Li Shenming: Wang Zhen's Early Interactions with Chairman Mao
This year marks the 130th anniversary of Chairman Mao Zedong’s birth, as well as the 115th anniversary of the birth of my old superior, Wang Zhen. As someone born the same year as the New China, I can say that the vast majority of people of my age harbor an exceptionally special and profound affection for Chairman Mao—an affection that has grown more intense, burning, pure, and enduring with the passing years. Having worked by Old Wang’s side for over a decade, I also hold a very deep affection for him and feel deeply that he was a true Communist. To commemorate Chairman Mao and Old Wang, and based on Old Wang’s own oral accounts as well as interviews with his old comrades-in-arms and subordinates, I have compiled the following review of Wang Zhen’s early interactions with the Chairman:
I. Escorting Committee Member Mao by handcar and participating in the formation of the Hunan-East Independent Division based on Mao Zedong’s instructions
In 1922, thirteen-year-old Wang Zhen left his hometown for the first time, traveling alone to Changsha to earn a living, where he became a worker on the Guangdong-Hankou Railway. Under the care of the underground Party organization, he soon joined the Youth League and the Party. In the spring of 1925, seventeen-year-old Wang Zhen was serving as a small-group leader in the workers' picket corps on the Changsha-Yueyang section of the railway. One day in August, the picket corps leader Shi Yingdian told him to select three elite members to use a railway handcar [1] to safely escort Committee Member Mao to Jiu-cai-yuan in Changsha. This was the first time Wang Zhen met Mao Zedong. Along the way, Mao Zedong took the initiative to chat with Wang Zhen, showing not the slightest bit of pretension. He asked about Wang’s age, hometown, and experiences, and encouraged him to study more culture and theory. Upon parting, Mao Zedong thanked Wang Zhen and expressed his hope that they would meet again.
After the failure of the Great Revolution [2], Wang Zhen lived in exile in Wuhan, during which time he became acquainted with several intellectuals within the Party. In 1929, he returned to his hometown of Beisheng in Liuyang with these intellectuals to establish an underground Special District Committee. Together with Zhang Zhengkun, Su Lao, Xu Hong, and others, he led the armed revolutionary struggle of the peasants in northern Liuyang.
When the Third Red Army Corps attacked Changsha, Wang Zhen served as Secretary of the Changsha-Liuyang-Xiangyin Special District Committee of the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Region, Political Commissar of the Sixth Division of the Red Guards [3], and concurrently as Branch Secretary of the First Guerilla Detachment of Northern Liuyang. During this attack on Changsha, the commander of the First Detachment, Zhang Zhengkun, and the Political Commissar, Su Lao, were wounded in succession, leading Wang Zhen to take on the roles of both commander and political commissar of the detachment. He was ordered to lead the more than 10,000-strong Sixth Division of the Peasant Red Guards and the First Guerilla Detachment of Northern Liuyang to guard and protect the communications lines between Pingjiang and Liuyang.
On September 12, 1930, after the First Front Red Army failed in its second attempt to capture Changsha, it was decided to retreat. Wang Zhen and Xu Hong, who were then in charge of guarding against enemy reinforcements from Wuchang and Yuezhou, received orders to rush to Zhentou Market, some seventy li [4] southeast of Changsha. Just as they arrived, several horses galloped into the village from the west along the Liuyang River. Wang Zhen immediately recognized the man who leaped down from a dappled grey horse: it was Mao Zedong. At that time, Mao Zedong was the General Political Commissar of the First Front Red Army, Secretary of the General Frontline Committee, and Chairman of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Revolutionary Committee.
Teng Daiyuan, Political Commissar of the Third Red Army Corps, introduced Wang Zhen and Xu Hong to Mao Zedong. Mao said warmly, "I have heard of your great name for a long time! Many leaflets and proclamations have been distributed using your name!"
"Report, Chairman: my original name was Wang Yukai, and I have also gone by Wang Zhenlin. The scholars in our guerrilla detachment said that using the name 'Wang Zhen' [5] would be bright and resonant. They said issuing proclamations under this name would cause a 'great vibration' and could suppress the landlords, the wealthy, and the local militias [6], so they suggested I change it. I am a rough man with little education. Those leaflets and proclamations you saw were all written by our scholars!" Mao Zedong praised their leaflets and proclamations for being well-written, with a momentum as sharp as a sword or an axe. Wang Zhen said with a smile, "Our scholars are very democratic. Before and after drafting the leaflets and proclamations, they always seek the opinions of us rough men!" Mao Zedong laughed as well.
Mao Zedong briefed Wang Zhen and Xu Hong on the military situation before and after the Second Front Red Army’s second attack on Changsha: the defending enemy in Changsha had solid fortifications, their reinforcements were increasingly concentrated, and our army was becoming short of ammunition and supplies. It was decided to proactively evacuate Changsha and transfer to the revolutionary base area in the Hunan-Jiangxi border region—the northern section of the Jinggang Mountains across southwest Jiangxi and southeast Hunan (the flank of the original Jinggang Mountains Revolutionary Base Area). In accordance with Mao Zedong’s instructions, the CPC Hunan-East Special Committee organized guerrilla detachments from Lianhua, Wanzai, Liuyang, Chaling, Liling, Pingxiang, and other counties into a revolutionary force. Mao Zedong required them to select core personnel to participate in the formation of the Hunan-East Independent Division. He suggested drawing from various guerrilla detachments across eastern Hunan to build this division to consolidate and develop the Hunan-Jiangxi Revolutionary Base Area and to coordinate with the operations of the First Front Red Army moving into Jiangxi.
On the fourth day after Wang Zhen and Xu Hong returned to northern Liuyang, they received formal orders from the Hunan-East Special Committee for the main force of the Northern Liuyang First Detachment to quickly participate in the formation of the Hunan-East Independent Division. Wang Zhen volunteered to lead 154 men and over 110 rifles to join the formation. Zhang Zhengkun, Su Lao, and Xu Hong remained in northern Liuyang to continue the struggle.
In 1985, Wang Zhen recalled: "To my knowledge, of the other 153 comrades who left home with me in 1930 to form the Hunan-East Independent Division, only a few were still alive after Liberation [7]." When recounting this fact, I noticed Wang Zhen's voice trembling and a glimmer in the corners of his eyes.
II. Participating in the First National Soviet Congress and visiting Chairman Mao
From November 7 to 20, 1931, the First National Congress of the Chinese Soviet Republic was held in Yepeng, Ruijin. Wang Zhen and Yuan Desheng led the delegation from the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area.
Shortly after the congress opened, Mao Zedong sent someone to find Wang Zhen, saying he wanted to chat about the situation in the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area. In the two small rooms where Mao Zedong resided, Wang Zhen met him once again. Mao Zedong asked in detail about the development of the Red Army in the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet, the building of Soviet political power, land distribution, and relations between the military and government, as well as between the military and the people. Wang Zhen answered each question.
When Wang Zhen mentioned that the Hunan-Jiangxi Independent Division had fought dozens of battles in 1931—tasting success in the first by annihilating and capturing the enemy and seizing weapons and ammunition, only to consume it all in the second—Mao Zedong said: "You are fighting too many battles... If you hadn't fought those battles of attrition, your victory would be even greater. However, it’s understandable; sometimes a perilous environment forces you to fight." "Even if forced, do not fight; create conditions, try every means to evade, and stick to those sixteen characters: 'the enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue!' [8] The terrain of the Hunan-Jiangxi base is excellent. You must keep your back to the Jinggang Mountains and move north, south, and east. The Hunan-Jiangxi Revolutionary Base Area has a very promising future."
Mao Zedong asked about Tan Sicong, the Political Commissar of the Hunan-Jiangxi Independent Division. Wang Zhen said: "The original Hunan-East Special Committee and the West Route Sub-committee of Southwest Jiangxi had friction, one important reason being the interference of localism [9]. Shi Qing and some other Hunanese wanted to defend eastern Hunan, while the Jiangxi-born leaders of the West Route Sub-committee wanted to consolidate Yongxin in Jiangxi. Comrades from the Hunan-East Special Committee even suspected those from the West Route Sub-committee of being 'AB Corps' [10] members or corrupt elements. Comrade Tan Sicong did not see it that way and worked to unite both sides. Additionally, because he resolutely resisted Comrade Li Lisan's 'Left' adventurist line, he was marginalized and attacked there."
Mao Zedong agreed with Wang Zhen’s view and also spoke of the dangers of localism: "The wrongful killing of Yuan Wencai and Wang Zuo was due to localism playing a role. Now the Jinggang Mountains base cannot be fully recovered because it is occupied by the defected former subordinates of Yuan and Wang; this serves as a negative teacher and a lesson for us." Mao Zedong also mentioned his idea of transferring Tan Sicong to the Provisional Central Government of the Chinese Soviet Republic as Secretary-General and bringing in Li Tianzhu to serve as Political Commissar.
While expressing his agreement, Wang Zhen also reported to the Chairman, "Some say Li Tianzhu is a counter-revolutionary and has close ties with Chiang Kai-shek. Is it that attending the Whampoa Military Academy [11] means one has close ties with Chiang Kai-shek and is therefore a counter-revolutionary?! I don't believe it for a moment!" Mao Zedong suggested that Wang Zhen consult Zhou Enlai, who was about to arrive in Ruijin from Shanghai to serve as Secretary of the CPC Central Bureau of the Soviet Area and General Political Commissar of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission, regarding Li Tianzhu’s situation.
At this time, Wang Zhen did not yet know that on the eve of the National Soviet Congress in early November, the First Party Congress of the Central Soviet Area—the Gannan Meeting—had been held. Active supporters of Wang Ming’s “Left” erroneous line, priding themselves as “representatives of the international line” and “100% Bolsheviks,” ridiculed the idea that “there is no Marxism-Leninism in the mountain gullies.” They slandered the correct views and propositions represented by Mao Zedong as “non-proletarian views” politically, “pure defense” and “guerrillaism” militarily, and “narrow empiricism,” a “rich peasant line,” and “extremely serious and consistent Right opportunism” in practical work. They thus slandered the great achievements of Mao Zedong, Zhu De, and others in creatively applying Marxism-Leninism to establish revolutionary base areas in the countryside as having no merit at all. The meeting also removed Mao Zedong from his post as Acting Secretary of the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area and passed a decision to abolish the General Frontline Committee of the First Front Red Army, essentially also removing Mao Zedong from his posts as Secretary of the General Frontline Committee and General Political Commissar. In fact, Mao Zedong had already anticipated the harm Wang Ming's “Left” line would bring to the Chinese revolution; he was anxious that good comrades like Tan Sicong and Li Tianzhu were being marginalized and attacked, and even more anxious for the entire future of the Chinese revolution.
In 1985, recalling that conversation with the Chairman during his first participation in the National Soviet Congress, Wang Zhen said: "Chairman Mao was elected Chairman of the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Soviet Republic, and I was extremely happy. But I had no idea then that he had been stripped of his leadership in the Central Bureau of the Soviet Area and the First Front Red Army, and had already been subjected to extremely unjust criticism. Yet he strictly observed Party discipline and did not reveal a single word of grievance or dissatisfaction to me!"
After New Year's Day 1932, with the Spring Festival approaching, Wang Zhen, who was about to return to the Hunan-Jiangxi base, requested to see Mao Zedong one more time.
Upon meeting, Mao Zedong said: "Some comrades advocated transferring you to the Hubei-Henan-Anhui area. I said, Wang Zhen is a man of Hunan and Jiangxi; he knows the situation in the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet well, so it is better for him to return there!" Knowing that Wang Zhen had recently been training officers and soldiers who had defected during the uprising of the former 26th Route Army [12], Mao Zedong asked about their situation. Wang Zhen reported truthfully: "The soldiers of the 26th Route Army are mostly poor peasants from Shaanxi, Gansu, Ningxia, and Qinghai. They are very angry at the Kuomintang’s reactionary policy of 'internal pacification before external resistance' [13]. Before coming to the Central Base Area, they were frightened by the Kuomintang’s deceptive propaganda that the Red Army 'kills, burns, and shares property and wives.' After arriving in the Soviet area, they saw that we workers and peasants hold political power, divide the land equally, treat men and women as equals, have freedom of marriage, and that there is equality between officers and soldiers in the army, who are like brothers. They found everything very fresh. Many have requested to join the Red Army and not return home! There is a company commander named Li Da, from Mei County in Shaanxi, a graduate of Feng Yuxiang’s Northwest Army Second Military Academy, who has great talent for command and training. He said even if he were beaten to death, he wouldn’t leave; he insists on joining the Red Army! I told him being in the Red Army involves a lot of hardship. He said if you can bear it, so can I."
Mao Zedong suggested that Wang Zhen take the majority of the over 500 men who did not want to leave back to the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet, saying: "In Sun Tzu’s Art of War: Governing the Army, it says, 'In military operations, education and discipline come first.' This means that for military operations, educating and training the army is paramount. Among Kuomintang generals, Feng Yuxiang is famous for his strict training. Take these officers and soldiers back with you; you can select some to serve as grassroots instructors to improve and strengthen the tactics, techniques, and individual movements in the unit’s military training. These things have no class nature—they can be used by both the White Army and the Red Army!"
When Wang Zhen mentioned that most of the 26th Route Army were northerners and some comrades worried they would not adapt to life in the south and would be difficult to lead, Mao Zedong laughed: "If they can't cook southern food well, you can send 'Jiangxi Old Cousins' [14] to be their head chefs and try to improve the meals. Besides, human habits can change gradually. If some comrades still can't adapt and regret it after getting to the Hunan-Jiangxi area and want to go home, that's fine too. Your Hunan-Jiangxi area isn't struggling as much; you have money. Just issue them travel expenses and send them home!" Wang Zhen nodded, then asked: "The Chairman previously ordered that those caught deserting cannot be subjected to corporal punishment, let alone killed. But what if someone makes off with a gun?" Mao Zedong immediately replied: "Open the net on all four sides [15] and let them go. The Ningdu Uprising brought us over 20,000 rifles—would you really be so begrudging over a few rifles someone carries off? Let him carry off as many as he wants!" Wang Zhen was moved by Mao Zedong’s broad-mindedness, and his eyes lit up: "Report, Chairman, I understand everything!"
Mao Zedong also told Wang Zhen that during lulls in the fighting, he must make time to study revolutionary theory, paying particular attention to clarifying the nature, situation, motive forces, and tasks of the Chinese revolution. He said: "Our country is a large nation with extremely uneven political and economic development. The enemy's ruling power is mainly concentrated in the large cities, while their control over the countryside is relatively weak. Furthermore, since the basic content of our country's democratic revolution is the agrarian revolution and peasant war under the leadership of the proletariat, and the vast majority of our population is concentrated in the rural areas, we can only take the path of encircling the cities from the countryside and finally seizing the cities. Our Red Army's current strength, compared to the enemy, is small in numbers, poor in equipment, and faces difficulties in supplies; we are constantly subjected to the enemy's 'encirclement and suppression' and 'joint suppression' campaigns. In this grim situation, we absolutely cannot follow the established rules of any historical war. We must create a set of strategic and tactical principles with the characteristics of the Chinese revolutionary war—beginning primarily with guerrilla warfare and then, as the Red Army's strength grows, shifting primarily to mobile warfare. Only through movement can we exhaust the enemy and cause them to make mistakes, thereby annihilating their effective strength. If one considers mobile warfare to be 'running oneself ragged' [16] and abandons this form of combat to head-on attack large cities where the enemy's strength is concentrated, it may bring extremely grave consequences!" Wang Zhen only later realized that Mao Zedong's remarks were, in essence, directed at Wang Ming's "Left" adventurist errors [17].
Mao Zedong stood up and paced back and forth by the table: "Wang Zhen! There is another very important issue, which is to pay great attention to correcting the simplification and expansion of the 'Suppression of Counter-revolutionaries.' The Central Bureau of the Soviet Area has already issued a document, which you will see upon your return. Judging from the reports, you in the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area have arrested quite a few people. There are some counter-revolutionaries, but certainly not that many. After you return, anyone who has been locked up but whose case cannot be clearly verified must be released!"
At the time of parting, Mao Zedong took down three books from the shelf—“Left-Wing” Communism: An Infantile Disorder, The State and Revolution, and Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism—and gave them to Wang Zhen. Wang Zhen was very pleased: "Chairman, please sign them!" Mao Zedong signed his name in each book and wrote on the flyleaf of one: "Please have the Hunan-Jiangxi Provincial Party Committee and Provincial Government print this by mimeograph or lithography, and let comrades Yuan Desheng, Wang Shoudao, Wang Zhen, Li Tianzhu, and Tan Sicong read these books carefully."
During his more than three months in Ruijin, Wang Zhen and other comrades of the delegation, in addition to attending the All-China Soviet Congress, visited the Red Army School and went to Donggu, Longgang, Huichang, and other places to offer greetings to the Central Red Army. Wang Zhen also paid visits to other leading comrades such as Zhou Enlai, Wang Jiaxiang, Ye Jianying, and Peng Dehuai.
III. Meeting Chairman Mao while attending the Second All-China Soviet Congress
On January 22, 1934, the Second National Congress of the Chinese Soviet opened in Shaheba, Ruijin. Wang Zhen, the Party branch secretary of the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area delegation, and Tan Yubao, the delegation leader, led the group in attendance. The central theme of the meeting was to concentrate all forces to smash the Fifth "Encirclement and Suppression" campaign [18], striving for the greatest and most thorough victory in the revolutionary war and for the victory of the revolution throughout China.
Just two days before the closing of the Second All-China Soviet Congress, Wang Zhen received notice that as soon as the meeting ended, the Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission wanted to hear his report on the military work of the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area and discuss the operational principles for the Fifth Counter-"Encirclement and Suppression" campaign in that region. The military reporting meeting for the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area was presided over by Bo Gu, General Secretary of the CPC Central Committee, and Otto Braun (Li De), the central military advisor. During the report, when Wang Zhen spoke of the situation where the enemy was strong and we were weak, and the enemy was large and we were small, he expressed his intention to continue implementing the sixteen-character formula [19]—"The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue"—fully relying on the strength of the armymen and civilians of the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area to lure the enemy in deep, using mobile and guerrilla warfare to disperse the enemy's forces while relatively concentrating our own to eliminate them one by one and gradually change the balance of power. He was angrily rebuked by Otto Braun, and a heated confrontation ensued between Wang Zhen, Braun, and others.
After the reporting meeting ended, Wang Zhen saw Mao Zedong again. Mao Zedong learned the specific details of the report from Wang Zhen. He approved of Wang Zhen’s approach and encouraged him to still use those "sixteen characters" and avoid head-on attacks. "In particular, the northern troops are good at defending; if they build fortifications, then do not attack them. Only in this way can you preserve a whole piece of territory and prepare a foothold for the 17th Division's return to the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area. However, some people criticize me, saying that laying ambushes is the 'Romance of the Three Kingdoms' [20] line. I say, I read Romance of the Three Kingdoms in my youth and haven't read it for many years, but the impression remains quite deep. You can convey these words of mine truthfully to Comrade [Ren] Bishhi when you return. As for other unrelated comrades, do not speak of it!"
Wang Zhen nodded and asked further: "Then what about the 'blockhouse against blockhouse' approach mentioned by Comrades Otto Braun and Bo Gu?"
Mao Zedong replied immediately: "Of course that must also be conveyed. Mine is my personal opinion; theirs represents the opinion of the Central Committee and the Central Revolutionary Military Commission." Following this, Mao Zedong asked about other conditions in the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area and inquired warmly about Ren Bishhi’s health and work.
Finally, Mao Zedong said to Wang Zhen: "Originally, the Central Committee determined that you would go to the Soviet Union to participate in the Seventh Congress of the Communist International. I have suggested that Comrades Teng Daiyuan and Gao Zili go instead; you should not go. As it happens, Comrade Bishhi sent a special telegram urging you to return quickly. After the 17th Division moved north to the Nan-Xun Railway, your Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area has been at a grave and critical juncture; it much needs a cadre like you who is familiar with the region. Wang Zhen is a man of Hunan-Jiangxi; you, Wang Zhen, should return to Hunan-Jiangxi and go count the stones on the Jinggang Mountains!" [21]
Wang Zhen indicated he would return to Hunan-Jiangxi immediately, but Mao Zedong suggested he set out after attending the rally commemorating the 11th anniversary of the "February 7th" General Strike [22]. Upon parting, Mao Zedong held Wang Zhen's hand firmly and said: "Your Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area has a good mass base and good terrain. I wish you new victories in the struggle against the 'Encirclement and Suppression'!" Wang Zhen, looking at the somewhat haggard Mao Zedong, said with great emotion: "I hope the Chairman takes care of his health!"
Before returning to the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area, Wang Zhen visited Liu Bocheng, Chief of the General Staff of the Central Revolutionary Military Commission and the Headquarters of the Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army. From Liu Bocheng, Wang Zhen learned that during his absence from Hunan-Jiangxi, Bo Gu and Otto Braun’s "blockhouse against blockhouse" [23] strategy had already been implemented in the region. On February 1, the enemy's 15th Division, acting on the orders of Liu Jianxu, commander of the first column of the Hunan provincial enemy forces, began its offensive against the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area. On the night of the 5th, Wang Dongyuan, commander of the enemy's 15th Division, personally led the 44th Brigade and a regiment of the 43rd Brigade to launch a surprise attack and occupy Longyuan口, located behind the flank of our Qixiling position. On the 6th, the enemy attacked our Qixiling positions from two sides. Defending Qixiling were part of the Red Army School and the guard units of the Hunan-Jiangxi Military District. Outnumbered, they resisted step by step. On the 7th, the enemy captured our army's positions at Zhuoyuan North Mountain and Putao Ridge near Qiuxi in Yongxin County. At 2:00 PM, the 18th Division, positioned in the Lujiang area for mobile combat tasks, arrived to counterattack, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. After occupying the positions at Longyuan口, the enemy's 15th Division paused to build blockhouses and stockpile supplies, preparing for the next offensive toward Yongxin. Our army also constructed fortifications in the Yanjiang and Donghualing areas of Yongxin County to prepare for the enemy's attack.
Hearing this, Wang Zhen pondered for a moment and said: "Chief of General Staff Liu, I see that if we keep matching blockhouse against blockhouse, we will inevitably be broken. We must still use that 'sixteen-character formula'—circling around and laying ambushes!" Liu Bocheng smiled and said: "In your conversation with Chairman Mao, did he mention laying ambushes?" It turned out that Liu Bocheng had long since publicly questioned Otto Braun’s tactics and had engaged in fierce disputes with him. When Wang Zhen introduced Mao Zedong’s views on the Fifth Counter-"Encirclement and Suppression" in the Hunan-Jiangxi Soviet Area, Liu Bocheng sighed with deep feeling: "Chairman Mao is the experienced one after all! After you return, fight according to the methods Chairman Mao spoke of. You must never act like a tethered ox!" [24]
Ren Bishhi, Wang Zhen, Xiao Ke, and others did not fail Chairman Mao’s expectations. On April 5, 1934, after more than three hours of fierce fighting, the Shashi ambush by the Sixth Red Army Corps completely annihilated the enemy's crack 43rd Brigade. In addition to a large number of enemy killed or wounded, more than 1,000 prisoners were taken, and over 1,000 weapons of various types were captured. The Battle of Shashi was the greatest victory in the Fifth Counter-"Encirclement and Suppression" of the Hunan-Jiangxi Revolutionary Base Area. This not only eased the difficulties of maintaining the struggle in the area but also forced the enemy to divert the 53rd Division under Li Baobing and the Independent 46th Brigade from the forces "encircling" the Central Soviet Area to fight in the Hunan-Jiangxi region. Furthermore, the enemy increased reinforcements to strengthen defenses on the west bank of the Gan River to prevent our army's eastward movement. To a certain extent, this reduced the enemy's pressure on the Central Red Army and supported the counter-"encirclement" struggle of the Central Revolutionary Base Area.
One morning in February 1985, Zhou Renjie, who had retired from the position of Deputy Commander of the Navy, said: "During the Battle of Shashi, I was the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 51st Regiment of the 17th Division. At that time, while the Central Soviet Area was under the dominance of Wang Ming’s 'Left' opportunist line and the Central Red Army was suffering successive setbacks in the Fifth Counter-'Encirclement and Suppression,' our Sixth Red Army Corps achieved a major victory by annihilating an entire enemy brigade despite the grim situation and difficult circumstances. There were many reasons for the victory, of course, but the most important and critical was that Comrade Wang Zhen brought back Chairman Mao’s instructions on ambush, mobile, and annihilation warfare from the Central Soviet Area, and Comrades Ren Bishhi, Wang Zhen, and Xiao Ke decisively excluded the interference of people like Liu Shijie and Chen Hongshi, resolutely and conscientiously implementing Chairman Mao’s instructions!"
(Author: Former Vice President and Deputy Secretary of the Party Leadership Group of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Researcher) Online Editor: Tongxin Source: Biannual Tide (Bǎinián Cháo), 2023, Issue 3