisy, and taboos, reflecting more frankly the true views of the American ruling group on peace. Nixon divided peace into two types: "real peace" and "perfect peace," repeatedly asserting that what he spoke of was "not a mythical perfect peace," but "a real peace built on a common recognition of harsh realities." This peace acknowledges that "there are deep, irreconcilable differences between them, but their survival depends on finding ways to manage their differences without having to fight."

Nixon believed that real peace would not "suddenly and once and for all" emerge from some plan, but is "a continuous process of managing and controlling the conflicts that arise between competing nations, systems, and international ambitions." This "peace is not the disappearance of conflict" or "the end of contradictions"; "on the contrary, it is a means of tolerating conflict," and the only kind of peace that has ever existed. "Without the United States, peace and freedom would be impossible to maintain."

Nixon also believed that...

"Contradiction is a natural state in the world" and is "inherent to humanity"; "nations will inevitably clash on a variety of issues through various means, and the danger that these contradictions will lead to violence will always exist." Real peace is "a means of learning to coexist with contradictions," it is the "management of contradictions so that they do not erupt into war," and "the ultimate test of a nation's character is not how it endures the misfortunes of war, but how it meets the challenges of peace."

(1) Peace and strength are inseparable in the real world

Nixon believed that "world peace and national strength are inseparable." For countries with fundamentally opposing ideologies, "the peace sought cannot be built on mutual friendship; it can only be built on mutual respect for each other's strength."

First, perfect peace exists only in the fantasies of diplomats and in the grave. Nixon argued that "in a world where conflicts between people always exist and are widespread," perfect and permanent peace exists only in "two places: in the grave and on the typewriter." Such peace is "an illusion," "fashioned out of beautiful thoughts and pretty words"; "it never existed in the past, and it will never exist in the future." "Idealists long for a world without conflict," but this is "a world that has never existed and will never appear." Nixon admonished that "the real world does not revolve around wishful thinking about the 'full realization of peace,' but around the enduring realities of geopolitics." It is dangerous to "confuse real peace with perfect peace"; "we should not engage in a futile search for perfect peace, but should instead strive to forge a realistic peace." Real peace requires the United States to have the determination to use its power in various ways other than war.

Second, seeking peace through trade and friendship is a myth. Nixon believed that seeking peace through trade and friendship is a myth and a fallacy. The view that "economic power has replaced military power as the primary instrument of foreign policy" is a philistine perspective. "Trade itself can never produce peace or prevent war"; "seeking peace through trade has not worked in the past and will never work now." "Economic relations can never substitute for deterrence and competition." "Although economic interdependence limits each nation's freedom of action, it has not rendered military power meaningless." When "an issue involves vital national interests, a great power will discard even the firmest economic ties to achieve victory." "If economic relations are handled correctly, they can strengthen deterrence and competitiveness," making trade "an important additive force acting as a restraint on potential aggressors," but "it can never replace the substantive deterrent force built on the foundation of military power." "Shaking hands and making merry" cannot change a nation's ambitions or interests.

(2) Peace is not the ultimate end; peace should be a means to achieve a higher purpose

Nixon argued, "We should not allow ourselves to be seduced by the proposition of peace at any price." "If peace were truly our only goal, we could have it at any time we wish—simply by surrendering." "The peace we seek must be a peace joined with justice." Peace should be a means to realize "a new world where everyone can enjoy the blessings of freedom, justice, and progress." If peace is made "our only goal, then the freedoms already won may be jeopardized." Peace is a great goal, but it is not a panacea for all ills.

(3) To maintain peace and defend freedom, a sober policy of détente must be pursued

During the Cold War, the United States implemented policies of containment and détente ^[3] toward socialist countries in succession. U.S. dignitaries and scholars debated which policy was more effective in dealing with socialist states until the end of the Cold War. Nixon said: "The debate over this word has been so charged with emotion that the argument over substance has turned into an argument over semantics. Therefore, we must clarify what sober détente is and what it is not."

Nixon's views on détente can be summarized into five points: First, détente is not a substitute for the Cold War; both détente and the Cold War are substitutes for a hot war between the two superpowers (the U.S. and the USSR), specifically a substitute for nuclear war. Second, U.S. policy must combine détente with deterrence. Third, détente is an attempt to expand elements of cooperation and impose certain limits on elements of competition. Fourth, détente without deterrence is a prescription that inevitably leads to retreat and defeat. Fifth, to implement a sober détente, one must use both "carrots" and "sticks."

III. Nuclear weapons have profoundly changed the way the world operates

U.S. dignitaries, certain scholars, and news media believe that the new force of nuclear weapons has changed "the nature of war" and "will also change the nature of peace." In 1953, Truman said: "We have now entered the atomic age; war has undergone technical changes that make it fundamentally different from the wars of the past." U.S. nuclear strategy has shifted alongside changes in its nuclear advantage.

First, when the United States held nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union, it always maintained nuclear war as an option. In 1962, then-Secretary of Defense McNamara said: "Although no nation could rationally take steps leading to nuclear war, that fact does not guarantee that nuclear war will not break out." "Only in situations where nuclear weapons can be reliably used—where the alternative might be worse than the risks of nuclear war (such as gradually yielding to Communist aggression)—are nuclear weapons a rational weapon." Former U.S. President Kennedy said: "In some circumstances, we must be prepared to use nuclear weapons from the start."

On one hand, the cutting edge of U.S. action is non-nuclear force, with nuclear force kept in the background. In 1959, General Maxwell Taylor, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that the U.S. strategy of "atomic deterrent force will become a shield" providing security for the U.S., "but not a flexible tool of application." This is because "in future military operations, limited war forces will play an active role, while atomic retaliatory forces can only play a passive role." The U.S. "strategy of massive retaliation may have prevented the outbreak of a great war" but failed to "eliminate unrest in local areas."

U.S. dignitaries and military generals believed that nuclear power could not be used for "brushfire wars" on the periphery. The United States must possess sufficient non-nuclear forces to have conventional options in marginal situations, so that it is not forced into nuclear war for lack of other choices. The outcome of global conflicts would likely depend on unconventional, limited wars; the powerful nuclear arsenal of the U.S. has little impact on Third World conflicts, and superior conventional military forces might be unable to deal with an enemy employing unconventional warfare. The United States cannot face a choice between total war or total defeat.

On the other hand, "limited nuclear war" was seen as the most effective U.S. strategy. In 1957, Kissinger proposed: "When fighting a nuclear-armed state or a major power that can substitute manpower for science and technology, limited nuclear war is our most effective strategy." "The policy of limited nuclear war should also not be treated as a means to relax our preparations for total war." In 1959, Taylor also proposed that "under relatively rare circumstances and conditions consistent with our national interests," "tactical atomic weapons" could be used.

Second, after the Soviet Union achieved strategic nuclear parity with the United States, the U.S. concluded that one superpower could no longer use war as a policy tool against the other. Nixon stated that during the Cold War, the two superpowers "possessed the power to destroy each other and the rest of the world. This greatly reduced the possibility of a global nuclear war." "Neither superpower can afford to fight the other"; resorting to war "as a last resort is self-destruction. In the age of nuclear war, continuing our political differences through the means of war would destroy our civilization today."

U.S. dignitaries and some scholars believed that any direct conflict between superpowers would almost certainly escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Any local war could suddenly spread into a nuclear holocaust; nuclear war could lead to the destruction of all nations and societies. In any conventional or nuclear world war, there will be no winners, only losers. Nuclear parity changed the nature of U.S.-Soviet conflict; nuclear weapons made war between great powers obsolete as a means of resolving contradictions. Due to the destructive power of nuclear weapons, there will be no more world wars in the 21st century. Besides maintaining sufficient nuclear deterrence, the United States must learn to compete without direct military intervention.

Third, the attempt by developing countries to become nuclear states makes the nightmare of nuclear war a potential reality. Nixon argued: "All countries in the developing world are now attempting to become nuclear states," and "as a result, the danger of nuclear war is now more serious than it was during the Cold War."

Fourth, for the foreseeable future, the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear war will persist; nuclear weapons must remain part of U.S. strategy. U.S. dignitaries believe that the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear war is a fundamental fact of international life, and nuclear weapons must be part of the U.S. strategy to prevent the outbreak of war. Nixon said that "claims that nuclear deterrence is immoral" are irresponsible, and the U.S. "must possess nuclear weapons to deter potential aggressors from launching a war or forcing us to surrender without a fight."

IV. To protect vital American interests, peaceful methods must be combined with resolute action

U.S. dignitaries believe that in protecting its vital interests, the United States should "combine firmness with flexibility," utilizing "peaceful methods" and military methods as complementary tools. The United States must possess capabilities in six areas: ideology, diplomacy, economic aid, military aid, military force, and covert operations. Simultaneously, the U.S. "must understand where and how to use each instrument" and "cannot exercise leadership solely by example or solely by might, but must combine the most perfect elements of both."

First, the United States must maintain a powerful and diversified military force capable of a wide range of military activities. After World War II, regardless of which party or president was in power, the United States consistently treated the strengthening and maintenance of its enormous and diverse military force as the preferred means of defending American interests. In 1961, upon taking office, Kennedy stated: "First, we must strengthen our military tools." He believed that "facing a new and difficult world," the United States "must maintain a strong, diversified military force, a force capable of a broad range of military activities." His successor, Johnson, declared that the U.S. would "never allow our adversaries to gain an advantage in any possible war, whether it be nuclear, conventional, or guerrilla warfare." After the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces became roughly equal to those of the U.S., Nixon argued that the U.S. "urgently needs to significantly increase our general-purpose forces and strengthen our regional capabilities."

U.S. dignitaries and military leaders have consistently maintained that the United States must master the most advanced weapons and maintain superiority over the communist bloc, particularly in military technology. Otherwise, it could lead to a resurgence of the Soviet Union's fading revolutionary will. To this end, the U.S. must maintain a strong strategic deterrent to ensure that both sides utilize nuclear weapons politically and diplomatically rather than militarily.

Second, democratic nations cannot win by military might alone. Kennedy said that in our time, "no significant problem can be solved by military force alone," and "the world situation must be dealt with from social, economic, and political foundations." U.S. dignitaries believe: 1) in the global competition, one of the West's most powerful weapons is liberal thought, and the U.S. president must fully utilize this weapon appropriately and effectively; 2) economic power itself is a potent weapon that, if used skillfully, can promote U.S. interests; 3) the U.S. must learn to achieve strategic goals by providing foreign aid, and American military and economic aid should prevent new opportunities for communist expansion; 4) without military strength and the determination to use it decisively and selectively in major conflicts, we will defeat ourselves without a fight; a moderate tone must be combined with tough action; 5) according to the needs of the situation, military, political, economic, and psychological means should be used alternately or in combination.

V. All Peaceful Means Must Be Utilized to Induce the Communist Bloc

In April 1956, Eisenhower delivered a speech titled "The Search for Security," proposing a policy of "peaceful evolution" toward Communist states. He stated, "We must use all peaceful means to induce the Soviet bloc to correct the existing injustices." The following year, at a NATO meeting, he remarked that the "obvious possibility of achieving victory through peaceful means" before the free nations was a "noble strategy." John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration, remarked on certain actions by Soviet leaders at the time, stating, "There are signs that a new era may be dawning," and that "the results of such changes may emerge—not this year, nor next year, but after several years." The United States must "go all out" to execute Eisenhower's "noble strategy," noting that "its cost will be high, not just in terms of money, but especially in terms of will, tenacity, and faith." Consequently, "peaceful evolution" became, alongside the Cold War, a means for the US to deal with socialist countries.

First: "In the long run, we can encourage 'peaceful evolution' within the Communist bloc itself, a process that will take many years to complete." Since the Eisenhower administration, US politicians and scholars have believed that within Communist countries, there are "forces demanding greater liberalism." If these forces can persist, it is possible for "fundamental changes to occur internally" within Communist states. "We cannot predict when or by what means the countries and peoples still under Communist rule may move toward freedom. But we must always keep the lamp of freedom burning before them." "We look forward to such a day" as "the maximum goal of our policy" to be "achieved within ten years or a generation." Kennedy believed there was "obviously no easy solution to the problem of how to uproot the Communist movement." One way was for the Communists to "do it themselves," and "the other way is through actions from the outside." Nixon maintained that "this task will not be completed in a few decades, but will take many generations."

In April 1963, Kennedy stated that achieving "peaceful evolution" "relies on the gradual evolution of human institutions." In June of the same year, George Kennan, the former US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, opined: "From the perspective of the prospects for world peace, the Russian approach is relatively encouraging and hopeful." Nixon believed that the Western bloc, led by the US, would win without a fight through "peaceful evolution." In 1984, he remarked: "If we remain firm in our will, we need not be pessimistic about the outcome of the competition. As one generation succeeds another, we will begin to see a process of peaceful evolution within the Eastern bloc... In the long run, we will win, and win without war."

Second: "In this world, even established Communist governments are inevitably subject to the forces of evolution." Some in the US believed that "military evolution is too dangerous, and peaceful evolution is impossible" for Communist states. Nixon did not entirely agree with this view. He said, "They are right on the first point, but wrong on the second. In this world, everything—even an established Communist government—is inevitably subject to the forces of evolution." As long as the US "adopts a responsible policy" in the competition, "we can help shape and accelerate the process of positive change." The US must seek cooperation with Communist leaders who hope to implement "genuine reform."

US politicians and scholars believe that contact between their society (referring to socialism) and ours will sow the seeds of discontent, which will one day bear the fruit of peaceful evolution; therefore, the US must adopt a policy of maximizing such exchanges. Using various economic weapons against Communist regimes and increasing trade contacts can promote "peaceful evolution" within the Communist bloc. Trade must be treated as a weapon, not a gift, ensuring that communism fails years or even decades before its eventual collapse. It is "extremely important" to adopt distinct policies of friendship or hostility toward different Communist countries to "strengthen divisions within the Communist world."

Third: "There is a limit that cannot be crossed in the development of US-China relations." Nixon believed that the US should "first consider long-term investment in China, an investment that would make China's future progress dependent on continued cooperation with the West." Since the US and China are "not allies," the development of relations "has a limit that cannot be crossed," and the US "will not sacrifice our Chinese friends in Taiwan." "In the face of shifting international realities, there are no shared experiences, struggles, or ideals between us that would keep us inseparable forever. Unless a large-scale political reform movement occurs in China, our fundamental views on how to govern a country will remain diametrically opposed." "The future of US-China relations lies in the hands of both US politicians and the US business community." The path China chooses may ultimately determine the survival of the West.

Fourth: "Defeating communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 20th century is only the first step toward the worldwide victory of freedom in the 21st century." After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Nixon claimed the Western nations had "defeated communism" in the Cold War. "This was not only a military victory, but a victory in ideological, political, and economic aspects," and "one of the most brilliant achievements by free people in the history of civilization." Nixon said, "While celebrating the defeat of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, we must seize the opportunity to strive for the victory of peace and freedom throughout the world."

Nixon stated, "The Communists lost the ideological struggle on a worldwide scale. However, the fact that they lost this struggle does not mean that the West has won it." In the 21st century, "nothing will have a greater political impact on the world than whether political and economic freedom can take root and thrive in Russia and other former Communist countries." "Until this transition is finally transformed into irreversible political freedom, economic freedom, and non-aggressive foreign policy, there always exists the danger that the remnants of the shattered Soviet empire will pull off a 'return cavalry charge' ^[4] with catastrophic consequences." Nixon believed the challenges facing the US after the Cold War were greater than those during it. This is because, since the end of the Cold War, choosing how and when to fight for peace and freedom has become even more complex than before. The end of the Cold War between superpowers does not mean the end of conflicts between small nations.

Fifth: One of the most significant challenges of the 21st century is handling the deep divisions that remain—and will always remain—between peoples who believe in diametrically opposed ideologies. Nixon believed that in the 21st century, there would still be "two types of revolutionary change threatening the Third World." "The first is the Communist revolution," and the second is Islamic fundamentalism, the latter of which "has replaced communism as the primary means of violent revolution." The US must concern itself with events in the Third World because they involve immense US strategic and economic interests. If the 21st century is to be a century of peace, the hardships and wars in the Third World must be resolved; otherwise, "when one revolution subsides, another will occur." The term "Third World" is outdated; now there are only two "worlds" composed of developed and developing countries. "If the 'Tale of Two Worlds' persists, the foundations of future peace and stability will be built on sand."

VI. Armaments are Not the Cause of War, and Arms Control Cannot Achieve Peace

Nixon believed that war is not caused by the existence of weapons, but rather by political differences between nations that lead to the use of weapons; arms expansion is a symptom of political conflict, not the cause. While we should certainly try to alleviate symptoms, we should not ignore the disease itself. The advocacy for disarmament is based on the logical fallacy of equating people's intentions with the means they use to achieve those intentions. "Because of this fundamental misunderstanding, the methods that disarmament advocates believe are most promising for achieving peace are precisely the prescription for international disaster."

US politicians believe that armaments are determined by political differences and antagonistic relations. Attempting to disarm before eliminating these conflicts of interest is putting the cart before the horse. The myth of disarmament is the progenitor of all peace myths.

First, the US must simultaneously pursue the two paths of disarmament negotiations and arms expansion to maintain high military effectiveness. US politicians argue that the goal of the US is not disarmament, but the achievement of a stable strategic balance, and that the means of defending the US system must never be weakened. The US government will not propose any suggestion that would shift the balance of power to its disadvantage.

Second, total nuclear disarmament is an unattainable dream. Nixon said those who advocate for the elimination of nuclear weapons live in a fantasy. "One of the most reckless and dangerous fallacies of the nuclear disarmament movement is: if there were no nuclear weapons, life in the world would certainly be better."

US politicians and some scholars believe that nuclear weapons will exist forever. As long as people know how to manufacture them, the US cannot simply dream of eliminating them from the earth; it must accept these harsh realities. Although nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated, much can be done to prevent their use. Only by learning to coexist peacefully with its adversaries can the US learn to coexist with nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the US will die by the atomic bomb. It is in the interest of the US to prevent the proliferation of nuclear technology to other countries; to stop nuclear proliferation, the superpowers must make joint efforts. Without US leadership in the world, the problem of "avoiding nuclear anarchy" cannot be solved.

Source: Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theory Studies, Issue 2, 2022 Online Editor: Jing Mu