Liu Weiliang & Yong Linyi: The Significance, Basic Principles, and Practical Paths for Improving Mechanisms to Protect Overseas Interests
As China's overseas interests continue to expand and the global security situation grows increasingly complex, the question of how to effectively protect wide-ranging, diversified, and dynamic overseas interests has become a vital issue in the modernization of the national security system and capacity. In December 2024, General Secretary Xi Jinping explicitly proposed to "improve the mechanism for protecting overseas interests" during the fourth symposium on the construction of the Belt and Road Initiative. Based on this, and grounded in the strategic requirements for the evolution of the global security posture and the modernization of the national security system, this article conducts an analysis centered on the three core questions of "why improve," "how to construct," and "what is the path forward." After systematically reviewing the urgency and necessity of improving the mechanism for protecting overseas interests, the paper distills the basic principles that its optimization and upgrading should follow, and finally proposes a practical path characterized by systematicity, adaptability, and operability. This is done with the aim of providing theoretical support and policy references for the construction of a mechanism for protecting overseas interests that adapts to the developments of the times, meets realistic needs, and possesses Chinese characteristics.
I. The Significance of Improving the Mechanism for Protecting Overseas Interests
Bearing in mind the "two overall situations" [1] is the basic starting point for advancing all undertakings in the New Era. Based on this, we must approach from a holistic and strategic perspective to deeply analyze and accurately grasp the significance of improving the mechanism for protecting overseas interests. This includes responding to the complex evolution of the global security environment, adapting to the multi-dimensional expansion of our overseas interests, enhancing the governance effectiveness of overseas interest risks, and promoting the steady and long-term progress of major national strategies, thereby providing a basis for decision-making and a practical orientation for the subsequent design and construction of the mechanism.
(1) Improving the mechanism for protecting overseas interests to respond to complex changes in the global security environment
As the changes unseen in a century accelerate their evolution, improving the mechanism for protecting overseas interests is no longer a temporary arrangement to prevent "localized crises," but rather a strategic project to respond to systemic shocks and enhance the adaptability of national governance.
First, the intensification of geopolitical conflicts and major-power competition has placed China's overseas interests under the dual pressure of interwoven "hard threats" and "soft constraints." Currently, some countries, in order to consolidate their hegemonic status or seek geostrategic advantages, frequently instigate geopolitical conflicts and create bloc confrontations in regions such as the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Africa. This poses substantive threats to China’s major investment projects, energy supply channels, and personnel safety in these regions. Simultaneously, some Western countries, in order to contain China's development, abuse the concept of "national security" to impose "long-arm jurisdiction" [2] and unilateral sanctions on Chinese enterprises, setting discriminatory market access standards and seriously interfering with the normal business order of China's overseas enterprises. This pressure posture of "interwoven hard and soft threats across multiple domains" constitutes an all-around and multi-layered challenge to China's overseas interests, significantly increasing the complexity and difficulty of maintaining those interests.
Second, non-traditional security threats are diversifying and spreading, causing overseas interests to face composite security challenges. Currently, "non-traditional security issues have entered an active period as a whole, with increases in antagonism, conflict, diversity, and threat, and unprecedented levels of globality, linkage, suddenness, and transmissibility." For example, if critical information infrastructure suffers a cyberattack during major natural disasters or public health crises, the resulting socio-economic losses and chaos will grow exponentially. Transnational criminal syndicates may exploit geopolitical conflicts or governance vacuums to expand their illegal activities, further deteriorating local security. The composite and linked nature of such risks significantly increases the difficulty of risk identification, early warning, assessment, and response.
Third, secondary security risks triggered by the "governance deficit" in some countries are gradually becoming new challenges for China's overseas interests. Under the combined influence of factors such as high global inflation, rising debt ratios, and capital flight, the sovereign credit of some countries has deteriorated and fiscal expenditure capacity has declined, resulting in a serious lack of investment in livelihood protection, infrastructure maintenance, and public security. In such cases, social contradictions are easily and rapidly exacerbated, and incidents such as violent protests, strikes, riots, and interruptions of basic services occur frequently, potentially even triggering regime crises. Regime change is often accompanied by policy ruptures and drastic changes in diplomatic shifts, leading to frequent instances of contract breaches, asset freezes, and illegal seizures. Such secondary security risks caused by the governance dilemmas of host countries are sudden and uncontrollable, urgently requiring a separate category, specific identification, and preemptive research and judgment within the map of overseas security risks.
(2) Improving the mechanism for protecting overseas interests to adapt to the multi-dimensional expansion of China’s overseas interests
As China participates more deeply in the process of globalization, its overseas interests have expanded from an early focus on trade and investment to much broader fields. This presents challenges of adaptability to the coverage, functional settings, and governance models of the existing mechanism for protecting overseas interests.
First, the overall scale of overseas interests continues to expand, and the demand for risk protection is growing rapidly. According to statistics, as of the end of 2023, "China's stock of outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) reached 2,955.4 billion USD," with "48,000 overseas enterprises established in 189 countries (regions) worldwide," "covering all industry categories of the national economy, with seven industries having a stock scale of over 100 billion USD." The vast quantity and wide distribution of overseas interests inevitably lead to a severalfold increase in the demand for risk protection that the national level must undertake or coordinate. This exerts immense pressure on the supply capacity of existing protection resources (such as human, financial, material, technical, and informational resources), making the "protection deficit" increasingly prominent and exacerbating the contradiction between supply and demand.
Second, the types of overseas interests are increasingly diversifying, and traditional protection logics and governance tools are facing pressure from "paradigmatic failure." Alongside the expansion in scale, structural changes have occurred in the types and forms of China's overseas interests. Currently, China's overseas interests are no longer limited to traditional "hard asset" projects such as energy development and infrastructure construction, but are expanding comprehensively into new fields such as financial capital, data resources, intellectual property, and even the deep sea, polar regions, and outer space, forming a highly heterogeneous and complex spectrum of interests. This causes traditional protection logics and governance tools—which focus on responding to geopolitical conflicts and physical security threats and rely on national compulsion and traditional diplomatic and consular means—to see their effectiveness and applicability greatly reduced when dealing with emerging and highly specialized interest types, gradually falling into a dilemma of "paradigmatic failure."
Third, the structure of overseas interest stakeholders is diversifying, and the difficulty of integrated governance continues to increase. "In the early stages of the 'Going Out' initiative [3], the main bodies 'going abroad' were primarily official institutions and large central or state-owned enterprises, mainly engaged in diplomatic work or large-scale energy and infrastructure construction projects." As China's exchanges and integration with the world deepen, the subjects of overseas interests have gradually evolved into a multi-element composite structure encompassing state-owned enterprises, private enterprises, joint ventures, social organizations, and individual citizens. Different types of stakeholders have significant differences in scale, organizational form, compliance levels, risk exposure paths, and interest demands. This results in difficulties at the national level regarding information integration, definition of responsibilities, resource allocation, and behavioral coordination when carrying out integrated protection.
(3) Improving the mechanism for protecting overseas interests to enhance the governance effectiveness of overseas interest risks
Overseas interest risks increasingly exhibit characteristics of diverse types, complex paths, and cross-border linkages, which place higher requirements on risk early warning, resource coordination, and emergency response dispatch capabilities. However, several key stages of China's current mechanism for protecting overseas interests still have structural shortcomings, restricting the improvement of overall effectiveness in responding to overseas risks.
First, the supply of legal systems lags behind the evolution of overseas risks, leading to a lack of unity and adaptive support in governance work. Currently, China has not yet established a legal system specifically targeting the protection of overseas interests. Existing protection mechanisms mainly rely on policy documents and administrative orders, which have limited legal binding force and make it difficult to provide effective rule-of-law protection for normalized risk governance. Although the introduction of laws such as the Foreign Relations Law of the People's Republic of China in recent years has provided some legal basis for foreign-related affairs, legislative gaps still exist in key areas such as investment protection, overseas security, crisis intervention, and risk compensation. Furthermore, China's foreign-related legal system is still in its early stages of construction, lacking substantive capacity to deal with extraterritorial judicial conflicts, overseas compliance reviews, and the cross-application of international laws.
Second, the inter-departmental coordination and cross-level linkage mechanisms are not yet sound, restricting the overall efficiency of risk governance. "Because many departments participate in the protection of overseas interests, and the relationship between the central and local governments is complex, vertical management (tiāotiáo), horizontal management (kuàikuài), and the combination of the two often interact," resulting in occasional long command chains and poor information communication when responding to emergencies, which affects the synergy of resource allocation and task execution. For example, some tasks still rely on temporary coordination mechanisms and on-site mobilization modes, lacking a unified leadership and a coordination platform for routine operation. Additionally, while some local governments bear the responsibility of promoting enterprises to "go out," they lack the relevant authority and professional capacity to handle foreign-related affairs, weakening the overall protection effectiveness.
Third, the professional support system and market participation mechanism have defects, resulting in structural shortcomings in risk governance capacity. In recent years, relevant departments have conducted practical explorations in policy training, security norms, and early warning platform construction. However, at the national level, an integrated capacity-building system covering risk identification, capacity reserves, fiscal incentives, and insurance support has not yet been established, and governance resources remain relatively scattered. In terms of professional talent, the number of professionals in fields such as overseas risk control, security coordination, and crisis intervention is generally insufficient, making it difficult to support high-frequency, cross-domain protection tasks. In terms of market participation, the participation paths for market entities such as security companies, insurance institutions, and crisis response consultants are restricted, and incentive measures are insufficient; a collaborative mechanism led by the government with social synergy and market supplementation has not yet been formed.
Fourth, international cooperation mechanisms are not yet sound, hindering the external coordination capacity for risk governance. The protection of overseas interests is highly dependent on local resources and requires the coordination and cooperation of host governments, international organizations, and multilateral platforms. In recent years, China has achieved certain results in promoting bilateral consular protection cooperation, participating in regional security collaboration, and building joint emergency platforms. However, two major bottlenecks still exist at the institutional level: First, there is a systemic gap in bilateral cooperation. Some host countries have not yet signed institutionalized agreements with China covering investment protection, security collaboration, judicial assistance, and information sharing; thus, when responding to sudden risks, uncertainty exists in the allocation of local resources and the connection of procedures. Second, multilateral participation faces structural constraints. While China's willingness to participate in multilateral security mechanisms has increased, it still lacks institutional discourse power and resource integration capacity in some areas, and the effectiveness of cross-domain crisis collaborative disposal urgently needs improvement.
(4) Improving the mechanism for protecting overseas interests to promote the steady and long-term progress of major national strategies
Against the backdrop of the accelerating evolution of the global situation and the continuous rise of external risks, the mechanism for protecting overseas interests is deeply embedded in the national strategic system, becoming a key fulcrum for coordinating development and security. Its degree of soundness concerns whether major national strategies can proceed smoothly and whether economic and social development can maintain a stable trend.
First, it provides an important guarantee for promoting the Belt and Road Initiative to achieve the combination of high-quality development and high-level security. As the construction of the Belt and Road Initiative enters a stage of in-depth advancement, the tension between its high-quality development and high-level security has become increasingly prominent: high-quality development inherently contains the pursuit of multiple goals such as efficiency, openness, and green development, while high-level security requires effective prevention and control of risks in a turbulent international environment. This internal tension prompts the mechanism for protecting overseas interests to transcend the traditional modes of post-event response and localized disposal; it must proactively embed itself into the implementation process of development strategies, achieving the systematic integration and collaborative optimization of mechanisms with projects, standards with services, and risks with objectives. Therefore, against the background of rising global uncertainty, the improvement of the mechanism for protecting overseas interests essentially constitutes an important guarantee for the Belt and Road Initiative to achieve a dynamic balance between high-quality development and high-level security, and is a key factor in ensuring the continuous advancement, steady development, and eventual benefit of the initiative to the world.
Second, it provides important support for the construction of a new security pattern compatible with the accelerated construction of the new development pattern. Accelerating the formation of the new development pattern is a strategic decision made according to changes in China's development stage, environment, and conditions. The smooth advancement of this strategy necessarily requires...
"To secure the new development pattern with a new security architecture." Against this backdrop, the mechanism for safeguarding overseas interests, as a vital pillar of the new security architecture in the realm of foreign affairs, possesses dual strategic value. On one hand, the mechanism for safeguarding overseas interests is the foundational guarantee for the stable operation of the "outer circulation" [4]. Cross-border allocation of productive factors, the orderly functioning of international logistics hubs, and the steady operation of overseas industrial parks are the critical nodes of the outer circulation; however, these nodes are highly vulnerable to external risk shocks. By refining early-warning response mechanisms, crisis mediation systems, and localized service networks, the mechanism for safeguarding overseas interests can enhance the outer circulation's resilience against interference, constructing a stable channel for the new development pattern. On the other hand, the mechanism for safeguarding overseas interests serves as an institutional barrier against the transmission of external risks. Currently, external shocks easily transmit to the domestic sphere via supply chain disruptions, price fluctuations, and logistics blockages. These not only directly threaten China’s energy and resource security and industrial security but may also impact economic and social stability. The core value of perfecting the mechanism for safeguarding overseas interests lies in establishing an institutional buffer zone between external shocks and internal stability by constructing identification models for risk transmission nodes, dynamic control systems for critical links, and pressure-buffering mechanisms, thereby preventing external risks from directly impacting the domestic economic fundamentals.
II. Basic Principles for Perfecting the Mechanism for Safeguarding Overseas Interests
Perfecting the mechanism for safeguarding overseas interests must take clear basic principles as its normative basis and guide for action. It requires the coordination of value goals with problem orientation, structural construction with functional synergy, and local experience with global perspectives. This ensures that the construction of the mechanism possesses directional consistency, institutional adaptability, and governance effectiveness. These principles are not only the value leaders for the mechanism’s operation but also the normative framework for its practical unfolding.
(1) Adhering to the Unity of Goal-Orientation and Problem-Orientation
The primary prerequisite for building a mechanism to safeguard overseas interests is to establish an inherent unified logical tension between value-driven goals and responsive problem-solving. Safeguarding overseas interests differs from general administrative governance; it concerns the depth of support for the national security system. Therefore, it must manifest clear strategic attributes and governance logic within the overall institutional construction, achieving an organic integration of national strategic goals and institutional governance efficacy.
From the perspective of goal-orientation, the design of the mechanism should proactively align with the national strategic vision and achieve logical reconciliation, manifesting foresight, integrity, and systematicity. This is the basic prerequisite for the mechanism to achieve "functional fit" within the national strategic system. Specifically, the core value of adhering to goal-orientation is reflected at two levels: first, ensuring the dynamic coupling of the overseas interest safeguarding mechanism with national strategic goals, avoiding its reduction to a simple extension of departmental tools or a mechanical replication of localized governance; second, by imbuing the institutional structure with directional design, the mechanism is endowed with both the realistic ability to deal with currently known problems and the functional elasticity to respond to strategic development needs and changes in the international landscape. Correspondingly, adhering to problem-orientation is reflected in the mechanism design's dynamic identification of and response to realistic challenges. That is, it must take risk identification as the starting point, operational failure as the entry point, and institutional gaps as the breakthrough point to promote the dynamic reconstruction of the mechanism's structure and functions. The practice of safeguarding overseas interests is generally characterized by high suddenness, complex interest chains, and diverse local environments. The problems of delayed decision-making, fragmented resources, and insufficient coordination existing in traditional mechanisms precisely reflect their failure to closely align with realistic problems and specific realities. Therefore, adhering to problem-orientation requires mechanism design to shift from "static matching" to "dynamic coupling," and from "passive response" to "proactive construction," ensuring that the institutional system and the risk ecosystem form a stable structural correspondence.
It must be clarified that goal-orientation and problem-orientation are not antithetical but are a unified institutional logic that promotes and complements one another. That is, "we must take the goal as the focal point, working hard on overall planning and top-level design to enhance a sense of direction and planning; meanwhile, we must take the problem as the focus of effort, continuously applying force to mend shortcomings and strengthen weak links to enhance precision and effectiveness." Adhering to the unity of goal-orientation and problem-orientation can effectively avoid the risks of "vacuous values" and "path drift," making the mechanism for safeguarding overseas interests a truly systemic governance solution led by strategic goals and driven by realistic problems.
(2) Adhering to the Unity of Systematic Planning and Targeted Policy Implementation
Faced with the continuous expansion of overseas interests, the accelerated evolution of risk types, and the rising complexity of foreign-related affairs, mechanism design can only avoid structural imbalances—such as "heavy on design but light on execution" or "heavy on emergency response but light on coordination"—if it integrates dynamic categorical thinking into systematic planning and maintains consistency in overall functions across categorized policy implementations. Only then can strategic goals be effectively transformed and implementation paths precisely anchored.
Specifically, adhering to systematic planning means advancing mechanism design with systems thinking, grasping the core elements, collaborative paths, and key points of overall coordination in mechanism construction. Overseas interests involve diplomatic positioning, foreign investment, industrial chain collaboration, energy security, personnel exchanges, cultural exchange, and many other fields. Mechanism construction lacking systematic planning easily falls into structural governance dilemmas such as blurred primary responsibilities, obstructions in vertical and horizontal (departmental) coordination, or functional redundancy and misalignment across levels. Furthermore, as the nation's strategic layouts on the international stage continue to deepen and the map of overseas interests expands, the situation faced by overseas interest protection becomes increasingly complex. In this context, the perfection of the safeguarding mechanism cannot be achieved through simple repairs or partial incremental adjustments to the existing governance system. Instead, there is an urgent need for mechanism design to break through the shackles of traditional linear thinking and single-dimension perspectives to construct a new governance paradigm characterized by strategic security as the guide, systemic synergy as the core, and dynamic adaptation as the feature, achieving deep integration and high-efficiency linkage of all governance elements under the guidance of strategic goals. However, systematic planning does not mean "one size fits all" or "standardized replication." Political and legal systems vary significantly across different countries, risk forms differ across industries, and the safeguarding demands of different types of entities are highly fragmented. This requires that the overall framework constructed by systematic planning must embed a set of flexibly adapted and precisely responsive mechanisms for categorized policy implementation. That is to say, "we must strengthen precision-oriented thinking, persisting in 'reaching the greatest heights while exhausting the infinitesimal' [5]. We should take in the whole situation during planning and be meticulous and precise during operation, doing work solidly and thoroughly with the 'embroidery craftsmanship' [6]," realizing the transformation from "vague governance" to "targeted policy implementation."
It is evident that systematic planning and targeted policy implementation are not independent modules acting on their own, but are synergetic and symbiotic parts of the mechanism design architecture. Targeted implementation without systematic planning will appear fragmented due to vague orientation; systematic planning without the support of targeted implementation will be reduced to procedural formality due to idle execution. The organic unity of the two requires the formation of smooth connections and hierarchical linkages across dimensions such as national strategic goal setting, institutional system construction, functional module deployment, and specific scenario governance, making the overseas interest safeguarding mechanism possess both strategic coordination attributes and practical transformation logic.
(3) Adhering to the Unity of Practical Exploration and Institutional Construction
Perfecting the mechanism for safeguarding overseas interests is both an institutional supply project and a process of practical generation. In other words, its construction cannot start in a vacuum or be completed overnight; it must combine continuous practical feedback with dynamic institutional shaping, forming an evolutionary logic where practical scenarios are the starting point for institutional innovation, governance effectiveness is the yardstick for institutional improvement, and mechanism optimization is the driving force for sustained development.
Specifically, institutional construction lays the normative foundation and organizational framework for the overseas interest safeguarding mechanism. Faced with the continuous expansion of overseas interests and the complex, volatile international situation, we must adhere to institutional construction as the main thread, establishing clear divisions of power and responsibility, efficient coordination systems, standardized operational procedures, and logical resource allocation for safeguarding overseas interests. At the macro level, we should focus on the global, strategic, and long-term nature of overseas interest protection, using the full project life cycle, the full risk process, and the full chain of responsibility as a framework to build an institutional system with high adaptability, flexibility, and inclusiveness, achieving comprehensive horizontal coverage and deep vertical integration of institutional elements to form a powerful institutional synergy. At the micro level, institutional arrangements must clarify the roles and divisions of labor of various subjects in protecting overseas interests, enabling them to achieve efficient interaction in information sharing, resource allocation, and collaborative action based on institutional norms, forming a multi-party collaborative governance pattern to enhance the overall effectiveness of overseas interest protection. However, institutional construction is not an abstract system generated out of thin air; it must be deeply rooted in practical scenarios. The types of risks faced by China's overseas interests are intricate, and the institutional environments are complex and diverse, making it difficult for existing safeguarding mechanisms to achieve "universal applicability." Therefore, institutional construction needs to take practical scenarios as a verification platform, "timely summarizing good experiences and practices from practice, so that mature experiences and practices can be elevated into institutions and transformed into laws." Through the closed-loop mechanism of "experience extraction—institutional transformation," the dynamic adaptation of institutional supply and practical demand is promoted.
It must be emphasized that adhering to the unity of practical exploration and institutional construction is not a mechanical splicing of institutions and practice, but rather the construction of a dynamic circular mechanism involving advance design, practical embedding, experience extraction, and institutional optimization. Specifically, institutional design should uphold open concepts and reserve interfaces at the technical level to ensure that practical results can be effectively transformed into the basis for institutional revision. At the same time, it is necessary to establish normalized evaluation and feedback mechanisms to promote the self-iteration and systemic updating of institutions based on the summary of practical experience. In other words, only by realizing the bidirectional interaction between institutional frameworks and practical logic can we promote the gestation of institutions within experience and their evolution within operation, ensuring that the mechanism for safeguarding overseas interests always maintains strong institutional adaptability and governance supply capability.
(4) Adhering to the Unity of Rooting in National Conditions and International Reference
Perfecting the mechanism for safeguarding overseas interests must be rooted in our national conditions, guided by national strategic needs, while absorbing and drawing on useful international experience. We should form a mechanism structure and operational paradigm with Chinese characteristics through mutual comparison.
Adhering to rooting in national conditions first requires accurately identifying the structural characteristics and governance resource constraints of the expansion of China's overseas interests. Under the current backdrop of the deepening "Going Out" strategy [7], the types of Chinese overseas interest entities are diverse, their regional distribution is scattered, and the local political and economic environments differ significantly. Meanwhile, China's safeguarding of overseas interests is still in a stage of institutional exploration and efficiency enhancement regarding organizational structure, distribution of powers and responsibilities, and local resource mobilization capabilities. Collaborative operation mechanisms and role positioning among different governance subjects still need further perfection and clarification. This reality dictates that the mechanism for safeguarding overseas interests needs to be systematically constructed from multiple dimensions, such as unified leadership, local coordination, and the cultivation of professional forces, forming a mechanism architecture that is deeply coupled with China's national security system, diplomatic layout, and development strategy. That is to say, rooting in national conditions means defining institutional boundaries based on realistic conditions, matching functional logic based on organizational characteristics, and tracing institutional connection methods based on practical experience to ensure the mechanism effectively integrates into the tracks of the national governance system.
Adhering to international reference requires maintaining an open, inclusive mindset and a spirit of rational critique, actively learning from, researching, and referencing the theoretical achievements, institutional designs, and practical experiences of various countries in the field of safeguarding overseas interests. "However, learning and referencing do not equal simple 'take-ism' [8]; we must insist on putting ourselves first and making things serve our purposes, carefully discriminating and reasonably absorbing." Specifically, multi-dimensional critical referencing should be carried out: first, systematically analyze the policy tools of various countries in areas such as risk early-warning mechanisms, consular protection systems, crisis management frameworks, legal remedy paths, public-private partnership models, and international coordination mechanisms to fully understand their institutional structures and implementation methods. Second, focus on distinguishing institutional functions from institutional forms, avoiding the simple replication of surface-level institutional structures; instead, extract transferable "mechanism design principles," deeply analyze the institutional logic and operational mechanisms behind successful experiences, as well as the potential risks exposed by failure, providing useful references for China's institutional construction. Finally, dynamically track the evolutionary trends of international legal norms, international common standards, and industry best practices, focusing on rule innovation in emerging fields such as cross-border security cooperation, digital sovereignty protection, and supply chain resilience building. Timely grasp international frontier dynamics to promote the alignment of China's overseas interest protection with international standards and continuously improve safeguarding capabilities.
III. The Practical Path for Perfecting the Mechanism for Safeguarding Overseas Interests
The key to the effective construction of the mechanism for safeguarding overseas interests lies in systematically transforming general goals and basic principles into operable, executable, and evaluable specific practical paths. Faced with the situation where overseas interests are widely distributed, subjects are diverse, and risks are intertwined, it is necessary to coordinate the advancement of structural setup, functional integration, and process optimization, focusing on...
The six core links of "organizational coordination, institutional supply, risk governance, capacity support, external collaboration, and feedback optimization" constitute a closed-loop, highly efficient, and resilient system for the overseas interest protection mechanism, driving the transformation of the mechanism from strategic design into institutional practice.
(1) Constructing an Organizational Coordination Mechanism for Unified Leadership and Efficient Synergy
Among the six core links of the overseas interest protection mechanism, the organizational coordination mechanism plays a commanding role. Currently, overseas interest-related affairs are scattered across multiple vertical management systems, manifesting structural defects such as blurred jurisdictional boundaries, broken response chains, and insufficient local coordination. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the institutional core through unified leadership and enhance mechanical cohesion through efficient synergy, promoting the transition of overseas interest protection from "departmental governance" to "systemic governance."
On one hand, the principle of "unified leadership" should be upheld to construct an authoritative system of vertical coordination. To improve the overseas interest protection mechanism, we must "consciously uphold the centralized and unified leadership of the Party Central Committee and further strengthen the systems and mechanisms of the Party's leadership over foreign affairs work." Specifically, first, a strategic coordination platform should be established at the central level. Led by the Central Foreign Affairs Commission, a national coordinating body for overseas interest affairs can be set up to serve as the command platform for overseas matters at the central level. This body would uniformly undertake functions such as strategic coordination, mechanism design, responsibility allocation, and coordination for the handling of major matters. It should have a permanent office staffed by personnel dispatched from relevant foreign-related ministries to ensure a high-efficiency closed loop of instruction issuance and task execution. Second, an operation mechanism that connects the top and bottom with high synergy should be constructed. This involves opening up organizational chains and work interfaces between central functional departments, local foreign-related agencies, and overseas missions to form an institutional closed loop—from strategic planning to functional implementation, and finally to local grounded execution—thereby eliminating structural obstacles such as fragmented management, misalignment of powers and responsibilities, and delayed instructions. Finally, intensive reforms of the organizational system should be promoted. Addressing current issues such as unclear responsibilities, cumbersome procedures, and redundant resource allocation in overseas interest protection, we should build operation mechanisms based on lists of responsibilities, modular tasks, and unified resource planning for different types of overseas interests, enhancing the clarity and executive power of organizational operations.
On the other hand, "efficient synergy" should serve as the support to strengthen the horizontal linkage effectiveness of organizational mechanisms. At the central level, the collaboration mechanism between functional departments should be strengthened. Led by the national coordinating body for overseas interest affairs, a "task-oriented joint execution group" system should be established. For specific scenarios such as emergency response, security for key projects, and handling of foreign-related public opinion, core departments including public security, commerce, emergency management, and transportation should form scenario-specific task groups. These should be supported by standardized work instructions, response processes, and closed-loop feedback mechanisms, upgrading the governance structure from "reactive linkage" to "pre-set combinations." At the local level, multi-departmental synergy mechanisms should be improved. Especially in key coastal and border provinces with intensive foreign-related affairs, a local synergy platform composed of foreign affairs, commerce, public security, emergency management, and transportation departments should be constructed to avoid fragmentation and redundant resource allocation in local governance. At the overseas level, parallel collaboration networks should be perfected. Frontier units such as embassies, consulates, commercial representative offices, and security liaison points should be encouraged to establish regularized mechanisms for information sharing, joint risk prevention, and crisis management. This ensures efficient collaboration in the transition between peacetime and "wartime" [9] states, task synergy, and resource allocation, solving the problems of "fragmented administration" and "coordination failure."
(2) Strengthening a Comprehensive, Systematic, Pragmatic, and Effective Rule of Law Guarantee Mechanism
As the foundational institutional framework for the operation of the overseas interest protection mechanism, the rule of law is the fundamental reliance for ensuring that all measures operate stably, efficiently, and normatively. Faced with the frequent and diverse risks to overseas interests, we must construct a comprehensive, coordinated, and effective legal mechanism to provide clear institutional basis and procedural support for overseas interest protection work.
To achieve a "comprehensive and systematic" legal mechanism, the key lies in filling legislative gaps, optimizing the regulatory system, and unifying the paths for legal application. First, the legislative process for an Overseas Interest Protection Law should be initiated as soon as possible to clarify the legal responsibilities and jurisdictional boundaries of the Chinese government in safeguarding its overseas interests. This law should specifically define the division of responsibilities among central ministries, the local authority of overseas missions, and the collaborative obligations of involved enterprises. It should also establish information disclosure mechanisms, emergency procedures, and local negotiation rules for sudden incidents, filling the institutional void of "having no law to follow." Second, based on overarching legislation, a dynamic legal supplementation mechanism should be established. Detailed implementation regulations or supporting laws should be issued for key industries, high-risk local areas, and new governance scenarios. By establishing regular feedback mechanisms between legislative departments, overseas missions, and corporate entities, the timeliness and adaptability of the legal supply can be maintained. Finally, the construction of foreign-related rule of law should be strengthened. Legal systems regarding anti-sanctions, anti-interference, and countering "long-arm jurisdiction" [10] should be further improved to enhance legal protection for Chinese citizens and enterprises overseas, building a foreign-related legal system with outward adaptability and strategic counter-strike capabilities.
To achieve a "pragmatic and effective" legal mechanism, the key lies in improving legal enforcement efficiency and judicial coordination capabilities. First, a sound inter-agency linkage mechanism for foreign-related law enforcement should be established, clarifying the functional boundaries of relevant departments and streamlining legal response processes in cross-border emergencies. Especially for high-frequency scenarios such as emergency handling, personnel risk control, and corporate compliance supervision, we should promote list-based configuration, process-oriented operation, and standardized guidance of enforcement actions to strengthen the consistency and effectiveness of legal execution. Second, the foreign-related legal service system should be improved to form a service network with comprehensive coverage and high-efficiency response. The legal service functions of overseas embassies and consulates should be strengthened, enhancing their ability to provide legal interpretations, cite local laws, and assess negotiation paths during emergencies. Meanwhile, "attention must be paid to cultivating a group of world-class arbitration institutions and law firms" to enhance the local projection capability of China's legal resources. Finally, a regularized overseas judicial cooperation mechanism should be established. Through specific paths such as setting up bilateral judicial cooperation offices and signing memoranda of understanding on cross-border enforcement, we should "incorporate the expansion of law enforcement and judicial cooperation into the important agenda of bilateral and multilateral relationship building, extending the security chain for protecting our country's overseas interests."
(3) Improving a Graded Control and Precision Response Risk Governance Mechanism
As the core operational module of the overseas interest protection mechanism, the risk governance mechanism is directly related to whether the institutional system can effectively anticipate and contain risks. Currently, overseas interest risks manifest characteristics of high complexity, cross-regionality, and systemic linkage. There is an urgent need to build a comprehensive governance mechanism that combines graded control with precision response, driving the transformation of risk governance from local, patch-style emergency responses to a systemic and forward-looking governance model.
On one hand, "graded control" should be maintained. A layered governance system should be constructed around the three levels of risk identification, rating assessment, and contingency planning, forming a systemic path from information perception to action configuration. First, the mechanism for risk intelligence collection and assessment should be improved. Diversified information channels—including host governments, embassies and consulates, security agencies, corporate branches, and community networks—should be integrated to build a comprehensive information network. Meanwhile, artificial intelligence technology should be introduced, utilizing big data public opinion scraping and behavioral pattern recognition systems to strengthen real-time monitoring and dynamic assessment of diversified risks in the political, economic, social, and natural fields of host countries, driving the shift from "post-event processing" to "pre-event response." Second, guidelines for risk grading and categorization should be formulated. Overseas risks should be subdivided into categories such as security risks (e.g., violent attacks, terrorist activities), political risks (e.g., governance disorder, regime change), legal risks (e.g., compliance obstacles, asset freezes), economic and financial risks (e.g., capital controls, exchange barriers), and reputational risks (e.g., China-related public opinion, corporate disputes). Impact indicators, trigger thresholds, and disposal levels should be detailed to provide a basis for subsequent response. Finally, a graded response contingency plan system should be improved. For different risk levels and scenarios, modular, standardized, and highly operable graded response plans should be formulated, clarifying activation conditions, command levels, response processes, resource allocation standards, and expected goals. Through regular assessments and practical drills, the dynamic adaptability and practical effectiveness of these plans should be ensured.
On the other hand, with the goal of "precision response," a multi-dimensional disposal mechanism that balances efficiency, strategy, and legal legitimacy should be constructed. First, the responsible subjects and work processes for responding to various types of incidents should be clarified. Clear definitions of responsibilities and processes at all levels are needed to avoid multi-headed decision-making, shifting of blame, and redundant operations. In major risk events, the central government should establish a unified lead agency and grant it temporary command power to coordinate resource allocation, information release, and local coordination, ensuring unified instructions and efficient dispatching. For low-to-medium intensity events, the local level should take the lead, with the central government providing resource guarantees and technical guidance, promoting the institutionalized development of local response capabilities. Second, the pertinence and effectiveness of response measures should be enhanced. Factors such as the type, level, background, and potential impact of risk events should be comprehensively considered to accurately analyze the characteristics and needs of the event, and differentiated disposal strategies should be formulated to ensure that measures fit the reality and are truly effective. Finally, the limits and rhythm of response interventions should be scientifically controlled. Since the disposal of overseas risks involves the sovereignty of other countries, local justice, and international public opinion, we should adhere to the principles of moderate intervention, collaborative disposal, and balance of interests. This avoids both the aggravation of the situation due to slow action and the triggering of local rejection due to over-disposal, creating a flexible and moderate "targeted governance" system.
(4) Strengthening a Factor-Integrated and Multi-Party Contributed Capacity Support Mechanism
Any effective protection mechanism requires solid capacity as support. In a context of increasingly complex risks, diversified responsible subjects, and layered protection needs, we must advance along the dual axes of factor integration and multi-party contribution to build a capacity support system that spans subjects, fields, and spaces, enhancing the country's proactive protection and comprehensive contingency capabilities in overseas fields.
The so-called "factor integration" refers to the systemic integration and structural optimization of capacity types. First, the professional configuration of overseas on-site protection forces should be strengthened. Relevant central departments should jointly formulate plans for the deployment of security forces in key areas, stationing "emergency response teams" in high-risk regions or major projects to ensure initial response capabilities in emergency situations. Furthermore, "a strong military force is the ultimate guarantee for safeguarding our country's overseas interests. We should provide indestructible armed deterrence and military security guarantees for maintaining national overseas interests by actively participating in overseas peacekeeping operations, strengthening the construction of overseas support bases, and forming a rapid reaction force." Second, to compensate for the limits of government capacity, effort must be made to construct a standardized and professional market-based capacity supply system. Specifically, state-level qualification certification standards and regulatory systems for private security, risk consulting, safety training, and insurance services should be accelerated to ensure that market service subjects are professional and reliable. Meanwhile, a government-endorsed, transparent information platform for matching supply and demand should be built to facilitate various subjects in procuring compliant and high-quality market-based services. Finally, the training and reserve of professional talents should be strengthened. On one hand, universities should be encouraged to establish majors or research platforms related to overseas interest protection to enhance theoretical and applied research; on the other hand, a regularized talent selection and dynamic rotation mechanism should be established to build a composite talent team that possesses knowledge of international rules, understanding of local cultures, and professional disposal capabilities, providing high-quality talent support for the operation of the overseas security protection mechanism.
To achieve "multi-party contribution," the key lies in constructing a composite protection network with multi-party participation, clear powers and responsibilities, and orderly synergy. First, the institutionalized constraints of corporate security responsibilities should be strengthened. Risk assessment reports, local security plans, and employee training programs should be set as pre-conditions for overseas investment audits. Full-process filing and regular assessments should be implemented for key enterprises to urge them to earnestly fulfill their primary responsibilities. Second, social synergy and mobilization capabilities should be enhanced. Overseas enterprises, business associations, and professional service institutions should be encouraged to jointly establish "regional protection liaison associations," promoting the establishment of joint prevention and protection mechanisms among Chinese enterprises in the same region. This facilitates resource sharing and cost splitting in areas such as security outsourcing, public opinion response, and legal services, improving the efficiency of local collaboration. Finally, the overseas security literacy and response capabilities of individual citizens should be incorporated into the scope of mechanism building. Overseas security literacy training, configuration of emergency contact channels, and anticipation of risk scenarios abroad should be integrated into the process of citizen exit-entry management and departure guidance. Improving citizen overseas emergency manuals, warning information push systems, and emergency assistance systems will extend the governance feelers from organizational systems to the individual level, ensuring that the capacity support mechanism covers the very front lines and the furthest extremities.
(5) Constructing a System-Driven and Mutually Beneficial International Cooperation Mechanism
"In the face of increasingly complex and escalating new international problems, countries often need to work together in the process of maintaining their overseas interests." To build a mature and effective international cooperation mechanism, it is necessary to proceed systematically from the two dimensions of "system-driven" and "mutually beneficial," promoting the transition of cooperation from diplomatic initiatives toward institutional embedding, and upgrading from interest exchange to rule co-construction.
On the one hand, we should take "institutional traction" as the main thread to construct a wide-reaching, stable, and logically unified system of international cooperation institutions. First, we must expand regional institutional cooperation. Relying on multilateral platforms such as the BRICS cooperation mechanism and the G20, the issue of safeguarding overseas interests should be incorporated into the regular agenda. Additionally, we can explore initiating new types of multilateral security dialogues and cooperation initiatives focused on specific regions and risks, jointly formulating regional codes of conduct or cooperation guidelines for risk prevention. Second, we must improve and implement bilateral institutional arrangements. We should promote the signing or revision of detailed, sound security cooperation agreements with key partner countries, clarifying specific operating procedures and regular meeting arrangements in areas such as intelligence sharing, law enforcement cooperation, judicial assistance, consular protection, and emergency linkage. Based on the risk characteristics and cooperation foundations of different countries, differentiated bilateral cooperation plans should be designed to enhance the focus and effectiveness of cooperation. Finally, we should actively participate in the formulation of international governance rules. We must deeply participate in the formulation and revision of rules involving the protection of overseas interests under the framework of international organizations such as the United Nations, the World Trade Organization, and the International Monetary Fund, "voicing more Chinese perspectives and injecting more Chinese elements into the formulation of international rules to maintain and expand our country's developmental interests."
On the other hand, we should take "mutual benefit and win-win results" as the value orientation to construct a cooperation paradigm centered on the legitimacy of cooperation, joint construction of responsibility, and inclusive development, thereby strengthening the value foundation of the influence exerted by international institutions. First, we must clarify the boundaries of cooperation. We should clearly define the norms of conduct for our country in local areas, upholding the principle of "cooperation without interference and protection without crossing boundaries," fully respecting the sovereignty, laws, and cultural institutional differences of the host country; this avoids institutional cooperation being misinterpreted as interference or expansion and solidifies the foundation of cooperation legitimacy. Second, we must promote cooperation interests that benefit local societies. We should transform the institutional achievements of mechanism-building into shared public resources for the locality—such as security resources, information services, and infrastructure support—thereby achieving the unification of our own security and common security. Finally, we should enhance the consultability and oversight of cooperation mechanisms. We must establish normalized consultation mechanisms with the host country's legislative bodies, industry associations, and social organizations to ensure their full participation in the design, operation, and evaluation of the mechanisms, constructing a dynamic cooperation relationship based on trust and effectively building a "security community."
(6) Establish a result-oriented and continuously optimizing feedback and adjustment mechanism. As the "terminal end of operations" in the system for safeguarding overseas interests, the feedback and adjustment mechanism is not only a technical tool for evaluating institutional performance and correcting strategies, but also a key element in ensuring the mechanism possesses adaptability, resilience, and evolutionary capacity.
On the one hand, we should adhere to being "result-oriented" and construct a full-process operation evaluation system with effectiveness assessment as the handle. First, we must build a layered index system for assessing the operational effectiveness of the mechanism. Centering on national strategic goals, the performance of departmental functions, and the results of project implementation, we should respectively set three types of evaluation indicators: strategic performance, functional performance, and field-level performance. We should set differentiated weights and evaluation dimensions for different types of tasks to promote the shift of effectiveness evaluation from "subjective impressions" to "objective quantification." Second, we should promote the participation of diverse subjects in evaluation. We should encourage overseas missions, enterprises, and third-party research institutions to jointly participate in mechanism evaluation, examining the implementation effects of the safeguarding mechanism from multiple perspectives to enhance the professionalism, representativeness, and practical value of the evaluation results. Finally, we should promote the institutionalized application of evaluation results. We must integrate evaluation results into decision-making processes, resource allocation, and institutional revision mechanisms, opening up the links between evaluation, decision-making, and adjustment so that institutional evolution has a more empirical basis and target orientation.
On the other hand, we should take "continuous optimization" as the core and construct a dynamic updating mechanism that possesses learning, adaptability, and iterativity. First, we must build an information integration and sharing platform. Led by the central competent departments, we should build a cross-departmental, cross-territorial, and cross-industry platform to transform diplomatic records and security information into structured data. We should regularly organize mechanism review meetings, local experience exchanges, and case summary evaluations to promote the transformation of the mechanism from experience accumulation to knowledge generation. Second, we should establish a channel for mechanism revision. Aiming at problems such as mismatches or maladaptations in the operation of the mechanism, we should organize expert teams to conduct timely analysis and formulate adjustment plans, ensuring that mechanism updates do not lag behind changes in the internal and external environments and enhancing the ability to adapt to various situations. Finally, we must treat mechanism optimization as a long-term task. We should regularly and comprehensively evaluate the operational effects of the mechanism, and—combining the domestic and international situations with new requirements for safeguarding overseas interests—introduce new concepts, methods, and technologies to systematically optimize and upgrade the mechanism, promoting its continuous improvement.