Li Shenming et al.: Fundamental Causes, Lessons, and Inspirations of the Collapse of the Soviet Party and State (Part I)
The year 2022 marked both the 100th anniversary of the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the 31st year since the demise of the Soviet Party and state. The collapse of the Soviet Party and state was a great tragedy and a major transition in human history; more importantly, it was a massive catastrophe and a significant regression in the developmental history of world socialism.
Comrade Mao Zedong and General Secretary Xi Jinping have attached extreme importance to the study of the evolution and degeneration of the Soviet Union from socialism to capitalism.
In February 1965, while the Soviet Union’s economy, science, technology, and military were still at their zenith, Mao Zedong—with keen perception—sensed and anticipated the potential, even inevitable, major catastrophe that might befall the Soviet Party, state, and people. He instructed the entire Party to strengthen research on Soviet issues and to use them as a mirror to improve China’s Party building and socialist modernization. In the publisher’s note to Volume 3 of The Utterances of Khrushchev, the World Affairs Press (Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe) quoted Mao Zedong as follows: "A revolutionary party and a revolutionary people must repeatedly undergo education from both positive and negative sides. Only through comparison and contrast can they be tempered to maturity and gain the guarantee of victory. We Chinese Communists have positive teachers—namely Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin. We also have negative teachers." He added, "If there were only positive teachers and no negative teachers, the Chinese Revolution would not have achieved victory. Anyone who belittles the role of negative teachers is not a thorough dialectical materialist."
General Secretary Xi Jinping has offered profound expositions on the experiences and lessons of the Soviet Party and state’s collapse on many occasions. On January 5, 2013, shortly after taking office, General Secretary Xi Jinping pointed out with deep meaning: "Why did the Soviet Union disintegrate? Why did the Soviet Communist Party collapse? One important reason was that the struggle in the ideological field was extremely intense. There was a total negation of Soviet history and the history of the Soviet Communist Party; a negation of Lenin and a negation of Stalin. They engaged in historical nihilism [1]. Thinking was thrown into chaos. Party organizations at all levels had almost no function left, and the military was no longer under the Party's leadership. In the end, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, as large a party as it was, 'scattered like birds and beasts.' The Soviet Union, as large a socialist country as it was, fell apart. This is a lesson from the past!"
On October 16, 2022, our great, glorious, and correct Communist Party of China will triumphantly convene its 20th National Congress. This is a highly important congress held at a critical moment when the whole Party and the people of all ethnic groups are embarking on a new journey toward the comprehensive building of a modern socialist country and marching toward the Second Centenary Goal. Around the time the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out in 2022, Russian President Putin noted that Russia had never been defeated by a foreign power and that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was caused by internal betrayal; he also stated that Russia cannot be without socialism. Against this backdrop, it is of special importance, necessity, and urgency to further scientifically understand the fundamental reasons and lessons of the Soviet collapse and to draw historical insights for governing the Party and flourishing the nation. This holds significant practical and historical meaning for adhering to the Party’s self-revolution, jumping out of the "historical cycle" [2] of the rise and fall of political parties and regimes, and uniting the people of all countries to solve this solemn and harsh major problem—one that has been raised by the international communist movement but not yet fully resolved. It is essential for maintaining the Party's revolutionary nature, advanced nature, and purity, and for leading the Chinese people in the united struggle to build a powerful modern socialist country, comprehensively advance the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, create a new form of human civilization, and build a community with a shared future for humanity.
I. The Ideological and Political Degeneration of the Leadership Collective from Khrushchev to Gorbachev is the Fundamental Reason for the Demise of the Soviet Party and State
The causes of the Soviet collapse are multifaceted and were inevitably the result of a "resultant force of history." However, among them, there must be one fundamental cause that played a decisive role. As Comrade Mao Zedong pointed out: "If in any process there are a number of contradictions, one of them must be the principal contradiction, playing the leading and decisive role." Among the many causes of the Soviet demise, which one exactly was principal and played the leading, decisive role?
Long before the birth of New China, Mao Zedong paid close attention to the major issue of how to ensure the Party and the regime would never change their nature. This led to Mao Zedong’s "Jiashen Dialogue" [3] in 1944, the "Cave Dwelling Dialogue" [4] in 1945, and the "Examination Dialogue" [5] in 1949. After the founding of New China, Mao Zedong exerted every effort to break the historical cycle of dynastic rise and fall characterized by the phrase "rising swiftly but perishing just as suddenly" [6]. Mao Zedong believed that the high-level echelons of the Party, especially the leadership collective, are of extreme importance and decisiveness in ensuring the Party and regime never change nature. He argued that senior Party cadres must become Marxist statespeople and that our Party must cultivate millions of successors for the proletarian revolutionary cause in the midst of "great winds and waves."
On June 16, 1989, following the suppression of the political turmoil at the turn of spring and summer, Deng Xiaoping pointed out: "As long as there is a good Politburo, especially a good Standing Committee... any trouble can be stopped." He added, "But if the Central Committee itself loses its footing, that would be hard to say. This is the most crucial issue." In early 1992, shortly after the tragedy of the Soviet collapse, Deng Xiaoping said during his inspection of Shenzhen: "If problems arise in China, they will not come from other areas, but from within the Communist Party. The problems in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe came from within the Communist Party. If our Party has problems, the whole country will certainly have major problems." He also said: "Collapse can happen overnight! Collapsing is easy; construction is very difficult. How fast the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe collapsed! A country as strong as the Soviet Union collapsed all at once in a few months. If China does not accept this lesson and fails to take notice when signs appear—just as no one took notice when Gorbachev’s 'New Thinking' emerged—then trouble will occur." Jiang Zemin pointed out profoundly: "In the final analysis, it was caused by the leaders of the Soviet and Eastern European parties executing an incorrect line, incorrect principles, and incorrect policies, which led to a serious detachment from the masses." Hu Jintao also profoundly noted that the collapse of the Soviet Party and the disintegration of the Soviet Union occurred because "reasons were multifaceted, but a very important one was that problems arose in theory and politics."
On January 5, 2018, General Secretary Xi Jinping profoundly pointed out: "We often say that if the foundation is not solid, the earth will shake and the mountains will sway. If convictions are not solid, the earth will also shake. Is this not the logic of the Soviet disintegration, the Soviet Party's collapse, and the drastic changes in Eastern Europe? The CPSU had 200,000 members when it seized power; it had 2 million members when it defeated Hitler; yet it lost power when it had nearly 20 million members. I have said that in that turmoil, 'not a single person was a real man' [7], and almost no one came out to resist. Why? Because their ideals and convictions had completely vanished." On January 12, 2016, in a speech at the Sixth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Commission for Discipline Inspection, General Secretary Xi Jinping further pointed out: "There are careerists and conspirators within the Party who erode the Party's governing foundation from within. We cannot 'hesitate to pelt a rat for fear of breaking the vase' [8], or 'look left and right while speaking of other things' [9], or adopt an 'ostrich policy.' This must be stated clearly." Further in-depth study of the major historical event of the Soviet collapse and reaching scientific conclusions will inevitably help clarify—through the combination of theory and practice—the major issue raised by General Secretary Xi Jinping regarding "careerists and conspirators within the Party eroding its governing foundation." It will help address this solemn and major problem that has been raised by the international communist movement but has not yet been, or is far from being, resolved.
We often say that the economic base determines the superstructure; this is a general law in the long term of history. We should also remember that within a certain scope and period, under certain conditions, the political superstructure can play a decisive counter-reaction on the economic base and directly play a decisive role within the superstructure itself. Precisely for this reason, the Party Central Committee is the most precious and important part of the political superstructure. The Party’s century of glorious history tells us that whether in seizing and establishing power or in governing the country, the key lies in the Party, and the key lies in people—especially in the Party’s high-level echelons and its leadership collective.
The Russian people have also reflected on this. Following the Soviet collapse, reflections from various sectors in Russia have fully demonstrated that the fundamental reason for the Soviet demise lay in the degeneration of the Party, particularly the leadership collective. The famous Soviet dissident Aleksandr Zinovyev, who later changed his views, said that while living abroad in 1979, he was asked: Where is the Soviet system most vulnerable to attack? His answer was: "Those places considered as solid as a fortress—the organs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, its Central Committee, its Politburo, and finally its General Secretary... One only needs to place one's own person in that position. In just a few months, he could bring down the Party apparatus... Then, the entire power and management system would begin a chain reaction of disintegration."
(1) The Ideological and Political Evolution of the Leadership Collective from Khrushchev to Gorbachev
Between August and September 1970, regarding the struggle against the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique at the time, Mao Zedong clearly pointed out: "Whether the ideological and political line is correct determines everything. If the Party’s line is correct, we will have everything; if we have no people, we can get people; if we have no guns, we can get guns; if we have no power, we can get power. If the line is incorrect, even if we have these things, we may lose them." Mao Zedong emphasized this idea many times in his later years. This important, even monumental, idea possesses the nature of a universal law. General Secretary Xi Jinping has repeatedly emphasized the need to "strengthen top-level design" and "pay more attention to the systematic, holistic, and synergistic nature of reform." Strengthening top-level design means the ideological line and political line must be correct, ensuring that reform and opening up always adhere to the correct direction and advance along the correct path. Therefore, the fundamental manifestation and expression of the Party and its leadership reside in the Party's ideological and political lines. The fundamental reason for the CPSU's demise and the Soviet Union's disintegration was, in the final analysis, the ideological and political degeneration of the leadership collective from Khrushchev to Gorbachev.
There are various theoretical systems in the world, but Marxism-Leninism alone is the scientific theoretical system regarding the complete liberation of the global proletariat and all of humanity; it is a truth that is universally applicable. In a certain sense, such a scientific, open, and continuously developing theoretical system has become an objective existence since its founding by Marx and Engels. Lines include the ideological line, political line, organizational line, and mass line, collectively called "the line." The ideological and political lines are the direct manifestations of the subjective initiative of a political party or individual under the guidance of a certain theoretical system. Mao Zedong pointed out: "Whether a line is correct is not a theoretical problem, but a practical problem." According to Mao Zedong's view, among the eight aspects we discuss—conviction, theory, politics, economy, organization, conduct, diplomacy, and worldview—knowledge of them is not a relationship of parallel items, but a relationship of overlapping command and subordination. Conviction, theory, and worldview belong to the ideological line, referring to the actual status of a specific class, party, or even individual in combination with the scientific theoretical system of Marxism; however, these do not belong to theoretical problems but to practical problems of the ideological sphere. The five aspects of politics, economy, organization, conduct, and diplomacy essentially belong to practical problems of the political line. In a certain sense, among these five, the economy is the base, while politics—like the aforementioned ideology—is the soul and the commander. Organization, conduct, diplomacy, and other tasks among these five are concrete embodiments of broad professional work within the political line.
In the relationship among the above eight aspects, politics and economy, and politics and professional work, are all unities of opposites. Ideological and political work are the guarantees for completing economic, technical, and professional work; they serve the economic base. Ideology and politics are the commander, the soul, and the "sovereign" (jun), while economic, technical, and professional work are the "ministers" (chen). Political work is not only the lifeblood of all economic work but also the lifeblood of all technical and professional work. If ideological and political work are relaxed even slightly, economic, technical, and professional work will surely go astray. This is the main viewpoint. Mao Zedong said, "The key to all problems lies in politics." General Secretary Xi Jinping has emphasized many times the need to "speak politics with a clear-cut stand," and to continuously improve "political judgment, political understanding, and political execution." This is to consciously and fully exert the subjective initiative of the Marxist party and every Communist, to confidently work toward the continuous realization of the Party's current goals and ultimate grand goal—that is, practicing the original aspiration and founding mission—while avoiding detours. This has extremely significant practical meaning and profound historical significance.
Marxism-Leninism, the ideological line, and the political line constitute a highly organic unity while remaining distinct from one another. Marxism-Leninism is the theoretical foundation guiding our thinking. The ideological line is the state of cognitive awareness among us Communists after studying, mastering, and integrating Marxism with specific conditions. The political line consists of the principles, policies, and specific tactics formulated by integrating Marxism with concrete practice, unifying our supreme program with our current program.
The fundamental cause of the degeneration and transformation of the Soviet leadership group lay in the execution of erroneous and even reactionary ideological and political lines, a process of qualitative change that began with the Khrushchev leadership and culminated in the total betrayal of socialism by the Gorbachev leadership. The Gorbachev leadership was conceived and nurtured within the ideological and political line of the Khrushchev leadership. At that time, although the Soviet Party and state had accumulated a large number of serious problems, the collapse of the Party and the nation was not inevitable. In a certain sense, before the Gorbachev leadership came to power, the Soviet Union remained a superpower with formidable national strength. It was only because Gorbachev led reform down the evil and dead-end path of capitalism that the Party and state lost the entire basis of their legitimacy and righteousness for existence and development. It is evident that it is extremely important for the Party and the people to choose the right leaders and for those leaders to provide correct leadership. Clarifying this issue serves as a powerful warning and has great practical significance, helping us avoid making the same mistakes. Furthermore, clarifying this issue allows for a deeper recognition that the Communist Party of China's choice of Comrade Xi Jinping to take the helm and lead the way is an exceptionally correct choice and a blessing for the Chinese nation. It will lead to a more profound understanding of the decisive significance of the "Two Establishments" and a more conscious commitment to the "Two Upholds."
The ideological and political degeneration of the leadership groups from Khrushchev to Gorbachev was manifested primarily in the following eight aspects:
1. On Belief: From wavering, departing, and abandoning to the total betrayal of socialist and communist ideals and convictions.
The faith of Communists referred to here primarily signifies the cognition of and adherence to the laws of historical development of human society. From its founding in 1898 to its announced dissolution in 1991, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (the name of the Party changed several times from the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; hereinafter referred collectively as the CPSU) spanned 93 springs and autumns. Regarding the duration of the CPSU's existence, there are currently three common interpretations. The first is the "93-year theory," calculated from the 1898 founding of its predecessor, the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party. The second is the "88-year theory," calculated from the Second Congress of the Russian Social Democratic Labour Party in 1903, where the Party program and constitution were adopted, central leadership bodies were elected, and Iskra was designated as the central organ. The third is the "86-year theory," calculated from the Third Congress in 1905; this was the first Bolshevik congress held under Lenin's leadership, which revised the Party constitution, adopted the first article proposed by Lenin, elected the Central Committee as the sole leadership center, defined the tasks of the proletariat as the revolutionary leader, and formulated the Party's tactical line—Author's Note. During the eras of Lenin and Stalin, the CPSU was tempered by the fires of the October Revolution, foreign military intervention, domestic counter-revolutionary rebellions, and the German Fascist invasion. In these harsh environments, it withstood the severe tests of consolidating socialist political power and developing the socialist cause, enjoying high prestige and possessing strong cohesion, rallying power, and combat effectiveness among the Soviet people and the people of the world. However, after Stalin’s death, the ideals and convictions of the CPSU high command began to waver. By the time of the Gorbachev leadership, they eventually abandoned Marxism-Leninism and the nature, tenets, and goals of a proletarian party. The Party, state, military, and people were reduced to a heap of loose sand, collapsing without a fight in the face of frantic attacks by hostile forces.
Looking across history, the shaking of the CPSU’s ideals and convictions began during Khrushchev’s time in power. As the leader of the Soviet Communist Party, Khrushchev lacked a basic cultivation in Marxism-Leninism. Mao Zedong once evaluated Khrushchev by saying: "He does not understand Marxism-Leninism and is easily deceived by imperialism." U.S. President Richard Nixon said of Khrushchev: "He believed in the communist cause and the inevitability of its victory, but he only worshipped at the altar of theory on Sundays."
Regrettably, Khrushchev used the methods of a "two-faced person" [10] to secure promotion from Stalin. While Stalin was alive, he praised him as a "biological father," a "wise leader," and a "genius." Shortly after Stalin’s death, in his "Secret Report" at the 20th Congress of the CPSU, he attacked Stalin as a "persecution maniac" and a "megalomaniac" who "studied the situation in the country and agriculture only from films" and "planned operations using a globe," claiming that the "leadership practices formed in Stalin's later years became a serious obstacle on the path of Soviet social development." In 1961, under Khrushchev's presidency, the 22nd Congress of the CPSU passed a resolution to remove Stalin's body from the Lenin Mausoleum. Subsequently, acts of destroying Stalin's statues and monuments appeared across the Soviet Union, triggering a new wave of total negation of Stalin.
Stalin represented an important period of history for the Soviet Party and state and was an important symbol of both. Therefore, the evaluation of Stalin’s merits and demerits was not a simple question of personal evaluation, nor a matter limited to a single party or country. Despite Stalin’s various errors, the failure to analyze his mistakes historically and scientifically, the failure to distinguish between the "mainstream" and the "tributaries" [11] of the CPSU and the Soviet Union under his leadership, and the failure to carry out effective educational guidance led to extremely serious consequences. The total negation of Stalin not only negated the achievements of the CPSU and the Soviet Union during that period and severely damaged their image, shaking the people’s faith in socialist and communist ideals; it also struck at the worldview and values of the younger generation. It produced a group of "gravediggers" of proletarian political power who yearned for Western capitalism, causing ideological turmoil in society. Gorbachev, Aleksandr Yakovlev, and Boris Yeltsin were the primary representatives of this group. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev stated that the anti-Stalin movement at the 20th Congress "was of great significance," that "this critique morally discredited totalitarianism," and was "the first attempt to move our society toward democratization." Practice has proven that the direction of "democratization" spoken of by Gorbachev was essentially a naked dictatorship over the Soviet and Russian people by the alliance of domestic capital and Western countries.
Reviewing history, during the period of the Sino-Soviet split, the two parties developed serious differences regarding the evaluation of Stalin and Soviet socialist practice. The Chinese Communists, with Comrade Mao Zedong as their chief representative, firmly defended Stalin’s historical status and achievements, demonstrating the profound insight and political foresight of Mao and the Chinese Communists. If people at that time could not yet fully see the serious consequences of mistreating Stalin and Soviet socialism, or fully understand the far-reaching significance of the CPC's advocacy for a scientific evaluation of Stalin and full affirmation of Soviet socialist achievements, then the tragedy of the Party’s fall and the state’s collapse 35 years after the 20th Congress—and the world-shaking achievements of socialism with Chinese characteristics more than 30 years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union—provide us with both positive and negative lessons to reassess that history and distinguish right from wrong. Appraising the past in light of the present, history and reality have already rendered a public verdict on who was right and who was wrong.
On major theoretical issues of Marxism, Khrushchev underwent a process that started with a superficial understanding, moved to blurred distortion, and ended in total departure. At the 20th Congress of the CPSU, he made "peaceful coexistence," "peaceful transition," and "peaceful competition" the general line of socialist foreign policy, believing this could deal a "devastating blow" to all capitalist relations and realize socialism worldwide. At the 22nd Congress, he introduced the theories of the "party of the whole people" and the "state of the whole people," beginning the transformation of the CPSU from a proletarian party into a "party of the whole people" with a bourgeois nature. The program adopted at the 22nd Congress abolished the "dictatorship of the proletariat"—the core idea of Marxism—replacing it with an abstract so-called "humanitarianism." In 1959, he proposed that the Soviet Union had entered the "period of the all-out construction of a communist society," and in 1961, he declared that the Soviet Union would "basically build a communist society within 20 years," calling out that "our generation of Soviet people will live under communism." These lines and programs, severely detached from the international struggle and Soviet social reality and in grave violation of the principles of scientific socialism, threw the thoughts of CPSU members and the Soviet people into confusion. They caused the Soviet Union to deviate from the correct direction of socialist development, sowing the seeds for the later collapse of the CPSU and the Soviet Union.
During the Brezhnev era, although the Soviet leadership corrected some practical errors of the Khrushchev period and implemented some new policies that allowed for a degree of social development, they clung tenaciously to the erroneous theories of the 20th Congress. Socialist and communist ideals and convictions had effectively vanished among the Soviet privileged stratum represented by Brezhnev. Brezhnev himself was content with the status quo, sought pleasure, and was keen on the flattery of others; Marxism and communism were merely hollow clichés he frequently uttered but did not believe himself. In her English-language memoir published in the United States, The World I Left Behind: Pieces of the Past, Brezhnev’s niece Lyuba disclosed that Brezhnev once said to his brother: "What communism? These are just empty words to fool the commoners." When those above have a preference, those below will indulge it to excess [12]. At that time, the prevailing social atmosphere in the Soviet Union was to "say one thing and do another." Corruption was rampant. Many people joined the Communist Party not to sacrifice for the cause of socialist construction or communist ideals, but to secure an official post, eventually viewing the seizure of more personal and small-group interests as their ultimate pursuit. On the surface, they appeared as revolutionaries and leaders of socialist construction, playing the role of defenders of the interests of the people and the state; in reality, they had no Marxist faith and no socialist or communist convictions, focusing exclusively on maintaining their own privileges.
Of course, during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, the vast majority of Soviet Party members and the masses still held socialist and communist ideals and were sincerely building socialism. The fundamental reason the Soviet Union could truly become a superpower rivaling the United States in the 1970s and 80s lies in this fact. However, the political faith of the primary leaders, such as Khrushchev and Brezhnev, had already completely changed.
If the Party cadres during the Brezhnev era could at least maintain the appearance of Marxist and communist faith, by the Gorbachev era, they simply tore off the mask and openly negated it. As early as his university days, Gorbachev began to doubt the scientific nature of Marxism. After graduation, the "Secret Report" of the 20th Congress accelerated his ideological transformation. After assuming the post of General Secretary, he raised the banner of so-called "humane, democratic socialism"—a slogan that could both deceive people and achieve his goals—and began to systematically destroy the Soviet socialist system. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev admitted that communism was "an almost unachievable slogan" and that Russia’s tragedy was that "the ideas of Karl Marx's later years, which were already dead, were chosen in early 20th-century Russia and introduced into real society; this was a mistake." He also said that as a student, he discovered "socialist reality was a hundred thousand miles away from the ideal," and that he felt "very honored to have been able to clear away many of the ill effects caused by the influence of communism from people's consciousness" during the years of reform. The American economist Lester C. Thurow once said: "I happened to be in Moscow around the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union. The fundamental reason for the collapse was that Gorbachev lost his faith in Marxism and communism... Imagine, if Pope John Paul II announced today that God does not exist, what would the Christian world look like tomorrow?!"
Alexander Yakovlev, who served as Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and Head of the Propaganda Department of the CPSU Central Committee during the Gorbachev era and was known as "Gorbachev's chief brains trust," advised Gorbachev as early as December 1985: "In our country's practice, Marxism is nothing other than a new religion, which is subordinated to the interests of an autocratic regime and its capricious demands." He continued, "The danger of the dogmatic interpretation of Marxism-Leninism is sufficient to completely destroy any creative thinking, or even classical thinking." On August 2, 1991, in an interview with TASS reporters, he stated openly: "Our misfortune stems from the dogmas of Marxism... I oppose taking Marxism as a guide to action and conclude that socialism will fail." After the collapse of the Soviet Union, he admitted: "Essentially, among all the specific economic conclusions upon which Marx built the edifice of his 'scientific socialist' worldview, not a single one has been confirmed in practice." Furthermore, Yakovlev was full of praise and adoration for capitalism: "Capitalism brought a pragmatic ethic. Noble idealism is embodied in the capitalist slogans of liberty, equality, and fraternity..."
Eduard Shevardnadze, another of Gorbachev’s capable assistants who served as the Soviet Foreign Minister, also spoke about the transformation process of his own political thought. In 1991, answering questions from a French television reporter, he said: "For a period, we held communist ideals and struggled to realize them. Later, I gradually realized that what I firmly believed in was impossible to achieve, and this phenomenon had to be changed. One day in the early 1990s, I said to Gorbachev that our system was rotten, and it must be entirely destroyed and thoroughly reconstructed from the top down."
2. Theoretically: From failing to study and failing to understand, to deviating from, and finally betraying Marxism-Leninism
"Theoretically" here mainly refers to the actual state of studying and mastering the basic principles of Marxism and integrating them with concrete practice. The leaders of the CPSU after Stalin went from not reading, not understanding, and deviating from Marxism-Leninism to ultimately turning against and betraying it. They were able neither to respond to the challenges of the times nor to counter the "peaceful evolution" [13] strategy of imperialism.
In his early years, Khrushchev received no systematic education, and after entering politics, he did not seriously study Marxist theory. Vyacheslav Molotov once commented that Khrushchev never had much interest in, nor had he ever thought about, what Leninism or Marxism were; he was "theoretically illiterate." Former U.S. President Richard Nixon also remarked: "I find it hard to imagine whether he actually read Marx's three thick volumes of Capital. In this respect, he was different from Stalin, who read extensively and wrote a large number of books on communist theory." Precisely because of this, Khrushchev unscrupulously proposed erroneous theories such as "Three Peaces" and "Two Alls" [14]. The fundamental error of the theories of the "party of the whole people" and the "state of the whole people" lay in the complete abandonment of the Marxist-Leninist theory regarding the essence of "political parties" and "the state." It blurred the boundary between the Party's class basis and its mass basis, elevating what originally belonged to the Party’s mass base to its class base. He believed that under socialist conditions, the exploiting classes had been eliminated, and that in Soviet society, except for a tiny minority of criminals, there existed only a total population based on consistent fundamental interests—a broad political alliance composed of the working class, peasantry, and intellectuals. Consequently, the CPSU was no longer the party of a specific class but had become a "party of the whole people" representing the interests of all Soviet people; the CPSU became a "political organization of the whole people." Khrushchev ignored the fact that class struggle still existed within a certain scope in Soviet society and could intensify under certain conditions; he ignored the fact that complex and sharp class struggle between socialism and capitalism still existed internationally; and he ignored the possibility and danger of the socialist state being subverted by domestic and foreign hostile forces. By preaching the "theory of the dying out of class struggle," he led the vast numbers of Party members, cadres, and the masses to mistakenly believe that class struggle no longer existed in Soviet society and that anti-communist and anti-socialist forces were gone, thus losing the vigilance they should have maintained against capitalist restoration.
Brezhnev worked as a laborer and engineer in his youth and possessed specialized knowledge in agriculture and metallurgy, but he lacked theoretical cultivation, had no interest in social science theory, and lacked a systematic understanding of Marxism. After becoming the supreme leader of the CPSU, he spent a great deal of time and energy on hunting, driving cars, and other activities. In 1965, while discussing the first draft of the report commemorating the 20th anniversary of the victory of the Great Patriotic War, he said: "It is hard for me to understand all of this. To be frank, I do not do this kind of work (referring to theoretical work—Editor’s Note). My strength lies in organizational work and understanding human psychology." He also told his assistants: "Write simply; do not write me as a theorist. Otherwise, no matter what, no one will believe I wrote it, and they will laugh at me." He sometimes requested the deletion of quotes from Marxist classics, explaining: "Who would believe I’ve read Marx's works!" According to relevant archives, there is no record of any study of Marxist works in the activities of high-level CPSU leaders during the 1970s. With high-level leaders being as they were, one can imagine the state of theoretical study among other Party members and cadres.
Brezhnev did not value the study of Marxist theory, nor could he scientifically grasp its essence. Therefore, he not only failed to fundamentally overcome the theoretical errors of the Khrushchev period but instead carried forward Khrushchev's erroneous viewpoints. For example, the new Soviet Constitution adopted in October 1977 still included the concepts of the "state of the whole people" and "party of the whole people" invented by Khrushchev. He also proposed the slogan of "developed socialism," emphasizing the "highly developed" nature of Soviet productive forces and the "power" of its material and technical base, the "maturity" of Soviet social relations, and the "profound" nature of socialist democracy. He emphasized the unity and harmony of the various republics and nationalities of the Soviet Union, thereby covering up serious problems—both latent and manifest—in Soviet economic, political, and ethnic policies. He denied that contradictions still existed between the productive forces and the relations of production, and between the economic base and the superstructure in Soviet society. Thus, in terms of ideology, theory, and practice, he denied the necessity and inevitability of the need for profound transformation in Soviet society. Brezhnev often said: "Change what? Just do the work well." During Brezhnev’s 18-year reign, more and more profound contradictions accumulated beneath the surface of prosperity. Crises, both exposed and unexposed, were everywhere, planting extremely serious hidden dangers for the subsequent great social upheavals and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Regarding Mikhail Gorbachev's cultivation in Marxist theory, his Chief of Staff, Valery Boldin, commented: "He was very familiar with Party history and Lenin’s works and often used this knowledge... However, Gorbachev was not familiar with the works of Marx and Engels." He had received a higher education and, after graduation, engaged in Party work for a long time, gaining rich work experience. Yet this young General Secretary, whom Andrei Gromyko described as "learned," "quick-witted," and "profound," eventually turned toward democratic socialism because his worldview and values evolved, leading him to completely abandon his Marxist faith. In June 1988, the 19th All-Union Conference of the CPSU officially proposed building "humane, democratic socialism." In 1990, the February Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee concluded that the CPSU’s ideal was "humane, democratic socialism." In March 1990, in his article "The World of the Future and Socialism," Gorbachev pointed out: "Between Socialists and Communists, the chasm that once divided them no longer exists"; their "political positions" and "worldview positions" have "converged on the basis of humane, democratic values." He claimed that the "true socialism" to be realized through reform "contains basic values that were originally approved by other currents of the socialist movement." In July 1990, the 28th Congress of the CPSU adopted the programmatic document Towards a Humane, Democratic Socialism, marking a fundamental change in the nature of the CPSU. Although the CPSU did not change its name, it existed in name only. Gorbachev later admitted: "During the years of perestroika, we wanted to make the CPSU a social democratic party. At that time, corresponding plans had been drafted for the scheduled 29th Congress of the CPSU. However, the rebellion (Gorbachev’s term for the 'August 19' event of 1991—Editor’s Note) and its aftermath, along with the policies adopted by Yeltsin that effectively banned CPSU activities, made it impossible to hold this congress."
The so-called "humane, democratic socialism" originated from Bernstein’s revisionism, the social democracy of the right wing of the Second International, and the democratic socialism of the Socialist International. The essence of Gorbachev's "humane, democratic socialism" was to use deceptive banners like "humanity," "democracy," and "socialism" to implement a full-scale capitalist system in the Soviet Union through so-called reforms. To transform the CPSU and Soviet society according to the theory of "humane, democratic socialism" meant replacing the theoretical foundation of Marxism with the old theories of Western social democratic parties. It meant abolishing the CPSU's status as the governing party and establishing a multi-party system, parliamentary democracy, the separation of powers, and a presidential system in the Soviet Union. It meant the "de-party-ization," "de-politicization," and "nationalization" of the military, and implementing economic privatization and a free-market economy—comprehensively transforming Soviet socialism into capitalism.
Gorbachev's set of theories and propositions did not emerge all at once; their ideological and political origins can be traced back to the Khrushchev era. A leading comrade of our Party once pointed out: "Khrushchev’s 'Secret Report' at the 20th Congress of the CPSU totally negated Stalin, negated the Marxist-Leninist doctrines of class struggle and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and advocated things like the 'party of the whole people' and the 'state of the whole people,' throwing the thinking of the Party and the people into chaos. The evolution of the Soviet Union today began planting various crises as far back as the Khrushchev period." Specifically: First, Khrushchev’s total negation of Stalin at the 20th Congress was, in essence, a comprehensive vilification and attack on the CPSU and the socialist system; negating the Party’s history and actual socialist system was the prerequisite for the proposal and spread of "humane, democratic socialism." Second, Khrushchev proposed that "everything for the sake of man, everything for the benefit of man" was the Party’s programmatic goal; the "man" here refers to an abstract person without class distinctions. This actually took the idealist historical view of humanism as the Party’s guiding ideology, which constitutes the theoretical core of "humane, democratic socialism." Third, the revisionist viewpoints of the "party of the whole people" and the "state of the whole people" proposed by Khrushchev, which negated class struggle and opposed the dictatorship of the proletariat, served as the theoretical basis for the "humane, democratic socialism" line. Fourth, Khrushchev’s theory of nuclear terror, which denied the existence of international contradictions under nuclear conditions and advocated international class cooperation, also constituted the theoretical basis for Gorbachev’s "New Thinking" in diplomacy. When Khrushchev proposed these revisionist views in 1956, people could hardly imagine that after more than 30 years of spreading, these views would form a complete "humane, democratic socialism" line, ultimately resulting in the loss of the Party and the state in the Soviet Union.
3. Politically: From weakening and distorting to completely negating and betraying the Party's leadership and Marxist-Leninist principles of Party building
"Politically" here mainly refers to various major policies, programs, and actions of the Party in the process of its own building and governance. The Soviet leaders after Stalin failed to formulate and execute a correct political line. In practice, they diluted, weakened, and distorted the Party's leadership, eventually negating the Party's leadership, betraying Marxist-Leninist principles of Party building, admiring and copying the bourgeois democratic system, and ultimately resulting in the collapse of political power. Khrushchev and Brezhnev, to a certain extent, turned the power bestowed upon them by the Party to serve the people into a tool for seeking the private interests of individuals and the privileged stratum, thereby damaging and undermining the Party's centralized and unified leadership.
In the early period of Khrushchev’s rise to power, driven by the political necessity of anti-Stalinism, he advocated for the separation of the highest Party and state leadership positions and the implementation of collective leadership. However, once his power and status were solidified, he began to undermine democratic centralism and to marginalize and suppress political opposition. By 1958, following the execution of Beria (Lavrentiy Beria) and the purging of Malenkov (Georgi Malenkov), Kaganovich (Lazar Kaganovich), Molotov, and Bulganin (Nikolai Bulganin) as an "anti-Party group," [15] Khrushchev practiced personal autocracy on many issues while simultaneously building his own authority and fostering a new cult of personality.
In 1961, the 22nd Congress of the CPSU decided to establish a cadre renewal system, but it imposed rigid regulations on every routine election. It required that at least one-quarter of the members of the Central Committee and the Presidium be replaced; at least one-third of the members of the Party Central Committees of the Union Republics and the territorial, regional, and provincial committees be replaced; and at least half of the members of city, district, and primary-level Party committees or branch committees be replaced. There were also regulations on the number of consecutive terms cadres at all levels could serve: members of the CPSU Central Committee Presidium could serve three consecutive four-year terms; secretaries of territorial, regional, city, and district committees could serve three consecutive two-year terms; while secretaries of primary-level Party organizations could only serve two consecutive one-year terms. These frequent cadre changes caused the leadership cores at all levels to lack continuity and a sense of security, which also had an adverse impact on the consistency of work and aroused dissatisfaction among cadres at all levels.
In November 1962, Khrushchev decided to reorganize the organizational structure and leadership bodies of local Party organizations, dividing the Party organizations in regions and territories into separate organizations for leading industry and leading agriculture. These were independent of one another and held no subordinate relationship. Simultaneously, corresponding reorganizations were carried out for the Soviets, trade unions, and Komsomol (Communist Youth League) organizations and their leadership bodies. Practice proved that the division into industrial and agricultural Party organizations was inappropriate. Far from producing the expected results, it led to serious negative consequences, severing the close ties between industry and agriculture, destroying the unified leadership of the Party, and resulting in chaos.
After Brezhnev came to power, he abolished the division between industrial and agricultural Party organizations, re-establishing unified Party organizations and leadership bodies based on geographic regions. At the same time, he adjusted the highest leadership system and abolished the system of frequent cadre replacement. However, Brezhnev overemphasized the stability and continuity of the cadre ranks, which resulted in a system of life-tenure for leadership positions and the aging of the cadre force.
By the Gorbachev period, the Party’s supreme power was openly negated, and a presidential system with highly centralized power was established. This completely abandoned the essence of socialist political power—the people as masters of the country—in both content and form, turning the Party’s power into a tool for overthrowing the Party’s leadership and the socialist system.
Gorbachev directly inherited Khrushchev’s mantle, advocating that the CPSU must "exclude the dictatorship of any class." He also attacked the dictatorship of the proletariat as "tyranny" and "dictatorship" that "led to arbitrariness and lawlessness." He trumpeted a so-called "general, all-people’s democracy," praised Khrushchev’s theory of the "state of the whole people," and claimed that "the ultimate goal of reform is the comprehensive enrichment of human rights," bringing the state system to "complete all-people character," which he believed conformed to the "political conclusion of the state of the whole people." [16]
Gorbachev criticized Soviet socialism as "totalitarianism," arguing that the Soviet Union’s "totalitarian socialism" caused the "alienation of man from politics and political power, man from the means of production and property, and man from culture," creating political, economic, and spiritual monopolies. To overcome alienation and eliminate monopolies, he argued it was first necessary to end the CPSU’s "monopoly" on political power. In February 1990, the Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee decided to revise Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, abolishing the CPSU's leading position. One month later, the Congress of People’s Deputies of the Soviet Union passed the Law on the Establishment of the Post of President of the USSR and Amendments and Additions to the Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the USSR, which abolished Article 6. It held that "citizens of the USSR have the right to form political parties," and the Soviet Union began to emulate Western countries by implementing a multi-party system.
Gorbachev also comprehensively betrayed Marxist-Leninist principles of Party building. He abandoned the guiding status of Marxism-Leninism, advocated for pluralism in guiding ideology, and promoted "free competition" among various ideas. In essence, he used so-called "humanistic, democratic socialism" to replace the scientific socialism of Marxism. He abandoned the lofty ideal of communism and declared the CPSU to be an "autonomous political organization" and a "voluntary association of like-minded people." He stated that the CPSU was "prepared to engage in open competition and cooperation with other political parties and movements" and would "strive to maintain its position as the ruling party within the scope of elections." He discarded democratic centralism, promoted "the principle of universal democracy" and "the rejection of the rule of the majority over the minority," allowed the legal existence of factional organizations within the Party, and gave lower-level Party organizations the right to refuse to implement the decisions of higher-level Party organizations. He abandoned the CPSU’s leadership over mass organizations, declaring that the CPSU and mass organizations such as the Komsomol and trade unions were equal "partners" and that the CPSU would not interfere in their internal affairs. Under the guidance of these concepts, the CPSU completely lost its character as the vanguard of the working class, transforming from a Marxist ruling party into a parliamentary party organized for presidential and parliamentary elections.
4. Economically: From "The Higher the Degree of Public Ownership, the Better" to Abandoning Socialist Public Ownership and Pursuing Total Privatization
The highly centralized planned economic system established during the Stalin period, based on socialist public ownership, played a huge role in rapidly developing the Soviet Union’s productive forces and elevating its comprehensive national strength. It provided a powerful material guarantee for achieving victory in the anti-fascist war. After the end of the Second World War, in an environment of peaceful construction and as economic interactions became increasingly complex, the original ownership structure and economic operational mechanisms became increasingly unable to meet the requirements of the Soviet Union's further development, and drawbacks in the economic and social spheres became increasingly apparent. In his later years, Stalin began to reflect on socialist economic issues such as commodity production and the law of value. Half a year before his death, he realized that Soviet reform was inevitable.
After Khrushchev came to power, he attempted to reform the highly centralized economic system of the time. However, he fundamentally failed to see the essence of the Soviet Union’s economic problems. Instead, he believed that "the higher the degree of public ownership, the better," and consequently, ignoring the stage of social development and the level of productive forces, he was in a hurry to transition toward communism regarding the issue of ownership. Under Khrushchev’s chairmanship, the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union adopted by the 22nd Congress of the CPSU in 1961 explicitly stated: "With the transition to a single, all-people’s communist ownership and a communist system of distribution, commodity-money relations will become economically outdated and wither away." [17]
Brezhnev assumed that the Soviet Union’s productive forces were already "highly developed," its relations of production were "highly mature," and it was politically "highly democratic." He believed that "new, harmonious relations—relations of friendly cooperation—had emerged among the various classes, social groups, and large and small nationalities of the Soviet Union." This assessment was clearly overblown.
By the Gorbachev period, the pendulum swung to the other extreme. Gorbachev attacked the dominant status of public ownership as an "economic monopoly" that hindered the free choice of forms of ownership of the means of production, "severed the connection between man and the means of production," and fettered labor initiative. He proposed that Soviet state ownership "is the foundation of the administrative-command system, a system that shackles our entire society; without breaking this system, the country fundamentally cannot achieve revival and innovation." He argued that the "primary and urgent task of reform is to comprehensively reform ownership relations through the denationalization of property and the abolition of monopolies."
Gorbachev also advocated for the promotion of a free market economy on the basis of denationalization and privatization. In October 1990, in his report Basic Guidelines for the Stabilization of the National Economy and the Transition to a Market Economy delivered to a session of the Supreme Soviet, he proposed reform tasks in four stages: in the first stage of the "extraordinary measures plan," to "denationalize and privatize property and carry out land reform"; in the second stage of the "price formation mechanism," to "expand the scale of denationalization and implement the privatization of small enterprises"; in the third stage of "forming a market economy," to "support entrepreneurial activity, denationalization, privatization, and the development of competition," and to "liberate the majority of enterprises from state management as quickly as possible and implement privatization"; and in the fourth stage, the "completion stage" of "stabilizing the market," "we must take large strides toward economic demonopolization, denationalization, and privatization." It is clear that the essence of the transition to a market economy proposed by Gorbachev was to gradually lead the Soviet economy toward total privatization. The Russian economist Pchelintsev (Oleg Pchelintsev) pointed out that Gorbachev’s "denationalization is privatization, which is capitalization. It can be said that denationalization is the primary form of privatization, and privatization is the advanced form of denationalization. At first they spoke of denationalization, later they all spoke of privatization."
In April 1991, the Soviet government proposed an anti-crisis program that "stipulated comprehensive measures for denationalization and the privatization of property," even for ultra-large enterprises of special significance to the country. On July 1 of the same year, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR passed the privatization law. According to this law, state-owned enterprises would be transformed into leased enterprises or collective enterprises, converted into joint-stock companies, and sold through bidding or at auction. According to the policies and laws of the time, even if the Soviet Union had not collapsed a few years later, its state-owned enterprises would have ceased to exist, and the socialist economic base would have completely disintegrated.
After the "August 19 Incident" [18] of 1991, the "shock therapy" implemented by Russia and other newly independent countries was essentially carried out in the direction guided during the Gorbachev period and produced serious consequences. In the later stages of Gorbachev's rule, the Soviet economy showed negative growth, with an average annual economic growth rate of -9.6% from 1989 to 1991, reaching a record -13% in 1991. During the Yeltsin period, "shock therapy" openly allowed oligarchs to plunder and divide up state property. The leader of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, Zyuganov (Gennady Zyuganov), once pointed out that a "big bourgeoisie that crazily plundered the people’s property and transported it to the West" formed in Russian society at that time. This comprador class "grasped basic industrial sectors and monopolized natural resources, banks, newspapers, television stations, and radio stations, and held state power; they are the main scourge causing Russia to lose its status as a great power and causing the poverty of the people." History textbooks from the Putin period describe "shock therapy" as a "great swindle" of robbery against the citizens.
5. Organizationally: From Abandoning the Party's Nature as the Vanguard of the Working Class, Nepotism, and Factionalism to the Open Usurpation of the Party's Leadership
A certain organizational line always serves a certain political line; the political line determines the organizational line. The organizational line implemented by Soviet leaders after Stalin gradually became a political tool for forming factions and organizing the destruction of the socialist system. From the Khrushchev to the Gorbachev leadership groups, the selection, appointment, and removal of cadres turned into nepotism, factionalism, and the organization of private small circles, becoming tools for sectarianism and the domain of family rule.
After Stalin's death, along with the criticism of the cult of personality and personal autocratic power, the CPSU Central Committee emphasized the implementation of collective leadership. However, collective leadership was only practiced for a few years before Khrushchev, by executing Beria and labeling CPSU leaders who maintained Stalin's historical status (such as Molotov, Malenkov, and Kaganovich) as an "anti-Party group," eliminated differing opinions within the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. With the collapse of the "opposition" and the rise of Khrushchev's personal power, collective leadership gradually became a name without reality. It was precisely because of this that Khrushchev's authority of personal autocracy and commandism was established, and his many decisions driven by impulse and impetuous adventurism could be implemented.
During the Brezhnev period, the criteria for the selection and removal of members of the Presidium of the CPC Central Committee were based entirely on whether they were personal confidants. Brezhnev graduated from the Dniprodzerzhynsk Metallurgical Institute and worked for a long time in Dnipropetrovsk, Moldavia, and Kazakhstan. He surrounded himself with a group of cronies who lacked both political integrity and professional competence; many were his former subordinates and friends from the places where he had previously studied or worked, known as the "Dnipropetrovsk Gang." Nikolai Tikhonov’s [19] integrity and talent were mediocre, but because he was a fellow townsman and alumnus of Brezhnev, he was appointed Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union. Deputy Chairmen of the Council of Ministers such as Vladimir Novikov, Leonid Smirnov, Veniamin Dymshits, and Ivan Bodiul; First Deputy Chairman of the KGB Semyon Tsvigun, as well as Deputy Chairmen Viktor Chebrikov and Georgi Tsinev; Minister of Internal Affairs Nikolai Shchelokov; and First Secretary of Kazakhstan Dinmukhamed Konayev—all were Brezhnev’s alumni, fellow provincials, or former assistants and subordinates. The "Dnipropetrovsk Gang" wielded immense power for a time, occupying prominent positions and virtually monopolizing all important power departments. For an official seeking promotion, the primary issue was not their own ability, but how to establish a connection with this "Dnipropetrovsk Gang." Conversely, those Brezhnev distrusted, such as Alexander Shelepin, Nikolai Podgorny, Pyotr Shelest, Alexei Kosygin, and Gennady Voronov, were marginalized one by one and subsequently faded into obscurity. The Soviet diplomat Andrei Gromyko once privately lamented: "Our Politburo is like the Bermuda Triangle; some people suddenly appear here, and some people suddenly disappear."
Brezhnev's son, Yuri Brezhnev, became Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade at age 43, was promoted to First Deputy Minister at 46, and was elected an alternate member of the Central Committee at the 26th Congress of the CPSU. Brezhnev's son-in-law, Yuri Churbanov, rose from a low-ranking officer to Colonel General in just ten years, later serving as First Deputy Minister of Internal Affairs; he was also elected an alternate member of the Central Committee at the 26th Congress. Brezhnev's four assistants—Andrei Alexandrov-Agentov, Anatoly Blatov, Viktor Golikov, and Georgy Tsukanov—all entered the Central Committee at the 26th Congress. In the Brezhnev era, the promotion of the children of cadres was primarily due to their status and social connections rather than any outstanding talent. An insider revealed: "They lived, received medical treatment, and took vacations in isolation; within this stratum, they often formed their own family and clan relationships—it must be noted that the children of this stratum spent their time together, knew each other, and often intermarried." From this, a new step was taken: "An attempt to establish a system of power transfer, or what might be called a system of inherited privilege. That is, to achieve the goal of inheriting power by establishing an educational system specifically for these children, followed by a system of appointments and promotions." Brezhnev also failed to act in accordance with the Party's democratic centralism. The 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan was decided by four men—Brezhnev, Minister of Defense Dmitry Ustinov, Gromyko, and Mikhail Suslov—who then informed the Politburo. On the surface, Brezhnev’s collective leadership met regularly and acted according to the rules, but in reality, there was insufficient promotion of democracy and full discussion; decisions were essentially made by a few people or by Brezhnev alone.
In order to accelerate the evolution toward capitalism, Gorbachev began by adjusting organizational and personnel policies, finding ways to marginalize those who persisted in the socialist path or were relatively upright [20]. Upon taking power in March 1985, he immediately purged Grigory Romanov—the man most likely to threaten his position—from the Politburo. He replaced Gromyko with Eduard Shevardnadze as Foreign Minister, substituted Nikolai Ryzhkov for Nikolai Tikhonov (one of Gorbachev’s most stubborn opponents) as Premier, and replaced Viktor Grishin with Boris Yeltsin as First Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee. He also promoted Yegor Ligachev, who appeared to support him at the time, to the Politburo. In the short year leading up to the 27th Congress of the CPSU in February 1986, Gorbachev carried out a series of major personnel changes. Of the 12 Politburo members at the 27th Congress, only four remained from the 26th Congress, including himself and Gromyko, who had nominated him for the top leadership. During this period, senior leading cadres in various regions and departments also underwent large-scale replacement. By February 1986, 19 of the top leaders of the Party Central Committees, Supreme Soviets, and Councils of Ministers of the 14 union republics (excluding the Russian Federation) had been replaced, and over 40% of the full members of the Central Committee were newcomers. At the January 1987 Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee, Gorbachev proposed five criteria for the selection and appointment of cadres in his long report "On Perestroika and the Party’s Personnel Policy." The primary criterion was one's attitude toward "reform." This meant that only those who supported his "reform" proposals could be promoted and given important roles. Thereafter, he emphasized this personnel standard on many occasions. Under the guidance of this ideology of selection and appointment, Gorbachev replaced an enormous number of cadres. By early 1988, 66% of the staff in various ministries had been dismissed, reassigned, or downsized. All ministers, heads of Central Committee departments, and chairmen of committees were replaced, fired, or shifted multiple times; the cadre turnover rate exceeded 100%.
As a result, a large number of senior leading cadres within the CPSU who dared to persist in principle were replaced in succession. Conversely, those opportunists and anti-communist, anti-socialist elements who were adept at flattery, followed the prevailing wind [21], believed in so-called "humanistic, democratic socialism," and viciously attacked Marxism and the socialist system, were promoted and given heavy responsibilities. For example, when Ligachev first took office, he was highly praised by Gorbachev and assigned to lead the CPSU’s ideological work, ranking second only to Gorbachev. However, when Ligachev raised questions or even expressed dissatisfaction with Gorbachev’s "reforms" that deviated from the socialist direction, Gorbachev changed his tune, attacking Ligachev as a "conservative" who opposed "reform" and a "hidden enemy of reform." Under Gorbachev’s orchestration, Ligachev was soon stripped of his oversight of central ideological work following the "Nina Andreyeva incident" [22] and was succeeded by Aleksandr Yakovlev, who had completely aligned himself with Gorbachev. Gennady Zyuganov, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, noted in a commentary published after Gorbachev's death: "Since he (Gorbachev) took power, nearly a hundred first-in-command leaders and ministers were expelled from the CPSU Central Committee. Gorbachev gathered around himself a group of out-and-out traitors, such as the likes of Yakovlev, Shevardnadze, Yeltsin, and Bakatin."
Under the suppression of Gorbachev, Yakovlev, and others, those like Ligachev and Ryzhkov—who out of loyalty to the cause of the Party and the people dared to offer blunt advice and admonitions—were almost completely deprived of their right as Party members and cadres to speak freely, let alone the right to criticize and supervise Party leaders and institutions. This explains a question once posed by the American scholar David Kotz. In June 1991, an American social research organization conducted a survey in Moscow on ideological issues; the respondents were high-ranking Soviet Party and government officials holding senior power. The results showed: approximately 9.6% held a communist ideology and explicitly supported the pre-"reform" socialist model; 12.3% held democratic socialist views, supported "reform," and hoped for democratization; while 76.7% believed that capitalism should be implemented. David Kotz expressed shock at this: "It is truly shocking that in the Soviet Union—the world’s longest-existing and most influential socialist state—so many within the Party’s cadre ranks advocated for the capitalist road." Such a result was clearly directly related to Gorbachev’s use of organizational means to promote a large number of confidants to key leadership positions within the CPSU.
6. Conduct: From Formalism and Bureaucratism to the Deviation From and Betrayal of the Fundamental Interests of the Masses
The construction of the Party's conduct [23] is an essential component of Party building. The mass line within the Party's conduct construction embodies the nature and purpose of the Party. The CPSU once attached great importance to the construction of Party conduct. During the Lenin period, the Party was a political party of a true Marxist nature. As the vanguard of the proletariat, the CPSU at that time—based on its purpose of struggling wholeheartedly for the cause of the people's liberation and happiness—maintained close ties with the masses, resolutely believed in and relied on them, and united and led the broad masses to achieve the great victory of the October Socialist Revolution. Simultaneously, it raised the curtain on the great cause of socialist construction and performed immortal historical feats. During the Stalin period, although the CPSU also faced problems such as being divorced from reality, it generally inherited the fine traditions of the Party from the Lenin era. It maintained the Party’s distinct proletarian nature and its purpose of wholeheartedly serving the people, and promoted the Party’s fine work styles, such as integrating theory with practice, maintaining close ties with the masses, and practicing criticism and self-criticism. Consequently, it achieved great successes in socialist construction. However, Soviet leaders after Stalin undermined the Party's conduct and all embarked on a path of divorcing themselves from the masses, suppressing the masses, and even treating the people as enemies.
The worst manifestation of the CPSU's conduct during the Khrushchev period lay not only in inciting anti-Stalin sentiment through many fabricated and exaggerated details, but also in the brutal suppression of the masses who criticized his "Secret Report." [24] On March 4, 1956, the masses in Tbilisi were incensed by Khrushchev's "Secret Report"; they took to the streets in protest, shouting "Long live Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin!" Khrushchev ordered the shooting of the masses, resulting in a bloody tragedy. From 1956 to 1957, the number of people arrested for "anti-Soviet agitation" under Article 58 of the Criminal Code due to dissatisfaction with Khrushchev reached as many as 3,380—nearly half the total number of people arrested for that crime between 1953 and 1988.
Khrushchev’s own work often proceeded from mere experience; he acted on impulse, relied on coercion and commands, and even followed whims, doing things on a momentary urge. Consequently, he committed many hasty and absurd acts. His practice of mechanically copying the American agricultural method of large-scale corn cultivation was a massive joke. He failed to conduct investigation and research, relying instead on administrative orders to blindly expand the acreage of corn. Since the climate in the north was unsuitable for corn growth, the yield was very low, and the loss outweighed the gain. Kosygin later evaluated this as a measure conceived by a leader’s imagination and enforced by coercion, causing enormous losses to the national economy. He also blindly advocated for large-scale land reclamation, leading to the abandonment of tens of millions of mu [25] of land. He even interfered in specific agricultural production activities, and in May 1957, he groundlessly put forward "rash advance" [26] slogans for agriculture. Khrushchev’s blind commands, coercive orders, and policy errors caused Soviet agricultural production to fluctuate wildly; agricultural growth slowed during the latter part of his reign, and a serious grain crisis emerged. From that point on, the Soviet Union turned from a traditional grain exporter into a grain importer.
During the Brezhnev period, the CPC's work style [27] went from bad to worse, and the problems of detachment from reality and detachment from the masses became increasingly severe. Bureaucratism was rampant, and a culture of cadres gravitating toward pleasure and lacking any desire for progress became the norm. The ties between the Party and the masses grew more fragile, and the Party's prestige continued to decline. Many among the masses developed a sense of political distrust toward Soviet political institutions and Party-state officials, leading to phenomena such as the so-called "Night People." (Note: The author defines "Night People" as those who maintained outward consistency with official propaganda in public spaces during the day, but lived their own lives at night: reading samizdat publications, sharing political jokes, discussing current affairs with friends and family, attacking the powerful and privileged, and venting their dissatisfaction with reality.)
This detachment in Party-mass relations led to a decline in the Party's vanguard role and combat effectiveness. The masses’ sense of being the masters of the country [28] gradually faded, and the Soviet people’s enthusiasm for labor and construction waned, with phenomena like absenteeism, work stoppages, and slowdowns becoming increasingly serious. Unhealthy tendencies within the Party also polluted society at large; corruption and bribery became prevalent social trends, and some disillusioned citizens simply drifted with the tide. This following of the lead of superiors by subordinates resulted in a decline in public morality. A Russian scholar pointed out: "In the late 1970s, and especially in the early 1980s, falsifying targets, fraud, theft of public property, and bribery had practically become mass phenomena." The Soviet crime rate remained high, as many individuals took the acquisition of wealth as their sole objective, regardless of whether the means were legal.
The CPC's work style during the Gorbachev period completely deviated from the nature, purpose, and goals of a Marxist party. On the one hand, Gorbachev played the role of a double-dealer; on the other hand, he engaged in "one-voice rule" [29], tolerating no differing opinions or voices. The political views he published were often uncoordinated with those of other members of the CPSU Politburo, nor was there any mutual communication. Many of his initiatives and promises were only discovered by Politburo members through the newspapers. Even during meetings, he "was not good at, did not like, and was unwilling to listen to others' opinions; he was only good at, only liked, and was only willing to indulge in grandiloquence. Only he would drone on endlessly in a flowery display of rhetoric, dressing up essentially hollow and rigid ideas to sound magnificent." By the late stage of Gorbachev's reforms, the principle of collective leadership was further sabotaged; the Politburo did not meet for months at a time, and everything was decided by him alone. Ryzhkov said he "always liked to hold court alone." Medvedev (Roy Medvedev) also remarked that Gorbachev was "extremely autocratic," that "the various meetings he chaired lacked a democratic style," and that "when he heard dissenting opinions or critical words, he often lost control."
After the mechanical copying of Western multi-party systems and parliamentary democracy, representatives of anti-communist and anti-socialist forces, representatives of ethnic separatist forces, and various careerist opportunists were elected as CPSU delegates or People's Deputies at various levels of the USSR. In February 1986, at the 27th CPSU Congress, there were still 1,705 worker delegates among the 5,000 representatives. By the 28th CPSU Congress in July 1990, out of 4,683 delegates, there were only 543 worker delegates—less than one-third of the previous congress's total and only 11.6% of the overall delegation. There were only 225 peasant delegates. Meanwhile, approximately 60% of the delegates were so-called "People's Deputies of the USSR" or "People's Deputies" from various Union and Autonomous Republics elected during Gorbachev's "democratization" period. These so-called "deputies" claimed to represent the people in speech, but in practice, they engaged in activities that harmed the people's interests. Genrikh Osipov, an academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences and Director of the Institute of Social and Political Research, stated that Gavriil Popov, a representative of the Democratic Platform that emerged during Gorbachev's rule, said: "We do not consider the people; what we want is to deliberately create a state of total shortage."
Gorbachev’s severe corruption of the CPSU’s fine work style not only destroyed the Party’s cohesion but further disintegrated its class and mass base, causing the masses to completely lose trust in the Party. Ryzhkov once said with great pain that by 1990, the CPSU was "slowly approaching its death." During Gorbachev's rule, a rare wave of Party resignations occurred. At the 27th Congress in February 1986, the total membership was 19 million, but by July 1, 1991, the number of CPSU members had fallen to 15 million, regressing to 1973 levels. Even among those who did not leave, ideals and convictions generally wavered; they lacked trust in the CPSU and its leaders and felt confused about the future of the Party and the state. At the time, an editorial director at a Moscow television station put it this way: "I was once a proud Communist Party member and actively participated in various Party activities. However, people like Gorbachev, under the banner of reform, are actually fighting for power and the presidency, without considering the wishes and demands of the vast number of Party members and the masses at all. They have long since become a special, high-ranking bureaucratic stratum. With such leaders and such a foul work style, how could we possibly continue to follow them?"
7. Foreign Policy: From Fearing the US and Seeking Hegemony to Catering and Surrendering to Western Imperialism Led by the United States
Foreign relations are an extension of domestic politics. Since the appearance of socialist states on Earth, various contradictions and conflicts have existed between the two social systems of capitalism and socialism. The ruling party of a socialist state must be adept at seizing opportunities and adjusting policies to steer international relations toward peace, development, and the progress of human civilization; simultaneously, it must maintain a clear head and fully recognize that various contradictions and struggles still exist internationally between two ideologies, two social systems, and two paths of development—some of which are exceptionally sharp.
After the end of the Stalin era, Soviet leaders passed through three stages in handling relations with the United States: attempting to engage in Soviet-US cooperation to dominate the world; Soviet-US global hegemony; and surrendering to the United States while selling out national and ethnic interests.
Regarding the question of different forms of transition to socialism, Khrushchev emphasized the possibility of using the "parliamentary road" to transition to socialism. He said that in today's world, "the working class, provided it unites around itself the laboring peasantry, the intelligentsia, and all patriotic forces, and gives a resolute rebuff to the opportunist elements who are unable to give up the policy of compromise with the capitalists and landlords, has the possibility of defeating the reactionary, anti-popular forces, winning a stable majority in parliament, and transforming parliament from an organ of bourgeois democracy into an instrument of the truly popular will." He added that with such a stable parliamentary majority, "conditions can be created for the working class of a number of capitalist and former colonial countries to realize fundamental social transformation."
Khrushchev's "Three Peaces" theory [30] did recognize that the two social systems have a side of mutually beneficial cooperation and proposed strengthening dialogue and peaceful coexistence, which was conducive to stabilizing the international situation at that time. However, the key issue was not whether socialist countries wanted peace, "peaceful coexistence," or "peaceful competition" with capitalist countries, but whether the conditions and possibilities for realizing such desires existed at the time. Against the backdrop of the West already having initiated and intensified the push for peaceful evolution [31] against the Soviet Union, Khrushchev’s proposal of "peaceful coexistence" and "peaceful competition" was nothing more than wishful thinking. When fantasy turns into unrealistic practice, harm becomes unavoidable. Although Khrushchev restrained himself somewhat after hitting a wall, this diplomatic line largely served to dismantle the CPSU's ideological armament, leading to a lack of necessary vigilance toward the West and providing a breakthrough point for hostile forces to implement their peaceful evolution strategy. An even more serious danger lay in the fact that the CPSU never fully recognized the essence of Khrushchev's erroneous thinking, allowing it to resurface during the Gorbachev period.
The parliamentary road that Khrushchev was so keen on was also criticized and even opposed by the Communist parties of most other countries. The Communist Party of China maintained that Khrushchev discussed only peaceful transition and not non-peaceful transition, and further defined peaceful transition as "winning a majority in parliament and transforming parliament from an instrument of the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie into an instrument of genuine people's power." This was, in effect, substituting the so-called "parliamentary road" of the Second International opportunists for the path of the October Revolution, thereby tampering with the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism regarding the state and revolution. It should be pointed out that Khrushchev’s theory of "peaceful transition" had a severe negative impact on the international communist movement at the time. Communist organizations in the capitalist world split into two opposing camps based on whether they adhered to armed struggle or the parliamentary road, thereby weakening their own strength. Moreover, from that point on, more and more Communist organizations became keen on parliamentary struggle, viewing those that still adhered to armed struggle as anomalies and making them objects of ridicule or even targets of attack. This was also an extremely abnormal phenomenon.
In 1982, US President Ronald Reagan delivered a speech to the British Parliament representing the general objectives of US foreign policy. He argued that in the struggle between the two different social systems, the ultimate decisive factor was not nuclear bombs or rockets but a contest of wills and ideas, shouting that "the march of freedom and democracy... will leave Marxism-Leninism on the ash-heap of history." In light of Gorbachev’s new characteristics of downplaying class struggle and ideological struggle, Reagan opportunistically proposed a "peaceful competition of ideas and values" with the Soviet Union. He expressed the intent to use the "spread of ideas and information" to influence the Soviet people and "help" them establish "independent trade unions," churches, political parties, universities, newspapers, and judicial institutions, eventually achieving a Western-style "democratization" of the Soviet Union through these "institutions in which democracy is born." In 1989, shortly after entering the White House, George H.W. Bush also proposed a new strategy called "Beyond Containment." Bush claimed the goal of this strategy was so grand it exceeded the "imaginations of all predecessors"; it was not merely to contain Soviet expansion but to "integrate the Soviet Union into the international community," to tear down the Berlin Wall, and to integrate East and West Europe into a " Europe whole and free."
Facing the powerful offensive of the US-led Western bloc to effect the peaceful evolution of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev advocated for the elimination of the "enemy image" from policy and ideology, announcing that there would no longer be enemies in international relations and that "all humanity is moving towards grand cooperation." He believed that political positions should be freed from narrow ideological prejudices and that "the interests of survival and the prevention of war are universal and above all else." He declared that the interests and values of all humanity "rank above all else," preaching the "de-ideologization" and "humanization" of international relations, advocating for the "integration" of the two major social systems (socialism and capitalism), and claiming that socialism should "put values of universal significance in the first place."
The "humanization" of international relations advocated by Gorbachev objectively catered to and integrated with the needs of the imperialist strategy of peaceful evolution [32]. Soviet foreign policy gradually shifted from seeking cooperation with Western powers to succumbing to the United States and its allies. Regarding relations with the U.S., the Soviet Union initially abandoned confrontation to seek cooperation; however, as its domestic crisis deepened and pressure from the U.S. and other Western nations increased, Gorbachev made continuous major concessions, gradually becoming dependent on the U.S. and its allies. On issues such as disarmament, reducing military spending, arms control, and the reduction of nuclear weapons, Gorbachev completely accepted American demands. To demonstrate "sincerity," he even went beyond what the U.S. requested, such as the September 1991 announcement to withdraw Soviet troops stationed in Cuba. In negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States regarding the reduction of nuclear weapons, Gorbachev repeatedly violated the Soviet Union's established negotiating bottom lines, making unprincipled "impromptu" concessions to the United States.
On April 14, 1987, Gorbachev met with U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz at the Kremlin for talks on reducing intermediate-range missiles. The more than one hundred new CC-23 missiles [33] owned by the Soviet Union, which had a maximum range of less than 400 kilometers, did not fall within the category of intermediate-range missiles and were therefore not within the scope of the agreement being prepared. However, Shultz insisted on reducing the CC-23 missiles, a move opposed by both Soviet negotiators and military experts. When negotiations reached a stalemate, Gorbachev changed his stance at the last minute and agreed to the American demand. Staff close to Shultz described this sudden step by Gorbachev as "pie from the sky." Similar occurrences happened many times in U.S.-Soviet nuclear disarmament negotiations, to the extent that Shultz proudly reported to the U.S. government: "We didn’t make any concessions, and we got a lot more than we expected."
Regarding policy toward Eastern European countries, Gorbachev also adopted an attitude of complete abandonment. On one hand, he stood idly by or even connived at the anti-communist and anti-socialist activities occurring within these countries. On the other hand, he adopted an attitude of tacit consent toward the demands of "democrats" in these countries to condemn and investigate the "historical crimes" of the Soviet Union and to re-evaluate major events in the history of their relations with the USSR. This resulted in the collapse of the socialist camp formed by the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. On July 1, 1991, the Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact) was formally dissolved. Ironically, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)—the adversary of this military organization—did not dissolve along with the Warsaw Pact. Instead, it strengthened its military functions, becoming a military tool for Western powers to bully weak and small nations and to promote hegemonism and power politics in the post-Cold War era.
The military conflict that broke out between Russia and Ukraine on February 24, 2022, though stemming from complex causes, was undoubtedly rooted in NATO's perfidy following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Disregarding Russia's national security concerns and serious warnings, NATO expanded eastward five times. From 1999 to 2020, NATO not only recruited former Eastern European countries such as Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, Montenegro, and North Macedonia, but also brought Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—territories formerly part of the Soviet Union—under its command. NATO further intended to turn Ukraine into a member state without pause, extending the NATO defense system to the Russian-Ukrainian border. The North Atlantic Treaty stipulates that an armed attack against one member shall be considered an attack against them all. Ukraine's accession to NATO would pose an unprecedented threat to Russian national security. After Putin's hopes for Ukraine to commit to renouncing NATO membership and declaring neutrality were dashed, he reached the end of his patience and made the decision to send troops into Ukraine. The root cause of the Russia-Ukraine military conflict is that Western hegemonic forces, led by the United States, took advantage of Russia's decline after the Soviet collapse to "hit the person who has fallen into the well" [34], continuously compressing Russia's strategic space. This also demonstrates that NATO is moving against the tide of history, continuing to uphold a Cold War mentality and pursue hegemony, becoming the source of trouble affecting the security and stability of Europe and the world.
Gennady Zyuganov, Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, in a commentary article after Gorbachev's death, reviewed Gorbachev's process of dissolving the Warsaw Pact and angrily condemned Gorbachev's compromise, surrender to the West, and betrayal of Soviet national interests. He pointed out: "In December 1989, when Gorbachev met with U.S. President Bush and Secretary of State Baker in Malta... Gorbachev said to Bush for no reason: 'We have decided to dissolve the Warsaw Pact and withdraw from Eastern Europe.' Baker later recalled that after Gorbachev made the statement, the American delegation even started sweating because of the news; they thought Gorbachev would immediately put forward higher demands—for example, demanding the U.S. dissolve NATO. But then Gorbachev surprised the American side again. He said, 'No, we are now implementing New Thinking, so we are dissolving the Warsaw Pact, and you can do whatever you want.' The entire security system of the Soviet Union, for which 27 million of the Motherland’s finest sons and daughters fought and died, was buried in this way. During the Great Patriotic War [35], almost every Soviet family suffered losses."
In May 1987, a West German youth named Mathias Rust piloted a private plane to "visit the Soviet Union" and landed safely in Moscow's Red Square. This incident caused a worldwide sensation and humiliated the superpower Soviet Union, leading to the dismissal of Soviet Defense Minister Sergey Sokolov. However, according to facts exposed by involved parties after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is certain that Sokolov was wronged. The guarantee of Rust's flight safety in Soviet airspace was tacitly approved by the Soviet "top leader." The real purpose was to create a pretext to strike at the high-ranking Soviet generals who opposed Gorbachev's unilateral disarmament and to clear the way for the future dissolution of the Warsaw Pact. According to Russian Colonel General Leonid Ivashov, when Gorbachev summoned Defense Minister Sokolov in February 1987, he withheld two air defense maps of the Soviet Union's northwestern region. Evidence suggests that these top-secret maps were provided at Gorbachev's request, and Gorbachev irregularly withheld them and never returned them. Existing evidence shows that Rust's flight path demonstrated a thorough knowledge of the locations of radio-location tracking stations in the northwestern Soviet Union. From this, it can basically be concluded that in the Rust incident, there were large-scale political conspiracies involving high-level Soviet leaders headed by Gorbachev. Vladimir Kryuchkov, then Deputy Chairman of the KGB, stated that per Gorbachev's instructions, he ensured Rust’s flight reached Moscow.
To seek Western support and aid, Gorbachev also tried his best to meet the demands of the U.S. and the West regarding Soviet domestic issues. During a visit to London in December 1984, Gorbachev showed Margaret Thatcher a Soviet military map labeled with security classifications that marked Soviet missile targets in the United Kingdom, assuring her that "all this should end, and should end as soon as possible," implying that he would take major "destructive" actions against his own country once in power. Thatcher was both surprised and delighted, calling Gorbachev a "man we can do business with." This was even more apparent regarding the issue of allowing the three Baltic states to become independent. Two high-level Soviet-U.S. meetings, held in Reykjavik in October 1986 and Malta in December 1989 respectively, both involved the sensitive issue of the three republics—Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—seceding from the Soviet Union. According to official Soviet reports, Gorbachev's meeting with Reagan in Reykjavik ended without results, but Valery Ivanov, a Lithuanian law enforcement officer, confirmed that in 1989 he saw a Lithuanian-language pamphlet published by the Vatican. According to its contents, among the four issues discussed in the secret talks between Gorbachev and Reagan in Reykjavik, the third was the issue of the three Baltic republics seceding from the Soviet Union. Regarding the Soviet-U.S. summit in Malta in 1989, the memoirs of Jack Matlock Jr., the last U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, state that during the talks, "Bush brought to Gorbachev's attention that the United States had never recognized the Soviet occupation of the three Baltic countries, nor did it recognize it now." The U.S. President clearly implied that Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were not inherent territories of the Soviet Union, and he stood on the side of the forces fighting to secede. Gorbachev did not offer any rebuttal to the U.S. President's interference in the Soviet Union's internal affairs; he merely "explained the special nature of the Soviet situation to the U.S. President" in an understated manner, and even guaranteed that the handling of the issues in these three countries would be limited to non-violent means. This indicates that Gorbachev and Bush reached a secret oral agreement in Malta: Gorbachev promised not to use force, and Bush promised that the U.S. would not create more problems for Gorbachev. After the Malta meeting, separatist forces in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia accelerated their pace of secession. Anatoly Gromyko, son of Andrei Gromyko, believed that Gorbachev lost completely in Malta, calling it the "Soviet Munich."
When the Soviet Union was beset by difficulties at home and abroad, Gorbachev did not hesitate to sacrifice national dignity to beg the West. In July 1991, Gorbachev participated in the G7 summit in an informal capacity. Before leaving, Gorbachev hurriedly sent a 23-page Soviet "reform plan" to the G7 leaders, hoping that Western countries would increase investment in the Soviet Union, provide large quantities of consumer goods, and cancel or delay the $65 billion foreign debt owed by the Soviet Union. Submitting a country's internal affairs to Western countries for discussion is in itself an act of forfeiting sovereignty and bringing national humiliation. However, faced with this humiliating plan (which people at the time called the "begging plan"), the Western bosses' answer was: "No money!" President Bush's answer was even more blunt; he said the leaders attending the summit "will not do anything to indicate that we are ignoring the developing democratic systems in Eastern Europe to aid the Soviet Union. This is not the time to give a blank check."
Gorbachev’s "New Thinking" in diplomacy essentially denied the Marxist theory of class struggle, abandoned basic Marxist viewpoints on international issues, and surrendered autonomous power, causing the Soviet Union to tie its own hands and give up in the face of the international bourgeoisie's offensive. This point was clearly seen even by bourgeois politicians.
Jack Matlock Jr. pointed out: "The theory of class struggle was the central concept upon which the Leninist view of the evolution of the state structure and the Cold War with the West were based. Without it, the justification for the Cold War ceases to exist, and the theoretical basis for one-party dictatorship disappears." He added, "Until this theory [class struggle] is truly officially discarded, any changes indicating an improvement in our relations may be illusory and at most temporary." "As long as the Soviet Union does not give up the ideological core of its system—the concept of class struggle—the Cold War will never stop. And once it gives it up, the system itself no longer has any theoretical basis." He also specifically mentioned: "If the Soviet leaders are truly willing to discard this concept, then whether they continue to call their guiding ideology 'Marxism' no longer matters. It would already be a different kind of 'Marxism' implemented in a different kind of society—a different society that we could all recognize."
Zbigniew Brzezinski, another famous American politician, pointed out the essence of Gorbachev's "reforms" as early as 1989. He said: "The new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev has gradually embarked on a revisionist path in the process of reform... He not only wants to change the Soviet economic structure, but also to revise the ideological foundations of the Soviet system, and even to some extent change the Soviet political procedures." "The impact of a revisionist General Secretary appearing in the Kremlin is immense." "Its particularly grave danger lies in disintegrating the common Marxist-Leninist theory of world communism." One day, the CPSU will "lose its monopoly control over society," and "the Soviet Union could collapse at any time."
8. On the Outlook on Life: From Individualism Seeking Personal Advancement and Small-Family Privileged Enjoyment to Becoming Ambitious Careerists and Conspirators Subverting the Party and State Power
One's outlook on life and values are, in essence, a question of "for whom one lives." We often speak of the "Three Outlooks"—worldview, outlook on life, and values; in a certain sense, among these three, the outlook on life holds decisive significance. The outlook on life connects to the worldview on one end and to values on the other, functioning like the "first button" of one's clothes that General Secretary Xi Jinping has Said must be fastened correctly [36]. If Party members and cadres only consider personal promotion and their own nuclear families' standard of living, or pursue material pleasures, it will inevitably lead, under specific conditions, to forming factions for private gain and even developing into careerists and conspirators.
A piece of information once disclosed on the internet alleged the following: Leonid Khrushchev (Леонид Хрущёв), the son of Khrushchev, lost contact with his squadron during a battle in 1943 while piloting a fighter jet. It was later confirmed he was captured by German forces and defected. Upon learning of the situation, Stalin ordered the Soviet counterintelligence units to bring Leonid back to the Soviet Union, a mission they successfully fulfilled. After Leonid returned to the country, Stalin requested the Soviet leadership to discuss his sentencing. Beria pointed out that they held evidence of Leonid's criminal acts and that since he had been pardoned twice before, he could not be pardoned again. Malenkov, Kaganovich, and others all agreed to sentence Leonid to death. The Moscow Military Tribunal quickly issued a death sentence, and Leonid was executed. One view holds that Khrushchev harbored a grudge because of this, and after coming to power, he not only launched the "de-Stalinization" movement but also took revenge against Beria, Malenkov, and others who had agreed to Leonid's death sentence.
After becoming General Secretary of the Party, Brezhnev let out a long sigh of relief and said, "I’ve finally made it to this day!" When his mother hurried from the countryside to see him, he proudly showed her his exquisite furniture and luxurious villa with an air of complete self-satisfaction. "Brezhnev’s lifestyle, words, and deeds exerted an influence on those around him and on the entire upper echelon of the Party." Brezhnev used his authority to enjoy unparalleled privileges. He was notoriously fond of hunting, living in luxury villas, and collecting high-end automobiles. Brezhnev also loved various high-grade gifts; the presents he accepted could be described as "innumerable." These should not have been personal property and ought to have been turned over to the state, but Brezhnev took most of them as his own. Brezhnev’s granddaughter, recalling her grandfather’s life, mentioned that his collection of high-end cars reached as many as one hundred. Brezhnev believed that "the 'shadow economy,' the looting of public facilities, and bribery among cadres were all normal."
Brezhnev’s indulgence and condoning of the corrupt behavior of his cronies and relatives were even more notorious. In the late 1970s, Yuri Andropov (Юрий Андропов), the head of the KGB, prepared to launch a struggle against greed and corruption, but he met with Brezhnev’s opposition. Brezhnev would not allow Andropov to investigate the serious corruption within the Ministry of Internal Affairs controlled by Shchelokov. When Andropov handed Brezhnev a report reflecting the state of corruption within the country, Brezhnev was very displeased. He dropped his previously intimate relationship with Andropov, refusing to meet with him for three months or even take his phone calls. Only after Andropov changed the content of the report to a "peace and safety" bulletin did Brezhnev restore their good relationship.
Brezhnev and his cronies, on the one hand, continuously increased the types of privileges available, while on the other hand, they rarely blocked—and even permitted or encouraged—the pursuit of privilege by cadres at all levels. This led to an increasing number of Party and government officials enjoying privileges, gradually forming a privileged stratum. Raisa Gorbacheva (Раиса Горбачёва), wife of Mikhail Gorbachev, later recalled: "After moving to Moscow in 1978, I made many discoveries. One of them was that certain national leaders, including Party leaders, in addition to having state-provided villas, had also built private villas for themselves, their children, and their grandchildren simultaneously. This luxury and audacity shocked me."
The pursuit of a privileged life by the top leadership of the CPSU, headed by Brezhnev, played a "modeling role" in promoting corruption within the Party. After Gorbachev came to power, his first thought was to seek benefits for himself and his family; the "first family" lived a luxurious and grand lifestyle. Just after taking over as General Secretary, he instructed subordinates to build new luxury villas and other vacation spots by the sea. The six-bedroom official residence of Gorbachev on the Lenin Hills was particularly conspicuous, visible to passersby from a distance, becoming a tourist sight in Moscow.
According to Valery Boldin, Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Secretariat and Chief of Staff for Gorbachev, from January 1991 onward, people were constantly discussing the difficulties facing the country. The nation was in a political and economic crisis. Some warned that the national economy was sliding and the Union itself was likely to collapse. However, "the President was thinking of other things: he was frantically trying by every means to raise his currently very low approval rating, preparing to publish his new book, and helping his wife publish her autobiography. Someone had already guaranteed to pay Raisa a large sum of cash for the book immediately, and publication work for their other writings was also underway. Raisa's book was to be published in the Soviet Union, and she often called me to ask which publishing house would be most suitable for her debut work." Although "the President's family would also face difficult times, they had hard currency deposited in the bank. The royalties from Gorbachev’s works plus the licensing fees paid to him by the Union Copyright Agency had already funneled more than one million US dollars into his account. He had accepted many gifts made of precious metals and various hard currency awards; besides these, he had other property. I raised my vigilance, wondering whether the President cared about the fate of the country, and whether he could find the time to handle national affairs and the economic and social plight faced by the people."
Those in power during the Gorbachev period took advantage of privatization reforms to line their pockets at public expense, turn public property into private assets, and swallow up public assets on a massive scale. The fruits accumulated through the hard work of several generations in the Soviet Union were transformed in an instant into the wealth of a minority. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, more than 40% of the Russian business elite came from the former CPSU bureaucracy. Among the owners of the 100 largest private enterprises in Russia between 1992 and 1993, the former Party and government elite, entrepreneurs, bankers, and their families accounted for 62%.
The new bourgeoisie birthed by the reforms became the class basis for destroying the CPSU and dismantling the Soviet Union. When analyzing the reasons for the Soviet collapse, Ligachev pointed out with some emotion that objective reasons for the collapse did not exist; they were basically subjective. First was the degeneration of the upper leadership. They sought primarily to enrich themselves and wanted to rule the people without limit; they later all became millionaires, tens-of-millionaires, or even billionaires. They are the group represented by Gorbachev and Yeltsin. This wealth was brought about by plundering the wealth of the people. They had a strong desire to possess private wealth, but the Soviet Party and people did not allow it at the time.
Osipov said: "Starting from the time of Khrushchev, our Party leadership began to rot. What was the main purpose of these people who sneaked into the Party and sought constant promotion? After joining the Party, it meant being able to go hunting in Africa, arranging for their children and grandchildren, and arranging for their own families. The degeneration and ultimate disintegration of the Communist Party actually occurred at the most fundamental level—the family."
David Kotz provided a profound analysis: "Although the material interests of the Soviet elite were greatly increased, if compared with the elite in Western capitalist countries, the material privileges they enjoyed paled in comparison." "Under the Soviet system, the income gap between the upper and lower strata of society was much smaller than the gap under the capitalist system." "Under the Soviet system, the salary of the highest leader was 8 times higher than that of an average industrial worker," and "the compensation of a general manager of a large enterprise was about 4 times that of an average industrial worker," whereas the income of high-level elites in the United States is 150 to more than 400 times that of an ordinary worker. "Under the Soviet socialist system, it was almost impossible to accumulate material wealth through legal means. Soviet leaders who accumulated material wealth were always fearful, dreading that one day they would be discovered or prosecuted." Therefore, "the collapse of the Soviet system" "originated from its own ruling elite's pursuit of personal interests."
Once extreme individualists climb to high positions in the Party and state, they inevitably degenerate into careerists and conspirators, becoming the most primary and dangerous enemies within a Marxist ruling party. It is precisely for this reason that Comrade Mao Zedong, during the struggle against the Lin Biao counter-revolutionary clique [37], repeatedly admonished high-level Party cadres: "Practice Marxism, not revisionism; unite, and don't split; be open and aboveboard, and don't intrigue and conspire" [38].
Some domestic scholars claim that the "Secret Report" delivered by Khrushchev at the 20th Congress of the CPSU in 1956 arrived through entirely proper organizational procedures. This claim is not a fact. As early as 1996, the Russian historian Nikolai Barsukov, based on a careful study of the complete recordings of Khrushchev’s memoirs and declassified archival materials, reached the following conclusion: when the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU decided to deliver a report on the personality cult to the Congress and announced this decision to the Central Committee Plenum, all that was prepared was an investigative report drafted by Pospelov [39]. Much of the content of the report later delivered at the secret session was added privately by a small group, including Khrushchev himself. Furthermore, the session where the "Secret Report" was delivered was chaired not by the Presidium of the 20th Congress, but by the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Afterward, many people asked: was this a continuation of the 20th Congress or some other meeting? The renowned Russian theorist Richard Kosolapov stated that Khrushchev’s "Secret Report" "was concocted by a tiny clique and brought to the Congress without collective consent," and that "his behavior was essentially an anti-Party act." Consequently, "strictly speaking, the 'Line of the 20th Congress' or 'Spirit of the 20th Congress' so loudly praised later never achieved a status of internal Party legitimacy." Many people, both at home and abroad, primarily remember Khrushchev for his crude and blunt side—such as pounding his shoe on the rostrum at the United Nations—but know little of his other side as a conspirator. For example, in March 1939, during a speech of about 20 minutes at the 18th Congress of the CPSU(B), Khrushchev praised Stalin warmly 32 times, concluding with the shout: "Long live our dear Stalin, the greatest genius of humanity, teacher, and leader, who leads us victoriously toward communism!" in December of the same year, in an article celebrating Stalin’s 60th birthday, he fawned: "The peoples of the Soviet Union look upon Stalin as their friend, father, and leader." At Stalin’s 70th birthday in 1949, Khrushchev offered this "eulogy" to Stalin: "Glory belongs to Comrade Stalin, the biological father [40], wise teacher, and genius leader of the Party, the Soviet people, and the laborers of the whole world!" Changing Stalin's title from father to the sycophantic "biological father." Yet, in the "Secret Report" of 1956 after Stalin's death, Khrushchev posthumously branded Stalin a "tyrant," "executioner," and "inhumane." While Stalin certainly bears important, even primary, leadership responsibility for the excessive expansion of the Purge [41] during those years, Khrushchev and others bear important, even primary, direct responsibility for that expansion, at the very least to claim personal credit and rewards. In 1937, while serving as the City Committee Secretary in Moscow, Khrushchev called the Moscow Internal Affairs Bureau daily to press them on the arrest of criminals: "Moscow is the capital; it cannot fall behind Kaluga or Ryazan." He also said: "These scoundrels must be eliminated... it must be done without the hand trembling; we must step over the corpses of the enemy for the interests of the people." By the end of 1937, 35 out of 38 provincial and municipal committee secretaries in Moscow had been purged, and 136 out of 146 district and municipal committee secretaries had been arrested. The Russian historian Yuri Zhukov verified in the Soviet archives that during his tenure in Moscow, Khrushchev approved the execution of 8,500 people; after being transferred to Ukraine, he requested the execution or imprisonment of 30,000 people. Even more difficult to imagine is that after taking power, Khrushchev used his authority to direct his henchmen to directly destroy documents and materials concerning his participation in the suppressions; the destroyed materials filled as many as 11 paper bags. While Khrushchev struggled desperately to whitewash himself, he struggled equally to blacken Stalin’s name. In 1937, based on shifts in the situation, Stalin pointed out that "the more victories we have, the more vicious the remnants of the defeated exploiting classes will become, and the more they will employ sharper forms of struggle." Here, Stalin was speaking of "remnants of the exploiting classes" and "sharper forms of struggle," yet Khrushchev distorted this into a claim that Stalin proposed the absurd theory that "the closer one gets to socialism, the more enemies there are" and "class struggle will increasingly intensify." Many people failed to check Stalin’s original text and instead propagated the fallacies fabricated by Khrushchev.
Gorbachev was likewise a conspirator. At the April 1985 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, he solemnly vowed that Lenin’s teachings "were, are, and remain for us a guide to action, a source of inspiration, and a reliable compass for determining our strategy and tactics for progress." Thereafter, at different times and on various occasions, he repeatedly and deliberately expressed his loyalty to Lenin. In 1987, in his then newly published Perestroika and New Thinking, Gorbachev felt compelled to say: "The works of V.I. Lenin and Lenin’s ideas of socialism remain for us an inexhaustible source of dialectical creative thought, theoretical wealth, and political foresight"; "Lenin continues to live in the hearts of hundreds of millions." He also said: "We measure all achievements and mistakes by the yardstick of socialism. Whoever hopes that we will abandon the socialist road will be deeply disappointed." Yet at that very moment, he was using Lenin to strike at Stalin, claiming everything he did was to restore Leninist principles and traditions. Gorbachev's assistant, Vadim Zagladin, said: "At that time, Gorbachev could not speak the truth openly; he knew the majority of the Politburo and the Central Committee did not support his position. Gorbachev admitted this himself. He had to become something of a 'cunning fox,' unable to say everything, sometimes saying one thing while doing another." Gorbachev acted exactly as described. In July 1990, when the 28th Congress of the CPSU convened, Gorbachev believed the time was ripe. He subsequently ceased emphasizing the guiding status of Marxism-Leninism, instead stressing the need to break free from "dogmatic interpretations" of it and advocating for its "creative development." In reality, what Gorbachev continually enriched and developed was merely his so-called "humanistic, democratic socialism" based on the philosophical foundation of abstract humanism. This set of theories was, in essence, nothing more than an attack on Marxism-Leninism as being neither humanistic nor democratic.
The descent from extreme individualism to ultimately becoming an' ambitious careerist and conspirator is by no means merely a manifestation of trivial personal desires; it is also the political representation of a specific, decayed class and its ideological tendencies. Lu Xun once said that while playing tricks has its methods and can be effective, its efficacy is limited [42]. Throughout history, in China and abroad, all careerists and conspirators who betray the people have been or will be nailed to the pillar of historical shame. This is the self-confidence of our history and our people. This confidence is as calm, natural, strong, and firm as the sun and moon traversing the sky or the rivers flowing across the earth.
Shortly before the collapse of the CPSU, a survey conducted by relevant institutions showed that 85% of people believed the CPSU primarily represented the interests of bureaucrats, cadres, and institutional staff. When the Communist Party of the Soviet Union was no longer the vanguard of the Soviet working class and no longer the representative of the interests of the Soviet people, it is understandable that CPSU members did not stand up to defend the interests of the Party and the state, but looked on with indifference as the CPSU moved toward its death.
(II) Brief Analysis and Critique of Twelve Other Viewpoints on the Causes of the Fall of the Party and the State in the Soviet Union
In the 30-plus years since the dissolution of the Soviet Union, political and academic circles at home and abroad have explored and studied the causes of the CPSU's fall and the Soviet collapse from multiple perspectives and dimensions. A multitude of opinions has emerged, with conclusions varying widely; more than 50 specific theories have been identified. Here, we list only the following twelve for brief analysis.
The "Octover Revolution Original Sin Theory" Some so-called scholars at home and abroad believe that the October Revolution was a forced, manufactured revolution—not only a "premature birth" but also one filled with "original sin" from the day it was born. The essence of this view is to question and negate the historical necessity of the Russian October Socialist Revolution at its source, and to question and negate the historical legitimacy of the existence and development of Soviet socialism. In fact, the October Revolution was by no means a revolution deliberately "manufactured" by the Bolsheviks, as some with ulterior motives claim. Rather, it was the product of exceptionally sharp social class contradictions in Russia and the maturation of objective and subjective revolutionary conditions; it was the result of the active choice of the Russian people under the guidance of Leninism—the choice of history and the choice of the people.
The "Stalinist Model Stagnation Theory" Some scholars attribute the main cause of the Soviet collapse to the Stalinist model. In their view, the highly centralized political and economic system formed during the Stalin era severely stifled the vitality and vigor of Soviet socialism, seriously hindered the display of the superiority of socialism, and ultimately led to the fall of the CPSU and the collapse of the Soviet Union. This viewpoint exaggerates the problems of the Stalinist model and its role in the fall of the Party and state, confuses the superiority of the socialist system with specific flaws in institutional mechanisms, and negates the historical achievements and socialist nature of the Stalinist model. On the one hand, socialist practice during the Stalin period achieved great successes, and the highly centralized political and economic system played a massive role. On the other hand, the problems existing in the original Soviet institutional mechanisms only demonstrated the necessity of reform; they did not mean that the Soviet Union was destined to fall. Among the scholars holding the aforementioned view, some aim to totally negate the Soviet socialist system and absolve Gorbachev of responsibility for his crimes.
The "Ethnic Contradiction Determinism Theory" Some scholars believe that the principle of national self-determination and the federal state structure proposed by Lenin strengthened ethnic consciousness and sentiment, while the Soviet Constitution's reservation of the right for each union republic to freely secede from the Union laid the groundwork for the collapse. Putin also believes that Lenin’s idea of ethnic autonomy, which gave republics the right to withdraw from the Soviet Union, ultimately led to the collapse: "It was like a nuclear bomb placed under the building of 'Russia,' and later this nuclear bomb exploded." He further argued this was "Lenin's greatest mistake," stating that "the Leninist principles of state-building were not only a mistake, they were worse than a mistake." The implication is that the collapse began with Lenin’s idea of national self-determination and the "gap" left in the Soviet Constitution. The above views do not align with historical facts. First, the basic spirit of Lenin’s idea of the right to national self-determination was to protect the rights of oppressed nations and oppose the imposition of the will of large nations—especially the Russians—on other smaller, weaker nations. During the October Revolution, it was precisely through the slogan of upholding national self-determination that the Bolshevik Party supported the national liberation struggles of non-Russian ethnic groups against the Tsarist autocracy and created the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic. On this basis, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) was formed in 1922 according to the principle of voluntary association. The 1924 Soviet Constitution affirmed that "the Union is a voluntary association of equal peoples" and stipulated in Article 4 that "each union republic retains the right to freely secede from the Union." This was based on the right to national self-determination and the historical facts of the Soviet Union’s formation, and was also intended to prevent a resurgence of Great Russian Chauvinism from destroying the new union state. Second, during the Stalin period, as well as under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, although contradictions and frictions existed between ethnic groups in the Soviet Union—some quite sharp at times—overall there was unity, friendship, and centripetal force. The West only held doubts regarding the sovereignty of the three Baltic states incorporated in 1940, while recognizing the Soviet Union formed in 1922. Finally, the intensification of ethnic contradictions and the increased centrifugal tendencies of the republics occurred during the Gorbachev period. This was caused by Gorbachev’s erroneous reforms and ethnic policies, because the fundamental ties of unity among Soviet peoples—the CPSU, Marxism, and socialism—were dismantled by the Gorbachev leadership group. The ideological, political, and economic foundations upon which the Union relied were completely destroyed. In this context, ethnic separatist forces used the name of the people and the right of secession granted by the Constitution to openly dismantle the Soviet Union. In fact, the Soviet Constitution simultaneously contained basic principles for maintaining the unity of all ethnic groups and the integrity of the union state; however, these principles were cast aside by Gorbachev and ethnic separatist forces.
The "Arms Race Exhaustion Theory"
Some scholars attribute the collapse of the Soviet Union to the arms race between the USSR and the United States, arguing that it increased the burden on the Soviet people and intensified domestic contradictions, leading to economic exhaustion and failing national strength that eventually dragged the country down. While the arms race with Western military blocs did indeed create certain difficulties for Soviet economic and social development, this was, on the whole, a matter of national strategy. It could have been addressed by adjusting strategic objectives and reducing military expenditures to ensure military strength remained consistent with the level of national economic development, keeping national defense construction within the limits of what human and financial resources could sustain. In fact, by the Gorbachev era, the Soviet Union had completely abandoned its strategy of competing for hegemony with the United States and other Western military blocs and had fully withdrawn its troops from Eastern Europe and elsewhere. Abandoning the arms race did not save the Soviet Union from its fate of collapse.
5. The "Economic Failure Theory"
Some scholars ignore the massive achievements the Soviet Union made over the long term in developing the economy and improving the people's standard of living. Instead, they one-sidedly attribute the dissolution of the Soviet Union to the socialist economic system, arguing that a rigid economic structure led to stagnation and low living standards. This view fails to recognize that the Soviet economy only experienced a slowdown in growth after the mid-1970s; even in the early years of Gorbachev's leadership, the Soviet economy maintained a growth rate of no less than 2%. The serious recession and collapse of the Soviet economy occurred in the later stages of Gorbachev's tenure—specifically beginning in 1989, when the Soviet economy saw negative growth, reaching a negative rate of 13% by 1991. This was clearly not caused by the rigid Soviet economic system, but was rather a severe consequence of Gorbachev's erroneous reform line, including his mistaken economic reform policies.
6. The "Communist Utopia Theory"
This perspective attributes the Soviet collapse to the guiding ideology of the CPSU, arguing that communism is an unachievable "utopia" and thus the Soviet Union was destined to fall. This view was primarily advanced by Gorbachev and Western anti-communist forces. It fundamentally denies that communism is the goal of the Marxist scientific worldview and the trend of human social development; instead, it views the Soviet collapse as the abandonment of a communist "utopia" and a return to a "normal society."
7. The "Abandonment by the People Theory"
Some scholars argue that the masses' lack of trust in the CPSU caused it to lose its governing legitimacy, which was the primary reason the Party lost power. In reality, the Soviet people’s abandonment of the CPSU was the result of the degeneration of the leadership groups from Khrushchev to Gorbachev, not the cause of the Party's destruction and the national collapse. One must clearly recognize the nature of the CPSU during the Gorbachev period: although the Party's name remained unchanged, it was no longer the CPSU of the original sense that believed in Marxism-Leninism, but a "CPSU" that believed in so-called "humanistic, democratic socialism." By this time, the CPSU had essentially become a social democratic party that did not represent the fundamental interests of the broad Soviet masses but only the interests of a tiny minority. It was entirely reasonable that the Soviet people abandoned it. The ideological and political degeneration of the leadership groups from Khrushchev to Gorbachev was the fundamental cause of the Party’s demise and the state’s collapse; it was an inevitable result that such a party would eventually be abandoned by the people. In analyzing the fundamental cause, one must not mistake the effect for the cause.
8. The "External Factors Determined Theory"
Some scholars view the long-term "peaceful evolution" [43] strategy pursued by Western hostile forces led by the United States as the fundamental cause of the Soviet collapse. This view one-sidedly emphasizes the role of external causes while ignoring that external causes operate through internal causes. Without the betrayal and cooperation of the high-level CPSU leadership represented by Gorbachev, and without the fuel added by the "democratic" separatist forces in Soviet society represented by Yeltsin, the Western strategy of peaceful evolution could not have been realized.
9. The "One-Party Dictatorship Theory"
Some scholars believe the true reason for the CPSU's downfall and the Soviet collapse was the Party's long-term one-party rule and monopoly on political power. This view completely reverses right and wrong. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union held power for nearly 70 years without the tragedy of Party demise or national collapse; it was precisely during the Gorbachev period—through constitutional amendments that abolished the CPSU's leading status and the promotion of a multi-party system, the separation of powers, parliamentary democracy, and a presidential system—that the results of Party demise and national collapse were finally brought about.
10. The "Total Responsibility of the Traitor Gorbachev Theory"
Some attribute the entire responsibility for the demise of the Party and the state to Gorbachev alone, believing that the Soviet collapse was not a historical necessity but was fundamentally caused by the emergence of Gorbachev, a traitor to Marxism, socialism, communism, and the fundamental interests of the masses. This does not conform to the basic tenets of historical materialism, and objectively exculpates the leadership groups of Khrushchev and Brezhnev from the responsibility they should bear. Engels clearly pointed out: "The main characters appearing on the stage are representatives of certain classes and tendencies, and thus also representatives of certain ideas of their time; their motives are not derived from trivial personal desires, but precisely from the historical currents in which they find themselves." Once the Khrushchev leadership group totally negated Stalin and began to deviate and detach from the soil of Marxism, socialism, communism, and the fundamental interests of the masses, it became inevitable—in a certain sense—that the "seedlings" of the traitorous Gorbachev leadership group would grow and bear this poisonous fruit. Under the historical conditions of the time, even if Gorbachev had not appeared, a similar figure would have emerged.
11. The "Soviet Collapse as Progress Theory"
Certain scholars stand entirely on the side of Western hostile forces, ignoring the disastrous consequences the Soviet collapse brought to the Russian people and the world at large. Instead, they view the dissolution of the Soviet Union as a form of "historical progress," claiming it allowed the Soviet Union to emerge from "historical error" and return to the "correct path of civilized development." Other scholars argue that the collapse relieved the military pressure China faced and improved China's security environment. This view only sees isolated aspects of the impact; it fails to comprehensively analyze the effects and harms of the Soviet collapse from the perspective of world socialism and the cause of human progress. Even regarding Sino-Soviet relations, there was the possibility that the Soviet Union could have corrected its errors and returned the relationship to the correct track—the history of interactions between socialist states fully illustrates this. Moreover, after Gorbachev came to power, there were already signs of a thaw in Sino-Soviet relations. It is easy to see that resolving the contradictions and conflicts between China and the Soviet Union and eliminating the threat from the north did not necessitate the price of the CPSU's demise and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.
12. The "Synergy of Various Factors Theory"
Some scholars believe the Soviet collapse was not the result of a single factor but the outcome of multiple factors influencing and acting upon one another. This "synergy theory" synthesizes various factors and has its merits and insights, but it is far from sufficient to merely list various factors without distinguishing between the primary and the secondary. One must deeply analyze the most important decisive factors—the primary contradiction and, particularly, the principal aspect of the primary contradiction and its transformation. The qualitative character of any thing is determined by its internal primary contradiction, especially the principal aspect of that contradiction. Naturally, one must further study what "glue" caused these various factors to form a "synergy." The CPSU and the Soviet Union were originally dominated by a Marxist leadership group centered on Lenin and Stalin; they gradually evolved to be dominated by a revisionist leadership group centered on Khrushchev and finally Gorbachev. This is the essence of the Party's demise and the collapse of the Soviet Union.
As a matter of academic research, the analysis of the "fundamental causes of the demise of the Party and the state in the Soviet Union" must adhere to the "Double Hundred" policy [44], revealing the truth and gradually forming a consensus through solid and painstaking research. At the same time, the exploration of "causes" has never been a purely academic issue. Especially when historical nihilism [45] is rampant, a prominent manifestation is the use of negating and distorting the history of the CPSU, totally negating Stalin, or even attacking Lenin, as a means to attack the Communist Party of China, smear the historical choices of the Chinese people, and allude to, attack, and negate Mao Zedong, the great leader recognized by the Chinese people. Claims such as "Hitler, Stalin, and Mao Zedong are the three great demons of the 20th century" or "the shift from 'learning from the West' to 'taking Russia as the teacher' was a departure from the mainstream of human civilization"—these once-fashionable "political signifiers" have indeed undergone a superficial change since the 18th National Congress [46], but we must remain highly vigilant against the practice of using academic discourse to convey political demands. Regarding the major principles of right and wrong involved in the interpretation of the fundamental causes of the Soviet collapse, one must maintain a clear-cut and correct political stance. If we cannot reach accurate and scientific conclusions regarding these fundamental causes, it could directly or indirectly impact or shake the source and foundation of our Communist Party of China and the socialist People's Republic of China. (To be continued)
(Project: This article is a staged result of the National Social Science Fund's special commissioned research topic "New Changes in Capitalism, the Essence and Development Trends of Imperialism, and Our Strategic Response.")
(Project Head: Li Shenming, Honorary Dean of the School of Politics and Public Management at Zhengzhou University, Director of the World Socialism Research Center at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences) (Project Members: Liu Shulin, Wang Tingyou, Li Ruiqin, Zhang Shuhua, Fan Jianxin, Zhao Dingqi) Source: World Socialism Studies, Issue 9