Cheng Yingying: Zhou Enlai's Strategic Thinking and Practical Wisdom Regarding News and Propaganda Work
Attaching great importance to news and propaganda work is a fine tradition of our Party. Throughout the long-standing practice of revolution and construction, Zhou Enlai consistently showed concern for the Party’s journalism. He did not merely focus on the specific business of running newspapers, but viewed propaganda from a strategic height, recognizing its special and vital role in revolution and construction. He engaged in profound reflection on how to conduct news and propaganda work, leaving behind many important thoughts and viewpoints. Currently, academic research on this topic is primarily concentrated in the following dimensions: first, investigations into specific historical periods, such as studies of Zhou Enlai’s early journalistic activities and his time in Europe; second, analyses of specific journalistic strongholds, such as thematic research centered on the Xinhua Daily (Xinhua Ribao); and third, studies of specific historical events, particularly historical narratives based on the memoirs of those who experienced them. These achievements have laid a solid foundation for further deepening research. This article intends to start from several of Zhou Enlai's core assertions regarding news and propaganda work and, in conjunction with the historical background in which they arose, provide a concrete and palpable demonstration of Zhou’s combative wisdom in maneuvering and responding to complex public opinion situations from a strategic height.
I. "The Battle of the Pen Precedes and Backs the Battle of the Gun": The Dialectics of News Propaganda and Armed Struggle
Correctly grasping the relationship between the "pen" and the "gun"—that is, the relationship between news propaganda and armed struggle—is a precious experience in the victory of the Chinese Revolution. Our Party was born and grew out of revolutionary struggle. Grasping the "gun" to counter armed counter-revolution with armed revolution was the fundamental prerequisite for achieving national independence and people's liberation. Simultaneously, grasping the "pen" to propagate the Party’s policies and propositions and to carry out effective struggles in public opinion was an inevitable move to deeply mobilize, organize, and arm the masses, creating a "vast ocean of people's war." In September 1940, Zhou Enlai wrote an inscription for Mr. Wang Xijun of the China Vocational Education Society: "The battle of the pen is the precursor to the battle of the gun, and also the shield of the battle of the gun." [1] This was not only a strategic response to the Kuomintang's reactionary "two-handed" policy of political slander and military friction [2] against the Communists following the Fifth Plenary Session of the Fifth Central Executive Committee; it also profoundly revealed the inherent and organic dialectical relationship between news propaganda and armed struggle.
(1) The "Precursor": The Vanguard of Ideological Enlightenment and Mass Mobilization
Being the "precursor" means serving as the ideological guide and the foundation for action. Zhou Enlai knew well that before any large-scale social transformation or military struggle, it is often necessary to carry out ideological mobilization and preparation of public opinion, a principle he personally practiced.
During his early years studying in Europe, as a correspondent for the Tianjin Yishi News (Yishi Bao), Zhou Enlai wrote a total of 57 dispatches from Europe, conveying the changing international situation to the domestic audience. Simultaneously, as a major leader and contributor to Youth (Shaonian, later renamed Red Light [Chiguang]), the organ of the Chinese Communist Youth League in Europe, he authored numerous articles propagating Marxism, introducing the experience of the Russian October Revolution, and analyzing international and domestic situations to point out the revolutionary direction for Chinese youth in Europe. This can be seen as his early practice of using the "battle of the pen" for ideological enlightenment. During the Great Revolution [3], Zhou Enlai served as the Director of the General Political Department of the National Revolutionary Army’s Eastern Expedition. While leading the establishment of new government organs and mass organizations in the Dongjiang region of Guangdong, he spearheaded the founding of the Lingdong Republican Daily (Lingdong Minguo Ribao). He personally inscribed the supplement’s masthead with the word "Revolution" and established it as the newspaper's operating purpose. The paper quickly became the Kuomintang’s primary party organ in the Chaozhou, Meizhou, Haifeng, and Lufeng areas, playing an important role as a "precursor" in awakening the revolutionary spirit of the masses.
After the full-scale War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression broke out, the vanguard role of the "battle of the pen" became even more critical. On the third day after the July 7th Incident [4], Zhou Enlai proposed: "In the Kuomintang-controlled areas, there is much to be done. We must run a party newspaper." [5] After numerous negotiations, and under Zhou Enlai’s direct leadership and care, the Xinhua Daily and the weekly The Masses (Qunzhong) were founded, becoming our Party’s open organs in the Kuomintang-controlled areas and sounding the "clarion call to encourage advancement." [6] Additionally, under Zhou Enlai's guidance, a "newspaper with the character of a cultural National United Front against Japan"—the Salvation Daily (Jiuwang Ribao)—was organized in August 1937. In 1941, he established a "propaganda outpost for overseas Chinese and progressives in 'Nanyang' (Southeast Asia) and Western countries"—the China Commercial Daily (Huashang Bao)—in Hong Kong. These strongholds fully exerted their roles as "pathfinders," accumulating profound explosive power for the "battle of the gun" against the Northern Warlords and Japanese imperialism.
(2) The "Shield": Public Opinion Cover and Support for the Revolutionary Camp
Relative to the ideological mobilization and creation of public opinion "momentum" by the "precursor," the "shield" referred to by Zhou Enlai focused more on holding ground and stabilizing the hearts of the people, aiming to "provide escort" for the revolutionary struggle. He deeply recognized that in the midst of brutal military struggle, news propaganda work must function as a "shield." It must construct a defensive line of public opinion to resist the enemy’s political slander and expand the united front strongholds to break political isolation, thereby providing reliable political cover and broad social support for the armed struggle.
First, news propaganda provides powerful cover for armed struggle through timely strikes. During the stage of strategic stalemate when frictions between the Kuomintang and the Communists were constant, the Kuomintang often utilized its propaganda advantage to "demonize" the Communist-led armies, attempting to isolate our Party and army politically. Zhou Enlai emphasized: "We should not relax in refuting the enemy's deceptive propaganda," and "this work is extremely important; there must be no hesitation." [7] This meant that the "battle of the pen" had to construct a defensive line on the flank of the "battle of the gun."
A classic historical footnote is the struggle in public opinion following the Southern Anhui Incident [8]. When the Kuomintang militarily encircled the New Fourth Army and attempted to label them as "rebels" in public opinion, Zhou Enlai grief-strickenly wrote the inscription: "A grievance of eternal proportions, South of the Yangtze, a single leaf; brothers of the same house turning their blades on one another, why the frantic haste to simmer?" [9] This was published in Xinhua Daily, breaking through Kuomintang censorship. This was not merely an outpouring of emotion, but a classic instance of the Party using news propaganda to seize the right to interpret the facts under extreme hardship. it allowed the people in the Great Rear [10] to see the truth clearly, causing the tide of public opinion to turn rapidly and successfully thwarting the Kuomintang's attempt to politically annihilate the New Fourth Army. Beyond valuing the "battle of the pen" in the complex domestic struggle, Zhou Enlai also placed high importance on the role of propaganda in the face of armed provocation from international imperialism. After the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea began, Zhou Enlai reviewed and issued the "Directive of the CPC Central Committee on Conducting Propaganda on Current Affairs Nationwide," making meticulous and thoughtful arrangements for how to help the masses correctly understand the current situation and eliminate the fear of the United States. [11] Through practical and effective propaganda and education, "Resist U.S. Aggression, Aid Korea, Protect our Homes, and Defend the Motherland" became a national consensus. This vividly illustrated the vital significance of demonstrating the justice of the war and strengthening the confidence in victory through news propaganda to provide powerful cover for the military struggle.
Second, news propaganda expands the revolutionary camp's "circle of friends" by winning over intermediate forces and breaking political isolation. In 1941, facing the strict political blockade of the Kuomintang reactionaries, the Party’s situation in the Kuomintang-controlled areas was once extremely difficult. Zhou Enlai clearly analyzed the united front situation at the time: although we had made many friends in the cultural and educational sectors, the Party’s influence remained weak in the industrial and commercial sectors, which possessed significant economic power, and many public opinion strongholds were occupied by the Kuomintang government. To break this situation, he led the Southern Bureau to use the Commercial Daily (Shangwu Ribao) as a breakthrough point, establishing the strategy of "seizing the stronghold from within the organization." He adopted the "squeezing strategy"—squeezing our people in and squeezing secret agents out of important departments. [12] In less than six months, except for the president, the staff of the newspaper were all replaced by Communist comrades. The reorganized Commercial Daily shifted its editorials and reporting to speak for national industry and commerce, specifically exposing the policies and measures of the bureaucratic-capitalist "Four Big Families" [13] that restricted and strangled national industry and commerce, transforming a tool of anti-communism back into a newspaper that spoke for the business community. Zhou Enlai spoke highly of this achievement: "The work at the Chongqing Commercial Daily was well done. In 1941, our Party was still relatively isolated in Chongqing; only people in culture and education dared to approach us. The Commercial Daily mobilized the industrial and commercial sectors to oppose the 'Four Big Families,' and they began to move closer to us, expanding our Party's united front." [14] Under Zhou Enlai's guidance, the Commercial Daily did not merely preach grand political theories but tangibly "spoke" for the oppressed national industrialists and businessmen, successfully winning over intermediate forces that had previously been hesitant. The resulting broad social support established a reliable social barrier for the revolutionary forces situated within the White Terror.
(3) Strategic Extension: From "Simultaneous Advance of the Literary and Martial" to "Two Wheels"
From a broader perspective, Zhou Enlai always viewed news propaganda as a vital component of the Party’s cultural work, emphasizing its special strategic status. In August 1940, while discussing the role of cultural movements, he looked back on the past and pointed out: "In the three stages of the history of the entire Chinese Revolution—following the Taiping Heavenly Kingdom, the reformism of the 1898 Coup [15] combined with the cultural revolution movement and New Army movement led by Dr. Sun Yat-sen brought about the Revolution of 1911; the May Fourth Movement, the February 7th Strike movement, and the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy brought about the Great Revolution; after the failure of the Great Revolution, the cultural movements in Shanghai and Beiping and the resulting December 9th Movement [16] and National Salvation Association movement also played a role in coordinating with the armed struggle." From this, he concluded: "Cultural movements have a special significance for the Chinese Revolution," and emphasized that "the military and cultural fronts must advance simultaneously." [17]
With the victory of the New Democratic Revolution, Zhou Enlai extended this dialectic with great foresight. After the founding of New China, facing the new central task of economic construction, he pointed out metaphorically: "Economic construction and cultural construction are like two wheels of a cart, moving in tandem." He added, "Cultural and educational work includes not only education but also literature and art, science, health, news, and publishing. All of these have a close relationship with economic construction. Therefore, to carry out economic construction, cultural and educational work must be strengthened and must never be weakened." [18] This essentially treated news propaganda work as a vital support for the smooth advancement of national construction, reflecting Zhou Enlai’s high degree of political sensitivity and strategic vision.
II. "Spread Our Political Views Far and Wide": The Political Communication Efficacy of News Propaganda
As a vital means of contending for strongholds in the ideological sphere, news propaganda possesses distinct class attributes and must firmly adhere to the correct political direction. In January 1946, through the joint efforts of the Communist Party of China and various democratic parties, the Political Consultative Conference [19] passed five agreements, including the proposal on government organization, the program for peaceful national construction, and the draft constitution. However, the Kuomintang ruling clique was fundamentally unwilling to fulfill these agreements. Some diehards even publicly slandered them, saying "the PCC decisions are unfavorable to the Kuomintang" and "the principles of the draft constitution are a betrayal of [Sun Yat-sen's] legacy." [20] Subsequently, the Kuomintang acted perversely and began to deliberately sabotage the PCC agreements. Under these circumstances, in February 1946, Zhou Enlai clearly proposed at a symposium for the Chongqing cultural community: "Spread our political views far and wide." [21]
Coming just as the Political Consultative Conference had adjourned, the assertion of this thesis was highly targeted and urgent. Zhou Enlai deeply recognized that for agreements on paper to be transformed into actual peace, the reactionaries' distortions and blockades had to first be defeated in the field of public opinion. The core intent of "spreading our political views far and wide" was to rapidly transform the CPC's propositions regarding peace, democracy, and unity, as well as the genuine results of the PCC, into a political consensus among the broad masses, thereby constructing a powerful dam of public opinion throughout society to restrain civil war and protect peace. Of course, utilizing the PCC to propagate "stopping the civil war" was only a microcosm of Zhou Enlai’s journalistic practice. In his view, it was not only urgent and major matters concerning "peace" that required grand-scale publicity; the Party’s political views across all aspects and periods could not be locked in drawers or remain only at the high levels. The Party's political views had to be spread far and wide, resolutely breaking away from "closed-door" methods of propaganda.
(1) Clarifying "What to Spread": Adherence to Political Direction and Manifestation of Class Standpoint
First, one must unswervingly propagate Marxism-Leninism. As early as March 1922, the 24-year-old Zhou Enlai firmly stated: "The 'Ism' I have recognized will certainly never change, and I will resolutely propagate and work for it." [22] Actively propagating Marxism-Leninism was also Zhou Enlai’s consistent requirement for news propaganda work. During the War of Resistance, as the ideological beacons of our Party in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, Xinhua Daily and the weekly The Masses cooperated closely while maintaining their own focuses. At the founding of The Masses, Zhou Enlai clearly pointed out that...
“The editorial policy of Qunzhong [The Masses] is identical to that of the Xinhua Daily. The difference is that Qunzhong is a Party organ and a theoretical publication; it must proceed more from Marxism-Leninism and from a theoretical perspective to help the broad masses of readers understand the justice of the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the inevitability of its victory” [24]. In his view, arming the masses with scientific theory and helping readers understand the nature of the war and the prospects of the revolution from a theoretical height was an important mission of the Party's news and propaganda. Under the guidance of this policy, the Qunzhong weekly strengthened its propaganda and interpretation of Marxism-Leninism through various means—such as translating classical Marxist-Leninist works, establishing a special column for “Research Materials on the History of the CPSU (B),” and publishing articles to commemorate the birth anniversaries of classical Marxist-Leninist authors. This played an important role in the dissemination of Marxism in the Kuomintang (KMT)-controlled areas during the War of Resistance. At the same time, the journal adhered to the excellent academic style of integrating theory with practice, closely combining the study of Marxist theory with the analysis of the realities of the Resistance. For example, it published articles by Xu Dixin such as “How to Study Political Economy,” “On China’s Private Capital,” “The Characteristics of China’s Industrial Capital,” and “The Path of the Chinese Economy.” These used principles of Marxist political economy to dissect China’s economic problems, particularly providing a granular analysis of the terminally ill economic system in the KMT-controlled areas, helping people see through to the theoretical core of “who is sucking the blood.”
Secondly, one must propagate the Party’s line, principles, and policies with a clear-cut stand. In Zhou Enlai’s view, “political opinion” is the concentrated expression of the Party’s will. He explicitly proposed that news must “give full play to its role as the Party's tool for propaganda and mobilization” [25] and must unconditionally promote the Party's propositions. Zhou Enlai’s inscriptions for various newspapers and periodicals reflected this point. For instance, his inscription for the founding of the Xinhua Daily read: “Persist in a long-term War of Resistance to strive for final victory.” For the May Day commemorative special issue of the Xinhua Daily, he wrote: “The entire Chinese working class commemorates May Day during the War of Resistance, which truly holds a dual significance: on the one hand, the entire Chinese working class should strive for national liberation to seek its own liberation; on the other hand, it should unite with the working class of the world to resist the aggression of the brutal Japanese [invaders] to safeguard world peace.” For the Jiuwang Ribao (Salvation Daily), he wrote: “Consolidate and expand the salvation front, mobilize millions upon millions of the masses, and drive the Japanese bandits out of China!” For the Military and Political Magazine of the Eighth Route Army commemorating the second anniversary of the “July 7th Incident,” he wrote: “Persist in the War of Resistance to the end, oppose halfway compromise! Persist in the united front, oppose the instigation of internal strife! Wage a total war, oppose monopolization and suppression!” And on the eve of the founding of New China, for the third anniversary of the Nan Chiau Reporting [23], he wrote: “Strive to propagate the Common Program [24] of New Democracy; strive to protect the legitimate rights and interests of overseas Chinese” [26]. These concise inscriptions pointed the way forward for these publications. Whether promoting the Party’s policy of united resistance or propagating the program for founding New China, it was a proper and necessary requirement for disseminating the Party's voice. Party newspapers must be “surnamed Party” [25]; this is the fundamental attribute upon which they depend for survival and development.
Zhou Enlai not only clarified the primary content of propaganda but also emphasized that “the Party’s policies must be made public to the masses in a timely manner” so that they “can obtain the understanding and support of the masses and become a force” [27]. To this end, he regarded the rapid and accurate publicizing of the Party’s principles and policies at critical moments as a basic responsibility of the Party's news and propaganda work. Whenever there was a historical turning point or a major emergency, he would always immediately guide Party newspapers to issue statements or editorials to manifest the Party’s attitude and keep the masses informed. For example, in October 1938, the day before the fall of Wuhan, Zhou Enlai dictated the final editorial for the Hankou edition of the Xinhua Daily, solemnly announcing: We are only leaving Wuhan temporarily, we will certainly return, and Wuhan will eventually return to the hands of the Chinese people [23]. In a moment of crisis, this kind of statement transformed abstract strategic principles into visible and audible promises, ensuring the people did not lose confidence in the country’s future due to a temporary retreat. When Wang Jingwei committed treason and defected to the enemy, Zhou Enlai led Party newspapers and journals to focus on combining the “denunciation of Wang” with the strengthening of the entire people’s confidence in the War of Resistance. On January 2, 1939, he spoke to a Reuters reporter, explaining that Wang’s actions could neither break China’s internal unity nor damage China's strength in the Resistance [24]. On the same day, the Xinhua Daily published an editorial titled “Wang Jingwei’s Treason,” criticizing the “national subjugation theory” [26] of Wang Jingwei and his ilk, which had lost confidence in the future of the Resistance, and used public opinion to demonstrate to the people the Party’s firm determination to “resist to the end.” When the KMT forcibly convened the “bogus National Assembly” [27] in 1946, Zhou Enlai immediately held a press conference in Nanjing, issuing a “Solemn Statement on the Kuomintang’s Convening of the ‘National Assembly,’” which was published in the Xinhua Daily. It manifested the CPC’s attitude of boycott and “firm refusal to recognize” it to all sectors of society, drawing a clear political line. The purpose of this series of vocal actions was to clarify the Party's position and the rights and wrongs of the matter amidst the clamor of voices. After the founding of New China, Zhou Enlai continued to attach great importance to communicating the Party's policies and propositions through news and propaganda. In April 1954, Zhou Enlai led a delegation to the Geneva Conference to discuss the peaceful settlement of the Korean issue and the restoration of peace in Indochina. In the face of open American propaganda against a ceasefire, its plotting to expand the war, and its mobilization of public opinion to clamor for conflict, Zhou Enlai instructed People’s Daily to add four sentences to an editorial: “We do not invade others, and we resolutely oppose any act of aggression by anyone; we do not threaten others, and we oppose any act of threat by anyone; we do not interfere in the internal affairs of others, and we oppose anyone’s interference in the internal affairs of anyone; we advocate peace and oppose war, but we will never sit idly by regarding any armed aggression by others against us!” [25] These four sentences were powerful and resonant; they were both a declaration of position and a keynote for policy, announcing New China’s independent foreign policy of peace to the world.
(2) Solving "How to Disseminate": United Front Thinking, the Art of Expression, and Tactical Discretion
Propaganda must consider both its motivation and, more importantly, its effect. To break through blockades and achieve the goal of “widely disseminating” the Party’s political opinions, special attention must be paid to the methods and means of propaganda. To this end, Zhou Enlai constructed a multidimensional dissemination strategy. First, one must find every possible way to expand propaganda channels and scope so the Party’s voice can be heard by more people. During the War of Resistance, limited by the KMT’s news blockade, Zhou Enlai particularly emphasized that Communists should “submit manuscripts to various centrist newspapers” and “get close to all kinds of newspapers; even for die-hard newspapers, their editors are not all die-hards” [26]. Zhou Enlai knew well that if we relied solely on our own one or two newspapers, it would be difficult to break through the KMT’s tight blockade. By submitting manuscripts to centrist publications, one was actually using legal public platforms to send the Party's voice into the enemy’s opinion strongholds, allowing the Party’s propositions to spread further and wider. During the War of Liberation, the KMT government's exorbitant taxation and predatory levies led to skyrocketing prices, and waves of resistance from the masses in KMT-controlled areas surged. To strengthen our Party's propaganda work and "add fuel to the fire" of the KMT’s relationship with the masses, in May 1947, Zhou Enlai pointed out in the “Instructions on the Principles of Work and Struggle Tactics in Chiang [Kai-shek]-controlled Areas” drafted for the CPC Central Committee that we should “focus the Party’s propaganda work on professional and high-status figures among the masses, utilizing public journals, newspapers, and rallies to criticize current politics and increase discontent” [27], thereby accelerating the “total collapse” [28] of KMT rule through legal struggle.
Second, one must use ingenious efforts to enhance the effectiveness of dissemination. Zhou Enlai opposed dry preaching. He repeatedly emphasized that newspapers and periodicals “must on the one hand pay attention to standing firm in their position, but on the other hand also be lively and clever, and cannot be rigid” [29]; “manuscripts must be written concisely and vividly for people to read them” [30]; and “in written propaganda, one must strive for specificity, popularity, and vividness” [31]. Zhou Enlai also paid attention to the impact of specific terminology on propaganda effects. In May 1952, regarding the propaganda and reporting work during the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, Zhou Enlai pointed out in a telegram to Li Kenong and Qiao Guanhua that “there are many provocative terms used in our speeches and news scripts, such as ‘bandits,’ ‘imperialists,’ ‘demons,’ ‘fascists,’ etc., to the extent that foreign newspapers and broadcasts do not easily adopt them.” We should “focus on briefly and concisely exposing facts, stating reasons, revealing and attacking the enemy’s weaknesses, and avoiding or minimizing unnecessary provocative language,” and “the same policy will be adopted domestically” [23]. This dissemination strategy not only allowed the Party’s political opinions to “get out” but also allowed people of different classes to “take them in.”
Third, one must adhere to the principle of “differentiation between internal and external” [28] and hold fast to the political bottom line of public opinion dissemination. The “broad dissemination” emphasized by Zhou Enlai had principles and limits. He explicitly stated: “The publication of all work plans and content must be determined in terms of detail based on their scope and timeliness” [24], and emphasized that propaganda must adhere to the “principle of non-disclosure” [25]. He strictly distinguished between secret channels and public channels, requiring that “the Party’s broadcast speeches and news of victories in the Liberated Areas be disseminated secretly through extremely reliable connections” [26]. This strict discipline ensured that under the White Terror [29], the Party’s propaganda work could both extensively mobilize the masses and not pose a threat to organizational security.
The “broad dissemination” understood by Zhou Enlai was by no means merely extensive coverage in terms of scope, but rather referred to the ability to truly touch people’s hearts, be understood and accepted by them, and ultimately be transformed into ideological identification and the pursuit of action. This placed higher demands on the Party’s journalists: they not only needed to possess a firm political stand and a solid theoretical foundation but also had to possess superb professional ability and the art of propaganda, being skilled at subtly embedding profound political and ideological content within the vividness and readability of reports, truly achieving the effect of “fine rain moistening things silently” [30].
III. “Voice of the People, Guide for the People”: The Unity of the Party Nature and People Nature of News Propaganda
For whom is the newspaper run? This is the fundamental question that determines the success or failure of a newspaper. At the beginning of 1947, the gunfire of the full-scale civil war had completely shattered the illusion of peace, and the Xinhua Daily in the KMT-controlled area faced the perilous situation of imminent closure. Under the test of life and death, Zhou Enlai wrote an inscription for the ninth anniversary of the founding of Xinhua Daily: “Be the voice of the people, be the guide for the people; continue to work hard, persist unyieldingly, to welcome the new high tide of national democracy” [27]. Zhou Enlai’s proposal to “be the voice of the people, be the guide for the people” was not only an encouragement to the colleagues of Xinhua Daily to persist in the struggle in a perilous environment but also a profound answer to the fundamental questions of “for whom, relying on whom, and who am I” in news propaganda work. This was fundamentally different from the KMT’s practice of blockading news, fabricating lies, and keeping the people in the dark because they “feared the masses.”
(1) The Meaning of “Voice”: Going Deep into the Life of the Masses and Sincerely Accepting Supervision
The so-called “voice of the people” (literally “throat and tongue” of the people) focuses on “from the masses,” emphasizing reliance on the masses and reflecting the people’s will, so that the Party’s propaganda work truly becomes a window for the people to express their wishes and pour out their hearts.
First, one must go deep into the masses and observe the people’s conditions. During the War of Resistance, Lu Yi, the director of the interviewing department at Xinhua Daily, once went to Zhou Enlai and said: “Recently the situation has been stagnant, and news leads are few. Some reports are dry and boring, and readers don't want to see them.” Zhou Enlai analyzed this: “This is because you have not gone deep into the masses and do not understand the wishes and requirements of the readers.” At the same time, he pointed out: “In addition to interviewing some upper-level activities when necessary, you can set your sights on the masses.” “Go sit in the tea houses and listen to what the masses are talking about and thinking about” [28]. These guiding opinions promoted a change in the working style of Xinhua Daily’s interview work, ensuring that subsequently published content truly reflected the actual conditions, wishes, and requirements of the masses of all social classes.
Second, one must be modest and accept supervision. Zhou Enlai profoundly recognized that mass supervision is the preservative that maintains the purity and combat effectiveness of the Party newspaper. In 1942, during the Yan’an Rectification Movement, Mao Zedong telegraphed Zhou Enlai, requesting that Xinhua Daily “enhance Party nature and reflect the masses” [29]. Under Zhou Enlai’s direct leadership, the newspaper published an editorial titled “A Respectful Message to Our Readers—Please Give This Paper Comprehensive Criticism,” comparing the relationship between the newspaper and its readers to “the inseparable nature of fish and water,” emphasizing that without criticism, “it would be like a pot of fragrant flowers lacking the irrigation of clear water, which would eventually wither away” [23]. That same year, the Xinhua Daily...
When the Tuanjie (Unity) supplement was launched, Zhou Enlai pointed out in the inaugural message, "The Purport of 'Unity'": "We are confident" that after nearly five years of struggle, Xinhua Daily "under the Party’s guidance, has fulfilled its mission as a clarion call for the united resistance against Japanese aggression and as the throat and tongue [31] of the masses"; yet, "it goes without saying" that there "still exist many shortcomings." We are establishing the Tuanjie supplement in order to "perform our own work of self-reflection." [32]
On January 11, 1947, on the ninth anniversary of the founding of Xinhua Daily, an article titled "Review and Encouragement—A Summary of Readers’ Opinions" was published in the name of the editorial department. It meticulously organized various suggestions for improving Xinhua Daily raised by readers over a long period—covering editorial policy, commentary, news layout, dispatches, and supplements—and included extensive excerpts from original reader letters. At the end of the text, it sincerely stated, "We must study these opinions more deeply and review our shortcomings, so that this newspaper can gradually improve in all aspects to meet the earnest expectations of our readers." [33]
Zhou Enlai deeply realized that only by truly letting the masses speak and exercise supervision can a newspaper truly represent the people and earn their heartfelt conviction.
(2) The responsibility of the "Guide": The organic unity of theoretical leadership and categorized communication
The so-called "serving as a guide for the people" focuses on "going to the masses" [32], emphasizing the education of the masses, the guidance of public opinion, and pointing out the direction of struggle for the people.
First, he prioritized using scientific theory to disperse the mist and guide the course. News and public opinion must not only reflect the aspirations and demands of the masses, but must also apply the Marxist standpoint, viewpoint, and method, as well as the Party's scientific theories and correct policies, to educate and guide them. Zhou Enlai’s vigorous promotion and publicity of On Protracted War is a classic practice embodying this "guide" role. In May 1938, Mao Zedong published On Protracted War, systematically elucidating the Party's general strategic policy for the protracted war of resistance against Japan. Zhou Enlai knew well that publicizing On Protracted War was of great significance. Immediately after its publication, Zhou Enlai introduced its fundamental spirit to the high-ranking Kuomintang (KMT) general Bai Chongxi. Bai admired it deeply, considering it "the supreme strategic policy for defeating the enemy and achieving victory," and summarized its spirit as "accumulating small victories into a great victory, and trading space for time." With Zhou Enlai’s consent, this was promulgated to the entire country by the Military Affairs Commission as the strategic guiding ideology for the War of Resistance. [34]
In February 1939, while discussing work in Guilin with Li Kenong and other heads of the Eighth Route Army Liaison Office, Zhou specifically emphasized the need to pay attention to publicizing the ideas of On Protracted War. [35] He also sent the book to Hong Kong, commissioning Soong Ching-ling to find someone to translate it into English for overseas distribution. Notably, from October 7 to 9, 1938, Zhou Enlai published a long article titled "On the Current Situation of the War of Resistance" in the form of consecutive editorials in Xinhua Daily. The article stated at the very beginning: China "can only win the final victory of the Chinese nation's war of liberation by persisting in a long-term war of resistance." Building on the publicity of the scientific conclusions and correct resistance strategy of On Protracted War, Zhou Enlai addressed the situation at the time—when Wuhan was in peril, some pessimists doubted the future of the resistance, and certain speculators hoped to salvage the crisis through a single desperate gamble. He provide a calm analysis, noting: "From the perspective of the overall situation of the war of resistance, the battle to defend Wuhan is merely the key to whether the first stage can transition into the second stage, but it is by no means the key to whether the long-term war of resistance can be continued." [36]
After this article was published, it was also printed as a pamphlet and distributed in large quantities, allowing many people to see the future clearly through their confusion and strengthening their conviction in the inevitable victory of the resistance. The publication and dissemination of On Protracted War, along with Zhou Enlai’s elucidations tailored to the war situation, powerfully refuted the then-prevalent erroneous views of "theory of national subjugation" and "theory of quick victory," answering the questions people cared about most yet could not see clearly for the time being. This practice vividly illustrates the great utility of news propaganda: it is not just for transmitting information, but must light a beacon at critical moments so the people can see which way to go.
Second, he emphasized running newspapers and periodicals according to the characteristics of different readers to enhance the effectiveness of guidance. Zhou Enlai opposed "uniformity" [33] and advocated for differentiated guidance based on the characteristics of different reader groups. After the Jiuwang Daily (Salvation Daily) was founded, Zhou Enlai consistently followed the development of this newspaper, which possessed the character of the United Front. In April 1943, Xia Yan, the editor-in-chief of Jiuwang Daily, reported on his work to Zhou Enlai. After inquiring in detail about the newspaper's situation, circulation, and the feedback from various sectors, Zhou Enlai said: "If your paper is run exactly like Xinhua Daily, some people will not dare to read it. The general policy is to promote anti-Japanese resistance, unity, and progress, but you must cultivate a unique style, producing a newspaper that people from the left, center, and right all want to read and enjoy reading." [31] Jiuwang Daily conscientiously implemented Zhou Enlai’s instructions, enabling the paper to exert a great influence across broad social strata.
In November 1958, while discussing newspaper management with Qi Feng, Secretary-General of the CPC Hong Kong and Macau Work Committee, he pointed out once again that if both Ta Kung Pao and Wen Wei Po only used Xinhua News Agency wire copy, it would be difficult for them to compete with other Hong Kong newspapers. The supplements of the newspapers must have ideological depth. The Hong Kong news section should not only report on the struggle against the enemy but should also appropriately increase content regarding the lives of the masses, so as not to become detached from the "middle-of-the-road" masses. Commentary writing must also suit the level of the local masses; editorials from the People’s Daily do not necessarily need to be published in full in Hong Kong. [32]
This differentiation in content was also reflected in the overall coordination of news writing. In April 1949, during a talk with Xinhua News Agency staff, Zhou Enlai pointed out that news and commentary writing must take all parties into account. At present, special care should be taken for the various democratic parties and personages with whom you are unfamiliar but who occupy an increasingly important position in domestic political life. Your reports must fully embody the Party's United Front policy and show full respect for the democratic parties and personages. [33]
Of course, in Zhou Enlai’s view, "differentiation" is the means, while "integration" is the end. Categorized guidance is like a "bridge over a river"—one cannot simply build the bridge and forget about crossing the river. Only by using language that different groups can understand to explain the same principles can the Party’s propositions enter every household, truly exerting a guiding role and ensuring that everyone "thinks toward the same goal and exerts effort in the same direction."
The two roles of "throat and tongue of the people" and "guide of the people" are dialectically unified and complementary. If detached from their "people-centered" character, the so-called "throat and tongue" could degenerate into a tool for the few or for minority interest groups, even becoming a tool for suppressing public opinion; similarly, the "guide" might lose its way because it is detached from the actual needs and fundamental interests of the masses, even leading the people astray. Only by unswervingly adhering to the unity of Party spirit and people-centeredness can news propaganda work truly fulfill its proper roles as "throat and tongue" and "guide" for the Party, maintaining its vitality and vigor forever.
IV. "A Sharp Weapon": The Art of Public Opinion Struggle Based on the Foundation of Truthfulness
At the end of October 1950, the newborn Republic was facing severe trials from both internal and external sources. Internationally, the flames of the Korean War had reached the banks of the Yalu River; the Chinese People’s Volunteers had just entered the theater of operations, and the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea had officially begun. Domestically, the task of restoring and developing the national economy was urgent, yet KMT remnants and spies were still engaged in clandestine sabotage, and the Movement to Suppress Counter-revolutionaries was about to commence. In this moment of pervasive smoke and an extremely complex public opinion environment, Zhou Enlai signed the "Directive of the Government Administration Council on Improving and Developing the National Publishing Enterprise" on the 28th. He put forward highly combative requirements for news and publishing work, emphasizing the need to "treat the publication of periodicals as a regular and sharp weapon for guiding work." [34]
Comparing newspapers and periodicals to a "sharp weapon" was Zhou Enlai’s profound summary of the Party’s practice in public opinion struggle. In his view, publications were not only important drivers of economic and social construction but also sharp swords in the struggle against the enemy. No matter how the environment changed, news work could not lose this "combative edge." To make this "weapon" truly peerless in sharpness, it had to possess two core elements: first, an indestructible foundation of credibility—that is, an emphasis on the truthfulness of news reporting; second, the employment of sophisticated and flexible tactical methods—that is, an emphasis on the combative nature of news and public opinion.
(1) Truth as the blade of the "weapon": Only with truth can there be power
Throughout his life, Zhou Enlai regarded "seeking truth" as the bottom line of news work. In January 1950, he wrote an inscription for the New Year's supplement of News Daily: "Strive for the reporting of truthful news!" [35] He often cautioned journalists that "reporting must correspond to reality." [36] This was not merely an admonition regarding professional ethics, but a profound judgment based on strategic considerations—in the international struggle for public opinion, any factual deviation or exaggerated propaganda could become a handle for hostile forces to attack, thereby causing the "weapon" to blunt its edge and lose its combat effectiveness.
During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, facing the U.S. military’s bombing of the neutral zone in Kaesong and its subsequent flat denial, Zhou Enlai prudently oversaw the international news dispatches. In August 1951, he drafted a telegram for Mao Zedong to Li Kenong, specifically mentioning: "The invading enemy aircraft should be confirmed as one; do not say the number is unknown, which makes the reporting inconsistent." "Of the nine bombs dropped by the enemy plane, how many exploded? Are the unexploded ones and the fragments of the exploded ones still kept in their original places? Are the craters and charred crops still preserved in their original state? Are there scars from strafing on ground objects? What is the witness testimony of the residents regarding this?" On the basis of having a full command of the facts, Zhou Enlai decisively instructed that the detailed investigation results be broadcast in both Chinese and English and published in full in the People’s Daily, sternly piercing the opponent's lies: "Facts speak louder than eloquence... the fragments of the bombs dropped by your aircraft and the craters they made, the cracks in the blasted rocks, and the scorched areas are all still preserved in their original state near our delegation’s residence in the Kaesong meeting area; the residents of the Kaesong area can also testify to the truth of your aircraft’s bombing and strafing that night." "As long as one comes into contact with the actual scene of the bombed area in Kaesong, one can see who the manufacturer of this provocative incident is, and who is making up preposterous and far-fetched lies without a factual basis." [31]
Publicizing scrutinized details exactly as they are for the peace-loving people of the world to distinguish right from wrong is precisely the kind of respect for facts that allows us to be invincible in the contest of public opinion.
(2) Struggle as the application of the "weapon": Taking the initiative and winning the hearts
Zhou Enlai was skilled at picking up this "sharp weapon" at critical moments to win political battles, demonstrating a high degree of artistry in the struggle for public opinion.
First, he was adept at seizing positions and breaking blockades. After the victory of the War of Resistance, Chiang Kai-shek, in order to monopolize the fruits of victory, "appeared willing to seek a compromise to deceive the countrymen, while secretly arranging military deployments with great conspiratorial intent." [32] Particularly after the KMT government returned its capital to Nanjing, rumors were rampant. To expose Chiang Kai-shek’s conspiracy of "sham peace talks" and to refute the KMT authorities' fabricated claim that the CPC did not want peace or unity, occupying the high ground of public opinion was vital. During the Chongqing Negotiations, in order to "utilize legality to unite the masses" during "the period of chaos when KMT rule has not yet been established or stabilized," [33] Zhou Enlai insisted that "our Party must prepare a large Party newspaper and news agency in Shanghai." [34]
In May 1946, in a telegram to the CPC Central Committee, Zhou Enlai clearly stated: "Nanjing and Shanghai have become centers of reactionary public opinion; the prevalence of rumors exceeds that of Chongqing. Therefore, our Party should have newspapers in both Nanjing and Shanghai to facilitate combat and mobilize the masses; otherwise, being besieged, we will have no opportunity to strike back." [35] This pointed the way for our Party to seize the initiative in public opinion—and thus the initiative in the revolution—under the ambiguous situation following the victory of the war. Under Zhou Enlai’s leadership, the Southern Bureau of the CPC Central Committee took a series of measures, such as moving the Qunzhong (The Masses) weekly from Chongqing to Shanghai and founding the English publication Xinhua Weekly, opening propaganda channels in the heart of enemy territory and mastering the initiative in discourse.
Second, he was adept at "using the enemy’s strength against them" [34] to win over people's hearts. In the struggle for public opinion, the choice of perspective in news reporting is crucial. During the War to Resist U.S. Aggression and Aid Korea, U.S. planes bombed power plants in places like the Yalu, Changjin, Bujeon, and Heocheon Rivers during the day for two consecutive days in June 1952. Zhou Enlai specifically suggested to the North Korean side regarding the news release: "Could the news content emphasize that the power plants serve the Korean people and do not constitute military targets? The U.S. side’s wanton bombing of them is clearly intended to sabotage the daily life of Korean residents and violates humanitarian principles." [36] After the North Korean side released this news, Zhou Enlai instructed the People’s Daily to reprint it and publish an editorial titled "The United States Must Be Held Accountable for the Crime of Bombing the Yalu River Power Plants." From...
Protesting the facts of American aircraft bombings from the perspective of "violating humanitarian principles" exposed the villainous intentions of the United States to destroy peaceful life. This unique entry point for public opinion was more likely to trigger international condemnation of the aggressors and sympathy for the Korean people, thereby doubling the striking effectiveness of the "weapon."
Thirdly, he was adept at "knowing oneself and the enemy" and mining intelligence. In Zhou Enlai’s hands, newspapers and periodicals were not only tools for propaganda but also sources of intelligence. During the Korean Armistice Negotiations, Zhou was skilled at extracting valuable clues from enemy news reports. In December 1951, in two telegrams regarding negotiation strategy he drafted for Mao Zedong, he mentioned: "Please estimate whether the enemy intends to stop the construction of new airfields as an exhange; there are hints of this in the enemy news"; and "In addition to the bargaining methods currently being employed, the enemy is even envisioning using the prisoner repatriation issue as an exchange for their abandonment of free inspections; this was revealed in the enemy news reports on the 7th." [35] By analyzing the minute traces in the enemy’s public reports to discern their true underlying intentions, this "sharp weapon" could be used not only to strike at the enemy’s vital points but also to see through their conspiracies, thereby helping us grasp the initiative in complex struggles.
Beyond assisting in the information game at the negotiating table, foreign news reports could also serve as references for comparative learning. Reference News (Cankao Xiaoxi) provided domestic reference by selecting and publishing valuable materials broadcast or published by foreign news agencies and newspapers. Zhou Enlai always attached great importance to and cared for the publication of Reference News, emphasizing that "it cannot only publish reflections favorable to China; it must also appropriately publish some negative things." [36] In October 1971, while meeting with American friends, Zhou Enlai pointed out: "We publish Reference Materials (Cankao Ziliao) and Reference News, featuring articles from the AP, Reuters, AFP, etc. ... Publishing these newspapers and periodicals can educate our people and enable them to distinguish right from wrong. ... If we do not allow people to conduct various ideological comparisons, how can they recognize correct propositions and correct opinions?" [37] Distinguishing right from wrong through comparison is intended to strengthen ideological immunity and combat effectiveness.
The "sharp weapon" advocated by Zhou Enlai refers to a comprehensive combat capability formed on the basis of ironclad facts, coordinated with precise timing and superb arts of expression. Its "sharpness" is primarily reflected in the depth of its critique, the timeliness of its combat, and the steadfastness of its political stance. It requires that when news propaganda faces great storms, it must possess the momentum to overwhelm the enemy and the courage to meet force with force; simultaneously, it must be adept at assessing the situation, knowing how to use the enemy's own strength against them, and always maintaining the initiative in the struggle for public opinion amidst complex circumstances.
V. Conclusion
From his student days, Zhou Enlai "engaged enthusiastically in academic journals, exerting his efforts twofold" [38], accumulating preliminary journalistic experience from the practice of running newspapers such as Jingye, Xiaofeng, and the Tianjin Student Union Bulletin. In September 1915, he wrote: "Upholding the fundamentals without sycophancy, being strict in praise and censure, wielding the pen of Dong Hu [39], and upholding the righteousness of the Spring and Autumn Annals—this is a superior newspaper; manifesting only the good and concealing the evil, holding to one's view and never regretting it even in defeat, unafraid of the blade or the saw—this is a middling newspaper; as for those where rumors are divorced from fact and one merely follows the crowd, they are beneath the likes of Kuai." [40]
In the long-term practice of revolution and construction, through his unremitting pursuit of the "superior newspaper," Zhou Enlai elevated news propaganda work—including the operation of newspapers and periodicals—from a purely professional category to the level of Party and state strategy. He impelled the Party’s news propaganda cause to consistently serve the overall interests of the Party and the state, achieving significant results. These important conclusions proposed by Zhou Enlai highly summarize his core concepts and specific requirements for news propaganda work from multiple dimensions—strategy and tactics, political propaganda, fundamental stance, and the art of struggle. They clearly demonstrate his systematic thinking and strategic foresight, exerting a profound influence on the theoretical construction and practical exploration of the Communist Party of China's news enterprise. The wisdom contained therein remains of great revelatory significance for us today as we perform the Party’s propaganda, ideological, and cultural work amidst complex domestic and international public opinion environments, assisting in the comprehensive advancement of building a strong country and the great cause of national rejuvenation through Chinese-path modernization.