Rong Weimu: A Discussion with the Author of "China Needs to Rewrite the History of the War of Resistance"

As early as the 60th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression, an article titled "China Needs to Rewrite the History of the War of Resistance" caught public attention and has continued to circulate to this day. I would like to share my own insights regarding why the history of the War of Resistance should be rewritten and how it should be done.

Let us first address the first question: why rewrite the history of the War of Resistance. I agree with the author's point that we must not forget those who contributed to the War of Resistance, even though the author only mentioned Kuomintang (KMT) ^[1] generals. This is indeed a reason for rewriting the history of the war. However, the actual situation is that from the 1980s to the present, a large number of works have truthfully described the anti-Japanese deeds of KMT officers and soldiers. It is particularly worth mentioning that on September 3, 2005, then-President Hu Jintao, in his speech at the rally commemorating the 60th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, explicitly affirmed the positive contributions of the KMT military to the war effort. The assembly awarded commemorative medals to veterans who participated in the war, and KMT anti-Japanese fighters of that era enjoyed the same high honors. Since then, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has clearly stipulated that KMT veterans who participated in the war are eligible for pensions. Additionally, several important battlefield sites where KMT officers and soldiers fought heroically have been restored.

Since the issues that concerned the author have already been resolved, why the continued resentment? The article reveals the reason: he feels it is unjust to treat KMT generals who once fought the Japanese as war criminals. Here, the author confuses a fact: the War of Resistance Against Japanese Aggression and the Chinese Civil War were two wars of entirely different natures. From a macro-historical perspective, the War of Resistance was a national war against foreign aggression regardless of political party; the Chinese Civil War was a war between progressive and reactionary forces within China. In the former war, the Communist Party and the Kuomintang were comrades-in-arms; in the latter, they were adversaries. It is consistent with common practice to treat war adversaries as war criminals. While "victors are kings and the losers are bandits" ^[2] is indeed not a scientific standard for judging history, the author, while emphasizing one aspect, ignores another—namely, that progress triumphs over reaction. This is the fundamental law of historical development. Naturally, there are different interpretations of "progress" and "reaction," and this indeed involves a matter of standpoint. For instance, regarding the ten-year civil war after the collapse of the first KMT-CPC cooperation, the Communist Party calls it the "Land Revolutionary War period," while the Kuomintang calls it the "Period of Bandit Suppression"; regarding the three-year civil war after the collapse of the second cooperation, the Communist Party calls it the "Liberation War period," while the Kuomintang calls it the "Period of Rebellion Suppression." Looking at China today, there is clear evidence of who was right and who was wrong; even Li Zongren ^[3], who made significant contributions to the War of Resistance but was declared by the Communist Party as the "number two war criminal" second only to Chiang Kai-shek, attested through his later words and deeds to who represented progress.

The author has another fixation: that the Chinese government was too lenient toward Japanese war criminals, while KMT war criminals were not so lucky. In fact, the Chinese government's transformation of Japanese war criminals was highly successful; many released Japanese war criminals returned home to form the famous "Chukiren" ^[4], which played an important role in the struggle against the Japanese right wing. As for whether KMT war criminals were "lucky," one can easily find the answer by looking at their own memoirs. The author also uses the treatment of the Confederate Army after the American Civil War as a standard for humanitarian value judgments; in fact, even a slight understanding of the situation at Guantanamo would lead to the opposite conclusion. The author's resentment and fixations are clearly not valid reasons for rewriting the history of the War of Resistance.

Now to the second question: how to rewrite the history of the War of Resistance. From the perspective of the laws of historical research, the progress of historiography can only be driven by constantly examining and revising past research results with new perspectives, new historical materials, and new methods. The study of the history of the War of Resistance is no exception; rewriting is for the purpose of making it more objective and truthful, thereby encouraging people to judge history rationally and fairly and to summarize beneficial experiences and lessons. Therefore, I not only advocate for rewriting the history of the War of Resistance but also practice it myself. In fact, the crux of the problem is not whether to rewrite it, but how.

Regarding how to rewrite the history of the War of Resistance, the author offers no specific suggestions, but from his lamentations, two debatable issues can be summarized. These two issues have long received widespread attention.

First is the issue of anti-Japanese policy. The author suggests that we should view the Nationalist Government's policy choices after 1931 in a positive light. In short, after the September 18th Incident ^[5] occurred, under the circumstances of a strong enemy and a weak China, the Nationalist Government's adoption of a policy of non-resistance was a rational choice, and did not mean it had abandoned preparations for resistance. It should be acknowledged that after the September 18th Incident, and especially after the January 28th Incident ^[6], the Nationalist Government did indeed begin preparations for war. However, the author ignores an important fact: in the face of Japanese aggression, the dominant policy of the KMT leadership headed by Chiang Kai-shek was "internal pacification before external resistance" (攘外必先安内). What was "internal pacification"? Simply put, it meant "suppressing the Communists" and eliminating other dissidents. Such a policy not only failed to facilitate the formation of a resistance front but also greatly undermined the national cohesion required for resistance. Although KMT forces engaged in some anti-Japanese military actions before the July 7th Incident ^[7], their main forces were used for "internal pacification." This practice violated the collective interests of the nation and thus met with opposition from the majority of the nation's people. The occurrence of the Liangguang Incident ^[8] and the Xi'an Incident ^[9] demonstrated that the policy of "internal pacification before external resistance" was untenable. Ultimately, under pressure from the people across the country, Chiang Kai-shek had no choice but to change course and cooperate with the Communist Party of China (CPC), making preparations for resistance by gathering all anti-Japanese forces. In fact, even by the time of the July 7th Incident, the disparity between a strong Japan and a weak China had not changed; what had changed was the internal situation of resistance within China.

Second is the issue of anti-Japanese military strategy. China's War of Resistance consisted of the "Frontal Battlefield" led by the Kuomintang and the "Enemy Rear Battlefield" led by the Communist Party. Which battlefield played a greater role has always been a hot topic, and the article specifically addresses it. I agree with the author's point that the victory of the Battle of Changsha is just as worthy of commemoration as the Great Victory at Pingxingguan ^[10]. Broadly speaking, I believe the merits of both battlefields must be affirmed. Even regarding how to evaluate the retreats on the Frontal Battlefield—if we set aside specific campaigns (such as the Henan-Hunan-Guangxi Campaign)—I agree with the author that under conditions where the enemy is strong and we are weak, advances and retreats are unavoidable. However, when the author immediately follows this by pointedly stating that "only an army that avoids major battles will not suffer a rout, but instead will continuously grow stronger," it is not only unfair but also contradicts the facts. First, the Communist armies never avoided major battles; for instance, in the early stages of the war, they actively participated in the Battle of Taiyuan and were commended by the Nationalist Government for their performance. Second, during the most difficult period of China's War of Resistance, the Eighth Route Army made significant sacrifices to launch the Hundred Regiments Offensive ^[11] to actively coordinate with the Frontal Battlefield. Third, the Communist forces did grow stronger, but this was not "growing in isolation" (坐大); rather, it was the result of extensively mobilizing the masses of the people to participate in the war of national liberation. Furthermore, by creating a "vast ocean of people's war" in the Enemy Rear Battlefield through guerrilla warfare, their strategic role was by no means inferior to the large-scale campaigns of the Frontal Battlefield. My view is that although the two battlefields differed in the scale and form of combat, they shared an important relationship of interdependence. In different periods, the magnitude of their roles varied, but both made vital contributions to the final victory of the Chinese nation. If we are to rewrite the history of the War of Resistance, we cannot emphasize one aspect while ignoring the other.

The author uses hyperbolic techniques to describe isolated fragments while stripping away the logical connections between those fragments, deviating from the standpoint of historical materialism. In rewriting the history of the War of Resistance, we must prevent such phenomena from occurring.