Li Jianming: From "Spontaneous Modernization" to "Conscious Modernization"
In the 1950s and 60s, a whirlwind of modernization theory swept through American social sciences, yet the field of history did not exhibit a comparable enthusiasm for the issue of modernization. The American scholar Richard Brown complained in this regard that historians tended to treat "modern" as a "chronological expression" while maintaining a cautious distance from the concept of "modernization," with only a few historians dabbling in the subject. However, such a statement is not entirely accurate. In Euro-American historiography, traces of modernization research can be found at least as early as the beginning of the 20th century, and by the mid-20th century, it had become quite common. At that time, many historical narratives concerning the modern world or specific regions, whether explicitly or implicitly, often organized their materials around "modernization" or "the modernization process."
A view has long been prevalent in domestic academic circles that modernization research in Euro-American academia primarily takes non-"Western" countries and regions as its objects of investigation. This view suggests that American scholars, in particular, prefer to use "modernization" to discuss problems in other countries while refusing to acknowledge that modernization ever occurred in the United States, because the U.S. was "born modern" and thus never faced the problem of "becoming modern." This impressionistic view also fails to withstand scrutiny. A search of the Journal Storage (JSTOR) database reveals that between 1946 and 1980, there were 86 historical journal articles with "modernization" (including both the American and British spellings) in their titles. Among these, 23 concerned Europe, 6 concerned the United States, and 5 were monographs on Russia, totaling 34 papers; meanwhile, those discussing the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and Latin America also totaled exactly 34. Furthermore, many American historians focus on the transformation or revolutionary changes of American society, employing the three-stage framework of "tradition–transition–modern" to explain American social change, or using terms like "early" or "traditional period" to imply a subsequent "current period called 'modern,'" thus aligning their underlying meaning with the idea of "modernization." In certain fields of American historical research, such as the study of the Civil War, historians from the 1960s to the 1990s used "modernization" as an interpretive tool. From the perspective of global social transformation, they viewed the American Civil War as a watershed event in the move from "tradition" to "modernity," and regarded slavery as a "regressive institution" that rendered the South less "modern" than the North. This is, in effect, using "modernization" as a method—that is, taking "modernization" as an analytical tool or "organizing idea" to handle specific historical subject matter. Naturally, some historians also take "modernization" directly as their research subject, involving the transformation of American society as a whole, changes in specific American regions, and the development of certain technological and industrial sectors.
According to another general impression, Euro-American (especially American) modernization historiography formed a craze during the early-to-mid Cold War and gradually cooled thereafter. Yet the actual situation is not quite like that either. Although data retrieved from the JSTOR database cannot reflect the full scope of Euro-American modernization historiography, it provides a profile of relevant research over recent decades from one perspective. Prior to 1945, there was only one historical journal article in this database with "modernization" in its title; during the same period, not a single book review in the field of history featured the word in the title of the book being reviewed. From 1946 to 1980, there were 86 such journal articles and 220 such book titles. From 1981 to 2000, there were 82 journal articles and 260 book titles. Since 2001, the same database shows 118 journal articles and 187 book titles with "modernization" in the title. Some of these mentions of "modernization" in titles relate to the research subject, while more often they refer to a theoretical tool. From the above data, one can see that the interest of Euro-American historians in "modernization" was not limited to the Cold War period; to lightly claim that modernization research in foreign historiography is already a "flower after the festival" [1] seems somewhat arbitrary.
Since the early 1980s, modernization research has also gradually emerged in the domestic historical community and has maintained a trend of continuous development for a long time. According to search results from the China National Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI) Academic Journal Database, the number of historical articles with "modernization" in their titles was 40 from 1980 to 1990, 391 from 1991 to 2000, reaching 935 from 2001 to 2010, and 488 from 2011 to 2020. Since 2021, there have been 255 articles in just four years. At a glance, the figures for the 24 years since the start of the 21st century remain impressive. The domestic historical community has also handled the "modernization" issue in various ways. Some scholars advocate treating "modernization" as a universal world-historical process that can serve directly as a source of historical research subjects. Others treat "modernization" as a convex lens through which to reflect upon modern China, allowing the historical phenomenon of "modernization" to be seen. Still others advocate using "modernization" as a framework for compiling textbooks to renew conceptions of history. In the field of modern and contemporary Chinese history, discussions of "modernization" have been particularly heated. Inspired by the American scholar Arif Dirlik, some scholars began discussing the shift in research paradigms, advocating for the reconstruction of modern Chinese history using the "modernization paradigm." However, this "modernization paradigm" in the study of modern and contemporary Chinese history seems to have remained more in the state of concepts and propositions; weighty works of empirical research are not yet common.
Broadly speaking, social science research on modernization (primarily in economics, sociology, and political science) typically adopts three interrelated paths: first, constructing theories of modernization; second, analyzing the experience of modernization (also for the purpose of theorization); and third, using modernization as a theoretical tool to explore current social or international issues. Modernization research in the field of history generally also covers three aspects: first, taking "modernization" as a research subject; second, using "modernization" as an analytical tool; and third, using "modernization" to build a framework for the compilation of general history. However, there is a special characteristic to the historical study of modernization: "modernization" as a subject is usually the product of reflecting on past historical events with the aid of the concept of "modernization," and most works also require the aid of modernization theory to construct interpretive frameworks and narrative paths. This indicates that for most historians, the primary significance of "modernization" lies not in being an object of study, but in providing paths and methods for handling subject matter. That is to say, "modernization" usually manifests in historical research as a "paradigm." The number of works that could be categorized under this research paradigm is vast, and to provide a proper evaluation after in-depth study would seem an impossible task for any individual scholar; yet after a rough browsing of the relevant literature, one can still broadly distinguish the strengths, weaknesses, gains, and losses of modernization historiography. Furthermore, if this paradigm is to continue maintaining its academic vitality, it requires a measure of reflection on methodological issues. To address the essentials, there are three key points: how to view the historical types of modernization; how to further advance the "historicization" of modernization research; and how to handle the relationship between modernization theory and modernization historiography.
I. Historical Types of Modernization
The "modernization paradigm" of historical research first involves a typological analysis of modernization within world history. As early as the 1970s, some in American political science circles divided modernization into two types: "endogenous" and "exogenous." The classic example of "endogenous modernization" is in Western Europe, characterized by internal changes in factors clustered within a traditional framework that eventually manifest as significant social change. "Exogenous modernization" can be seen in all other societies outside Western Europe, characterized by the superimposition of modern models upon traditional ones, or the replacement of traditional models with modern ones. This classification emphasizes the nature and results of social change, focusing on the relationship between "modern" and "traditional." "Endogenous modernization" is the result of the evolution of a society's own traditions, while "exogenous modernization" is an innovation external to a society's traditions. According to this classification, "modernity" and "tradition" in Western Europe share a symbiotic relationship of fusion, with "modernity" being endogenous to its society, whereas in other regions the two are difficult to reconcile, and "modernity" is superimposed or implanted from the outside. This is equivalent to suggesting that the indigenous modernization mode of Western Europe might become the source of modernization for other regions, essentially constituting an invasive foreign object relative to local "tradition."
When the Chinese scholar Luo Rongqu [2] discussed the different types of the global modernization process, the formulations he initially used were "endogenous modernization" and "exogenous or externally-induced modernization." Later, in another article, he renamed these two types "endogenous-type" and "exogenous-type" [3], with the former typified by Western Europe and the latter represented by East Asia. Here he borrowed the terminology of American political science but endowed it with new meaning. This classification emphasizes the differences in these various modernizations in a genetic sense: "endogenous modernization" is triggered by conditions or factors internal to its society, while "exogenous modernization" refers to changes primarily caused by external factors.
Distinguishing modernization into "endogenous" and "exogenous" types certainly offers epistemological convenience, but it also possesses certain limitations. First, this classification easily obscures the historical dimension—that is, modernization under different spatial and temporal conditions may have more specific differences and hybridity in terms of inducements, nature, and results, making it difficult to simply categorize them into these two types. Second, there is a possibility of a one-sided understanding of "internal causes" and "external causes." From a transnational or global perspective, modernization in Western Europe was not an isolated or self-sufficient phenomenon but the result of deep involvement in globalizing movements, where external pressures or inducements also played a significant role. On the other hand, modernization in regions outside Western Europe was not entirely the product of external shocks or inducements but was inseparable from the internal autonomy and selectivity of the specific society. Third, it easily becomes entangled with ideological issues, sometimes even involving national sovereignty and dignity, because "exogenous-type" can, in certain contexts, be accused of being "Westernization" or "worshipping foreign things and fawning on foreigners" [4].
If we shift our perspective to focus on the historical stages of modern social transformation, it seems possible to see two different types of modernization: "spontaneous modernization" and "self-conscious modernization." "Spontaneous modernization" is mainly seen in the North Atlantic world from the 17th to the 19th centuries; it was modernization carried out without the name of "modernization," a monumental social change formed through continuous evolutionary accumulation over a long period. From the mid-to-late 19th century onward, some other regions and countries in the world, based on their observation and reflection on the social transformation of the North Atlantic world, began to adopt imitative, catch-up strategies of social transformation. After World War II, the concept of modernization and its related theories flourished, and many "Third World" countries sought development and transformation in the name of "modernization." At this point, "self-conscious modernization" became the mainstream. Meanwhile, "already modernized" countries also began to reflect on "modernity," exploring new modes of development and embarking on another path of "self-conscious modernization."
The massive social changes that occurred in the North Atlantic world from the 17th to the 19th centuries have long been a familiar story. This was a process of long-term, incremental, and spontaneously occurring social change. During this process, historical movements such as conquest, colonization, trade, proselytization, revolution, democratization, equalization, technological innovation, industrialization, urbanization, consumerism, and welfarism either occurred in succession or advanced in an intertwined manner. Ultimately, they converged and fused, manifesting over several centuries as a broad and profound social transformation. Any single one of these historical movements might have been a deliberate pursuit based on planning—for example, regarding British colonization and trade, there were discussions in public opinion, blueprints drawn up by civil society groups, and promotion by both the Crown and Parliament. Furthermore, some of these changes exhibited chain or interactive effects. For instance, cities in Western Europe arose from the needs of defense, governance, and exchange; they unintentionally prepared a platform for technological innovation and the rise of industry. Industrialization, in turn, provided a powerful and sustained impetus for urban development and created fundamental conditions for urban expansion, including architecture, transportation, water and sewage systems, and fuel. The continuously developing cities then opened up even greater space for industrial, commercial, and financial activities, providing more convenient conditions for the operation of industrial capital. In short, various changes converged through historical serendipity, much like the reaction caused by combining numerous elements in a chemical experiment, unexpectedly shaping a modern world utterly different from traditional society. The figures who played important roles in this process did not know that what they were doing was implementing a "social engineering" project called "modernization." That the social transformation they experienced and promoted became "modernization" was the result of later generations "recognizing" it ex post facto through the method of "conceptualization."
In the social transformation of the North Atlantic world, most of the fundamental factors that ultimately distinguished the transformed society from the previous one were not new things born suddenly. Industrialization is both the primary hallmark of modern society and the key force shaping it, yet it did not suddenly appear in Britain at some specific moment in the 18th century. Rather, it was the concentrated manifestation of the continuous evolution of knowledge, technology, craftsmanship, energy, production organization, and market relations since the late Middle Ages. The contemporary historical community generally recognizes that there was a stage of "proto-industrialization" [5] prior to industrialization. Furthermore, the economic growth driven by industrialization in the Britain of that era was nowhere near as rapid as it is in many countries today. Additionally, even the most cataclysmic political revolutions of the Atlantic world did not create new political structures, power relations, and political concepts like a "skyscraper rising from level ground" [6]; rather, they elevated new factors that had long been gestating within the "Old Regime" from the inner layers to the surface, transforming them from illegal to legal. For example, the system of "Parliamentary Sovereignty" formed after the English Revolution was largely an evolution of the "King-in-Parliament" [7] system that had existed since the mid-to-late Middle Ages; the "free government" created by the American Revolution was primarily a development of the British and colonial traditions of self-governance and electoral politics. In the narrative modes of modern world history common in Euro-American academia, the social transformation of the North Atlantic world is "conceptualized" as a "Dual Revolution" (the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution) or a "Triple Revolution" (the Scientific-Technological Revolution, the Industrial Revolution, and the Political Revolution). This makes it possible to "reduce" a long, complex, and even messy historical process of spontaneous and gradual change into a series of planned, orderly, and abrupt events.
From the perspective of the social transformation experience of the North Atlantic world, factors such as a stable political order (fewer civil disturbances and wars), a less threatening international environment, a relaxed social system, a de-hierarchized social structure, expanding political participation, an increasingly mature rule of law, guarantees of individual liberty and security, an atmosphere that allows and encourages innovation, and the habit and capacity for exploring the unknown and inventing new things were not primarily the conditions for social transformation at the time, but rather the fundamental substance of "modernization." They advanced alongside technological innovation, the industrial revolution, economic takeoff, and social welfare, becoming characteristics of the post-transformation society. Those factors that in the eyes of later generations constituted the "conditions" for modernization were not, for those in the midst of the transformation process, deliberate preparations made for some grand social blueprint. For example, the problems that the American revolutionaries were preoccupied with were not developing the economy, promoting industrialization, or improving the national quality of life, but rather innovating the polity, consolidating independence, protecting liberty, promoting equality, and preventing the rulers from oppressing the ruled. Yet, by coincidence, the political structures, power relations, and value orientations formed after the American Revolution were indeed conducive to technological change, economic development, and rising living standards. However, this was merely a kind of historical convergence; if the American Revolution were viewed as a political event that consciously created conditions for American development, one would inevitably fall into the trap of teleological thinking.
Attempts to theoretically reflect on social transformation based on observations of the great changes in the North Atlantic world began quite early, both in the West and beyond. The Euro-American intelligentsia distilled the idea of "modernity" from this and referred to the economic "miracle" that occurred in Britain as the "Industrial Revolution." Intellectual and political elites in "non-Western" countries saw the powerful effects of "modernization" in the North Atlantic changes and attempted to use them to drive change in their own societies. Mustafa Kemal, the primary founder of the Republic of Turkey, explicitly used "the modernization of Turkey" as a major administrative slogan, where "modernization" meant the active adoption of the "Western" model to transform Turkey. The influence of this trend also radiated to China; it is said that the term "modernization" mentioned in Liu Keshu’s New Turkey (published by Commercial Press in 1926) was taken from Turkish documents. At this stage, the non-Western world's understanding of "modernization" goals focused primarily on "enriching the country and strengthening the military" (fuguo qiangbing). Their primary concern lay in adopting new technologies to realize industrialization as quickly as possible, while simultaneously arming an army sufficient to resist foreign aggression. By the time modernization theory was fully formed, definitions of "modernity" became more systematized.
In the 1950s and 60s, a cohort of "modernization" theorists emerged in the American social sciences, including Walt Whitman Rostow, Talcott Parsons, Edward Shils, Gabriel Almond, Lucian Pye, David Apter, Cyril Black, Karl Deutsch, and Daniel Lerner. They sketched blueprints for the economic, political, and social development of the "Third World." Modernization theory did not create the concept of "modernization"; rather, it proposed a theoretical conception for the development of the "Third World" based on the cognition of the process and results of social transformation in the North Atlantic world. Within the theoretical perspective of "modernization," the "West" was already a "modernized" entity that could provide a model and guide for societies that had not yet modernized or were about to do so. In the words of Seymour Martin Lipset: "The world has been moving in the direction of the United States." Granted, while "modernization" theory, as a guiding principle for U.S. foreign policy, met with failure in many places, it still exerted a profound influence on the development of many countries. While remaining critical of "modernization" theory, the political and intellectual elites of these countries also drew inspiration from it, defining their desired mode of development as "modernization" and establishing their goal as "becoming modern." Thus, "conscious modernization" flourished here. At this point, "modernization" was both a developmental plan and a process of change; it could serve as a social ideal for certain groups and as a strategic tool in "interstate politics." In short, modernization became a goal pursued with intent, transformed into conscious action.
Before World War I, when the European powers dominated the world, they were bent on making the world belong to them through "partitioning"; during the Cold War, the United States attempted to make the world like itself through "development," thereby becoming the primary advocate and promoter of "conscious modernization." In the view of American proponents of "modernization," "stagnant" societies could obtain the "catalyst" for change and a template for development through interaction with the United States. Therefore, the United States should actively promote "Third World" countries to take the path of modernization through various channels. In fact, the United States and its European allies did use diplomatic, military, and economic aid to help "developing" or "underdeveloped" countries pursue economic development and social transformation, cultivating "modernity" within their societies. They sought to make these countries increasingly closer to the "West" to compete with the Soviet Union for "intermediate forces" [8] and to compete with socialism for adherents. However, the actual situation did not follow American desires; the interest of "Third World" countries in liberty and democracy was far less than their concern for economic growth and the increase of personal wealth. Some countries did achieve significant economic growth, but the political transformations expected by the United States did not occur. Furthermore, against the backdrop of the U.S.-Soviet competition, or due to other political considerations, some countries accepted "Western" aid while intentionally avoiding the American model, striving instead to seek a "modernization" path different from that of the "West."
From the 1960s to the late 1980s, "conscious modernization" was also once the policy guide of the United Nations for "underdeveloped" countries, as seen in a series of resolutions, particularly the "UN Development Decade" reports. The gist of this policy was that "underdeveloped" countries, facilitated by external aid and centered on industrialization, could achieve economic growth measured by a continuous increase in Gross Domestic Product (GDP); once the economy developed, other problems would be easily solved. However, this "modernization paradigm" focused one-dimensionally on economic development while ignoring human welfare and the public good. Later, the UN shifted to adopting a "human development approach." This new approach no longer took economic growth as the core objective but placed welfare goals first, treating development as a multidimensional, holistic process including social development, good governance, poverty alleviation, and institutional development.
If "spontaneous modernization" was a process of natural convergence of multidimensional changes, "conscious modernization" has mostly exhibited a selectivity driven by the desire for quick results. On the one hand, this selectivity stems from an understanding of the experience of the early-modernized countries. For example, if it is believed that the key to a developed nation's success lies in the development of education, then education becomes a priority in the modernization strategy; if it is believed that the political system is decisive for modernization, then political reform is treated as the "priority of priorities" for social transformation. On the other hand, the selectivity of modernization also arises from the judgments made by its advocates and implementers regarding "national conditions" (guoqing). In July 1933, the Shun Pao Monthly (Shenbao Yuekan) initiated a discussion on the "problem of China’s modernization." Its editors stated that although modernization covers a wide range, they intended to concentrate on production and economic issues because the Chinese economy was then in a deep predicament. Among the scholars participating in the discussion, some explicitly proposed: "As far as the state and society are concerned, modernization is industrialization... Industrialization is the foundation for all other modernizations. If China is industrialized, then education, academia, and other social systems will naturally follow suit." Furthermore, selective modernization generally carries the goal of "catching up and surpassing" (ganchao), aiming to complete in a short time the path that predecessors traveled over several hundred years. The problem, however, is that those ills that emerged sequentially alongside social transformation over several centuries also "blow out" in a concentrated form during the process of "conscious modernization," sometimes to an extent that a society cannot bear. Unsurprisingly, while some countries experience rapid economic growth, inequality in income distribution also expands sharply, corruption intensifies, and problems such as resource waste and environmental destruction become increasingly prominent.
Contrary to the expectations of American architects of "modernization," within the process of "conscious modernization," economic development and political transition are often out of sync or even completely decoupled. In "Third World" countries, the government becomes the primary planner, promoter, and implementer of modernization. The more centralized and powerful a government is, the more capable it is of proposing and implementing a particular modernization scheme; sometimes modernization even becomes a potent tool of its rule. American scholar Jack Donnelly observed that "underdeveloped countries," in seeking economic growth, have had to accept authoritarian systems because democratic governments were too "weak" and lacked the capacity to implement strong policies conducive to improving economic conditions. A study involving 98 countries in the 1970s showed that "among poor countries, authoritarian regimes increased the rate of economic development, while democratic regimes were indeed a luxury that hindered development." During the era of Park Chung-hee, South Korea vigorously promoted modernization with the aim of developing the economy and improving people’s livelihoods, yet this did not include political democracy. Park himself stated explicitly that for "people suffering in hunger and despair," democracy was "meaningless." This represents a sharp departure from the case of "spontaneous modernization," where industrialization and democratization generally proceeded in parallel and reinforced one another.
In "conscious modernization," there is also a common situation where significant tension exists between policy planning and environmental conditions. Since the late 18th and early 19th centuries, "Western" scholars have observed Asian and African societies and cultures through the lenses of "Orientalism" [9] and "Othering," believing they lacked rational religion, possessed no tradition of contract, lacked genuine private property rights, and missing the mechanisms or habits of political participation, while placing too much emphasis on the significance of the village community or the collective. In the eyes of modernization theorists, these were all obstacles to implementing "Western-style" modernization. While such views were full of imagination and prejudice, they also revealed a truth: namely, that the "Western" modernization model is difficult to apply in certain non-"Western" societies. Furthermore, modernization in "Third World" countries is intertwined with issues such as independence, sovereignty, the distribution of power, resource conditions, and market capacity, and is subject to redirection or even interruption at any time.
Modernization in non-"Western" countries is also frequently haunted by the specter of "Westernization." In the 1960s, a period when modernization theory flourished, the American political scientist Rupert Emerson pointed out: "What makes 'modernization' modern is the capacity to live, think, produce and organize in substantially the same way as Western countries, even though the imperialist control of Western countries has now been completely broken." His implication was that the true meaning of "modernization" for non-"Western" countries lay in imitating the "West" to become the "West." This view, which equated "modernization" with "Westernization," reflected on one hand the American intention to resist Soviet-style "modernization," and on the other, the self-admiration and confidence Americans felt toward their own model of social development. However, an increasing number of non-"Western" countries have gradually moved away from the path of mimetic modernization, striving instead to explore their own ways of achieving modernization. In the early 1970s, whether the development of "backward" societies must follow a "Western-style" path of industrialization, and whether "modernization" merely meant "Westernization," became concerns for many non-"Western" scholars. Some non-"Western" scholars well-versed in modernization theory began to attack the "Western narrative of modernity" and sought to construct a set of "modernity discourses" to counter the "West." Since the end of the Cold War, modernization has become intertwined with issues such as globalization, the War on Terror, color revolutions [10], and new geopolitics. "Old-guard" modernized countries have shown a trend of relative decline, while some non-"Western" countries have moved to the center of the international stage, further strengthening the "de-Westernization" orientation of modernization.
It is easy to see from the above discussion that "spontaneous" and "conscious" are not only two types of modernization but also two stages of modernization. The former is modernization without the name "modernization," occurring in the North Atlantic world from the 17th to the 19th centuries; the latter is usually launched based on a "modernization scheme" and belongs to planned modernization, originating in non-"Western" regions in the mid-to-late 19th century, gradually expanding worldwide after World War II, and affecting those countries that were "already modernized." Compared to the classification of "endogenous" and "exogenous," the division into "spontaneous" and "conscious" can account for both diachronic and synchronic aspects, possesses a more concrete sense of time and space, and can bring about new epistemological effects. The nature of historical thinking requires historians to think in terms of time and space, and for the historiography of modernization, the most severe challenges happen to come precisely from the dimensions of time and space. Therefore, the distinction between "spontaneous" and "conscious" provides an appropriate starting point for reflecting on the methodology of modernization historiography.
II. The "Historicization" of Modernization Research
When discussing the meaning of "modernization," the American historian Richard Brown said it was a concept encompassing the major changes in "Western" society over the "past six centuries." One might say this sentence exposes a massive methodological loophole in modernization historiography, indicating that relevant researchers have not clearly realized that "modernization" is itself a concept with its own history. Especially during the "spontaneous modernization" stage, the word "modernization" did not yet possess its current meaning. Only after "modernization" became a concept specifically referring to modern social transformation could the social changes of the "Western" world over the previous centuries be labeled as "modernization." Furthermore, in the stage of "conscious modernization," different societies have different definitions of "modernization," and there is no lack of conflicting points among them. Consequently, the "modernization" faced by historians is not a self-evident, self-sufficient historical fact, nor is it a continuous and consistent historical process. Only by soberly recognizing this can one speak of the "historicization" of modernization research.
The word "modernization" appeared in English before the mid-18th century. A Dictionary of the English Language compiled by Samuel Johnson in 1755 includes the entry "To Modernise" under the word "Modern," defining it as "to adapt ancient compositions to modern persons or things" or "to change ancient language into modern language." That is to say, "modernization" referred to making ancient things suit current norms or requirements and did not involve "social transformation." For a long period thereafter, the English-speaking world mostly used the word "moderniz(s)ation" in this sense. For example, the 1895 Illustrative Monthly spoke of the "modernization of Greek classicism." In 1896, the Journal of American Folklore mentioned the "modernization of spelling." In 1925, an article titled "The Modernization of International Law" wrote that "the modernization of international law means the adaptation of international law to modern conditions." In 1929, Arnold Toynbee gave a lecture titled "The Modernization of the Middle East" based on Denison Ross's observation notes in the region, which sparked heated discussion among the audience. The "modernization" they repeatedly mentioned primarily referred to the reform of Islam and did not contain the meaning of holistic social transformation.
As a vocabulary describing "social transformation" (rendered in English as social transformation rather than societal transformation), "modernization" appeared later in the English-speaking world. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the British author William Thackeray said in 1860 that "printing and gunpowder will tend to modernize the world," a sentence marking a turning point in the word's usage. Yet upon closer inspection, Thackeray's usage still largely did not exceed the scope of Johnson's dictionary definition. Only when social change is viewed as a departure from and transcendence of "traditional society," and "modernization" is then used to describe this process, does the word take on the meaning of social transformation. In 1895, an article in an American geographical magazine mentioned that there were some "extreme conservatives" in Korea at the time who strongly advocated adhering to "China's ethical system" to prevent "the modernization of Korea." The appeal here to the opposition between "tradition" and "modernity" seems to understand "modernization" as a social transformation of "becoming modern." This is the earliest evidence seen thus far of the "modern" usage of the word "modernization." Since the mid-19th century, some "backward countries" in Asia and Africa began to learn from or imitate the "West," conducting political reforms, social restructuring, or promoting industrialization. When European and American travelers observed these trends in the early 20th century, they used "modernization" to describe them. In 1923, the Chinese educator Zhang Pengchun (P.C. Chang) published the English work Education for Modernization in China in New York, discussing China's educational reforms since the Xinhai Revolution [11]; the word "modernization" used in the book clearly carried the meaning of social transformation. A review of the book stated: "The modernization of China is a process long prophesied but slow to be realized... The weight of tradition is so heavy, the continuity of life based on specific forms has lasted for countless centuries, and its momentum is so great that change is very difficult to occur." Here, "modernization" is explicitly contrasted with the stubborn adherence to "tradition," undoubtedly referring to a social change of a transformational nature.
In the decades after World War II, "modernization" became a hot topic in both political and academic fields, with its aim being to explore how underdeveloped countries could embark on a path of development. At this time, the usage of "modernization" as specifically referring to social transformation acquired a stable academic and practical foundation. Eisenstadt noted that after World War II, the development issues of "Third World" countries aroused (American) academic interest, and research on "modernization" and development in a narrow sense subsequently flourished, covering disciplines such as economics, sociology, political science, and social anthropology. But from a deeper level, interest in the nature of modern society and social change and development belongs to the foundations of modern social science; therefore, the surge of research on modernization and development is a natural extension of this characteristic. In other words, since the beginning of the modern era, the North Atlantic world's reflections on "modernity" stored deep-seated academic resources for the rise of modernization research and the maturation of modernization theory, and provided the historical roots for the "modern" usage of the term "modernization."
The word "modernization" (现代化, xiàndàihuà) roughly began to appear in Chinese newspapers and periodicals at the end of the 19th century. By the 1920s and 30s, it had become a common term in various books and journals, usually used to refer to social change or the transformation of civilization. By the 1930s, how to build China into a "modernized country" became a point of intense concern for the intellectual community; the concept of "modernization" at this time carried the meaning of comprehensive social transformation. In July 1933, the Shenbao Monthly [12] compiled and published a special issue on "The Problem of China’s Modernization" to discuss principled issues regarding China's modernization, involving topics such as: should we imitate the "West" or follow our own path; should we take the capitalist road or the socialist road; should industrialization be the priority, or should industry and agriculture be developed simultaneously; and so on. This indicates that the Chinese intellectual community at that time already had a relatively clear grasp of the concept of "modernization."
Undoubtedly, during the period when social transformation occurred in the North Atlantic world from the 17th to the 19th centuries, no one knew that the changes they were experiencing were "modernization." What the British of this period saw was not a holistic social change called "modernization," but rather various specific changes—for instance, the gradual shrinking of common land, the increasing number of new types of pastures and farms, the continuous emergence of new technologies and machines, smoke-billowing chimneys everywhere, more and more young men and women entering factories to work, the increasing power of Parliament, the gradual lowering of qualifications for voting, and the distribution and possession of wealth becoming increasingly different from the past. For the tremendous changes in Britain since the mid-18th century, even keen-eyed and profound social theorists of the time, such as Engels, only referred to them as "social revolution." Similarly, those in late-Qing China who advocated for the introduction of foreign knowledge, technology, and institutions, those officials managing "Western Affairs" [13], as well as the founders of the Tongwen Guan [14] and the proponents of abolishing the imperial examinations, did not categorize what they were doing within the scope of "China's modernization." In short, using "modernization" to describe the social transformations that have already occurred or are currently underway around the world is merely a form of "belated" cognition. The fact that social transformations in the North Atlantic world prior to the late 19th century carry the name of "modernization" is the result of later "conceptualization."
This situation presents a sharp challenge to the study of the history of modernization: "spontaneous modernization" is not a self-contained historical fact, but rather a "social fact" that requires researchers to identify and integrate. Whether it can be handled using the conventional methods of historiography thus becomes an issue. That is to say, in world history prior to the late 19th century, "modernization" was not an event with a clear visage, self-contained connotation, and its own "label"—unlike the "Glorious Revolution" or the "Luddite Movement"—but was rather a product constructed by researchers with the aid of the concept of "modernization." From a deeper perspective, the transformation of "spontaneous modernization" into a "social fact" is the result of repeated interaction between the concept of "modernization" and people's observations of actual social change. In other words, people perceived a holistic social transformation within the historical movements of the 17th through 19th centuries, from which a "modern society" emerged that possessed many fundamental differences compared to previous eras. At the same time, people discovered that the word "modernization"—used to refer to making ancient things adapt to the present—could be used to describe this social transformation that had already occurred. Consequently, the process of social transformation in the North Atlantic world prior to the late 19th century acquired the name "modernization."
Is "conscious modernization" since the late 19th century, then, a self-contained fact? It seems one cannot generalize. Modernization as a development strategy or social movement—whether taken as a whole or in its specific aspects, such as industrialization, urbanization, political reform, changes in customs, adjustment of social structures, and shifts in lifestyles and value systems—can indeed be a self-contained fact. However, in the process of "conscious modernization," the "modernization schemes" implemented by the subjects of modernization may produce collateral effects. For instance, in a modernization movement centered on industrialization, change is not limited to the technical and economic spheres, as economic development also drives changes in other areas. These changes might not be part of the initial modernization planning, nor do they carry the "modernization" label, yet they nonetheless constitute important content of social change. These changes require the use of "modernization" as a theoretical tool for identification and interpretation. Therefore, certain aspects of "conscious modernization" as objects of historical research may also possess a degree of constructivity.
Viewed in this light, modernization as an object of historical research does not possess identifiable contours and characteristics in the same way as the figures, events, institutions, and ideas examined by classical historiography; therefore, it cannot rely entirely on conventional historical methods. Here, the methods of "New Social History" [15] may offer something to draw upon. Since the 1950s and 60s, social historians have used sociological theory as a method to integrate the fragmented and dispersed trivial behaviors of millions of people—their clothing, food, housing, transport, eating, drinking, and entertainment—into social facts of daily life, and then examined them using historical methods. In essence, when researchers examine specific events or phenomena within the modernization process—such as economic development, social reform, party politics, or university education—they can utilize classical historical methods. However, when constructing an interpretative framework, they must rely on modernization theory, the purpose of which is to reveal the significance of specific events or phenomena within the social transformation. At this point, "modernization" is no longer merely the subject matter of research, but primarily the method of research. Even when writing a general history of "modernization," it serves mainly as an "organizational concept" for integrating materials and building a framework.
At the same time, different types of modernization are inconsistent in their research paths and methods; to confuse different historical types of modernization is equivalent to ignoring the constraints of specific temporal and spatial conditions. For example, some scholars have used Max Weber's theoretical paradigm regarding the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism to examine the role of cultural factors in East Asian development, only to conclude that "Weber was wrong" because a wave of modernization likewise rose in East Asia where Protestantism does not hold a dominant position (the so-called "Confucian" East Asia). The flaw in this explanation stems precisely from a failure to consider that modernization has different historical types. Even if Weber's theory were accurate and reliable, the historical events it concerns come from the stage of "spontaneous modernization." Conversely, East Asian development bears the characteristics of "conscious modernization," where a massive influx of foreign values, ideas, and customs, the guidance of the state, the shaping of public opinion, and the effects of education all made it possible to "manufacture" social values and ethics compatible with capitalism. Similarly, in discussions concerning "conscious modernization," certain social, political, and cultural factors are treated as prerequisites for industrialization to explain the status of industrialization in "late-developing countries." However, applying this line of thinking to the discussion of "spontaneous modernization" would lead to serious "anachronism." "Spontaneous modernization" was originally the result of the intertwining and fusion of multiple changes and transformations; industrialization proceeded in tandem with various social, political, and cultural factors, mutually stimulating one another to collectively constitute social transformation. Elements such as the formation of the "nation-state," changes in political systems, adjustments in power relations, and shifts in value systems were themselves part of modernization, rather than appearing as conditions for it. They may have existed in a state of mutual conditionality or support, but they did not constitute a chain-like causal relationship.
Furthermore, in the study of the history of modernization, failure to distinguish between historical types of modernization may also produce an illusion that modernization in world history possesses a certain unity and is a consistent process from beginning to end. Indeed, early modernization theory carried a tendency toward "convergence theory," believing that all countries undergoing modernization would eventually become similar (based on the "Western" model), and that a "modernized" world would be a homogeneous one. Yet, modernization as a historical form—whether "spontaneous" or "conscious"—exhibits a high degree of diversity. First, regarding "spontaneous modernization," social forces played the primary role; artisans, entrepreneurs, inventors, workers, universities, newspapers, and associations were the protagonists, while the state and rulers played the roles of "night watchman" or "patron." However, in "conscious modernization," the government and those in power become the dominant actors; the core impetus for modernization comes from government policy. Although various elite power groups or international forces can influence, constrain, or even dominate government policy, the modernization strategies and measures implemented through the state are the key factors directly shaping the modernization process. Second, modernization is diverse in degree; even within the same society, the degree of transformation is usually uneven. Moreover, for different countries, regions, and groups, the meaning of modernization can be vastly different or even diametrically opposed. For instance, groups that lose power due to equalization, or those who lose their land and even their livelihoods due to industrialization and urbanization—such as the urban poor and vagrants—might not welcome modernization. Third, neither "spontaneous modernization" nor "conscious modernization" is a process that moves forward relentlessly toward improvement; it is filled with setbacks, failures, destruction, and even annihilation. The social transformation of the North Atlantic world was long accompanied by "negative phenomena" such as conquest, expansion, colonialism, war, disease, polarization between rich and poor, social unrest, and environmental destruction. In many countries, the pollution and traffic congestion brought by industrialization and urbanization are also heavily criticized. Finally, complex connections and interactions often exist between different countries and different types of modernization, necessitating the introduction of perspectives and methods from transnational and global history.
III. Modernization Theory and Modernization Historiography
The above discussion faintly suggests that there has always been a closely related yet entangled relationship between modernization historiography and modernization theory. On the one hand, in the study of the history of modernization, modernization theory possesses indispensable methodological significance; whether in the identification and definition of research themes or the formation of lines of reasoning, one must utilize or even rely upon modernization theory. On the other hand, modernization theory itself—whether as part of "conscious modernization" or in terms of its influence on American foreign policy and post-WWII international relations—is an object of study for modernization historiography. However, modernization theory is not a single theory, but a hodgepodge of various theories; moreover, it is not merely a theory, but often an ideology. As a result, modernization theory inevitably brings complications to modernization historiography; researchers must maintain a keen sense of discernment, knowing which modernization theory they are employing, in what sense they understand the concept of "modernization," and which pitfalls they must be careful to avoid when drawing upon modernization theory.
Undoubtedly, modernization theory—especially the concept of "modernization"—constitutes the foundation of modernization historiography. It could even be said that without the idea of "modernization," there would be no way to speak of modernization historiography. However, "modernization" is precisely a concept that is extremely difficult to grasp; its meaning is unsettled, opinions are divided, and it is saturated with value orientations and ideological connotations. From the academic perspective of modernization studies, the concept of "modernization" has roughly two different usages. First, emphasizing the temporal dimension—that is, simply "becoming modern," especially making ancient things adapt to the present. Second, emphasizing the dimension of value—stressing the change from "backward" to "advanced"—where, when used to refer to social transformation, the focus is on making all aspects of a society's conditions (such as production, institutions, facilities, ideas, and customs) more conducive to the improvement of human life. After the formation of modernization theory, the latter concept of "modernization" became dominant. The concept of "modernization" used by bridgehead historians in Europe and America generally belongs to this latter category as well.
Concerning the specific connotation of the concept of "modernization," there are various accounts in European and American academic circles. S.N. Eisenstadt once sorted out early modernization theories, mentioning Karl Deutsch's "social mobilization" theory, the structural-functionalist school's "organizational development" theory, as well as theories of cultural change and the personality orientations of modern man. Looking broadly at the various theories of modernization in Western academia, it seems the goals and results of "modernization" can be roughly summarized as follows: (1) secularization, i.e., the separation of state and church, and the "disembedding" of religious activities from daily life; (2) rationalization, i.e., the removal of superstition and blind following, the honoring of science, the reliance on knowledge, and respect for common sense; (3) equalization, i.e., the abolition of social hierarchies and subordinate obligations, with adult interactions based on voluntary association, contracts, and equivalence, alongside active social mobility; (4) democratization, i.e., the implementation of competitive politics based on mass voting, where the state is no longer a tool for a specific class, group, or family to acquire and maintain privilege, but a "public instrument" [16] to promote the security and well-being of all citizens; (5) legalization [rule of law], i.e., placing the rights, disputes, and security of citizens under the jurisdiction of law and the judiciary; (6) industrialization, i.e., adopting machine production, implementing a market economy, and striving for sustained economic growth; (7) urbanization, i.e., the convergence of population, wealth, and superior facilities in cities; (8) improvement in the quality of life, i.e., increased income, the rise of consumerism, the lowering of the "Engel coefficient," and increased life expectancy. These terms describing the trends and results of social change long existed in European and American languages, but were at this time "co-opted" and integrated by modernization theory. Furthermore, some scholars formulated indicator systems for "modernization" to identify and distinguish "traditional society" from "modern society." These indicators involve all aspects, such as population, marriage, family, education, morality, values, technology, division of labor, religion, the state, associations, institutions, political processes, social relations, social mobility, and lifestyles, all of which can be measured with numbers (indices). In defining the connotation of "modernization" in this way, the reference is undoubtedly the experience of social transformation in the North Atlantic world; its view of history is linear, its process manifests as development and transformation, and its value orientation is one of progress, affluence, and freedom.
The most prominent issue with this conception of "modernization" is clearly its strong "Western-centric" orientation. Initially, most scholars in Europe and the United States equated modernization with "Westernization." In June 1959, American sociologist Edward Shils, discussing the development of "new states," proclaimed that a "modern" state should be a "welfare state" and a "democratic state." It should eliminate privilege, conduct land reform, adopt "progressive income taxes with wide brackets," implement universal suffrage, provide public education, emphasize science and technology, achieve continuous economic progress, and possess high standards of living. In short, for "new states," "'modern' means being Western without the burden of following the West. It is the Western model detached from its geographical origin and location." The vision of "modernization" depicted by Shils contained a certain "cosmopolitan" sentiment, believing that "modernization" was not merely a unique phenomenon limited to the "West" but could become a universal process of world history. However, it used the experience of the North Atlantic world as its blueprint and the current status of "new states" as a contrast; thus, it was an undisguised "Western-centrism" that embodied classic "Othering" logic. Shils even applied the "Western" version of the modernization mold to the Soviet Union's "modernization," labeling it at best a "deformed modernization." In 1964, a "Western" journalist wrote a book on modernization that leveled many criticisms against the conditions of "non-Western" countries and prescribed a formula directing them on how to follow the "Western" path to escape their "backward" state. A sharp book review pointed out that this was entirely a reproduction of the "White Man's Burden" [17].
It is generally believed that American modernization theory during the Cold War era served U.S. foreign strategy with a clear-cut banner. However, this was primarily the intent of U.S. policymakers and think tanks, while the attitude of the U.S. academic community was quite complex. Regarding modernization theory, there were supporters as well as opponents; some scholars raised strong criticisms against the arrogance and prejudice inherent in the "modernization model." Their general argument was that modernization theory leaned toward the "West" and "developed countries," carrying a "ethnocentric" color. It also possessed ideological bias by promoting liberal-democratic systems. Furthermore, it was ahistorical in its framework, mechanically assuming that some societies were the pioneers of modernization while backward countries must catch up with advanced ones; it even possessed a certain "teleological" nature, treating "modernity" as the common destination for humanity.
Moreover, after the formation of modernization theory, adversarial theories quickly emerged in European and American academia, the most well-known being "Dependency Theory" and "World-Systems Theory." The former explicitly opposed mainstream modernization concepts, arguing that "underdeveloped" countries could not achieve development by adopting the models of developed countries, because the reason for their "underdevelopment" lay precisely in their dependency on developed nations. The solution, they argued, was to do the opposite: break away from the international capitalist order and seek development through self-determination, self-reliance, and import-substitution. The latter explicitly challenged "Eurocentrism," claiming that peripheral conditions are constrained by the center; in the pattern of center-periphery relations, the more the economy develops, the wider the gap between the center and the periphery becomes. Both theories carried a certain pessimistic tone, insisting that the "Western" path of modernization could not be universal. Simultaneously, they both touched upon a truth: that "development" is not the affair of a single country but is constrained by various factors such as great power politics, international relations, and the world market. Additionally, modernization theory encountered several subversive intellectual rivals. For instance, postmodernists directed their spearheads at the dilemmas of "modernity," while postcolonial theory linked modernization to "Western" hegemony. After the Cold War, "Western" modernization theory began to circulate in a new guise, with a scope of observation covering cultural change, gender equality, democratization, and the democratic peace theory. It made various revisions to previous theories, believing that "economic and technological development would bring about a set of corresponding social, cultural, and political changes." Particularly noteworthy is that in the vast "non-Western" world, various indigenous modernization theories with nationalist or other political orientations have been published, most of which take European and American modernization theory as their target.
The complexity and diversity of modernization theory suggest that historians, when borrowing from it, need to be mindful of several issues. First, the utilization of modernization theory by various European and American governments and the meaning and value of the theory itself are two matters that must be distinguished. Second, one should carefully identify the "Western-centric" orientation of modernization theory; when utilizing the concept of "modernization," it is necessary to subject it to a certain "de-Westernization" treatment. Third, although modernization theory is derived from history, it is not equivalent to history; in historical research, borrowing these theories must never be treated as evidence for an argument, but only as methods and tools, or as targets for dialogue and deliberation. Finally, those voices "singing a different tune" against modernization theory should not be ignored; one might as well use them to sharpen the theoretical tool of "modernization."
Another highly controversial aspect of modernization theory is its adoption of a "traditional-modern" binary opposition to understand and plan social transformation. As Eisenstadt noted, early modernization theory's definition of the nature of modern society primarily adopted a binary mode of thinking, conducted with reference to the understanding of the characteristics of "traditional society." So-called "modernization" was to dismantle and eliminate the characteristics of "traditional society" to ensure the continuous development of modern economic, political, and social forces. The "traditional society" referred to here encompasses both the "pre-modern" societies of the "West" and the "non-Western" societies positioned as the "Other." According to this "traditional-modern" binary concept, the "traditional" is equated with stagnation, closure, superstition, poverty, and backwardness, while the "modern" signifies development, openness, rationality, affluence, and progress. Understanding modernization through this logic reduces it to a simple departure from "tradition," overemphasizing abrupt change and rupture. This inevitably cuts off historical continuity and fails to consider the significance of gradual change and transition. If we introduce the distinction between "spontaneous" and "conscious" modernization, it seems possible to mitigate the simplistic flaws of the "traditional-modern" binary, turning them into a pair of categories that complement each other while maintaining tension.
As discussed previously, the greatest characteristic of "spontaneous modernization" is that it is formed by gradual changes accumulating into a monumental shift. In this process, "tradition" and "modern" are not in a simple state of opposition and confrontation but rather long-term coexistence and symbiosis. The move from "tradition" to "modern" is not a ruptural mutation but a gradual evolution and transformation. In other words, "spontaneous modernization" does not manifest as the "modern" suddenly replacing the "traditional," but as the "traditional" slowly transforming into the "modern." It is only because the final difference and contrast between "modern society" and "traditional society" are so intense that, in the eyes of later generations, "modernization" takes on the sense of an abrupt change. Recently, in response to the previous tendency to focus excessively on ruptures and mutations, European and American academia has vigorously developed research on the "transitional period," discarding the "traditional-modern" binary. They have launched critiques of a single "modernity" and a unique modernization model, reflected on linear views of modernization history, and utilized the concept of "multiple modernities" to interpret "non-Western" modernization.
Entering the stage of "conscious modernization," the relationship between "tradition" and "modern" presents an even more complex situation. Initially, some countries also firmly believed in the "traditional-modern" binary, attempting to forcibly smash "tradition" to quickly enter the "modern." However, this often failed to bring true "modernity"; sometimes, what appeared after tradition was shattered was merely chaos and regression. In other modernizing countries, society exhibited a certain hybridity, where some aspects were modernized while others continued to maintain old characteristics; this is referred to as "partial modernization." Still other countries dedicated themselves to seeking modernization paths different from "Westernization," attempting to discover the significance of "tradition" for the transition to "modern society" and considering how to strive to maintain and promote "excellent" traditions during the modernization process. This not only abandoned the concept of "traditional-modern" binary opposition but also intentionally leaned on "tradition" to highlight the unique characteristics of their modernization.
In European and American social theory, there are several hypotheses regarding the laws of the modernization process. Some scholars believe that the political, economic, and cultural systems in social transformation are interrelated or even mutually conditional; changes in the political system can become a prerequisite for economic development, while the results of economic development can play a role in political change. Other scholars suggest that once a certain core institutional system is established, its development and change are continuous and inevitable—for example, once the economy "takes off," there must be "sustained development." Among all hypotheses regarding the laws of modernization, "industrialization determinism" possesses the most enduring vitality. The modernization models constructed by some economists take industrialization as the main trunk and sustained economic growth as the support; some economists, when discussing the economic development of the "Third World," even simulated specific economic processes in laboratories. Many believe that economic development inevitably brings about corresponding political transformation, and modernization must be accompanied by political democratization. One scholar wrote that, in the long run, the "democratic form of government" is "the most revolutionary force in political affairs," and "modernization is the key step in the universalization of this ideal." Eisenstadt also attempted to extend the economic concept of "sustained growth" to non-economic fields to understand the development of modern political systems, especially the formation and maintenance of political democratization. These discourses may have heuristic value for understanding modernization as a historical phenomenon, but they are more likely to be viewpoints that need to be questioned and challenged in empirical research.
Another characteristic of modernization theory in terms of research methodology is its particular reliance on causal models. In related research in economics, political science, and sociology, some scholars tend to view modernization as a "dependent variable," whose occurrence and development cannot be separated from the effects of other "variables." Discussing modernization with this mindset naturally leads to a focus on the various conditions of modernization. The American political scientist Gabriel Almond mentioned that four variables affect the modernization process: power (government capacity), participation (political participation), wealth (economic growth), and welfare (income distribution). Among these, government capacity and economic growth are more decisive, because if the government lacks capacity, political participation becomes meaningless, and without wealth, there is no talk of distribution and welfare. The emphasis here is on the significance of order, liberty, growth, and equality for modernization. Almond believed that by focusing on these four variables and their interrelationships, one could explain the success or failure of modernization in the "Third World."
Whether this "variable" analysis method from the social sciences can be introduced into historical research is a question that requires careful consideration. Admittedly, many historians have long been enamored with causal analysis. However, when exploring the causes of "spontaneous modernization," if the question is framed as "why modernization" or "because of what modernization," it easily leads to "ahistorical" or "anti-historical" problems, because the people of the 17th to 19th-century North Atlantic world did not know they were conducting or experiencing so-called "modernization." Even in discussing the causes of "conscious modernization," one cannot treat it in a generalized manner. Although correlations exist between the various elements that constitute modernization in the sense of an "ideal type," there is not necessarily a causal link. Moreover, the statuses of different elements vary in importance, and their appearance occurs at different times. If one or several elements are regarded as decisive, or if certain elements are treated as "variables" influencing other changes, one easily falls into the trap of simplistic causality. Ultimately, the basic meaning of the "modernization" explored by historians is "becoming modern." Therefore, the focus should be on two issues: first, the connotation of "modernization" within specific eras and societies; and second, the diversity of the process of "becoming modern."
Finally, historical research into modernization must also consider the current state of modernization itself. In today's world, is modernization still a universally visible reality? For "already modernized" "post-industrial societies," is "modernization" still a meaningful category through which to view social evolution? Regarding this, clues for certain answers can also be found within new modernization theories.
In the 1970s, the American political scientist Ronald Inglehart proposed that in the "post-industrial societies" of several European countries, a shift had occurred from "materialist values" to "post-materialist values"; the former emphasizes survival needs and security, while the latter prioritizes quality of life. Does this imply that the social development of "developed nations" had long ago taken a new direction, while "late-developing nations" remain perpetually in a state of catching up on the road to modernization? In the 1990s, Inglehart further noted that some countries were just beginning modernization (such as Nigeria), some were rapidly advancing toward modernization (such as China), and some had reached the "post-modernization" turning point (such as South Korea); meanwhile, other countries were racing ahead on the "post-modernization" path (such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and the United States). That is to say, different countries occupy different positions on the spectrum of modernization, and modernization holds different meanings for different nations. Additionally, some scholars have suggested that while the signature characteristics of modern society are still taking shape in some places, in Western Europe, some have already concluded while others have been modified. However, this does not mean that "modernization" has taken its final bow in Western Europe. If one defines "modernization" by "goals" rather than "functions," then Western Europe is still within the process of modernization. This is because the universal goals of modernization—such as the continuous expansion of individual choice, greater rationality in social and daily life, linear progress toward humanism, and secularization—while having shown their first signs in Western Europe since the Renaissance, have even now not been fully realized. It is simply that contemporary modernization in Western Europe differs from the "objective modernization" centered on industrialization; rather, it is a more superior form of "subjective modernization."
Judging from the logic of these arguments, modernization remains an obvious and prominent [18] global phenomenon. The historiography of modernization maintains its vitality abroad, and in contemporary China, it is experiencing a new surge [19], which is perhaps not unrelated to these factors.
(Author’s affiliation: Department of History and Institute for Global History, Fudan University) Source: Journal of Jiangnan University (Humanities & Social Sciences Edition), 2025, No. 1. Online Editor: Jingmu