Wang Zhe: Mao Zedong's Important Thesis on the Strategic Stalemate Stage of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression
After the outbreak of the national War of Resistance, Mao Zedong scientifically predicted in his essay On Protracted War that the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression would undergo three stages: strategic defense, strategic stalemate, and strategic counter-offensive. He placed particular emphasis on the stage of strategic stalemate as the "transitional stage" of the entire war, its "most difficult period," and the "pivot of the change." Subsequently, as the practice of war continued to unfold, Mao Zedong further deliberated upon and expounded the strategic stalemate stage in works such as On the New Stage, The Present Situation and the Party's Tasks, Overcome the Danger of Capitulation and Strive for a Turn for the Better, and Our Study and the Current Situation. He put forward major assertions such as "the stalemate stage is the pivot of the war," "prepare for a long war and endure this difficult stretch of the road," and "China will gain the strength to turn from weak to strong during this stage." He also sought to achieve "a greater mobilization of the vital forces among all strata of the entire nation and greater progress in all aspects of the Party, government, military, and people." These assertions powerfully revealed the status, characteristics, and tasks of the strategic stalemate stage, providing strategic guidance for managing the war. The insights and wisdom contained therein regarding the overall situation and the laws of struggle remain of significant guiding importance today.
1. Using "the stalemate stage is the pivot of the war" to demarcate the special status of the strategic stalemate stage
In response to erroneous understandings existing around the outbreak of the national War of Resistance—such as the "theory of national subjugation," the "theory of quick victory," and the belief held by some that China’s resistance could pass directly from the defense stage into the counter-offensive—Mao Zedong clarified that the War of Resistance would be protracted and that final victory would belong to China. At the same time, he pointed out: "To travel a 'zigzag' path [1] is the principle for the development of anything in the world. Our War of Resistance must pass through the three stages of defense, stalemate, and counter-offensive; this too is traveling a 'zigzag' path." From a philosophical height, he elucidated the internal basis for the emergence of the stalemate stage. He further noted: "The primary characteristic of the three stages lies in the inclusion of a transitional middle stage," which is the stage of stalemate between the enemy and ourselves. During this stage, "for the enemy, it is the stage of securing occupied territories and preparing for the further destruction of all China; for China, it is the stage of securing unlost territory and preparing to recover fallen areas." Based on this, starting from the overall process of the war and through an analysis of the changes in the strength of both sides and their impact on the war situation, he scientifically answered major questions such as the causes of the strategic stalemate stage and its status in the progression of the war.
The strategic stalemate stage is an inevitable phase caused by the characteristics of both the enemy and ourselves. Mao Zedong examined the history of warfare in both ancient and modern times, in China and abroad, and categorized wars into three types based on the stages they undergo. The first type consists of wars with only one stage: Side A attacks and Side B is defeated, such as the 1905 Russo-Japanese War or the Second Italo-Ethiopian War. The second type consists of wars with two stages: Side A attacks and Side B defends, whereupon Side B turns from defense to offense, such as the Battle of Red Cliffs [2] or the Battle of Fei River [3] in ancient China. The third type consists of wars that undergo three stages: the first stage is Side A's attack and Side B's defense; the second stage is a period of indecisive stalemate; and the third stage is Side B's counter-offensive and Side A's retreat, such as the Hundred Years' War or the American Revolutionary War. The characteristic of this type of war is a relatively long period of stalemate. Mao Zedong believed that China's War of Resistance belonged to the third category; this was a conclusion reached through a dialectical analysis of the strengths of the enemy and ourselves. On one hand, Japan possessed obvious advantages in terms of military, economic, and political organizational power. In particular, to realize its goals of external expansion, it increased military spending, expanded its army, stockpiled materials, mobilized its citizens, and intensified industrial militarization, all of which provided it with formidable war-making capabilities. China, conversely, was temporarily inferior to the enemy in terms of weaponry, economic strength, and popular organization. Therefore, a quick military victory for China was impossible, nor did China possess the material conditions to transition immediately to a counter-offensive. On the other hand, with a broad vision, Mao Zedong analyzed the contest of military forces and changes in the balance of the battlefield within the context of the competition of national power, shifts in international forces, and the trends of historical development. That is: the enemy was a small country, regressive, and lacked support (寡助), while we were a large country, progressive, and enjoyed much support (多助). Especially during the strategic defense stage, the resolute resistance of the Chinese military and people was bound to cause the Japanese invaders' battle lines to overextend, their forces to become scattered, and their consumption of resources to increase drastically. This would cause the enemy to gradually lose the ability to continue launching large-scale military operations, thereby forcing them to stop their strategic offensive, at which point the war would enter the stage of stalemate. From the practice of the war, by the end of 1938, "Japan had already committed a massive force of nearly one million troops to the Chinese theater and paid a price of nearly 450,000 casualties." Along a front of approximately 4,000 kilometers—stretching across Suiyuan, Shaanxi, Shanxi, Henan, Anhui, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, and Guangdong—the Japanese army faced over 200 divisions of Chinese troops. Meanwhile, in the rear of a battle line covering over one million square kilometers—nearly three times the size of Japan's home islands—the anti-Japanese guerrilla war led by the Communist Party of China was widely launched, with anti-Japanese base areas and guerrilla zones spread everywhere. This disrupted the Japanese invaders' strategic plan to quickly destroy China, making it impossible for their strategic offensive momentum to continue. However, because China's resistance forces had not yet developed to the point of being able to completely and thoroughly expel the Japanese invaders, "although the enemy is strong, their strength has been reduced by other unfavorable factors, but not yet to the degree necessary to destroy their superiority; although we are weak, our weakness has been supplemented by other favorable factors, but not yet to the degree necessary to change our inferiority." This resulted in the arrival of a protracted war situation and the strategic stalemate stage.
The strategic stalemate stage is the key phase in which the relative strength of the enemy and ourselves changes. After a comprehensive analysis of various factors, Mao Zedong profoundly revealed the inevitable trend of China's War of Resistance: "China moving from inferiority to equilibrium to superiority, Japan moving from superiority to equilibrium to inferiority; China moving from defense to stalemate to counter-offensive, Japan moving from offensive to conservative to retreat—this is the process of the Sino-Japanese War, the inevitable trend of the Sino-Japanese War." Within this development trend, Mao Zedong emphasized that the strategic stalemate stage is the "pivot of the war." On one hand, this was a scientific conclusion reached by understanding the changes in the strength of both sides dynamically rather than statically. Unlike mechanical materialists, Mao Zedong believed that the relative strength of the enemy and ourselves was not fixed but developed and changed continuously with the progress of the war. That is to say, the situation at the outbreak of the war—where the enemy was strong and we were weak—although an objective reality, was not static. With the extension of time and the expansion of the space of the war, the enemy's unfavorable factors and our favorable factors would both change, and one development trend would be the gradual reversal of the enemy's strength and our weakness. From the practice of the war, although the enemy could plunder resources in occupied areas to increase their strength during the strategic stalemate stage, because the war continued—especially with the launch of guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines—it was very difficult for the Japanese army to obtain military supplies in the Chinese theater. The strength they added was insufficient to compensate for their ongoing consumption; "continuous consumption" became "the decisive aspect." Meanwhile, although China's population, industry, land, and military suffered significant consumption during the war, national unity was strengthening, the people's consciousness was rising, the military's combat effectiveness was improving, and progress was being made in politics, economy, and culture. The overall strength of China’s resistance was constantly adding new quality and quantity. During the strategic stalemate stage, as the enemy's difficulties and our progress increased day by day, coupled with the continuous strengthening of international anti-fascist forces, the accumulation of quantitative changes could gradually alter the situation of the enemy being strong and us being weak. On the other hand, this carries the requirement for a struggle that is proactive and enterprising rather than passively waiting. Mao Zedong emphasized that "the thing that determines the counter-offensive is the strength added during the second stage," therefore "it is necessary to use every effort to prepare all the conditions requisite for our counter-offensive; otherwise, we cannot transition into the counter-offensive stage and will remain forever in stalemate." In other words, the changes in the strength of the enemy and ourselves during the strategic stalemate stage had several possible developmental directions: it could be a reinforcement of the "enemy-strong, we-weak" situation, or it could be a reversal of that dynamic. To make the strategic stalemate stage the pivot for achieving final victory, one cannot do without subjective effort. We should persist in being proactive and enterprising, expanding the enemy's weaknesses and growing our own strength, so as to transform the war situation from strategic stalemate to strategic counter-offensive through the reversal of strength. It is in this sense that Mao Zedong pointed out: "Whether China will become an independent country or fall into a colony is not decided by whether the large cities are lost in the first stage, but by the degree of the entire nation's efforts in the second stage."
2. Using "prepare for a long war and endure this difficult stretch of the road" to elucidate the vivid characteristics of the strategic stalemate stage
In the strategic stalemate stage, in addition to the contest on the battlefield, the rivalry between the enemy and ourselves is carried out extensively across broader spaces and fields. The breadth, depth, and intensity of the struggle are extraordinary. For the side that is temporarily at a disadvantage, it is inevitable to face a long-term situation of high pressure. Mao Zedong clearly proposed that the strategic stalemate stage is a "difficult stretch of the road," warning the people of the whole country to prepare for a long and arduous struggle; at the same time, he emphasized that "after crossing the difficult stretch of the road of war, the level road to victory will arrive—this is the natural logic of war," so as to firm up the conviction of the Chinese military and people to resist to the end and that victory is certain.
The duration of the struggle is relatively long. In a holistic military confrontation between states, the war-making capacity of both sides is a composite entity. Its weakening or strengthening, and the resulting shift in the war situation, often requires a long process of cumulative change. Mao Zedong believed that China’s War of Resistance was protracted, and regarding strategic stalemate, "the length of time for this stage depends on the degree of increase or decrease in the strength of the enemy and ourselves and how the international situation changes; roughly speaking, we must be prepared to give it a relatively long time." This meant that after Japan launched its full-scale war of aggression against China, although it encountered resistance, it would not immediately lose its war-making capacity entirely; the weakening of its overall strength would take time. For China, although the anti-Japanese national united front was established and developing, guerrilla warfare behind enemy lines was gradually unfolding, and the masses were being mobilized and armed, the great leap in these strengths would not happen overnight. The protracted nature of the War of Resistance determined the long-term nature of the stalemate, and determined that "only through the immense efforts of the entire nation during the long-term stalemate stage, and in coordination with international conditions," could a fundamental change in the balance of power between the enemy and ourselves occur.
The pressure of the struggle comes from all sides. During the strategic stalemate stage, while military confrontation on the battlefield persists, the struggle between the enemy and ourselves in various fields such as politics, economy, society, and foreign relations is also exceptionally intense in order to win an overwhelming overall advantage. The conquest of cities is intertwined with the conquest of hearts; the use of soldiers is paired with the use of diplomacy. The reason the strategic stalemate stage "is a very painful period for China" lies in the fact that we must bear tremendous pressure from all sides during this phase. At the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee of the Party, Mao Zedong pointed out that "most of the time" during the stalemate stage would be "even more difficult," and he summarized the manifestations of this "greater difficulty." First, the pressure from the battlefield would be continuous. Because large cities and major transportation lines were controlled by the enemy, and because the political systems and combat positions were fragmented by the enemy, an extremely serious and unfavorable military posture was created. Furthermore, although the Japanese army’s strategic military offensives had basically ceased during the stalemate stage, they still possessed the capability and intent to launch operational-level offensives. The Battle of Nanchang, the Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang, the First Battle of Changsha, and the Battle of Zaoyang–Yichun during this stage all confirmed Mao Zedong’s scientific judgment. At the same time, "stalemate on the front line and stalemate behind enemy lines are in inverse proportion; when a stalemate situation appears on the front line, the situation of struggle behind enemy lines will become tense." From 1939 onwards, the "Public Security Restoration Plan" implemented by the Japanese army in occupied areas, as well as the later "Public Security Strengthening Movement" and "Rural Pacification" [4] carried out on a large scale in North and Central China under the guidance of the "Total War" policy, all made the struggle on the battlefield behind enemy lines extremely fierce. Second, pressure from political and economic fields became increasingly prominent. After entering the stalemate stage, the Japanese army adjusted its strategy toward China, promoting the policies of "using Chinese to govern Chinese" and "sustaining the war through war." They propped up puppet regimes, plundered property in occupied areas, implemented enslavement education, and stepped up efforts to divide and induce surrender. The enemy’s propaganda momentum and tactical inducements led to unfavorable situations within China, such as fragmentation, defection, and temporary or partial compromises. Furthermore, Mao Zedong worried that if the enemy occupied Guangzhou, China’s primary maritime transportation routes were at risk of being cut off, which would affect international aid to China. The worsening economic difficulties and the realistic, pressing danger of capitulation posed huge challenges to the War of Resistance. Third, pressure was brought by the complex attitudes of the international community, especially Britain and the United States, toward China’s War of Resistance. Although countries like Britain and the US had profound contradictions with Japan, they would not easily give up the "fisherman’s policy" of "sitting on the mountain to watch the tigers fight" [5]. Moreover, Western countries prioritized the resolution of European problems as their first priority and temporarily placed the resolution of Eastern problems second. This made it possible for Britain and the US to adopt a policy of compromise toward Japan and plot a "Far Eastern Munich" [6] that would sacrifice China’s interests. In fact, one important factor in the danger of capitulation existing in China during the strategic stalemate phase was the pressure exerted on the Chinese government by capitulationists in countries like Britain and the United States.
Interlocking forms of struggle. "Interlocking" [7] is a vivid description of the two sides being locked in a tangled embrace. Mao Zedong believed that "the 'interlocking' form of the war" was produced by "the contradictory factors of Japan’s savagery and insufficient manpower, and China’s progress and vast territory." Mao provided an in-depth explanation of this interlocking posture in the field of military struggle, including interior lines and exterior lines, having a rear and having no rear, encirclement and counter-encirclement, and "large pieces" versus "small pieces" [of territory]. Regarding encirclement and counter-encirclement in particular, Mao used the metaphor of "playing Go" [8]. He compared the combat actions between the enemy and ourselves to "capturing stones" and the establishment of enemy strongpoints and our base areas to "making eyes." To gain a favorable situation in the overall theater, it was necessary to recognize and treat the establishment of anti-Japanese base areas behind enemy lines and the launching of guerrilla warfare at a strategic level. Furthermore, Mao believed this interlocking nature was reflected not only in the military realm, but also in politics, economy, culture, and foreign relations, where both sides engaged in intense struggles of offensive and defensive, and encirclement and counter-encirclement. This included the enemy’s political inducements to surrender versus our anti-friction, anti-surrender, and anti-secession efforts; the enemy’s economic plunder versus our "strengthening the walls and clearing the fields" [9] and establishing economic blockade lines; the enemy’s slave-like propaganda versus our use of songs, theater, and newspapers for war mobilization; and the international struggle between the aggressor front and the peace front. Both sides conducted fierce offenses and defenses in all aspects and fields. It should be pointed out that while the interlocking struggle brought pressure, it was also a "whetstone." Frequent, small-scale military actions and multi-dimensional struggle practices allowed us to further grasp the enemy's patterns of movement, shortcomings, and weaknesses, thereby honing our fighting capacity, strengthening our conviction in victory, and laying a solid foundation for final success.
The course of struggle moves forward through twists and turns. In June 1939, when discussing the future of the War of Resistance at a meeting of senior cadres in Yan'an, Mao Zedong pointed out: "The general future is bright, but it must go through long-term and tortuous struggle. There are no short-term or linear victories." The victory of a single battle, the temporary acquisition of an ally, or the strengthening of resistance forces in one region are not enough to fundamentally change the balance of power between the enemy and ourselves, and may even incite crazier counter-attacks from the enemy. Intense confrontation makes the course of struggle full of twists, yet it inevitably moves forward. In April 1944, Mao divided the development of the anti-Japanese armed forces and base areas led by our Party into three stages: 1937 to 1940 was the rising stage, during which our Party led the opening of vast theaters behind enemy lines, established base areas, dealt heavy blows to the Japanese invaders, and saw significant growth in the number of Party members and troops; 1941 to 1942 was the declining stage, as the Japanese army concentrated its forces to attack our Party-led armed forces and base areas, leading to great difficulties, reduced base area size, population loss, and heavy casualties among Party cadres and troops; from 1943 onward was a new rising stage, as we learned warfare through warfare, summarized experiences and lessons, overcame shortcomings, and realized the renewed growth of our resistance forces. Regarding this, Mao used a vivid metaphor: "The first stage was like an open palm, the second stage was a retracted fist, and the third stage is the thrusting out of a powerful fist." It can be said that during the strategic stalemate stage, both sides fought fiercely for the initiative. The entire process was exceptionally arduous and full of twists, but as long as we persisted in the resistance—advancing through struggle and struggling while advancing—the final victory would certainly be achieved.
3. Clarifying the fundamental problem to be solved during the strategic stalemate stage with the thesis that "China will acquire the strength to turn from weak to strong during this stage"
In October 1937, in his "Outline of a Report on the Current Situation of the War of Resistance and the Party's Tasks," Mao Zedong proposed that the victory or defeat of the Sino-Japanese War depended on "China's strength," "Japan's strength," and "international strength," with the "decisive factor being China’s own strength." A year later, in "On the New Stage," he pointed out even more clearly: "By relying primarily on our own growing strength, complemented by the aggravation of the enemy's difficulties and the increase of international aid to us, we can change the entire situation—moving from the current situation of enemy superiority and our inferiority to an equilibrium, and then to our superiority and enemy inferiority. This is the fundamental problem that must be and can be solved during the long stage of stalemate."
The growth of Chinese strength. Unlike those who placed their hopes for the future of the War of Resistance primarily on foreign aid, Mao believed that defeating the Japanese invaders must rely primarily on our own strength. During the strategic stalemate stage, the main task was to overcome our own weaknesses and increase our own strength, reflecting the principle of independence and self-reliance he repeatedly advocated. In Mao's view, China's strength included not only the number of troops, combat literacy, and weapons, but also population, production capacity, and the organization and mobilization of the masses. Therefore, to increase China's strength, "it is essential to strive for progress in military, political, cultural, Party affairs, and mass movements. Without greater progress in all fields, it is impossible to mobilize all the vital forces of the entire nation, and thus impossible to further unify the nation." This meant that supporting a long-term war and striving for final victory required stimulating the nation's deep and lasting power through various means. Based on this judgment, during the strategic stalemate stage, our Party moved behind enemy lines to establish anti-Japanese base areas, develop armed forces, carry out struggles against "mopping-up" [10] and "nibbling" [11] campaigns, implement the "three-thirds system" [12] principle, practice "better troops and simpler administration," implement rent and interest reductions, launch the Great Production Movement, and strengthen its own building. These efforts promoted progress in military, political, economic, cultural, and Party affairs, continuously expanding the strength of the entire nation's resistance.
The aggravation of Japan's difficulties. Mao believed that the growing difficulties of the Japanese invaders were "the result of Japan's savage aggression and China's heroic resistance," and that all means should be used to further weaken the enemy's power. First, targeting Japan’s weakness as a small country with insufficient manpower and financial resources, we should expand its disadvantage of dispersed and insufficient troops by establishing base areas deep behind enemy lines. Simultaneously, to counter the Japanese army's plot to plunder occupied areas to support a long-term war, we should carry out a tit-for-tat struggle to prevent the puppet regimes from being easily established or consolidated, thereby creating difficulties for their plunder. Second, targeting Japan’s internal contradictions—namely, that the war of aggression was a perverse act that consumed resources, caused hardship for the Japanese public, and ignited anti-war sentiment among soldiers—we should establish a common anti-aggression united front including the Japanese military and civilian masses. We must distinguish between Japanese imperialism and the Japanese people, between enemy officers and soldiers, and between high-ranking and lower-ranking officers. Through anti-war propaganda, we would increase their homesickness and war-weariness until it turned into anti-war psychology, "forcing their people and soldiers to move toward opposing the war itself through resolute methods." From the practice of the war, Japan's difficulties increased immensely after entering the strategic stalemate. From the autumn to winter of 1939, Japan suffered from a suddenly apparent state of national exhaustion. Facing power shortages, severe rice famines, and imbalances in energy supply, its high-ranking generals lamented: "A hollow shell of strength is the portrayal of our country today. It cannot be maintained for long." It was precisely due to increasing difficulties and declining national strength that "the heads of the Army General Staff wavered in their belief in winning the war."
The enhancement of international aid. In the unfolding picture of world history, one country's aggression against another is no longer limited to the two nations; other countries often make strategic judgments and deployments based on their own perceptions and interests. Mao pointed out clearly: "Neither China nor Japan is an isolated country; the issue of peace and war in the East is a world issue." Although international aid—especially from major powers—was insufficient, hesitant, and watchful at the onset of the strategic stalemate, the Japanese military's savage acts of aggression were bound to meet opposition from the majority of countries and people worldwide. The root cause was that Japan's aggression was not only the ravaging of China but also a threat to the world; Japanese imperialism was an enemy not only of China but also of the peace-loving countries and peoples of the world. Therefore, China's War of Resistance was not isolated; it was closely linked to the World Anti-Fascist War. Thus, Mao proposed establishing an "international anti-fascist united front" to strengthen alliances with all countries and peoples opposing the fascist rule of Germany, Italy, and Japan. It should be noted that in response to the complex attitudes of various international forces toward Japan's aggression, in December 1940, Mao proposed: "We must distinguish between the Japanese imperialism which is invading China and other imperialisms which are not currently invading; we must distinguish between German and Italian imperialism, which are allied with Japan and recognize 'Manchukuo,' and British and American imperialism, which are in opposition to Japan; we must also distinguish between the Britain and the United States of the past, which adopted the Far Eastern Munich policy [13] harming China's resistance, and the Britain and the United States of the present, which have abandoned that policy in favor of supporting China's resistance." He advocated the tactical principle of "utilizing contradictions, winning over the majority, opposing the minority, and crushing enemies one by one," and sought to seize the moral high ground through international propaganda to win global support.
4. Defining the general tasks of the strategic stalemate stage as striving for "greater mobilization of the vital forces among all social strata of the whole nation and greater progress in all aspects of the Party, government, military, and people"
At the Enlarged Sixth Plenary Session of the Sixth Central Committee, Mao Zedong clearly proposed that new strength must be increased through vast and persistent efforts. This increase meant the "greater mobilization of vital forces among all social strata of the nation and greater progress in all aspects of the Party, government, military, and people." He emphasized that the general task was to "persist in the War of Resistance, persist in the protracted war, and consolidate and expand the united front, so as to overcome difficulties, halt the enemy's offensive, prepare our strength, implement our counter-offensive, and achieve the final goal of expelling the enemy."
Repelling the enemy's political offensive and persisting in resistance, unity, and progress. During the strategic stalemate stage, the enemy took measures such as sowing discord and using deceptive inducements to surrender to disintegrate our fighting will and capacity. These posed a major threat; if not effectively countered, they would fundamentally shake the foundations of the resistance. In October 1939, in "The Present Situation and the Party’s Tasks," Mao pointed out that during the stalemate stage, "if China cannot disrupt the enemy's occupied territories and prevent them from achieving the goal of securing and managing those territories; and if China cannot repel the enemy's political offensive, cannot persist in resistance, unity, and progress to prepare counter-offensive forces, or if the Kuomintang government eventually surrenders voluntarily—then, in the future, the enemy still has the possibility of launching a large-scale offensive. That is to say, the stalemate that has already arrived still risks being destroyed by the enemy and the capitulationists." After entering the strategic stalemate, the Japanese invaders abandoned the policy of "quick decision" and attempted to induce the National Government into a compromise. Simultaneously, the anti-communist tendency within Chiang Kai-shek's clique grew significantly. Whether it was the treason of the Wang Jingwei clique, the secret talks between Japanese military representatives and Chongqing government representatives in Hong Kong and Macau in 1940, or the frequent "friction" incidents created by Kuomintang troops, all signaled that the dangers of capitulation, division, and regression were real. Mao was keenly aware of the gravity of this issue. In an internal Party directive drafted for the CPC Central Committee in January 1940, he clearly pointed out the opposition and struggle between the direction of capitulation and the direction of resistance. On July 7, the CPC Central Committee issued a manifesto emphasizing: "Now is a period of unprecedented danger of capitulation and unprecedented difficulty in the War of Resistance... the whole nation should tighten its unity to overcome this danger and difficulty." Facing this crisis, Mao emphasized the need to "persist in the stance of resistance and oppose any compromise movements," "persist in the stance of unity and oppose any divisive movements," and "persist in the stance of progress and oppose any regressive movements." He proposed that the task of the CPC and the people was to "unite all anti-Japanese progressive forces, resist all capitulationist and regressive forces, strive for the improvement of the situation, and rescue it from reversal." To this end, our Party launched a nationwide anti-capitulation struggle and resolutely denounced the treasonous acts of the Wang Jingwei clique. The Eighth Route Army launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive in North China—the largest and longest strategic offensive since the start of the national resistance—which strengthened the confidence of the people in fighting to the end. Particularly regarding Chiang Kai-shek's dual attitude—wavering and compromising yet not daring to openly abandon the resistance, and actively opposing the Communists yet not daring to completely break the CPC-KMT cooperation—Mao creatively proposed the strategy of "developing the progressive forces, winning over the intermediate forces, and isolating the diehard forces." He emphasized conducting struggles "on just grounds, to our advantage, and with restraint," seeking unity through struggle, which ultimately brought about an improvement in the national situation.
Resolutely relying on the masses and carrying out a people's war. Mao Zedong believed that the deciding factor in war "is people, not things" and that "the army and the people are the foundation of victory." To sustain a protracted war and win the final victory, one must persist in relying closely on the masses and conducting a people's war. First, the masses must be extensively and deeply mobilized. The role of material factors in war cannot be realized without the spiritual awakening of people. The objective conditions of China's vast territory, abundant resources, and large population must ultimately be utilized by an awakened people. Therefore, Mao Zedong regarded political mobilization for the War of Resistance as "a matter of paramount importance," likening the mobilized common people to a "vast ocean" [14] in which the Japanese invaders would be drowned. He demanded that broad, deep, and regular mobilization be carried out through popular and mass-oriented means such as oral communication and newspapers, linking the mobilization to the progress of the war and the lives of the masses, so that the broad masses would truly recognize the extreme importance of resisting Japanese aggression for both the country and the people, and consciously throw themselves into the torrent of resistance. Second, the masses must be effectively organized and armed. Mao Zedong believed that the prerequisite for gaining superiority and the initiative was the "superior organization of the masses." Therefore, in response to the needs of the war's development, organizational methods had to be innovated. Workers, peasants, youth, women, children, and merchants were to be organized into anti-Japanese organizations through various forms. This leveraged their advantage of being familiar with local conditions to assist the anti-Japanese armed forces in blocking information, screening movements, and providing support, thereby creating illusions and miscalculations for the enemy and enhancing the combat effectiveness of our army. In particular, the masses had to be armed to adapt to the requirements of war, implementing an armed force system of the "three-in-one combination" of the main forces, local forces, and the militia or self-defense corps [15]. Main force corps were to be cultivated within the mass guerrilla movement, and local armed forces were to be created with the help of the main force corps. Third, an attitude of "respecting the soldiers and respecting the people" must be established to properly handle "officer-soldier relations and military-civilian relations." In a broad and enduring war of resistance, only when the people of the whole country and the anti-Japanese armed forces are truly united can a majestic force be formed to win the war. For war leaders, achieving a situation of unity requires not only external means such as mobilization and organization, but also the establishment of an attitude of respect for soldiers and the people. Only policies and methods formulated from this attitude can win the understanding and support of soldiers and the masses in practical work; otherwise, it is impossible to manage officer-soldier and military-civilian relations well, and united resistance will become empty talk.
Mastering the "art of swimming" in the ocean of war to powerfully command the conflict. War is not only a contest of strength but also a competition of wisdom. Mao Zedong believed that "all problems of hostility between two armies rely on war for their solution." While the outcome of war is closely related to objective factors such as economic conditions, weaponry, and topography, these material factors must be closely combined with human subjective initiative to form combat power. "War is a contest of subjective ability between the commanders of two armies in their struggle for superiority and the initiative, on the basis of material foundations such as military and financial power." Mao Zedong used a vivid metaphor, stating that a commander is like someone swimming in the ocean of war; to reach the shore of victory, one must master the art of swimming. "Strategy and tactics, as the laws for directing war, are the art of swimming in the ocean of war." Facing the new enemy characteristics and war requirements of the stage of strategic stalemate, Mao Zedong issued a call to study military issues, including military theory, strategy and tactics, and political work. He clarified that the purpose of war is to "preserve oneself and destroy the enemy," expounded on the strategic position of anti-Japanese guerrilla warfare, pointed out the important significance and principles of establishing anti-Japanese base areas, and emphasized the initiative, flexibility, and planning of operational guidance. He also provided profound expositions on a series of major relationships, such as offense and defense, exterior lines and interior lines, protracted war and battles of quick decision, and war of attrition and war of annihilation, as well as mobile warfare, guerrilla warfare, and positional warfare. These innovative understandings, reflecting multiple aspects and levels of the anti-Japanese military struggle, are rich in content and form an integrated whole. They raised our Party's understanding of the laws of directing war to a new height and pointed the way for the anti-Japanese military and civilians to defeat a superior enemy with inferior strength.
Strengthening the Party's own construction and exercising the vanguard and exemplary role. In "On the New Stage," Mao Zedong specialized his discourse on "The Role of the Chinese Communist Party in the National War," emphasizing that Communist Party members should demonstrate high degrees of proactivity in the national war and play a vanguard and exemplary role in all aspects. He explicitly put forward specific requirements for the vanguard and exemplary role of Communist Party members in the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, in relations with friendly parties and armies, in government work, and in mass movements. Addressing the new requirements for Party building posed by the war environment, Mao Zedong made scientific plans for strengthening the Party’s own construction: he proposed that the Party must expand its organization, adopting a general policy of "boldly developing the Party but not letting a single bad element in"; he put forward the major proposition of the "Sinicization of Marxism," [16] emphasizing that studying theory is a condition for victory and that the Marxist theoretical level of the whole Party must be continuously raised; he proposed that the Party’s independence must be maintained within the United Front, and that Communist Party members must at all times maintain ideological, political, and organizational independence while keeping the overall situation in mind and uniting all forces that can be united; he proposed the cultivation of cadres with both political integrity and professional competence, and the planned training of large numbers of new cadres; and he proposed that discipline is the guarantee for the implementation of the line, clarifying the basic principle of democratic centralism known as the "Four Subordinates," [17] to maintain the Party's solidarity and unity. In October 1939, in his "Introducing The Communist," Mao Zedong solemnly proposed that Party building is a "Great Project," indicating that the Party's understanding of the importance of its own construction had become more conscious and profound. In short, the strengthening of Party leadership and Party building during the stage of strategic stalemate provided a powerful political guarantee for the Party to play its role as the "mainstay" [18] in the War of Resistance.
V. Conclusion Mao Zedong's series of important assertions regarding the stage of strategic stalemate in the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression took command of the overall situation of the war, assessed the process of the war, and grasped its key junctures. With far-reaching strategic vision, they guided China's resistance to final victory. The experience and wisdom contained therein remain of great significance today. Currently, as the world undergoes accelerated changes unseen in a century, China's development has entered a period where strategic opportunities coexist with risks and challenges, and uncertain and unpredictable factors are increasing. The report to the 20th National Congress of the CPC clearly defined "Five Major Principles" that must be firmly grasped on the road ahead, one of which is "persisting in carrying forward the spirit of struggle." To face risks and challenges head-on and conduct a "great struggle," we must comprehensively and dialectically analyze the characteristics of both sides, scientifically assess the stage of the struggle, and accurately grasp its trends and directions, using this to formulate long-term and holistic struggle strategies. We must fully recognize the arduousness and complexity of the struggle, "not believe in heresies, not fear ghosts, and not fear pressure," [19] strengthen the will to struggle, maintain strategic focus, establish a conviction in victory, and be prepared for struggle. We must aim for the shift between strength and weakness and the transformation between superiority and inferiority, persist in being proactive, select breakthrough points, seize the initiative, consolidate the situation of unity, deeply plant our own strength, and rely on tenacious struggle to open up new horizons for the development of our cause.
(The author's affiliation: School of Political Science, National Defence University) Source: Party Documents (Dàng de Wénxiàn), Issue 1, 2025 Web Editor: Jing Mu