Yan Shaohua: Historical Experience and Enlightenments of the CPC's Handling of Religious Issues in Southern Xinjiang in the 1950s
The southern region of Xinjiang (Southern Xinjiang) is an area where ethnic minorities live in compact communities. Historically, religion has exerted a profound influence on the politics, economy, law, culture, and social customs of Southern Xinjiang. In the 1950s, particularly after the establishment of the socialist system, Southern Xinjiang faced the major historical task of guiding religion to adapt to socialist society. The Southern Xinjiang region conscientiously implemented the Party’s policy of freedom of religious belief and adhered to the separation of church and state. By uniting and educating personages from religious circles to establish an anti-feudal united front, the local religious situation underwent a fundamental transformation. Individuals gained the freedom not to believe in religion, making religious belief a matter of personal choice. A significant group of non-believers emerged among the ethnic minorities, a phenomenon unprecedented in the history of Southern Xinjiang. During this stage, the Party’s handling of religious issues in Southern Xinjiang was characterized by being cautious, steady, flexible, and progressive. This approach successfully achieved its goals without causing major social upheavals, and ensured that people of all ethnic groups in Southern Xinjiang truly enjoyed the freedom to believe or not believe in religion. This historical experience still provides important enlightenment for handling religious issues in Xinjiang under the current new situation.
I. Propaganda and Implementation of the Policy of Freedom of Religious Belief
Respecting and protecting the freedom of religious belief is one of the basic policies of the Communist Party of China toward religion. In the 1950s, the ethnic minority masses in Southern Xinjiang "generally believed in Islam and possessed deep religious concepts." [1] To effectively carry out work among the masses, unite the broad populace, stabilize social order, promote social democratic reforms, and complete the socialist transformation, the Southern Xinjiang region adhered to the principle of the separation of church and state. It adopted a cautious, steady, and flexible approach to propagate the policy of freedom of religious belief and guided religion to gradually adapt to the fledgling socialist society.
(1) Strategically Propagating the Party’s Policy of Freedom of Religious Belief
During the Republic of China period, to oppose the spread of Marxism-Leninism in Xinjiang and to counter the Soviet Union and the Three Districts Revolution [2], the Kuomintang reactionaries deliberately exploited the differences in belief between the Communist Party and religion, spreading rumors that communism intended to eliminate religion. Consequently, Wang Enmao, then First Secretary of the Southern Xinjiang Regional Party Committee, pointed out that in the early period after entering Xinjiang, propaganda among the masses should focus on the freedom to believe, while temporarily refraining from propagating the freedom not to believe. He stated: "Propagating the policy of freedom of religious belief will allow the masses to understand that this freedom is guaranteed by the laws of the People’s Government. This will shatter the rumors spread by counter-revolutionaries that the People’s Government is 'anti-religion' or 'extinguishing religion,' thereby strengthening the close relationship between the People’s Government and the people." [3] Comprehensive propaganda and implementation of the Party's policy of freedom of religious belief would wait until conditions were essentially ripe. The Party’s propaganda in Southern Xinjiang broke the "Communist Party wants to eliminate religion" rumors manufactured by the Kuomintang reactionaries and stabilized the religious sentiments of the believing masses. During the early period of the Party's governance in Southern Xinjiang, this policy laid a solid mass foundation for the believing masses to enthusiastically participate in socialist construction and respond to various Party calls; it also helped consolidate the Party’s governing foundation and maintain ethnic unity and the unification of the motherland.
With the successful completion of democratic reforms and socialist transformation, social conditions in Southern Xinjiang underwent significant changes. On one hand, the backward social economy saw substantial improvement, the political consciousness of the masses was raised, and Party organizations experienced considerable growth. Party organizations at all levels were generally established throughout the region, developing a large number of Party members from various ethnic groups. The Party established high prestige among the masses of all ethnicities, and its policy of freedom of religious belief became understood by more and more people, providing a preliminary basis for further work. On the other hand, democratic reform and socialist transformation objectively weakened the influence and foundation of religion, touching the vital interests of the feudal religious privileged class. Stubborn elements within the feudal landlord class, unwilling to accept the elimination of the system of exploitation, attacked the Party's leadership and the socialist system, utilizing religion to carry out various sabotage activities. Simultaneously, backward elements within religious circles, unwilling to see religious power weakened, attempted to restore certain abolished feudal religious privileges, forcing adolescents to study scriptures, coercing others to fast and perform prayers, and wantonly attacking and slandering Party and Youth League members who did not believe in religion. Between 1952 and 1955, a series of separatist and sabotage activities using religion occurred; for instance, four organized, programmed, and planned counter-revolutionary riots occurred consecutively in the Hotan region. In response to these issues, on March 5, 1958, the Regional Party Committee issued the "Opinions on Comprehensively Propagating the Freedom of Religious Belief Among the Masses in Combination with the Socialist and Communist Education Movements." This document exposed and criticized bad people and deeds within religious circles, struck at the reactionary arrogance of stubborn elements, and decided to comprehensively propagate the Party’s policy of freedom of religious belief throughout Xinjiang. It emphasized the need to propagate both the aspect of freedom to believe and the freedom not to believe, determining that the propagation should proceed in steps—first among Party and League members, then among the general masses—thereby ensuring the smooth progress of education.
At the same time, the Southern Xinjiang Regional Party Committee also emphasized propaganda and education in Marxist atheism. In March 1950, in his "Report Requesting Instructions on Religious Issues" written to the Xinjiang Sub-bureau, Wang Enmao emphasized: "We Communists do not believe in religion; on the contrary, according to the viewpoint of historical materialism, we believe that religion, like political parties and the state, will eventually wither away." However, this withering away requires long-term education and continuous social progress. Therefore, in the long run, atheistic propaganda and education are necessary. From the second half of 1958 to the end of 1960, Southern Xinjiang continued to implement the policy of freedom of religious belief. In combination with the rectification of People's Communes, the socialist and communist education movements, and the development of industry, agriculture, science, education, culture, and health, atheistic education was first conducted within the Party to help Communist Party members draw a clear line between communism and religious belief. Simultaneously, struggles against bad people and deeds were carried out among the upper strata of religion. On June 6, 1959, while conducting reforms of the religious system, the Regional Party Committee proposed beginning atheistic education within the Party, in colleges and universities, and among cadres at or above the county level, noting that atheistic education is a long-term process of ideological education.
In short, the Party’s flexible and strategic propaganda of the policy of freedom of religious belief in Southern Xinjiang not only upheld the Marxist view of religion and consolidated the guiding ideology of scientific atheism of the Communist Party of China, but also successfully caused the rumors of "the Communist Party wanting to eliminate religion" to collapse. This thoroughly dispelled the doubts and worries of the believing masses and religious personages of all ethnicities regarding "the Communist Party not allowing people to believe in religion," unified ideological understanding, stabilized the religious sentiments of the masses, and greatly won the trust and support of the people and religious circles for the Party and the government.
(2) Adhering to the Separation of Church and State and Correctly Handling Religious Interference in Administration, Justice, Marriage, and Education
In the early period of the founding of the People's Republic of China, religious interference in administration, justice, marriage, and education remained widespread in Southern Xinjiang. While protecting legal religious activities, the Communist Party of China consistently adhered to the principle of the separation of church and state. It carried out extensive and in-depth propaganda among the masses of all ethnicities in Southern Xinjiang, asserting that religious belief is a personal matter of the citizen and that no one may use religion to interfere in administration, justice, marriage, or education. At the same time, based on the principles of acknowledging history and taking reality into account, it adopted the practice of allowing temporary existence followed by gradual abolition, effectively avoiding conflicts between religious personages/believing masses and the Party/government.
First, the separation of education and religion was upheld. In the early days of New China in Southern Xinjiang, modern schools had not yet been properly established, and it was impossible to expand and develop them on a large scale. The children of the general populace mostly preferred to enter scripture schools (madrassas), and the consciousness of the broad masses had not yet reached the level of demanding the abolition of these schools. Therefore, the Southern Xinjiang Regional Party Committee believed that conditions for abolishing scripture schools were not yet ripe. However, they held that "it is possible and necessary to carry out reforms in various scripture schools, such as opposing forced attendance, abolishing reactionary preaching, and adding courses with some New Democratic political content." [4] Meanwhile, according to the educational policies of the Common Program [5], the old educational system was reformed, various old-style schools were transformed, and universal education was implemented in a planned and step-by-step manner. Secondary and higher education were strengthened, technical education was emphasized, and spare-time education for laborers and on-the-job education for cadres were enhanced, alongside the vigorous cultivation of a teaching force. By the late 1950s, all levels and types of education in Southern Xinjiang had seen significant development; a relatively complete modern national education system was preliminarily established, and religion and education were gradually separated.
Second, the separation of the judiciary and marriage from religion was upheld. In August 1952, during the process of implementing the spirit of the Second Regional Party Congress, some religious personages proposed the establishment of religious courts and requested that the government recognize "Triple Talaq" [6]. On June 18, 1953, the United Front Work Department of the Xinjiang Sub-bureau of the CPC Central Committee gave a clear reply: "Regarding the issue of religious courts, it should be explained to the religious circles that our country can only have one set of laws and cannot have two sets of laws coexisting. Therefore, all legal disputes involving marriage, land, property, and civil affairs shall be handled by the People’s Courts; religion shall not interfere with the state judiciary. ... Regarding marriage issues... all divorce and marriage procedures shall be managed by the relevant government organs." [7]
The Party's implementation of the policy of freedom of religious belief in Southern Xinjiang held epoch-making significance for the ethnic minorities there. Religion no longer interfered in administration, justice, marriage, or education, and religious belief truly became a matter of personal choice for citizens. The Party’s religious work in Southern Xinjiang received the heartfelt support of the people of all ethnic groups, laying a mass foundation for rent reduction, the fight against local tyrants, land reform, socialist transformation, and the democratic reform of the religious system.
II. Cautiously and Steadily Advancing the Democratic Reform of Religion
In Chinese history, religion was often intertwined with feudal political and economic systems, becoming a tool for the oppression and exploitation of the broad believing masses. After the founding of New China, these feudal privileges and systems of exploitation were detrimental to the political, ideological, and economic liberation of the believing masses. When promoting democratic reform, the Southern Xinjiang Regional Party Committee and government fully considered the mass character and complexity of religion, adopting more cautious and steady steps.
(1) Cautiously and Steadily Handling Religious Issues within Democratic Reform
After the founding of New China, the CPC Central Committee instructed that democratic reform in Xinjiang must resolutely implement the policy of "caution and steady progress," deeply mobilizing the people of all ethnic groups, uniting all forces that can be united, and carrying out the struggle in a led and step-by-step manner. A series of steady and progressive measures were taken to successfully complete the task of overthrowing the landlord class and to create a solid social foundation for the reform of the religious system.
In carrying out democratic reform in Xinjiang, the primary issue was how to handle the Waqf [8] lands. The Waqf system was a feudal system of exploitation cloaked under the guise of Islam, serving as a tool for a small number of religious feudal lords and the religious upper strata to exploit the broad masses of Muslim laborers. There were many types of Waqf lands; in 1952, Deng Liqun and Gu Bao investigated and found 24 different names, which could be roughly divided into six categories of ownership. [9] Numerous drawbacks and instances of chaos existed in the ownership, management, and distribution of income of Waqf lands. Its existence, like the general feudal land ownership system, seriously hindered the development of agricultural productive forces in Southern Xinjiang and was once a major social problem in the rural areas of the region.
Given the religious nature and complexity of Waqf lands, the Southern Xinjiang Regional Party Committee and government, following the guiding principle of "caution and steady progress," issued instructions on August 11, 1951, regarding the mobilization of the masses for rent reduction and the struggle against local tyrants. They proposed policies and slogans for adjusting land tenancy relations, first redistributing various Waqf lands possessed or occupied by the landlord class to peasants with little or no land for cultivation. Once proposed, this measure immediately mobilized the broad peasantry, fundamentally reforming the Waqf system—which the landlord class had used for years to annex land and plunder peasant property—in terms of its usage relations. During the Land Reform movement, parts of the Waqf lands continued to be redistributed to local peasants, giving former landless serfs their own land. At the same time, mosques and lamasery temples were allowed to retain a portion of temple land and property to maintain temple expenses and the livelihood of professional religious personnel. These measures were approved and supported by the believing masses and religious personages, ensuring the smooth progress of land reform. When the socialist transformation movement reached its climax, influenced by the transformation, the ideological state of most religious personages showed various degrees of progress compared to before, and they displayed proactive attitudes. In rural areas, 70%–75% of professional religious personnel successively joined agricultural producer cooperatives. In cities, some professional religious personnel, depending on their family circumstances—those primarily engaged in farming joined agricultural cooperatives, while those primarily in commerce joined joint state-private enterprises (including cooperative stores, groups, and sales agencies). [10] Meanwhile, to increase their income, some professional religious personnel began to actively participate in productive labor.
Professional religious personnel gradually became decoupled from Waqf religious lands and actively threw themselves into socialist construction to adapt to democratic reform, laying the foundation for the subsequent thorough abolition of the system of religious exploitation.
(2) Promoting the Democratic Reform of the Religious System...
In 1956, the socialist transformation was basically completed and the socialist system was fundamentally established; the people of all ethnic groups in Southern Xinjiang, alongside the people of the entire country, entered into a socialist society. Under the leadership of the Party, the socialist consciousness of the masses in Southern Xinjiang saw a significant increase, making the abolition of religious feudal privileges and the system of feudal exploitation an inevitable requirement. In January 1959, the Party Committee of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) convened the Seventh United Front Work Conference. In accordance with the spirit of the Report on Current Issues Regarding Work on Islam and Lamaism [11] issued by the Party Group of the State Nationalities Affairs Commission and approved by the CPC Central Committee, and in integration with the realities of Xinjiang, the committee proposed targeted reforms of the religious system in Xinjiang. In April, the XUAR Party Committee issued the Directive on the Reform of Islamic and Lamaist Systems, deciding to carry out religious system reforms in conjunction with various other tasks.
1. Gradually abolishing religious feudal privileges
First, the feudal privilege system of "granting huan" [12] was abolished. In the Islam of that time, systems of religious privilege such as "huan" and "casket money" were very severe. All actions of the believers and the appointment or removal of mosque akhunds [13] had to seek a "huan" from the religious leader. The jiaofang [14] system seriously interfered in all aspects of the lives of the religious populace, arbitrarily threatening or even punishing believers deemed to have violated religious doctrines or rules. Tibetan Buddhism (Lamaism) similarly possessed religious privileges, such as the occupation of large numbers of livestock and grasslands, employing laborers for herding without pay; apportioning significant sutra-chanting expenses to the masses five times a year, ranging from 300 to 1,000 yuan each time; and chanting for the deceased, which, in addition to the gratuitous handover of the deceased's clothing and horses to the lama, required payment ranging from 100 to 700 yuan. Chanting was also required during droughts or seasonal migrations, costing hundreds of yuan per instance. The Report on Current Issues Regarding Work on Islam and Lamaism pointed out: "Abolish all feudal privileges of religion, including the unauthorized appointment of tribal headmen and the private stockpiling of weapons by akhunds." In the main contents of religious system reform proposed at the Seventh United Front Work Conference of the Autonomous Region Party Committee, the first item was the abolition of all religious feudal privileges, such as the unauthorized appointment of akhunds and the granting of "huan." Following the spirit of these instructions from the Central Committee and the Autonomous Region Party Committee, the Southern Xinjiang regional party committees resolutely abolished religious feudal privileges such as the inheritance of religious leadership and the "granting of huan."
Second, the privilege of forced religious belief was abolished. Before the founding of New China, the religious privileged class forced the masses to engage in religious activities; failure to believe or participate resulted in severe punishment. According to the recollections of a resident from a village in Kashgar, in the past, if an adult male did not go to the mosque to perform namaz [15], the village landlord would instigate people to seize him and paint his face black. If it happened in winter, they might pour cold water on him or simply throw him into a laoba (reservoir) [16] to soak. At that time, if a man did not perform prayer and wanted to avoid punishment, he had to either travel far away or lie in bed pretending to be ill. The Southern Xinjiang regional party committees resolutely implemented the spirit of the Directive on the Reform of Islamic and Lamaist Systems. While protecting the masses' freedom of religious belief, they emphasized the freedom of the masses not to believe. It was forbidden to force children and adolescents to recite sutras or attend scripture schools, or to force youth to become mullahs or lamas. No one was permitted to discriminate against lamas returning to secular life to start families and careers. Temples and mosques were prohibited from forcing the masses to become lamas, forcing the fast, or forcing children to study scripture. Lamas were granted the freedom to return to secular life.
Third, the privilege of religious interference in secular life was abolished. Historically, figures in religious circles wielded great power, constantly interfering in all aspects of the lives of ethnic minority masses. Beyond punishing artisans and peasants who did not perform namaz or observe the fast, they managed transactions in the bazaars (markets). Akhunds had to be invited to recite prayers or apply their seals as witnesses for marriages, divorces, births, infant circumcisions, funerals, the division of inheritance, tenancies, mortgaging or sale of land, loans, and the slaughter of livestock. In many matters involving Muslim marriage, property inheritance, debt, and neighborhood disputes, "arbitration" was often carried out by religious judges. According to the aforementioned conference spirit and documentary directives, after 1958, all such religious feudal privileges interfering in secular life in Southern Xinjiang were abolished.
Fourth, the privilege of religious leaders to privately establish religious schools was abolished. Before the founding of New China, religious leaders established private religious schools where children as young as four had to begin studying scriptures. The religious system reform required the abolition of this privilege. Simultaneously, a large number of public schools, community-run schools, and literacy classes were established, and the vast majority of people entered national education schools or joined the workforce.
Due to the abolition of the feudal privileges of religious leaders, the civil rights, personal freedoms, and private property of the working people were secured. The phenomenon of religious institutions infringing upon judicial, fiscal, educational, and even diplomatic powers ceased to exist. All of this merely removed the feudal privileges of religious leaders and did not hinder the normal religious beliefs of the people in the slightest. Mosques and mazars [17] remained open as before, and religious masses had full freedom to engage in religious activities. Therefore, the abolition of these privileges also received the heartfelt support of the religious masses.
2. Gradually abolishing the feudal temple and mosque management system
In the early period of New China, the mosques in Southern Xinjiang were primarily divided by parish. Within each parish, mosques were further categorized into different levels; they were not independent but maintained a hierarchical relationship of subordination. The Aksu City Gazetteer records: In the old days, the division of the Aksu County parishes followed three levels—administrative region, county, and sub-county district. County and district-level parishes had akhund offices responsible for managing religious affairs in that area and appointing subordinate religious personnel. The Qazi Guzat [18] was the highest akhund, the leader of the entire county's faith, who managed all religious activities, appointed and removed district-level leaders and akhunds, and witnessed various contracts and documents.
The hierarchy within mosques was also prominent. Orthodox sects [19] in various locations appointed akhunds such as Alam, Mufti, Qazi, and Rais [20] to manage local religious affairs. These akhunds were appointed by Wangs, Beis, and Begs [21] during the Qing Dynasty, and by the county governments during the Republican period. County-level grand akhunds had the power to appoint and remove religious heads such as Alams, Qazis, and Raises in the districts below the county level.
Mosques also had a system of punishing believers through religious courts. Any believer who violated religious law was interrogated by the Qazi, sentenced by the Mufti, and, upon approval by the Alam, the sentence was carried out by personnel organized by the Rais. Penalties ranged from fines for minor offenses to both beatings and fines for serious ones. Religious courts handled cases based on religious regulations and could pass sentences of death, imprisonment, fines, corporal punishment, and various other penalties.
In addition to Islam, the feudal management system in Lamaism (Tibetan Buddhism) was also prominent, featuring systems such as forced service (where believers performed periodic corvée labor for the temple) and the "son-sending system" (where according to Lamaist regulations, one of every two sons had to be sent to become a lama). Strict constraints were also placed on the spiritual and material lives of believers through religious rules and discipline.
In January 1959, following the democratic reform of the religious system, temple and mosque management systems that were out of step with the times were basically abolished. Democratic Management Committees were generally established in all temples and mosques. Within the scope of the Constitution and laws, these committees led the temples and mosques in conducting normal religious activities and protected the lawful rights and interests of the religious masses.
3. Gradually abolishing religious exploitation
Before the founding of New China, the religious income of Islamic clergy primarily came from three sources: first, collecting rent and interest from property owned by religious institutions, collectively known as waqf [22]. This mainly consisted of waqf land, but also included waqf houses and water mills; second, religious taxes and tithes; third, other religious income. These were the primary channels through which religion oppressed and exploited believers under the feudal system. Abolishing the economic roots of religious oppression and exploitation became one of the key components of the religious system reform.
During the democratic reforms, some waqf lands were redistributed to peasants with little or no land, which received wide support from the masses. In 1958, following the spirit of the Central Committee's instructions on religious system reform, Southern Xinjiang began taking measures to thoroughly abolish the remaining feudal religious land exploitation system. During the People's Commune movement, religious lands belonging to temples and mosques were transferred to collective ownership, bringing a complete end to the religious feudal land system.
In addition to waqf land, religious taxes were a heavy burden on the Muslim masses. Before the founding of New China, the religious taxes collected year-round mainly included ushr grain, zakat, fitr, qibuli grain, livestock taxes, Eid al-Adha gifts, nazir, and ziyat [23]. After the founding of New China, although the religious burden on the masses was greatly reduced, it was not fundamentally eliminated. In December 1958, the Report on Current Issues Regarding Work on Islam and Lamaism pointed out that it was necessary to abolish "the ownership of means of production, usury, and the exploitation system of unpaid labor by lamaist temples and mosques, and to ban illegal commerce," as well as to abolish "the acts of temples and mosques to extort property from the masses... though voluntary offerings by the masses shall not be interfered with." The Seventh United Front Work Conference of the Autonomous Region Party Committee explicitly proposed "abolishing the ownership of means of production, land leasing, and unpaid labor exploitation systems of temples and mosques. Religious pretexts shall not be used to forcibly apportion expenses or extort property from the masses; religious taxes such as 'ushr' and 'zakat' are abolished." From then on, all religious taxation systems incompatible with the socialist system were thoroughly abolished.
By 1960, Southern Xinjiang had basically completed the democratic reform of the religious system. Through these reforms, religious feudal privileges, feudal temple/mosque management systems, and feudal exploitation were basically eliminated. The economic burden on the working people was greatly lightened, creating favorable conditions for the masses of all ethnic groups to develop production and improve their lives, and laying the political foundation for the compatibility of religion with socialist society.
III. Establishing an Anti-Feudal United Front with Religious Figures
The United Front is a political advantage and strategic policy of the Communist Party of China to rally people's hearts and pool their strengths. Since religious figures hold a special status and role among the ethnic minority masses—most of whom are believers—the Southern Xinjiang regional party committees and government fully considered the specific circumstances of religious figures and established an anti-feudal united front with them. Consequently, the Party's governance in Southern Xinjiang received the understanding and support of the broad masses of religious figures, greatly reducing various forms of resistance.
(1) Alleviating the Doubts of Religious Figures
In the early stages of New China, religious figures in Southern Xinjiang generally lacked clarity regarding the Party's religious policies. Rumors were circulating that akhunds and all those who relied on religion for their livelihood would be classified as "landlords," and that mosques would be turned into warehouses. In a township in the Tashihong District of Shule County, a symposium for religious figures was held; of the 20-plus akhunds in attendance, only a few wore the traditional white cloth on their heads, while the others did not dare to. An imam from a middle-peasant background in the Se'ai District of Shufu County (a pilot area for land reform) heard that the Land Reform Team had arrived; he stayed home praying and weeping, fearing he would be classified as a landlord and subjected to "struggle" sessions. Among the Xinjiang representatives attending the second enlarged meeting of the Islamic Association of China, some believed that after the socialist transformation, there would no longer be freedom of religious belief and no one would become an akhund in the future.
In response to this situation, Wang Enmao [24] wrote in a report to the Xinjiang Sub-bureau of the CPC Central Committee in March 1950: "I believe the method of holding akhund conferences is effective." In September, at a meeting of Southern Xinjiang regional county party secretaries and officers above the regiment level, he pointed out: "We should not only not oppose the akhunds, but must also unite with and utilize progressive akhunds to participate in the patriotic movement, the defense of world peace, and the support of Various policies and decrees of the People's Government, and through them, overcome certain bad behaviors among the akhunds." On October 22 and November 20, 1951, the Xinjiang Sub-bureau successively required party committees at all levels to publicize the justice of the "reduce rent and resist local tyrants" campaign and related policies through symposiums with akhunds and mullahs, alleviating their ideological concerns and winning their support for the peasants' liberation movement, while ensuring that the interests of religious figures and their families were looked after during the campaign.
(2) Distinguishing Religious Clergy from Landlord-Despots
During the movement to "reduce rent and resist local tyrants," the peasants of Southern Xinjiang, in the process of struggling against the landlord class, sometimes acted without restraint due to a lack of understanding. They struggled against anyone who had oppressed them, often grouping akhunds who engaged in religious exploitation together with the local despots. In response to these phenomena, Secretary Wang Enmao carefully reflected and pointed out that "not every akhund is a landlord, nor is every landlord an akhund." He noted: "Specific analysis must be conducted regarding the akhunds. Do not casually raise slogans against them, nor can we eliminate them. In the campaign to reduce rent and resist tyrants and the subsequent land reform, we must pay attention to uniting with religious figures... appropriate care should be given to their interests, but this must never hinder the progress of the rent reduction and land reform movements."
Secondly, the Party adopted different approaches for different categories of religious personages. Ordinary rural religious practitioners could receive a share of the fruits of land reform just like the peasants. For religious personages whose families were of landlord status and who had past "sinful" records, provided they thoroughly complied with the law and reformed themselves, the masses were persuaded not to launch struggle sessions [26] against them, and they were given special consideration during the confiscation and distribution of property [27]. During the period of agricultural cooperation, religious personages with the capacity to work were encouraged to actively join cooperatives, participate in productive labor, and become self-reliant. For those who were elderly, had lost the capacity to work, lacked a source of income, or lived in urban areas without the conditions for labor, living allowances were distributed. Regarding those imams who were truly landlord-tyrants [28] requiring disposal, during the process of adjudication and public propaganda, they were addressed only as landlord-tyrants without mentioning their status as imams. This strategy succeeded in uniting the vast majority of law-abiding religious personages and the broad masses of believers.
The Party committees and governments of the Southern Xinjiang region differentiated religious clergy from landlord elements as a matter of policy. This significantly fractured the landlord class, narrowed the scope of those targeted for struggle, expanded the scope of unity, and stabilized the mindset of religious personages, becoming the key to advancing democratic reforms in Southern Xinjiang.
(3) Absorbing Representative Religious Figures into Land Reform Committees at All Levels
At the beginning of the land reform, religious personages, landlords, rich peasants, middle peasants, and poor and landless peasants all held different mentalities. By convening symposiums for religious personages, absorbing them into land reform committees, and organizing tours for them, the Southern Xinjiang region enabled them to understand the policies of land reform (as well as the socialist transformation of animal husbandry and private industry and commerce) and to participate in land reform propaganda. Consequently, they became an important force in promoting the smooth progress of land reform. On November 17, 1952, the United Front Work Department of the Southern Xinjiang Regional Party Committee held a symposium for democratic personages from thirty counties and one city in Southern Xinjiang. A total of 119 people attended, including 43 religious practitioners, and the participants were organized to visit land reform sites in nearby rural areas. Following deep and meticulous propaganda, figures from Islamic circles expressed to government staff their support for land reform [29].
In January 1953, Wang Enmao, then First Secretary of the Xinjiang Bureau, pointed out at the fifth meeting of cadres at or above the county level in the Southern Xinjiang region that the trial land reform in Southern Xinjiang from September to December 1952 was victorious and healthy. He noted that one of the experiences gained was the importance placed on anti-feudal united front work: by holding symposiums and various united front meetings for democratic personages, absorbing them into land reform committees, and adopting a policy of differential treatment toward the landlord class, the resistance to the land reform movement was reduced while its momentum increased. This earned broader social sympathy and was more conducive to fully mobilizing the masses [30].
(4) Strengthening Policy Education for Religious Personages
Prioritizing ideological education, breaking down narrow nationalism and the remnants of feudal exploitation left over from history, and gradually guiding religious personages to establish the resolve to take the socialist path and accept the leadership of the Communist Party of China—these are the paths to consolidating and developing the Party's united front with religious circles. In the early period of the New China, the Party primarily utilized various social reforms to conduct propaganda on relevant Party policies and carry out ideological education among patriotic religious personages through organized study and tours, leading them toward a gradual acceptance of socialist thought. As the cause of socialism developed further, ideological education for religious personages became increasingly regularized. From 1954 to 1955, various localities held study sessions to widely carry out propaganda and education on socialist transformation policies among religious personages. This helped them understand the policies and raise their awareness, persuading and educating religious clergy to actively participate in the "Three Great Transformations" [31]. Religious personages were then utilized to propagate Party policies to the masses, encouraging their active participation in socialist construction. Starting from February 1955, propaganda and education on patriotism and the policy of regional ethnic autonomy were carried out among people of all strata across Xinjiang, including religious personages, further strengthening unity among ethnic groups and maintaining social stability. In 1956, the Autonomous Region held the first study session for Islamic personages. Through these sessions, religious personages changed their erroneous concepts and participated actively in productive labor and socialist construction. According to statistics from the Kashgar City Annals, in October 1953, the United Front Work Department of the Kashgar Municipal Party Committee held a study class for 37 religious personages to study the Party's principles and policies to raise their political and ideological consciousness. Subsequently, from 1956 to 1965, more than ten study classes were held, organizing democratic, ethnic-religious, and industrial/commercial figures to study the Party's line, principles, and policies of various periods, ensuring they kept up with the situation and followed the Party. Each study class lasted about two to three months, with 50 to 60 participants. In 1959, a "study day" system for religious circles was established in Kashgar [32]. Through rectification [33], religious personages generally raised their ideological consciousness. For example, in Poskam (Zepu) County, the positive phenomenon of the "Four Absences" and "Four Abundances" appeared among religious circles [34].
IV. Experiences and Lessons from the Party’s Handling of Religious Issues in the Southern Xinjiang Region in the 1950s
History is the best textbook. The successful practice of the Party in handling religious issues in Southern Xinjiang during the 1950s constitutes important experience and a precious asset for the Party’s religious work. Conducting a historical investigation and summary of these experiences remains of significant reference value for today’s complete, accurate, and comprehensive implementation of the Party's strategy for governing Xinjiang in the New Era, and for handling religious issues under new circumstances.
(1) Religious Work Must Be Subordinate to and Serve the Party’s Central Work in Specific Periods
Marxism has always maintained that handling religious issues must be subordinate to and serve the Party’s central work during a given period. The Communist Party of China persists in continuously advancing the Sinicization and modernization of Marxism, combining the basic principles of Marxism with the specific realities of religion in China. Throughout a century of the Party’s religious work, it has proposed and developed a series of basic viewpoints and policies regarding religious issues, gradually forming a theory of religious work consistent with China’s national conditions—namely, the theory of religion with Chinese characteristics and the theory of religious work in the New Era.
During the period of socialist revolution and construction, the main task facing the Party was to achieve the transition from New Democracy to socialism, carry out the socialist revolution, and advance socialist construction, thereby laying the fundamental political prerequisites and institutional foundations for the transition toward the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation [35]. Therefore, the main task of the Party’s religious work during this period was the reform of the religious system for the sake of "prospering the country." The Party Central Committee fully took into account the specificity and complexity of religious issues in Xinjiang, believing that the conditions for religious system reform in Xinjiang were not yet ripe at that time. It was determined that the matter must be handled with caution and stability, flexibly addressing religious issues according to the central tasks of different stages. In the early 1950s, to shatter the rumor that "the Communist Party wants to eliminate religion," to win over and unite the broad masses of believers, and to consolidate the Party’s ruling foundation, the focus of the Party’s work was on propagating the freedom of religious belief. To ensure the smooth progress of land reform, a policy of establishing an anti-feudal united front with religious personages was adopted, absorbing them into land reform committees to ensure the smooth completion of democratic reforms. After 1958, greater importance was placed on propagating the freedom to not believe in religion to the broad masses, and atheistic propaganda and education were strengthened. By the end of 1958, the socialist system was basically established, and the political, social, and mass foundations for religious system reform were largely solidified, making religious system reform an inevitable requirement for social development and progress.
The Communist Party of China has never viewed religious issues in isolation but has always linked the handling of religious issues to the cause of revolution and construction. The specific tactics for implementing religious policies serve the central work of a particular period. Since the 18th CPC National Congress, socialism with Chinese characteristics has entered a New Era. The main task facing the Party is to achieve the First Centenary Goal, embark on a new journey toward the Second Centenary Goal, and continue advancing toward the grand objective of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Therefore, the key task of the Party’s religious work is to fully implement the Party’s theory of religious work in the New Era and better organize and guide believers to work together with the broad masses toward the goal of building a modern socialist power and realizing the Chinese Dream of the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In Xinjiang, implementing the Party's theory and policies on religious work in the New Era must also be subordinate to and serve the general objective of Xinjiang work—achieving social stability and long-term peace and security. The key task is to persist in the direction of the Sinicization of religions in China and actively guide religion to adapt to socialist society.
(2) The Principle of the Separation of Church and State Must Be Upheld
The state’s implementation of the separation of church and state, and the separation of education and religion, is one of the basic principles and attitudes of a Marxist party toward religion. In the 1950s, the CPC’s religious work in Southern Xinjiang was highly effective. The previously widespread phenomenon of religious interference in administration, justice, marriage, and education in Southern Xinjiang was gradually eliminated, and the principle of the separation of church and state was reflected more effectively. The ethnic minority masses bid farewell to the history of "universal religious belief," gained the freedom to not believe in religion, and gradually changed the situation where ethnicity and religion were indistinguishable.
In the New Era, in the process of implementing the policy of freedom of religious belief, the Party must uphold the principle of the separation of church and state so that religion truly becomes a private matter for individual citizens. Regarding the relationship between church and state, all religions must conduct religious activities within the scope permitted by national laws, regulations, and policies. They must not interfere in political or government affairs; they must not interfere in the implementation of state functions such as administration, justice, education, marriage, and family planning; they must not use religion to obstruct normal social, work, or life order, nor interfere in the secular life of citizens; and they must not use religion to oppose the leadership of the CPC and the socialist system or to undermine ethnic unity and national unity. Regarding the relationship between religion and ethnicity, religion should no longer carry the ethics and values of an entire ethnic group or collective in the form of faith, nor should it exist in an institutionalized "sacred" form. Instead, it should become an entirely private matter for citizens in the modern sense, serving only individual life by providing self-cultivation, self-discipline, psychological comfort, and spiritual support. Religion must not be bound to ethnicity; there is no such thing as a "Muslim ethnicity." Members of the Uyghur and other ethnic minorities may either believe or not believe in a religion, and they may believe in Islam or any other religion. No one may compel others to believe or not believe in a religion.
(3) Advancing the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang Must Persist in the Party’s Leadership
After Islam was introduced into Xinjiang, it began a process of localization, manifesting regional characteristics and ethnic features. The localization of Islam in Xinjiang was completed within the inertia and logic of Chinese history and culture, representing a gradual historical process from the surface to the interior. Historically, due to the mutual exploitation between the ruling classes and religion, Islam in Xinjiang never underwent major reforms of its religious system. Furthermore, it was impossible for Islam in Xinjiang to proactively develop a theory or system where the state was primary and religion subordinate, or where church and state were separated. This is one reason why the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang lacked depth, had a weak foundation, and progressed slowly. Following the establishment of the socialist system, in order to adapt to fundamental changes in the political and economic systems, the CPC began reforming the religious system. Since then, the face of Islam in Xinjiang has undergone fundamental changes, and the process of the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang has achieved a qualitative leap. The fundamental reason for this lies in the Party’s cautious, steady, yet resolute democratic reform of the religious system, which abolished religious institutions that were incompatible with the socialist political and economic systems.
In the New Era, to deeply advance the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang, we must persist in the Party’s leadership over religious work. Historical experience and realistic practice have repeatedly proven that for the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang to advance effectively, the principle of "state presence" must be upheld, highlighting the state's prominent position and the effectiveness of its role. The most essential characteristic of socialism with Chinese characteristics is the leadership of the Communist Party of China. The Party’s comprehensive, systematic, and holistic leadership over religious work is a vital link in the Party’s leadership over all work in the New Era. We must strengthen and improve the Party’s leadership over religious work in the New Era. Establishing and improving a strong leadership mechanism is one of the main components of the Party’s theory and policy on religious work in the New Era, as well as the fundamental political guarantee for doing this work well. As the guiding subject of the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang, the key for Party and government departments is to think deeply, see clearly, and grasp accurately when "guiding" [36]. They must ensure that guidance is methodical, powerful, and effective, firmly maintaining the initiative in religious work and ensuring the correct political direction for the Sinicization of Islam in Xinjiang. Specifically, Party and government departments mainly guide the overall situation and direction of the interpretation of religious classics, firmly establish national authority, and enhance national awareness, civic awareness, and the awareness of the rule of law. They guide Islam to be subordinate to and serve the overall situation of national governance, improve the religious governance system, and guide religious circles to consciously love the country and the Party, respect and abide by the law, adapt to society, and integrate into culture.
(About the Author: Yan Shaohua is an Associate Professor at the Party School of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Bingtuan Committee and a doctoral student in Religious Studies at Minzu University of China.)
Online Editor: Tong Xin
Fourth, we must promote the Sinicization of religion in our country by coordinating the "external drive" of government administration with the "internal drive" of religious self-transformation. Effectively handling religious issues in the border regions of Southern Xinjiang requires a persistent effort to guide religion toward compatibility with socialist society. During the 1950s, the Party actively encouraged and supported the patriotic transformation of religious circles. High-level religious figures were encouraged to interpret religious doctrines and canons in ways conducive to social harmony, progress, and health. This process established a group of patriotic religious personnel who loved their country and their faith, providing a solid internal foundation for maintaining stability in Southern Xinjiang and promoting the Sinicization of Islam.
In the New Era, the Sinicization of religion in China is a fundamental requirement for guiding religion toward compatibility with socialist society; it is a major task that must be persisted in over the long term. This process requires both the "external drive" of government administration—strengthening the rule of law in religious affairs and regulating religious activities according to the law—and the "internal drive" of religious circles themselves. On one hand, we must maintain the Party's leadership over religious work, persist in the direction of the Sinicization of religion, and improve the level of legalization in the governance of religious affairs. On the other hand, we must support religious circles in strengthening their own construction and enhancing their political consciousness. We should encourage the religious community to conduct "interpretation of scriptures" [37] activities, delving deep into the contents of doctrines and canons that are conducive to social harmony, modern progress, and healthy civilization, and providing interpretations that align with the requirements of the development and progress of contemporary China and the excellent traditional Chinese culture. By strengthening the "internal drive" of religious self-reform, we can effectively guard against the infiltration of religious extremism [38] and ensure that religion in China always develops in the correct direction.
Fifth, we must handle the relationship between "governing the surface" and "governing the root" [39] by persisting in people-centered development to fundamentally solve the problem. In the 1950s, the Party’s success in resolving religious issues in Southern Xinjiang was fundamentally rooted in its commitment to the mass line. By leading the people of all ethnic groups in Southern Xinjiang to carry out democratic reforms and socialist construction, the Party realized their fundamental interests and won their heartfelt support. This effectively undercut the mass base and social conditions that religious extremists and separatist forces relied upon. History has proven that the problem of Southern Xinjiang is ultimately a problem of development. Improving the people's livelihood and winning their hearts is the fundamental key to solving religious issues and maintaining long-term stability in the region.
The primary task in the New Era is to achieve high-quality development, and the ultimate goal remains the realization of common prosperity. To solve the deep-seated problems in Southern Xinjiang, we must always persist in the people-centered development philosophy. We must integrate the work of religious governance with the tasks of economic and social development, improving people’s livelihoods, and promoting ethnic unity. By accelerating the construction of a modern industrial system, improving the level of public services, and narrowing the gap between urban and rural areas as well as between different regions, we can ensure that people of all ethnic groups share in the fruits of reform and development. Only by making the masses truly feel the warmth of the Party’s care and the superiority of the socialist system can we fundamentally eliminate the social roots of religious extremism and achieve long-term peace and stability in Southern Xinjiang. This is the profound historical inspiration that the Party’s experience in handling religious issues in Southern Xinjiang during the 1950s provides for our current work in the New Era.