Michael Martin: Atheism, Agnosticism, and Theism
Michael Martin: Atheism, Agnosticism, and Theism
Translated by Han Qi
[Abstract] Atheism can be divided into positive atheism and negative atheism. Broadly defined, positive atheism refers to the lack of belief in all gods; narrowly defined, it refers to the lack of belief in a theistic God. Negative atheism, in a broad sense, refers to the absence of belief in any god or gods; in a narrow sense, it refers to the absence of belief in a theistic God. In reality, individuals often hold different atheistic perspectives based on differing concepts of God. Agnosticism can be divided into skeptical agnosticism and cancellation agnosticism. If God is defined as an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent creator of the universe, an atheist is understood as someone who does not believe such a God exists, and an agnostic is understood as someone who neither believes nor disbelieves in the existence of this God; then, if you are a non-believer, you should not simply suspend belief—on the contrary, it is more rational to be an atheist. Given that atheism is a truthful insight, should it be accepted by everyone? Some argue that although religious belief is incorrect, it has its benefits; Martin provides a deep analysis of the problems inherent in this view.
[Keywords] Atheism, Agnosticism, Positive Atheism, Negative Atheism, Theism
Atheism, Agnosticism, and Theism
The concept of atheism developed historically within the context of Western monotheism, and its application is clearest within this field. For instance, applying it to pre-modern or non-Western environments might lead to misunderstandings. Furthermore, even within the modern Western context, "atheism" carries different meanings depending on different concepts of God. Nevertheless, this article (Translator’s note: The original text uses "this book" because this section is the introduction Martin wrote for The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. Based on the overall arrangement of the full text, the translator has changed it to "this article" here) assumes that if we use the concept of atheism cautiously outside its clearest historical context, it will remain highly illuminating for contemporary Western readers.
If you look up "atheism" in a dictionary, you will find it defined as the belief that God does not exist. Undoubtedly, many people understand "atheism" in this way. However, if we look at the Greek roots of the word, this is not its meaning. In Greek, the prefix "a-" means "without" or "not," and "theos" means "god." (Gordon Stein, "The Meaning of Atheism and Agnosticism," in Gordon Stein (ed.), An Anthology of Atheism and Rationalism [Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1980], p. 3.) From this perspective, an atheist is a person without belief in a god; he or she does not necessarily need to be a person who believes that God does not exist. However, according to the common dictionary definition of "atheism," atheists do not merely lack belief in the existence of a god or gods; they also believe that a god or gods do not exist. This dictionary usage of the term should not be ignored. To avoid confusion, we shall call the latter "positive atheism," while calling the type of atheism derived from the original Greek roots "negative atheism."
We shall not attempt to provide a general definition of "god" here. However, it would be helpful to clarify the different concepts of God that have appeared traditionally in religious debates and discussions. In modern times, theism has generally come to mean belief in a personal God who takes an active interest in the world and has given humanity a specific revelation. Understood this way, theism differs clearly from deism, where belief in God is not based on revelation but on evidence from the natural world. Deists assume a God generally thought to be remote from the world and not closely concerned with its affairs. Theism also differs from polytheism, which refers to belief in more than one god. It is also distinct from pantheism, the belief that God is identical to nature.
Thus, negative atheism in the broad sense (I owe the distinction between the broad and narrow senses of "atheism" to William L. Rowe, "The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism," American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 335-41) refers to the absence of belief in any god or gods, not merely the absence of belief in a personal theistic God. In the narrow sense, negative atheism refers to the absence of belief in a theistic God. Correspondingly, positive atheism in the broad sense refers to disbelieving in all gods, while in the narrow sense, it refers to disbelieving in a theistic God. To successfully defend positive atheism in the narrow sense, two tasks must be completed. First, one must refute the reasons for believing in a theistic God—in other words, one must establish negative atheism in the narrow sense. Second, one must provide reasons for disbelieving in this theistic God.
This taxonomy should not be used to obscure the complexity and diversity of views that atheists may hold, as a specific individual may adopt different atheistic stances depending on different concepts of God. For example, a person might maintain with good reason that an anthropomorphic god like Zeus does not exist, and would thus be a positive atheist regarding Zeus and similar gods. However, they might be only a negative atheist regarding, for instance, Paul Tillich's God. (This seems to be the position of Kai Nielsen. He rejects a non-anthropomorphic God as meaningless and an anthropomorphic God as false. See, e.g., Kai Nielsen, "Introduction: How Is Atheism to Be Characterized?" in Kai Nielsen, ed., Philosophy and Atheism [Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Press, 1985].) Furthermore, people can, and often do, hold different atheistic views based on different concepts of a theistic God. For instance, someone might be a positive atheist relative to Aquinas's God, but merely a negative atheist relative to St. Teresa's God.
Agnosticism is often contrasted with atheism, representing the view of neither believing nor disbelieving in the existence of God. However, this common opposition between agnosticism and atheism can easily be misleading. It is true that agnosticism is incompatible with positive atheism: if atheism is correct, then agnosticism is wrong, and vice-versa. But agnosticism is consistent with negative atheism, because agnosticism requires being a negative atheist. Since agnostics do not believe in God, they are by definition negative atheists. This is not to say that negative atheism must be agnosticism. A negative atheist might not believe in God but does not necessarily have to be an agnostic.
I have evaluated the primary arguments for agnosticism elsewhere. (Michael Martin, "Atheism v. Agnosticism," Philosophers’ Magazine 19 (Summer 2002): 17-19; see also Michael Martin, "On an Argument for Agnosticism," Aug. 27, 2001, http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/martinag.html.) Here I want to explore exactly where the focus of inconsistency between positive atheism and agnosticism lies. You might think an agnostic doubts whether there are sufficient reasons (to believe or disbelieve in God's existence), while an atheist does not. However, this is not the only way to understand the difference between these two views. An agnostic might think there are very good reasons for disbelieving in God's existence, but also think there are equally good reasons for believing God exists. These conflicting reasons would cancel each other out, thus failing to form a positive reason to believe or disbelieve overall.
We call the view that there are insufficient reasons to believe God exists and insufficient reasons to believe God does not exist "skeptical agnosticism"; whereas the view that there are equally sufficient reasons to believe in both theism and atheism, but that these reasons cancel each other out, is called "cancellation agnosticism."
Arguments supporting both negative and positive atheism can refute both skeptical and cancellation agnosticism. Arguments proving negative atheism undermine cancellation agnosticism, because the latter holds that there are reasons for both atheism and theism that cancel each other out, whereas negative atheism requires that there be no reason for theistic belief. Moreover, arguments supporting the non-existence of God undermine skeptical agnosticism, because the latter assumes there is no reason to believe in either theism or atheism.
Should Atheists Become Agnostics?
If we understand "God" as a theistic God: an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent creator of the universe who reveals his thoughts through the Bible and can perform miracles; and if we understand an atheist as someone who does not believe such a God exists, and an agnostic as someone who neither believes nor disbelieves in the existence of this God; then the question is: if you are a non-believer, should you be an agnostic or an atheist? What are the basic theoretical grounds for these two views?
Arguments Supporting Agnosticism
Let us first consider the arguments supporting agnosticism.
- The Huxley Principle Thomas Henry Huxley, in his famous article "Agnosticism," pointed out that the basic principle of agnosticism is:
In matters of the intellect, follow your reason as far as it will take you, without regard to any other consideration. And negatively: In matters of the intellect, do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable.
This principle is used by many agnostics to reject atheism. They argue that atheists claim God does not exist, yet cannot prove it.
However, there are several problems with using this principle to reject atheism. First, if one is to rely on the results of "demonstration," then the principle itself is questionable. If "demonstration" means the kind of deductive verification or falsification found in mathematics, then the principle is incorrect. After all, very few scientific conclusions belong to this category. Generally speaking, inductive reasoning based on empirical induction is intellectually respected, even though it does not produce demonstrable [N1] conclusions.
Second, the assumption that no atheistic perspective can be proven is controversial. Certain atheistic arguments attempt to deduce contradictions from the very concept of God. If these succeed, then the Huxley Principle [2] no longer applies. Furthermore, the view that the non-existence of God cannot be proven simply begs the question by assuming a lack of evidence without examining whether these deductive inferences are, in fact, flawed. More importantly, even if deductive atheistic reasoning were flawed, this would not undermine atheism, as some atheistic perspectives are built upon inductive reasoning.
2. The Limits of Human Reason The famous 19th-century agnostic Leslie Stephen argued in "An Agnostic's Apology" that agnostics assert human intelligence is limited, and that theology lies beyond these bounds. He continued by noting that since atheists claim to possess knowledge of God’s non-existence, they have exceeded these bounds, rendering their conclusions inadmissible.
The problem with the idea of "limits of human reason" is that it assumes exactly what needs to be demonstrated; in other words, it begs the question. Since atheists claim that one can possess knowledge of God's non-existence, Stephen’s essay must be proven wrong on its merits, rather than being assumed wrong by definition.
3. Intelligent Theists Another argument in support of agnosticism is as follows: many theists are extremely intelligent, even brilliant. Certainly, some of them are aware of all the arguments in favor of atheism and yet oppose them. Does the existence of these intelligent theists not cause atheists to hesitate and reconsider their position? Indeed, does the existence of these brilliant theists not urge atheists to be less certain of their own position and thus retreat to agnosticism?
This argument is entirely unpersuasive. It is true that the fact that intelligent and knowledgeable theists exist might prompt atheists to re-examine their views. However, if after careful scrutiny the atheistic arguments withstand criticism, that proves atheists are justified in maintaining their position. Moreover, this argument proves too much. After all, intelligent and even eminent scientists hold all manner of eccentric and peculiar theories while being fully aware of opposing views. Does their existence persuade other scientists to maintain an agnostic stance regarding those theories?
4. External Factors There is yet another agnostic argument that looks at atheism from the outside and attempts to determine the causes that produce atheistic belief, as well as why people accept its proofs. According to this view, atheistic beliefs, values, and attitudes are causally dependent on social, historical, and psychological factors. If the causes were different, a person would likely hold very different beliefs. For instance, if I had been raised in a strict fundamentalist family, I might not accept the atheistic views I endorse today. In reality, that I am an atheist now rather than a theist could be said to be a matter of luck, as it depended on my upbringing and other early influential factors. Given this understanding, one might think the only rational attitude is to adopt agnosticism to avoid the potential bias of an "unfortunate birth."
The first problem with this argument is that, if applied seriously, it would lead to widespread skepticism in all fields, including science. For example, whether a person accepts one theory of physics over another undoubtedly depends on numerous historical, social, and psychological factors. However, it would certainly be absurd to think that agnosticism is better justified than these theories. Sometimes, the evidence for one theory is much stronger than for any of its rivals; in such cases, it is entirely rational to reject those rivals. We should also note that not all atheists are born into atheistic families. Many were formerly religious believers who abandoned their religious heritage.
Another problem is that agnosticism is no less dependent on social, historical, and psychological factors than atheism. If Thomas Huxley had been born in different circumstances, would he still have written his famous essay on agnosticism? This certainly cannot serve as a reason to believe or disbelieve the central points of that essay. Granted, the fact that beliefs about God’s existence are to some extent the result of our social, historical, and psychological backgrounds should alert us to possible biases and prompt us to reconsider our views. But after careful re-examination, we can legitimately judge that our views are valid and that bias does not constitute a significant factor.
5. Dogmatism A common argument against atheism is that it is characterized by arrogant, authoritative assertions of unproven or unprovable principles—a dogmatic attitude. Generally, it is thought that dogmatic attitudes should be avoided; naturally, then, atheism should be avoided as well. In contrast, agnosticism is characterized as being uncertain, flexible, and unbiased. Since these traits are encouraged, it is maintained that agnosticism is more appropriate than atheism.
However, while there are indeed dogmatic atheists, there is no necessary connection between atheism and dogmatism. An atheist can be just as uncertain, flexible, and unbiased in their views as an agnostic. They are willing to consider opposing views and even prepare to modify or abandon their ideas when new evidence emerges. On the other hand, an agnostic can be just as dogmatic as the most dogmatic atheist. They may stubbornly refuse to abandon their rejection of atheism despite strong evidence to the contrary, and unreasonably insist that there is no evidence for disbelief.
6. Certainty It is sometimes argued that because one cannot be certain that God does not exist, atheism cannot be proven; and since only certainty can justify disbelief in God, what is proven is agnosticism rather than atheism. It should be noted that this view is similar to Huxley’s, but not exactly the same. Huxley’s view assumes atheism is only justified if it can be verified—that is, proven by deductive logic. The current view assumes atheism is only justified if one believes it with certainty. Although some atheists may believe God’s non-existence is certain, certainty is not an essential element of their position. For atheism to be reasonably justified, it only needs to be more probable than its negation, or at least more probable than theism. Atheism requires certainty no more than scientific theories do.
7. A Good Epistemic Position Another argument for agnosticism is that, regarding God, we can never be in a sufficiently "good epistemic position" to declare that because there is no certain evidence of God’s existence, God does not exist. To justify such a claim, two conditions must be met: first, it must be the case that if God existed, there would be certain evidence of his existence; second, there must be a satisfactory reason to conclude that such evidence does not exist. In the case of God, these two conditions are not met.
Similar requirements apply in non-religious contexts. For example, the lack of certain evidence for the statement "there is a blue bird in the bushes" does not always lead one to conclude that the blue bird is not there. You must be in a good epistemic position to reach that conclusion. In other words, it must be the case that if the blue bird were in the bushes, there would be certain evidence of its existence. Furthermore, you must have satisfactory reasons to conclude that such evidence is absent.
The "good epistemic position" argument has many problems. One is that even if it were reasonable, it would not refute atheism. The absence of evidence for God's existence is one way to support atheism, but it is not the only way. There is another way—namely, showing the illogical nature of the concept of God—and yet another way: invoking the argument from evil. Furthermore, if taken seriously, the implications of the "good epistemic position" argument are somewhat absurd. If invisible brownies, goblins, or leprechauns that are undetectable by any other method existed, there would be no certain evidence of their existence. The rational attitude toward these entities should be that, due to the lack of certain evidence, they are merely products of the human imagination. However, according to the view under discussion, we would have to suspend judgment.
Finally, this argument fails because we are, in fact, in a good epistemic position to claim that God does not exist. I pointed out in Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Chapter 11) that if there were a God, there would be evidence of God's existence; since there is no such evidence, it is very likely that there is no God. Perhaps the best way to understand this view is to recognize that the main premise of the argument—that if God existed, there would be evidence of God’s existence—is a defeasible presumption: if God is omnipotent, it seems he would be able to provide his creatures with good reasons to recognize his existence; if God is all-good, he might want his creatures to know he exists so they could revere him and follow his commands. Therefore, you would expect him to provide them with good reasons to believe in him. But if that is the case, then there should be sufficient evidence to believe in God. The fact that we do not have this evidence indicates that an omniscient, omnipotent, and all-good God does not exist. However, I have argued that this presumption has not yet been defeated. Thus, my argument stands.
Arguments for Atheism Relative to agnosticism, the fundamental theory of atheism consists of various arguments attempting to prove that disbelief in God is justified.
First, the traditional argument from evil holds that the vast amount of evil in the world makes the existence of a divine God improbable.
Second, the argument from non-belief utilizes the phenomenon of widespread non-belief in the world to show that the existence of a divine God is doubtful.
Third, the argument from reasonable non-belief provides evidence that the existence of reasonable disbelief in God shows that the existence of a divine God is improbable.
Fourth, various arguments have been formed to show the internal inconsistency of the concept of God. For example, in Atheism (Chapter 12), I discuss in detail how the various attributes of God contradict one another. Recently, Theodore Drange provided an overview of other similar arguments (Theodore M. Drange, "Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey," Philo 1 (Fall-Winter 1998): 49-60).
Conclusion The fundamental arguments supporting atheism have not yet been refuted, while the main arguments supporting agnosticism are all flawed. This should give agnostics pause. In the book The Big Domino in the Sky, there is a science fiction story titled "Are You an Atheist Without Knowing It?" In it, I point out that many agnostics would answer this question in the affirmative. The purpose of this current article is simpler. My only intent is to sincerely urge agnostics to re-examine their views. The results might surprise them.
Should Atheism Be Universally Held? (This article was first published in the American Rationalist (Jan/Feb 2001) and republished with the editor's consent (April 19, 2001). — Michael Martin)
Should atheists hope that everyone adopts atheism? Should atheism become a universally held view? Many atheists seem to think so. They insist that since atheism is a true insight, it should be accepted by all. This view takes truth as the primary consideration and deems other factors unimportant; however, Dmitri Tymoczko challenged this in his article "What Good Is Religion?" published in the Boston Review (Dec-Jan, 1997-1998).
Tymoczko believes that religion, although false, is nonetheless useful. In fact, he argues that to a certain extent, religious belief is precisely what psychologists call "positive illusions" (p. 37), from which those who possess them can benefit. He further contends that the truths discovered by science "would be deeply troubling in some respects: our universe has no moral structure, provides not the slightest basis for individual immortality, and contains striking disparities between wealth and poverty" (p. 37). Consequently, he believes that if everyone were to embrace atheism, it would result in a severe deficit. Tymoczko does not wish to deny that embracing atheism also has some inherent benefits. However, he maintains that "the merits of these two worldviews might be exactly equal, in the sense that one side cannot surpass the other."
Tymoczko also believes that atheists can benefit from contact with religious believers. He says one can "imagine atheists who particularly enjoy being with religious people and who feel a sense of empathetic joy toward their faith." He further points out that atheists should be tolerant of religious believers, not only because they respect the right of believers to choose a religious life, but also because of their deep respect for the true satisfaction that religious belief brings and their aesthetic appreciation for the quality of religious life. Believers are "the dreamers of society," and atheists "should cherish them as they cherish their own personal dreams" (p. 41). More importantly, Tymoczko insists that a more satisfaction-oriented attitude of religious tolerance "creates a powerful bond between atheists and believers... both religion and atheism are seen as parts of a complete, comprehensive society—like two sides of the same coin, rather than mutually antagonistic parties" (p. 38). This is precisely Tymoczko’s vision of society, where believers and non-believers share a social cognitive division of labor, in which these two groups "embody different, incompatible cognitive norms" (p. 41).
Tymoczko opposes the view that religious language is fundamentally unverifiable, purely metaphorical, or should be translated into secular discourse. In fact, he points out that religious language should be understood according to its literal meaning. He also rejects the following views: that religion exacts a price not only from persecuted atheists but also from those religious believers who fear eternal damnation; that religion is a tool for one part of society to control another; and that religion exists not because it is beneficial, but for other reasons, such as human irrationality. Setting aside these alternative accounts, he believes his "inaccurate but useful" view is simpler than other explanations. He argues that only his view clearly explains why religion continues to flourish. Moreover, he believes we should avoid explanations that unnecessarily make religious believers appear foolish, and only his view achieves this.
I support Tymoczko’s argument that truth is not the sole criterion for religious issues. In fact, I pointed out in Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (pp. 30-35) that in certain rare and extraordinary circumstances, the benefits brought by belief are so great that one should believe in God even though the belief is false. However, my view is far removed from Tymoczko's, because he clearly believes that instances of holding false religious beliefs are numerous and common.
I also advocate for thorough religious tolerance. I believe religious people have the right to believe what they want to believe, even if what they believe is irrational or absurd. But unlike Tymoczko, I do not advocate tolerance because I derive a sense of empathetic joy from their faith or possess an aesthetic appreciation for their lives. On the contrary, I believe many religious concepts are unpleasant; in fact, some are morally speaking "appalling." To take an obvious example, many Christians believe that sincere non-believers whose virtues are remarkable will suffer eternal damnation, while a moral scoundrel can enter heaven as long as he accepts Jesus on his deathbed. Furthermore, religious life is often aesthetically problematic because its basic religious dogmas are difficult to reconcile epistemically with the existence of an omnipotent and all-good God alongside a vast amount of seemingly unnecessary evil.
I am also skeptical of Tymoczko’s theory that atheists should value the opinions of believers because they—the believers—are the dreamers of society. Somehow, Tymoczko seems to forget that religious dreams always presuppose a form of society—one where women know their place, homosexuality is a sin, and creationism is mandated in public schools—while simultaneously invoking eternal damnation for atheists.
We need not deny that religion has some good effects. However, the history of religious wars, persecution, and suppression undoubtedly shows that, on the whole, religion has brought more evil than good. Tymoczko believes that false religious beliefs would not persist if they were not beneficial. But this theory is unreliable. Many harmful false beliefs persist indefinitely. Even now, our acceptance of pseudoscience and quackery remains widespread, although their harmful consequences cannot be denied. Tymoczko believes the atheist worldview is flawed because it lacks a moral structure. Does he mean that atheists are subject to a subjective morality? Yet even an Oxford philosophy student should know that moral objectivity is perfectly compatible with atheism, while morality built on a theistic foundation has serious problems of its own. He also believes atheism is flawed because it provides no basis for individual immortality. But since Hindus and Buddhists do not believe in personal immortality, this is not a problem unique to atheism. I recall that Tymoczko was attempting to show some advantages of religious belief relative to non-belief, not the advantages of Christian belief relative to non-belief. Furthermore, the Christian concept seems unfair and arbitrary. Salvation requires faith, which excludes countless people for whom this faith was impossible due to historical and cultural backgrounds, and consigns every non-believer in Jesus to hell—including everyone from survivors of the Holocaust to 10th-century Africans. In opposing such a concept of individual immortality, atheists stand on firm moral ground and do not believe that doing so demonstrates a flaw in their perspective.
(Translator's Note: This article is a compilation. The first part of the article, "Atheism, Agnosticism and Theism," is the first part of the "General Introduction" written by Michael Martin for The Cambridge Companion to Atheism, which primarily clarifies concepts. The second part of the article is a piece published by Martin in the Summer 2002 issue (Issue 19) of The Philosophers’ Magazine, titled "Should atheists be agnostics?" The third part is an article published in American Rationalist (Jan/Feb 2001), titled "Should atheism be universally held?" cited here from the website The Secular Web at: http://infidels.org/kiosk/article/should-atheism-be-universally-held-90.html. Martin is a representative figure in contemporary American atheist studies. The translator has combined these three articles for translation, first hoping to provide a rigorous conceptual definition of "atheism," and second, to provide a clear explanation regarding the issue of atheism and agnosticism. The clarification of concepts helps us conduct in-depth and valuable research; clear concepts are even more conducive to exchange and even growth between different academic perspectives. Martin asks: if you are a non-believer, should you be an agnostic or an atheist? This question is not only valuable in academia but is also closely related to every individual. After reading his rigorous and slightly humorous analysis, I believe everyone will more clearly understand the meaning of atheism and its close connection to our lives. Thirdly, atheists might hope that everyone holds atheist views; however, many people, like Tymoczko, believe that religious concepts, though incorrect, are useful. Martin analyzes the problems with this perspective. The abstract and keywords of this article were added by the translator to meet the overall formatting requirements of the text, and the original title of the first part by Martin was used as the main title for the entire text. The translation of the entire text strictly follows Martin’s original work, with only one minor change made according to the needs of the article's integrity, noted in a footnote. Martin's own footnotes were not translated but were placed directly in the footnotes of this article in their English form; through these footnotes, we can see the degree of caution Western scholars exercise in the use of concepts when conducting atheist studies. Finally, the translator assumes responsibility for all translations.) Web Editor: Jiafei
Abstract: Atheism can be divided into positive atheism and negative atheism. In a broad sense, positive atheism refers to not believing in any gods; in a narrow sense, it refers to not believing in a divine God. Negative atheism in a broad sense refers to the absence of belief in any god or gods; in a narrow sense, it refers to the absence of belief in a divine God. In reality, people often hold different atheist views based on different concepts of God. Agnosticism can be divided into skeptical agnosticism and offset agnosticism. If God is defined as an omniscient, omnipotent, and all-good creator of the universe, an atheist is understood as someone who does not believe such a God exists, and an agnostic is understood as someone who neither believes nor disbelieves that this God exists, then if you are a non-believer, you should not suspend belief; on the contrary, being an atheist would be the more rational choice. Given that atheism is a truthful insight, should it be accepted by everyone? Some argue that although religious belief is incorrect, it has its benefits; Martin deeply analyzes the problems with this view. Keywords: Atheism, Agnosticism, Positive Atheism, Negative Atheism, Theism
Atheism, Agnosticism and Theism The concept of atheism developed historically within the context of Western monotheism, and its application is clearest in this field. For example, if we apply it to pre-modern, non-Western environments, it might lead to misunderstandings. Moreover, even in a modern Western context, "atheism" has different meanings depending on different concepts of God. Nonetheless, this article (Translator's note: the original text says "this book," because this part is the introduction Martin wrote for The Cambridge Companion to Atheism. According to the overall arrangement of the full text, the translator has changed it here to "this article." Notification is hereby given.) assumes that if we can use the concept of atheism cautiously outside its clearest historical context, it will be extremely enlightening for contemporary Western readers.
If you look up "atheism" in a dictionary, you will find it defined as the belief that God does not exist. Undoubtedly, many people understand "atheism" in this way. However, if we look at the Greek roots of the word, this is not its meaning. In Greek, the prefix "a" means "without" or "not," and "theos" means "god." (Gordon Stein, “The Meaning of Atheism and Agnosticism,” in Gordon Stein (ed.), An Anthology of Atheism and Rationalism (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus, 1980), p. 3.) From this perspective, an atheist is a person without belief in God; he or she does not need to be a person who believes that God does not exist. However, according to the common dictionary meaning of "atheism," atheists do not merely lack belief in the existence of a god or gods; they also believe that a god or gods do not exist. This dictionary usage of the term should not be ignored. To avoid confusion, we shall call it positive atheism, while the type of atheism derived from the original Greek root will be called negative atheism.
We do not attempt to give a general definition of "God" here. However, it would be helpful to provide some clarification of the different concepts of God that have traditionally emerged in religious debates and discussions. In modern times, theism has usually become the belief in a personal God who takes an active interest in this world and has given humanity some special revelation. Understood this way, theism differs clearly from deism, where belief in God is not based on revelation but on evidence from the natural world. The God postulated by deists is generally considered to be remote from this world and not intimately concerned with its affairs. Theism also differs from polytheism, which refers to the belief in more than one god. It is also distinct from pantheism, the belief that God is identical to nature.
Thus, in a broad sense (I owe the distinction between the broad and narrow senses of “atheism” to William L. Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 335-41.), negative atheism refers to the absence of belief in any god or gods, not just the absence of belief in a personal divine God. In a narrow sense, negative atheism refers to the absence of belief in a divine God. Correspondingly, in a broad sense, positive atheism refers to the disbelief in all gods, and in a narrow sense, it refers to the disbelief in a divine God. To successfully defend positive atheism in the narrow sense, two tasks must be completed. First, one must refute the reasons for believing in a divine God; in other words, one must establish negative atheism in the narrow sense. Second, one must provide reasons for not believing in this divine God.
This classification should not be used to obscure the complexity and diversity of views that atheists may hold, because an individual can adopt different atheistic perspectives depending on different concepts of God. Therefore, a person might maintain—with good reason—that anthropomorphic gods like Zeus do not exist, and thus be a positive atheist regarding Zeus and similar gods. However, for example, regarding Paul Tillich’s God, he or she might only be a negative atheist. (This seems to be the position of Kai Nielsen. He rejects a non-anthropomorphic God as meaningless and an anthropomorphic God as false. See, e.g., Kai Nielsen, “Introduction: How Is Atheism to Be Characterized?” in Karl Nielsen, ed., Philosophy and Atheism (Buffalo, N.Y.: Prometheus Press, 1985).) Furthermore, people can, and often do, hold different atheistic views based on different concepts of a divine God. For instance, someone might be a positive atheist relative to Aquinas's God, but merely a negative atheist relative to St. Teresa's God.
Agnosticism is often contrasted with atheism, holding the view of neither believing nor disbelieving in the existence of God. However, this common opposition between agnosticism and atheism can easily be misleading. Indeed, agnosticism is incompatible with positive atheism: if atheism is correct, then agnosticism is wrong, and vice versa. But agnosticism is consistent with negative atheism, because agnosticism necessitates being a negative atheist. Since agnostics do not believe in God, they are—by definition—negative atheists. This is not to say that negative atheism must also be agnosticism. A negative atheist may not believe in God, but it is not a necessity that they be an agnostic.
I have evaluated the main arguments for agnosticism elsewhere. (Michael Martin, “Atheism v. Agnosticism,” Philosophers’ Magazine 19 (Summer 2002): 17-19; see also Michael Martin, “On an Argument for Agnosticism,” Aug. 27, 2001, http://www.infidels.org/library/modern/michael_martin/martinag.html.) Here, I want to explore exactly what constitutes the focus of the inconsistency between positive atheism and agnosticism. You might think that an agnostic doubts whether there are sufficient reasons (to believe or disbelieve in the existence of God), while an atheist does not. However, this is not the only way to understand the difference between these two views. An agnostic might believe there are very good reasons to disbelieve in the existence of God, but also believe there are equally good reasons to believe in the existence of God. These conflicting reasons would cancel each other out, thus failing to form an overall positive reason for belief or disbelief.
We call the view that there are insufficient reasons to believe in God’s existence and also insufficient reasons to believe in God’s non-existence "skeptical agnosticism"; whereas the view that there are equally sufficient reasons for both theism and atheism, but that these two sets of reasons cancel each other out, we call "cancellation agnosticism."
Arguments that support both negative and positive atheism can refute skeptical agnosticism and cancellation agnosticism. Arguments proving negative atheism undermine cancellation agnosticism, because the latter holds that there are reasons for both atheism and theism which cancel each other out, whereas negative atheism requires the view that there are no reasons for divine belief. Furthermore, arguments supporting the non-existence of God undermine skeptical agnosticism, because the latter assumes there are no reasons to believe in either theism or atheism.
Should an atheist be an agnostic?
If we understand "God" as a divine God: an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent creator of the universe who reveals his thoughts through the Bible and is capable of performing miracles; and if we understand an atheist as someone who does not believe in the existence of such a God, and an agnostic as someone who neither believes nor disbelieves in the existence of this God—then the question is: if you are a non-believer, should you be an agnostic or an atheist? What are the basic theoretical foundations for these two views?
Arguments Supporting Agnosticism
Let us first consider the arguments supporting agnosticism.
1. The Huxley Principle
Thomas Henry Huxley pointed out in his famous essay "Agnosticism" that the basic principle of agnosticism is:
In matters of the intellect, follow your reason as far as it will take you, without regard to any other consideration. And negatively: In matters of the intellect, do not pretend that conclusions are certain which are not demonstrated or demonstrable.
This principle is used by many agnostics to reject atheism. They argue that atheists claim God does not exist, yet they cannot prove it.
However, there are some problems with using this principle to reject atheism. First, if one is to rely on the results of "proof," then this principle is questionable. If "proof" means deductive verification or falsification as found in mathematics, then the principle itself is incorrect. After all, very few scientific conclusions fall into this category. Generally, inductive reasoning based on empirical induction is intellectually respected, even though it does not produce demonstrable conclusions.
Second, the assumption that no atheistic view can be proven is controversial. Some atheistic views attempt to deduce contradictions from the concept of God. If these succeed, then the Huxley principle no longer applies. Moreover, the view that God's non-existence cannot be proven simply begs the question [6] by assuming there is no evidence—that is, assuming these deductive inferences are flawed. More importantly, even if atheistic deductive reasoning were flawed, this would not undermine atheism, as some atheistic views are based on inductive reasoning.
2. Limits of Human Reason
The famous 19th-century agnostic Leslie Stephen pointed out in "An Agnostic Apology" that agnostics assert human intelligence is limited, and theology lies beyond these limits. He went on to point out that since atheists claim to possess knowledge of God's non-existence, they exceed these limits, and therefore their conclusions are untenable.
The problem with the idea of the limits of human reason is that it assumes what ought to be shown; in other words, it begs the question. Since atheists claim that one can possess knowledge of God's non-existence, Stephen’s thesis must be shown to be false based on evidence, rather than being assumed false by definition.
3. Intelligent Theists
Another argument supporting agnosticism is as follows: many theists are very intelligent, even brilliant. Surely some of them understand all the arguments in favor of atheism and oppose them. Does not the existence of these theists make atheists hesitate and reconsider their position? Indeed, does not the existence of these intelligent theists prompt atheists to be less certain of their own position and thus retreat to agnosticism?
This argument is not persuasive at all. Granted, the fact that intelligent and knowledgeable theists exist might prompt atheists to re-examine their views. However, if upon careful examination the atheistic arguments withstand criticism, that proves atheists have reasons to stick to their positions. Furthermore, this argument proves too much. After all, intelligent and even eminent scientists hold all sorts of weird and peculiar theories while being aware of opposing views. Should their existence persuade other scientists to maintain an agnostic stance regarding these theories?
4. External Factors
There is another agnostic perspective that views atheism from the outside, attempting to determine the causes that produce atheistic belief and why people accept its justifications. According to this view, atheistic beliefs, values, and attitudes depend causally on social, historical, and psychological factors. If the causes were different, a person would likely hold very different beliefs. For instance, if I had been raised in a strictly fundamentalist family, I might not have accepted the atheistic views I endorse today. In reality, that I am an atheist now rather than a theist is arguably a result of luck, as it depended on my childhood upbringing and other early influential factors. Given this understanding, one might think that the only rational attitude is to adopt agnosticism to avoid the possible biases of an accidental birth.
The first problem with this view is that, if strictly enforced, it would produce widespread skepticism across all fields, including science. For example, whether a person accepts one theory of physics over another undoubtedly depends on numerous historical, social, and psychological factors. However, it would certainly be absurd to think that agnosticism is better justified than these theories. Sometimes the evidence for one theory is much stronger than for any of its rivals, in which case it is certainly reasonable to reject those rivals. We should also note that not all atheists are born into atheistic families. Many were formerly religious believers who abandoned their religious heritage.
Another problem is that agnosticism is no less dependent on social, historical, and psychological factors than atheism. If Thomas Huxley [7] had been born in a different environment, would he still have authored his famous essay on agnosticism? This certainly cannot serve as a reason for believing or disbelieving the main points of that text. Admittedly, the fact that beliefs regarding the existence of God are to some extent the result of our social, historical, and psychological backgrounds should alert us to potential biases and prompt us to reconsider our views. However, upon careful review, we can legitimately judge that our views are valid and that bias does not constitute a significant factor.
5. Dogmatism
There is a common argument against atheism: that atheism is characterized by arrogant, authoritative assertions of unproven or unprovable principles, representing a dogmatic attitude. It is generally held that dogmatic attitudes should be avoided; naturally, then, atheism should also be avoided. In contrast, agnosticism is characterized by uncertainty, flexibility, and lack of bias. In fact, because these characteristics are encouraged, it is insisted that agnosticism is more appropriate than atheism.
However, although there are indeed dogmatic atheists, there is no necessary connection between atheism and dogmatism. Atheists can be just as uncertain, flexible, and unbiased in their views as agnostics. They are willing to consider opposing views and are even prepared to revise or abandon their ideas when new evidence emerges. On the other hand, agnostics can be as dogmatic as the most dogmatic atheists. They may stubbornly refuse to abandon their rejection of atheism despite strong evidence to the contrary, and unreasonably insist that there is no evidence for unbelief.
6. Certainty
It is sometimes argued that because one cannot be certain that God does not exist, atheism cannot be proven; and because only certainty can justify disbelief in God, it is agnosticism rather than atheism that can be justified. It should be noted that this view is similar to Huxley’s, but not exactly the same. Huxley’s view assumes that atheism is only justified if it can be verified—that is, proven by deductive logic. The current view assumes that atheism is only justified if one believes it with certainty. Although some atheists may believe the non-existence of God is certain, certainty remains not an essential element of their view. If atheism is to be reasonably justified, it only needs to be more probable than not, or at least more probable than theism. Atheism requires certainty no more than scientific theories do.
7. A Good Epistemic Position
Another argument in support of agnosticism is that we can never be in a sufficiently satisfactory epistemic state regarding God to declare that because there is no certain evidence for God’s existence, God does not exist. To justify such a claim, two conditions must be met: first, it must be the case that if God existed, there would be certain evidence of His existence; second, there must be a satisfactory reason to conclude that such evidence does not exist. In the case of God, these two conditions are not met.
Similar requirements apply in non-religious contexts. For example, regarding the statement "there is a blue bird in the thicket," the absence of certain evidence for this statement does not always lead one to conclude the blue bird is not there. You must be in a satisfactory epistemic state to reach that conclusion. In other words, it must be the case that if the blue bird were in the thicket, there would be certain evidence of its existence. Furthermore, you must have a satisfactory reason to conclude that such evidence does not exist.
The "good epistemic position" argument has many problems. One is that even if it were reasonable, it would not refute atheism. The absence of evidence for God's existence is one way to support atheism, but it is not the only way. There is another method: showing the illogicality of the concept of God; and another: invoking the problem of evil. Furthermore, if taken seriously, the implications of the "good epistemic position" argument are somewhat absurd. If invisible pixies, goblins, or leprechauns that cannot be detected by other means existed, there would be no certain evidence of their existence. The reasonable attitude we should take toward these beings is that, due to the lack of certain evidence, they are merely products of the human imagination. Yet according to the view in question, we would have to suspend judgment.
Finally, this argument fails because we are, in fact, in a good epistemic position to claim that God does not exist. I pointed out in Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (Chapter 11) that if there were a God, there would be evidence of God's existence; since there is no such evidence, it is very likely there is no God. Perhaps the best way to understand this view is to recognize that its main premise—that if God exists, there would be evidence for it—is a rebuttable presumption: if God is omnipotent, He seems capable of providing His creatures with good reasons to recognize His existence; if God is omnibenevolent, He might want His creatures to know He exists so they can revere Him and follow His commands. Therefore, one would expect He would provide them with good reasons to believe in Him. But if this is the case, then there should be sufficient evidence to believe in God. Yet we do not have this evidence, a fact which suggests that an omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent God does not exist. However, I have noted that this presumption has not yet been rebutted. So, my point stands.
Arguments for Atheism
In contrast to agnosticism, the basic theory of atheism consists of various arguments attempting to prove that disbelief in God is justified.
First, the traditional argument from evil holds that the vast amount of evil in the world indicates that the existence of a divine God is unlikely.
Second, the argument from non-belief utilizes the widespread phenomenon of non-belief in the world to show that the existence of a divine God is doubtful.
Third, the argument from reasonable non-belief provides evidence that there are instances of sensible and reasonable disbelief in God's existence, which shows that the existence of a divine God is improbable.
Fourth, various arguments have been formulated to show the internal inconsistency of the concept of God. For example, in Atheism (Chapter 12), I discussed in detail how various attributes of God contradict one another. Recently, Theodore Drange provided an overview of other similar arguments (Theodore M. Drange, “Incompatible-Properties Arguments: A Survey,” Philo 1 (Fall-Winter 1998): 49-60).
Conclusion
The basic arguments supporting atheism have not been refuted, while the main arguments supporting agnosticism are flawed. This should give agnostics pause. In the book The Big Domino in the Sky, there is a science fiction story called "Are You an Atheist and Don't Know It?" in which I point out that many agnostics would answer this question in the affirmative. The purpose of the present article is simpler. My only thought is to sincerely urge agnostics to re-examine their views. The results might surprise them.
Should Atheism Be Universally Held?
(This article was first published in The American Rationalist (Jan/Feb 2001) and is reprinted with permission (April 19, 2001). — Michael Martin)
Should atheists hope that everyone embraces atheism? Should atheism be a universally held view? Many atheists seem to think so. They insist that since atheism is a true insight, it should be accepted by everyone. This view takes truth as the primary consideration and regards other factors as unimportant. However, Dmitri Tymoczko, in his article "What Good Is Religion?" published in the Boston Review (Dec/Jan 1997-1998), challenged this.
Tymoczko believes that religion, though false, is useful. In fact, he argues that to some extent religious belief is what psychologists call "positive illusions" (p. 37), from which those who possess them can benefit. He also argues that the truths discovered by science "are in some ways deeply troubling: our universe has no moral structure, provides not the slightest basis for individual immortality, and contains striking disparities between rich and poor" (p. 37). Therefore, he believes that if everyone embraced atheism, it would create a serious deficiency. Tymoczko does not wish to deny that embracing atheism also has its own benefits. But he insists that "in the sense that one side cannot transcend the other, the merits of these two sets of worldviews may be exactly equal."
Tymoczko also believes that atheists can benefit from contact with religious believers. He says you can "imagine atheists who particularly enjoy being with religious people, having a kind of empathetic joy in their faith." He further points out that atheists should tolerate religious believers, not only because they respect the right of believers to choose a religious life, but also because of their deep respect for the real satisfaction religious belief brings and their aesthetic appreciation for the quality of religious life. Believers are "social dreamers," and atheists "should cherish them as they cherish their own personal dreams" (p. 41). More importantly, Tymoczko insists that a religious tolerance attitude more oriented toward satisfaction "creates a powerful link between atheists and believers... religion and atheism are both seen as parts of a complete, comprehensive society—like two sides of a coin, rather than two sides arguing with each other" (p. 38). This is precisely Tymoczko's vision of society, where believers and non-believers share a cognitive division of labor in society, in which these two groups "embody different, incompatible cognitive norms" (p. 41).
Tymoczko opposes the view that religious language is fundamentally unverifiable, purely metaphorical, or should be translated into secular discourse. In fact, he points out that religious language should be understood according to its literal meaning. He also rejects the following views: that religion extracts a price not only from persecuted atheists but also from religious believers who fear eternal damnation; that religion is a tool used by one part of society to control another; and that religion exists not because it is beneficial, but for other reasons, such as human irrationality. Setting aside these alternative discourses for the moment, he believes that his "inaccurate but useful" view is simpler relative to other explanations. He argues that only his view clearly explains why religion continues to flourish. Moreover, he maintains that we should avoid unnecessary explanations that make religious believers appear foolish, and only his view achieves this.
I support Tymoczko's argument that truth is not the sole criterion for religious matters. In fact, in Atheism: A Philosophical Justification (pp. 30-35), I pointed out that in certain rare and extraordinary circumstances, the benefits brought by faith are so great that you ought to believe in God even though the belief is false. However, my view is far removed from Tymoczko's, because he clearly believes that instances of holding false religious beliefs are many and common.
I also advocate for thorough religious tolerance. I believe religious people have the right to believe what they want to believe, even if what they believe is irrational or absurd. But unlike Tymoczko, I do not advocate tolerance because I derive an empathetic joy from their faith or maintain an aesthetic appreciation for their lives. On the contrary, I believe many religious concepts are unpleasant; in fact, some are morally appalling. To take an obvious example, many Christians believe that sincere non-believers with remarkable virtues will suffer eternal damnation, while a moral scoundrel can go to heaven as long as they accept Jesus on their deathbed. Furthermore, religious life is often aesthetically problematic because its basic religious tenets are cognitively difficult to reconcile with the existence of an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God and the vast amount of seemingly unnecessary evil.
I also remain skeptical of Tymoczko's theory that atheists should treasure the opinions of believers because they—the believers—are society's dreamers. Somehow, Tymoczko seems to forget that religious dreams always presuppose a form of society—one where women know their place, homosexuality is a sin, and creationism is enforced in public schools—while simultaneously invoking eternal damnation for atheists.
It is unnecessary to deny that religion has some good influences. However, the history of religious wars, persecution, and suppression undoubtedly shows that, overall, religion has brought more evil than good. Tymoczko believes that if false religious beliefs were not beneficial, they would not persist. But this theory is unreliable. Many harmful false beliefs persist indefinitely. Even now, our acceptance of pseudoscience and quackery remains widespread, although their harmful consequences cannot be denied. Tymoczko believes the atheist worldview is flawed because it lacks a moral structure. Does he then mean that atheists are subject to a subjective morality? Yet even an Oxford philosophy student should know that moral objectivity is highly compatible with atheism, while morality built on a theistic foundation has serious problems of its own. He also believes atheism is flawed because it provides no basis for individual eternity. But since neither Hindus nor Buddhists believe in individual eternity, this is not a problem unique to atheism. I recall that Tymoczko was striving to show the advantages of religious belief relative to non-belief, rather than the advantages of Christian belief relative to non-belief. Furthermore, the Christian concept seems unfair and arbitrary. Attaining salvation requires faith, which excludes countless people for whom this faith was impossible due to historical and cultural backgrounds, and consigns everyone who does not believe in Jesus to hell—including everyone from survivors of the Holocaust to 10th-century Africans. In opposing such a concept of individual eternity, atheists hold a firm moral position and do not believe that doing so demonstrates a flaw in their view.
(Translator's Note: This article is a compilation. The first part, "Atheism, Agnosticism and Theism," is the first section of the "General Introduction" written by Michael Martin for The Cambridge Companion to Atheism; this section primarily clarifies concepts. The second part of the article is a piece published by Martin in the Summer 2002 issue (No. 19) of The Philosophers' Magazine, titled "Should atheists be agnostics?" The third part is an article published in The American Rationalist (Jan/Feb 2001), titled "Should atheism be universally held?" cited here from the website The Secular Web, at: http://infidels.org/kiosk/article/should-atheism-be-universally-held-90.html.
Martin is a representative figure in contemporary American atheist studies. The translator has combined these three articles for translation, first hoping to provide a rigorous conceptual definition of "atheism," and second, to provide a clear exposition on the issue of atheism and agnosticism. The clarification of concepts helps us conduct in-depth and valuable research; clear concepts are more conducive to exchange and even growth between different academic viewpoints. Martin asks: if you are a non-believer, should you be an agnostic or an atheist? This question is not only of value in the academic world; it is also closely related to every individual. After reading his rigorous and slightly humorous analysis, I believe everyone will more clearly understand the meaning of atheism and its close connection to our lives. Thirdly, atheists may hope that everyone holds an atheist view; however, many people, like Tymoczko, believe that religious ideas, though incorrect, are useful. Martin analyzes the problems with this view.
The abstract and keywords of this article were added by the translator to meet the formatting requirements of the text as a whole, and the original title of Martin's first part was used as the main title for the entire text. The translation of the text strictly follows Martin's original work, with only one minor change made for the sake of the overall integrity of the article, which is noted in a footnote. Martin's own footnotes were not translated but were placed directly in the footnotes of this article in their English form; through these footnotes, we can see the degree of caution Western scholars exercise in the use of concepts when conducting atheist studies. Finally, the translator assumes responsibility for all translated text.)
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