Li Shenming, Yin Bin, et al.: On the War and Peace Outlook of the US Ruling Group After the Cold War

World War II established the United States as the dominant force in the world capitalist system and the leader of the West. In the post-war era, to build a "world family" under its own leadership and create a global order under its own dominance, the U.S. utilized the dual means of war and peace to advance a foreign policy aimed at securing the "global political and economic interests" of the United States and its allies. Consequently, U.S. foreign and military policy shifted to primarily target socialist countries and the Third World. Starting from the Truman administration, U.S. politicians, major news media, and certain scholars continuously proposed a variety of so-called "perspectives" on the issues of war and peace—far exceeding any previous period—to provide a theoretical basis for the policy choices of successive post-war administrations. Among all post-war presidents, Richard Nixon wrote and theorized the most. Although Nixon stepped down due to the "Watergate Scandal," during his lifetime, subsequent U.S. presidents consulted him whenever they encountered major international issues, which demonstrates Nixon’s influence within the American ruling group. Therefore, Nixon's views on war and peace represent the outlook of the American ruling class in a relatively comprehensive and systematic manner. Due to the power and leadership role of the United States, these views were fundamentally accepted by U.S. allies and became the mainstream perspective in the West.

I. "War is an Instrument for Gaining Power and Influence"

U.S. politicians believe that war is a tool, a means used to obtain power and influence and to advance national interests. They posit that war is caused by political differences and that the use of military means is intended to achieve specific political objectives; American leaders can only engage in war with the firm support of public opinion; and regarding involvement in Third World conflicts, the U.S. must be selective. Nixon stated, "When a nation goes to war, achieving victory is essential," and "victory should be defined as using military means to achieve specific political goals." He argued that when American "interests are threatened," the "capacity and will to resort to force must be the primary instrument," as this "will reduce the likelihood of eventually resorting to force," while "always keeping the use of force as a last resort" ^[1]. Furthermore, he noted, "the greatest danger of war breaking out between superpowers is that when their interests conflict, a small war may escalate. Small wars always have the potential to trigger a world war."

(1) After World War II, the United States launched a global Cold War against communism

Nixon believed that in the 20th century, the United States "already experienced three great wars—World War I, World War II, and the Cold War." After World War II, the U.S. "launched a Cold War against communism across the globe."

First, the Cold War was a total war involving a fierce struggle between political ideas and economic systems.

On March 5, 1946, Winston Churchill's speech in Fulton, Missouri, raised the curtain on the Cold War. On March 12, 1947, President Truman delivered a message to Congress (later known as the Truman Doctrine), marking the official start of the U.S.-Soviet Cold War. "The Cold War covered every region of the world and forced most of them into this fierce struggle between political ideas and economic systems." From the Truman administration’s initiation of the Cold War to its conclusion during the George H.W. Bush administration, politicians in every U.S. administration were active practitioners of the Cold War.

Nixon argued that the Cold War was not a conventional war as defined in history books, but "a war called peace." He stated, "If this war is not to escalate to the level of actual armed conflict, we must wage it effectively in non-military dimensions." He added, "The success or failure of this conflict concerns not only our own freedom but also the freedom of all countries in the world"; it is a great struggle that decides the fate of nations, and "the survival of freedom depends on American action." Regarding this, U.S. politicians held several key views: First, the Cold War was a substitute for a hot war—especially nuclear war—between the two superpowers. "The Cold War prompted a fierce arms race and triggered hot wars in Korea and Vietnam" along with dozens of smaller military conflicts, yet "it did not bring the superpowers into combat with one another." Second, the United States had to resolve the question of what kind of country would dominate the "fate of the world." Therefore, the U.S. had no choice but to make victory in the Cold War the primary goal of its foreign policy. Third, the Cold War was a combination of military, economic, philosophical, political, and diplomatic power; every element was vital to the outcome of the war and would dominate the world situation. Fourth, the U.S. had to distinguish between vital interests, important interests, and peripheral interests. So-called vital interests refer to those essential not only to the U.S. but also to the "Free World," as part of the titanic struggle between two worlds. The highest priority for defense should be these vital interests. Fifth, the U.S. not only "saved the world from the clutches of communism but also helped transform it into a world where freedom is no longer threatened."

Second, the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of conflicts between regions and small states; rather, the threat of small-scale wars grew sharply.

Nixon believed the end of the Cold War did not bring about a "New World Order." He noted, "In the 'New Era' of world history, ideological conflict might not be dominant, but the violence of this era may become more intense than the previous one." He argued that "the collapse of communism in the Cold War" and "the fadng of the Cold War do not mean the end of international conflict"; "instability in the developing world will continue to pose a major threat to American interests," and "dozens of civil wars and regional wars are still caused by ancient struggles based on tribal, ethnic, national, or religious hatred."

On one hand, in a world of competition between states, conflicts of interest and national conflicts are inevitable and a necessary state of affairs. Nixon believed that the core of international relations is competition, which makes conflict "a necessity in the world." He observed that "some countries are unsatisfied with what they already possess" and "attempt to gain more for various reasons" and "through various means," while other countries "resist the schemes of those seeking to expand," leading to "conflict between countries in these two positions." He concluded, "If they cannot resolve their conflicts peacefully, they will eventually attempt to resolve them through violent means." The "end of the Cold War between superpowers does not mean the end of conflicts between small states."

On the other hand, the United States must not allow the "clash of civilizations" to become the defining feature of the post-Cold War era. Nixon agreed with the view proposed by Harvard Professor Samuel Huntington and others that a "'clash of civilizations' would place the West and the Islamic world in a state of hostility," noting that "military conflicts since the 1990s have confirmed this argument." Nixon stated that if the U.S. "continues to allow" such conflict to persist, it "will surely draw fire upon itself, leading to a conflict between the Muslim world and the West." He argued that the "civilized world must establish a unified policy for dealing with terrorism" and "once military retaliation is appropriate, they should be prepared to act together."

(2) The developing world is the current battlefield of the East-West struggle

U.S. politicians believe that "wars in the Third World began before the end of World War II," and that this is a war to decide the "future of developing countries" and "to save freedom." The "developing world" has become the "current battlefield of the struggle between East and West." Kennedy said, "This kind of war is unique," "its intensity is new," and it requires "an entirely new set of strategies" and "a completely different kind of force."

First, the United States cannot stand aside or remain uninvolved in Third World wars.

U.S. politicians believe that between peace and war lies a vast gray area of "neither-war-nor-peace," and that the competition between the U.S. and communism "will be concentrated mainly in the Third World." The Third World is the epicenter of global war and revolution; "the struggle will be largely decided in this arena... we must engage our opponents here." The importance of the Third World means the U.S. cannot "remain uninvolved" or "stand aside" in this war. If the U.S. stands aside, the West is certain to lose. Since the "cost of open aggression will become increasingly high" in the 21st century, if we "expect to win without war, or even just expect to avoid losing without war," then "we must resolve to use our power in ways that do not involve fighting." Anywhere in the world, the U.S. must not merely defend the line but must expand "freedom" globally.

Second, the goal of the U.S. in the East-West struggle is to establish a "world family" that includes all nations and shares a political system substantially identical to that of the United States.

U.S. politicians believe that the U.S. must "do everything in our power" to establish a world family encompassing all nations—an "ideal world" where "all nations have free economic and political systems and are forever loyal to social justice and human rights." This has been the "purpose since the founding of the United States," and while "every generation of Americans has encountered different problems in achieving these unchanging goals, the problems change, but the purpose remains the same." The American goal is diametrically opposed to the Communist goal; between the U.S. and socialist countries lies a "struggle between two incompatible systems and concepts" that "will continue until freedom achieves victory."

Nixon said that in the second half of the 20th century, "we have been living in a world dominated by conflict between two superpowers caused by two contradictory ideologies. The East-West struggle is the prominent feature of this era." Walt Rostow, former Director of the State Department's Policy Planning Staff, believed the "ultimate question" of the struggle was whether "this small planet should be organized according to the principles of the Communist bloc, or according to the principles of voluntary cooperation between independent states committed to human freedom," moving toward a "family of free nations."

U.S. politicians believe the "root of the conflict" between the U.S. and the Soviet Union lies in "profound differences in ideology, interests, and intentions," and is "part of the titanic struggle between two worlds" that "directly involves our own most vital interests." They argue that "the Soviet Union attempts to expand communism" while "the United States seeks to stop it"; further, "the U.S.-Soviet conflict is not a 'problem' but a 'condition.'" While "problems can be solved, conditions can only be managed." Competition is the core of Soviet-U.S. relations and will determine who triumphs in the superpower struggle.

More importantly, we must recognize that U.S. politicians, represented by Nixon, believe that although war as a means of policy implementation is outdated, the instruments of war must continue to play a role in maintaining peace. "The era when war was an alternative is over. Peace is the only choice for the future. We are currently in a dangerous state between peace and war," where "military deterrence, including nuclear forces, is an indispensable component of any lasting peace. When each side holds an equally good hand, potential aggressors are unlikely to act rashly."

II. "Real Peace is a Means of Tolerating Conflict"

Among all U.S. presidents, Nixon discussed the issue of peace most extensively and with the clearest views. His perspective on peace lacked typical veneers, hypocrisy, and taboos, reflecting more frankly the true views of the American ruling group. Nixon divided peace into "real peace" and "perfect peace," repeatedly stating that what he sought was "not a mythical perfect peace," but "a real peace built on a shared understanding of harsh realities." This peace recognizes that "there are profound and irreconcilable differences between them, but their survival depends on finding ways to manage their differences without going to war."

Nixon believed that real peace does not emerge "suddenly or once and for all" from some plan, but is a "continuous process of managing and controlling conflicts that arise between competing nations, systems, and international ambitions." This "peace is not the disappearance of conflict" or "the end of contradictions"; rather, it is "a means of tolerating conflict" and is the only type of peace that has ever existed. "Without the United States, it would be impossible for peace and freedom to continue to be maintained."

Nixon also believed that "conflict is a natural state in the world" and is "inherent to humanity"; that "nations will inevitably come into conflict on a variety of issues and through various means, and the danger that these conflicts will lead to violence will always exist." Realistic peace is "a means of learning to coexist with conflict," it is "the handling of conflict so that it does not explode into war," and "the ultimate test of a nation's character is not how it endures the misfortunes of war, but how it meets the challenges of peace."

(1) Peace and strength are inseparable in the real world Nixon believed that "world peace and national strength are inseparable." For countries with fundamentally opposing ideologies, "the peace sought cannot be built on mutual friendship; it can only be built on mutual respect for each other’s strength."

First, perfect peace exists only in the fantasies of diplomats and in the grave. Nixon argued that "in a world where conflict between people is constant and widespread," perfect and permanent peace exists only in "two places: in the grave and on the typewriter." Such peace is an "illusion" and is "fashioned out of beautiful thoughts and pretty words"; "it never existed in the past, and it never will in the future." "Idealists long for a world without conflict," which is "a world that has never existed and never will." Nixon cautioned that "the real world does not revolve around wishful thinking about the 'total realization of peace,' but around the enduring realities of geopolitics." 7 It is dangerous to "confuse real peace with perfect peace"; "we should not engage in a futile search for perfect peace, but should instead strive to create a realistic peace." Real peace requires that the United States have the resolve to use its power in various ways other than war.

Second, seeking peace through trade and friendship is a myth. Nixon believed that seeking peace through trade and friendship is a myth and a fallacy. The view that "economic power has replaced military power as the primary instrument of foreign policy" is a philistine perspective. "Trade itself can never produce peace or prevent war"; "seeking peace through trade has not worked in the past and will never work in the future." "Economic relations can never substitute for deterrence and competition." "While economic interdependence limits each nation's freedom of action, it has not rendered military power irrelevant." "When an issue involves vital national interests, a great power will discard even the strongest economic ties to achieve victory." "If handled correctly, economic relations can strengthen deterrence and competitiveness," making trade "an important additional force acting as a check on potential aggressors," but "it can never replace a tangible deterrent built on the foundation of military strength." "Shaking hands and making nice" cannot change a nation's ambitions or interests.

(2) Peace is not the ultimate end; peace should be a means to achieve a higher purpose Nixon argued, "We should not allow ourselves to be tempted by the claim of peace at any price." "If peace were truly our only goal, we could have it any time we wished—simply by surrendering." "The peace we seek must be a peace combined with justice." Peace should be a means to achieve a "new world where everyone can enjoy the blessings of freedom, justice, and progress." If peace is made "our only goal, then the freedoms already won may be endangered." Peace is a great goal, but it is not a panacea for all ills.

(3) To maintain peace and defend freedom, a "sober détente" policy must be pursued During the Cold War, the United States successively implemented policies of containment and détente ^[3] toward socialist countries. U.S. dignitaries and scholars debated which policy was more effective in dealing with socialist countries until the end of the Cold War. Nixon said: "The debate over this word is so emotionally charged that the argument over substance has turned into an argument over semantics. Therefore, we must clarify what sober détente is and what it is not."

Nixon's views on détente can be summarized into five points: First, détente is not a substitute for the Cold War; rather, both détente and the Cold War are substitutes for a "hot war" between the two superpowers, specifically a substitute for nuclear war. Second, U.S. policy must combine détente with deterrence. Third, détente is an attempt to expand factors of cooperation and impose certain limits on factors of competition. Fourth, détente without deterrence is a prescription that inevitably leads to retreat and defeat. Fifth, to implement a sober détente, one must use both "carrots" and "sticks."

III. Nuclear weapons have greatly changed the way the world operates U.S. dignitaries, some scholars, and the news media believe that the new power of nuclear weapons has changed the "nature of war" and "will also change the nature of peace." In 1953, Truman said: "We have now entered the atomic age; war has undergone a technical change that makes it starkly different from the wars of the past." U.S. nuclear strategy has evolved alongside changes in its nuclear advantage.

First, when the United States held a nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union, it always maintained nuclear war as an option. In 1962, then-Secretary of Defense McNamara said: "Although no nation could rationally take steps leading to nuclear war, that fact does not guarantee that nuclear war will not break out." "Only in situations where nuclear weapons can be credibly used—situations where the alternative might be worse than the risk of nuclear war (such as gradually succumbing to Communist aggression)—are nuclear weapons a rational weapon." Former President Kennedy said: "In some circumstances, we must be prepared to use nuclear weapons from the start." On one hand, the "edge" of U.S. action was non-nuclear forces, with nuclear forces kept in reserve.

In 1959, Taylor, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that the U.S. strategy of "atomic deterrence would serve as a shield," providing security for the U.S., "but not as a tool for flexible application." This is because "in future military operations, limited-war forces will play an active role, while atomic retaliatory forces can only play a passive role." The U.S. "strategy of massive retaliation may have prevented the outbreak of a major war," but it failed to "eliminate unrest in local regions."

U.S. dignitaries and military generals believed that nuclear power could not be used for "brushfire wars" on the periphery. The United States must possess sufficient non-nuclear forces to have conventional options in marginal situations, so that it would not be forced into nuclear war for lack of other choices. The outcome of world conflicts would likely depend on unconventional, limited warfare; the powerful nuclear weapons of the U.S. would have little impact on conflicts in the Third World, and superior conventional military forces might be unable to deal with an enemy employing unconventional warfare. The United States cannot face a choice between total war or total defeat.

On the other hand, "limited nuclear war" was seen as the most effective U.S. strategy. In 1957, Kissinger proposed: "In fighting a nation possessing nuclear weapons, or a major power capable of substituting manpower for science and technology, limited nuclear war is our most effective strategy." "The policy of limited nuclear war should also not be treated as a means to relax our preparations for total war." In 1959, Taylor also proposed that "in relatively rare circumstances and under conditions consistent with our national interests," "tactical atomic weapons" could be used.

Second, after the Soviet Union achieved strategic nuclear parity with the United States, the U.S. believed that one superpower could no longer use war as a policy tool against the other. Nixon said that during the Cold War, the two superpowers "possessed the power to destroy each other and the rest of the world. This greatly reduced the possibility of a global nuclear war." "Neither superpower can afford to fight the other"; resorting to war as "a last resort is self-destruction. In the age of nuclear war, continuing our political differences through the means of war would mean the destruction of our civilization today."

U.S. dignitaries and some scholars believe that direct conflict between superpowers would almost certainly escalate to the use of nuclear weapons. Any local war could suddenly spread into a nuclear holocaust; nuclear war could lead to the destruction of all nations and societies. In any conventional or nuclear world war, there will be no winners, only losers. Nuclear parity changed the nature of U.S.-Soviet conflict; nuclear weapons rendered war between great powers obsolete as a means of resolving contradictions. Due to the destructive power of nuclear weapons, there will be no more world wars in the 21st century. Besides maintaining sufficient nuclear deterrence, the U.S. must learn to compete without engaging in direct military intervention.

Third, the attempt by developing countries to become nuclear-armed states makes the nightmare of nuclear war a potential reality. Nixon believed: "All countries in the developing world are now trying to become nuclear states." "As a result, the danger of nuclear war is now more serious than it was during the Cold War."

Fourth, for the foreseeable future, the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear war will persist; nuclear weapons must remain part of U.S. strategy. U.S. dignitaries believe that the threat of nuclear weapons and nuclear war is a fundamental fact of international life, and nuclear weapons must be part of the U.S. strategy to prevent the outbreak of war. Nixon said it was irresponsible to "label nuclear deterrence as immoral"; the U.S. "must possess nuclear weapons to deter potential aggressors from launching a war or forcing our surrender without a fight."

IV. To protect vital U.S. interests, peaceful methods must be combined with resolute action U.S. dignitaries believe that in protecting its vital interests, the U.S. should "combine firmness with flexibility," utilizing both "peaceful methods" and military methods so that these two means complement each other. The U.S. must possess capabilities in six areas: ideology, diplomacy, economic aid, military aid, military force, and covert operations. At the same time, the U.S. "must understand where and in what manner to use each instrument" and "cannot exercise leadership by example alone or by force alone, but must combine the best elements of both."

First, the U.S. must maintain a strong and diverse military force capable of a wide range of military activities. After World War II, regardless of which party or president was in power, the United States consistently made the strengthening and maintenance of its vast and diverse military forces a choice for defending American interests.

In 1961, upon taking office, Kennedy proposed: "First, we must strengthen our military tools." He believed that "in the face of a new and difficult world," the United States "must maintain a strong, diversified military force, a force capable of a wide range of military activities." His successor, Johnson, claimed that the U.S. would "never let our adversaries gain an advantage in any kind of war that might occur, whether nuclear, conventional, or guerrilla." When the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces reached rough parity with the U.S., Nixon believed the U.S. "urgently needed to greatly increase our general-purpose forces and strengthen our regional capabilities."

U.S. dignitaries and military generals have always believed that the U.S. must master the most advanced weapons and maintain superiority over the Communist bloc, particularly in military technology. Otherwise, it would lead to a revival of the Soviet Union's declining revolutionary will. To this end, the U.S. must maintain a strong strategic deterrent to ensure that both sides utilize nuclear weapons politically and diplomatically rather than using them militarily.

Second, democratic nations cannot win by military might alone. Kennedy said that in our time, "no significant problem can be solved by military force alone," and that "the world situation must be dealt with on social, economic, and political foundations." U.S. dignitaries believe: 1) In the global competition, one of the West's most powerful weapons is "free thought" (liberal ideas); the U.S. President must fully utilize this weapon and use it properly and effectively. 2) Economic power is itself a powerful weapon; if used skillfully, it can promote our interests. 3) The U.S. must learn to achieve strategic goals through foreign aid; U.S. military and economic aid should prevent new opportunities for Communist expansion. 4) Without military strength and the determination to use it decisively and selectively in important conflicts, we will be defeated without a fight; a moderate tone must be combined with hard action. 5) According to the needs of the situation, military, political, economic, and psychological means should be used alternately or simultaneously.

V. All Peaceful Means Must Be Utilized to Induce the Communist Bloc

In April 1956, Eisenhower delivered a speech titled "Seeking World Security," in which he proposed the policy of implementing "peaceful evolution" toward communist countries. He stated: "We must employ all peaceful means to induce the Soviet bloc to correct the existing injustices." The following year, at a NATO meeting, he remarked that "the clear possibility of achieving victory through peaceful means lies before the free nations," calling this a "noble strategy." John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State in the Eisenhower administration, remarked regarding certain practices of the Soviet leadership at the time: "There are now signs that a new era may be dawning... the results of such changes may emerge—not this year, nor next year, but after many years." The United States must "go all out" to execute Eisenhower's "noble strategy," noting that "its cost will be high, not just in terms of money, but especially in terms of will, tenacity, and faith." Consequently, "peaceful evolution" joined the Cold War as a means for the United States to deal with socialist states.

First, "In the long run, we can encourage 'peaceful evolution' within the Communist bloc itself, which will take many years to complete."

From the Eisenhower administration onward, American political figures and some scholars believed that there were "forces demanding greater liberalism" within communist countries. If these forces could persist, it would be possible to bring about "fundamental internal changes" in those states. "We cannot predict when or by what means the nations and peoples still under Communist rule may move toward freedom. But we must always keep the lamp of freedom burning before them." "We look forward to that day," achieving "the ultimate goals of our policy" within "ten years or a generation." Kennedy believed that "there is clearly no easy solution to the problem of how to eradicate the communist movement"; one way was for the communists to "do it themselves," while "another way is through action from the outside." Nixon believed: "This task will not be completed in decades, but will take many generations."

In April 1963, Kennedy said that achieving "peaceful evolution" "relies on the gradual evolution of human institutions." In June of the same year, George Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, opined: "From the perspective of world peace prospects, the Russian approach is relatively encouraging and hopeful." Nixon, meanwhile, believed the Western bloc, led by the U.S., would win without war through "peaceful evolution." In 1984, he stated: "If we maintain our will, we need not be pessimistic about the outcome of the competition. As one generation succeeds another, we will begin to see the process of peaceful evolution emerge within the Eastern bloc... In the long term, we will win, and win without war."

Second, "In this world, even established Communist governments are inevitably affected by the forces of evolution."

Some in the United States argued that "military evolution is too dangerous, and peaceful evolution is impossible" for communist countries. Nixon did not entirely agree with this view. He said, "They are right on the first point, but wrong on the second. In this world, everything—even an established Communist government—is inevitably affected by the forces of evolution." As long as the U.S. "adopts a responsible policy" in the competition, "we can help shape and accelerate the process of positive change." The U.S. must seek cooperation with communist leaders who wish to implement "genuine reform."

U.S. political figures and scholars believed that contact between their society (referring to socialism) and "our society" would sow seeds of discontent that would one day bear the fruit of peaceful evolution; thus, the U.S. must adopt policies to maximize such exchanges. Applying various economic power weapons to communist regimes and increasing trade contacts could promote "peaceful evolution" within the communist bloc. Trade must be treated as a weapon rather than a gift, ensuring that communism fails years or even decades before its eventual collapse. It was "extremely important" to adopt distinct policies of friendship or hostility toward different communist countries to "widen the rifts within the communist world."

Third, "There is a limit that the development of U.S.-China relations cannot exceed."

Nixon believed the U.S. should "first consider long-term investment in China, an investment that would make China's future progress dependent on continued cooperation with the West." Since the U.S. and China "are not allies," the development of relations has "a limit that cannot be exceeded," and the U.S. "will not sacrifice its Chinese friends in Taiwan." "In the face of shifting international realities, there are no shared experiences, struggles, or ideals between us that can keep us inseparable. Unless a large-scale political reform movement occurs in China, our fundamental views on how to govern a country will remain diametrically opposed." "The future of U.S.-China relations lies in the hands of both American politicians and the American business community." Which path China might take could ultimately determine the survival of the West.

Fourth, "Defeating communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the 20th century was only the first step toward the worldwide victory of freedom in the 21st century."

After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Nixon claimed the West had "defeated communism" in the Cold War. "It was not just a military victory, but also a victory in ideological, political, and economic terms," and "one of the most brilliant achievements by a free people in the entire history of civilization." Nixon said, "While celebrating the defeat of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, we must seize the opportunity to strive for the victory of peace and freedom worldwide."

Nixon remarked, "Communists have lost the ideological struggle on a global scale. But the fact that they lost this struggle does not mean the West has won it." In the 21st century, "nothing will have a greater political impact on the world than whether political and economic freedom can take root and flourish in Russia and other former communist countries." "Until this transition is finally transformed into irreversible political freedom, economic freedom, and non-aggressive foreign policy, there remains the danger that the remnants of the shattered Soviet empire will stage a 'killing return' ^[4] and bring catastrophic consequences." Nixon believed the challenges facing the U.S. after the Cold War were greater than those during it. This was because, since the end of the Cold War, choosing how and when to fight for peace and freedom has become even more complex than before. The end of the Cold War between supermarkets did not mean the end of conflicts between small nations.

Fifth, one of the most significant challenges of the 21st century is handling the profound differences that still exist, and will always exist, between peoples who subscribe to diametrically opposed ideologies.

Nixon believed that in the 21st century, "two types of revolutionary change still threaten the Third World." "The first is the communist revolution," and the second is Islamic fundamentalism, the latter having "replaced communism as the primary means of violent revolution." The U.S. must concern itself with events in the Third World because they involve massive U.S. strategic and economic interests. If the 21st century is to be a century of peace, the hardships and wars of the Third World must be addressed; otherwise, "when one revolution subsides, another will occur." The term "Third World" is outdated; now there are only two "worlds" composed of developed and developing nations. "If the 'Tale of Two Worlds' persists, the foundations of future peace and stability will be built upon sand."

VI. Armaments are Not the Cause of War, and Arms Control Cannot Achieve Peace

Nixon believed that war is not caused by the existence of weapons, but by the political differences between nations that lead to their use; arms expansion is a symptom of political conflict, not the cause. While we should certainly try to alleviate the symptoms, we should not ignore the disease itself. The advocacy for disarmament is based on the logical fallacy of equating people's intentions with the means by which they realize them. "Because of this fundamental misunderstanding, the methods that disarmers believe offer the most hope for achieving peace are precisely the prescriptions that lead to international disaster."

U.S. political figures believe that armaments are determined by political differences and adversarial relationships; attempting to disarm before eliminating these conflicts of interest is putting the cart before the horse. The myth of disarmament is the progenitor of all myths of peace.

First, the United States must simultaneously pursue the two paths of disarmament negotiations and arms expansion, maintaining a high degree of military effectiveness.

U.S. political figures advocate that the U.S. goal is not disarmament but the realization of a stable strategic balance, and they will never weaken the means of defending the American system. The U.S. government will not propose any suggestion that would shift the balance of power to its disadvantage.

Second, comprehensive nuclear disarmament is an unattainable dream.

Nixon said that those who advocate for the elimination of nuclear weapons live in a fantasy world. "One of the most reckless and dangerous fallacies of the nuclear disarmament movement is that if there were no nuclear weapons, the world would necessarily be a better place."

U.S. political figures and some scholars believe that nuclear weapons will exist forever. As long as people know how to manufacture them, the U.S. cannot simply fantasize about eliminating them from the earth; it must accept these harsh realities. Although nuclear weapons cannot be eliminated, much can be done to prevent their use. Only by learning to coexist peacefully with its adversaries can the U.S. learn to coexist with nuclear weapons. Otherwise, the U.S. will perish by the atomic bomb. It is in the interest of the U.S. to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology to other countries; to stop nuclear proliferation, the superpowers must make joint efforts. Without U.S. leadership in the world, the problem of "avoiding nuclear anarchy" cannot be resolved.

(Author Profiles: Li Shenming is the Director of the World Socialism Research Center at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences [CASS], former Vice President of CASS, and a Research Fellow; Yin Bin, Xu Shiping, and Wang Liqiang are Guest Research Fellows at the World Socialism Research Center of CASS; Hong Yuan is a Research Fellow at the Institute of American Studies, CASS)

Web Editor: Tongxin Source: Mao Zedong Deng Xiaoping Lilun Yanjiu (Studies in Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping Theories), Issue 2, 2022.